CONCEPT AND SCOPE OF QUASI DELICT RULING: Petitioners are seeking to recover damages not as a result of the felony

ers are seeking to recover damages not as a result of the felony (delito),
but as a result of a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana). The latter is recognized by the civil code
1. FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO (July 8, 1942) as a separate legal concept. A quasi-delict is a separate legal institution under the CC, with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of CC, the
FACTS: At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of
the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis.
The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The 1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action
be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939,
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the
which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes."
Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the
action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the
mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully
chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers
CA: It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he did not
who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In fact it is shown he
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. Since the present action is a separate civil suit
the Automobile Law and speeding violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau
and not an action to recover damages arising from criminal liability, Barredo’s negligence
of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify
under the Civil Code provision invoked makes him directly liable. Preponderance of
plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
evidence is sufficient to prove his negligence (instead of beyond reasonable doubt)
because the case at bar is a civil action.
Defense of Barredo: The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo
is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there
2. GERMAN C. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (August 31, 1973)
has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable.

CA: The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation
arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation
imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as
an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
Pertinent provisions: CC: ART. 1903, ART. 1904; RPC: ART. 100-103
FACTS: On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental
Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of
said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference. At about 9:30 a.m., while the
PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio
Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger
bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro
Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical
injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the
accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and
imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety
of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners filed with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages against the private respondents,
owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the
collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
Marcelino Inesin (operator) and Ricardo Vayson (driver) filed their answer admitting the
contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was
due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite
direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he
had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such
precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question,
and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused
on petitioners.
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala filed a motion to dismiss contending, among
others, that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days
before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged
with a criminal case, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the
aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the
criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the
liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment
has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of
the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical
injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
Trial court: It dismissed the complaint for damages and declared that whether or not "the
action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa
aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that
the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it
separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of
the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the
opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
ISSUE: Whether Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite an existing
criminal action against the defendant.
RULING: The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger
bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the
passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that
the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent
manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one
based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in
the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the
civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in
both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same
negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art.
100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal
action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has
the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the
former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party
loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has
actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal
case has disappeared. The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.
3. PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano, deceased, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, (May 26, 1977)
FACTS: It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored the SC with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son,
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to. The lower court granted
motion to dismiss; hence the present action.
ISSUES:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was
already legally married?
RULING:
1. NO. The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated
civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
2. YES. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual. Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
4. EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch
VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, (June 29, 1979)
FACTS: On October 22, 1969, a three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur
Highway, Marilao Bulacan involving Mercedes Benz Owner/ petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza,
and respondents jeepney driver Salazar and truck driver Montoya. This resulted in the
filing of two separate Informations of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Damage to
Property. The first one being a Php 1,604.00 Criminal case against truck driver Montoya
for hitting Salazar’s jeepney at the right rear portion causing the jeep to hit Mendoza’s
Mercedes, and the second Criminal Case was against jeepney driver Salazar for hitting the
Benz in the amount of Php 8,890.00.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan rendered judgment. Truck
driver Montoya was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of damage to
property through reckless imprudence and was sentence to pay jeepney driver Salazar a
fine for actual damages and indemnity. Accused Rodolfo Salazar, on the other hand, was
acquitted. Mercedes Benz owner was not awarded damages. On August 22, 1970 , after
termination of criminal cases, Petitioner filed Civil Case against truck owner Timbol and
jeepney driver Salazar. Timbol filed a motion to dismiss claiming that such action is barred
by the prior judgment in criminal cases. The CFI judge granted Timbol’s Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUES:
1. Can Timbol be sued for damages by Mendoza after termination of criminal cases?
2. Should the Civil Case against jeepney driver Salazar be dismissed?
RULING:
1. Timbol can be sued for damages. The principle of res judicata does not apply. There is
no identity of cause of action between the civil case in question and the criminal case
against the truck driver for damage to the jeep. There is no oneness in Identity in the civil
and criminal cases. In the former, the truck owner, Timbol, was made a party in the case
while in the latter only the jeepney driver, Salazar, was a party in the case for the damage
to Petitioner’s Mercedes Benz. Moreover, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was
the enforcement of a civil liability arising from criminal negligence, while the Civil Case is
based on quasi delict under Art 2180 in relation to Art 2176 of the New Civil Code. Failure
to make a reservation in the criminal action for negligence of the right to file an
independent civil action does not bar the filing of the latter. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
cannot amend the substantive provision of Art. 31 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict.
2. The civil case against Salazar should be dismissed. The circumstances attendant to the
criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana, as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal
suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal
action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have
reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with
Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court10 which provides: “Sec. 3. Other civil actions
arising from offenses.—In all cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed: (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. And even if petitioner’s cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar’s acquittal was not
based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted.
5. PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge
of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, (May 31, 1979)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account
of a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver.
At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of
the civil action pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111
of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property
during the pendency of the criminal action.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action. Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article
2177. The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.
6. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, vs. CA and MARILOU T. GONZALES, (February 19, 1993)
FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan
City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former
waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the
respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live
with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the
respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However,
the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by
the respondent from the petitioner. The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and
the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that
the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and
that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his
custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry per se is an actionable wrong.
RULING: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, Article 21 of the Civil Code is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. The Court
ruled that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT
7. TAKUTARU UYEHARA, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH
GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., (December 24, 1915) (Proof of Negligence)
FACTS: The plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an automobile from the
defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at a
certain price hour and was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab
company. The journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip,
while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad company in the barrio of San Juan,
municipality of Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs
injured. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad
Company and held the defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs in
various amounts. The taxicab company appealed.
Trial Court: It appears from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of
the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the
precautions which ordinary care and prudence would require, without reducing speed and
without taking any precaution looking to determining whether there was danger from a
train or locomotive. The trial court accordingly found that the driver was guilty of gross
negligence and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It also found
that the driver had been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab company to approach and
pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the occasion
in question, and that, for that reason, the taxicab company was liable for the damages
caused.
Appellants: (TAXICAB)
1. On approaching the railroad crossing from the direction in which the automobile was
travelling at the time, the view of the railroad tracks in both directions was obstructed by
bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was impossible for a person
approaching the crossing even though on guard, to detect by sight the approach of a train.
If that were the case, it was clearly the duty of the driver to reduce the speed of his car
and the noise thereof to such an extent that he would be able to determine from the
unrestricted and uninterrupted use of all his faculties whether or not a train was near. It is
the law that a person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad
crossing. In the case at bar the appellant's own showing is to the effect that the view of
the track in the direction from which the train was coming was obstructed in such manner
that neither the track nor a train could be seen as a traveler approached the crossing; and
yet, in spite of that fact, the chauffeur drove upon the tracks without investigation or
precaution of any kind. The very fact that a train was approaching and was so near as to
collide with the automobile is strong evidence of the fact that no precautions were taken
to determine that fact. Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their
presence, generally speaking, is easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
2. Under the second error assigned, the appellant contends with much vigor that the
plaintiffs cannot recover for the reason that the negligence of the driver of the automobile,
if any, was imputable to them, they having permitted the driver to approach and pass over
the railroad crossing without the use of ordinary care and diligence to determine the
proximity of a train or locomotive, and having made no effort to caution or instruct him or
compel him to take reasonable care in making the crossing. With this contention we
cannot agree. We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of
authority, is that a person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver direction as
to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercise no other control over the
conduct of the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented
from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train,
caused by the negligence either of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver.
3. The appellant assigns as the third error the finding of the trial court "that the defendant
Manila Railroad Company was not guilty of negligence which contributed to the causing of
the accident complained of." There is evidence in the record showing that the locomotive
engineer gave due and timely signals on approaching the crossing in question. The trial
court found that the employees of the railroad company fully performed their duty as the
train approached the crossing on the night in question and that, therefore, the railroad
company in nowise contributed to the accident. That the bell was rung and the whistle
was blown on nearing the crossing, giving due and timely warning to all persons
approaching, was testified to not only by servants of the corporation but by passengers on
the train.
The main contention of the appellant is based on the claim that, even admitting as proved
all of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the appellant is not liable. It is maintained that up
to the time the accident occurred the defendant taxicab company had fully performed its
duty to the public, it being undisputed in the record that the driver was competent and
had a long and satisfactory record, having driven cars for the defendant for 5 or 6 years
without accident or misadventure, and that his negligence, if any, in attempting to pass
over the crossing on the occasion before us, cannot legally be imputed to the taxicab
company so as to make it liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff must prove the negligence of the employer in order to
recover damage from the latter.
