Article VIII: Judicial Department

Section 1. Judicial Power

Definition and Scope

1. Marbury v. Madison – Cranch 137 [1803]
Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson
took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act 1801, which
created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment
of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his
successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the
peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they were not valid until their
commissions were delivered by Secretary of State John Marshall.

William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but
his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three
other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the
delivery of the commissions.

Ruling: The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. A court may declare an act of
Congress void if it is inconsistent with the Constitution.

2. Santiago v. Baustista – 32 SCRA 188 [1970]

The Petitioner Santiago was a pupil and graduating elementary student. Before his
graduation, his school created a “Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor” which
was composed of mostly teachers from the school and the principal. This committee was
made to select the students that will graduate with honor. After the deliberation of the said
committee awarded the Petitioner as the third honors. Due to dissatisfaction, the parents of
the Petitioner sought of the invalidation of the ranking of honors made by the said
committee. The lower courts ruled against the Petitioner. Thus, this action for certiorari.

Ruling: Committee on the ratings of students for honor whose actions in proclaiming the
honor students of a graduating class are questioned, is not the “tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions” against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section
1 of Rule 65

3. Radiowealth v. Agregado – 86 Phil. 429 [1950]

A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Php 585 and installed
in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the SC. The Chairman
of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President) disapproved of the
purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases.
Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however, the
Auditor of theSC refused to countersign the warrant for payment
 Ruling: All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is independent from the
other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special functions.
Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to preserve
their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of
justice.

4. In re Laureta – 148 SCRA 382 [1987]

Marravilla Illustre wrote to the Justices of the Supreme Court complaining about the
dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution.
Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by
the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is
far from finished by a long shot.”

Ruling: Supreme Court resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the
government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the Supreme Court
decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

5. In re Borromeo – 241 SCRA 405 [1995]

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has been instituting
and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors
supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. He sued, as well, the
public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or
order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the
notices thereof before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling: Judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other
agency, branch, department or official of Government.

6. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice – GR 132601, January 19, 1999

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Ruling: The finality of a judgment does not mean the Court has lost all its powers over the
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify, or alter the same. The court still has jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The
power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
Supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.

7. Planters v. Fertiphil – 548 SCRA 485 [2008]

 Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. Then President Ferdinand
Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465. Pursuant to the LOI,
Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market. With the return
of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC
in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of
due process of law. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Fertiphil declaring said LOI
unconstitutional and order for the satisfaction of collection of sum of money against PPI.

PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It
asserts that the constitutionality of the LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint
for collection. Alternatively, the resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for
a determination of the complaint for collection.

Ruling: It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree or an executive order. Judicial review of official acts on the ground of
unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by
courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief.

8. RE: Letter to UP Law Faculty…, A.M. No. 10-10-4-C, June 7, 2011

Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. 37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty
of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Ruling: The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

9. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary - 677 SCRA 408 [2012]
In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions
to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).

Petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create
the IAD-ODESLA and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with
 quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create
a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative
agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman.

Ruling: The creation of IAD-ODESLA is within President's continuing authority to

reorganize the Office of the President. Such entity is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.

Limits
10. Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transit Co. 57 Phil. 60 [1932-1933]
The Manila Electric Corporation (MERALCO), asked the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to
be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies.

Ruling: The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise
any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions.

11. Noblejas v. Teehankee – 23 SCRA 405 [1968]

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. He approved a subdivision plan
covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of
Justice, Teehankee, asked Noblejas to explain but he refused. He stated that since he has a
rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be
investigated only by the Supreme Court. Later, he was suspended by the Executive
Secretary. Thus, Noblejas filed this case to question the jurisdiction of the Executive
Secretary over him.

Ruling: There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary
with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that
they are judicial in character.

12. Erdito Quarto v. Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al., GR 169042, 05

October 2011
Petitioner Cuarto assails Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to private respondents, resulting
in the respondents’ exclusion from the criminal informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents,
and to compel the Ombudsman to include them as accused in the informations for estafa
through falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019.

Ruling: The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative

prerogative. The exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and to
provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons
 from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the solution
and prosecution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact. This is beyond
the ambit of the Supreme Court.

Principle of Judicial Restraint

13. Francisco Jr v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee.
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Should the Courte xercise judicial restraint on the ground that matters
relating to impeachment are lodged before the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.?

Ruling: The Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review
over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. The exercise of judicial restraint over
justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is
no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

14. PCGG v. Desierto, GR 132120 , Feb. 10, 2003
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), herein petitioner, charged
Disini with bribing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos as a means to induce him to
assist and favor individuals and corporate entities which was dismissed on the ground that
there exist no probable cause. After Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino took over the Presidency of
the Republic, petitioner filed the previously mentioned charges against Disini before the
Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated, dismissed the charges. Hence, the
instant Petition.

Ruling: It must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. No grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

15. Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. On June 15,
2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty
for violation of Section 12. , respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the RTC, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.
 Ruling: As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility;
it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

16. Domingo v. Scheer – 421 SCRA 468 [2004]

Respondent was granted a permanent residence status card by the Bureau of Immigration
and deportation. The BID received information that Scheer was wanted by the German
Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him. The BID obtained
custody of Scheer for deportation proceeding.

Scheer has filed a petition for certiorari questioning the legal standing of the immigration
commissioner contending that the commissioner has no authority to decide whether an
alien may stay or not and alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature,
unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The RTC rendered a judgment annulling the
summary deportation proceedings period.

Ruling: Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of
Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the
legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution.

17. Presidential Ad Hoc v. Desierto – 548 SCRA 295 [2008]

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). Several loan accounts were
referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan transactions between now
Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint3 for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned
Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI.

The Ombudsman issued the assailed Memorandum, finding that there was no probable
cause to warrant the filing of the instant case in court. Petitioner alleges that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had prescribed;
(ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws;
and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for violation under Section
3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
 Ruling: As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power,
exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence
or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

18. Reyes v. Belisario – 596 SCRA 31 [2009]

Respodents are all officers of Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) who filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against LWUA Administrator
Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. (petitioner) for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. An administrative complaint was filed
thereafter questioning the authority of Reyes under the law in the issuabce of reassignment
order against the respondents. The ombudsman desisted from ruling on the validity of the
respondents’ reassignments, acknowledging the primary jurisdiction of the CSC.

The respondents challenged the Ombudman’s rulings before the CA based on grave abused
of discretion.

Ruling: By statute and regulation, a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent
of the administrative charge is final and unappealable. Findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.

19. Eloisa L. Tolentino v. Atty. Roy M. Loyola, et al., GR 153809, 27 July 2011
On November 9, 1999, the petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents
with Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents
and, administratively, for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Falsification of Official Documents.

Said complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman Desierto and was appealed before the
CA questioning the said resolution. CA still affirmed OMB’s decision.

Ruling: Elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and
weight, especially when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is
grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly
be made.

Advisory Opinions
20. Channie Tan v. Republic, 107 PHIL 632
The Solicitor General seeks a review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebú,
in this naturalization case, declaring that petitioner Danilo Channie Tan, alias Tan Suy
Chan, is a citizen of the Philippines and accordingly, dismissing his petition for
naturalization as such citizen.

Ruling: Under the Philippine laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of
 justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a
controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

21. Santiago, Jr v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188

The Petitioner Santiago was a pupil and graduating elementary student. Before his
graduation, his school created a “Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor” which
was composed of mostly teachers from the school and the principal. This committee was
made to select the students that will graduate with honor. After the deliberation of the said
committee awarded the Petitioner as the third honors. Due to dissatisfaction, the parents of
the Petitioner sought of the invalidation of the ranking of honors made by the said
committee.

Ruling: The Court refused to review the matter. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special
civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.

But even to allow the Court to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did,
that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, the Court are inclined
to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply
with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court’s holding that
appellant’s failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject
thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto
“is fatal to his cause”

22. Felipe v. Leuterio, 91 PHIL 482

In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of
five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma
asked the court of first instance of that province to reverse the award, alleging that one of
the judges had fallen error in grading her performance. After a hearing, the court declared
Emma winner of the first place.

Ruling: The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that
contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and
similar competitions.

23. Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio – 33 SCRA 494 [1970]

Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the
Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the
Executive Secretary.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the Regional Trial Court denied. The Court of
Appeals also denied it. But the Court of Appeals made a recommendation that Ang may be
allowed to leave the country on the first available transportation abroad.
 Ruling: Recommendatory powers of the Court are granted only by law. Thus, the Courts
cannot recommend or rule on matters involving political questions.

Justiciable Controversy
24. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 134
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath. The National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

Private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the
Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. Citing among others the earlier resolution
of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The
Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

Ruling: The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly.

25. US v. Nixon- 418 US 683 [1974]

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides
in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants
sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted
that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right
to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential
communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided
together with Nixon v. United States.

Ruling: The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a
limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference
to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice."
Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents.
Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

26. Marcos v. Manglapus – 177 SCRA 668 [1989]

 Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three-year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order
the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines on the ground that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
"within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case
involves a political question which is non-justiciable.

Ruling: Given the expanded jurisdiction of the SC, it no longer cowers behind the political
question doctrine save for certain undeniable situations such as recognition of states or the
grant of pardons. The SC, in the face of the present controversy, has the duty of ascertaining
whether or not the Executive goes beyond the power vested by the Constitution.

27. Daza v, Singson – 180 SCRA 496 [1989]

The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties
represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HoR.
24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17
members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation
in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed
LDP. Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the
assumption of his seat by the Singson amd contended that he cannot be removed from the
CoA because his election thereto is permanent.

Ruling: The issue presented is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality
and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within the powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon the SC by ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1, of the Constitution, which includes
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

28. Garcia v. BOI – 191 SCRA 288 [1990]

FACTS: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for the
transfer of its proposed plant site from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of the plant’s
feedstock or fuel

RULING: The Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, may review and annul executive
as well as legislative actions when they clash with the Constitution or with existing laws,
 but, the Court may not do more than that. It may not make the decisions that the executive
should have made nor pass the laws that the legislature should have passed

29. Djumantan v. Domingo – 240 SCRA 746 [1995]

FACTS: The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to
petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws
of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since
she was an Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.

RULING: Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 provides for the rule on settling judicial controversy.
In this case, the Court held that there is no need to resolve the validity of petitioner's
marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an
"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Courts may review
deportation proceedings

30. Mariano v. COMELEC – 242 SCRA 211 [1995]

FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). RA 7854 is said to be
unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special

RULING: Nachura: It was held that a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review,
because it creates no rights and imposes no duties enforceable by the courts. The petition
to declare RA 7854 (converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City)
as unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was premised on many contingent events the
happening of which was uncertain; petitioner, thus, posed a hypothetical issue which had
not yet ripened into an actual case or controversy

31. PPI v COMELEC -224 SCRA 272

FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to
provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI),
a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court
to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772

RULING: the Court noted that PPI failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the
part of the Comelec designed to enforce or implement Sec. 8, Res. No. 2772; thus, the case
was deemed not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy.

32. SBMA v. COMELEC – 262 SCRA 492 [1996]

FACTS: Congress enacted RA. 7227(The Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence. Respondents Garcia filed a Petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
to annul the same. Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a
 "Calendar of Activities for local referendum. SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848

RULING: Courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However,
it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter.

33. Tanada v. Angara – 272 SCRA 18 [1997]

FACTS: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers,
taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the
growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy.

RULING: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

34. Arroyo v. De Venecia -277 SCRA 268 [1997]

FACTS: Petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum.

RULING: The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of

the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The rule is that courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which
a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction"
so as to call for the exercise of our judicial power.

35. CIR v. Santos – 277 SCRA 617 [1997]

FACTS: The Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions
of the NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that
present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry
manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries.

RULING: Considering the allegations of fact in the petition which were duly proven
during the trial, the Court holds that the petition states a cause of action and there exists a
justiciable controversy between the parties which would require determination of
constitutionality of the laws imposing excise tax and customs duty on jewelry
36. Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio – 278 SCRA 769[1997]
FACTS: Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion in refusing to find
that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING: While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's
action when there is an abuse of discretion. The Court ruled that the respondent
Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding against the filing of the
information against public respondents of the Office of the City Prosecutor.

37. Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, GR 134577, November 18, 1997

FACTS:, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original
petition for quo seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader
of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

RULING: The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these
members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations.

38. Tatad v. DOE – 281 SCRA 330 [1997]

FACTS: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180
entitled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” They aver that
deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it
cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court.

RULING: The statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are
assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because
the law lacks wisdom. Petitioner were also able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people thus, there is a need of the power to review in this case.

39. Telecom v. COMELEC - 289 SCRA 337 [1998]

FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
It contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

RULING: No. The petitioner, an association of lawyers of radio and television broadcast
companies, was not a proper party, because the members of petitioner have not shown that
they have suffered any injury as a result of Sec. 92, B.P. 881. They do not have any interest
as registered voters, because the case does not involve the right of suffrage.

40. Miranda v. Aguirre – GR 133064, September 16, 1999

FACTS: RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela,
 into an independent component city and was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. Later, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit
the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

RULING: Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a
political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether
or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional. Petitioners are directly affected in
the implementation of RA No. 8528 as they were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago

41. Cutaran v. DENR – 350 SCRA 697 [2001]

FACTS: Cutaran et. al, assails the validity of DENR Special Order 31 for being issued
without prior legislative authority. SO 31 is the “Creation of a Special Task force on
acceptance, identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims
nationwide.” Relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral
Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation.
These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the said SO, the heirs of Cervantes filed
application for CALC for some portions of the lands in Camp- John Hay Reservation,
overlapping some of the land occupied by the petitioners.

RULING: The courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there
has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on
the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of
petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of
Carantes.

42. Estrada v. Desierto – GR 146740-15, March 2, 2001 and MR April 3, 2001

FACTS: Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.

RULING: While the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the
1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, the
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

43. Cawaling v. COMELEC – GR 146319, October 23, 2001

FACTS: Former Pres. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating the City
of Sorsogon by Merging The Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of
Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds therefor." Invoking his right as a resident and
taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment
 of the plebiscite on the grounds that the plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
day period from the approval of R.A. 8806.

RULING: There is no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of
Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. Judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of
judicial power, Courts are allowed only to settle actual controversies may not annul an act
of the political departments simply because they feel it is unwise or impractical.

44. Montesclaros v. COMELEC – GR 152295, July 9, 2002

FACTS: Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed a petition as a taxpayers and class suit,
on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths. Petitioners claim that they are in danger
of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections
on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date.

RULING: Petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining the suit, that
the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any
provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
45. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR 119775, October 24, 2003
FACTS: Proclamation No. 420 was issued by President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp
John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within
the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation.

RULING: The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on
the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a
recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in
its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged.

46. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28, 2004

FACTS: SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote
for a specified candidate.

RULING: The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable
controversy because it stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the
people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the
latter. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal
right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents
 47. Panganiban v. Philippine Shell, GR 131471, Jan. 22, 2003
FACTS: Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with
respondent. Through the SLDA, private respondent subleased to petitioner a gasoline
station located at Caloocan City. Private respondent is not the owner of the lot subject of
the sublease but was only leasing the lot from its owner, Serafin Vasquez. In a letter, private
respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring. Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief but respondent, instead of filing an answer, filed a case for unlawful
detainer case.

RULING: No. The action for declaratory relief was not yet submitted for resolution when
private respondent filed the action for unlawful detainer. The "abuse" feared by petitioner
does not apply in this case and yet, petitioner urges us to reevaluate the applicability of a
doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. This, the Court cannot do. We can only rule
upon actual controversies, not on scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit her interest.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

48. SMART v. NTC, GR 151908, August 12, 2003
FACTS: The National Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars
on the billing of telecommunications services and on measures in minimizing, if not
eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla Communications Co., Inc.
(IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration
of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate
the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum circulars.

RULING: No. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality
and validity of the said issuances. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where
the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in
cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency
of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.

49. Buac v. COMELEC – 421 SCRA 92

FACTS: COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig on the conversion of its
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) declared the “No” votes won. Buac filed a filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action
involving the conduct of a plebiscite.

