Module 3 Reviewer
Court the present original action for prohibition which preliminary
I. Philippine Legal System
A. Courts: Who interprets and the Constitution and the law?
1. Judicial Power Defined
LOPEZ, petitioner vs. ROXAS, respondent
G.R. No. L-25716
28 July 1996
Concepcion, C.J.:
Facts:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders Vice
President in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By
Resolution No. 2, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session
assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes
then cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines,
proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office
with 3,531,550 votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest
opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826
votes had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5,
1966, respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal(PET), Election Protest No, 2, contesting the election of
petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the
ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained
the largest number of votes for said office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme
injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the PET from
hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the
ground that RA 1793, creating said Tribunal, is “unconstitutional,”
and that, “all’ proceedings taken by it are a nullity.”
Issues:
 Whether or not RA1793 is constitutional. (Yes)
 Whether or not PET can recount votes. (Yes)
 Whether or not RA1793 violates constitutional tenure. (No)
 Whether or not Justices of SC can sit as PET members. (Yes)
Held:
JUDICIAL POWER is the authority to settle justiciable controversies
or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of
such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or
prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or
disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,”
subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch
of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but the entirety or “all” of said power, except, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
“judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution).
RA 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated
candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the
President elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of
the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to
secure a judgment declaring that he, not the candidate proclaimed
elected by Congress, is the one elected President or Vice-President,
as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the
duties attached to said office.
RA 1793 provides that the PET “shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court”, it has
conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an
exclusive character. It has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The PET is not inferior to the SC,
since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said
Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its ordinary functions. It is like the fact that Courts
of First Instance (now RTC) perform the functions of such ordinary
Courts of First Instance, those of courts of land registration, those of
probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic
relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the
municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority,
pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. In all of these instances, the court (Court of First Instance
or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be
distinct and, even, separate.
The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of any public officer is essentially judicial.
As such—under the very principle of separation of powers—it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as
the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why
said organic law ordains that “the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members” (Article VI, Section 11, of
the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was
to exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of
Congress—which by nature is judicial—from the operation of the
general grant of judicial power to “the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law”.
The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or Vice President, has obtained the largest number of
votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with
the jurisdiction vested in the PET. Congress merely acts as a national
board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty
to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns only
certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII,
Section 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) Upon the other hand, PET
has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified
election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each,
and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of
each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in
the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.
The authority of the PET to determine whether or not the protestant
has a better right than the President and/or Vice-President to be
declared elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional
tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that
the person really elected President or Vice-President is the
protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the
latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence,
he can claim no abridgment thereof.
In imposing upon the Supreme Court, the additional duty of
performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon
the appointing power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties
constitutes, neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of
an officer. Said law is constitutional.
Ruling:
Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby DISMISSED, and the writs
therein prayed for DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. SERENO,
respondent
G.R. No. 237428
11 May 2018
Tijam, J.:
Facts:
The Office of the Solicitor General initiated the case for quo
warranto asking the court to declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold
office for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and net
worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures show that
she does not possess “proven integrity” demanded of every aspirant
to the Judiciary.
Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law
(UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009.
On July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position
of Associate Justice of the SC.
Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to
2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel of various
government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP
Human Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of
the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment
Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by Respondent were
those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have
been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was
employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed
when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and
when she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August
2010.
The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine
probable cause. Among the Justices who appeared before the
Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted (a) CJ
Sereno’s bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary
Decentralized Office, (b) the suspicious issuance of the TRO in the
Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege of Members
of the Court to nominate for vacant judicial posts, and (d) the
clustering of the Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice Peralta who
testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson of the Council that
nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice Bersamin; (4) Justice Tijam; and, (5)
Justice Jardeleza.
The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available
remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment,
and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It
also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The
petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her SALNs
as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required
number of SALNs, Respondent has not proven her integrity, which
is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus
concludes that since Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief
Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and
may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may
only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of the
Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she
argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should have
been filed within one year from the cause of ouster, and not from the
discovery of the disqualification.