RULING: NO. Article 1903 of the Civil Code made a distinction which holds the masters
responsible for the negligent acts of the servant when the master is the owner "of an
establishment or enterprise," and the acts complained of are committed within the scope
of the servant's employment in such business. From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the selection of the servant or employee or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure (conclusive) and consequently may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
The Court ruled that a taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it furnished a
safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply
with one of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of
supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations
and the formulation and publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases
where such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
8. L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, and SPS. FLORENTINO
and THERESA VALLEJERA, (September 26, 2006)
FACTS: On 26 Feb. 1996, Charles Vallejera (7 yrs old) was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by
LG Foods and driven by Vincent Ferrer (employee). Charles died as a result. An
Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against Ferrer
before the MTCC Bacolod City. However, before the trial could be concluded, Ferrer
committed suicide. The MTCC had dismissed the case. On 23 June 1999, in the RTC of
Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against LG Foods as
employers of the deceased Ferrer. They allege that as the employers, they had failed to
exercise the due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
LG Foods denied liability for the death of Charles. They claimed that they had exercised
the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. They
moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. LG Foods argued that
the complaint is a “claim for subsidiary liability against an employer” under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. They contend that there must be first a judgment of conviction
against Ferrer as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. And because Ferrer had
died during the pendency of the criminal case, the sine qua non condition for their
subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the lack of cause of action on the part of the
spouses Vallejera. On 4 Sept. 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: Is the cause of action of the Spouses Vallejera founded on Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code (as LG Foods assert) or derived from Art. 2180 of the Civil Code?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is to be applied in this
case. Under Article 2180, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.
The complaint of the Spouses Vallejera had sufficiently alleged that the death of Charles
was caused by the negligent act of LG Foods’ driver. Hence, LG Foods is civilly liable for
the negligence of their driver for failing “to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver,
which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident.” To add, the Court also
stated that “victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the
Civil Code.” Since Ferrer had committed suicide, the Spouses Vallejera had no other
remedy but to sue LG Foods based on their direct and primary liability based on quasi-
delict. The Supreme Court had denied the petition of LG Foods.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was
made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment where the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein—in reality, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place.
9. ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO, v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
FACTS: Respondent, Ranida D. Salvador, started working as a trainee in the Accounting
Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. As a prerequisite for regular
employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center
(CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface
Antigen) test and issued the test result indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive."
The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp
signature of Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto.
Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that
she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report
submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s employment for failing the
physical examination.
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart
attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement,
Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result indicated that
she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the
test conducted by CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result. Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag
test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indicated
that she was non-reactive.
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive
Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-
employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida
which indicated a "Negative" result. Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of
CDC, issued a Certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining
medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Garcia and a
purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous
interpretation of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and suffered serious
mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost
business opportunities.
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the
scientific explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test. On the other
hand, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his
rubber-stamp signature.
TC: Dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
CA: Reversed the trial court’s ruling. Ordered Garcia to pay Ranida moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. CA also found Garcia liable for damages for
negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro
for lack of participation in the issuance of the results.
ISSUE: WON Garcia should be held liable liable for damages to the respondents for issuing
an incorrect HBsAG test result.
RULING: YES. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with
statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote
the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed
and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public
interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person
the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.
A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed
physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained
in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the
supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any
examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist. These rules are intended
for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical
examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public
demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required
by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. Second, Garcia
conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant-
appellee Castro. Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida
without the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release
of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules
promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to
observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus,
his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply
with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service
for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was
compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the
proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and
releasing the clinical report.
10. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, vs. ETHEL BRUNTY (November 2, 2006)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 47567 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The assailed decision affirmed with partial modification the ruling3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, directing petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR)
to indemnify respondents Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia for the death of
Rhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to
the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together
with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes
Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00
midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on
its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila4 as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m.,
January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad
crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr,
drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to
collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz
smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. 5 A
certain James Harrow6 brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in
Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had
suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was
transferred to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for
further treatment.7
On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter8 to the PNR demanding payment of
actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of her daughter’s death. When PNR
did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint 9 for damages against the PNR
before the RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well
as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the
gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the
railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that
there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the
railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand
flashlight.10 Plaintiffs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the
performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator
of the train.11 They prayed for the payment of the following damages:
1.) ₱200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
2.) ₱2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty
representing lost or unearned income of Rhonda Brunty;
3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the
evidence adduced, to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
4.) At least ₱64,057.61 as actual damages representing medical expenses to
plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia and at least ₱1,000,000.00 as unearned or lost
income of said plaintiff;
5.) At least ₱72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost of the Mercedes
Benz car to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia;
6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the
evidence adduced, to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and
7.) Attorney’s fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs
herein.12
In its Answer,13 PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not
only in the selection but also in the supervision of its employees. 14 By way of special and
affirmative defense, it stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in
question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such
crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically
posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita’s negligence, and that he
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs,
the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the
guard.15 As counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded actual and compensatory damages,
and litigation expenses.16
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17 dated July 28, 1986 to include, as party plaintiff,
Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil), Garcia’s employer, who claimed to
have paid for the latter’s medical and hospitalization expenses, the services rendered by
the funeral parlor of the deceased, and the expenses in transferring the remains of
Rhonda Brunty to the United States.18
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision19 on May 21, 1990 in favor of
plaintiffs. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan
Manuel M. Garcia and against the defendant Philippine National Railways directing the
latter to pay the former the sum of:
 1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of
Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois,
U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and actual
damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (₱72,760.00) Philippine
Currency for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for attorney's
fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT AWARD OF
DAMAGES DUE THE HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE
FOR THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MERCEDES BENZ IN
THE AMOUNT OF SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS
(₱72,760.00).
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES.21
In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence and recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita.22 It insisted that it had provided
adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing23 and had exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of its employees. 24 The RTC erred in awarding damages to
Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to receive what she is not in a position to give,
having been a non-resident alien who did not own a property in the Philippines.25 It
likewise questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes Benz as well as the grant of
attorney’s fees.26 At the very least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence.27
For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and recklessly negligent in
not properly providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Rizal,
Moncada, Tarlac;28 appellant was negligent in not exercising due diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, particularly the train operator
Alfonso Reyes;29 the car was driven in a careful and diligent manner, and at a moderate
speed, with due regard to all traffic rules and regulations at that particular time;30 the
doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable;31 Ethel Brunty is a non-resident alien who
can rightfully file the instant case;32 and they are entitled to recover damages from
appellant.33
The CA rendered the assailed Decision34 on August 15, 2005. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death indemnity award from ₱30,000.00 to
₱50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz.
SO ORDERED.35
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the negligence of the PNR.
Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the
alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were not merely
inadequate – they did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in
transportation.36 However, the CA did not agree with the RTC’s findings on the
contributory negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that
Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other
passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of
contributory negligence.37
The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS
NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION SUCH AS:
THE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY ACCELERATING AT 70
KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 YARDS AWAY FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
IN THE INSTANT CASE.38
Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was Mercelita’s disregard of
traffic rules and regulations. Had the court considered the fact that Mercelita had
overtaken another vehicle a few yards before the railroad track, it would have reached a
different conclusion.39 Moreover, petitioner asserts, considering that the decisions of the
RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence,
the findings of the RTC should prevail. Thus, Mercelita’s contributory negligence should
not have been ignored.40 Lastly, petitioner avers that since there is freedom of control and
greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad
crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident from
taking place.41
In their Comment42 on the petition, respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the
CA that the breach by petitioner of its legal duty to provide adequate and necessary public
safety device and equipment within the area or scene of the accident was the proximate
cause of the mishap.43 While it is true that as a general rule, the trial court is in the best
position to evaluate and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presented
during the trial, the CA, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the vested right to
modify, reject, or set aside the trial court’s evaluation and findings. 44 As to the application
of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents claim that said issue is being raised for
the first time in this petition.45 Lastly, respondents cite foreign jurisprudence stating that if
the violation is one which gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, the defenses
ordinarily available in actions for diligence are barred and the contributory negligence of
the person injured is no defense.46
The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual questions: (1) As between
petitioner and Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision? (2) Is
Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of contributory negligence? Finally, the
application in this case of the doctrine of last clear chance is likewise in question.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.47 In Corliss v.
