Tañada vs.

Tuvera (1986)
GR No. 63915

FACTS:
 Lorenzo Tañada (petitioner) invoked due process in demanding for the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which were claimed to be not published as required by law.
 The government argued that while publication was required, it is not needed when the decrees
provide that they are effective immediately upon approval.
 The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect and ordered the respondents to publish such in the Official
Gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances.
 The petitioners advocate that no distinction shall be made between laws of general applicability
and those which are not. Publication means complete publication, and such must be made in
the Official Gazette.
 The Solicitor General asserted that the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the
New Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not mandatory, and that the
publication when necessary, need not be made in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:
W/N laws requires publication for them to be effective

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.” And in this case, it was ruled that the clause “unless it is
otherwise provided” pertains to the date of effectivity of the law, and not on the requirement as to its
publication. Therefore, laws, even if it state effectivity upon approval, must be published in the Official
Gazette in order to be effective.

People vs. Veneracion (1995)

GR No. 119987-88

FACTS:
 The body of a young girl later identified as Angel Alquiza, wrapped in a sack and yellow table
cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding was seen floating in
Binondo, Manila.
 Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were later charged with the
crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
 The trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto
Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
 sentenced both accused with the “penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law.”
 City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be
“modified in that the penalty of death be imposed” against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in
place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua) which was denied by the court.

ISSUE:
W/N the judge is given the discretion to impose a penalty other than what is prescribed by law

HELD/RATIO:
No. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of law and ought to protect
and enforce without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death
penalty in spite of his personal contrary beliefs. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code
Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency of the laws.

Van Dorn v. Ronillo, Jr., et al

GR No. 68470

FACTS:
 Alicia Reyes (petitioner) is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American citizen.
The two were married in Hongkong in 1972; then established their residence in the Philippines.
The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982.
 Alicia Reyes re-married in Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
 Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business
(Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties and asking that the
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property".
 The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree had no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the Galleon Shop is a conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent even after
their divorce obtained in USA

HELD/RATIO:
No. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his county, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him. He is also estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the
petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a wife's obligation. The private respondent
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA (1989)

GR No. 80116

Petitioner: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, wife

Respondents: Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, Presiding Judge of RTC of Manila, Br. XXVI, Hon. Luis C. Victor,
City Fiscal of Manila, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, husband

FACTS:
 On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was married to
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
 After 3 and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against
the petitioner in Germany and on January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the petitioner. The records show that under the German law, said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction.
 On June 27, 1986 or more than 5 months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed for two complains of adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that
while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982
and with Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
 The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia” was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge while the
other case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua” was assigned to
Judge Cruz of Branch XXV.
 The Secretary of Justice in response to the petition filed by the petitioner directed the
respondent city fiscal to defer any arraignment proceedings if the accused has not yet been
arraigned and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. Consequently,
Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings in the case against Pilapil and Chua while the respondent
judge on the other hand, merely reset the date if the arraignment in the case against Pilapil and
 Chia. In an order dated September 8, 1987, the respondent Judge denied the motion to quash
filed by the petitioner and directed the arraignment of Pilapil and Chia. On October 21, 1987 this
Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with the criminal case. On October 27, 1987,
petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash.
 Petitioner argues that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing of the
criminal complaint.

ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of the
criminal action.

HELD/RATIO:
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence an
adultery case on the ground that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Thus, it follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action,
and by this it meant that he is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of
the complaint.

Bellis v. Bellis (1967)

GR No. L-23678

FACTS:
 Amos G. Bellis was born in and a citizen of Texas. He had five legitimate children with his first
wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife and three illegitimate
children.
 August 5, 1952 – Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should
be divided, in trust, in an order and manner he specified. He wanted 1) his first wife to get
$240,000.00; 2) his three illegitimate children to get P120,000.00 (or P40,000.00 each); and after
these two have been satisfied, 3) the remainder to go, in equal shares, to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives.
 July 8, 1958 – Amos died a resident of Texas.
  September 15, 1958 - His will was admitted to probate at the Court of First Instance, Manila. The
People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the will executor, paid all bequests to the first wife and
three illegitimate children. Their respective legacies were released from time to time as how the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances.
 January 8, 1964 – Executor submitted and filed a report regarding the satisfaction of the legacies
of the first wife and three illegitimate children, and the project of partition on the division of the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the legitimate children.
 January 17, 1964 – Two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma, filed oppositions
to the project of partition, saying that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and thus compulsory heirs of the deceased.
 Lower court overruled their oppositions and their motions for reconsideration have been
denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the execution of the will

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The national law of Amos Bellis should apply. The decedent was both a citizen of Texas and a
resident thereof at the time of his death. Even if there was a conflict of law between domicile and
nationality rule, it would still refer back to Texas law and would not result to the doctrine of renvoi.
Given that the decedent executed two wills, even if it is assumed that the intention of executing one as
a separate Philippine will was so that the Philippine law would govern, properties would still not be
distributed according to Philippine law as such is illegal and void; national law cannot be ignored
regarding those matters. Consistent with the provisions of Art. 16 of the Civil Code which provides that
“Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person