1. Suroza v.

Honrado
110 SCRA 388

FACTS:

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his
wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A
certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then
delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn
used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73
years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she
allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.
Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and issued
orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing
the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a
motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn
was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration
and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of
administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the
probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting
that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that
she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will was written.
She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s
son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the
fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day period
within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in
the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her
failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge
Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.

ISSUE:

W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is
void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged
will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.

HELD:

YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an
obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will,
it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it
was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that
the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina
Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful
and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed
father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition,
respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have
ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

2. TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES, petitioner-
administrator-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee.

This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga
Vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.

On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On
December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several
grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine,
that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the
signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this
decision petitioner appealed to this Court.

While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court, we believe, however, that for purposes of this appeal of
discussion of some would be sufficient. Thus, the issues may be boiled down as follows: 1) Whether or not the
signatures of the deceased appearing in the will (Exhibit "C") are genuine; 2) whether or not there is evidence to
show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was written; and 3) whether or not the testatrix was of
sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.

1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner presented as witnesses the
three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin
Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. The first used to provide the deceased with ice every day, and in one of those
occasions she went to her house to bring ice, she requested to act witness to the execution of the will. The second
was a laborer whose job was is to fix bed made of rattan, and in one of those days he went to the house of the
deceased to work, he was asked also to witness the signing of the will. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased
for many years who was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. These witnesses testified in their own
simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed
in their presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the
presence and in the presence of each other. This is the substance of what they have testified and from an
examination of their testimony to the court entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. There is nothing in their
testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance
which may give rise to the suspicion that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. They
have impressed the court as simple persons who had intervened in the execution of the will out merely of deference
to the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to be a good and respectable woman.

What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony of these instrumental witnesses? only one
expert witness, Jose G. Villanueva, who made a comparative analysis of the signatures appearing in the will in
relation to some genuine signatures of the deceased, and in fact testified on the analysis and study he has made of
said signatures and submitted a memorandum on the study and comparison he has made. And in his testimony as
well as in his memorandum, this witness has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the
deceased appearing in the will is not the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and which he
used as basis of his analytical study, thereby concluding that said signatures are not genuine. The lower court gave
full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and decreed as a result that the will cannot be admitted to
probate.
There are, however, certain important facts and circumstances which make us differ from this opinion of the lower
court. In the first place, we find that the opinion of this expert witness has been rebutted by another expert witness
Jose C. Espinosa, whose opinion, to our mind, deserves more weight and credence. And our reason for reaching this
conclusion is the fact that the standards of the comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those used by
Villanueva in the comparison are two signatures appearing in two documents executed on November 10, 1942, one
signature in an identification card affixed in April 1940, a half signature appearing in a letter written on October 8,
1943, one signature appearing in a letter written on July 16, 1945, and one signature appearing in a letter written on
January, 1945, whereas the disputed signatures appearing in the will were affixed on October 29, 1945. On the other
hand, the standards used by Espinosa in making his comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed
signatures. Thus, he examined four genuine signatures that were affixed on October 16, 1945, other four signatures
that were affixed in October 1945, one on January 2, 1945, on January 24, 1945, and one on September 24 1945, He
also examined one affixed on March 12, 1941, only for emphasis. The closeness or proximity of the time in which
the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature or document is very important to bring about
an accurate analysis and conclusion. the selection of the proper standards of comparison is of paramount importance
especially if we consider the age and the state of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. a signature
affixed in 1941 may involved characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is
because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a
person. It for this reasons that the authorities of the opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and
analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such
was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. But such was observed in the study made by Espinosa. He
followed the standard practice in handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion
deserves more weight and consideration.

The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the suspected document. It is
preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the document, so that one part comes from
the time after the origin. (Page 423 "Modern Criminal Investigation" by Soderman and O' Connell, 1936,
Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York and London.)

If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double that number."
(Page 139, Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation by Lucas, 1935, Edward Arnold &
Co., London.)

