1.

G.R. No. L-27825 June 30, 1970

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GERARDO RIVERA and the HONORABLE JUDGE LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, First Branch, respondents.

Facts:

On June 20, 1966 the original information was filed with respondent court against respondent
Rivera as accused, charging him for grave threats, alleged by the prosecution to have been
committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1965, in the Municipality of Batangas,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, motivated by personal resentment which he
entertained against one Ricardo Rivera, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and, in a letter, seriously threatened to kidnap the wife and the
daughter of said Ricardo Rivera if the latter would not give him P25,000.00, the
accused thus threatening to inflict upon the persons of the wife and daughter of
Ricardo Rivera of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, to kidnap them,
although the said accused failed to attain his purpose.1

On March 9, 1967, the prosecution filed a formal petition for admission of its amended
information, the sole amendment consisting of changing the year of commission of the offense
from March 2, 1965 to March 2, 1964 on the grounds of clerical error and of having the
information conform to the evidence in its possession with respect to the year of commission of
the crime charged.

Respondent court, on respondent's opposition, denied on April 12, 1967 admission of the
amended information ruling that it was unfair to respondent and concerned material facts
constituting the offense and would consequently be prejudicial to the substantial rights of
respondent-accused. It denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and reset the
continuation of the trial on August 2, 1967 and other dates thereafter, unless the matter was
elevated to this Court.

Ruling:

Here, all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized by paragraph 1 thereof were duly alleged in the original information, viz., (1)
that respondent-accused threatened complainant with the infliction of a wrong on the latter's
wife and daughter (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime, the threat being to kidnap them
and (3) the threat was made in a letter (which calls for imposition of the maximum penalty). The
amendment which sought the correction of an obviously typographical or clerical error in the last
digit of the year alleged (from 1965 to 1964, the month and day being left exactly the same) did
not affect the nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did it involve any
change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to cause surprise to respondent and require
him to effect any material change or modification in his defense.

2.

G.R. No. 59241-44 July 5, 1989

PEDRO TANDOC, ROGELIO ERCELLA, RUDY DIAZ, JUAN ROSARIO, AND FRED
MENOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RICARDO P. RESULTAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of
San Carlos City (Pangasinan), ARNULFO PAYOPAY, MANUEL CANCINO, and CONRADO
PAYOPAY, SR., respondents.

Facts:

On 19 October 1980, a criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80- 198 was lodged with the Office
of the City Fiscal of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, with the charges of "Serious Physical Injuries",
filed by Bonifacio Menor against respondent Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; "Slight Physical Injuries",
filed by Fred de la Vega against respondent Beda Acosta, and "Trespass to Dwelling", filed by
Pacita Tandoc against respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino,
Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria.

Pending the resolution of said complaint, Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and his father Conrado
Payopay, Sr., together with Manuel Cancino, also filed a complaint on 2 December 1980 3 with
the Office of the City Fiscal, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc,
Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and Fred de la Vega, with the charges of
"Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and "Physical Injuries",
docketed as I.S. No. 80-233.

On 10 December 1980, the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and
Arturo Syloria committed the crimes charged in I.S. 80-198, 4 thus

The evidence in the above-cited complaints tend to show that at about 6:35
o'clock in the afternoon of October 19,1980, at the house of Pacita B. Tandoc,
 situated at Rizal Avenue, SCC, the respondents entered the store and dinning [sic]
room of the complainant without her permission. There was a sort of altercation
between the complainant and respondent, Arnold Payopay, regarding the stoning
of the store and house of complainant, Tandoc. In the course of their altercation,
respondent Arnold Payopay picked up stones and struck the complainant Tandoc
but instead her helper Bonifacio Menor was hit and suffered physical injuries
which according to the medico-legal certificate will heal for [sic] more than thirty
days. She further declared that respondent, Beda Acosta, who was behind Arnold
Payopay picked up stone [sic] struck her but unfortunately her helper, Fred de la
Vega, was hit and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than nine days
according to the medical certificate. The matter was reported to the Barangay
Chairman of the place and to the Office of the Station Commander. In support of
the complaint are the sworn statements of Bonifacio Menor, Fred de la Vega and
Barangay Chairman Hermogenes Salangad.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence on hand and the entries in the police blotter the
undersigned finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
Trespass To Dwelling, has been committed by all respondents; Serious Physical
Injuries, has been committed by respondent Arnold Payopay; and Slight Physical
Injuries, has been committed by respondent Beda Acosta. The latter case has not
been referred to the Barangay Chairman as the case will soon prescribe and that
the affidavit of complainant was just endorsed on November 28, 1980. I most
respectfully recommend that the corresponding Informations be filed in Court.