It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers
without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not
required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years
that she was on official leave without pay, she was actually not
required to file any SALN. She adds that to require the submission of
SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications
provided by the Constitution.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of
Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient and
acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently
filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues that the Court’s rationale in
Doblada that one cannot readily conclude failure to file SALNs
simply because these documents are missing in the Office of the
Court Administrator's files should likewise be made applicable to her
case.
Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed
Motions for Leave to Intervene echoing some or all of CJ Sereno’s
arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed a similar motion
alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court from the Senate
Impeachment Court.
CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro,
imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified before the
House Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for his
purported insinuations of CJ Sereno’s psychological fitness during
the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also prayed that the Motion for
Inhibition be by the SC En banc without the participation of the
Justices who are asked to inhibit.
Issues:
 Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.
 Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the
Associate Justices on the basis of actual bias is proper.
 Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against
Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against
whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed
with the House of Representatives;
 Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground
of prescription;
5. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief
Justice:
 Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for
nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC, and
whether such determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review
powers;
1. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated
by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the
failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment
of Respondent as Chief Justice;
2. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission
of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the
failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice; and
3. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
 Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
Held:
Propriety of Motion for Intervention
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be
affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of right but
addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with
the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b) that no delay or
prejudice should result.
The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the
motions for intervention filed by several other groups. It observed
that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion; that movant- intervenors have no legal interest in the
case, as required in order to qualify a person to intervene; and that
the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in a
particular group.
Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned
position, which is the only time when an individual himself/herself
may commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the
movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled
to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged with the
usurpation thereof.
The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo
warranto proceeding, by its nature, is one brought by a person
claiming to be entitled to the usurped office.
Propriety for Motions for Inhibition
There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must
prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to
disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a whole, was
only to prod the Respondent to observe and respect the
constitutional process of impeachment. It does not appear that
there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary
inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices
participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the impeachment of Respondent
does not disqualify them to hear the instant petition.
Their appearance was in deference to the House of Representatives
whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment
complaint filed against Respondent could not be doubted. Their
appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme Court En
Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set
for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing should be carefully
viewed within this context and should not be hastily interpreted as
an adverse attack against Respondent.
The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a
case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may
be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only exception to
the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory
inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the
Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on
Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of
respondent does not make them disqualified to hear the instant
petition. Their appearance thereat was in deference to the House of
Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not be
doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the
Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters
that the Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing,
should be carefully viewed within this context, and should not be
hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against respondent.
A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila
Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was
only to prod respondent to observe and respect the constitutional
process of impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public
accountability.
Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po
maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador,” is clearly a hypothetical
statement, an observation on what would the Court be if any of its
Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the Court cannot
ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin’s remark that he was offended by
respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of the Supreme
Court when she withdrew the Justices’ “privilege” to recommend
nominees to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be
presumptuous to equate this statement to a personal resentment as
respondent regards it.
Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on Justice
also contradicts respondent’s allegation that Justice Peralta’s
apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent caused the
exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice
Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of applications for the
position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta has made it clear
during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has
already moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his
testimony was merely to protect prospective applicants to the
Judiciary.
Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and
partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was sought,
respondent’s motions for inhibition must perforce fail. Mere
conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge
or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law
and evidence, and without fear or favor, should not be abandoned
without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Jurisdiction over Petition for Quo Warranto
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such
writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant
case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action
for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a
Member of the Court. The issue is of transcendental importance, is
one of first impression, and of paramount public interest.
The origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto
are materially different. Impeachment proceedings are political in
nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding
exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to
vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands
of the public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay
in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2)
grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Thus, there is no forum shopphing in
the instant case as the nature and purpose of the remedies are
different, and there is yet no impeachment trial.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed
from office. Article XI, Sec. 2 of the Constitution uses the permissive
term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. To subscribe to
the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of
any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding.
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings
does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit
the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment
or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject
of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes
an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy squarely
presented before it. Indeed, the easiest way to lose power is to
abdicate it.
