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On the Lim its o f “Presentism” and

“ Historicism” in the Historiography
o f the Behavioral Sciences

This cssay appeared originalfy as au editorial in the third number oí

the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. Although
the Journal was founded in 1965 primanly by a gioup of psychol-
ogists and psychiatrísts, and its contents still reflect its origin, it
may be regarded as a manifestation of a more widespread interest
in recent yean in the histórica] background of the modern be­
havioral and social sciences.1 This interest has been evident both
among historians and, to a gieater degree, among scholars in the
various disciplines involved. Such a dualism of penonnel, along
with the nature of the sub/ect rnatter, creates special historio-
graphical problems for the histoiy of the behavioral sciences,
which are widely manifest in its literature. In parí because my
own training and experience have been such a$ to give me an
abnormal sensitivity to certain issues of histórica! method, I have
devoted a fair amount of my scholaríy energies to their discussion
— perhaps more than was tactful for someone who still feels a bit
of an “ outsider” in relation to the anthropologícal “ tribe.” 8
Although severa! of the essays reprinted here reflect this meth-
odologica! interest, they have been chosen primanly for their reía-
tion to a substantive historical theme. I have nevertheíess decided
to include the present essay, since it states an underlying histori-:
ogiaphical point of view which I hope will be generally evident iii
the essays which folJow. Jn the present Jess polemical context, I am
incüned to qualify íuithei my suggestion that the historian ap-
proaches history siinpiy because “ it is there.” Much historical
practice suggests otherwise. Furthermo/e, I am at this point in-
cJined to be /ust a bit doubtful of the utilitarian benefits of his­
tórica] study for ongoing aiithropoJogicaí research. Neither of
• these second thoughts, however, afiects the basic message, which
• is a pJea for an ideal oí historícal understanding which may never
- be easily obtainable in practice, and for the legitimacy of an his­
torical enterprise whose utüity is rarely easily definabíe in irame-
diate terins. f have therefore reprinted the essay as it originally
appeared, with oníy minor modifications of language.

í J l L T H O U G H the A p ril editorial on “ P olicy and its Imple-
mentation” outlined the basic objectives o f the Journal o f the
History o f the Behavioral Sciences, its frankly limited scope and
purpose did not allow extended conáderadon o f certain broader
questions o f m otive and method in the historiography o f the be­
havioral sciences. Perhaps this was as it should have been. T h e
“ grass roots” impulses w hich produced the Journal w ere numer-
ous, and express themselves in a variety o f historiographical ap-
proaches. Furthermore, history itself is in m any respects the most
undisciplined o f disciplines. T h ere have been m any attempts to
co d ify historical method and to define the philosophical presup-
positions.of historical inquiry. B ut C lio, putative mother o f m any
o f the behavioral sciences, still drapes herself in skirts as varied as
the progeny w h o once abandoned and now return to them.* F or
all this, however, history remains a discipline o f sorts, and one to
w hich all the makers o f this joum al are at least avocationally com-
mitted. W h ile w e cannot assume and do not seek a consensus o f
motive and method, it is still appropriate to discuss these problems
tyitematicaUy. I í w e can neither prescribe ñor proscribe historio-
¿ •p h ic a f poincs o f view , w e can ar least define them and argüe
Iheir relative merits.
W ith due regard fo r the oversimplification w hich ideal-
typical analysis involves, let us proceed b y settíng up a series o f
flkhotomies w hich may be subsumed under tw o altem ative orien-
facions tow ard historiography. I f subtler analysis should destroy
the neat dualism o f the m odel, w ell and good. It m ay nevertheless
icrve as a polemical starting point. Consider then the follow ing
•Iternatives: “ context” and “analogue” ; “ process” and “sequence” ;
‘‘•Miergence” and “agen cy” ; “ thinking'’ and “ thought” ; “ reason-
ibteness” and “ rationality” ; “ understanding” and “ judgment” ;
“iffcctive” and “ utilitañan” , “ historicisrn” and “ presentism.”
Their explication w ill, I hope, fio w from the ensuing^rgum enc"
A( this point, however, let us leap directlyto.the-akeínative orien-
«rions under w lych-I'W Íi'saSsiírñe them: in each case, the lirst -
t»nn seemfrtífrne to characterize the attempt “ to understand the
M lt for the salce o f the past” ; the second, to characterize the -
(fWdy o f “ the past fo r the sake o f the present.”