RULING: It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2 (1), Article IX
(C) of the Constitution authorizing it to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
 relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Thus,
the Court directed the COMELEC to reinstate the petition to annul the results of the 1998
Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without delay.

50. Information Technology v. COMELEC -460 SCRA 291

FACTS: Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004
elections. It resolved to conduct biddings. Five individuals and entities (including the
herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines protested the
award of the Contract to Respondent MPC which did not even participate in the bidding
and that MPC therein did not comply with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements.

RULING: The Court ruled that it is ripe for judicial review because it was inherently
impossible for petitioners to resort to the appeal in th Comelec because comelec en banc
had already awarded it to MPC. The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.
serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the
decision of the poll body to award the Contract.

51. Senate v. Ermita, GR 169659, April 20, 2006

FACTS: The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate. Before said date arrived,
Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten
the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

RULING: The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her
consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining
the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned. For EO 464
does not require either a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition
issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

52. Garcia v. Executive Secretary – 583 SCRA 119 [2009]

FACTS: For the second time, petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (petitioner Garcia) asks the
Court to examine the constitutionality of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8479 otherwise
known as the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998 through this petition for certiorari. He raises
once again the propriety of implementing full deregulation by removing the system of price
controls in the local downstream oil.

RULING: The Court declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are
non-justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial review.
The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is
a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending
the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.

Distinguish from Declaration Relief

 53. Macasiano v. NHA – 224 SCRA 236 [1993]
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44
of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992. The Solicitor General contends that there is no actual case or controversy, that the
petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to
question the Act as he does not state that he has property being squatted upon and that there
is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented.

RULING: Constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts
unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary
to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota
presented. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.

54. Tano v. Socrates – 278 SCRA 154 [1997]

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning
the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City. The second set of
petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners, all of whom, except the Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen. Both filed a case questioning
the constitutionality of the said ordinance
RULING: As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for
DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a
nullity for being unconstitutional. As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court
is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved, it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate
jurisdiction over such petitions

Conclusive Character of Supreme Court Judgment

55. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum dated Jan. 11, 2011 – 614 SCRA 1
The Philippine Supreme Court reiterated he following basic doctrines:

1. The Court held that under the ruling in In re Wenceslao Laureta and Alzua v. Arnalot, a
criminal complaint for violation of sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT), “Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions”, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme
Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of the
Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The Constitution
 provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if
they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Only after removal can they be
criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and
for their official acts do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and
their liabilities therefor, are as defined in the above rulings.

2. The Court also found that the Lozanos also brazenly misquoted and misused applicable
constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired Justices. Citing sec. 4(3),
Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Court stressed that cases or matters heard by a division
can be decided or resolved with the concurrence of at least three members of a division.

3. “In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of plain and simple
errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain disregard, misuse,
and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that
reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the Philippine Bar,” the Court said.

Plenary Judicial Power; Derivative; PET

56. Macalintal v. PET – 635 SCRA 783 [2010]
FACTS: The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s
decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent
PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional.

RULING: Although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is
not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision

57. Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR No. 171101, November 22, 2011

FACTS: CARP law RA 6657 was passed. One of the lands covered by this law is the
Hacienda Luisita which was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TADECO). The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP
compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer.

RULING: The intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA 6657,

Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21,
1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter. Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case.

58. Sana v. CESB, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011

FACTS: Atty. Sana filed a petition assailing EO 883, which granted Career Executive
Service Officer (CESO) rank to eligible lawyers in the Executive Department. However,
President Aquino issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883 and other issuances in conflict
 with EO 3 on the ground that EO 883 encroaches upon the power of the CESB to
promulgate rules on the selection, classification, compensation, and career development of
members of the Career Executive Service vested by the law with the CESB.

RULING: To pass upon the validity of EO 883 would be to transgress the requirement of
case and controversy as precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review. The SC
also ruled that Atty. Sana himself does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right
vested in him under EO 883.

59. Madrigal v. DOJ GR No. 168903, 726 SCRA 544, June 18, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner is the president of Madrigal Transport, Inc. (MTI). Respondent Palma
is the vice-president of Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), while respondent
Chua is an account officer of FEBTC. Petitioner filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila a Complaint charging respondent Palma with the crime of estafa. Respondent
Chua was named as additional respondent. DOJ Secretary Tuquero issued a
Resolution upholding the Resolution of the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. Subsequently, a
Resolution by then Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez (Usec. Gutierrez) reversed and
set aside the Resolution made by Sec. Tuquro.

RULING: Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary
of Justice, save only when it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, we find no abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion,
on the part of the Secretary of Justice, [acting through Usec. Gutierrez], as to warrant a
reversal of the CA Decision.

60. Torrecampo v. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482

FACTS: Torrecampo alleged that if the MWSS and the DPWH are allowed to continue
and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project three aqueducts of the MWSS. Atty. Alberto
C. Agra for respondent MWSS finds as premature the filing of the petition for injunction
as there is yet no road expansion project to be implemented.

RULING: Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter

outside this Court’s jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary
certiorari power. In this case, the determination of where, as between two possible routes,
to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of this Court.

Sec. 2. Power of Legislative Apportion Jurisdiction

61. Mantruste Systems v. CA -179 SCRA 136 [1989]
FACTS: MSI entered into a 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza
Hotel. The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under
Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization
Trust (ATP). The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement.
MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, they have acquired preference in
buying the property. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were
 awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a complaint with
injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders.

RULING: Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an
injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. There can be
no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except
when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or
acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

62. Malaga v. Penachos – 213 SCRA 516 [1992]

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication of the Western Visayas Daily an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF The
petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept their application for bid resulting to their non-inclusion
in the list of pre-qualified bidders.

RULING: ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There
are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by
the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of
the project.

63. Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

PRC issued Resolution No. 105 which provides that no examinee shall attend or receive
tips, review materials or etc. from any review centers, reviewer, lecturer and so on. Hence,
a petition for injunction was filed against PRC before the RTC. PRC filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution.

RULING: RTC has jurisdiction. Orders or resolutions of the PRC fall within the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. There is no provision in Presidential Decree No.
223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions
of the Commission are appealable only either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court. Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of
general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority. But where
there is silence, the general rule applies.

Sec. 3 Fiscal Autonomy

64. Radiowealth v. Agregado – 86 Phil. 429 [1950]
This involves a purchase of Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker to be
installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme
Court. This was certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Chairman of the Property
Requisition Committee disapproved of the purchase and its installation. Petitioner, the
 vendor, is now requesting that the payment be approved. However, the Auditor of the SC
refused to countersign the warrant for payment.

RULING: The SC has authority to purchase. The prerogatives of the Supreme Court which
the Constitution secures against interference includes not only the powers to adjudicate
causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for administration of justice. It is within
its power, free from encroachment by the executive, to acquire books and other office
equipment reasonably needed to the convenient transaction of its business.

65. Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297. However, President Aquino vetoed the said bill.

RULING: Invalid veto! The Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law and the Executive cannot control such by using the
Presidential Veto power.

66. In re clarifying and strengthening the Philippine Judicial Academy – 481 SCRA 1
In the Resolution of the Court promulgated on Feb. 24, 2004, the positions of the SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades 25 and
23 were created in certain Divisions of the PHILJA. However, in its Notice of
Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA), the DBM downgraded said
positions and their corresponding salary grades.

RULING: DBM has no authority to downgrade. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control. In downgrading the positions and salary of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer
and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the Court’s fiscal autonomy and supervision of court
personnel as enshrined in the Constitution, in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself.

67. RE: Petition for the recognition of the exemption of GSIS, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0,
February 11, 2010
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs. It avers
that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the
GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all
kinds under Section 39 of RA 8291. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize
its exemption from payment of legal fees.

RULING: Not exempted. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS
from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court’s independence—fiscal autonomy. Legal fees do not only constitute
a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of
the Court’s fiscal independence.
 68. In re COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of Properties -678 SCRA 1
[2012]
COA found that an underpayment amounting to 221,121.5 pesos resulted when five retired
Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. This underpayment was
attributed to the erroneous appraisal of the value of the property involved using the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines.

The Court advised the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG
formula.

RULING: COA cannot interfere. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy
and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s
own affairs.

Sec. 4. Composition; En Banc and Division Cases

Filling-in Vacancy in Supreme Court; 90 days

69. De Castro v. JBC – 615 SCRA 666 [2010]
Due to the compulsory retirement of Justice Puno just days before the presidential
elections, there is a need to fill in the vacancy. One of the major contention of the
Petitioners and Movants is that the prohibition in Article VI, Section 15 “that no
appointments may be made 2mos before the next presidential elections”, does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. However, under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a
“list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”

RULING: The President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno. The Prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Referral to En Banc; Par. 3; Case Only; Modification of Doctrine

70. Fortich v. Corona – GR 131457, August 19, 1997
This involves the conversion of a 144 hectares agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidno to an
agro-industrial land by the municipality of Sumilao. President acceded to the conversion
 only with respect to the 44 hectares and distributed the 100 hectares to the farmers. The
respondents then filed an MR, but there was “no result” because the justices voted 2-2 in
resolving such MR.

Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc. The SC said
that the resolution of the MR cannot be referred to the Court en banc because of the
difference between “CASES” and “MATTERS.” CASES are to be DECIDED, while
MATTERS are to be RESOLVED. An example of a MATTER is a motion for
reconsideration, such as the one in this case. Only CASES which do not obtain the required
number of votes are required to be elevated en banc.

RULING: SC is correct. If a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the
necessary vote for its reconsideration.

71. People v. Dy, GR 115326-37, Jan. 16, 2003

Accused-appellants filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court
Division’s decision which affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Baguio City, finding them
guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Dy contends that the decision should have been merely recommendatory, because it is the
Supreme Court sitting en banc which has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher and not the SC division.

RULING: Incorrect. Actions considered in any of the divisions and decisions rendered
are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. Decisions or resolutions of a division of the court are
not inferior to an en banc decision.

72. People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept 29, 2004

Appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this Court of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer
the death penalty. The PAO moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court lacked
a quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the Decision was signed only by
seven (7) justices in a 14-member Court. The accused now raises the issue whether the
votes of only seven Justices of the Court sitting en banc can validly impose the death
penalty and whether there is a need for a quorum when it sits en banc.

RULING: Since it was a capital criminal case, the Court said that there should be eight.
In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused.

73. Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000

A motion was filed by petitioner Republic to refer to the Court en banc the motions for
reconsideration of the consolidated decision rendered by the RTC affecting the validity of
titles of 99 hectares of land adjudicated to private individuals. It was alleged that the
 decision failed to state the classification of the subject lands, claimed by the government,
and that the court has no jurisdiction.

The first motion was denied by the division in a vote of 4-1, while the motion for
reconsideration was unacted upon.

RULING: The MR may be heard en banc. It bears stressing that where, as in the present
cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair
justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration.

74. Republic v. Garcia – 527 SCRA 495 [2007]

Petitioner filed against respondent a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties. The Republic contends that it is exempted from filing the attachment bond by
invoking the ruling in Tolentino v. Carlo. That case was decided under the old Code of
Civil Procedure enacted more than a century ago. Sandiganbayan still ordered petitioner to
post the necessary bond.

RULING: Sandiganbayan is wrong! In Tolentino, this Court declared that the State as
represented by the government is exempt from filing an attachment bond on the theory that
it is always solvent. The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a
decision in violation of this constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction.

75. Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
GR 164195, 05 April 2011.
The dispute was caused by the failure of the parties to agree on a price regarding the sale
of property by petitioners to the government. A case was filed before the RTC to determine
just compensation which ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondent however filed for a
motion for reconsideration to which the court partially granted by deleting the attorney’s
fees and interest of petitioner. Entry of judgment was issued. Petitioner then filed a 2 nd
motion for reconsideration to the SC en banc which was granted. Hence, this 2nd motion
for reconsideration by the respondent. Respondent contends that the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment cannot be despite transcendental importance of the case
at bar.

RULING: Respondent is wrong. The doctrine “transcendental importance” is justified in

negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. More than the stability of our
jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because
of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government
has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century. From this perspective, the court
demonstrated that the higher interests of justice are duly served.
 76. In re; Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Re: G.R. No. 178083 – Flight Attendant
and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc
(PAL), et al., A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, 13 March 2012

The Court’s Third Division granted the petition for review filed by Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) by declaring PAL guilty of illegal
dismissal. PAL filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied. A 2nd motion for
reconsideration and was raffled to Justice Brion of the 2nd Division which was denied again
on September 7, 2011.

The contention was that the decision on September 7, 2011 ruling was void for raffling
the case to Justice Brion who did not participate in ruling on the merits of the original
Decision or of the subsequent resolution

RULING: True. The raffle should have been confined among the Members who actually
participated in ruling on the merits of the original Decision or of the subsequent
Resolution. At that point, only Justices Peralta and Bersamin were left because all the other
Members of the original ruling groups had retired.

Sec. 5. Powers of Supreme Court

Judicial Review
Requisites
77. Macasiano v. NHA – 224 SCRA 236 [1993]
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of
Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and his being a taxpayer.

RULING: No judicial review. There is no actual controversy and petitioner is not likewise
a "proper party." The consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner
has not manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof. Moreover, although the
petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not
mean, however, that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked this Court
is left with no alternative except to hear the parties.

78. Liban v. Gordon – 639 SCRA 709 [2011]

Petitioner allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate. Respondent
claims that there is no violation since PNRC is not a government office or an office in a GOCC
but a private corporation pursuant to its charter which is R.A. 95. Hence, the constitutionality
of said charter is being questioned.

However, respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the
issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not
the lis mota of the case.
 RULING: The Court cannot exercise judicial review. It has been consistently held in
Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of
constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case. In the case at bar, the constitutionality
of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such, the Court should not have
declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional.

Administrative Agencies; No Power

79. Serrano v. Gallant – 582 SCRA 254 [2009]
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving
only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three
days. Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of
RA 8042.

Serrano then questioned the constitutionality of RA 8042. Respondents contend that the
constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by
petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when
he filed an appeal before the NLRC.

RULING: The constitutional challenge is timely. Records disclose that the issue on the
constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner’s appeal with the
NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, and reiterated
in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Nonetheless, seasonably raised because it is
not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional the issue
is deemed issue.

First: Ripe for Adjudication

80. PACU v. Secretary of Education – 97 Phil. 806 [1955]
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706
be declared unconstitutional.
The law sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is also
provided that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a
person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by
private schools and the right to withdraw permits.
RULING: No justiciable controversy. The power of courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is
insufficient. However, mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the
law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.

81. Tan v. Macapagal – 43 SCRA 678 [1972]

 A five-page petition was filed by petitioners for declaratory relief as taxpayers, and
allegedly suing in behalf of the Filipino people. The petition assails the validity of a
resolution called the “Laurel-Leido resolution”, dealing with the range of authority of the
1971 Constitutional Convention. Petitioners would like this court to declare that the
Convention is without power to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise
the then 1935 Constitution.

RULING: No standing. The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing
on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.

82. Solicitor General v. MMDA – GR 102782, December 18, 1991

Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

The Solicitor General expressed the view that the said ordinance violated PD 1605 which
does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

RULING: The rule that the Court will not decide a question of law when there is no actual
case or controversy is not an absolute rule. Like all procedural rules exceptions to it may
be dictated when, for instance, lack of clarity may be creating a great of confusion
detrimental to public order, as in this case, the case of the confiscation of license plates and
driver’s licenses for traffic violation.
The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow either the removal of the license
plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila.

83. Militante v. CA, GR 107040, April 12, 2000

Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land in
Caloocan City. In 1975, President Marcos issued PD No. 1315 expropriating forty (40)
hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City which includes a portion of petitioner’s
land. Said PD is being claimed by petitioner as unconstitutional.

RULING: The facts reveal that petitioners land is not in clear danger of expropriation.
P.D. No. 1315 was issued way back in 1975. Considering this long lapse of time, it is
doubtful if the government would still desire to expropriate petitioners lot which only
measures 1,590 sq. m.

