Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State Of Bihar & Ors.

(1978 AIR 327)

Facts –
1. The appellant, a B.Sc. Engineering degree-holder in Tele-Communication was appointed as an
Assistant Engineer (Tele-Communication) in September 1963 by the Bihar State Electricity
Board and was sent abroad to the headquarters of M/s. Brown Boveri and Co. Ltd., Badan,
Switzerland for six months specialized training in power line carrier, tele-metering and tele-
control equipment in the modern power system. On his return the appellant was deputed to
look after the entire telecommunication system of the Board. In June 1968, the Board felt the
necessity of maintenance of efficient communication service between the vital centres of
generation, utilization and administration for ensuring reliability and continuity in power
supply which would facilitate quick supervision and checking of the then existing
arrangements oil the generating stations receiving sub-stations and distributing areas as also the
necessity of proper supervision and handling by trained and qualified personnel of large
number of wave-change-over communication equipments on 33 KW Transmission line
which had been installed in the Tele-Communication Sub-Division of the Board at Patna and
were maintained and aligned with the help of special electronic instruments. The Board,
Therefore, accorded Sanction to the creation of a temporary Tele-Communication Division with
headquarters at Patna and also to the creation of a temporary post of Executive Engineer
(Tele-Communication).
2. As per the recommendation of its expert Selection Committee to the effect that the appellant
was fit to be promoted to the rank of the Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication) in view
of the fact that he had consistently good record of service, possessed the degree in Tele-
Communication Engineering, had undergone special training in Switzerland in Tele-
Communication, had ever since his return from Switzerland been satisfactorily performing the
onerous and complex duties assigned to him and had been looking after the entire Tele-
Communication system of the Board and had thus acquired a valuable practical experience in
that field which was necessary to man the post of Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication),
the appellant was appointed temporarily on promotion to the post of Executive Engineer.(Tele-
Communication).

Issues -

(i) Respondents 3 to 28 who were Assistant Electrical Engineers challenged the promotion of the
appellant as mala fide; they were seniors to the appellant and possessed the requisite
qualifications; their cases must have been considered by the Board.

(ii) Whether their supersession is in violation of guarantee of equality of opportunity enshrined

in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Rule of Law –
Article 14: Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
(ii) Article 16 - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

Analysis -
1. Previous holding
The High Court quashed the said orders and held that the case of respondents 3 to 28 who were
seniors to and had better experience and academic career than the appellant had been
unjustifiably ignored by the Board violating the protection of equal opportunity guaranteed
under Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution.

2. Respondents 1 and 2 contended : (i) that Tele-Communication is a highly specialized subject

quite distinct from that of general electricity-, (ii) that respondents 5 to 28 who were merely
graduates of Science in Electrical Engineering were not qualified for the post of Executive
Engineer (Tele-Communication). Respondents 3 and 4 who had only studied telecommunication
as one of the subjects in their final B.Sc. Engineering Examination also were not equally
qualified; (iii) that they had no right to maintain the writ petition; and (iv) that there was no
Question of any breach or violation of the guarantee of equality of opportunity contained in
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

3. Appeal in the Supreme Court

Allowing the appeal, the court held that the process of rulemaking is a protracted and
complicated one involving consultation with various authorities and compliance with many-fold
formalities. Exigencies of administration at times require immediate creation of service or posts
and any procrastination in that behalf cannot but prove detrimental to the proper and efficient
functioning of public departments. In such like situations, the authorities concerned would have
the power to appoint or terminate administrative personnel under the general power of
administration vested in them. In the absence of rules, qualifications for a post can validly be laid
down in the self-same executive order creating the service or post and filling it tip according to
those qualifications.

4. Article 14 explained and related to the facts

The doctrine of equality before law and equal protection of laws and equality of opportunity in
the matter of employment and promotion enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
which is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination is attracted only when equals
are treated as unequals or where unequals are treated as equals. The guarantee of equality does
not imply that the same rules should be made applicable in spite of differences in their
circumstances and conditions. Although Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution forbid hostile
discrimination, they do not forbid reasonable classification and equality of opportunity in
matters of promotion means equality as between members of the same class of employees and
not equal between members of separate independent classes. Though the concept of equal
protection and equal opportunity undoubtedly permeate the whole spectrum of an individual's
employment from appointment through promotion and termination to the payment of gratuity
and pension, it has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature of constitutional
guarantee. Equality is for equals, that is, who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an
equal treatment but the guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be
carried beyond the point which is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.