Manila Railroad Company,48 this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by
the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require.49 In determining whether or not there is negligence on
the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence 50 has laid down the following
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent was thoroughly discussed by both
the RTC and the CA. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be put into issue, and questions of fact as a general rule, cannot
be entertained. The finding of negligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is a question
of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on
which the finding of negligence was based.51 The established rule is that factual findings of
the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court.52
The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the
factual circumstances surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the
same. It is, however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found negligent because of
its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in
crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty;
and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. 53 Applying
the foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage
or injury as a result of the collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is,
likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal
accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not
only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x
xxxx
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac
presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or
safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of
proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as
claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a
railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada
side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. x x x54
Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty
in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an
unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate
safety equipment in the area.55
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings,
which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the
crossings.56 Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make
and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient,
and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to
admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed
thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity
of looking out for trains.57
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to
put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be
installed.58
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its conclusion
on petitioner’s negligence.
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with
petitioner. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own protection. 59 To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about
his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In
a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the
injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.61
The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the
place was not properly illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and
Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was
then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a
vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven
the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they
nevertheless do not negate petitioner’s liability. Pursuant to Article 217962 of the New
Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability,
which, however, is not applicable in this case, as will be discussed later.1âwphi1
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the
negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from
recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.63 The
proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner,
we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) ₱1,000,000.00 as actual and moral
damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty; and (3) ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s
fees. No damages, however, were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the
latter never interposed an appeal before the CA nor even before this Court. The record is,
likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the
driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the
part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.
As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same is in order, specifically
on the award of actual and moral damages in the aggregate amount of ₱1,000,000.00.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for
an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at
repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have
suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.64 Respondents, however, failed
to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be
sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the
wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.65 This is in lieu of actual
damages as it would be unfair for the victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the death of
their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts.66
The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not
proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.67 We, therefore, sustain
the award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate
in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must
nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted.68 In the instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was
sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition,69 viz:
Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?
A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and extreme sorrow because she died
so far away and alone, and because her death could so easily be prevented if there had
been adequate and appropriate warning signals at the railroad crossing and it is just an
unbearable and irreparable loss. In so many ways, she was my life. It seemed to me that
losing her was just like losing my own life, or worst, and even now, there is no end to our
bereavement. I am still on constant medication to be able to sleep and to be able to
perform my duties effectively in my job but it does not take away the pain of loss.70
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,71 and in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,72 we awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the
deceased. In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan,73the award of ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages was held in keeping with the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong,74 the
amount of ₱50,000.00 was held sufficient.1âwphi1
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that an award of
₱500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent
jurisprudence, indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorney’s
fees amounting to ₱50,000.00 is likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 15,
2005 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is deleted, and in
lieu thereof, temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.
The award of moral damages is reduced to ₱500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM CRIME
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which
affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42,
in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent
Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number
CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan
and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his
owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was
tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as
the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the
existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although
there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the
stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia
Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a
job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac,
when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown to look for
him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together
with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it
was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and
identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he
had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from
the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not
brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No.
684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he
was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of
the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case
No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took
place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to
70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it
was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the
back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of
the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the
Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the
jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which
he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved
to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they
overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped
in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the
right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit
bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the
left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before
the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus,
which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would
be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner
Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials
used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including
appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in
the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with
this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife,
Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of
the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a
photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by
the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-
M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal
case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. 23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI
failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to
except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies
of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 26 Moreover,
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato
Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of
plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process
when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to
raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a
ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper
time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite
therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN,
the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was
belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said
ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony
or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only
of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the
testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the
same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic
as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor
their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of
Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising
from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or
reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure
to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board
the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the
North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO
MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the
above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being
driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then
travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his
vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor
vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where
it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-
described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented
during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his hospitalization
from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is
hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-
described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely
 due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who
drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or
observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its
drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding
the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his
part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent
"when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause
of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the
jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-
quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a
civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now
settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action,
if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to
disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the
process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to
the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a
review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would
warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was
negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence
to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15)
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him
about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision
took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan
was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on
the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held
responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent
when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he
alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his
explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took
place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former
that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision
between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however,
that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the
two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan
having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his
statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should
prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the
statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did
not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep
when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to
the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been
somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should
have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless,
likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. 41 Under Article 218042 of
the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner
Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators
(Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in
the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation
of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure
the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the
employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence
of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as
follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a
very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles.
There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There
has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should
manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in
the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while
operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner
Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-
mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown
and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all
the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be
continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all
the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the
towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 49 The amount awarded by
the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
(1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of
exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed
the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave
coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,
ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias
TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE
COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen
Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and
acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence
prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at
the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying
away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages,
and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their
public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino
who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it
was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez,
Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo,
Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto
Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal
participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a
nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner
Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises.
The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and
of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of
P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages,
P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the
sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to
complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the
crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act
was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing
 (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record
established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition
of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION
DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL
WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO
UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL
DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF
NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED
RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT,
THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic)
'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY
WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY
WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant
was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil
liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents
to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by
him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action
for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine
laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo
contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA
1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were
acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them.
There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes
and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted
some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence
must be employed against the person, not against property as what
happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense
other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for
threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render
judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that
they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either
threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that
the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular
threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into
trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable
for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the
 demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111,
Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People
v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil
might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the
accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the
civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule
111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability
which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from
the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v.
Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can
create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising
from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to
reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In
other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig,
supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed
by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code);
and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093;
See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code
also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not
constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the
criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and
in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his
personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil
Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by
such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged,
which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section
1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil
action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal
case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A
person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar,
he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at
least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same
for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner
not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello,
120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in
the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action
simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and
money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by
both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No.
32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not
vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced
upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods
taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned
with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store,
ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up
to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from
the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been
made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up
to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief
of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the
market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of
the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first
inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them
brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice
served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and
equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the
complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that
they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is
untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has
been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that
the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
 On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor
to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras
were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the
Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to
the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer,
...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited,
that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive
law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even
in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common
sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action
but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it
render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but
hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are
distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the
reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or
other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence:
(b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of
the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of
the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based
on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it
clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same
act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and
therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal
action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and
disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any
significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are
distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is
much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the
accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must
recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the
nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and
oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil
action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because
the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or
injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29
clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision
does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate
civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can
stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It
does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a
provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the
victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he
seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of
the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the
aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory
and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
 derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance
of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and
a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on
the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate
action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in
this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon
City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17,
1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her
own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for
damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp.
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC.,
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing
in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor,
Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are
impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to
be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the
acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the
 time of the incident complained of, was under their control and
supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA,
while he was on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON
V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant
SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due
to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to
him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed
that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since
the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on
the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or an
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as
alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial
Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee
of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with
homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S
motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent
judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a
quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting
Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent
judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was
one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion
of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate
facts alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the
applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants
Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p.
110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing
Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private
respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision
of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD
or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under
Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may
be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated,
frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior
conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal
action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was
not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles
2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not
have been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private
respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal
shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357
[1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the
private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a
delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in
dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose
of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA
243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the
private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character;
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled
in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence
as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial
reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to
injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193
[1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However,
the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638
[1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action
may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must
be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide,
not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with
reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his
duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-
delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional
and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss
petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of
action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action
exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA
33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an
actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela
was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer
and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and
wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of
Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants
are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege
the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done
at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the
petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just
to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated
April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded
to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
G.R. No. L-11318 October 26, 1918
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LA COMPAÑIA TRANSATLANTICA, defendant-appellee. and
THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO., defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid & Thomas L. Hartigan for plaintiff-appellant.
Lawrence, Ross & Block for defendant-appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.
Gilbert, Cohn & Fisher for defendant-appellee Compañia Transatlantica.
STREET, J.:
In March 1914, the steamship Alicante, belonging to the Compañia Transatlantica de
Barcelona, arrived at Manila with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property of The
Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not
sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, and it was therefore necessary for the
Steamship Company to procure assistance in the port of Manila.
