1. SENATE VS ERMITA
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions
about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the said hearing
due to pressing matters that need immediate attention.
AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the
PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves.
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD:  The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied.  In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or
a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.  The appearance
of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also,
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically
to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for
that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can
be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus
made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour.  While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore,
while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power
of Congress.  One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.  Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.  When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.  They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads.  Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment.    It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.    The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.  For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries
in aid of legislation.  Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative
as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only  request  their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
2. DISISNI VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)
(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as
unconstitutional.   It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the
right to freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic
transmission of unsolicited commercial communications.  It
found Section 12 in violation of the right to privacy Section 4©(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited
because it lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness in commercial electronic communications, commonly
collecting real-time computer data.   It struck down known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for
Section 19 of the Act for giving the government the sale of products and services unless the recipient
authority to restrict or block access to computer data affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the
without any judicial warrant.  c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s  f o r s e r v i c e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
announcements from the sender to its existing users, or
FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the “when the following conditions are present:  (aa) The
Supreme Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of commercial electronic communication contains a simple,
several provisions of the  Cybercrime Prevention Act of valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of
2012, Act No. 10175. further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the
s a m e s o u r c e ;  ( b b ) T h e c o m m e r c i a l e l e c t r o n i c
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the communication does not purposely disguise the source of
government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace the electronic message; and  (cc) The commercial
activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their electronic communication does not purposely include
constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of misleading information in any part of the message in order
expression and access to nformation.  to induce the recipients to read the message.”

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the The government argued  that unsolicited commercial
duration of a temporary restraining order against the communications amount to both nuisance and trespass
government to halt enforcement of the Act until the because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using
adjudication of the issues. online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain
without prior permission.
 Decision Overview The Court first noted that spams are a category
of commercial speech, which does not receive the same
Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion. level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime protection.”   It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting
Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose of  regulating unsolicited communications  “would deny a person the
access to and use of cyberspace.  Several sections of the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the addressed to him.”   Accordingly, the Court declared
government to track down and penalize violators.   Section4©(3) as unconstitutional. 
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in
Sections 4©(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.  real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.”  Traffic data
under this Section includes the origin, destination, route,
size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its
content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority
curtails their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of
discretion by the government.  They also claimed that this
provision violates  the right to privacy and protection from
the government’s intrusion into online communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to
disclosure of private communications, it must survive the
rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored
towards serving a government’s compelling interest.   The
Court found that the government did have a compelling
interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time
traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the
Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned
informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have
private information disclosed, and the right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.”   In determining
whether a communication is entitled to the right of
privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the
person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of
privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his
expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively
reasonable in the society.  precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it
The Court noted that internet users have subjective
reasonable expectation of privacy over their
communications transmitted online.   However, it did not
find the expectation as objectively reasonable because
traffic data sent through internet “does  not disclose the
actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the
sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses.”  eventually granted the petition, but on appeal, the Court
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data
under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable
expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data
may reveal the personal information of its sender or
recipient, against which the Section fails to provide
sufficient safeguard.  The Court viewed the law as “virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage
in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want.”
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack
of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the
right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict
or block access to a computer data found to be in
violation of the Act.   The Petitioners argued that this
section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as
well as the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes
a personal property, entitled to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Also, the Philippines’
Constitution requires the government to secure a valid
judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property
or to block a form of expression.   Because Section 19
unconstitutional.  
3. KALAW VS REPUBLIC
FACTS: In  1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to
have his marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez be annulled
on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC, after hearing the expert witnesses testify in court,
of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to
the Supreme Court. In September 2011, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the CA.  Tyrone filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:  Whether or not the  September 2011 decision (657
SCRA 822) should be reversed.
HELD: Yes.
Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by
the RTC when the SC  reviewed the case in September
2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the
RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of
the witnesses while they were testifying.  The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance
and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to
brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version of
the events. The conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the Tyrone’s factual premises.
Respondent could also establish  the psychological
incapacity of the plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36  carries
the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, however,
the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also
establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff
spouse  if the respondent raised the matter in her/his
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes
the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or
in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either
or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null
and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her
psychological incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the
children of Tyrone and Elena testified that although their
parents have differences, both took good care of them.
However, upon closer look at the testimonies of the
children, it was shown that Elena was too addicted to
mahjong that she would even bring her children to her
mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last
from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that
the Elena  brought her children with her to her mahjong
sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental
duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children
to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification
of her own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her
wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development.
4. OBERFEGELL VS HODGES
FACTS: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant
state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those
states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize
legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that
provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case
argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases,
the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the
states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to
recognize marriages performed in other states did not
violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to
equal protection and due process.
ISSUES: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a
state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
recognize a marriage between two people of the same
sex that was legally licensed and performed in another
state?
HELD: Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the
opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it
protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in
the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples.
Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept
of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate
association between two people, it safeguards children
and families by according legal recognition to building a
home and raising children, and it has historically been
recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there
are no differences between a same-sex union and an
opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of
same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right
would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the
law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed
through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply
with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution
protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to
marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment
protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to
their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-
sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those
for opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which
he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good
and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and
therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide
whether states have to recognize or license such unions.
Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state
legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The
Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right
to marry and require states to apply laws regarding
marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its
bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The
precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down
unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been
traditionally defined and government intrusions, and
therefore there is no precedential support for making a
state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts
also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly
expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without
engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to
such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the
courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his
separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority
opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority
both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial,
power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution
reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the
question of whether same-sex marriage should be
recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the
issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against
one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that
political change should occur through the votes of
elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking
role, the majority opinion departed from established
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right
where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate
dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion
stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights
found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing
so distorted the democratic process by taking power from
the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary.
Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process
Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
indicates that they were meant to protect people from
physical restraint and from government intervention, but
they do not grant them rights to government entitlements.
Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion
impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating
from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature
to determine how best to address the competing rights
and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In
his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that
the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex
couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the
states to decide whether to depart from the traditional
definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court
to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously
strayed from the democratic process and greatly
expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the
Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent.
5. ESTRADA VS SADIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said
law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the
accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged
“vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because
of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi
to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.
HELD: On how the law uses the terms combination and
series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot
be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is
manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this
case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny
holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned
are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a
statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue,
the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely
on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have
been resolve in the Congress’ decision to include it among
the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional
and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
2. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide
or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself
closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide
for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of other may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
3. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives
life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof of reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged—the element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported
defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern” is a “very
important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec.
4 is “two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and
a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1
par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a
rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does
not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by
the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
4. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se
the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution
for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully,
unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge
on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention
that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea
and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada
made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the
scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As
far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and
the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a
malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in
the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to
include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are
crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when
the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit
6. POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC
FACTS: Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar
in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife.
Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
1991  – Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident
therein
2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen
First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the Philippines to
permanently reside herein
February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose
family belongings
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before
the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident of the
Philippines for 6 years and 6 months  (reckoned from year
2006 when she   re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225).  parents are the fact that:
Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016
elections  (hence, computing from May, 2013, she has
been a resident in the Philippines for  9 years and 6
months only). However, in her COC, Poe declared that she
is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to
the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from  May 24, 2005  (when she returned from the
US to the Philippines for good).
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is qualified to be a candidate
for President
HELD: Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in
the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
1. Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen?  Yes,
based on: Circumstantial evidence, Legislation, and
Generally accepted principles of international law
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. xxx. [T]here
is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The
Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the
Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985.
While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10
Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child
born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn,
would indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s
parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On
this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
Legislation