5. Revision of Facts and Considering

In the instant case: The High Court was in error in thinking that respondents 3 to 28 possessed
qualifications equal to the appellant or that they were-eligible for the job and It is evident from
the perusal of the proposal for creation of a Tele-Communication Division at Patna and the
aforesaid recommendation made by the Selection Committee in favor of the appellant that for
ensuring reliability and continuity in power supply it was absolutely essential that maintenance
of the sophisticated wave-change-over communication equipments of 33 KW installed by the
Board in the Tele-Communication Sub-Division should be entrusted to specially trained
experienced and qualified officer possessing specialised theoretical and practical knowledge of
Tele-Communication which is a subject quite distinct from that of general electricity. It was
only the appellant who possessed degree in B.Sc. Engineering in Tele-Communication, was
separately recruited and specially trained in that line in Switzerland and thus acquired specialised
knowledge therein and acquitted himself creditably in the field for five years who could be said
to possess the requisite qualification and be considered fit and suitable for the job in question
and not any one of the respondents 5 to 28 who were mere graduates in electrical engineering or
respondents 3 and 4 who had studied tele-communication only as one of the subjects in their
final B.Sc. Engineering Examination.

CONCLUSION -
The criterion used by the concerned authority in promoting the appellant was not arbitrary or
capricious but was intended to increase the efficiency in the functioning of the department.
It was not based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations or suffered from any other thing. The
court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and upholds the aforesaid
Notification No. SS/AI-103/68/2676-EB dated June 24, 1968 issued by the Board.
 State of Bihar & Ors vs Bihar State +2 Lecturers
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2519 of 2007

Facts -

1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated March 22, 2004 passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Letters Patent Appeal No. 323
of 2004.Advertisement No. 1 of 1987 was issued by the appellants, inviting applications for
appointment of +2 Lecturers in Secondary Schools in the pay scales of Rs.940-1660 in
Government Schools as well as in Nationalized Schools. The qualification prescribed in the
Advertisement for the post was Post-Graduate Degree in II Class. There was no requirement of
having training for appointment to the said post.

2. In 1989, Members of the Respondent-Association who had Post-Graduate Degree in II Class

but who were untrained, were selected and appointed as Lecturers in Nationalized Schools in the
pay scales of Rs.940-1660. There was resentment amongst the employees against fixation of two
different pay scales of +2 Lecturers based on training. A writ petition was, therefore, filed by the
Association challenging classification made based on training. A Fitment Appellate Committee
was, therefore, constituted by the State Government presided over by a sitting Judge of the High
Court by an order dated January 15, 2000 to go into the anomalies in pay scales of trained
lecturers and untrained lecturers. The Fitment Appellate Committee submitted its report,
recommending payment of uniform pay scales to trained as well as untrained lecturers observing
that different pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers would be arbitrary and unreasonable.

Issues -

(i)Whether the Differentiation which is based on the seniority is considered as a reasonable

classification under Article 14 of the constitution?

(ii)What are the various grounds of reasonable classification and intelligible differentia? Whether
this case follows the grounds mentioned under Article 14 ?

Rule of Law -
Article 14: Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

Analysis:

1. Discussing the background of case

The Contentions of the court on both sides goes as, the learned counsel for the State contended
that the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly wrong in holding that there can be no
difference between trained lecturers and untrained lecturers and that difference in pay scales
would be arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. Whether Classification is Reasonable and Rational

The point raised in the court was that trained and untrained lecturers form different class and
such classification is rational and reasonable. Fixation of different pay scales, therefore, cannot
be said to be arbitrary or irrational. It was also submitted that though the Fitment Appellate
Committee recommended payment of uniform pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers, the
said decision was not in consonance with law. Regarding advertisement issued by the Authorities
for making appointment of +2 Lecturers and non-mention about training, it was submitted that it
related to eligibility for appointment and had nothing to do with pay scales.