The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company (hereafter called the Atlantic Company) was
accordingly employed by the Steamship Company, as having probably the best equipment
for this purpose of any contracting company in the city. The service to be performed by
the Atlantic Company consisted in bringing it s floating crane alongside the Alicante, lifting
the boilers our of the ship's hold, and transferring them to a barge which would be placed
ready to receive them.
Upon the arrival of the Alicante, the Atlantic company sent out its crane in charge of one
Leyden. In preparing to hoist the first boiler the sling was unfortunately adjusted near the
middle of the boiler, and it was thus raised nearly in an horizontal position. The boiler was
too long to clear the hatch in this position, and after one end of the boiler had emerged
on one side of the hatch, the other still remained below on the other side. When the
boiler had been gotten into this position and was being hoisted still further, a river near
the head of the boiler was caught under the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane
was thus increased by a strain estimated at fifteen tons with the result that the cable of
the sling parted and the boiler fell to the bottom of the ship's hold. The sling was again
adjusted to the boiler but instead of being placed near the middle it was now slung nearer
one of the ends, as should have been done at first. The boiler was gain lifted; but as it was
being brought up, the bolt at the end of the derrick book broke, and again the boiler fell.
The crane was repaired and the boiler discharged, but it was found to be so badly
damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was
returned to Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by reason of the cost of repairs,
expenses and loss of the use of the boiler proved to be P23,343.29; and as to the amount
of the damage so resulting there is practically no dispute. To recover these damages the
present action was instituted by the Railroad Company against the Steamship Company.
the latter caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in as a codefendant, and insisted
that whatever liability existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an
independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers and had become
responsible for such damage as had been done.
The judge of the Court of First Instance gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
Atlantic Company, but the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint. The
plaintiff has appealed from the action of the court in failing to give judgment against the
Steamship company, while the Atlantic company has appealed from the judgment against
it.
The mishap was undoubtedly due, as the lower court found, to the negligence of one
Leyden, the foreman in charge; and we may add that the evidence tends to show that his
negligence was of a type which may without exaggeration be denominated gross. The
sling was in the first place improperly adjusted, and the attention of Leyden was at once
called to this by the man in charge of the stevedores. Nevertheless he proceeded and,
instead of lowering the boiler when it was seen that it could not readily pass through the
hatch, he attempted to force it through; and the ship's tackle was brought into use to
assist in this maneuver. The second fall was, it appears, caused by the weakening of the
bolt at the head of the derrick boom, due to the shock incident to the first accident. This
defect was possibly such as not to be patent to external observation but we are of the
opinion that a person of sufficient skill to be trusted with the operation of machinery of
this character should be trusted with the operation of machinery of this character should
have known that the crane had possibly been weakened by the jar received in the first
accident. The foreman was therefore guilty of negligence in attempting to hoist the boiler
the second time under the conditions that had thus developed. It should be noted that
the operation was at all its states entirely under Leyden's control; and, although in the
first lift he utilized the ship's tackle to aid in hoisting the boiler, everything was done
under his immediate supervision. There is no evidence tending to show that the first fall of
the boiler might have been due to any hidden defect in the lifting apparatus; and if it had
not been for the additional strain caused by one end of the boiler catching under the
hatch, the operation would doubtless have been accomplished without difficulty. The
accident is therefore to be attributed to the failure of Leyden to exercise the degree of
care which an ordinarily competent and prudent person would have exhibited under the
circumstances which then confronted him. This conclusion of fact cannot be refuted; and,
indeed, no attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this finding of the trial court.
Three questions are involved in the case, namely: (1) Is the steamship company liable to
the plaintiff by reason of having delivered the boiler in question in a damaged condition?
(2) Is the atlantic company liable to be made to respond to the steamship company for the
amount the latter may be required to pay to the plaintiff for the damage done? Is the
Atlantic company directly liable to the plaintiff, as the trial court held?
It will be observed that the contractual relation existed between the railroad company
and the steamship company; and the duties of the latter with respect to the carrying and
delivery of the boilers are to be discovered by considering the terms and legal effect of
that contract. A contractual relation also existed between the Steamship company and the
atlantic company; and the duties owing by the latter to the former with respect to the
lifting and the transferring of the boiler are likewise to be discovered by considering the
terms and legal effect of the contract between these parties. On the other hand, no
contractual relation existed directly between the Railroad Company and the Atlantic
Company.
We are all agreed, that, under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the
Steamship company is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done to the boiler while it was
being discharged from the ship. The obligation to transport the boiler necessarily involves
the duty to convey and deliver it in a proper condition according to its nature, and
conformably with good faith, custom, and the law (art. 1258, Civ. Code). The contract to
convey import the duty to convey and deliver safely and securely with reference to the
degree of care which, under the circumstances, are required by law and custom applicable
to the case. The duty to carry and to carry safely is all one.
Such being the contract of the Steamship Company, said company is necessarily liable,
under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for the consequences of the omission of
the care necessary to the proper performance of this obligation. The contact to transport
and deliver at the port of Manila a locomotive boiler, which was received by it in proper
condition, is not complied with the delivery at the port of destination of a mass of iron the
utility of which had been destroyed.
Nor does the Steamship Company escape liability by reason of the fact that it employed a
competent independent contractor to discharge the boilers. The law applicable to this
feature of the case will be more fully discussed further on in this opinion. At this point we
merely observe that in the performance of this service the Atlantic company, and it has
never yet been held that the failure to comply with a contractual obligation can be
excused by showing that such delinquency was due to the negligence of one to whom the
contracting party had committed the performance of the contract.
Coming to the question of the liability of the Atlantic Company to respond to the
Steamship Company for the damages which the latter will be compelled to pay to the
plaintiff, we observe that the defense of the Atlantic company comprises two contentions,
to-wit, first, that by the terms of the engagement in accordance with which the Atlantic
company agreed to render the service, all risk incident to the discharge of the boilers was
assumed by the steamship company, and secondly, that the atlantic company should be
absolved under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the civil code, inasmuch as it had
used due care in the selection of the employee whose negligent act caused the damage in
question.
At the hearing in first instance the Atlantic Company introduced four witnesses to prove
that at the time said company agreed to lift the boilers out of the Alicante, as upon other
later occasions, the steamship company not be responsible for damage. The vice-
president of the atlantic company testified that hew as present upon the occasion when
the agent of the Steamship company made arrangements for the discharge of the boilers
and he heard the conversation between the president and said agent. According to this
witness the substance of the agreement was that, while the Atlantic Company would use
all due care in getting the boilers out, no responsibility was assumed for damage done
either to ship or cargo. The intermediary who acted as agent for the Steamship Company
in arranging for the performance of this service stoutly denied that any such terms were
announced by the officials or anybody else connected with the Atlantic Company at any
time while the arrangements were pending.
In the conflict of the evidence, we recognize that, by a preponderance of the evidence,
some reservation or other was made as to the responsibility of the Atlantic Company; was
made to the responsibility of the atlantic company and though the agent who acted on
behalf of the steamship company possibly never communicated this reservation to his
principal, the latter should nevertheless be held bound thereby. It thus becomes
necessary to discover what the exact terms of this supposed reservation were.
We think that we must put aside at once the words of studies precision with which the
president of the Atlantic company could exclude the possibility of any liability attaching to
his company, though we may accept his statement as showing that the excepted risk
contemplated breakage of the lifting equipment. There is undoubtedly a larger element of
truth in the more reasonable statement by the vice-president of the company. According
to this witness the contract combined two features, namely, an undertaking on the part of
the Atlantic Company to use all due care, combined with a reservation concerning the
company's liability for damage.
The Atlantic Company offered in evidence, a number of letters which had been written by
it at different times, extending over a period of years, in response to inquiries made by
other firms and person in Manila concerning the terms upon which the Atlantic Company
was not accustomed to assume the risk incident to such work and required the parties for
whom the service might be rendered either to carry the risk or insure against it. One such
letter, dated nearly four years prior to the occurrence such letter, dated nearly four years
prior to the occurrences which gave rise to this lawsuit, was addressed to the Compañia
Transatlantica de Barcelona one of the defendants in this case. It was stated in this
communication that the company's derrick would be subject to inspection prior to making
the lift but that the Atlantic Company would not assume responsibility for damage that
might occur either to ship or cargo from any whatsoever. The steamship company
rejected the services of the Atlantic company in that instance as being too onerous.