84. Pimentel v. HRET – GR 14189, November 29, 2002

Senator Pimentel wrote two letters to the Chairman of Commission of Appointments and
the chairman of the HRET to reorganize both bodies in order to include party-list
representatives who did not win in the 1998 party-list eelctions. Petitioners later filed a
petition in the Supreme Court assailing that party-list representatives should have at least
1.2 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in CA. They assert that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on Senator Pimentel’s letter.
 RULING: The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have
not alleged that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the
HRET or the CA. Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-
list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not possess the personal
and substantial interest required to confer them with locus standi.

85. Constantino v. Cuisia – 472 SCRA 505

President Cory Aquino resorted to incurring foreign debts as solution to the country’s
problem. It gave the power to the Secretary of Finance and Central Bank Gorvernor Cuisia
to incur foreign debts.

RULING: SC may not exercise judicial review. The exercise of the power of judicial
review is merely to check—not supplant—the Executive, or to simply ascertain whether
he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

86. Senate v. Ermita 488 SCRA 1 [2006]

Senate invited various officials of the exec depts and AFP officials to attend the Senate
hearing. EO 464 was issued requiring consent first of the President. Hence, EO’s
constitutionality was raised by petitioners.

RULING: The Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct
interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes
their prerogatives as legislators.

87. David v. Arroyo – 489 SCRA 162 [2006]

FACTS: PGMA issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state
of national emergency. These consolidated petitions allege that in issuing PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. A week after, PGMA
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist and lifting PP 1017. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such
actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot and
academic by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.

RULING: The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if:
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and
 4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All these exceptions are present here.

88. Suplico v. NEDA – GR 178830, July 14, 2008

FACTS: The Philippine Government decided not to continue with the ZTE National
Broadband Network Project. That said, OSG assert that there is no more justiciable
controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve. Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo
that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot, the Supreme Court may
still take cognizance thereof.

RULING: Dismissed. Pontificating on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an

actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole; Judicial
power presupposes actual controversies; In the absence of actual justiciable controversies
or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues.

89. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Panel

FACTS: RP and MILF were scheduled to sign a MOA of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.

RULING: Ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

90. Lozano v. Nograles – 589 SCRA 356 [2009]

FACTS: The petitioners contend that the House Resolution No. 1109 contradicts the
procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the
same as the separate voting of the members of each House is deleted and substituted with
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress.

RULING: No power to review validity of HR No. 1109. This Court’s power of review is
limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal
claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.

91. Drilon v. De Venecia – 594 SCRA 749 [2009]

FACTS: Senator Madrigal of PDP-Laban claimed that the Senate contingent in the CA
violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. The Senator avers
that political parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in
the CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the
CA. Sen. Madrigal also filed the same petition before the Supreme Court.
 RULING: Petition before the SC not proper. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates
that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.
Senator Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

92. De Castro v. JBC – 615 SCRA 666 [2010]

FACTS: The Court directed the JBC to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President. Movants argue that constitution intended the ban on midnight appointments to
cover the members of the Judiciary.
RULING: It is ripe for adjudication for because the JBC’s suspension of its selection
process would constitute a violation of its duty under the Constitution to carry on with such
process until it is able to submit the desired list to the incumbent President.

93. LAMP v. Sec. of Budget and Management – 670 SCRA 373 [2012]
FACTS: According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the
Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects will
result in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds.
RULING: Not dismissed. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount
to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers.
This affords ripeness to the present controversy.

Second: Standing
Legislators and Government Officials
94. Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.- 191 SCRA 452 [1990]
FACTS: The senators assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto in the 1989 and 1990
Appropriations Bill. Gonzalez averred the following:
1. that he President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s
and does not cover provision/s
2. when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise
the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill.
3. the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers
4. the power of augmentation has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is
also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
RULING: A member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a
constitutional issue is raised.

95. Philconsa v. Enriquez- 235 SCRA 506 [1994]

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of GAA 1994 because it contains provision that
allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
 President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment
the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
RULING: A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a
presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress.

96. Del Mar v. PAGCOR, GR 138298, November 29, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. Petitioners filed a
petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating
the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on
the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from
the Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.

RULING: When a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, we

find and so hold that as members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal
standing to file the petitions at bar.

97. Sandoval v. PAGCOR- GR 138982, November 29, 2000

***Same case Del Mar vs. PAGCOR

98. Jaworski v. PAGCOR- 419 SCRA 420

FACTS: Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the
grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE to operate gambling on the internet be
nullified because it contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise.

RULING: Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may have
serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal
standing to file this petition.

99. SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, GR 159085, Feb. 3, 2004

FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.

In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
The petitioners in this case, among others, are member of HOR and Senate.

RULING: The declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an

exercise of Congress emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers legislative power.
Therefore, Members of Congress has legal standing to bring the suit.

100. Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387, Dec. 10, 2003

 FACTS: A petition was filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of The Fair
Election Act insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of The Omnibus Election Code. The
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives.

OSG alleged that, except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by
the majority of the members of the HOR, the petitioners have not shown that they have
suffered harm as a result of the passage of The Fair Election Act.

RULING: Have legal standing. Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. However, being merely a matter of
procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of overarching significance to our
society, had adopted a liberal stance on standing.

101. Province of Batangas v. Romulo- 429 SCRA 736 [2004]

FACTS: A petition was filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the GAA of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

The petitioner is the Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor,

Hermilando I. Mandanas.

ISSUE: whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit.
RULING: has legal standing. A local government unit (LGU), seeking relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs, pertaining to their
interest in their share in the national taxes or the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has
the requisite standing to bring suit.

102. Disomangcop v. Datumanong-444 SCRA 203 [2004]

FACTS: RA 8999 was passed establishing an engineering district in the first district of the
province of Lanao del Sur. Subsequently, DPWH Secretary issued Department Order No.
119 for Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office. Petitioners Disomangcop
and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as officers of the First
Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners allege that D.O.
119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the constitutional
autonomy of the ARMM.

RULING: The party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show
not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved.
 In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.

103. CHR- employees v. CHR- 444 SCRA 300 [2004]

FACTS: Petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests
that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees.
The respondent questioned the locus standi of CHREA, considering that it not a recognized
bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that
its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR.

RULING: Has locus standi. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.

104. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary- 462 SCRA 622

FACTS: The Philippines, through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine
Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute provisions, however, require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners
now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.
One of the petitioners is Senator Pimentel.

RULING: Sen Pimentel has locus standi. Legislators have the standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

105. Pimentel v. Ermita- 495 SCRA 170 [2006]

FACTS: The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
North Rail Project. Subsequently, the President issued E.O. 464. The petition proffer that
the President has abused such power by issuing E.O. 464. They thus pray for its declaration
as null and void for being unconstitutional.
The petitioners in this case, among other, are The Senate of the Philippines, Party-
list Representatives, and BAYAN MUNA.

RULING: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

106. Prov. Of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel- 564 SCRA 402 [2008]
FACTS: Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners,
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, City of Iligan and City of
Zamboanga and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela
and Municipality of Linamon, seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
 complete and official copies of the MOA-Ancestral Domain and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
Senator Manuel Roxas filed an intervention to the case as a member of the Senate.

RULING: An act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
LGUs have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they would
suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended
domain of the BJE.

107. Concepcion v. COMELEC- 591 SCRA 420 [2009]

FACTS: NAMFREL filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick
Count with the COMELEC. The present petitioner, then an incumbent Punong Barangay
of Barangay in Makati City, was one of the signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his
capacity as the National Chairman of NAMFREL.

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation conditionally

granting NAMFRELs petition subject to the condition that petitioner, the National
Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman
of said organization. NAMFREL did not question the COMELECs ruling.

The petitioner filed the present petition, ostensibly questioning the COMELECs
Resolution.

RULING: The petition it fatally defective. The defect lies in the petitioner’s personality to
file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in
which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question
the assailed resolution.

108. Drilon v. De Venecia- 594 SCRA 749 [2009]

FACTS: Senator Madrigal of PDP-Laban claimed that the Senate contingent in the CA
violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. The Senator avers
that political parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in
the CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the
CA. Sen. Madrigal also filed the same petition before the Supreme Court

RULING: Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of
the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party
PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal
and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.

109. Biraogo v. PTC- 637 SCRA 78 [2010]

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
 third-level public officers and employees, during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Petitioners, as incumbent members of the House of Representatives, asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional because violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

RULING: Have legal standing. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

Taxpayers
110. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works- 110 PHIL 331 [1960-1961]
FACTS: RA 920 (An act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953
containing an item for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder
road terminals within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta. The
provincial governor of Rizal, Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA
920, it being not for a public purpose.

RULING: the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised
by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.

111. Gonzales v. Marcos- 65 SCRA 624 [1975]

FACTS: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center
of the Philippines. It was alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the
private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million
guaranteed by the National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million
received from President Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds,
all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48
million.

RULING: No. The funds used came from donations and contributions not by taxation."
Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest."

112. Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835, August 14, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of
implementing them.
In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and
taxpayer.
 RULING: No legal standing. A taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is
an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.

113. Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, GR 159131, Jan. 13 2004.

FACTS: The COMELEC approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the subject
Contract not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard
of its own bidding rules and procedure. For the automation of the counting and canvassing
of the ballots in the 2004 elections, COMELEC awarded the Contract to Mega Pacific
Consortium an entity that had not participated in the bidding and had not met the eligibility
requirements.
Petitioners - suing in their capacities as taxpayers..

RULING: Has standing. The subject matter of this case is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest; in other words, it is of paramount public interest and
transcendental importance. This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal
standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves an issue of
overarching significance to our society. Petitioners legal standing should therefore be
recognized and upheld.

114. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary- 421 SCRA 656 [2004]

FACTS: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitions were filed challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 for violating provisions of the Constitution, specifically Sec 18,Art. VII.
Petitioners are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), Filipino
citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers.

RULING: That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not
necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained
of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such
illegal disbursement is alleged.

115. Velarde v. SJS- 428 SCRA 283 [2004]

FACTS: A petition for Declaratory Relief against Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE
was filed by SJS, a registered political party, which sought the interpretation of the
separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring
the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
SJS allege that it has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered
voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of
the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics.

RULING: No. In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that
taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.
116. Brillantes v. COMELEC- 432 SCRA 269 [2004]
FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) and acquire automated counting machines (ACMs).
A petition was filed by Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., a voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify
Resolution No. 6712 approved by the COMELEC En Banc captioned GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF
ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS.
The petitioner avers that there is no provision under RA 8436 which authorizes the
COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters and a
system of electronic transmission of election results.

RULING: Has legal standing. Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

117. Domingo v. Carague- 456 SCRA 450

FACTS: Petitioners are retired Commissioners of COA. All claim to maintain a deep-
seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA, especially in its Organizational Restructuring
Plan, as concerned taxpayers.
This petition for certiorari assailed the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
COA providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners basically alleged
therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to
undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards.

RULING: No legal standing. Where the petitioners have not shown any direct and
personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, where there is no
indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its implementation, they do not have any legal standing to file a suit
questioning the legality of said Plan.

118. Republic v. Nolasco- 457 SCRA 400

FACTS: A bidding was conducted for the procurement of the contract for of the Agno
River Flood Control Project. However, even before the Bids and Awards Committee could
come out with its recommendations, a legal challenge had already been posed to preempt
the awarding of the contract to Daewoo.
Emiliano R. Nolasco, a self-identified taxpayer, filed a Petition, filed a petition arguing
that based on the confidential reports it was apparent that Daewoos bid was unacceptable
and the putative award to Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government
and the Filipino taxpayers.

RULING: The mere invocation of standing as a tax payer does not mean that in each and
every instance where such a ground is invoked courts are left with no alternative except to
hear the parties, for the courts are vested with discretion whether or not a taxpayer’s suit
should be entertained.
119. Constantino v. Cuisia- 472 SCRA 305
FACTS: The petitioners object to the debt-relief contracts entered into by the government
pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 as beyond the
powers granted to the President. Even assuming that the contracts under the Financing
Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the
power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents
(Governor of the BSP, the Secretary of Finance, the National Treasurer, and the Philippine
Debt Negotiation Chairman).

RULING: Have legal standing. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.

120. Abaya v. Ebdane- 515 SCRA 720 [2007]

FACTS: The petitioners, as a taxpayers, seek to nullify a DPWH resolution which
recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the
contract for the implementation of the civil works known as Contract Package No. I. They
also seek to annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into by and between the
DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation pursuant to the said
resolution.

RULING: Has legal standing. Notwithstanding the fact that the Contract Package I project
is primarily financed from loans obtained by the government from the JBIC, nonetheless,
taxpayers’ money would be or is being spent on the project considering that the Philippine
Government is required to allocate a peso-counterpart therefor.

121. Planters v. Fertiphil- 548 SCRA 485 [2008]

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided for the imposition of levy on
the domestic sale of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to
the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the payment
of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed
a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI on the ground that LOI No.
1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due
process of law.

RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury. Fertiphil suffered a
direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay. It may
be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that
does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a
refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of
severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to
Fertiphil.
122. Roque v. COMELEC- 599 SCRA 62 [2009]
FACTS: Petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers,, seek to nullify
COMELEC’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project to TIM and Smartmatic and
to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or
implementing the corresponding contract-award. They contend the mechanism of the
PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the
ballot.

RULING: Have legal standing. Where issues of public importance are presented, there is
no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.

123. Mamba v. Lara, GR 165109, December 14, 2009

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cagayan passed several resolutions
authorizing Governorto negotiate, sign and execute several contracts in line with the
Construction of Town Center. In total, the Province of Cagayan will incur a total cost of
P P231M and P 187M for the 7 years of subsidizing the interest of the bonds from which
the construction will be primarily sourced.
Petitioners, who are members of the SP of Cagayan, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Contracts.

RULING: Has legal standing. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge
its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered
into by the government.

124. De la Llana v. Chairperson, COA- 665 SCRA 176 [2012]

FACTS: COA issued Circular No. 89-299 which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and GOCCs.
Petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayers suit. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the
part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA,
serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-
million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory
project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

RULING: Has legal standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a
constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.

125. Galicto v. Aquino-667 SCRA 150 [2012]

FACTS: Petition to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO entitled Directing the
Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and
GFIs, and for Other Purposes, issued by the Office of the President because it is
unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being
in breach of existing laws.
 Petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced
by the EO, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or
new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCCs and curtails the prerogative
of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.

RULING: Petitioner lacks locus standi. The Court is not convinced that the petitioner has
demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case
because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy.

126. Initiatives for Dialogue v. PSALM- 682 SCRA 602 [2012]

FACTS: Petition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric
Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the
public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM).
Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct
of the bidding it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed
under the Constitution. Petitioners also thus argue that the protection of their right to water
and of public interest requires that the bidding process initiated by PSALM be declared
null and void for violating such right.

RULING: Petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and
taxpayers. The continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila might be
compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant
in the Angat Dam Complex. Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party
in interest.

Citizens and Associations; Transcendental Importance

127. Legaspi v. CSC- 150 SCRA 530 [1987]
Petitioner requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Heath Department of Cebu City who
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible. Respondent CSC denied
this request. Claiming that he has the right to be informed as guaranteed by the
Constitution, petitioner filed this petition for mandamus to compel respondent to
disclose said information.

The court ruled that petitioner has the standing to sue. When a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

128. Oposa v. Factoran- 224 SCRA 792 [1993]

Petitioners, through their parents, sought to make respondent, DENR Secretary,
stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their Constitutional right to a healthful
 environment. The petitioners further asserted that they "represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn." Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him.

The court ruled that petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.

129. PASEI v. Torres-225 SCRA 417 [1993]

Pres. Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate
agencies for overseas employment. Later, Pres. Aquino issued EO 450 lifting such
ban. Petitioners seeks the nullification of EO 450 alleging that their member
agencies, which enjoy protection against competition by new licensees pursuant to
LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury with the repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450.
Intervenors, all applicants for new licenses challenge the locus standi of petitioner
to bring the instant petition.