2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of the petitioner to prove
that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question appears to have been written.
According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be written in the dialect or language known to the
testator and this fact having been proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the wall was disallowed.

There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would indicate that the
testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question. But, in our opinion,
this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important requirement of the law has not been
complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this technical omission. In the
first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard,
Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters submitted as
evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now
be allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in
which the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan vs.
Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this presumption has not been overcome. And
finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish
language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only
mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the
will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground.

3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact that the deceased
was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it reached this conclusion, not because of any
direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. On this
point the lower court said:

El Juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las firmas arriba indicadas feuran de Maria Zuñiga
Vda. de Pando, las mismas revelan que ella no estabe en el pleno de sus facultades mentales cuando la
hicieron firmar el documento, Exhibit C, pues el hecho de que en una sola ocasion la repetida Maria Zuñiga
Vda. de Pando firmo dos veces, sin escribir su verdadero nombre, demuestra que ella no se daba cuenta de
sus actos por no hallarse mentalmente sana. Si esto es asi, no se debe legalizar como testamento y ultima
voluntad de la finada Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando el documento, Exhibit C, porque el Articulo 614 de la
Ley 190 y el Articulo 12, Reglamentos de los Tribunales, disponen que solamente pueden otorgar
testamento las personas que al tiempo de su otorgamiento estaban en el pleno goce de sus facultades
mentales.

The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses have said on this point. Cornelio Gonzales de
Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before the signing of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she
was of the impression that the deceased was of sound mind at the time. To the same effect is the testimony of
Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her impression when the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk
and read, only that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These statements had not been
contradicted. They give an idea of the mental had not contradicted. They give an idea of mental condition of the
deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state of health rather
than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These
differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are
indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the
will readily give this impression.

Abbreviated, distorted and illegible, forms, which are sufficiently free and rapid, often actually indicate
genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very unusual and not exactly like those in the
standard writing. Those who write of difficulty or hesitation through some physical infirmity may
sometimes produced broken and unfinished signatures and these results, which in themselves are distinctly
divergent as compared with signatures produced under conditions of strength and health, may forcefully
indicate genuineness . Under conditions of weakness due to diseased or age, parts of a genuine signature
may be clumsily written over a second time not at just the same place and in a way when clearly shows that
the writer either could not see or was so week and inattentive as not to care what the result might be. This
careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure 184), unlike the painstaking and delicate retouching of the
forger, often indicates genuineness. (Page 365, Questioned Documents by Osborne, 2nd Edition, 1927.)

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court erred in disallowing the will Exhibit C.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The Court admits the will Exhibit C to probate, and
remands these case to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the appellee.

3. Balonan vs. Abellana GR No. L-15153, August 31, 1960

Facts: A 2-page Will and Testament by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to be probated at rhe CFI of
Zamboanga City. ON the second page, which is the last page of the Will, on the left margin appears the signature of
Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following phrase 'Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana' (for
the tetattrix Anacleta Abellana). (The CFI admitted the probate of the will. Hence, this appeal, the petitioner
contending that the signature of Juan A. Abello on top of the phrase ‘por la tetadora Anacleta Abellana did not
comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which it ill be executed.)
ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta
Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a
will shall be executed?

HELD: The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:

"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another." (Italics supplied.)

In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing is that it clearly appears that the
name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name
of the testatrix signs his own or not. Cases of the same import are as follows: (Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil.,
479, Caluya vs. Domingo, 27 Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90 Phil., 489).

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said
Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the
law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by Some other person in his
presence and by his express direction.

It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained to declare that the
said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.

4. Garcia v. Lacuesta
90 P 489

FACTS:

This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects was signed by the testator through a
cross mark (an “X”). The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and
the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because
its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the express
direction of the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and
3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:

Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause since the testator had placed a cross
mark himself as his signature.

HELD:

The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado directed Javier to write the testator’s name
under his express direction. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will
himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which has been held sufficient in
past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have
the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
 5. Nera v. Rimando

G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911

Ponente: Carson, J.:

'Test of Presence'

Facts:

1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain
hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching their signatures
to the instrument.