The letters directed to this parties, it may observed, would not, generally speaking, be
admissible as against the plaintiff for the purpose of proving that a similar reservation was
inserted in the contract with it on this occasion; but if knowledge of such custom is
brought home to the steamship company, the fact that such reservation was commonly
made is of some probative force. Reference to a number of these letters will show that no
particular formula was used by the Atlantic Company in defining its exemption, and the
tenor of these various communications differs materially. We think, however, that some
of the letters are of value as an aid in interpreting the reservation which the Atlantic
Company may have intended to make. We therefore quote from some of these letters as
follows:
We will use our best endeavors to carry out the work successfully and will ask
you to inspect our plant but we wish it distinctly understood that we cannot
assume responsibility for damage which may occur . . . while the lift is being
made. (To Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Oct. 4, 1909.)
Our quotation is based on the understanding that we assume no responsibility
from any accident which may happen during our operations. We always insert
this clause as precautionary measure, but we have never had to avail ourselves
of it as yet and do not expect to now. (To "El Varadero de Manila," Nov. 1,
1913.)
As is customary in these cases, we will use all precaution as necessary to handle
the gun in a proper manner. Our equipment has been tested and will be again,
before making the lift, but we do not assume any responsibility for damage to
the gun ship, or cargo. (To Warner, Barnes & Co., June 7, 1909.)
The idea expressed in these letters is, we think entirely consonant with the interpretation
which the vice-president of the company placed upon the contract which was made with
the steamship company upon this occasion, that is, the company recognized its duty to
exercise due supervisory care; and the exemption from liability, whatever may have been
its precise words had reference to disasters which might result from some inherent
hidden defect in the lifting apparatus or other unforeseen occurrence not directly
attributable to negligence of the company in the lifting operations. Neither party could
have supposed for a moment that it was intended to absolve the Atlantic Company from
its duty to use due care in the work.
It is not pretended that negligence on the part of the Atlantic Company or its employees
was expressly included in the excepted risk, and we are of the opinion that the contract
should not be understood as covering such an exemption. It is a rudimentary principle
that the contractor is responsible for the work executed by persons whom he employees
in its performance, and this expressed in the Civil Code in the form of a positive rule of law
(art. 1596). It is also expressly declared by law that liability arising from negligence is
demandable in the fulfillment of all kinds of obligations (art. 1103, Civil Code). Every
contract for the presentation of service therefore has annexed to it, as an inseparable
implicit obligation, the duty to exercise due care in the accomplishment of the work; and
no reservation whereby the person rendering the services seeks to escape from the
consequences of a violation of this obligations can viewed with favor.
Contracts against liability for negligence are not favored by law. In some
instances, such as common carriers, they are prohibited as against public policy.
In all cases such contracts should be construed strictly, with every intendment
against the party seeking its protection. (Crew vs. Bradstreet Company, 134 Pa.
St., 161; 7 L. R. A., 661; 19 Am. St. Rep., 681.)
The strictness with which contracts conferring such an unusual exemption are construed is
illustrated in Bryan vs. Eastern & Australian S. S. Co. (28 Phil. Rep., 310). The decision in
that case is not precisely applicable to the case at bar, since the court was there applying
the law of a foreign jurisdiction, and the question at issue involved a doctrine peculiar to
contracts of common carriers. Nevertheless the case is instructive as illustrating the
universal attitude of courts upon the right of a contracting party to stipulate against the
consequences of his own negligence. It there appeared that the plaintiff had purchased
from the defendant company a ticket for the transportation of himself and baggage from
Hongkong to Manila By the terms of the contract printed in legible type upon the back of
the ticket it was provided that the company could not hold itself responsible for any loss
or damage to luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever, unless it had been paid for as
freight. It was held that this limitation upon the liability of the defendant company did not
relieve it from liability of the defendant company for negligence of its servants by which
the baggage of the passenger was lost. Said the court: Ordinarily this language would
seem to be broad enough to cover every possible contingency, including the negligent act
of the defendant's servants. To so hold, however, would run counter to the established
law of England and the United States on that subject. The court then quoted the following
proposition from the decision of the King's Bench Division in Price & Co. vs. Union
Lighterage Co. ([1903], 1 K. B. D., 750, 754):
"An exemption in general words not expressly relating to negligence, even
though the words are wide enough to include loss by negligence or default of
carriers' servants' must be construed as limiting the liability of the carrier as
assurer, and not as relieving from the duty of the exercising reasonable skill and
care."
Even admitting that, generally speaking, a person may stipulate against liability for the
consequences of negligence, at least in those cases where the negligence is not gross or
willful, the contract conferring such exemption must be so clear as to leave no room for
the operation of the ordinary rules of liability consecrated by experience and sanctioned
by the express provisions of law.
If the exemption should be understood in the scene that counsel for the Atlantic Company
now insists it should bear, that is, as an absolute exemption from all responsibility for
negligence, it is evident that the agreement was a most inequitable and unfair one, and
hence it is one that the steamship company can not be lightly assumed to have made.
Understood in that sense it is the equivalent of licensing the Atlantic Company to perform
its tasks in any manner and fashion that it might please, and to hold it harmless from the
consequences.
It is true that, in these days insurance can usually be obtained in the principal ports of
commerce by parties circumstanced as was the steamship company in the case now
before us. But the best insurance against disasters of this kind is found in the exercise of
due care; and the chief incentive to the exercise of care is a feeling of responsibility on the
part of him who undertakes the work. Naturally the courts are little inclined to aid tin the
efforts of contractors to evade this responsibility.
There may have been in the minds of the officials of the Atlantic Company an idea that the
promise to use due care in the lifting operations was not accompanied by a legal
obligation, such promise being intended merely for its moral effect as an assurance to the
steamship company that the latter might rely upon competence and diligence of the
employees of the Atlantic Company to accomplish the work in a proper way. The contract
can not be permitted to operate in this one-sided manner. The two features of the
engagement, namely, the promise to use due care and the exemption from liability for
damage should be so construed as to give some legal effect to both. The result is, as
already indicated, that the Atlantic Company was bound by its undertaking to use due
care and that he exemption was intended to cover accidents use to hidden defects in the
apparatus or other unforeseeable occurrences not having their origin in the immediate
personal negligence of the party in charge of the operations.
We now proceed to consider the contention that the Atlantic Company under the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which declares that the liability there referred
to shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. In this connection the
conclusion of fact must be conceded in favor of the Atlantic Company that it had used
proper care in the selection of Leyden and that , so far as the company was aware, he was
a person to whom might properly be committed the task of discharging the boilers. The
answer to the contention, however is the obligation of the Atlantic Company was created
by contract, and article 1903 is not applicable to negligence arising in the course of the
performance of a contractual obligation. Article 1903 is exclusively concerned with cases
where the negligence arises in the absence of agreement.
In discussing the liability of the Steamship Company to the plaintiff Railroad Company we
have already shown that a party is bound to the full performance of his contractual
engagements under articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code, and other special provisions of
the Code relative to contractual obligations; and if he falls short of complete performance
by reason of his own negligence or that of any person to whom he may commit the work,
he is liable for the damages resulting therefrom. What was there said is also applicable
with reference to the liability of the Atlantic Company upon its contract with the
Steamship Company, and the same need not be here repeated. It is desirable, however, in
this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the distinction between negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and neligence considered
as an independent source of obligation between parties not previously bound (culpa
aquiliana).
This distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the
provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from
the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7
Phil. Rep., 359, 365), and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here
presenting a more correct English version of said passage.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give arise to duties, whether springing form contract or
quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
contract for passage, while that of the injured by-stander would originate in the
negligent act itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his
commentary on article 1093:
"We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence,
may be understood in two different senses, either
as culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between two person not formerly bound by
any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an
obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability
arising from the already existing obligation."
Justice Tracey, the author of the opinion from which we have quoted, proceeds to observe
that Manresa, in commenting on articles 1101 and 1104, has described these two species
of negligence as contractual and extra-contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of
the Roman law. "This terminology is unreservedly accepted by Sanchez Roman (Derecho
Civil, fourth section, chapter XI, article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain,. among them those of November 29, 11896
(80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182.)"
The principle that negligence in the performance of a contract is not governed by article of
the Civil Code but rather by article 1104 of the same Code was directly applied by this
court in the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s successors vs. Compañía Maritima (6 Phil. Rep.,
215); and the same idea has been impliedly if not expressly recognized in other cases (N.
T. Hashim & Co. vs. Rocha & Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong Sian vs. Inchausti & Co., 22
Phil. Rep., 152).
What has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the Atlantic Company is
liable to the Steamship Company for the damages brought upon the latter by the failure of
the Atlantic company to use due care in discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that
the damage was caused by the negligence of an employee who was qualified for the work
and who had been chosen by the Atlantic Company with due care.