3. Referring to the precedents and the previous decisions, the court describes the scope and
ambit of the reasonable restriction and intelligible differentia in detail:

In State of Mysore & Anr. v. P. Narsinga Rao1, In this case different pay scales were described
for the matriculate tracers. It is well settled in this case that though Article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any
impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its
validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The "first test is that the classification on
which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the
differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus
between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the
rule."

In Shyam Babu Verma & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors,2 different pay scales were prescribed
for Pharmacists on the consideration of qualifications and experience. Whereas higher pay scales
were fixed for qualified Pharmacists, unqualified Pharmacists were paid lower pay scales. It was
ruled that it was open to the Government to prescribe different pay scales for different categories
of Pharmacists based on qualifications and experience.

It is also described that, in the advertisement, there is the mention of the eligibility of the persons
for that post and it is no where connected to the pay scales and they have declared that,
differentiation in the pay scales are not reasonable and just.

1
(1968) 1 SCR 407: AIR 1968 SC 349
2
(1994) 2 SCC 521
4. Anomaly in Pay

Firstly, when the Appellate Fitment Committee was appointed by the State Government
presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court of Patna and the matter was referred as
regards anomaly in pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers, the reference expressly
mentioned that the State Government will accept the recommendation of the Committee and the
Committee recommended payment of uniform pay scales to trained as well as untrained teachers.

5. Uniform Pay scales

Secondly, it was stated in the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the untrained lecturers Association (writ
petitioners) that after the report of the Fitment Appellate Committee, the State Government on
January 22, 2001 withdrew its earlier order dated October 19, 2000 for sending untrained
lecturers (in-service candidates) for taking training on the ground that no such training was
mandatory in view of report of the Committee and when uniform pay-scales were to be given to
trained as well as untrained lecturers.

CONCLUSION -

After considering the merits of the case, it was held that the view of the Division Bench of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna was not right in holding that there is no distinction between
trained lecturers on the one hand and untrained lecturers on the other hand and no different pay
scales can be prescribed for trained and untrained lecturers and such fixation of pay scales would
violate Article 14 of the Constitution, and though it holds that the learned single Judge was right
in upholding the classification between trained and untrained lecturers as rational, reasonable and
intelligible, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the court did not intend to interfere with
the final direction issued by the Division Bench in the light of two circumstances referred to
above. Appeal is accordingly disposed of by the court.
 Deepak Sibal & Ors vs Punjab University And Another (1989 AIR 903)

Facts -
1. The prospectus for the year 1988/89, for admission in the evening classes of the Three-Year
LL.B. Degree Course conducted by the Department of Laws of the Punjab University,
prescribed that admission to evening classes was open only to regular employees of Government/
Semi-Government institutions/affiliated Colleges/Statutory Corporations and Government
Companies and that a candidate should attach No Objection/Permission letter from his
employer with his application for admission. Out of the 150 seats available in the evening
classes, 64 were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, physically
handicapped persons, outstanding sportsmen and defence personnel and the remaining 86 were
reserved for regular employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned
in the aforesaid rule for admission.
2. The two appellants, one employed in a Limited Company, a joint venture with an Undertaking
of the State Government and the other working as a temporary employee in a State Govt.
office, applied for admission in the evening classes with 'No Objection Certificates' from their
employees. Both were interviewed but were not selected, although their positions in the merit
list were 29 and 19 respectively, on the ground that wile one of the appellants was an
employee of a Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories as
mentioned in the impugned rule, the other was only a temporary employee.
3. Both the appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court, challenging the validity of the
impugned rule. Petitions were also filed by five other refused candidates. It was contended that
the impugned rule was violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ
petitions. While upholding the validity of the impugned rule, the High Court held that
Government employees had protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution which non-Government
employees did not have and that the employees of the Semi-Government institutions were also
on the same footing. Hence the two appellants filed appeals in this Court.
4. In the counter affidavit filed in this Court the respondents sought to justify the exclusion of
private employees, restricting admission to evening classes only to the Government employees
and similar other institutions on the grounds of production of bogus certificates of employment
from private employers and imparting of legal education to the employees of the
Government/Semi-Government and other institutions as in public interest. It was also contended
that a candidate should have an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years
and that, as far as possible, there should be no possibility of wastage of a seat.

