DUEÑAS v HRET

HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., Petitioner, v HRET and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, Respondents.
FACTS:

 Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the
2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
 Petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes.
 Private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts
through insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies.
 On September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested
precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules.
 On October 27, 2008, Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-
protested precincts but was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its
own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
 On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the
discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds
affecting the validity of the election.

ISSUE:(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Resolution, to
continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

HELD: The petition has no merit.

The Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall not be reviewed by this Court, the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or
curtail it or even affect the same. Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor
substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal. By employing the word “sole,” jurisdiction of the HRET in the is exclusive and exhaustive.
Its exercise of power is intended to be its own — full, complete and unimpaired.

Indeed, HRET as an independent constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on
firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET. But what
is “grave abuse of discretion?” It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary
abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice
and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the
authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit
a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

The HRET possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had the wherewithal to carry it out. HRET has the
inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it deemed best. This is specially significant in election
contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in determining the true will of the electorate.

Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and
such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may
be provided by law.

Rufino v Endriga

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006

ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 139565 July 21, 2006

BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN
FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of
propagating arts and culture in the Philippines.
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees (“Board”) to administer real and personal properties of CCP.
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two sets of CCP boards. The
controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has
the legal right to hold the office. The resolution of the issue boils down the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the
manner of filling vacancies in the Board.

Facts
On 25 June 1966, President Marcos issued E.O. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines governed by a Board of
Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
After declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into non-municipal
public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics”.
PD 15 increased the members to nine trustees. Later, EO 1058 increased further to 11.
After People Power Revolution in 1986, President Aquino asked for resignations of incumbent CCP trustees and appointed
new trustees.
Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison Potenciano,
Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and Manuel T. Maῆosa (“Maῆosa”).
On 22 December 1998, President Joseph Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to
replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were: Armita B.
Rufino(President), Zenaida Tancoco, Federico Pascual, Rafael Buenaventura, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao, Jr., and Freddie
Garcia. Except for Tancoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office.
Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning the President Estrada’s appointment of seven new members to
the Board.
Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of
trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by surviving
trustee acting consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the Board is entirely vacant may the President fill such vacancies, acting with
consultation of ranking officers of the CCP. When President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant
due to Maῆosa’s expiration of term. The Endriga group maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustee’s fixed four-year
term could only be terminated “by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause.”
Endriga group also cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”
The Court referred the Endriga group’s petition to the Court of Appeals “for appropriate action in observance of hierarchy of
courts. Court of Appeals declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees.
In motion for reconsideration, Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to
appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer to the CCP trustees the
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow
trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the
appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power. On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the
Rufino group's motion for reconsideration as well as the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999
Decision. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity. It also mandates the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the CCP Board. Only
when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the situation in the present case, may the President exercise his power to
appoint.
The Court of Appeals stated that the legislative history of PD 15 shows a clear intent "to insulate the position of trustee from
the pressure or influence of politics by abandoning appointment by the President of the Philippines as the mode of
filling" vacancies in the CCP Board. The Court of Appeals held that until Section 6(b) of PD 15 is declared unconstitutional in
a proper case, it remains the law. The Court of Appeals also clarified that PD 15 vests on the CCP Chairperson the power to
appoint all officers, staff, and personnel of the CCP, subject to confirmation by the Board.
The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration for failure to raise new issues except the
argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 6(b) of PD 15 since the Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals also held, "Nor may the President's constitutional and/or statutory power of supervision and control over
government corporations restrict or modify the application of the CCP Charter."

Issue: Whether or not Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 on the manner of filling of vacancies in the CCP Board is valid

Held: Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing
them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank
as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In the present case, the incumbent
President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the
same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President
to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers
in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are
irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly. Another constitutional impediment to the
implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is that, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the
control of the President of the Philippines. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. CCP falls under the Executive branch which no law can cut off the President's control over the CCP in the guise
of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the "President shall have control of all the executive x x
x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive
branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, insofar as it authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the
Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in G.R. No. 139554, we find it unnecessary
to rule on G.R. No. 139565.