This brings us to the last question here to be answered, which is, Can the Atlantic
Company be held directly liable to the Railroad Company? In other words, can the
judgement entered in the trial court directly in favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic
Company be sustained? To answer this it is necessary to examine carefully the legal
relations existing between the Atlantic Company and the Railroad Company with
reference to this affair; and we shall for a moment ignore the existence of the contract
between the steamship company and the atlantic company, to which the railroad
company was not a party.
Having regard then to the bare fact that the Atlantic Company undertook to remove the
boiler from the ship's hold and for this purpose took the property into its power and
control, there arose a duty to the owner to use due care in the performance of that
service and to avoid damaging was obviously in existence before the negligent act may, if
we still ignore the existence of the express contract, be considered as an act done in
violation of this duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an implied obligation, of a quasi contractual nature, since
it is created by implication of liability with which we are here confronted is somewhat
similar to that which is revealed in the case of the depositary, or commodatary, whose
legal duty with respect to the property committed to their care is defined by law even in
the absence of express contract; and it can not be doubted that a person who takes
possession of the property of another for the purpose of moving or conveying it from one
place to another, or for the purpose of performing any other service in connection
therewith (locatio operis faciendi), owes to the owner a positive duty to refrain from
damaging it, to the same extent as if an agreement for the performance of such service
had been expressly made with the owner. The obligation as if an agreement made with
the owner. The obligation here is really a species of contract re, and it has its source and
explanation in vital fact, that the active party has taken upon himself to do something
with or to the property and has taken it into his power and control for the purpose of
performing such service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil Code.)
In the passage which we have already from the decision in the Rakes case this Court
recognized the fact that the violation of a quasi-contractual duty is subject to articles
1101, 1103, 1104 of the Civil Code, and not within the purview of article 1903. Manresa
also, in the paragraph reproduced above is of the opinion that negligence, considered a
substantive and independent source of liability, does not include cases where the parties
are previously bound by any other obligation. Again, it is instructive in this connection to
refer to the contents of article 1103 of the Civil Code, where it is demandable in the
fulfillment of all kinds of obligations. These words evidently comprehend both forms of
positive obligations, whether arising from express contract or from implied contract (quasi
contract).
In this connection it is instructive to recall celebrate case of Coggs vs. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym,
909), decided in the court of the King's Bench of England in the year of 1803. The action
was brought by the owner of certain casks of brandy to recover damages from a person
who had undertaken to transport them from one place to another. It was alleged that in
so doing the defendant so negligently and improvidently put then down that one of the
casks was staved and the brandy lost. The complaint did not allege that the defendant was
a common carrier or that he was to be paid for his services. It was therefore considered
that the compliant did not state facts sufficient to support an action for breach of any
express contract. This made it necessary for the court to go back to fundamental
principles and to place liability on the ground of a violation of the legal duty incident to
the mere fact of carriage. Said Powell, J.: "An action indeed will not lie for not doing the
thing, for want of a sufficient consideration; but yet if the bailee will take the goods into
his custody, he shall be answerable for them; for the taking of the goods into his custody
is his own act." S9 Gould, J.: ". . . any man that undertakes to carry goods in liable to an
action, be he a common carrier or whatever he is, if through his neglect they are lost or
come to any damage: . . . . " Behind these expressions was an unbroken line of ancient
English precedents holding persons liable for damage inflicted by reason of a misfeasance
in carrying out an undertaking. The principle determined by the court in the case cited is
expressed in the syllabus in these words: 'If a man undertakes to carry goods safely and
securely, he is responsible for any damage they may sustain in the carriage through his
neglect, though he was not a common carrier and was to have nothing for the carriage."
Though not stated in so many words, this decision recognizes that from the mere fact that
a person takes the property of another into his possession and control there arises an
obligation in the nature of an assumpsit that he will use due care with respect thereto.
This must be considered a principle of universal jurisprudence, for it is consonant with
justice and common sense and as we have already seen harmonizes with the doctrine
above deduced from the provisions of the Civil Code.
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no contract of any sort between
the Atlantic company and the Steamship Company, an action could have been maintained
by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover the damages
sustained by the former. Such damages would have been demandable under article 1103
of the Civil Code and the action would not have been subject to the qualification
expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903.
The circumstance that a contract was made between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship company introduces, however, an important, and in our opinion controlling
factor into this branch of the case. It cannot be denied that the Steamship company has
possession of this boiler in the capacity of carrier and that as such it was authorized to
make a contract with Atlantic Company to discharge the same from the ship. Indeed, it
appears in evidence that even before the contract of affreightment was made the Railroad
Company was informed that it would necessary for steamship company to procure the
services of some contractor in the port of Manila to handle the discharge, as the ship's
tackle was inadequate to handle heavy cargo. It is therefore to be assumed that the
Railroad Company had in fact assented to the employment of a contractor to perform this
service.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a person who contract to do a service like that rendered
by the Atlantic company in this case incurs a double responsibility upon entering upon
performance, namely, a responsibility to the party with whom he contracted, and another
entirely different responsibility to the owner, based on an implied contract. The two
liabilities can not in our opinion coexist. It is a general rule that an implied conract never
arises where an express contract has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such case as this, it would result that a person who had
limited his liability by express stipulation might find himself liable to the owner without
regard to the limitation which he had seen fit to impose by contract. There appears to be
no possibility of reconciling the conflict that would be developed in attempting to give
effect to those inconsistent liabilities. The contract which was in fact made, in our opinion,
determine not only the character and extent of the liability of the Atlantic company but
also the person or entity by whom the obligation is eligible. It is of course quite clear that
if the Atlantic company had refused to carry out its agreement to discharge the cargo, the
plaintiff could have enforced specific performance and could not have recovered damages
for non-performance. (Art. 1257, Civil Code; Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 2
Phil. Rep., 766; Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) In view of the
preceding discussion it is equally obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract, the
Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover damages from the Atlantic
Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation of said contract. The rights
of the plaintiff can only be made effective through the Compañia Trasatlantica de
Barcelona with whom the contract of affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must, therefore be reversed not only
with respect to the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff directly against the Atlantic
company but also with respect to the absolution of the steamship company and the
further failure of the court to enter judgment in favor of the latter against the Atlantic
Company. The Compañía Transatlantic de Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to
pay to the Manila Railroad Company the sum of twenty nine thousand three hundred
forty three pesos and twenty nine centavos (P23,343.29) with interest from May 11, 1914,
until paid; and when this judgment is satisfied, the Compañia Transatlantic de Barcelona is
declared to be entitled to recover the same amount from the Atlantic & Pacific Gulf
Company, against whom judgment is to this end hereby rendered in favor of
the Compañia Transatlantica de Barcelona. No express adjudication of costs of either
instance will be made. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
The only question presented by the appellant the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company is
whether or not it is liable, either to the Manila railroad company or to the Compañía
Transatlantica de Barcelona for the damage caused to a certain locomotive boiler while
being discharged at the port of Manila.
The essential facts important for a decision upon the rights and liabilities of the Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Company may be stated as follows:
(1) That the Manila Railroad Company purchased certain locomotive boilers in Europe and
contracted with the Compañia Transatlantica de Barcelona to transport the same to
Manila by its steamship Alicante; (2) That the tackle and equipment of the
steamship Alicante being insufficient to discharge said locomotive boilers, the Compañía
Transatlantica entered into a contract with the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company by virtue
of the terms of which the latter company agreed to discharge the said locomotive boilers
from the said steamship Alicante by using its tackle and equipment for that purpose;' (3)
that in the effort of the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company to discharge in the manner
described in the complaint and damaged to the amount found by the lower court (4) That
while the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company attempted to show, during the trial for the
cause, that it and its employees exercised due care and diligence, it admitted in this court
that its employees had perhaps been negligent in the performance of their duties.
Considering that the relations between the Compañía Transatlantica and the Atlantic Gulf
& Pacific Company were contractual, it becomes important to ascertain what were the
terms of the contract, in order to properly understand the rights and liabilities of the
parties thereto, in relation tot he admission of the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company that is
employees had perhaps been guilty of negligence in the discharge of said boiler.
The contract was not wholly reduced to writing; it was partly written and partly oral.
The Compania Transatlantica alleged that under the terms of the contract said boilers
form the steamship Alicante, using its tackle and apparatus therefore, and that no
condition of any character was imposed, while the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company
alleged that it agreed to discharge said boilers and to use its tackle and equipment for that
purpose, but with the express conditions that it was, under no circumstances or
conditions, to assume any responsibility for any damage whatever which might be
occasioned thereby, either to the cargo ship or persons.