From the aforequoted resolution, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied in a resolution dated 5 January 1981. 5 Consequently, the corresponding informations
for "Slight Physical Injuries", "Trespass to Dwelling" and "Serious Physical Injuries" were filed with
the City Court of San Carlos City, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1992, 2000 and 2001,
respectively. 6

With respect to the criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80-233 filed by Arnulfo (Arnold)
Payopay and Manuel Cancino against petitioners for "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats"
and "Physical Injuries", the Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges
on the ground that they "were found to be in a [sic] nature of a countercharge, the same having
been filed after more than one (1) month from the date of the alleged incident of 19 October
1980." However, as to the charge of "Trespass to Dwelling" filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against
Pedro Tandoc, a prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal. 7 Thus, on 28 January
1981, an informations 8 for "Trespass to Dwelling" was filed with the City Court of San Carlos City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2017.
On 28 July 1981, respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr. and Manuel
Cancino, directly lodged with the City Court of San Carlos City the following criminal complaints
against herein petitioners, 9 to wit:

— Criminal Case No. 2105, entitled "People v. Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan
Rosario and Fred Menor", for Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as
private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2106, entitled "People vs. Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor", for
Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. as private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2107, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred
dela Vega", for Less Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Manuel Cancino as private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2108, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Rogelio Ercella, Juan
Rosario & Fred Menor", for Grave Threats to Kill, with Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as private
complainant.

Ruling:

From the order of the City Court finding reasonable ground to believe that a crime was committed
and the accused probably guilty thereof, petitioners cannot seek a re-investigation by the Office
of the City Fiscal. The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a
case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of
preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima
facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not
only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City
Fiscal has no authority to re- investigate.

3.

G.R. No. L-48974 March 20, 1944

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BANAAG LINATOC and GERARDO LINATOC, defendants-appellees.

Facts:

Defendants-appellees were accused by the chief of police of Calamba, Laguna, of "slight physical
injuries with threats to kill" in a complaint filed on November 11, 1942, in the justice of the peace
court of said municipality, which reads as follows:
 The undersigned Chief of Police, after having duly sworn on oath, accuses Banaag Linatoc
and Gerado Linatoc of the crime of "Slight Physical Injuries with Threats to Kill"
committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of Nov. 1942, in the public market of Calamba, Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
attack, assault and threaten to kill the person of Suzana Galvez and using personal
violence upon the said Suzana Galvez by holding her arm, pushing and hitting her with a
fist blow thus causing injuries in the different parts of her body, which injuries have
required and will require medical attendance necessary for a period of 7 days, and will
incapacitate the said Suzana Galvez from performing her customary labor for the same
period of time.

That in the commission of the said crime there is present the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength due to sex. Contrary to law.

Ruling:

The complaint above transcribed charges two different crimes — slight physical injuries and
threats to kill. The justice of the peace court undeniably had jurisdiction to try and decide the
light offense of slight physical injuries. Assuming, without deciding, that the complaint sufficiently
charges also the less grave offense of "grave threats" as penalized in article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, the justice of the peace had to ignore it because it was beyond his jurisdiction, and
any pronouncement he might have made with regard thereto would have been coram non judice.

Separate Opinions

BOCOBO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. I deem it advisable to state that the more serious offense, threats to kill,
should have been given preference by the Justice of the Peace by immediately making a
preliminary investigation thereof, with a view to forwarding the case to the Court of First
Instance if good and justifiable grounds for such action were found by the Justice of the Peace. It
was in the public interest and the offense of threats to kill should have been prosecuted and
tried before the offense of slight physical injuries, because the former involved a more serious
menace to public order.

4.

G.R. No. L-32737 May 8, 1985

GREGORIO A. CONCON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JOAQUIN T. MAAMBONG, as Judge of the City Court of Cebu
City, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, respondents.

Facts:

This original petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition seeks the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin respondent Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, from
taking cognizance of an appeal interposed by petitioner Gregorio A. Concon from the decision of
the City Court of Cebu, now Municipal Trial Court of Cebu, convicting him of the offense of grave
threats.

Charged with grave threats for having ... "unlawfully and feloniously threaten(ed) to kill one
Cecilio Abella with said shotgun," petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one [1] month and one [1] day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00.
Immediately after promulgation of the sentence on July 2, 1968, he filed a notice of appeal,
stating that he was appealing the decision to the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The City Court,
however, instead of transmitting the records to the Court of First Instance, forwarded the same
to the Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G. R. No. 09188.

Ruling:

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law in force at the time of perfection of
petitioner's appeal, the offense of grave threats, punishable under Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance. 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 44(f), 2 and of paragraph (b), (c) and the
penultimate paragraph of Section 84 of the 1948 Judiciary Act, said courts exercised concurrent,
original jurisdiction in the offenses enumerated or referred to therein.

Considering that the City Court of Cebu had tried and decided the case against petitioner in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the
appeal interposed by petitioner was rightly certified to the Court of Appeals, the proper forum
for such appeal.

5.