T h e last tw o phrases are o f course H erbert Butterfield’s. H e
B*ed theift a generation ago in a critique entitled T h e W hig Inter- ■
prttation o f H istory, w hich he defined as “ the tendency in many
hllforians to w rite on the side o f Protestants and W higs, to praise
fivolutions provided th ey have been successful, to emphasize cer-
tlln principies o f progress in the past and to produce a story
Which is the ratificadon i f not the glorification o f the present.”
A tcord in g to Butterfield, the w h ig interpretaron introduces itself •
v^ito historical w riting as a principie o f abridgment. Faced w ith
the niassive com plexity o f historical particularity, the general
Witorian fa»s vicrim rn the “ hiscorian’s ‘pathedc faliaov’.’’ “ab^
B rtctin g things from their historical context and iudging them
ipart from their context-estim ating them and o rgan ian g the
hUtorical studv b y a svstem o f direct reference to the present.” 4 -
T h e w hig historian reduces the mediating processes b y w hich the
totulity o f an historical past produces the totality o f its conse-
tjiiciu future to a search fo r the origins o f certain present phe-
flnmcna. H e seeks o a t in the past phenomena w hich seem to
ttacmble those o f concern in the present, and then moves forw ard
fa time b y tracing lineages up to the present in simple sequential
movement. W h en this abridging procedure is charged w ith &
normatíve commitment to the phenomena whose origjns are
sought, the linear movement is “progress" and those w h o seem to
abet it are “ progressive.” T h e result is whiggish history. Because
it is informed b y a normative commitment, its characteristic in-.
terpretive mode is judgment rather than understanding, and
history becomes the field for a dramatic struggle betweeo children
o f light and children o f darkness. Because ít wrenches the indi­
vidual historical phenomenon from the complex netw ork of its
contem porary context in order to see it in abstracted relationship
to analogues in the present, it is prorte to anachronistic misinter-i
pretation. Because it assumes in advance the progressive charaeteS
o f historical change, it is less interested in-the-complex'processesí
b y w hich change emerges than in agencies w hich direct it,-,
whether th ey be great men, specific deterministic forces, or the!
“logic” o f historical development itself. i
W higgish history is a variety o f w hat I w ould cali generallyj
“ presentísm” in historical study. T o characterize its alternative,
I would suggest the term “ historicism,” although chis w ord has
been used w ith a variety o f meanings, w hich often have an under­
lyin g or explicic epistemological ch arle .5 B y deliberately using it
rather loosely, w ithou t epistemological commitment, I am of
course to some extent sacrificing analytic subtletv to polémica!
convenience. Nevertheless, some term is necessary, and “ histori-?
cism” conveys rather w e ll the essentíal quality of the commitmentj
to the understanding o f the past fo r its ow n sake. T h is essence;
should already be generally evident, but w e can make it m ore
explicit—and at the same time relate this w hole discussion more-
dírectly to the problems o f the historiography o f the behavioral]
sciences—b y briefly explicating several o f the diehotomies men-;
tioned above: “ thinking” and “thought” ; “ reasonableness” and i
“rationality” ; “ understanding” and “judgm ent.” j
W h a t 1 have to suggest in regard to the first tw o pairs of^
altematives has been adm irably stated in Joseph Levenson’s Con-
fucian China and Its M odern Fate, an extended essay on the bis-
toricization o f a w orld view : the process b y w hich a traditional
and absolutistic iveltanschauung becomes historical and relativistic
under the impact o f W estern cuitare. ín discussing this process,
Levenson treats w ith a subtle and delicate hand the w ays in which
fcftnoclasts “releíate traditional ideas to che past” and tradidonal-
}»t« “ transfonm traditional ideas in the present"—an “apparencly
Mradoxícal transformation-with-preservation" w hich depends on
. » change in the thinker’s alternatives.” For, as Professor Levenson
IWggcsts, “ a thought includes w hat its thinker eliminates; an idea
Mk its particular quality from the fact that other ideas, expressed
iñ mlier quarters, are demonstrably alternatives.” L evenson jjoes
on 10 quote the British j>hik»sophéF o f history, R . G . Collingwood,
fo Miggest a lQgieat'prfnciple b y w hich such change may be under-
«oud: “ a b ody of Icnowledge consists not o f ‘propositions,’ ‘state-
fftents’ or ‘judgments’ . . . but o f these together w ith the ques­
illo s they are meant to answer.” Levenson condudes that an
"Itlcn, then, is a denial o f alternatives and an answer to a question,”
•tld tliat intellectual history is the history o f men thinking rather -
lhan_t_he histo ry o f thouphiJ
In a general consideration o f the problem o f history and valué,
Levenson later comments on the alternatives o f “reasonableness”
«td “ rationality” : “ Absolutism is parochialism o f the present, the
fonfusion o f one’s ow n time w ith the timeless, a confusion o f the
fategories o f reasonable and rational.” T h e historian, however,
“ not w hethet something is tra e o r good, but w h y and -where
|IUÍ to what end i t carne to be enacted or expressed.” H e goes
fetyond “assessment o f his subject’s thought as rationally (time-
and abstractly) perhaps erratíc. H e proceeds to analyze
Why, nevertheless, that thought was not ridiculous . • • but rea-
|onal>le-in spite o f or because o f imperfect rationality.” F o r “ rea-
l&nnbleness relates to the questions put b y the subject’s time . . .