In support of the allegation of the Compañía Transatlantica, it really presented but one
witness, while the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company presented several witnesses, including
its president, vice-president and several others, together with a number of documents
showing that the contract was in conformity with its usual custom in making similar
contracts. The Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company also showed that the Compañía
Transatlantica had actual knowledge of such custom.
A careful examination of the proof in our opinion, clearly shows by a large preponderance
that the contract in question was as the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company alleged and that
by its terms said company was relieved of any responsibility for any damage which might
occur either to the ship, cargo or persons, from any cause whatsoever."
The contract is the law governing the rights and obligations of the parties, subject to
certain well defined exceptions. Persons have a right to enter into any contact with any
clauses, or conditions, or limitations which they may deem convenient and advisable so
long as such clauses or conditions do not conflict with the existing laws, morals or public
order. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.) There are some well defined exceptions to that rule, the
most notable of which are contracts with common carriers. (Hartford F. Ins. Co., vs.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co., 175 U.S., 91, 97.) The Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, so
far as the record shows, is not a common carrier, and the exception, therefore, just noted
does not apply to it. Neither was the contract between the Compañía Transatlantica and
the Atlantic a company for the carriage of merchandise. It was a contract for services of an
entirely different character from that of a common carrier.
If then, generally speaking, persons may enter into contractual relations with any clauses
or conditions which they may deem advisable and convenient, which do not conflict with
existing laws, morals, or public order, we may ask: Is a contract of the character of that
before us in which one of the parties stipulates that he will not assume any responsibility
for any damage which may occur from any cause whatsoever in the execution of said
contract, contrary to the laws morals or public order?
The contract in question was not one which the parties were obliged to enter into. In that
respect, it differed from contracts with common carriers, wherein the latter have no
option, generally speaking. In the preset case, the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company has a
perfect right to refuse to enter into the contract in question until and unless its terms
were satisfactory and acceptable. The parties being at perfect liberty to enter into the
contract or to refuse to do, they must be bound by the law which they themselves have
made for themselves. Having voluntarily made the law (contract), they must abide by its
terms until it can be shown that the same is contrary to the laws, morals or public order.
It is a fundamental rule of the law that what one may resume to do entirely, he may agree
to do upon such terms as her pleases so long as he does not contravene the laws, morals
or public order. The atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company having had the right to refuse to
enter into it except upon just such terms and conditions as it was fir to require. The
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, therefore, had a right to refuse to enter into the contract
in question until and unless the Compañía Transatlantica agreed to relive it of all
responsibility for any damages which might occur either to the ship, cargo or persons
from any cause whatsoever. By the terms of the contract the Compañia Trasatlantica
assumed all responsibility for damages in the discharge of the said locomotive boilers.
That must be true considering that, by the terms of the contract, the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company was relieved from any and all damages whatsoever which might
occur.1awph!l.net
The only purpose on the part of the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company, in imposing the
condition above-mentioned was to avoid the consequences of the negligence of its agent
or employees or of any act or accident which might cause damage, and to avoid possible
lawsuits growing out of the alleged negligent acts.
The question which we are discussing is not a new one in jurisprudence. The courts have
been called upon many times to interpret contract with conditions like those contained in
the contract before us. (Coup vs. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Railway Co., 56 Mich., 111; 56
Am. Rep., 374; Mann vs. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich., 210; Stephens vs. Southern
Pacific co., 109 Cal., 86; 29 L. R. A., 751; Quimby vs. Boston & Maine R., 150 Mass., 365; 5
L. R. A., 846; Pittsburgh, etc. Railway Co. vs. Mahoney, 148 Ind., 196; Russell vs.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 157 Ind., 305; 55 L. R. A., 253; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. vs. Chicago, M.
& St. P. Railway Co., 175 U. S., 91, 97; Baltimore, etc. Railway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U. S., 498;
Osgood vs. Railway Co., 77 Vermont, 334; 70 L. R. A., 930.)
In the case of the Hartford Insurance Company vs. Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co. (175 U.
S., 91, 97, supra) a contract was made by which one of the parties was relieved from all
liability for damage, et cetera, et cetera, even the liability for damage which might result
"from the careless ness or negligence of employees or agents of said railway company,"
and the Supreme Court of the United States held that such a condition in contracts of that
character was not void as against public policy, or public morals or contrary to law.
(Baltimore, etc. Railaway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U. S., 498; Osgood vs. Central Vermont R. Co.,
77 Vermont, 334; 70 L. R. A., 930.)
Court must not forget that they are not to extend, arbitrarily, those rules which say that a
given contract is void as being against public policy, or public laws, because if there is one
thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that the
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and must be
enforced in courts of justice. Courts should not lightly interfere with the freedom of
contracts. (Baltimore, etc., Railway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U.S., 498; Printing, etc. Company vs.
Sampson, Law Reps., 19 Equity, 465; Osgood vs. Central Vermont R. Co., 77 Vermont,
334.)
The record shows that the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company had, at various times,
discharged other freight from steamships in Manila Bay of much greater weight than the
boiler in question, by means of the same tackle and equipment and by the same
employees which were used in the present case. the records also shows that the tackle
and equipment was ample and that the men incharged were experience in the work they
were to perform., The record further shows that the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company
undertook the discharge of said boilers at a very low price, for the very reason that they
were relived of all liability whatsoever for damages in the discharge of the same. The
record further shows that the representative for the Compañía Transatlantica who made
the contract in question, was requested to and did make a causal examination of the
tackle equipment which were to be used in the discharge of the boilers. The records
further shows that said company, after receiving the information that the tackel and
equipment and employees of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company had discharged, on
various occasions, other and heavier freight without accident or mishap, and after having
made a casual examination of such equipment, voluntarily and willingly and without any
objection or protest for and on behalf of the Compañia Trasatlantica, entered into the
contract as above described, accepting fully and without protest the conditions imposed
by the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company. Having entered into the contract in question and
the same not being in contravention of the laws, morals or public order, the Compania
Trasatlantica is bound by its terms.
The rule above announced may seem to be a hard one, but when we remember that the G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
right to enter into contracts carries with it the freedom to impose such conditions as the
parties may see fit to impose, subject to specific limitations, the hardship if any, is one JOSE CANGCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.,Defendant-Appellee.
self-imposed by the parties.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
An example may serve to make the rule which we have announced plainer: Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

A is the owner of an automobile at Manila which desires to deliver at Baguio. B. is the FISHER, J.:
owner of a garage at Manila and has in his employ experienced chauffeurs. A desires to
employ B to take the automobile to Baguio and offers a certain price for the services. B
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco,
accepts A's proposition with the condition that he will assume no responsibility whatever
was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a
for any damages which might occur to the said automobile in the course of its delivery. In
monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which
passing the zigzag on the way to Baguio, an unforseen accident happens through the
is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to
casual neglect or lack of care on the part of the chauffeur and the automobile is damaged.
the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by
Can B held liable, in an action upon the contract, for the damages in the face of the fact
the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon
that A had relieved him of all liability for any damages which might occur? The cases
the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
which we have cited above, together with many others which might be cited, all answer
class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position
that question in the negative. That question is answered in the negative upon the theory
upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
that A, by the terms of his contract, relieved B, in an action upon the contract from all
support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
liability whatsoever.

It must not be forgotten that what we have said relates the actions upon the contract with
the conditions mentioned and not t actions for damages in an action ex delicto resulting
from the negligent performance of duties and obligations assumed.
The appellant, the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific company, contends that inasmuch as it had
exercised the care of a good father of a family in selecting its employees, that it should be
relieved from all liability by virtue of the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. We do
not believe that the provisions of said article can be invoked when the rights and liabilities
of parties to an action depend upon a contract. The right of parties are defined by the
contract and there is no occasion t invoke the statute. The argument employed by the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company if valid, would also relieve the Compañia
Transatlantic had not exercised the care of a good father of a family in selecting it for the
discharge of said boilers. Neither d we believe that the provisions of article 1902 of the
Civil Code can be invoked in favor of the Compañia Transatlantica for the reason that the
contract governs the rights and liabilities and by the terms of the contract the Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Company is relieved from all liability whatsoever. A relief from all liability is
a relief from any liability caused by negligence, especially so when the action is based
upon a contract. Whether or not the rule should be followed in an action of tort growing
out of willful negligence, square?