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.   to these conventions.
The amendment to the  Constitution  proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural born
citizens was not carried out, not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of unknown
parentage are not citizens, but only because their number
was not enough to merit specific mention. There was no
intent or language that would permit discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Likewise,  domestic laws on adoption  support the principle
that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the
adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Recent legislation  all expressly refer to “Filipino children”
and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.
Generally accepted principles of international law
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the  Convention on the Rights of the
Child  and the  International Convent on Civil and Political
Rights  obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles
stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the
Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed
to have the nationality of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found bind the Philippines although we are not signatory
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia,
North and South America and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of
189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as
citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been
born and a national of the country in which it is found.
2. After renouncing her American citizenship and after
having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as
a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poe’s repatriation
resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.
A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine
nationality will be restored to his former status as natural
born Filipino after repatriation  (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v.
Commission on Audit etc).
3. H a s P o e s a t i s f i e d t h e 1 0 y e a r r e s i d e n c y
requirement?  Yes, she will have been a resident for
10 years and 11 months on the day of the election.
[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other
conclusion that Poe decided to permanently abandon
her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and
her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US
passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad,
email correspondences with freight company to arrange
for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet
Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment
in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June
2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that
when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC
was only a mistake in good faith. As explained by Grace
Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013
COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when
the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the
Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers
in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May
2005. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against
her but it was by no means conclusive considering the
overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
7. RAPPLER VS BAUTISTA
FACTS: Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to sponsor the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
debates. Alleging that it is being discriminated particularly
as regards the MOA provisions on live audio broadcast via
online streaming, Rappler argues that the MOA grants
radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the
audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are not
obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA.
However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming
the audio of the debates is denied to the petitioner and
other online media entities which also have the capacity
to live stream the audio of the debates.
Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista to nullify
MOA provisions on the ground of violating the
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the
debates
HELD: Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates
because the exercise to do so is its contractual right under
the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the
copyright conditions for the debates, it can live stream the
debates.
The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities,
not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the debates subject
to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the press
to report and disseminate the live audio can no longer be
infringed or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the
press to report and disseminate the live audio of the
debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section
4, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that, “No
law shall be passed abridging the freedom…of the press.”

The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC

Chairman was directed to allow the debates to be shown
or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website
subject to the copyright condition that the source is clearly
indicated.