2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital
importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact
being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room,
would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.

3. The CA deemed the will valid.

Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in the act of
affixing their signatures.

HELD: YES

The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when the testator
and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will since the attaching of the
signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of
vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching the
signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign but whether they
might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical, mental condition and position in
relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of the signature.
 6. Taboada v. Rosal

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III,
Maasin), respondent.

Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.

Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in
Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez,
Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and
the motion for appointment of a special administrator.

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament
of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and
at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and
at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted
his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its
genuineness and due execution.

The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate of the
will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to
submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified and
could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex
partepraying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance
of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs with
their addresses be held in abeyance.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motion
together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C.
Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending
resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent court.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion
filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise
denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the intestate
heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another?

Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier
witnesses and signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is
not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same
place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest
not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where
the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition precedent
or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses
should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it would be
absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the
signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent
with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.

We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which
was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law
on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective
is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code
commission, p. 103).

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the place of
signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so
when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible
from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is
signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The
other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page".

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the
purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the
win is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against
the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the
heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54
Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be
that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing
the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of
the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the
 will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion
takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases
where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from
being defeated by purely technical considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:

... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and
two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of
the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. Vs.
Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may sabotage the
will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the probate
of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special
administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422

FACTS:

Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte,
and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix,
filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his
evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent
had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to
the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its
duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original,
and further averthat granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue
influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of
those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees
stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned
therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not
to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUE:

Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery of the
testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and
pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sir’s book) Is the failure of one of the
witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all respects.

On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a
handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince the Court, not only because
it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only
three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the
effect of writing fatigue.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not
appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with
different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to
overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented by
Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is
proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that
they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do
not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation
which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands
of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It
is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as
grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:

The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it
does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted
two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony
as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of
the attestationclause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of
the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence
does not affect the will’s validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did
sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had
no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for
the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a
fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of
the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled
to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily
discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law
there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can
be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At
any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament
was inadvertent and not intentional.

8. Cagro v. Cagro

Testate Estate of Cagro vs. Cagro

G.R. L-5826

Facts:
1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate
a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.

2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the
bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin.

3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially to law
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD: Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will. It
is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom negatives their participation.

Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the law. The said
signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of
all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to
a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

The probate of the will is denied.

9. Lopez v. Liboro

G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

Tirona, Gutierrez and Adorable for appellant.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to
be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas,
on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed. In the court below, the
present appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the
alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of
the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever
execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental
witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the
testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick.

In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court a quo erred
in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection
is added the alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was
written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous objection of
the oppositor.

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first
sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In
the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other
forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered
page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the
contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are
undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the
bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the
invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of
which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again,
as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the
signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one. Abangan
vs. Abangan, supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.

Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the credibility
of the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention
deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out
in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have
perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show that the
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of questioning,
and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch as not all those
who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions they
should not agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil.,
99.)

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that
the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed
someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or
suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a
matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)

With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated
an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator,
the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had
moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of the
court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this
discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the
sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of
evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened
after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it
or has denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon
the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs,
they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil.,
393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered,
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to the
evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64
C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.

Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the testator's
understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be
expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly
ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered
although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the
subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a
presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.

The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed,
with costs.
 10. VDA DE RAMOS V CA

G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978

Ernesto C. Hidalgo for petitioners.

Romulo S. Brion & Florentino M. Poonin for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:

Appeal by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49915-R, entitled "Adelaida
Nista Petitioner-appellee, versus Buenaventura Guerra, et al., Oppositors -Appellants, " denying and disallowing
the probate of the second last will and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila previously probated by the Court of First
Instance of Laguna Branch III at San Pablo City.