The court ruled that petitioners have locus standi. The "proper-party"
requirement is satisfied when a party is in danger of sustaining immediate
injury resulting from the acts or measures complained of. In this case, Any gain
made by the new agencies on the supposed exclusive preserve of existing agencies
necessarily results in the petitioners’ loss.

130. Joya v. PCGG- 225 SCRA 540 [1995]

Pres. Aquino authorized PCGG Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment
Agreement allowing to auction the art pieces alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late Pres. Marcos. COA's audit found that the assets subject of auction
were historical relics prohibited to be disposed. Petitioners claim that as Filipino
citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain
respondents from pushing through with the auction sale.

The court ruled that petitioners have no legal standing to file mandamus against
respondents. A writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not
after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the
1987 Constitution, but for the continued enjoyment by the public of the artworks
which is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this
action for mandamus.

131. Kilosbayan v. Morato- 246 SCRA 436 [1995]

In a previous case, the court held invalid the contract between PCSO and PGMC
for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system due to violation on the
 PCSOs charter. Both parties again signed an amended agreement in conformity of
PCSOs charter. Kilosbayan filed a petition to declare amended agreement invalid
because it is the same as the old contract of lease. PCSO contended that petitioners
do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

The court ruled that petitioners does not have legal standing. Concerned citizens
can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental
importance" such as in cases involving "paramount public interest" (but then
only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain
conditions). Petitioner cannot assert their rights as concerned citizens to bring
this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged.

132. Tatad v. Garcia 243 SCRA 436 [1995]

In line with the DOTC’s plan to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA
respondent EDSA LRT Corporation (organized under HK laws) was recommended
to be awarded with the contract which provides for a build-lease-transfer scheme.
Petitioners, in their capacity as senators and taxpayers, now seek to enjoin
respondents from further enforcing the contract contending that the agreement
grants respondent corporation the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility,
which violates the Constitution. The issue is on the legal standing of petitioner to
institute the present action.

Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to

question contracts entered into by the national government or government-
owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to
disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved.

133. Board of Optometry v. Colet- 260 SCRA 88 [1996]

RA 8050 was enacted regulating the practice of optometry education. Private
respondents filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition
and injunction on the grounds, among others, that the law violates Constitutional
guarantees. An examination of the petition disclosed that it failed to indicate in the
complaint that the suit filed is a class suit. The respondent judge issued a TRO
enjoining the respondents thereon from enforcing RA 8050. Petitioners filed this
instant petition for certiorari alleging that respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the locus standi of herein private respondents to question
the constitutionality of RA 8050.

The court ruled that the failure to allege in the complaint that the suit filed is a
class suit is fatal to the case that would cause its dismissal. In this case not only
did private respondents failed to allege this in their petition, but they likewise failed
to allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit; 1)the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and 2)the
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.

134. Anti-Graft League of the Philippines- 260 SCRA 250 [1996]

 Petitioner questions the transaction executed by and between the Province and
Ortigas. The issue is the petitioners locus standi. (no facts supplied)

The only remaining justification for petitioner to be allowed to pursue this action is
whether it is, or would be, directly affected by the act complained of. Undeniably,
as a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of
public money. When, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown, as
in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the
transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas.

135. Telecom v. COMELEC- 289 SCRA 337 [1998]

In GR 132231, the Court upheld the validity of RA 6646 which prohibits the sale
or donation of print space or air time for political ads except to COMELEC under
Sections 90 and 92 of Omnibus Election Code. In the present case, petitioners
challenge the validity of Sec. 92 that it takes property without due process and just
compensation. Petitioners Telecom and Broadcast Attorney of the Philippines is an
organization of lawyers of radio and TV broadcasting companies while petitioner
GMA operates radio and TV stations throughout the Philippines.

The court ruled that only GMA has locus standi. A citizen will be allowed to raise
a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners TELBAP have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the
operation of §92. However, petitioner GMA claims that it suffered losses running
to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992
and 1995 elections and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do
so again this year.

136. Chavez v. PCGG- GR 130716 [May 19,1999]

Petitioner alleges that there were several published news reports referring to the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
accounts in Swiss banks and the reported execution of a compromise between the
government and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. As a
taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of
the Marcoses and their cronies, petitioner invokes his right to information
demanding that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.

The court ruled that petitioner has locus standi. The instant petition is anchored
on the constitutional right of the people to information and access to official
records, documents and papers. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by
decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
 public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
be allowed.

137. IBP v. Zamora- GR 141284 [August 15, 2000]

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose
of crime prevention and suppression. Petitioner IBP questions the validity of the
deployment of the Marines. The SOLGEN among others, raised the issue of the
legal standing of petitioner.

The court ruled that petitioner has no locus standi. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.

138. Bayan v. Zamora- GR 138570, October 10, 2000

Pres. Ramos approved the Visiting Forces Agreement between the PH and the US.
It was ratified by Pres. Estrada and attained concurrence by the Senate. Petitioners
- as legislators, NGOs, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the
VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
agreement. Respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue. Petitioners, on the
other hand, counter that the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which
justifies their standing.

The court ruled that petitioners have locus standi . A party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only
that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. In
the case before us, petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in
danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional
significance of the issues raised in the petitions, the Court brushes aside the
procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.

139. Cruz v. Secretary of DENR- gr 135385, December 6, 2000

Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition and mandamamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of RA 8371 otherwise known as the IPRA
of 1997 and its IRR. Petitioners contend that provisions of the IPRA concerning
ancestral domains amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over
lands of the public domain and minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine.
 Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national
patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. A citizen
has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional
requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the
national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s suit.

140. Lozano v. Macapagal-Arroyo – GR 146579, February 6, 2001

Four consolidated petitions brought before the Court pertaining to the oath-taking
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines as well as the issue on
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President-on-leave . ..

Petitioner does not have legal standing. They have not shown any direct and
personal injury as a result of President Arroyo’s oath-taking. Specifically,
Petitioner Lozano’s alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the
ultimate objective of his Petition: nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare
Estrada as "President-on-leave." Petitioners failure to allege any prima facie
legal interest to qualify them as proper parties yield the petition to be
dismissed for lack of legal standing.

141. Lim v. Exec. Secretary- GR 151445 April 11, 2002

Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the US started arriving
in Mindanao to take part in Balikatan 02-1 together with the PH military. Petitioners
filed this petition, in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers, for certiorari
and prohobition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were
joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-list organizations who averred that certain members of their organization are
resident of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the
operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on
the rules re to locus standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue
involved.

Petitioners, lim, does not have legal standing as they have failed to demonstrate the
requisite showing of direct personal injury. However, the Court reiterated its view
in a related case ruling that in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court brushes aside the
procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petition; and that 'transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'

142. Chavez v. PEA- GR 133250, July 9, 2002

PEA and AMARI, a private corporation entered into a JVA through negotiation
without public bidding to develop the Freedom Islands. Senate investigations
concluded that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the public domain and therefore cannot alienate and that the JVA itself
is illegal. Notwithstanding, the subsequent amended JVA was approved. Petitioner
 as a taxpayer prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of
public concerns.

Petitioners have legal standing. The petition raises matters of transcendental

importance to the public. The Court ruled that since the instant petition,
brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

143. Tolentino v. COMELEC- 420 SCRA 438 [2004]

Following Sen. Guingona's confirmation as Vice-President upon Pres. Arroyo's
succession to the Presidency, the Senate passed a resolution certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and to be filled by a special election to be held
simultaneously with the 2001 regular election. It also provided that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve the unexpired term
of Sen. Guingona. The 2001 regular election was held. Petitioners as voters and
taxpayers filed the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the 13th winning senatorial candidate. Petitioners claim
that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished
in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results, which as claimed,
COMELEC ommitted to do.

Petitioners have legal standing . Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to

litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. On the other hand, we have relaxed
the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course
to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised
in this petition is likely to arise again.

144. Agan v. PIATCO- 420 SCRA 575 [2004]

AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government thru DOTC and MIAA
for the construction and development of the NAIA IPT III under a BOT (build-
operate-transfer) arrangement pursuant to the BOT Law. Respondent PIATCO was
awarded the project after finding that its bid was superior to AEDC and after the
latter's failure to match the said bid. Hence, the Government thru DOTC and
PIATCO signed the assailed 1997 concession agreement. Petitioners seek to annul
the agreement and to enjoin its enforcement.

Petitioners have legal standing. Beyond iota of doubt, the implementation of the
PIATCO Contracts would deprive them of their sources of livelihood. Under
settled jurisprudence, one's employment, profession, trade, or calling is a
property right and is protected from wrongful interference.

145. Tichangco v. Enriquez- 433 SCRA 324 [2004]

Petitioners assailed the decision of Court of Appeals affirming that there were no
legal grounds to initiate proceedings to nullify original certificate of title no. 820
 and 7477 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom, all covering parcels of land
in Tondo, Manila, which petitioners occupy but registered in the names of private
respondents.

Petitioners have no legal standing. Petitioners were neither applicants nor

claimants of any preferential right over the aforesaid disputed lands. Being too
vague, too highly speculative and uncertain, their presumed interest does not
suffice to constitute a legal right or interest that would grant them standing in
court.

146. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Rumolo- 449 SCRA 1

Petitioners invoke their status as labor unions whose rights and interests are
allegedly violated and prejudiced by EO 185. The subject EO 185, in authorizing
the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its
regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up,
amending the latter law which only Congress can do.

No legal standing. Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of
EO 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that EO 185
will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review,
reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Neither does the issue meet the exacting standard required for
this Court to take the liberal approach and recognize the standing of herein
petitioners.

147. Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary- 462 SCRA 622

Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondents to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate
of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to the Constitution. Petitioners
contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit
the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Among the petitioners, only Sen. Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant
suit. Legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

148. Senate v. Ermita- 488 SCRA 1 [2006]

The Senate sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing, in aid of legislation, on the
North Railway project, the wiretapping controversy and, the alleged electoral fraud
in the 2005 Presidential elections, among others. Following thereafter, then Pres.
 Arroyo issued EO 464 requiring heads of departments of the executive branch to
secure consent of the president prior to appearing before either House of Congress
on the premise of the rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege. This was
assailed by Petitioner Senate of the Philippines alleging that E.O. 464 it directly
interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions
and conceals information of great public interest and concern.

Petitioner has legal standing. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy. Indeed,
legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

149. Purok v. Yuipco- 489 SCRA 382 [2006]

Petitioners have legal standing. An association has standing to file suit for its
members despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the
action; similarly, an organization has standing to assert the concern of its
constituents.

150. David v. Arroyo- 489 SCRA 162 [2006]

As the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, Pres.
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. A week later,
Proclamation 1021 was issued declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. In the interim, these 7 petitions challenging the constitutionality of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the respondents.
Respondents stated the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the NPA, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.

Petitioners have legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No.
1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance
to the Filipino people. The petitions thus call for the application of the
transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements
for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.

NOTE: Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded

standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases
involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for
voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for
legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
151. Holy Spirit v. Defensor- 497 SCRA 581 [2006]
On 2003, Pres. Arroyo signed into law RA 9207 (The National Government Center
Housing and Land Utilization Act). The NHA formulated the IRR of RA 9207
which sought to effect the orderly disposition of certain portions of the National
Government Center Site, located in Quezon City, to bona-fide residents. Petitioner
seeks to prevent the respondents from enforcing the IRR by a petition for
prohibition. Respondent NHA contends that petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with the Court and not with the CA,
which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In questioning the validity

or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency
pursuant to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power, a party needs to
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. Hence, since the assailed
IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts must be followed.

152. Henares v. LTFRB- 505 SCRA 104 [2006]

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas as alternative fuel. Can petitioner compel them by
mandamus?

Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a

coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate
that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

153. Francisco v. Fernando- 507 SCRA [2006]

Petitioner as member of the IBP and taxpayer filed a mandamus to enjoin
respondents from further implementing its wet flag scheme contending that it
violates "pedestrian rights" as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards
and it is a summary punishment for jaywalking, hence, violates the due process
clause. Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for violation of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court's jurisdiction to

issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from
 which to seek such relief. We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling
circumstances. This is not the case here.

154. Public interest Center v. Roxas- 513 SCRA 457 [2007]

NAPOCOR entered into a contract with Westinghouse Electric S.A. (WESA) to
construct in favor of the NPC a 620-megawatt nuclear power plant at Bataan. The
Aquino administration filed a complaint against Westinghouse. Pres. Ramos issued
EO 265 creating the Presidential Committee on the BNPP(Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant)
be the coordinating and policy-making body on the BNPP, including policies
arising from negotiations for a fair commercial settlement of all pending legal
claims that will provide a substantial net benefit to the country,” After series of
talks, the government panel and Westinghouse eventually agreed on a settlement
involving a package of more than 100 million dollars. Petitioners Public Interest
Inc., et al., (PICI), as tax payers, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
complaint for declaration of nullity the contract. The Solicitor General moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that PICI legal capacity to sue and
lack of cause of action. Are propriety of entering into a Settlement Agreement
subject to judicial review?

Yes. Administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired special

knowledge and expertise on matters falling under their jurisdiction, are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon. As a general rule, their findings of fact are
generally accorded great respect by the courts.

155. Garcia v. J.G. Summit- 516 SCRA 483 [2007]

Respondent JG Summit was registered by the BOI as a new domestic producer of
polyethylene and polypropylene resins. Respondent informed the BOI that its plant
site would be located in Batangas instead of Negros Oriental. Petitioner objected to
the Batangas plant site, citing as basis the decision GR 92024, in which the SC
declared the Bataan petrochemical zone as the only possible site for petrochemical
plants as provided for under PDs 949 and 1803. The BOI dismissed petitioner's
opposition. It ruled, among other things, that the Court's Resolution in GR 92024
clarified that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not
violate PD 949 and 1803.

As has been this Court's consistent holding, administrative and quasi-judicial

agencies, which have acquired special knowledge and expertise on matters
falling under their jurisdiction, are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon. As a general rule, their findings of fact are generally accorded great
respect by the courts.

156. Kilosbayan v. Ermita- 526 SCRA 353 [2007]

Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born
citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court.
 Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a
list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the
latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Whether the
Court is the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong's qualification
for memberhip of this Court.

Yes. The case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a

Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits
of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Court is the proper forum for
resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.

157. Tondo Medical v. CA- 527 SCRA 746 [2007]

Pres. Estrada issued EO 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of
the Department of Health, which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and organizational processes of the DOH. Petitioners claim that EO. 102 is void on
the ground that it was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They
maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise
of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued EO 102.

The Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to

reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH. The Court regarded
reorganizations of government units or departments as valid, for so long as
they are pursued in good faith that is, for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. On the other hand, if the reorganization is done for
the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes,
any abolition of position would be invalid.

158. Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary- 531 SCRA 583 [2007]

Pres. Arroyo issued EO 364 transforming the DAR to the Department of Land
Reform, which shall be responsible for all land reform in the country. EO 379
amended EO 364, making the NCIP an attached agency of the Department of Land
Reform. Petitioner AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative
agencies should be the subject of a statute and the President’s issuance of the EOs
transgresses the principle of separation of powers.

The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly grants the power to the President
to transfer agencies from one to another. And together with the Constitution's
express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive
action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.

159. Pharmaceutical v. Duque- 535 SCRA 265

160. Chavez v. Gonzales-545 SCRA 441 [2008]
Then DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned the media that those who had in possession
copies of the alleged wiretapped conversations of Pres. Arroyo and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act subject to arrest. NTC issued a resolution warning that the
 broadcast/airing of the wiretapped conversations of Pres. Arroyo shall be just cause
for suspension, revocation and cancellation of the issued licenses. Petitioner filed a
petition under Rule 65 alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the
freedom on expression and of the press and the right of the people to info on matters
of public concern.

Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in
an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint, subject to the
Court's judicial review. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements
as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body
of media.