Issues –
(i) Whether the impugned rule violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution ?
(ii)Whether it was a reasonable classification? And whether a classification is permissible ?
Rule of Law –
Article 14: Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

Analysis –
1. Basis for Classification
Article 14 forbids legislation, but does not forbid reasonable classification. Whether a
classification is a permissible classification under Art. 14 or not, two conditions must be
satisfied, namely, (i) that the classification must be rounded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and
(ii) that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.

2. Reasonableness of Classification
In considering, the reasonableness of classification from the point of view of Art. 14 of the
Constitution, the Court has to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be
illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable. No
doubt, a classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no
difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of
the group, then the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one. A classification by the
identification of sources must not be arbitrary but should be on a reasonable basis having a nexus
with the object sought to be achieved.

3. Fair & Logical Objective

In the instant case, the objective of starting the evening classes was to accommodate in the
evening classes employees in general including private employees who were unable to attend
morning classes because of their employment. However, in framing the impugned rule, the
respondents have deviated from its objective for starting the evening classes. The classification
of the employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. by the impugned rule for
the purpose of admission in the evening classes of Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course to the
exclusion of all other employees, is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not sub serve any fair and
logical objective.

4. Classification of Employees for the Admissions

The Government and public sector employees cannot be equated with government undertaking
and companies. The classification of Government undertakings and companies may, in certain
circumstances, be a reasonable classification satisfying the tests laid down but the employees of
Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned in the impugned rule, cannot be
held to constitute a valid classification for the purpose of admission to evening classes of Three
years LL.B. Degree Course. Though the service conditions of employees of Government/Semi-
Government institutions etc. are different, and they may have greater security of service, that
hardly matters for the purpose of admission in the evening classes. The test is whether both the
employees of private establishments and the employees of Government/Semi-Government
institutions etc. are equally in a disadvantageous position in attending morning classes. There can
be no doubt that both of them stand on an equal footing and there is no difference between
these two classes of employees in that regard. To exclude the employees of Private
establishments will not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes the
employees of government/semi-government institutions etc., grouped together from the
employees of Private establishments.

CONCLUSION –
The impugned rule is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is
accordingly struck down as invalid. The refusal by the respondents to admit the appellants in the
evening classes of the Three-Years LL.B. degree course was illegal. The appellants are,
therefore, entitled to he admitted in the evening classes. However, the striking down of the
impugned rule should not in any manner whatsoever disturb the admissions already made for
the session 1988-89. The respondents should admit the appellants in the second semester which
has commenced from January, 1989 and allow them to complete the Three-Year LL.B. The
degree course, if not otherwise ineligible on the ground of unsatisfactory academic performance.
The seats allocated to the appellants will be in addition to the normal intake of students in the
college.
 Amalgamated tea estates co. Ltd and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala

Facts -
The petitioners are joint stock companies with limited liability and have been incorporated in the
united kingdom. One of them has its registered office in Scotland, and the other in England. Both
of them carry on-business also in this country, and particularly in the state of kerala. In kerala
their main business is one” of cultivation and marketing of plantation crops such as tea. It is also
alleged that the impugned statute seeks to treat as unequal companies which are equally
circumstanced. The two petitioners have been assessed to agricultural income-tax act,
1950(herein called the act) as amended by the agricultural income-tax act,1970. The assessment
is made at the rate of 75 per cent of their total income. They challenge the assessment on the
ground that section 2(h) and (k) and clauses (2) and (3) of part 1 to the schedule of the kerala
agricultural income-tax (amendment) act, 1970 are violative of article 14 of the constitution.
Issues –
(i)Whether the discrimination between the foreign and indian (domestic companies) comes under
the reasonable restrictions under Article 14?
(ii)Whether the foreign regulation act and Article 48 are violative of Article 14 of the
constitution?
Rule of Law –

Article 14: Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
Article 48: Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry The State shall endeavour to
organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular,
take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and
calves and other milch and draught cattle.