G.R. No. 102070 July 23, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 15, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Capiz, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
That sometime in the month of November, 1990, at Brgy. Cabugao, Municipality of Panitan,
Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter, possess and occupy a portion of Lot No. 3000, Panitan Cadastre, belonging to and owned
in common by Teresita Silva and the latter's brothers and sisters, after threatening to kill the
tenant-encargado if the latter would resist their taking of the portion of the land, and
thereafter, plowed, cultivated and planted palay on said portion of land to the exclusion of the
above-named owners thereof who, therefore, were prevented from appropriating the property's
produce or earning profits therefrom from the time of the said usurpation by accused up to the
present to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita Silva and her co-owners.
Ruling:
In sustaining the position of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that "in prosecution for Usurpation of Real Property as provided for in Art. 312 of the
Revised Penal Code, the over-all penalty imposable on the accused is determined not only by the
penalty provided therein but also by the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by
him. x x x The accused in Crim. Case No. 3386 committed acts of violence on the complainant's
tenant. The violent acts with which the accused were charged in attaining their wishes
constituted threats to kill Inocencio Borreros, if the latter prevented or prohibited both accused
in (sic) taking possession of the lot in question. Hence, accused's threats on the life of Borreros
may be considered as the 'violence or intimidation of persons' mentioned in Art. 312, supra, as
the means by which accused took possession of the lot in question. And, under Art. 282, the
imposable penalty for the threatening act of both accused -- to kill Borreros -- is one (1) degree
lower than that prescribed by law for the crime accused threatened to commit -- homicide;
hence, the additional penalty imposable on both accused is prision mayor minimum
toprision mayor maximum, which is well within the jurisdiction of (sic) Regional Trial Court."
In so holding, this Court does not preclude the owner of a piece of property from being the
offended party in the crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property
by means of intimidation consisting of a threat, under Article 282, provided, however, that all the
elements thereof are present. In such a case, the penalty imposable upon the accused would be
the penalty prescribed therein plus a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused.
As stated earlier, intimidation as found in Article 312 could result in either the crime of grave
threats under Article 282 or grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if
complainants were in fact the parties threatened and paragraph 1 of Article 282 is
applicable,[23] the Regional Trial Court would have exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense
charged because the corresponding penalty for the crime would be prision mayor, which is the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened to be committed --
homicide -- which is reclusion temporal,[24]and a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by
the accused.[25]
6.

G.R. No. L-14348 September 30, 1960

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CIRIACO YEBRA, defendant-appellee.

Facts:

That on or about February 7, 1958, in the Municipality of Daet, Province of

Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
the above-named accused, CIRIACO YEBRA, moved by personal resentment and,
with an evident intention of imputing an act or circumstance tending to dishonor
or discredit one Luciano Sta. Catalina, and injure his good name and reputation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, publicly, and maliciously
impute, threaten and make against the said Luciano Sta. Catalina, in a letter
written and sent by said accused to one Narciso Dames, the following derogatory
statements threatening to inflict upon the said Luciano Sta. Catalina a wrong
amounting to a crime, that is, to kill the said Luciano Sta. Catalina, to wit:

... Huwag nilang ipagmatigas and paglilinglang ni Luciano Sta. Catalina sa

mga tao . . .

at kung hindi babayaran ni Sta. Catalina ang mga nagugol ko o ang nagugol
ninyo sa donasyong ito ay maka-aasa kayo na ang gagawin ko ay buhay sa
buhay laban sa mga taong ito na manlilinglang sa ating baryo at sa
Kapangyarihan ng ating govierno sa wakas ng lahat kong sinabi dito ay
umaasa ako na hindi mo pagkakaitan ang kahilingan ko.1awphîl.nèt

which statement are fabricated, false, and without foundation in truth and in fact, and
made solely to dishonor, discredit and to besmirch the good name and reputation of the
said Luciano Sta. Catalina, as a result of which the said Luciano Sta. Catalina suffered
damages, both moral and actual in the amount of P10,000.00.

That portion of the letter sent by Ciriaco Yebra to Narciso 38 3 Dames, barrio lieutenant, which
is quoted in the information, may be translated, thus:

. . . They must not be stubborn about Mr. Luciano Sta. Catalina's fooling the people . . . .

. . . And if there is nobody which will care among the authorities in the government in this
request of my being belittled and the belittling of others and if Sta. Catalina will not pay
what I paid and other paid for the donation, you can be sure that I will do, life for a life;
against those people who have been fooling our barrio and to the authorities in the
 government, I hope they will not withstand all what I said (asked) in this respect. (pp. 5-
6, Brief for the Appellant.)

Ruling:

We have carefully read the letter containing the alleged libelous remarks, and we find that the
letter is more threatening than libelous, and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object
of the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely
preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express
the heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more
important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under these circumstances this Court
believes, after a study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and
principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to a person named do not
constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer may be prosecuted separately from
the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.