161. Akbayan v. Aquino- 558 SCRA 468 [2008]

JPEPA is the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan,
concerning trade in goods, trade in services, investment, etc. Prior to President’s
signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – NGOs, Congressmen, citizens and
taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents the full text of the JPEPA. The Executive is refusing to give them the
said copies until the negotiation is completed. Respondents invoke that executive
privilege is extended to diplomatic negotiations.

Diplomatic negotiations are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction,

including the JPEPA negotiations. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type
of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in
all instances. If there is a strong public interest that calls for the disclosure of the
desired information, its traditionally privileged status may be overcome.

162. SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board- 570 SCRA 410 [2008]

These consolidated cases assailes the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students
of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. For
one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch
as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.

While the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the
first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium
of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression. The principle of first impression provides that
the issue raised has not been previously considered or decided by a higher
court. There is no legally binding authority by which the cases must be
decided.
163. Garcillano v. House- GR 170338, Dec. 23,2008
Hello Garci tapes surfaced which allegedly contained the President’s instructions
to COMELEC Comm. Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the
2004 presidential elections. The recordings became subject of legislative hearings
coducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. However,
respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearing indefinitely but
decided to prepare reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the
resource persons. Petitioner Garcillano in GR 170338, filed with the Court a
petition praying that respondent be restrained from using the tape recordings in their
reports and for any other purpose.
Whether petitioner Garcillano raised an issue of actual controversy.

NO. No. The case is being dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court notes
that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.
There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the Hello
Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees. The exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited
to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.

164. White Light v. City of Manila- 576 SCRA 416 [2009]

City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law the Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, pension houses and similar establishments in the City
of Manila and providing the penalty thereof. Herein Petitioners operators or drive-
in-hotels and motels in Metro Manila, questions the validity of the said ordinance.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance, holding that The lawful objective of the
Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. Petitioners in essence
repeat their assertions contending that the Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police
power.

The Court granted the petition ruling that the ordinance must be be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The behavior which the
Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. These measures would have
minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants.

165. Chamber of Real Estete v. Romulo- 614 SCRA 605 [2010]

Petitioner is an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines.
Petitioner argues that the imposition of MCIT on corporations and creditable
withholding tax on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets violates the
due process clause because it levies income tax even if there is no realized gain.
 Respondents aver that there is no justiciable controversy since petitioners have not
shut down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT.

Contrary to respondents assertion, the Court does not have to wait until
petitioners members have shut down their operations as a result of the MCIT
or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being implemented. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.

NOTE: Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless
the following requisites are satisfied:
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
(2) the question before the court must be ripe for adjudication;
(3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so;
(4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
(5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

166. Chamber of Real Estate v. ERC- 624 SCRA 556 [2010]

Respondent ERC promulgated the Magna Carta, which establishes residential
consumers rights to have access to electricity and electric service, subject to the
requirements set by LGUs and distribution utilities. Petitioner seeks to nullify
Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, claiming that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is
unconstitutional as it is oppressive to the affected end-users who must advance the
amount for the installation of additional facilities. Whether a petition for certiorari
with this court is the correct remedy for petitioner.

No. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari; the rule on hierarchy of courts determines
the venue of recourses to these courts. In original petitions for certiorari, the
Supreme Court will not directly entertain this special civil action as in the
present case unless the redress desired cannot be obtained elsewhere based on
exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying immediate resort to this
Court.

167. Southern Hemisphere v. ATC- 632 SCRA 146 [2010]

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007), 6 different
petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed before the SC challenging its
constitutionality. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Ermita as Chairperson, different department secretaries including of
DOJ, DILG, DOF and DND. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP Chief. Whether a petition for
certiorari lie against herein respondents.
 No. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Parenthetically, petitioners do not
even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis motaof the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

168. Orlando A. Reyes v. City of Manila, GR 196063, 14 December 2011.

Respondent filed a complaint against herein petitioner. It alleged that it passed
Ordinance 7949 authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate the subject parcel of
land, owned by petitioners, and offered to purchase at P1,000 per square meter.
Petitioners conveyed their willingness to sell the property but at the price of
P50,000 per square meter which they claimed was the FMV of the land at the time.
Herein petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Ordinance
7949 is unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion and scheduled the trial
for determination of jsut compensation. Whether petitioner correctly filed the
instant petition before the SC

No. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.

In this case, since the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is not
appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle
of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should
file certiorari with the CA, and not directly with this Court.

169. Jelbert B. Galicto v. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino, III, GR

193978, 28 February 2012.
Legaspi filed a certiorari assailing the validity of EO 7 issued by PNOY which suspended
allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the BOD of all GOCCs and GFIs and a
moratorium in the salaries and other compensation of all its employees for an indefinite
period.

Ruling: The issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, certiorari

is not a proper remedy. Liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant
disregard of procedural rules.

170. Bayan v. Romulo- 641 SCRA 244 [2011]

 171. Magallona v. Ermita- 655 SCRA 476 [2011]
Petitioner filed certiorari assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522 adjusting the country's
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
Respondents assert that writs cannot be issued absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.

Ruling: The Court has viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial
vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes carrying such relevance in the life of this
nation that the Court finds itself constrained to pass upon the issues of non-compliance
with the procedural rules.

Other Rules: Raise at Earliest Opportunity and Constitutionality is the Very Lis Mota
172. People v. Vera- 65 PHIL. 56 [1937-1938]
Cu Unjieng was convicted and then applied for probation. Judge Vera set the hearing for
his probation. Petitioner opposed the probation questioning the constitutionality of Act
4221(Probation Act) as it constitutes invalid delegation to provincial boards of the
operation of the law.

Ruling: The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota presented.

173. Mirasol v. CA- 351 SCRA 44 [2001]

Mirasol in asking PNB to account for the sale of its export sugar insisting that the amount
if properly liquidated could offset their outstanding obligation with PNB contend that PD
579 violates the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation.

Ruling: The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNBs obligation to render an accounting is an
issue, which can be determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of PD 579.
The requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the
case is absent.

174. Matibag v. Benipayo- 380 SCRA 49 [2002]

Benipayo was appointed COMELEC Chairman in an ad interim appointment. Matibag was
relieved as Acting Director of the EID and reassigned to the Law Department. Matibag
requested Benipayo for reconsideration of her reassignment but was denied. Matibag
questions the validity of the ad interim appointment of Benipayo.

Ruling: (1) The legality of Matibag's reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of

Benipayo's ad interim appointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality
of Benipayo's ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of
 Matibag’s reassignment cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

(2) It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue
is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same. Matibag
questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed her petition
SC, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a
competent body.

175. La Bugal v. Ramos- 421 SCRA 148 [2004]

Pres. Ramos entered into an FTAA with WMCP, an Australian mining company.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its IRR in that it allows fully foreign
owned corporations to explore, develop and utilize and exploit mineral resources. WMCP
argues that the petition was filed only almost 2 years after the execution of the FTAA,
hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.

Ruling: The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality
must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. A
contrary rule would mean that a law would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure
of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.

176. Estarja v. Ranada- 492 SCRA 652 [2006]

Ranada filed an administrative complaint against Estarija. Ombudsman ordered Estarija's
preventive suspension. Estarija contends that the Ombudsman's administrative authority is
merely recommendatory under the Constitution. RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman additional
powers not provided in the Constitution; hence, his dismissal is invalid. The CA held that
the constitutional issue was belatedly raised in the proceedings before the Ombudsman,
thus, it cannot be considered on appeal.

Ruling: Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a

law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue before the CA, which is the competent court,
the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.

177. Moldex v. HLURB- 525 SCRA 198 [2007]

Moldex is owner-developer of the subdivision. Lot buyers and homeowners in the
subdivision organized the respondent homeowner's association. Moldex decided to stop
paying the electric bills for the streetlights. Respondent association refused to assume the
obligation so Meralco discontinued its service. HLURB granted the injunction applied by
respondent association citing HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, s.1994. Petitioner’s MFR
was denied. On appeal, petitioner prayed for nullification of HUDCC Res. R-562. CA
denied ruling that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of the resolution
directly to the SC.

Ruling: Petitioner had already raised the question of constitutionality in its petition filed
with the CA. The alleged injury caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of
 the HUDCC Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the assailed resolution is
effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the streetlights. For every
occasion that petitioner is directed to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of
action to question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not
time-barred.

178. Gobenciong v. CA- 550 SCRA 502 [2008]

Dr. Flora dela Pea, Head of the EVRMC Laboratory Unit filed an administrative complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging petitioner Gobenciong (administrative
officer IV) and other EVRMC officers with Falsification of Public Documents and
Misconduct on the alleged anomalous purchase of a hemoanalyzer. The Ombudsman found
Gobenciong and others guilty and recommended the suspension of 1 year without pay. In
a certiorari, Gobenciong asseverates that the power granted unto the Ombudsman under
RA 6770 constitutes unconstitutional delegation of authority.

Ruling: The Constitution granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping
prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. Lest it be
overlooked, the unconstitutionality of a law must clearly be demonstrated. It is basic that
the matter of constitutionality shall, as a rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the case
and raised and argued at the earliest opportunity. The issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman,
or at least before the CA. Withal, it cannot now be considered in Gobenciong’s petitions
for review.

179. Heirs v. Marasigan- 548 SCRA 409 [2008]

Ruling: It is unnecessary for the Court to address the unconstitutionality of Section 5, Rule
69 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the principle that a constitutional issue may only be
passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy. A purported constitutional
issue raised by petitioners may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and
controversy. Even if all the requisites for judicial review are present, the Court will not
entertain a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota of the case or if the case can
be disposed of on some other grounds. The present problem of partition by co-heirs/co-
owners can be resolved without elevating their case to one of constitutionality.

180. Abakada v. Purisima- 562 SCRA 251 [2008]

Petitioners enjoin the implementation of RA 9335 which provides a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board to encourage BIR and BOC employees to exceed their
revenue targets. Petitioners contend that the law transforms the officials and employees
into mercenaries and bounty hunters and assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Ruling: A constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Aside from the
general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment
 of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific
and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them.
However, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. Where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.

181. ABS- CBN v. Phil. Multi-Media- 576 SCRA 262 [2009]

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent alleging that its unauthorized
rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright.
The IPO-BLA ruled against PMSI and ordered it to permanently desist from
rebroadcasting. On appeal, the IPO Director General found for PMSI citing Memorandum
Circular No. 04-08-88. CA affirmed. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of of the
memo as it allows taking of property for public use without just compensation.

Ruling: The instant case was instituted for violation of the IP Code and infringement of
ABS-CBNs broadcasting rights and copyright, which can be resolved without going into
the constitutionality of MC 04-08-88. The records show that petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the memorandum by way of a collateral attack before the CA. For
reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be collaterally attacked.

182. CSC v. Andal- 608 SCRA 370 [2009]

FACTS: Andal is a Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. He passed the CSPE-CAT.
However, upon verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat
Plan and the ID card of Andal showed dissimilarity in the facial features. CSC-NCR
rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissed him from
service. Respondent’s appeal was denied. The case was brought to the CA, which ruled
that CSC encroached upon the SC power of administrative supervision over court
personnel.

RULING: It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. In case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel,
the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee
before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.

183. BPI v. Shemberg- 628 SCRA 70 [2010]

FACTS: Shemberg filed a petition for the approval of its rehabilitation plan and
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. BPI opposed the petition. After initial hearings,
RTC gave due course to Shemberg’s petition. CA denied the petition of BPI for Certiorari.
BPI questions the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Corporate Recovery insofar as
it alters or modifies and expands the existing law on rehabilitation contrary to the principle
that rules of procedure cannot modify or affect substantive rights.
 RULING: The challenge on the constitutionality of the Interim Rules is a new and belated
theory that we should not even entertain. It was not raised before the CA. Well settled is
the rule that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Relatedly, the constitutional question was not raised at the earliest opportunity.

184. Macalintal v. PET- 635 SCRA 783 [2010]

Macalintal questioned the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized progeny
of Section 4, Article VII. While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized
to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate
tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

RULING: YES. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its
jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time,
coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition
ought to be dismissed outright.

185. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. v. Board of Airlines Representatives, GR 193247,

The OP, et. al allege that the CA acted beyond its jurisdiction when it passed upon the
validity of CAO 7-92 and Sec. 3506 of the TCCP.

Ruling: CA is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to review matters, not
otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. Further, while it is true that the issue of
constitutionality must be raised at the first opportunity, this Court, in the exercise of sound
discretion, can take cognizance of the constitutional issues raised by the parties in
accordance with Section 5(2)(a), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

186. Office of the President v. Board of Airlines Representatives GR 194276, 14

September 2011
BOC issued CAO 1-2005 amending CAO 7-92 pursuant to Tariff and Customs Code.
Petitioners Office of the President, et al. alleged that prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92,
the BOC created a committee to review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in NAIA
and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of P25 to US$1 to the then exchange
rate of P55 to US$1. Petitioners alleged that for a period of more than two years from the
creation of the committee, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned,
including respondent BAR, to discuss the proposed rate adjustment.

BAR alleged that it wrote letters to BOC-NAIA and to the Secretary of Finance of its
objection to the proposed increase in the overtime rates. BOC informed BAR that the
Secretary of Finance already approved CAO 1-2005 demanding payment of overtime
 services to BOC personnel. The BARs member airlines refused and manifested their
intention to file a petition to suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005.

RULING: “When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or

invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the
regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the
party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity. Further, while it is true that the issue of constitutionality
must be raised at the first opportunity, this Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, can
take cognizance of the constitutional issues raised by the parties in accordance with Section
5(2)(a), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

187. Reiterating Moldex v. HLURB

Moldex is owner-developer of the subdivision Metrogate Complex. Lot buyers and
homeowners in the subdivision organized the respondent homeowner's association.
Moldex decided to stop paying the electric bills for the streetlights. Respondent association
refused to assume the obligation so Meralco discontinued its service. Respondent applied
for injunction with HLURB.

HLURB granted the injunction citing HUDCC Res. No. R-562, s.1994. Petitioner’s MFR
was denied. On appeal, petitioner sought nullification of HR R-562. CA denied ruling that
petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of the resolution directly to the SC.

Ruling: Petitioner had already raised the question of constitutionality in its petition filed
with the CA. The alleged injury caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of
the HUDCC Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the assailed resolution is
effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the streetlights. For every
occasion that petitioner is directed to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of
action to question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not
time-barred.

188. Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR 171101, November 22, 2011

The Court denied the petition filed by HLI affirming PARC Resolutions with the
modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries of Hacienda Lisita
shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. In its Motion for Clarification and
Partial Recon, among others, questions the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657(CARL)
insisting that the said issue is the lis mota of the case, raised at the earliest opportunity and
not to be considered as moot and academic.

Ruling: The Court reiterated its ruling that intervenor FARM has yet to explain its failure
to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 when PARC approved the SDP of
Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. Neither is the question of
constitutionality the lis mota of the instant case. The lis mota in this case, is the alleged
non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP and the alleged grave abuse of
discretion of PARC when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance. Hence,
the Court is not compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657.
 189. Sana v. CESB, GR 192926, November 15, 2011
EO 883 was issued by PGMA which granted Career Executive Service Officer rank to
eligible lawyers in the executive branch. Career Executive Service Board also issued Res.
No. 870, finding no legal impediment for the President to vest CESO rank to executive
officials during the periods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight appointment and
statutory ban on pre-election appointment. Later, PNOY issued EO 3 expressly revoking
EO 883. Petition was filed questioning the validity of EO 883.

RULING: EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and
effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these
issuances/validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case and controversy as
precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.

190. Gamboa v. Teves- 652 SCRA 690 [2011]

Petitioner, being a stockholder of PLDT, questioned the indirect sale of shares of PLDT to
another corporation which resulted to an increased in the common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT. Petitioner contends that he has the right to question the subject sale
which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution.

RULING: The Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public.

Moot Cases
191. David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162 (2006)
PGMA declared PP 1017 declaring a state of emergency and directs the members of the
AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 for various grounds. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot
and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 through issuance of PP 1021.