Prescription does not lie against the State
The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a
mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for
public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court,
the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the
necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word
“must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be
stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no
application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public
right.” In effect, when the government is the real party in interest,
and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense
on the ground of laches or prescription.
Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie against
the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil
Code, applies in this case.
Further, that prescription does not lie in this case can also be
deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto, which
is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully
asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning
Respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the
cause of ouster.
Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she
should not be required to submit the said documents as she was
considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering
that the same are more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already
cleared her of “all academic/administrative responsibilities, money
and property accountabilities and from administrative charges”. She
has never been clear on whether she had filed the required SALNs or
not. Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction,
in this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an
abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and
vindicate public interest.
Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the
novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us than to
dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.
Ineligibility as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief
Justice
The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own rules. The Court's supervisory
power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules
and procedures.
The SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the Constitution
and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws and its
implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one who fails to
file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws; and one
who violates the Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to
be a person of integrity as such equation is theoretically and
practically antithetical. The obligation of members of the Judiciary
to file their respective SALNs is not only a statutory requirement but
forms part of the mandatory conduct expected of a judge so that an
“honorable competent and independent Judiciary exists to
administer justice and thus promote the unity of the country, the
stability of government, and the well-being of the people.”
To be of proven integrity, as required by qualifications under the
Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a
steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line,
failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is
penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set
for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of
transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these
reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the
requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven
integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from
holding public office.
Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate
integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but
whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory
requirement of filing of SALNs.
That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the SALN
laws holds no water as the duty to comply with such is incumbent
with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for the UP
HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that
time; 5) That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement
was reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist prepared by
the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her
qualifications which were mistakenly believed to be present, and
that she should have been disqualified at the outset.
The established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit
the required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set by the JBC
itself during the process of nomination. The JBC determined that she
did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked
by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was
already required. There was no indication that the JBC deemed the
three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by
Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P. College of Law
and two years as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent was
specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the
U.P. College of Law.
In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only
the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001- 2011, for
applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En
Banc did not do away with the requirement of submission of SALNs,
only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of
the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all
SALNs, was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only
remaining applicant-incumbent Justice who was not determined by
the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent,
who submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even
after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so. Her
justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the
SALNs are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able
to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her
years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in obvious contrast
with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or
whose years in government service correspond to the period prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713. The clearance issued by UP HRDO
hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.
The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing respondent of
her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the
date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such could not, by any
stretch of imagination, be considered as compliance with the SALN
requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer, performing
ministerial and administrative duties, could not have certified
respondent's compliance with the filing of SALNs which is a
statutory, and not merely an administrative, requirement.
The failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the
public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant's
fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty.
Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and
lack of candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts
committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now
matters of public record and also determined to be constituting
probable cause for impeachment. Respondent's ineligibility for lack
of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
De facto Officer
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is
ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give
him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer.
For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to
hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable
right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never attained the
status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office,
other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a
quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust
Respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and
exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of
Respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and
duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
Sub Judice Rule
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to members of
the Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance thereof is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of
the Government and even men and women learned in law had
succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert the instant
quo warranto action from its primary purpose. Even worse,
Respondent and her spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's
case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before
several media-covered engagements. Through her actuations,
Respondent appears to have forgotten that this is a court action for
quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant rule on sub judice
applies.
Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on
hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to judicial
independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is
a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be stated that this
is not a fight for democracy nor for judicial independence. This is an
undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the Republic, to
judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or
otherwise, of Respondent to occupy the highest position in the
Judiciary.
It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation of
due process when she herself chose to litigate her case before the
media. when aggressive actions are taken against the Judiciary as an
institution and clouds of doubt are casted upon the people's faith in
the administration of justice, especially so when the same are
perpetrated by members of the Bar, this Court cannot be apathetic
to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing to
do is to stand and deal with it head on.
Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent is OUSTED and
EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared
vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and
for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
2. Separation and Blending of Powers
ANGARA, petitioner vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, respondent
G.R. No. 45081
15 July 1936
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, q935, petitioner, Jose A. Angara
and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district for having received the greatest number of votes. On
November 15, the petitioner took his oath of office.

On December 8, respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of the
petitioner, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolution No. 8, and praying that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
On December 9, the Electoral Commision adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
On December 20, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
Motion to Dismiss the Protest, alleging (a) that the Resolution No. 8
of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period;
On December 27, respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an An answer to
Motion of Dismissal alleging that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election
of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua’s
protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commission as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issues:
 Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative. (Yes)
 Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.
Held:
YES, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments.
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation
of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found
in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our constitution.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
No, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming the cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly.” The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
Ruling:
Petition for the writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission
is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
3. Hierarchy of The Philippine Judicial System
a. Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent
G.R. No. 205728
21 July 2015
Leonen, J.:
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′ ) by ten feet (10′ ) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
 candidates as either “(Anti -RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or
“(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
Team Patay: Juan Edgardo Angara, Teddy Casino, Alan Peter
Cayetano, Jackie Enrile, Francis Escudero, Risa Hontiveros, Loren
Legarda,
Partylist Gabriela, Partylist Akbayan, Partylist Bayan Muna, Partylist
Anak Pawis
Team Buhay: JV Estrada, Gregorio Honasan, Mitos Magsaysay, Koko
Pimentel, Antonio Trillanes, Cynthia Villar, Partylist Buhay Partylist
Ang Pamilya
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
Issues:
 Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review. (No)
 Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before
the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions. (No)
 Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens. (No)
 Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression. (Yes)
 Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation. (Content-Based)
 Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
(Yes)
 Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech. (No)
Held:
First Issue
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
the fundamental right to expression.

Also, the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of
whether an issue involves a truly political and non -justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to
the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.
Second Issue
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness
is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election
offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
Third Issue
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
Fourth Issue
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds
no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate,
political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the
tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
Fifth Issue
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents
of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.
The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must
be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Sixth Issue
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law.
Seventh Issue
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion
in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of
the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality- With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion
into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
 It has a secular legislative purpose;
 It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
 It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The
act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22,
2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
b. Highest Court of the Land: The Supreme Court
I. The Supreme Court: En Banc and Division
Cases
 FIRESTONE CERAMICS, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent
G.R. No. 127245
28 June 2000
Purisima, J.
Article VIII, Section 4, Paragraph 2 -3
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Facts:
99 hectares of land presumptively owned by the Republic of the
Philippines was adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged
to be without jurisdiction. Petitioners submitted these consolidated
cases to the SC Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc.
Under Supreme Court Circular No.2- 89, dated Feb. 7, 1989,
amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
Xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order,
or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and
Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or
both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
 8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court
en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to
merit its attention.
When the Motions were first brought to the attention of the Court
on March 7, 2000, it opined that since the Third Division had not yet
acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was
premature for the Court to resolve the motion.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4 -1 to deny petitioners
motion to transfer the cases to the Banc. On March 14, 2000, the
Court deliberated on the motion and voted 9-5 to accept the cases
for the banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases are of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.
This action of the Court is a legitimate and valid exercise of its
RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership
may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
Issues:
Whether or not the nine justices who voted to treat the
consolidated cases as En Banc cases did not have any cogent or
compelling reason for such action. (No)
Held:
The finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling
enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En banc has to
act upon and decide petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.
It has to be stressed that where the Court En Banc entertains a case
for resolution, it does so without implying that the Division of origin
is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the
Court simple means that the nature of the cases calls for an en banc
attention and consideration.
It should also not be concluded that the Court took undue advantage
of sheer voting strength.
It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable
opinion of the majority that; indeed, subject cases are of sufficient
importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which
is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated
as en banc cases; and petitioner’s motions for reconsideration are
hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m.