(to which} his ideas are answers.” 7 It is in some context such as
{hit, rather than in an y explicitly epistemological fram ework, that
i would like to pose the d k h o to m y between judgment and under-
(tanding: understanding is the attempt, b y w hatever means, to get
K tlie “reasonableness” o f w hat m ight otherwise be judged as fall-
}ng short o f some present o r absolute standards o f “ rationality.” 8
A t this point, the reader m ay w ell ask “what has aU this to do
With the w ork o f our joum al?” In the first place 1 w ould suggest
tn n frankly provocadve, but open-minded spirit—that each of
(hciic orientadons w ill tend to fínd Its natural adherents among the
hlworiographers of the behavioral sciences, and that each orienta-
*km carries w ith it a characteristic raotivational posture. T h e
' orientación o f the historian approaching the history o f the b q
havioral sciences w ill tend to be “ historicist” and his motivationaj
posture “affective.” Presentism is b y no means a dead issue in tM
historical fratem ity, and historíans are undeniably conditioned ifj
a thousand subtle w ays b y the present in w hich th ey write. B u t ia
general, the historian approaches the past rather in the spirit o f the
mountain climber attacking Everest—“ because it is there.”
demands no m ore o f it than the emocional satisfaction w hich flowj
from understanding a manifestation o f the changing human self-ía
time. T h e approach o f the professional behavioral scientisj;<&n th¿
other hand, is more lik ely to be w higgish or, m ore bpoádly, “ prej
sentíst,” and his motivatíonal posture “ u tilitarian ^ H e m ay shaH
the historian’s emotional satisfaction, but__h£-ténds to demand oí
the past something more: that it bürelated to and evea useful fo í
furthering his professional activities in the ongoing present Thua
the A p ril editorial emphasizes the utility o f historical study as “a
w a y to implement interdisciplinary cooperation.” \
Leaving aside fo r n o w the relative merits o f the postures oí
these frankly ideal-cypical pracáóoners, it is important to riott?
that there is a sort o f im plicit w higgish presentism virtually built
into the history o f science, and b y extensión into the history ol
the behavioral sciences. H ow ever disiiiusioned w e m ay have be-
come w ith the idea o f progress in other arcas, how ever sophis-
ticated in the newer philosophy o f science, most of us take it fo |
r granted that the developm ent o f science is a cumulative ever-upi
w ard progress in radonality. Indeed, G eo rge Sarton, long-time
doyen o f historíans o f science, described his study as “ the only
history w hich can illustrate the progress o f mankind” because “ the
j acquisition and systematization o f posidve know ledge are th e only
human activities w hich are tru ly cum ulative and progressive.’l
F o r Sarton, the history o f mathematics w as a w higgish progress;
- unmarred b y to ry backslidings, “ an endless series o f victories o£
the human mind, victories w ithou t counterbalancing failures, that
is, without dishonorable and humiliating ónes, and w ithout atro-
cides.” * In v i e * o f the occasionally strident sdendsm and also of
the residual reformism o f the behavioral sciences, it is hardly sur-;
prising that their historiography should manifest various signs ofí
whiggish presentism. T h e careful reader w ill find a number in the;
first issues o f our joum al. In a general and impersonal w a y , one‘
i y note that andqúaríanism can flo w from a presentist orienta-
just as w e n as fróm a know -nothing historicism. Stardng
n whijTgí^h a«umprions about progress. the historian can
Como rather pedantically involved in the search fo r “ firsts aná
ánders”—for the agents o f cumulative forw ard progresáon.