RULING: The Court holds that PGMA’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic.
GR: Court will not decide if case is moot and academic.
XPNs:
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

192. Suplico v. NEDA, GR 178830, July 14, 2008

Petition seeking to annul the award of contract of the ZTE-NBN deal. Later on, PGA
informed the President of China it will not push through with the project. SolGen argued
that there is no more justiciable controversy to resolve.
 RULING: Dismissed. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the
Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues.

193. Mattel Inc. v. Francisco, GR No. 166886, July 30, 2008

Mattel, Inc. filed a Notice of Opposition against Uy's "Barbie" trademark on confectionary
products as the latter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls. However, Bureau
of Trademarks had already declared the subject trademark application abandoned due to
the non-filing of the Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) by Uy.

RULING: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.

194. Araullo, et al v. Aquino, et al, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 (p. 22)
A case was filed questioning the constitutionality of DAP based on various grounds. OSG
later on confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination
had already mooted the challenges to the DAP’s constitutionality.

RULING: SC cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening
event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past
exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic
by supervening events.

Political Questions; Requisites

195. Baker v. Carr- 369 US 169 [1962]
The Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts for the Tennessee
General Assembly be redrawn every ten years according to the federal census to provide
for districts of substantially equal population. Baker's complaint was that Tennessee had
not redistricted since 1901, in response to the 1900 census which resulted to failure to
reapportion them subsequently notwithstanding substantial growth and redistribution of the
State's population, they suffer a "debasement of their votes."

RULING: The defendants unsuccessfully argued that redistricting of legislative districts is

a "political question". SC identified six factors to help in determining which questions were
"political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked by:
a. Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department
b. A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it
c. The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion
d. The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government
e. An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made
 f. The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question

196. Torrecampo v. Metropolitan- 649 SCRA 482 [2011]

MWSS issued Resolution and allowed DPWH to use the 60 Meter Right-of-Way for
preliminary studies in the implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project. Torrecampo
asserts that the right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and potable
water is greatly put at risk should the MWSS and DPWH choose to proceed with the C-5
Road Extension Project using MWSS properties.

RULING: These issues are dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. In the foot note, SC cited Tanada vs. Cueco – “political questions are those which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch.

Textually Demonstrable Commitment

197. Osmena v. Pendatun- 109 PHIL. 683 [1960]
For having made imputations of bribery against President Garcia and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, Congressman Osmena was, by resolution of the House,
suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.

RULING: The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly

behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the legislature.

198. Arroyo v. De Venecia- 277 SCRA 268 [1997]

199. Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona- GR 134577, November 18, 1998
In the selection of Senate officers, Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan as
Senate President comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

RULING: The SC refused to intervene where the dispute involved the selection of a Senate
minority leader.

200. ICMC v. Calleja- GR 85750, September 28, 1990

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee
processing center. IRRI is an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock
organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting basic research on
the rice plant. Labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed a petition
for certification election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.
 RULING: Under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by
the executive branch of the government.

201. Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997]

Petition was filed seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement alleging that the said Agreement is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

RULING: The responses to questions on whether WTO/GATT will favor the general
welfare of the public at large involve “judgment calls” by our policy makers, and are not
subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

202. Garcia v. Corona, GR 132451, Dec. 17, 1999

In Tatad v Doe, the Court struck down RA 8180 as invalid because 3 key provisions intended
to promote free competition where shown to achieve the opposite result. As a result, Congress
enacted RA 8479, a new deregulation law. Petitioner Garcia sought to declare Sec. 19 thereof
which prescribes the period for the removal of price control on gas and for the full deregulation
of the local downstream oil industry as unconsitutional on the ground that within the short span
of 5 months, the market is still dominated by an oligopoly of the 3 private respondents.

Ruling: The pleadings of public and private respondents both put forth the argument that the
challenged provision is a policy decision of Congress and that the wisdom of the provision is
outside the authority of this Court to consider.

Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

203. Liang v. People- GR 125865, March 26, 2001
A case for grave oral defamation was filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who as
employed as economist by the ADB against Joyce Cabal a staff of ADB. DFA advised
the trial court that petitioner is immune from suit, hence case was dismissed.

RULING: The immunity granted is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an

official capacity. It cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty. Immunity from legal process is only limited to
with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives the immunity.

Effect of Unconstitutionality; Par. 2(a); Operative Fact Doctrine

Article 7, New Civil Code
204. De Agbayani v. PNB- 38 SCRA 429 [1971]
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB but the latter later on instituted foreclosure proceeding
for nonpayment. Plaintiff countered that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB asserts that the
period of the effectivity of EO 32 (provides for debt moratorium) and RA 342 (provides
 for extension of debt moratorium) until the same were declared invalid, tolled the running
of the period of prescription.

RULING: PNB is correct. During the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

205. Philippine Coconut v. Republic, supra.

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan commited grave abuse of discretion when it
sanctioned the taking of COCOFED, et al’s property by the respondent Republic through
a retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut levy laws.

RULING: There was a violation of the doctrine of Operative Fact. The Sandiganbayan
gravely erred if not grossly abused its discretion when it repeatedly disregarded, and out
rightly refused to recognize, the operative facts that existed as well as the rights that vested
from the time the coconut levy laws were enacted until their declaration of
unconstitutionality.

206. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, GR 171101,

Nov. 22, 2011 (Operative Fact Doctrine applies to unconstitutional executive act)
FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords
the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of
outright agricultural land transfer

RULING: Noting that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or [choose actual land distribution].

207. CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, GR 187485, Oct 8, 2013 (Operative
Fact Doctrine does not apply to a mere administrative practice; there must be a law
or executive issuance)
Respondent corporation filed for an input vat refund with the CIR. A mere 13 days after it
filed for a refund, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. It did not wait for the 120-
day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim. Basis for their action: the BIR and the
CTA did in actual practice treat the 120-day and 30-day periods as merely discretionary
and dispensable; and this served as guidance for the taxpayers.

RULING: Doctrine of operative fact does not apply to a mere administrative practice;
there must be a law or executive issuance

Automatic Review; Paragraph 2 (d)

208. Garcia, et al. v. People- 318 SCRA 434
Petitioners were convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Petitioners did not appeal, hence it became final. Should the SC automatically
review the trial court’s decision?
 RULING: As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their
desire to appeal from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua, the decision became final and unappealable.

209. Pearson v. IAC, GR 74454, Sept. 3, 1998

Involves the declaration of validity of petitioner’s mining claims. They argued that
respondent IAC acted with grave abuse of discretion because it is the SC has the exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases where the jurisdiction of a lower court is in issue, as well as all
cases decided by lower courts involving pure questions of law.

RULING: Petitioner is incorrect. It has been emphasized in a number of cases that while
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to
this Court.

210. People v. Mateo- 433 SCRA 640

Mateo was found guilty of 10 counts of rape. He then appealed to the CA. Should the case
be directly forwarded to the SC?

RULING: It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive
in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused. Indeed, the
occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation
of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic
review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate
to review factual issues.

211. People v. Duavis, GR 190681, 07 December 2011

Duavis was found guilty of the crime of homicide. Hence, case was appealed to the SC.
Should the case be automatically reviewed by the SC?

RULING: pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts
under Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by
the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court, this Court transferred the cases to the
CA for appropriate action and disposition.

Question of Law; Paragraph 2(e)

212. Cebu Woman’s Club v. De la Victoria- GR 120060 [March 9, 2000]
Involves the construction of a building awarded to respondent CAMSAC. CAMSAC sub-
contracted the agreement to Seoron. The latter then filed a complaint for sum of money
against petitioner and CAMSAC but petitioner filed a complaint for interpleader in order
for CAMSAC and Sereon to interplead with one another to determine their respective rights
and claims. However, RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint to interplead hence, it resorted
directly to the SC by a petition for review on certiorari.
 RULING: Petitioners direct resort to this Court is erroneous. Under the Rules of Court, a
party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on
pure questions of law. The case at bench does not involve pure questions of law as to entitle
petitioner to seek immediate redress from this court.

Change of Venue; Paragraph 4

213. People v. Gutierrez- 36 SCRA 172 [1970]
A group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in Ilocos sur. They were
charged before the CFI of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The Secretary of Justice issued AO no. 226
authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal case to the Circuit Criminal Court,
“in the interest of justice and pursuant to RA 5179, as implemented by AO 258 and 274.”
The prosecution invoked the Administrative Orders, since the witnesses refused to testify
in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered.
Should the venue be changed?

RULING: Yes. Judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts “can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful
to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.” One of these incidental and
inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another
of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial
trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. Hence, the Supreme Court
possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to transfer the trial and disposition of a case from
one court to another.

Power to Promulgate Rules; Paragraph 5

Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in All Courts
214. First Lepanto v. CA- 231 SCRA 30 [1994]
FACTS:
a. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and
a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of
CA of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the BOI.

b. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its
BOI certificate of registration. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision. Soon rebuffed in its bid for
reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

c. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that CA does not have jurisdiction
over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

d. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and
Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals
from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
 Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because
the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O.
226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be
filed directly with the Supreme Court.

HELD: The Supreme Court has the power to regulate, by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making powers, procedural aspects such as the court and the manner an appeal can be
brought. Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected.
Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to
respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15)
days from notice.

215. Lina v. Purisima- 82 SCRA 344 [1978]

FACTS: Lina filed a petition to annul the two successive orders of dismissal of petitioner's
complaint before the CFI of Manila issued by respondent judge. The second order of
dismissal is couched on the declaration of the respondent judge as the CFI being
jurisdictionally impotent to decide the case because of an LOI issued by Pres. Marcos.

HELD: The Supreme Court may at its option, whenever it feels the best interests of justice
would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to
the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the Supreme Court may already
resolve the pertinent determinative issues and render the final judgment on the merits. The
obvious reason for such an extension in the exercise of the Court's pervasive power is that
any other procedure would amount to an unnecessary rigmarole (hassle) which can only
augment the expenses, efforts and anxieties of the parties and uselessly delay the
administration of justice, no other result for all concerned being anyway perceptible.

216. Santero v. CFI- Cavite- 153 SCRA 728 [1965]

FACTS: Petitioner, children of the deceased from another woman, questions the order of
the CFI-Cavite granting the Motion for Allowance filed by the common-law wife and all
her children represented by their mother. CFI based its decision on Section 3 of Rule 83 of
the Rules of Court as basis.
In response to an amended order, the common-law wife clarified that out of her 7 children,
4 are minors and 3 are of age. According to her, the 3 children have right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance citing nder Art. 188, of
the New Civil Code as basis. CFI ordered to get back the allowance given to the 3 children.

RULING: The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is
of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving
spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents are entitled
 to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo
Santero.

217. Damasco v. Laqui- 166 SCRA 214 [1988]

FACTS: An information was filed charging the petitioner of grave threat. After trial,
respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave
threats but only of light threats. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set
Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge's decision, contending that the lighter
offense had already prescribed when the information was filed citing the case of Francisco
vs. CA as basis.

RULING: A departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA, 12 can be done only "through
an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure. But this will have to contend
with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not
however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

218. Carpio v. Sulu Resources- GR 148267, August 8, 2002

FACTS: Sulu Resources filed a petition for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA).
Petitioner Carpio filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto. The Panel of Arbitrators of
the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding
Carpio’s adverse claim. SULU appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines
Adjudication Board (MAB). MAB ruled in favor of SULU. An appeal was filed in CA.
Pursuant to Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Should Carpio
appeal the decision of MAB to the SC directly?

RULING: When the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to
the Court of Appeals pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions,
such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested
rights of the parties.

219. Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes- GR 165922, February 26, 2010
FACTS: Peititioner filed a petition with RTC Baguio to foreclose a mortgage. This type of
petition is subject to legal fees based on value of claim. Seeking an exemption for payment
of these fees, petitioner then invoked Art 62 (6) of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the PH)
which exempts cooperatives from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code.

RULING: The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed
or modified by Congress
220. In re Petition for Recognition- 612 SCRA 193 [2010]
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs
under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39
of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) which provides that it shall be exempted.
May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and
local government units?

RULING: No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral
part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court. It
necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising from or connected to the
implementation of the said rules.

221. In re Exemption of NPC- 615 SCRA 1 [2010]

FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on
whether or not it is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas
bonds. Republic Act No. 6395 provides that NPC is exempted. However, the Rules of Court
provides that GOCCs are not exempted. The SC also denied its request for exemption
through an administrative matter.

RULING: Not exempted. The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure and that
power to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the
Executive.

222. In re: in the matter of clarification of Exemption from payment of all Court
Sheriff’s Fees of Cooperatives, A.M. 12-2-03-0,13 March 2012-668 SCRA 1 [2012]
FACTS: Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI) requests for the issuance of a
court order to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of
court and sheriffs fees pursuant to the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.

RULING: The power to promulgate the Rules of Court is no longer shared by the Court
with Congress, more so, with the Executive.
It is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court and sheriffs fees no
longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.

223. Sto. Tomas v. Paneda- 685 SCRA 245 [2012]

FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a
petition seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional.
Included in the assailed provision is Section 9 of R.A. 8042 which allowed the filing of
criminal actions arising from”illegal recruitment” before the RTC of the province or city
 where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense.
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the
offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the
general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws
and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended parties
violates their right to due process.

RULING: There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative

venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure; Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue
of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared policy of providing a criminal
justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.

Admission to the Practice of Law, the Integrated Bar, Disciplinary Powers, and Legal
Assistance to the Underprivileged
224. In re Cunanan- 94 PHIL. 534 [953-1954]
FACTS: Congress passed the Bar Flunkers Act. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix
the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.” Provided
however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%. Constitutional?

RULING: unconstitutional. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary

prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess
of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court.

225. Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475 [1992]

FACTS: Atty. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City. An Administrative
Case was filed against Javellana for continuously engaging in the private practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. 74-58. Later on, LGC was
enacted imposing the same duty on public officials who are also lawyers Javellana
questioned the constitutionality of LGC.

RULING: Petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a government

official from engaging in the private practice of his profession if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the government.
Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority
to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

226. Velez v. De Vera- A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

FACTS: An administrative case for alleged misappropriation of client’s funds against
Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California which resulted in a
 recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de Vera
resigned from the California Bar. Atty. De Vera ran for IBP Regional Governor. Petitioner
claims that such information was concealed by the respondent, hence disqualified from
running. IBP Board deems that respondent is not fit to be a member of the board, hence
his removal was sought.

RULING: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) By-Laws do not allow for
preelection disqualification proceedings—absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court
in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit.

227. In re letter of UP Law Faculty- 644 SCRA 543 [2011]

FACTS: UP Law Faculty published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
(Filipino comfort women case). Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law calls for
the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

RULING: The legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of
expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom.

PAGE 30
Limits of Power
A. Simplified and Inexpensive Procedure for Speedy Disposition
B. Uniform for All Courts of the Same Grade
C. Not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights

228. Bustos v. Lucero- 81 PHIL. 640 [October 20, 1948]

The petitioner was an accused in a criminal case; filed a motion to remand the case to the
justice of the peace where he can cross examine the complainant and her witnesses; their
testimony, the strength of which the warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. It was
denied because the records showed that the accused’s counsel expressed his intention to
renounce the accused’s right to present evidence.

Ruling: Accused cannot compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest
because “the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against
him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses.” As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

229. PNB v. Asuncion- 80 SCRA 321 [1977]

 Respondents failed to pay their obligations with the bank, thus, a collection case was filed
against them. One of the respondents died while case was pending so the court dismissed
the case. Petitioner alleged that dismissing the case against all the defendants is erroneous,
instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant. Court relied on
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: Under Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court there was nothing that
prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision
sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is
the applicable provision in this matter, which gives the creditor the right to “proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.” A procedural law
cannot be made to prevail over a substantive law.

230. Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742, September 16, 1998 295 SCRA 470

There is an intimation in the pleadings, that Section 27of Republic Act No. 6770 involves
a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals, which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction

Ruling: It is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That
right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided
has been changed. The transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case
is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to
transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive
power. Neither can it be considered such transfer as impairing a vested right because the
parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. (See
page 349)

231. People v. Lacson- 400 SCRA 267 [2003]

Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed two Criminal Cases on March 29, 1999. The new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000, which has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a prior notice to the offended party. Can this law be applied retroactively?