The facts are rotated in the appealed decision. the pertinent portions of which state:

It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed
a petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit H) and
codicil dated April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966.
The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and codicil be
probates and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the
testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and the value of
the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be summarily settled in accordance with the Rules.

Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on July 18, 1966
and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to the petition alleging among others that they are
the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila
(Exhibit 1); that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H and L) were
procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities requited by law for the execution
of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or
executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia
Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament (Exhibit 3) which
was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and
that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act as administration of the estate.

On November 4, 1968, the petitioner and the oppositors, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered into a Compromise Agreement with the following terms and conditions, thus:

1. That oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina (Martina) Guerra are the legally adopted
son and daughter, respectively, of the deceased spouses, Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Manila;

2. That Florentino Guerra pre-deceased Eugenia Danila that Eugenia Danila died on May 21,
1966, at San Pablo City, but during her lifetime, she had already sold, donated or disposed of all
her properties, some of which to Marcelina Martina Guerra, as indicated and confirmed in
paragraph 13 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. SP620, entitled Marcelina Guerra versus
Adelaida Nista, et al., and Which We hereby 'likewise admit and confirm;

3. That, however, with respect to the parcel of riceland covered by TCT No. T-5559 of the
Register of Deeds of San Pablo City, which oppositors believe to be the estate left and undisposed
of at the time of the death of the owner thereof, Eugenia Danila it now appears that there is a Deed
of Donation covering the same together with another parcel of coconut land situated at Barrio San
Ignacio, San Pablo City, with an area of 19,905 sq.m., and covered by Tax Declaration No. 31286,
executed by the late Eugenia Danila in favor of Adelaida Nista, as per Doc. No. 406, Page No. 83,
Series of 1966 under Notarial Register III of Notary Public Pio Aquino of San Pablo city;

4. That inasmuch as the above-mentioned parcel of coconut and has been earlier donated inter
vivos and validly conveyed on November 15, 1965 by the late Eugenia Danila to Marcelina
(Martina) Guerra as shown by Doc. No. 237, Page No. 49, Series of 1965, under Notarial Register
XV of Notary Public Atty. Romulo S. Brion of San Pablo City, the inclusion of said parcel in the
subsequent donation to Adelaida Nista is admittedly considered a mistake and of no force and
effect and will in no way prejudice the ownership and right of Marcelina Martina Guerra over the
said parcel; that as a matter of fact Whatever rights and interests Adelaida Nista has or may still
have thereon are already considered waived and renounced in favor of Marcelina Martina Guerra;

5. That in view of the fact that the riceland mentioned in paragraph 3 of the foregoing appears to
have already been disposed of by Eugenia Danila in favor of petitioner Adelaida Nista which the
parties hereto do not now contest, there is therefore no more estate left by the said deceased
Eugenia Danila to he disposed of by the will sought to be probated in this proceedings; that
consequently, and for the sake of peace and harmony money among the relations and kins and
adopted children of the deceased Eugenia Danila and with the further aim of settling differences
among themselves, the will and codicil of Eugenia Danila submitted to this Honorable Court by
the petitioner for probate, are considered abrogated and set aside;

6. That as the late Eugenia Danila has incurred debts to private persons during her lifetime, which
in addition to the burial and incidental expenses amounts to SIX THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (P6,800.00) her adopted daughter, Marcelina (Martina) Guerra is now
determined to settle the same, but herein petitioner Adelaida Nista hereby agrees to contribute to
Marcelina (Martina) Guerra for the settlement of the said indebtedness in the amount of THREE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P3,400.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be
delivered by Adelaida Nista to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra at the latter's residence at Rizal
Avenue, San Pablo City, on or about February 28, 1969;

7. That should there be any other property of the deceased Eugenia Danila that may later on be
discovered to be undisposed of as yet by Eugenia Danila during her lifetime, the same should be
considered as exclusive property of her adopted children and heirs, Buenaventura Guerra and
Marcelina (Martina) Guerra and any right of the petitioner and signatories hereto, with respect to
said property or properties, shall be deemed waived and renounced in favor of said Buenaventura
and Marcelina (Martina) Guerra; and