nnc inay note h o w the search fo r analogues, for precursors
IH mndernity, can produce its all too revealing shocks o f recogni­
ción «üsappointed—as, fo r instance, w hen scientist X , w h o other-
grife anticipated so m uch o f o u r current thinking, is found to
ivc an “ insufficient appreciarion” o f some point w hich is today

Fortunately, how ever, the history o f Science provides us w ith

cr niodels than the “ chroniclers o f an incremental process.” In
llc e n t years there has been, in the words o f Thom as K uhn, a
prtttoriographic revoludon in the study o f science.” Rather than
Ifching out “ the permanent contributions o f an older science to
ir present vantage,” historians have begun to attempt “ to display •
historical integrity o f that science in its ow n time.” A lthough
revolution is still “ in its early stages,” K uhn’s ow n brilliandy ■
Uroversial Structure o f Scientific Revolutions is a clear indica-
that historicism, though it may have come late to the history
1science, is b y no meaos irrelevant to it. T ru e, K uhn’s book i&¿-
erfectly historicist in its focus on the inner development o f ’
Mee to the deliberate neglect o f the role o f “ technological ad­
uce or o f extem al social, econom ic and intellectual conditions,”
one might add, the variety o f natíonal cultural traditíons
Wn w hich scitntific development takes place. B ut how ever
ch certain traditional historians m ay have balked at its nom o-
ic language and its attempt to generalize the coorse o f sden -
Sf development, K uhn’s approach to the intemal development o f '
ínce is informed b y a spirit w hich is clearly historicist, in the
Í|WM in w hich I have used the term.1®
Kuhn’s central concept is that o f the “paradigm”—an articu-
¡llted set o f assumpdons about “ the fundamental entides o f w hich
! th« universe is composed,” the nature o f their interaedon “w ith
. H eh oeher and w ith the senses,” the types o f questions “ w hich
ÍHIiy legitimately be asked about such enrities,” and the techniques
be cmployed in seeldng answers to these questions. In short, the
Ífrlfídigm functíons as a disdplinary world v in o —which, as K uhn
points out, is culturally transmitted and sustained b y a set o f social
insdtudons. Prior to the establishment o f its first consensúa!
digm, a Science tends to be a chaos o f com pedng sch o o lv^ ích o f
w hich feels “forced to b u iJ d [its] field anew fro p rits founda-
tions.” O nce accepted, the paradigtn- is_the b^ás^for the puzzle-
solving mop-up w ork o f “ normal science,” w hich serves primarily
to complete the articulation o f the paradigm. Scientific revoludons
occur w hen anomaües “ produced inadvertently b y a game played
under one set o f rules” require fo r their assimiladon the “ elabora-
don o f another set” —the crearion o f a new paradigm based on
different assumpdons, asking difTerent questions, and suggestíng
different answers. W ith o u t further elaboradng, or necessarily
accepting, the spedñcs o f K uhn’s analysis, I w ould suggest that
this approach does encourage us to see a body o f know ledge as a
set o f propositíons “ together w ith the questions they are meanc
to answer,” to understand the “ reasonableness” o f points o f v ie w
now superseded, to see historical change as a complex process ofj
emergence rather than a simple linear sequence-in short, to ün-j
derstandthe sden ce o f a given period in its o w n terms.11 j
Quite aside from the quesdon o f its general utility, Kuhn’sj
yhem anratinn suggests further reason fo r the presendsm o f many^
historiographers o f the behavioral sciences. Perhaps because thd
behavioral sciences are fo r the most part in K uhn’s terms “ pre^
paradigmatic,” their historiography is more open to certain vice^
o f presendsm than that o f science generally. W hen there is n d
single fram ework w h ich unites all the w o jk ers in a field, butj
rather compedng points o f view o r com pedng schools, historiog-?
raphy simply, extends the arena o f their compedtíon. A t its m osi
' nfntrali tt,A “ •erile tra d n g o f theoredcal lineaged
w hich is served u p in “ history o f theor v ” courses in m any be­
havioral science departments. A s the degree o f pardsan involve*
ment and historiographical efFort increases, the author m ay at-j
tempt to legidmize a present point o f view b y claiming fo r it a
putative “ founder” o f the discipline. O r he m ay sweep broadly
across the history o f a discipline, brushing out whigs and tories in
the-nooks and crannies o f every century .12 Inevitably the sins of
history w ritten “ fo r the safce o f the present” insinúate themselves?
anachronism, distortion, misinterpretarion, misleading analogy,
neglect o f context, oversimplification o f process.