Ruling: No. To apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to
run on 31 March 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. The new
rule was conceptualized primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice
system.
232. Planters v. Fertiphil- 426 SCRA 414 [2004]

Fertiphil moved to dismiss PPI’s appeal of the order dated November 20, 1991 due to non-
payment of the appellate docket fee. The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated
April 3, 2001 ruling that the payment of the appellate docket fee within the period for
taking an appeal is a new requirement under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which was
not yet applicable when PPI filed its appeal in 1992.

Ruling: PPI was not required under the rules in 1992 to pay the appellate docket fees at the
time it filed its appeal. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1,
1997 and which required that appellate docket and other lawful fees should be paid within
the same period for taking an appeal, cannot affect PPI’s appeal which was already
perfected in 1992. The remedy of appeal being an essential part of our judicial system,
caution must always be observed so that every party-litigant is not deprived of its right to
appeal, but rather, given amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.

233. Tan v. Bausch- 478 SCRA 115 [2005]

A case was filed for violation of RPC, for selling fake Ray Ban sunglasses. Petitioners filed
a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
offense and the crime should have been within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Respondent
opposed explaining that BP 129 had transferred the exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide
violations of intellectual property rights from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and SC
issued A.O. No. 104-96 deleting and withdrawing the designation of several branches of
the MTC and MTCC as special intellectual property courts.

Ruling: Supreme Court has rule making power as provided for by the Constitution. A.O.
No. 104-96, was issued pursuant to Section 23 of BP 129 which transferred the jurisdiction
over such crimes from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and which furthermore gave the
SC the authority to designate certain branches of the RTC to exclusively handle special
cases in the interest of the speedy and efficient administration of justice. RTC was vested
with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and decide intellectual property cases.

234. Republic v. Gingoyon- 478 SCRA 474 [2005]

The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex “stands on a parcel
of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of the
government. There are two crucial differences between the respective procedures under
Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of Rules of Court. Under the statute, the Government is
required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint
to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, it requires deposit of 15% of the
value of the property before an expropriator can enter. May Congress amend the ROC?
 Ruling: Since expropriation involves both substantive and procedural matters, the
substantive aspect is always subject to legislation. (See page 348)

235. Camp John Hay Development Corporation v. BIR- GR 172457, December 24,
2008 575 SCRA 467

CJH alleges that CA No. 55 has already been repealed by the Rules of Court; thus, the
remedy of declaratory relief against the assessment made by the BOC is proper.

Ruling: The Court cannot repeal, modify or alter an act of the Legislature. As a substantive
law that has not been repealed by another statute, CA No. 55 is still in effect.

Procedure of Special Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies Effective Unless Disapproved by SC

236. LBP v. De Leon- GR 143275, September 10, 2002

Petitioner argued that an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should prevail
over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary
interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the
power to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the under-privileged.”

Ruling: There is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the adoption of
the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60
of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can co-exist.
Moreover, the same Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted
by the petitioner states that “(r)ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.” Section 60 is obviously
a special procedure.

237. LBP vs. De Leon – MR (March 20, 2003)

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

238. Tan v. COMELEC- 507 SCRA 352 [2006]

COMELEC Rules:
 SECTION 3. When Extended Opinion Reserved.—When in a given resolution or decision
the writing of an extended opinion is reserved, the extended opinion shall be released
within fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of the resolution.
SECTION 4. Period to Appeal or File Motion for Reconsideration When Extended
Opinion is Reserved.—If an extended opinion is reserved in a decision or resolution, the
period to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court or to file a motion for
reconsideration shall begin to run only from the date the aggrieved party received a
copy of the extended opinion.

Ruling: SC declares that Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 18 COMELEC Rules are unconstitutional
and must perforce be struck down to obviate future confusion as to when the 30-day
reglementary period is reckoned and forestall unnecessary delays in the processing and
adjudication of election cases and proceedings. The Constitution grants and authorizes the
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedures as long as such rules concerning
pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights; on the other
hand, this Court has a rulemaking power provided in Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph
(5)—the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

Supervision Over the Judiciary

239. Ampong v. CSC- 563 SCRA 293 [2008]

A prima facie case was filed against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It was confirmed that the person
claiming the eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations. It was
petitioner Sarah Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn
Decir. Ampong admitted the commission of the act and during the said commission; she
was still under the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Teacher. At the time
the case was instituted, Ampong was appointed as interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38,
Sarangani.

Ruling: CSC does not have administrative jurisdiction over Ampong who is now a judicial
employee. The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. The bottom line is
administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless
of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.

Sec. 6. Supervision of Courts

240. Maceda v. Vasquez- 221 SCRA 464 [1993]

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over this case, since the
offense charged arose from the judge’s performance of his official duties, which is under
the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
 Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts.

Ruling: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. It is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them.

241. De Vera v. Pelayo, GR 137354, July 6, 2000 335 SCRA 281;

Petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against Judge
Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 206 (knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory
order) and 207 (malicious delay in the administration of justice) of the Revised Penal Code
and Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Ruling: To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to
review a judicial order or decision—whether final and executory or not—and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an
unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.

242. Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19,2001 361 SCRA 395;

This case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture.

Ruling: The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. From the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof not the
Ombudsman.

243. Fuentes v. OMB, GR 124295, October 23, 2001

The case is a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman’s action
investigating petitioner Judge Fuentes for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) Section 3(e).

Ruling: The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
 appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

244. Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman-265 SCRA 819 [1996]

Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate
an investigation into the alleged "undue delay in the disposition of the case" as said charge
relates to a judge's performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has
administrative control and supervision, as mandated under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling: The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of the Ombudsman is
basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
However, all cases filed before the Ombudsman against members of the Judiciary must be
referred to the SC. SC is mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
to assume administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

245. Garcia v. De la Pena, 229 SCRA 766 [1994] A.M. No. MTJ-92-687

The respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case notwithstanding the fact that he
is related within the second degree of consanguinity to private complainant - in violation
of the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court.

Ruling: The Supreme Court will not hesitate to exercise its full disciplinary powers in the
instant case where the violation is so patent and the same has caused grave injustice to a
party in a criminal case. The facts manifesting respondent’s partiality are patent in the
records. Respondent judge is dismissed from service.

246. Maningas v. Barcenas, AM P-99-1315, Nov. 3, 1999 317 SCRA 721

Respondent had been repeatedly warned against his absenteeism, tardiness, habitual
drunkeness during office hours, loafing, and deliberate disobedience to orders of the court
below to transcribe the stenographic notes on various cases already submitted for decision.
Since his time record was held back for verification, respondent went to the clerk of court,
shouted at her and threatened her.

Ruling: The Supreme Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act, or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary.
247. Grospe v. Sandoval, AM RTJ-00-1534, Feb. 15, 2000 325 SCRA 447

This is a complaint against respondents Judge Lauro G. Sandoval and OIC Clerk of Court
Alexander George P. Pacheco of the RTC Nueva Ecija, charging them with grave abuse of
authority and grave misconduct.

Ruling: The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. OCA found that
the respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority. When the case was submitted
for decision, the case was dismissed for lack of merit based on the records. Article VIII,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

248. Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19,2001 361 SCRA 395;

This case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture.

Ruling: The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. From the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof not the
Ombudsman.

249. Fuentes v. OMB, GR 124295, October 23, 2001

The case is a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman’s action
investigating petitioner Judge Fuentes for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) Section 3(e).

Ruling: The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

250. Adajar v. Develos- 475 SCRA 361 [2005]

A case for misconduct was filed before the Office of Ombudsman Mindanao against
government employees stationed in RTC. Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to
the Executive Judge. The executive judge investigated and forwarded its report back to the
Office of Ombudsman Mindanao. The Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao resolved the
same.
 Ruling: The Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of
the instant case the same being administrative in nature. Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk.

251. Garcia v. Miro- 582 SCRA 127 [2009]

The complaint arose from the death of Julieta’s husband, Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. as a result
of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the petitioner judge and
the motorcycle driven by the deceased.

Ruling: The Supreme Court’s administrative supervision over all inferior courts and court
personnel, does not extend to a criminal case filed against the petitioner which is not related
to the performance of his duties as a judge. However, that prerogative only extends to
administrative supervision. In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was
in no way related to the performance of his duties as a judge.

252. Escalona v. Padillo, AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010 631 SCRA 11

Complainant Lourdes S. Escalona filed a complaint charging respondent Consolacion S.

Padillo, Court Stenographer III with Grave Misconduct. Escalona submitted an Affidavit
of Desistance alleging that the P20,000 was “refunded” to her and this she “voluntarily
accepted” in the presence of Florante Gaerlan, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 119, Pasay City
and Erlinda Dineros, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City.

Ruling: No affidavit of desistance can divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against
erring officials and employees of the judiciary—the issue in an administrative case is not
whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the
employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts.

Sec. 7. Qualifications of Members of Judiciary

253. In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Judge Jaime Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the RTC Davao. Subsequent
thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator received confidential information that
administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then
Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service. In the Personal Data Sheet submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council, Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases filed against him before the
 Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge
Quitain in his PDS.

Ruling: Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed
from the service for grave misconduct by no less than the former President of the
Philippines. It is clear that respondent judge deliberately misled the Judicial and Bar
Council in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. “Dishonesty” means
“disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.” It behooves every
prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter
bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on
his integrity and probity. (See page 354)

254. Kilosbayan v. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 526 SCRA 353

Petitioners contend that the appointment of respondent Justice Gregory Ong to the SC
through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional. Petitioners claim that
Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth
certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners maintain that even if it were
granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted
Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

Ruling: As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under
the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the initial competence to do so. It is clear that from the
records of the Supreme Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen, that is why
he was allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath in the first place. (See page 354)

255. Topacio v. Ong, GR No. 179895, December 15, 2008 574 SCRA 817

Ferdinand Topacio via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, to prevent
Justice Gregory Ong from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because of his questioned Filipino citizenship [in
relation to Kilosbayan vs Ermita (2007).

Ruling: Petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. (See page 355)

256. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. 237428 - For Reporting

(Pa correct nalang. Walang digest sa file. – Nini)

This is a quo warranto case filed by the OSG seeking to invalidate the respondent’s
appointment as chief justice for lack of proven integrity on a ccount of her failure to
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service
 prior to her appointment to the SC, which is in violation of the Constitution, Anti-Graft
Law, and Code of Ethical Stadards for public employees.

Ruling: Members of the judiciary are bound by the qualification of honesty, probity,
competence, and integrity. Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the law. The offense is penal in character and is a breach of ethical standards. For these
reasons, a public official who failed to comply with the requirement of SALN cannot be
said to be of proven integrity and the Court may disqualify her from holding public office.
Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Sec. 8. Judicial and Bar Council

Composition

257. Chavez v. JBC-676 SCRA 579 [2012]

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House of Representatives and one from
the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

Ruling: It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. JBC’s composition, term and functions are provided under
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. The use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.
It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. It is a well-settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

258. De Castro v. JBC- 615 SCRA 666 [2010]

JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included
in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will
succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice, even though the position is not yet
vacant.

Ruling: Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the Judicial and Bar Council
began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to
decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to
the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
Sec. 9. Appointment of Justices and Judges

Sec. 10. Diminution of Salary

259. Nitafan v. CIR- 152 SCRA 284 [1987]

Sec. 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline

260. Vargas v. Rilloraza- 80 PHIL. 297 [1948]
261. De La Llana v. Alba- 112 SCRA 294 [1982]
262. People v. Gacott- 246 SCRA 52 [1995]
263. Lumpas v. Tamin, AM no. RTJ-99-1519

Sec. 12. Non-Judicial Assignments

264. In Re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246
265. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 635 SCRA 783 [2010]

Sec. 13. Conclusions of the Supreme Court-How Reached?

266. Consing v. Court of Appeals, GR 78272, August 29, 1989

Sec. 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Decision expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
Sufficient
267. Air France v. Carrascoso- 18 SCRA 155 [1966]
268. People v. Bravo- 227 SCRA 285 [1993]
269. Hernandez v. CA- 208 SCRA 429 [1993]
270. Francisco v. Permskul- 173 SCRA 324 [1989]
271. People v. Landicho- 285 SCRA 1 [1996]
272. People v. Co- 245 SCRA 733 [1995]
273. People v. Macoy- 275 SCRA 1 [1997]
274. ABD v. NLRC- 286 SCRA 454 [1998]
275. People v. Gastador, GR 123727 [April 14, 1999]
276. People v. Ordonez, GR 136591, July 10, 2000
277. People v. Orbita, GR 1365891, July 11, 2002
278. Lorbes v. CA, 351 SCRA 716
279. People v. Mendoza, GR 143702, Sept. 13, 2001
280. Asia Traders v. CA- 423 SCRA 114 [2004]
281. Tichangco v. Enriquez- 433 SCRA 324 [2004]
282. Ceferina Lopez Tan v. Spouses Antazo, GR 187208, 23 February 2011.
283. Donnina C. Halley v. Printwell, Inc. GR 157549, 30 May 2011.
284. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, GR 17046, 8 June
2011
285. Reiting Solid Homes v. Laserna. Art VIII, Section 14 applies only to the
judiciary)

Insufficient
286. People v. Escober- 157 SCRA 541 [1988]
287. Nicos v. CA – 206 SCRA 127 [1992]
288. People v. Viernas – 262 SCRA 641 [1996]
Accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of murder. In the decision of the RTC
Branch 9 of Aparri, Cagayan, no findings of fact in regard to the commission of the offense
were made and the conclusion of the court was contained in one paragraph.

RULING: Trial court’s decision that did not contain any findings of fact which are
essential in decision-making. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

289. People v. Bugarin – 273 SCRA 384 [1997]

RTC - Quezon City rendered a decision finding accused Marcelino Bugarin guilty of
consummated rape of his daughter. The trial court laconically ruled: “The issue is simple.
Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was raped? The answer of this
Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.” Accused-appellant questions the trial court's
decision for failure to state the facts and law upon which it was based.

RULING: Trial court’s decision that did not contain any findings of fact and law which
are essential in decision-making. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

290. People v. Nadera – 342 SCRA 490 [2000]

RTC-Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, rendered a decision finding accused Elegio Nadera, Jr.
guilty of rape of his minor daughters. It is contended that the trial judge failed to state the
factual and legal reasons on which the accused-appellant’s conviction is based. Its decision
merely narrated the prosecution’s evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No. 7659.

RULING: Yes. The trial judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he
based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the prosecution's evidence
and a bare recital of R.A. No.7659, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for the
decision.

291. Madrid v. CA, GR 130683, May 31 2000

Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner
Eligio Madrid and his co-accused Arsenio Sunido of the crime of homicide, for the killing
of Angel Sunido in Buguey, Cagayan.

RULING: The trial court’s decision, for all its length - 23 pages - contains no analysis of
the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It
contains nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties.
The decision failed to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements.

292. Yao v. CA, GR 132428, October 24, 2000

MeTC-Caloocan City rendered a decision convicting George Yao for unfair competition.
Such decision was affirmed by RTC Branch 121 of Caloocan City. RTC’s decision is now
 being questioned for failing to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which
it is based.
RULING: RTC decision miserably failed to meet the Constitutional requirement. It merely
affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution,
especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution;
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. The parties to a litigation should be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court.

293. People v. Dumaging, GR 135516, September 20, 2000

RTC-Capas, Tarlac, rendered a decision finding the accused Neil Dumaguing guilty of
qualified rape. In accused-appellants appeal, the counsel for the appellant noted the absence
of a statement of findings of facts in the decision of the trial court.

RULING: The trial court failed to include a statement of facts or at least a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The Information upon which the accused was arraigned is not cited nor quoted in
the trial court's decision, which failed to state distinctly the acts allegedly committed by
the accused constituting the crime. The trial court simply stated that the accused is guilty
of rape of his own daughter and that the evidence for the prosecution is not controverted
by the accused without mentioning the evidence the prosecution presented in court.