Analysis -
The petitioners’ contention is that this discrimination between a domestic company and a foreign
company is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification for the purposes of
taxation is not based on any intelligible differentia; and the differentia, if any, has no rational
relation to the purpose sought to be achieved by the taxing statute. Reliance is placed on
Wheeling Steel Corporation v. C. Emory Glander 93 Law. Edn. 1544, where the U.S.A. Supreme
Court has said : ''After a State has chosen to domesticate foreign corporations, they are entitled to
equal protection with the State's own corporate progeny, at least to the extent that their property
is entitled to an equally favorable ad valorem tax basis."
Reasonable and intelligible differentia
It may be pointed out that the Indian Income-tax Act also makes a distinction between a
domestic company and a foreign company. But that circumstance per se would not help the State
of Kerala. The impugned legislation, in order to get the green light from Article 14, should
satisfy the classification test evolved by this Court in a catena of cases. According to that test (1)
the classification should be based on an intelligible differentia and (2) the differentia should bear
a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation. The classification test is, however, not
inflexible and doctrinaire. It gives due regard to the complex necessities and intricate problems
of government. Thus, as revenue is the first necessity of the State and as taxes are raised for
various purposes and by an adjustment of diverse elements, the Court grants the State greater
choice of classification in the field of taxation, than in other spheres. There is no denying the fact
that for various reasons a domestic company may be treated differently from a foreign company
in the field of taxation. According to Article 48 of the Constitution, it is a fundamental obligation
of the State to make "endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and
scientific fines and to take steps for preservation and improving the breeds... of cows and calves
and other milch and draught cattle.'' So it may be safely presumed that the State of Kerala should
be striving to improve agriculture and animal husbandry within its boundaries. It may also be
presumed that in so doing it must be investing considerable money and skill. The State is,
therefore, entitled to raise revenue by taxation for investment in agriculture and animal
husbandry. So it could reasonably demand 75 per cent of total income as tax from a foreign
company. It could demand the same amount of tax from a domestic company also. But the rate
of tax on them is lesser. But the tax relief given to them is not proved to be arbitrary or
unreasonable. It may be that the domestic companies own land which is less fertile or produce
inferior quality of plantation crops while the foreign companies own more fertile land and
produce superior quality of plantation crops. In that case, the domestic companies would not be
able to withstand the competition of the foreign companies and would not survive. The State
might have chosen to give the domestic companies protection against the foreign companies.
And there seems to be yet another good reason for this. The entire income earned by a domestic
company from business inside as well as outside India will remain in India. But a good part of
the income earned by the petitioners inside India would be drained out of India to the United
Kingdom in the shape of dividends, etc. Under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, it is
open to a foreign company to transmit money out of India with the permission of the Reserve
Bank of India. It is thus evident that a greater part of the income and skill of the domestic
companies is likely to be utilised in improving agriculture within the State. It will not be so in the
case of foreign companies.
On these considerations it cannot be said that the classification of companies into domestic and
foreign companies has no rational relation to the purpose of the impugned provisions.
K.T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala and State of Kerala v. Haji K. Kutty Naha deal with taxing
statutes. In the first case, the State of Kerala had imposed a uniform lax levy on land. The taxing
provisions were struck down as violative of Article 14 because according to the Court there was
no classification of persons for the purpose of taxation. In the other case, a uniform building tax
was imposed on buildings according to their floor area. The taxing provisions were struck down
as being discriminatory for total lack of any classification of persons or buildings. The impugned
Act of 1970 does not suffer from this vice. So these cases also do not help the petitioners.
CONCLUSION:
The taxing provisions were stuck down as violative of A 14 because according to the court there
was no classifications of the persons for the purpose of taxation. The court was of the opinion
that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act of 1970 are not violative of Article 14. The
petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.