But does thís mean that the history o f the behavioral sciences
(hotild be wricten purely and sim ply “ co understand the past for
the sake o f the past?” I think not. It m ay w ell be that such under-
ttinciing exists only as a kind o f historical H o ly G rail—never to
be found b y sinful man, but enlightening the scholar w h o dedi-
Wtcs himself to the search. O r one m ay argüe, as indeed Professor
Levcnson does, that the historian must “ articúlate his ow n [pres-'
|flt| standards in order to find the rationale o f his subjeets’, in
ercíer~by raising the quesdon he could never recognize i f he
hcked his ow n convictíons—to find what made it reasonable fo r
fhe carlier generation to viólate tbe Jater historian’s criteria of
Tltlonality .” 18 But beyond such limitauons w h ich historicisrn
Would impose upon itself, there are compelling reasons fo r a
ffiorc active presentism in the historiography o f the behavioral
Igjences. Precisely because most o f us are p ractidn g behavioral
RBicntísts, w e are, and indeed must be, interested in thought as w ell
M thinking, in rationality as w e ll as reasonableness—not in abso-
fetímíc terms, but in the context o f ongoing attempts to develop
Étneralized explanations o t human~Sehavior at th e h ig h est level
A » f preserit know ledge permits. jftie case fo r an enlightened pres-
Ifltism in a particular área o f t h e behavioral sciences has been so
^Hll put b y D gJjJH gm g that I w ould like to quote from him at
|6me length:

There exists, indeed, not only a subject m anei for a history o f

llngulnic anthropology, but also a deñnite need. T o m y miad, there
'M * general need in the current study of language for codificación,
ÉRlculscion as well as exploration. From a humanistic viewpoint, such
might be seen as the reconstítution of a general phüology. In
íprictly anthropological terms, such work might be seen as the framing
¡Éf • provisional general theory of language aád culture. In either case,
:.'SM work of criticism and interpretation would have to draw for per-
ietive equaily as much on the history, or development, of the study
t language as on a survey of current knowledge and research. Histnry
Md lystematics would be interdependgit.
Keasons for t/its are familiar co scüdents of intelectual history, and
combination seems often to have occurred. . . . I mendon the
fMner here out o f a strong sense o f «s dmeliness and importance for
Mthropology. T o the degree that w e have Iacked an active knowl-
of the history of our field, w e have been limited by lack o f some
r i the perspectíves that have not been transmitted to us, and by the
ness of some of those that have. A cridcal history can help us
regain the One and transcend the other. In m y ow n w ork I have some-
• times felt that progress in y ^ r c t a n d i n f r bnt the recaoture o f per-
specdve that had beea lost.
" Ueraiuly a fiáSé can T e made for an intellectual discontinuity iz
American lingvúsóc anthropology dvsring this century, such that sonv
important Work of preceding generations has become unintelligible, iti
meaning having to be recaptured by special study. I say this not oui
of overestímaoon of the worth of earlier work. Much of its conten
has been permanently superseded, and its neglect thus to some ex$ea
justiñed. But historical interpretation and critique of earlier-'períod
has the twty^dyed valué o í reffaininy and rranv'mAitff^/m^núemei
above), and I say this, not as an historian, but-ás a pracmioner, of ti*
field in question. I would identify the situación in this way. O ur mos
recent, still conrinuing, period has been dóminated by reacáon agains
an earlier perspective considered too swéeping, too ambitious in scope
too weak in data and method. In oatline caricature, the devolutioi
¿ from generalizations of bold scope has been first to drop the generaü4
zarioos, and then the scope. V e*y narrow definitions of iinguisrics^
aífecting anthropology, have cortíe to the fore. B y enabling us to pu|
in full perspecave many of oqr problems and assumptions, histórica!