294. Ong Chiu Kwan, GR 13006, November 23, 2000

MTC-Bacolod City rendered a decision convicting accused Ong Chiu Kwan of unjust
vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a
business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong. Upon appeal, RTC
simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating the reasons
for doing so.
RULING: Failed to comply with the constitutional requirement. The Constitution requires
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

295. Spouse Yu Eng Cho v. Pan America World Airways, Inc., GR 123560, March
27, 2000
A complaint for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents Pan
American World Airways, Inc., Tourist World Services, Inc., Julieta Canilao, and Claudia
Tagunicar for expenses allegedly incurred such as costs of tickets and hotel
accommodations when petitioners were compelled to stay in Hongkong by reason of the
non-confirmation of their booking with Pan-Am. The RTC of Manila, Branch 3, held the
defendants jointly and severally liable, except defendant Julieta Canilao.

RULING: The trial court’s finding of facts is but a summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses and the documentary evidence presented by the parties. It did not distinctly and
clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the factual and legal bases for holding respondents TWSI,
 Pan Am and Tagunicar jointly and severally liable. For failing to explain clearly and well
the factual and legal bases of its award of moral damages, we set it aside in said case.

296. Kao v. C.A., G.R. No. 105014, December 18,2001

Respondent Court of Appeals sustained BOI’s decision in reducing tax credits on net value
earned and net local content applied for by petitioners. Petitioner contends that respondent
BOI did not render a decision in the manner prescribed by its own rules and the law because
it failed to state clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which these are based.

RULING: The Resolution did not qualify as decision, absent a clear and distinct statement
of the facts and the law to support the action. Lacking the essential attribute of a decision,
the acts in question were at best interlocutory orders that did not attain finality nor acquire
the effects of a final judgment despite the lapse of the statutory period of appeal.

297. People v. Pastor, 379 SCRA 181 (2002)

RTC of the City of Tagbilaran, Branch 2 rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
Elpidio Pastor guilty of incestuous rape. Respondent contends that the RTC , in its decision,
failed to clearly and distinctly express the facts and law on which its decision is based as
mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: The RTC judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based
accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated that the complainant "positively
declared that on May 7, 1998, her father (the accused in this case), without her consent,
forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in her being pregnant." He
then concluded that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction, and made a bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 8353. There is no discussion of the facts of the case and the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information, in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction
that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."

298. People v. Lizada, GR 143468, Jan 24, 2003

RTC of Manila rendered a decision finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty of
qualified rape. Respondent contends that the RTC , in its decision, failed to clearly and
distinctly express the facts and law on which its decision is based as mandated by Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: The trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution. It
merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses and merely made referral to the
documentary evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of
the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to
death, on each count.

299. Consing v. CA-425 SCRA 192 [2004]

Sugar Producers Cooperative Marketing Association (SPCMA) filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money against Antonio and Soledad Consing with the RTC-Bacolod
 City which ruled in favor of SPCMA. Petitioner contends that the RTC , in its decision,
failed to clearly and distinctly express the facts and law on which its decision is based as
mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: While Judge Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of his
ruling is not set out in the decision. Judge Querubin failed to meet faithfully the
requirement demanded by the Constitution from the courts in rendering their decisions.
The court must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for the court’s decision so that
if a party appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it
disagrees.

300. Velarde v. SJS-428 SCRA 283 [2004]

SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment
on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the RTC Manila failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision.

RULING: The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts. The assailed Decision
begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then
follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition
sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are
tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has
reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with
the clause SO ORDERED. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to
express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based.

301. Report on the Judicial Audit (MTC of Tambulig)- 472 SCRA 419 [2005]
CASE: In Civil Case No. 183-M, Judge Salvanera rendered a one-page decision without
stating the facts and the law on which it was based in violation of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which provides: No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement
is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached. It
is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal.

302. Lacurom v. Tienzo- 535 SCRA 252 [2007]

Complainant alleges that respondent judge rendered a Decision in violation of the
constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based when it affirmed in toto MTCC’s decision in a case of Unlawful Detainer.
 RULING: Nowhere in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts
which led to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain
respondent judges factual findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she
based her conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the constitutional
directive.

303. Salazar v. Marigomen- 537 SCRA 25 [2007]

Complainant Salazar claims that respondent violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
as well as the Constitution for not clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law on
which his decision was based when it declared the Mancio to be the duly elected municipal
mayor of Madridejos, Cebu.

RULING: Yes. The questioned decision dismissing for lack of merit the election protest
filed by Salazar against Mancio. After a thorough examination of the questioned decision,
it became obvious that the invalidation of the 90 votes against Salazar was made without
indicating in the decision the factual and legal bases therefor. Time and again, the Court
had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the decisions would present a comprehensive
analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the
issues raised by the parties. Respondent failed in this respect.

304. De la Pena v. CA- 579 SCRA 396 [2009]

Petitioners fault the CA for reversing the RTC, and for reinstating and upholding the MTC
decision. Reiterating their arguments before the RTC, they assert that the MTC decision is
null and void for it does not conform to the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and of the Rules of Court.

RULING: We agree with the petitioners that the above decision did not conform to the
requirements of the Constitution and of the Rules of Court. The decision contained no
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. It did not cite any legal authority
or principle to support its conclusion that petitioners are liable to pay respondent the
amount claimed including interests, penalties, attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

305. Office of the President and Presidential Anti- Graft Commission v. Calixto
R. Cataquiz, GR 183445, 14 September 2011.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed in toto the
findings of the OP and PAGC without stating clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor,
which is contrary to the Constitution and the Rules of Court;

RULING: Without any analysis of the evidence on record or a comprehensive discussion

on how the decision was arrived at, the CA absolved Cataquiz of the acts he was accused
of committing during his service as General Manager of the LLDA. Decisions of courts
must be able to address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a
comprehensive analysis or account of factual and legal findings of the court. It is evident
that the CA failed to comply with these requirements.
 306. Republic of the Philippines (University of the Philippines) v. Legaspi, GR
177611, 18 April 2012
Petitioner urges the nullification of the CA’s assailed decision, (ruling that the RTC’s
issuance of said assailed orders was well within its power and duty to review, amend or
reverse its findings and conclusions if it deems it necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction), on the ground that it did not state the facts and the law
on which it is based.

RULING: Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be

informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court, the rule is settled that a decision that does not conform
to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed
legally inexistent.

Legal basis must be stated if a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision shall be refused due course or denied
307. Borromeo v. CA- 186 SCRA 1 [1990]
Petitioner Joaquin Borromeo filed a complaint for damages against the different court officials
of the Supreme Court for usurpation of judicial functions, because the resolutions which
disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained
that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts
and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and
therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

RULING:
1. When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that
the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown
or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
2. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require
members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance
of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions properly
performed by the Clerk of Court.

308. JRB Realty v. CA-271 SCRA 229 [1997]

Petitioner JRB Realty filed before SEC a petition to enjoin private respondent Makati
Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) from submitting the proposal of revision
of the restrictions on the MCBD lots for consideration and/or approval of its members.
SEC dismissed such petition. Respondent CA denied due course to the petition for review
for failure to show prima facie that respondent SEC had committed errors of fact or law
that would warrant a reversal or modification of the assailed decision. Petitioner alleges
that respondent court refused to give due course to its petition and denied reconsideration
without indicating the legal basis therefor.
 RULING: Respondent court actually stated the legal basis for refusing to give due course
to the petition because it failed to show prima facia that SEC had committed errors of fact
or law that would warrant a reversal or modification of the assailed decision. In effect,
respondent court adopted as its own the factual findings of SEC as well as the evidence and
law which supported the conclusion. Respondent court likewise stated the legal basis for
denying the motion for reconsideration.

309. Komatsu v. CA-289 SCRA 604 [1998]

Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of
Appeals was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Petitioner now assails that the
minute resolutions are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
Constitution.

RULING: No. The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through
its two resolutions, after a thorough review of the issues and arguments of the parties in the
plethora of pleadings they have filed, is not only in accord with but is justified by this firm
and realistic doctrinal rule. A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a
Decision of the Court of Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or
adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other words that the
decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.

310. Martinez v. CA, GR 123547, May 21, 2001

Petitioner questions the resolution of the CA affirming the decisions of the RTC-
Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion
owners of the land in dispute.
RULING: The constitutional requirement was fully complied with when the Court of
Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no
reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new.

311. Protacio v. Laya-582 SCRA 417 [2009]

The Court of Appeals’ decision reduced the monetary award granted to petitioner by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) while the resolution denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’
resolution which denied his motion for reconsideration violated Article VIII, Section 14 of
the Constitution.

RULING: The assailed resolution complied with the requirement therein that a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration should state the legal basis of the denial. It
sufficiently explained that after reading the pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate
court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself.

312. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Ronald P. Valderama, GR

186614, 23 February 2011. Reiterating Philippine Health care Providers, Inc. v.
CIR.
 Petitioner appealed the NLRC decision before the CA reinstating the respondent as a
security guard, which was denied. Petitioner contends that the minute resolution issued by
the CA denying its reconsideration was in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

RULING: It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the
petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we
effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has
already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure
to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with
its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.

313. Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-
184-CA-J, 31 January 2012.
Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal
foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review;
and that the respondents as members of the CA’s Sixth Division thereby violated Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: Appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts
or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the legal basis for denying due
course. Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a
collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the
questions raised are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal
basis. There is no need to explain fully the court’s denial, since the facts and the law have
already been laid out in the assailed Decision.

314. Agoy v. Araneta Center, GR 196358, 21 March 2012. Reiterating Borromeo

v. CA
Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the minute resolution issued by the CA since
he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his case resolved on its merits
via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation.

RULING: No law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions that deny due
course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the
same. The notices quote the Courts actual resolutions denying due course to the subject
actions and these already state the required legal basis for such denial. To require the
Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable
and unnecessary.

Sec. 15. Period for Making Decisions

315. Dizon v. Judge Lopez- 278 SCRA 483 [1997]
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the
decision until almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive
 portion constitutes a violation of Section 15 of Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases
lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the date of their
submission.

RULING: The Court finds that respondent judge violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution. Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of
the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read
at such promulgation. It took a year and eight months more before this was done and a
copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994.

316. Mosquera v. Legaspi, AM RTJ-99-1511, July 10,2000

Wilfredo Mosquera filed a verified complaint charging respondent Judge Emilio Legaspi,
then Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, San Jose, Antique, Branch 10, with dereliction of duty
for his failure to resolve/decide Civil Case No. 2530 within the period required by law
despite several follow ups and a motion for early decision.

RULING: In the case at bar, it took respondent Judge more than three years to render a
decision on the case. The case was submitted for decision in June 1994 and decided on
December 2, 1997, clearly in violation of Section 15 of Article VIII.

317. OCA v. Salva, AM RTJ-98-1412, July 19, 2000

Pursuant to a judicial audit conducted by the OCA of the cases submitted for decision or
resolution in the (MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City, the Court Administrator recommended,
among others, that Judges Salva and Gomez be fined for their failure to decide or resolve
the cases submitted to them for decision within the reglementary period.

RULING: Respondent judges failed to decide of resolve the cases within the reglementary
period. This Court has consistently impressed upon members of the judiciary that failure
to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency warranting
the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.

318. Dela Cruz v. Bersamira, AM RTJ-00-1567, July 24, 2000

Respondent judge was charged with the violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and the Code of Judicial
Conduct for allegedly issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which unjustly delay
the administration of justice.
RULING: Respondent judge’s foot-dragging in acting on the incidents in the said cases,
which stopped only when administrative complaints were filed against him with the
Ombudsman and the OCA, is a strong indicia of his lack of diligence in the performance
of his official duties and responsibilities. Failure to decide cases and other matters within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions. If they cannot do so, they should seek extensions from this Court
to avoid administrative liability.
319. Heirs of Sucaldito v. Cruz, AM RTJ-991456, July 27, 2000
 Complainants Zenaida Sucaldito and Carmencita Sucaldito Valencia filed a case
respondent Judge Magno Cruz with malicious delay in the administration of justice for his
failure to rule on a motion for inhibition within ninety (90) days from its submission in the
intestate proceedings of former Senator Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr.

RULING: Respondent judge was able to resolve the motion for inhibition almost six (6)
months after it was submitted for resolution. The Court finds that the respondent judge is
guilty of delay in resolving motions pending before his court. Under Section 15(1)of
Article VIII of the 1987, judges are mandated to dispose of their cases promptly and decide
them within the prescribed periods. The failure of a judge to decide a case seasonably
constitutes gross inefficiency.

320. Sulla v. Ramos, AM-MTJ-00-1319, September 27, 2000

Dr. Rolando A. Sulla filed a case against respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos for
unreasonable delay or refusal to render a decision in a criminal case in behalf of her minor
daughter against Esmeraldo Talacay for acts of lasciviousness. The criminal case was
submitted for decision in April 1997, but as of May 21, 1999, respondent Judge Ramos
has not rendered any decision in the said case.
RULING: The prolonged inaction of respondent Judge over a period of more than two (2)
years cannot simply be ignored. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the
need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article
VIII of the Constitution. This requirement is designed to prevent delay in the
administration of justice because justice delayed is justice denied; and delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people, lowers its standards and
brings it into disrepute.

321. Seares v. Salazar, AM MTJ-98-1160, November 22, 2000

Dr. Maria Cristina B. Seares in a sworn letter complaint charged Judge Rosita B. Salazar
of MTC, Bangued, Abra with ignorance of the law for failure to decide criminal cases for
violation of B.P. No. 22. Complainant alleges that these cases were submitted for decision
on February 14, 1996. Since then no decision has yet been rendered.

RULING:. At the time complaint was filed, which was on November 13, 1996, the
mandatory 90-day period to decide or resolve the case had already lapsed, the cases having
been submitted for decision since February 14, 1996. The non-compliance of the 90-day
period in itself renders the respondent judge subject to administrative liability. It is the duty
of a judge to take note of the cases submitted for his (her) decision and see to it that the
same are decided within the 90-day period fixed by law, and failure to decide a case within
the required period constitutes gross inefficiency.

322. Gil v. Jonolo, AM RTJ-00-1602, December 5, 2000

This is a complaint filed against Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., for failure to decide Civil
Case No. 65268, entitled Maria Isabel A. Del Rosario, Alejandro A. Gil and Jose A. Gil III
v. Angel Gil and Josephine A. Gil within three months. Civil Case No. 65268 was filed on
August 30, 1995. On April 14, 1998, respondent judge issued an order admitting
 defendants Formal Offer of Evidence filed on December 4, 1997 and directing both parties
to submit their respective memoranda in the form of a draft decision within 30 days, after
which the case would be considered submitted for decision.

RULING: The Court finds Judge Janolo’s failure to resolve Civil Case No. 65268 within
the reglementary period to be inexcusable as to warrant the imposition of an administrative
sanction on him. Indeed, this Court has constantly impressed upon judges may it not be
said without success the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be
gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.

323. Aslarona v. Echavez, AM RTJ-03-1803, Oct. 2, 2003

This is an administrative case for Gross Inefficiency and Gross Ignorance of the Law filed
against respondent Judge Antonio T. Echavez, for delay of more than twenty (20) months
in resolving three (3) motions filed in Civil Case No. CEB-23577, Anastacia Alforque Vda.
de Alcoseba v. Victor Aslarona, et al.,

RULING: Respondent Judge failed to act on a Motion to Dismiss and a

consolidated Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and for Contempt of
Court within a reasonable period from the time they were submitted for resolution on 28
January 2000. It was only after twenty (20) months and notwithstanding a motion for early
resolution filed in July 2000 that respondent Judge finally resolved the motions with an
order of denial. Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination can such lengthy period of twenty
(20) months be considered as a prompt disposition of motions envisioned and mandated in
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

324. Unitrust Dev’t Bank v. Caoibes, AM RTJ-03-1745, Aug, 20, 2003

Case not found
325. Re: Request of Judge Javellana, AM 01-6-314-RTC, June 19, 2003
326. Salud v. Alumbres, AM RTJ-00-1594, June 20,2003
327. Samson v. Mejia, AM RTJ-02-1710,June 17,2003

Supplemnent:
328. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Judge Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, Nov. 13,2001

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