8. That with the exception of the foregoing agreement, parties hereto waived and renounce further
claim against each other, and the above-entitled case. (Exh. 6)

This Agreement was approved by the lower court in a judgment readings as follows:

WHEREFORE, said compromise agreement, being not contrary to public policy, law and moral,
the same is hereby approved and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in the above- quoted compromise agreement, which is hereby made an integral
part of the dispositive portion of this decision, and the parties are strictly enjoined to comply with
the same. (Exh. 7)

On November 16, 1968, Rosario de Ramos, Miguel Danila Felix Danila Miguel Gavino Amor
Danila Consolacion Santos and Miguel Danila son of the late Fortunato Danila filed a motion for
leave to intervene as co-petitioners alleging that being instituted heirs or devisees, they have rights
 and interests to protect in the estate of the late Eugenia Danila They also filed a reply partly
admitting and denying the material allegations in the opposition to the petition and alleging among
other things, that oppositors repudiated their institution as heirs and executors when they failed to
cause the recording in the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City the will and testament dated
November 5, 1951 (Exhibit 3) in accordance with the Rules and committed acts of ingratitude
when they abandoned the testatrix and denied her support after they managed, through fraud and
undue influence, to secure the schedule of partition dated January 15, 1962. The Intervenors
prayed for the probate and/or allowance of the will and codicil (Exhibits H and L), respectively
and the appointment of any of them in as administrator of said estate.

On December 6, 1968, the intervenors also filed a motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or
relief from judgment and to set aside the judgment based on compromise dated November 5, 1968.
The oppositors interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors filed their reply.

The lower court resolved the motions in an order the dispositive portion reading, thus:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING the Court hereby makes the following dispositions —

(1) Movants Rosario de Ramos, Miguel C. Danila Miguela Gavino Amor Danila Consolacion
Santos, Miguel A. Danila and Raymundo Danila are allowed and admitted to intervene to this
proceeding as Party Petitioners; and likewise admitted in their reply to the amended opposition of
November 11, 1968;

(2) The compromise agreement dated October 15, 1968 by and between Petitioner Adelaida Nista
and oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra Martina is disapproved, except as
regards their respective lawful rights in the subject estate; and, accordingly, the judgment on
compromise rendered by this Court on November 5, 1968 is reconsidered and set aside; and

(3) The original Petition and amended opposition to probate of the alleged will and codicil stand.

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the
intervenors.

xxx xxx xxx

A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order was filed by the intervenors co-petitioners but
the motion was denied.

xxx xxx xxx

On February 9, 1971, a motion for the substitution of Irene, Crispina, Cristina Casiano, Edilberto
Felisa, Guerra in place of their father, the oppositor Buenaventura Guerra who died on January 23,
1971, was filed and granted by the lower court.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dated July 6, 1971 allowing the probate of the wilt In
that decision, although two of the attesting witness Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see
the testatrix Eugenia Danila sign the will but that the same was already signed by her when they affixed their own
signatures thereon, the trial court gave more weight and ment to the .'straight-forward and candid" testimony of Atty.
Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public who assisted in the execution of the wilt that the testatrix and the three (3)
instrumental witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other, and that with respect to the codicil the same
manner was likewise observed as corroborated to by the testimony of another lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero who was
also present during the execution of the codicil.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that the late Eugenia Danila had testamentary capacity when she
executed the will, Exh. H., and the codicil Exh. L, and that said will and codicil were duly signed
by her and the three attesting witnesses and acknowledged before a Notary Public in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law, the said will and codicil are hereby declared probated. No
evidence having been adduced regarding the qualification and fitness of any of the intervenors- co-
petitioners to act as executors, the appointment of executors of the will and codicil is held pending
until after due hearing on the matter.

SO ORDERED.