study will help change the situación in two respects. In some ways tha
consequence wíll be to depart in a much more thoroughgoing waw
from earlier work, since the departure will be not simply a contraci
don, but a fresh start. In other ways the consequence will be to rene^S
earlier penttds by renewing attendon to problems posed in themj
Ideally, the fresh start will hamess the technical and empirical adj
vanees of the latest period to the broad sense of scope ana relevanaj
of its predecessors.1* \
Perhaps one m ight generalize this argument in terms o f th<
“ pre-paradigmaric” state, the a-historica! orientatíon, and the his
torically conditíoned disciplinary fragm entadon o f the behaviora
sciences. Because th e y are pre-paradigmade, the various com
peting schools o f the present and o f the past exist in a sense cotf
temporanetrasly. B u t because th e y have on the w hole such noto
riously shorc historical memorieSj the behavioral sciences o f th<
present have_very litd e aw areness that th eiF p red ecesor? w é íe u
many instatices askíng questions and offering answ en ábóut prób
lems which* have b y n o means been closed. A n d because o fU fl
disciplinary fragm en taron o f approaches -which w e rt in the pas
often m uch m ore integrated, there m ay b e fruits o f interdísciplin
ary cooperation w hich are as easily picked in the past as in th<
present In short, in a pre-paradigmade situación there are tremen
dous problems o f defíning w hat the positive increments in o a
[tmowledge o f human behavior actuaU ylíáve been. T h ere is also a
; tf*niendous field in w h ic h jb e ^ e e k e r o f serendipity m ay indulge
Rut precisejy-because in tne history o f the behavioral sciences
Iherc are legitímate and compelüng reasons fo r studying “ the past •
í®r the sake o f the present,” it is all the more important to keep in
m lm l the pitfalls o f a presentist approach. A n d beyond this I-
Would argüe that the Utilities w e are seeking in the present are in
flCt best realized b y an approach w hich is in practice if not in
Impulse “ affective” and “ historicist.” E B. T y lo r may speak to
resent anthropologists, but th ey w ill be better able to understand
{ Ini if they are able to distinguish hetween the questd^" ,¡ h* admH.<
Which have long since been answered. the questions w hich are srill'
Bpen, and the questions w hich w e w ou ld no longer even recog-'
W te as such. A s I have suggested below, T y lo r ’s central anthro-
•ological problem, in its simplest terms, was to “ fill the gap
p « w e e n Brixham Cave and European G vilization w ithout intro-
’^Ucing the hand o f G o d ”—that is, to show that human culture
p M , or m ight have been, the result o f a natural evolutionary de-
^N)opment. N o anthropologist tod ay w ould question the fact that
ipilture was, in a broad sense, the product o f such an ^ o lu ó o n a ry
ment. T h a t question has been answered. O n the other
id, the question o f filling in gaps is still very m uch open, and
hough our methods o f approaching this problem are perhaps
ite different, T y lo r m ay still have something to say to us. H o w -
er, the qüestíon o f the hand o f G o d , w hich greatly exercised a ^
||)umber o f T y lo r ’s contemporaries, and therefore T y lo r , w e
iuld not even regard as a question. A s Professor Levenson sug-
ts, to approach T y lo r in these terms requires a standpoint in the
icnt. B ut it also requires {hat w e kn ow what the questions w ere
w hich T y lo r ’s ideas w ere answers, and the alternatives w h ich *
answers w ere designed to exelude.
v W hat is involved here, i f I m ay tu m to m y ow n uses a distinc­
i ó n which Professor Levenson made in a somewhat different con-
rtvxt, is the difference in intonation between the “ historically
(rtnlly) significant” and the “ (m erely) historically ágnificant” —
"bctwcen an empirical judgment o f fruitfulness in time and a ñor-
^IWtive judgm ent o f arid ity in the here and now .” “B y abjqring
'judginent,'’ b y approaching the past “ w ith an even-handed alloca-
don o f historical significance.” the historian m ay be able to creaí
out of “ the nothing o f the historically significant” something <j
valué and utility in the present, something “historically signií
esnt . " 13 B ut to dp d a s re<juires~3i r ffppreachinterm s o f contea
process, emergence, thinking, and reasonabteness.Tndee3T ít is t i
burden o f this essay that this goa! requires an affective, histórica
orientadon w hich attempts “ to understand the past for th e sa*
o f th e past.” B y suspending judgment as to present utility, vd
maJeé that judgm ent ultimately possible.