II. The Supreme Court: Rule-Making Powers
FABIAN, petitioner vs. DESIERTO, respondent
G.R. No. 129742
16 September 1998
Regalado, J.:
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Facts:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation, which was engaged in a
business transaction with Nestor Agustin, the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, persuaded the
petitioner into having an
amorous relationship with him. Their affair lasted for some time, in
the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for the corporation’s problems.
Because of some misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents,
Fabian wanted to terminate their relationship, but Agustin
threatened her not to.
Fabian then filed an administrative case against Agustin with the
Ombudsman, but Agustin was eventually exonerated.
Fabian argues that Sec 27, of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
allows that all decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten days
from receipt of the written notice. She also argues that the
Ombudsman cannot restrict the right to appeal and cannot limit the
power of review of the SC.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 27 of RA 6670 is unconstitutional. (Yes)
Held:
Sec. 30, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The
constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure
of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
The very provision cited by the petitioner does not include quasi-
judicial agencies such as the OMB. Under the present Rule 45,
appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari
but only from judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi- judicial agencies.
Furthermore, the legislative background of RA 6770 shows that the
Conference Committee Report was aware of the provisions of
Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator
Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of the bill
admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction,
and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not
consulted this Court on the matter.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional and appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any
other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act
and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are
hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court
of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered
by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under
Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or
records as it may deem necessary and proper.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, petitioner vs. MANALO,
respondent
G.R. No. 180906
7 October 2008
Puno, C.J.:
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5:

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Facts:
Procedural
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein
respondents to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Respondents filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo
Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed, among others, that:
(1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) they be granted the interim reliefs
allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule;
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
Circumstances
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred
to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion
that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army
(NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on 13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond
and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007,
the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in
their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of
Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to
Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo
Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and
Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to
treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On 25 October 2007,
the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as
a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise
granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court
of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of
the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation
reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of
Issues:
 Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
 Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for
the right to security of a person may be invoked.
Held:
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the
quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an
enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim
during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and
the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and
candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements
can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left
by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the
places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers
are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO
PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to
security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise
of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from
fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the
word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person. xxx Second, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule,
one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.
Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion
of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities,
and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are
an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. xxx Third,
the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this
right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security
of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that
the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from fear as a right
– In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from
fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security
is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is
a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can
range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another
with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo
context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually
the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with
violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is
a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier
part of the provision. Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before
the right to security may be invoked – While the right to security of
person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article
9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can
exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need
not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked
.
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF AMPARO:
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition
in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The
Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based
perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, hence representatives from all sides of the political
and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in
light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence
of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.
Ruling:
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool
that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is
affirmed.
c. Third Level Courts:
i. Court of Appeals
CARPIO-MORALES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent
G.R. No. 217126-27
10 November 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were
accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in connection with the Procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an
investigation report and filed a complaint charging Binay JR. with six
Administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal
cases for violation of Section e of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds and Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then
placed Binay under preventive suspension for not more than six
months.
Proceedings before the CA
Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various
reasons including his opinion that his re-election as Mayor of Makati
for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability.
The TRO was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also
filed by Binay against the Ombudsman and various other officials for
deliberately refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to
course to the petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to
file her comment.
Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman
pleaded that the Court abandon the Condon action doctrine, the
case was then submitted to the Court for resolution.
Issues:
 Whether or not the present petition and not motions for
reconsideration of the assailed CA issuance, is the
Ombudsman plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (No)
 Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over
the main petition for certiorari. (Yes)
 Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
(Yes)
 Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually WPI enjoin in the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay Jr. based on the condonation doctrine. (No)
 Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay Jr. petition for contempt is improper and
illegal. (Premature Issue)
Held:
First Issue
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general rule
a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court
prior to resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can
still be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
a. Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a
quo has no jurisdiction.
b. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
c. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable.
d. Where under the circumstances a motion for
reconsideration would be useless.
e. Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief.
f. Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable
g. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for
lack of due process.
h. Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object.
i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and the public interest is involved. The cases involve both
constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman,
the Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine thus it involves an issue of
transcendental public importance. Thus, the Ombudsman direct
resort to certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion
for reconsideration was filed.