Oppositors Marcelina Guam and the heirs of Buenaventura Guam appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of
Appeals The latter court, in its derision dated May 12, 1975 ruled that the lower court acted correctly in setting aside
its judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and in allowing the intervenor petitioners to participate in the
instant probate proceedings; however, it disallowed the probate of the will on the that the evidence failed to establish
that the testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witness in accordance with
Article 805 of the Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.

In this present appeal petitioners vigorously insists on constitutional grounds the nullity of the decision of
respondent court but We deem it needless to consider the same as it is not necessary in resolving this appeal on the
following assigned errors:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO
THE MANIFESTATION CLAUSES IN THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL ANNEX B
(PETITION) AND INSTEAD IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED
WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN ATTESTATION CLAUSES AND THE TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC; AND

(B) THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DENIED THE PROBATE OF
THE WILL AND CODICIL DESPITE CONVINCING EVIDENCE FOR THEIR
ALLOWANCE.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the trial court allowing probate of the
will and codicil in question.

The main point in controversy here is whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed
in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting
witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.

Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the win and codicil which were signed by the instrumental witnesses
are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said witnesses from prevaricating later on by
testifying against due execution. Petitioners further maintain that it is error for respondent court to give credence to
the testimony of the biased witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the
testimonial account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom right after, the
deeds were acknowledged.

Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two surviving witnesses,
Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the win was not signed by the testatrix before their presence, which is
strengthened by two photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no
picture of the same occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where there
was an opportunity to take pictures it is not understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses and not of the
testatrix. It concludes that the absence of the latter's picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty.
Barcenas that the testatrix and the witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.

The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the will and
codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that
the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently supervised
by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity
surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an
ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and
testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. 2 If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers
in the execution of a wig, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as
members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had
been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of ty in the
execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse
suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove
their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures
of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient,
were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the
will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a
Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not
easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see
the testatrix sign the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced
with the convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this
regard —

It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document
constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances,
may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or
exaggerating what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only
half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the others. This cannot be
said of the condition and Physical appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit silent, will
reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. 3

Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause Which, significantly is a
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting
witnesses, it that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had previously
hold that the attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which later on may be made by
the attesting witnesses. 4 In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix
but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in
fact at not only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in
the attention clause. 5 By signing the wilt the witnesses impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate,
including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like. 6

In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witness to a will if available, must be called to prove the wilt Under this
circumstance, they become "forced witnesses" " and their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not
bind the proponent hence, the latter may present other proof of due exemption even if contrary to the testimony of or
all of the at, testing witness. 7 As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the
will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may, nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witness and from all the evidence presented that the will
was executed and attested in the manner by law. 8 Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested
will are the best witness in connection with its due execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be
reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or circubstantial. 9

In the case at bar, the s bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one
hand, and the Notary Public, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was
contradicted by his own admission. Though his admission to the effect that "when Eugenia Danila signed the
testament (he) and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada were present" (t.s.n., Feb. 12,
1970, p. 115) was made extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired upon during the trial.

With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas.
The records show that this attesting witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as
witness to a wilt Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed was all about. Although he performed his
function as an attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his testimony,
"half-hearted" as that of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind fully
attentive to the details of the execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct
witness himself, was Purposely there to oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an
account of what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no evidence to show that
this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take sides or that his statement is truth perverted.

It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of a will. 10 In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have
warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in
the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. 11 An appraise of a lawyer's participation has been succinctly
stated by the Court in Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra, this wise:

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, his statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to anticipate
in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to
prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more
likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents
in his memory.

One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testator Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will. The fact
that the only pictures available are those which show the Witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of the
witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they did
not speak of including the events they failed to capture. The probate of a will is a proceeding not embued with
adverse character, wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence "to the end that nothing less than the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible" should be presented to the court before a reported will may be probated
or denied probate. 12

We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the win does not serve any
persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been
acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence
intended to confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court
having satisfied itself that the win and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and
there being no indication of abuse of discretion on its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional
circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far its it disallowed the probate
of the will and codicil. With costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.