Second Issue
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman
argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter is
based on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same
states: Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued
by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence
that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure questions of law.
The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
bans the whole range of remedies against issuance of the
Ombudsman by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or
finding of the Ombudsman and any application of remedy against
the same except for decisions or findings taken to the Supreme
Court on pure questions of law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A
rule 45 appeal can only be taken against final decisions or orders of
lower courts and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies
including the Office of the Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert
provides that increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
without its advice and concurrence is in violation of Section 30,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 14 of RA 6770 attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, therefore it is concluded that the
second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before
the CA to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule
65 petition is the remedy against final and unappealable orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was
declared unconstitutional it is concluded that the CA had subject
matter jurisdiction over the petition.
Third Issue
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoin in the implementation of the a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices
independence under the 1987 Constitution insulated the said Office
from judicial intervention. The constitution envisions the
Ombudsman as an authority to directly check and guard against the
ills, abuses and excesses, of the bureaucracy. From the case of
Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman independence covers
three things:
1. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office
cannot be abolished nor its constitutionally specified
functions and privileges be removed, altered or modified by
law unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made
2. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose
its funds for purposes germane to its function.
3. Insulation from executive supervision and control which
means that those within the ranks of the Office can only be
disciplined by internal authority.
However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be
invoked to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. This is because the courts
are apolitical bodies which may apply justice to all. Thus the
Ombudsman is not exempt from judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the
courts of justice is to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. This provision vests in the
Judiciary particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislative
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because of grave abuse of discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
An example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where
the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and
writs of preliminary injunction (WPI) were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed
the first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, it took away the courts’
power to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’
constitutional rule-making authority. This same act does not allow a
court to exercise its full functions.
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the
first paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, pending deliberation
on whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole
authority over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from
issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, with Congress
interfering with matters of procedure without the consent of the
Court, the CA had the authority to issue the injunctive writs.
Fourth Issue

In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned thus
the TRO and the WPI of the CA was given no effect. The purpose of
a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who is being
suspended from using the powers of his office to influence witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to nullify
the preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr re-
election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to
the Makati Parking Building Project. The CA found it sufficient that
the application of the condonation doctrine was enough to enjoin
the implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual
v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the
condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
1. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the
term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct, also offenses committed, or acts done
during the previous term are held not to furnish cause for
removal.
2. An elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of
previous Misconduct, cutting the right to remove him for
these aforesaid acts.
3. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed
to know the life and character of their candidates of their
right to elect officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because
the legality of the doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and
employees must be accountable to the people at all times and that
public office is a public trust. The LGC provides that an elective
official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office for
disloyalty, culpable violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty,
oppression, Misconduct in office etc. The LGC also provides that
those officials removed from office as a result of an administrative
case are disqualified from running for any elective local office.
Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including
the ones cited above, the Court concluded that the doctrine of
condonation is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local officials’ administrative liability
for a Misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by
the fact that he was elected to a second term or another elective
post. There is no support to the statement in the case of Pascual that
the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect
their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned, in other
words there is no legal basis that election implied condonation.
There is also no presumption in any rule of law that the electorate
upon re-election an official, have disregarded or forgave the officials
faults. The electorate rarely has full knowledge of an official’s
misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are shrouded in secrecy.
Condonation cannot be subscribed to because its implied
forgiveness, which requires knowledge of the acts being forgiven for
and in the absence of knowledge of these acts there can be no
condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the
condonation doctrine in our jurisdiction, yet this abandonment was
deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases
after this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also
done for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
Fifth Issue
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The
Ombudsman’s contention is that as an impeachable officer she
cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this
penalty is criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal
from office. However, her being subjected to contempt proceedings
in the resolution, makes it clear that even though she is still ordered
to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr
contempt petition. Thus, in this comment, the Ombudsman may
raise her objections to the contempt proceedings and the CA may
still opt to not give due course to the same contempt proceedings.
Absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due
course by the CA it would then be premature for the Court to rule on
the issue.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the
premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
a. The second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against
the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other
than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision is declared INEFFECTIVE
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor;
b. The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the
abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;
c. The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr’s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 in light of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s supervening issuance of its Joint Decision
dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively
liable in the six (6) administrative complaints, docketed as
OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15- 0059Ê OMB-C-A-15-
0060Ê OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15- 0062 and OMB-C-
A-15-0063; and
d. After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-
Morales’s comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay,
Jr’s petition for contempt in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139504 with
utmost dispatch.
ii. Court of Tax Appeals
Republic Act No. 9282 (Third Level Courts: Court of Tax Appeals)
Under R.A. No. 9282:

The Court of Tax Appeals was elevated to the same level as the Court
of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers of a Court of Justice.
It shall now consist of one (1) Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate
Justices. They shall have the same qualifications, ranks, category,
salary, emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements
and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. It
shall sit en banc, or in two (2) divisions with three (3) Justices each. A
decision of a division of the CTA may further be appealed by verified
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
. iii.
(Due to the enactment of RA 9503 on 12 June 2008 and took effect
on 5 July 2008, the organizational structure of the CTA is further
enlarged by the creation of a Third Division which has three (3)
additional Justices. Therefore, CTA is now composed of one (1)
Presiding Justice and eight (8) Associate Justices. The CTA may sit
en banc or in three (3) divisions with each division consisting of three
(3) Justices.)
The CTA’s original appellate jurisdiction was expanded to include the
following:
1. Criminal cases involving violations of the NIRC and the Tariff
and Customs Code;
2. Decisions of the RTC in local tax cases;
3. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(CBAA) in cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property; and
4. Collection of internal revenue taxes and customs duties the
assessment of which have already become final.
Article XI, Section 4 of the Philippine Constitution
SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Sandiganbayann
Republic Act No. 8249 (Third Level Courts: Sandiganbayan)
Under R.A. No. 8249:
Sandiganbayan is a special court, of the same level as the Court of
Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
It shall consist of one (1) presiding justice and (14) fourteen associate
justices who shall be appointed by the President.
Before RA 8249 was enacted, the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan was
determined based on the penalty imposable on the offense or
offenses charged on the accused. Under RA 8249 Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction regardless of the penalty, so long as the offense
charged was committed by a public officer.
To determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, two (2)
criteria must be taken into consideration, namely: (1) The nature of
the offense and (2) The salary grade of the public official.
Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, (Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act)
B. Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
department heads;
b. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other department heads;
c. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
d. Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval
captains and all officers of higher rank;
e. Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of
Provincial Director and those holding the rank of
Senior Superintendent or higher;
f. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants;
officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
g. President, directors or trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
2. Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Classification
Act of 1989;
3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision
of the Constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
C. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public
officials and employees mentioned above;
D.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986
Sandiganbayan has Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court in:
Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive
of the Supreme Court
The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction in: Final
judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases
falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
but which were committed by public officers below Salary Grade 27.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in govemment -owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Therefore, private individuals can be sued in cases before the
Sandiganbayan if they are alleged to be in conspiracy with the public
officer.
Art. XI, Sec. 4:
Section. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
DUNCANO, petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent
G.R. No. 191894
15 July 2015
Peralta, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner in this case Danilo A. Duncano is the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as
classified under RA No. 6758. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him
for the violation of Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.
Duncano allegedly willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose
in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus
Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof,
and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of
his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets,
to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under
Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear a case because
he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a
Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below
Salary Grade 27.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials
of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those
specifically enumerated. This is so since the term “Regional Director”
and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies
that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but
are conjoined together “relating one to the other” to give effect to
the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional
Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its
salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials
occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding
that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions
where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249
unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over
officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the
position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support
of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Inding and Binay v.
Sandiganbayan were cited.
Issues:
Whether or not, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section
4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade
of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Yes)
Held:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27
or higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated
in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact,
on all fours with Cuyco.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)
and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional
director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction,
even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director
II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the
Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs
prayed for.
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified
as Director II with Salary Grade 26. There is no merit in the OSP’s
allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for
certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and
February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division,
which denied petitionerÊs Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
d. Second Level Courts
i. Regional Trial Court
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Second Level Courts: Regional Trial
Courts) Under BP Blg. 129: Section 18. Authority to define
territory appurtenant to each branch.
The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of
the different parts of the region and making the attendance of
litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or
claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where
the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (200,000.00);
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
7. In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
 Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as
now provided by law; and
8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691*).
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
1. In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
2. In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts.
The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may
give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations
cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall
under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or
such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial
Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases
and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable
under present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless
subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by
the Supreme Court.
e. First Level Courts
 i. Municipal Trial Courts; Metropolitan Trial
Court
Republic Act No. 7691 (First Level Courts: Municipal Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities)
Under R.A. No. 7691:
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does
not exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or
amount of the demand does not exceed two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,00.00), exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees:
Provided, further, That where there are several claims or
causes of actions between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
 Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
4. Jurisdiction
ECHEGARAY, petitioner vs. SECRETARY JUSTICE, respondent
G.R.No, 132601
19 January 1999
Puno, J.:
Facts:
The Secretary of Justice filed for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining Echegaray’s execution and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The Secretary of Justice claims that the decision of the case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit
of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may
be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority. It
further included in its position a copy of the House of
Representatives’ resolution which advised the branches of
government to immediately implement the re-imposition of the
death penalty.
Issues:
 Has the Court lost jurisdiction of the case at bar and hence
can no longer restrain the execution of Echegaray? (No)
 After a decision has become final and executory, does the
execution enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive department? (No)
Held:
First Issue
The Court does not lose jurisdiction of case after a decision has
become final and executory.
The important part of a litigation is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance
of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of
the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice. It bears repeating that
what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own
Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court,
contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of
a law enacted by Congress.

In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment.
But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of
the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Second Issue
After a decision has become final and executory, the execution does
not enter the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department. The Secretary of Justice uses Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitution which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
The above provision is simply the source of power of the President
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. The suspension of the death sentence is an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects are the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to
provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
5. Basis of Decision
Article VIII. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner vs. of Surigao City RTC for the enforcement of the of the foreign court’s
COURT OF APPEALS judgment.
G.R. No. 114323
CLAUSE 15 “All questions, disputes and differences, arising under
23 July 1998 out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the
Martinez, J.: exclusive jurisdiction of the court , within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated.”
Facts:
CLAUSE 16 "All questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of
Petitioner, Oil and Natural Gas Comm. (ONGC) is a foreign the specification, designs, drawings and instructions herein before
corporation controlled and owned by the Indian government. mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship of the items ordered
Respondent, Pacific Cement Company Inc. (PCCI), is a private or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but
corporation organized under Philippine Law. qualified to "in any way arising or relating to the supply
order/contract, design, drawing, specification, etc.,"
On February 26, 1983 respondent agreed to supply the petitioner
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the Issues:
petitioner paid $477,300.00 through a letter of credit.
 Whether
The oil well cement was loaded on MV SURUTANA NAVA ship at ornotthearbitratorhadjurisdictionoverthedisputeunder Clause
the port of Surigao City for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. 16 of the contract. (Yes)
Due to a dispute between the ship owner and the respondent, the
cargo remained in Bangkok and failed to reach its destination.
Respondent failed to give the 4,300 metric tons of cement despite
petitioner’s demands. They agreed that the respondent will replace
the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement
cost free at the petitioner’s designated port. However, upon
inspection, the Class “G” cement did not conform to the petitioner’s
specifications.

B. The Power of Judicial Review: What is Constitutional or

On July 23, 1988, arbitrator, Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute
in petitioner’s favor amounting to $899,603.07, Foreign court issued Unconstitutional?
notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition. C. Judges: New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
The private respondent complied and sent its objections dated
January 16, 1989. Foreign court refused to admit the private
Judiciary
respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and
thereafter issued an Order on February 7, 1990Private respondent
refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to
the petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30