From all the foregoing, we are persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be
modified and that the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company should be relieved from all liability
under the complaint.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a
cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from
the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to
cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named
Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When
the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one
or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from
the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station
was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform
where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging
from a lighted car.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons
and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon
another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the
edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his
foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His
statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared
that the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at
once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his
arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was
then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the
member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that
the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for
other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon
the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First
Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and
drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to
the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to
use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily
follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem
it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility
of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility
for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to
extra-contractual obligations - or to use the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code,
clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in
the case of Rakes vs.Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between " culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not
formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
In the Rakes case ( supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the
proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one
another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at
365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is,
in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not
based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior - if it
were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally - but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who
by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the
damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom
he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an
act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The
obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant,
while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the
person injured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the
servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts - on the contrary, that proof
shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability
arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage
to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking
into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby
performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the
scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article
1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the
selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof
of due care and diligence in this respect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto
Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-
contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)chanrobles
virtual law library
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the
theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage
caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence.
It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some
fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903
merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative
opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of
authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which
amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's
negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and
care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his
contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-
contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties
which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations,
other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in
the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure
of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of
those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general
duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise
to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that
in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering
into the contractual relation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect - and our Legislature has so elected -
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of
public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as
to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to
limit extra-contractual liability - with certain well-defined exceptions - to cases in which
moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control
of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render
service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the
sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act
or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence - if he does
not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by
defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficientprima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor
should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action
is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence
of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken,
it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that
the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though
such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of
defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of
the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or
agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants
in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in
person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable.
Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which
involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it
was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted,
juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from
the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of
necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most
instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants.
If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason
of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the
collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in
the selection and direction of the clerk?chanrobles virtual law library
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa
contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been
recognized by the supreme court of Spain. ( Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20,
1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that
plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the
provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court
rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts .
...
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for
damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the
court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to
constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of
contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a
carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case
the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court
that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had
any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to
plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the
course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8,
pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it
and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are
applicable to the case."chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's
chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time.
The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the
automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time,
saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist
therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil.
Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant
upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The
express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the
liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between
private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the
particular case the presumption of negligence had not been
overcome.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action
as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of
carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions
of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the
defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed
beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant
had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of
the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether
the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa
contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an
incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are
identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a
defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in
failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical
result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because
the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently
caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference
to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants,
that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense to
the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for
defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of
the servant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative
spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual
obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to
carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code,
article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach
of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains,
the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case ( supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should
be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant
contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per
se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly
stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance,
that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact
that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands
of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no
injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There
is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting
as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a
safe alighting place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It
is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of
the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances
disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required
should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.) was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37
Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled
admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality
his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation
virtual law library for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that
he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped treatment of his injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while
the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the
be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers
facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place,
as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure
Separate Opinions
upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff;
for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of
alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be chanrobles virtual law library
revealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting,
distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule
his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely,
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the together, should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been
in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968
performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly -
the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,
observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such vs.
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was of the said Bank, defendants.
his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.
Aviado and Aranda for defendants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein,
the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of
First Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-
defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of
P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had
seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said
judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment
was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands — in which the Singsons
had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned.
What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we
quote:
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all
matters of execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff
herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without
further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a
letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian
C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank
for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the
amount of P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing
No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the
Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said
drawers with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of
the check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank,
the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. After
the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the latter
wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him that
his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for
the reason that his account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M.
Glass Service further stated in the said letter that they were constrained to close
his credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote
the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was not
included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served
upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took
steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized
to the plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963,
requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of
garnishment from his account had already been removed. A similar letter was
written by the said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff
informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was
considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of
Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time
to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the
temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short
time.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its
president, Santiago Freixas, for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of
plaintiffs' account.1äwphï1.ñët
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the
defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is
contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code,
upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of
damages allegedly sustained by them.
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or
quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have
repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not
bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively
recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,3 involving an airplane passenger who,
despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation
and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although
the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ...
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly,
the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the
President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had
committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages — the amount of which
need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of
P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs
said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the
costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC., respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C.
Syquia, and Anthony Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased
Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint1 in the then Court of First
Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for
recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court
dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed
Syquia, plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages
against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale
(Contract No. 6885) dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No.
7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J.
Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased
Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee
to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in
accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures;
that on September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said
remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased
was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of
certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete
vault was being raised to the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered
that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of
the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour,
more or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the
aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset
with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault might
have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded
the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects
thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court
of Parañaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-
appellants with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain
personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused the opening of the
concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault,
the following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the
interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding;
(b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the
wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass
panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c)
the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the
exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by
the action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-
appellee of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault
designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against
the elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave
and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing
to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants
P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages,
exemplary damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and expenses of
litigation and costs of suit.2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did
not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-
delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there
was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father himself, Juan
Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled
with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the
vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given by defendant for boring a hole at
the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault
because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water
and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill
up the grave."3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in
holding that the contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration;
that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition.
They allege herein that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private
respondent allowed the flooding of the vault and the entrance thereto
of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily,
when it held that no act of desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such
as those which have been stipulated upon by the parties, testified to
by private respondent's witnesses, and admitted in the answer, which
could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and
the absence of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed
upon by the parties, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent
on the vault of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such
act was either a breach of private respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed
vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless,
petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent has committed, the
latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private
respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately,
however, We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There
is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has
committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of
private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was
no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and
Certificate of Perpetual Care"6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed
the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations.
Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be
send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent
provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete
box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual
installment of which shall be made by the employees of the
Association.7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978,
the day before the interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's
employees in the grave which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a
cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the
latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or double
internment (sic) underground in sealed concrete vault."8 Petitioners claim that the vault
provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently,
water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that
the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel,
explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed."9 On the other hand, the word "seal" is
defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without
rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." 10 The
meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited
dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with
"waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of
the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by
the respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A") and the attached Rules and Regulations
(Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-
appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can not
now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms
of their contract, which is the law between them (Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where
there is nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract
must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175
SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting party cannot incur
a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract
(Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are
reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the
parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of
evidence in respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so
long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648,
655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco, Revised
Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control
(Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank
& Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero
vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to
the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for
boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of
more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place." 14 In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is
expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act — boring of the hole —
negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores,
Interment Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case
that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on
July 25, 1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you
please tell the Hon. Court what or whether you
have participation in connection with said
internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our
personnel dug a grave. After digging the next
morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave
 and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole
was placed on the vault so that water could come
into the vault because it was raining heavily then
because the vault has no hole the vault will float
and the grave would be filled with water and the
digging would caved (sic) in and the earth, the
earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the
grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a
heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the
same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no
reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws
and jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate,
from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record",
are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first
class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged,
had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to
said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the
tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his
"first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make
complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider
facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by
any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which
the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision
every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues
raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process
from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged
with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the
Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for
said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based
entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would
not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each
witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean
that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the
legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the
matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the
written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support
the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law,
upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not
appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of
fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the
true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that
he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief
before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial
court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first
class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to
Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class
ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued,
would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of
plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the
necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could
have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It
received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping
with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or
riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no
question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C"
and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony
and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this
OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael
Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the
ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses,
and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified
that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The
court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding
with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos
in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of
First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments
of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as
free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision
of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way
at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon
a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of
the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then
an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can
a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to
strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to
the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that,
as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and
air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower
courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts
upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a
first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of
Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a
first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso
went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first
class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to
the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant
claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an
award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the
decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations
in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air
Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in
behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane
during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from
Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were
made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead
furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran
and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's
employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he
was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience
and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to
take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to
Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations
aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
 xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation
at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the
stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the
plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a
white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.
An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the
plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will,
has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his
notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-
passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of
defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is
noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by
the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-
class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff
should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to
be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in
the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence
committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there,
by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to
explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino,
another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of
defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what
reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p.
247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this
point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white
man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso?
The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better",
nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued
a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by
having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find,
as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok
not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the
plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said
Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
 It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the
recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this
is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from
what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest
or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad
faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers
to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat
that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto
G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white
man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the
plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding
"first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon
the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with
the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach
of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons
to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And
this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in
another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect
his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop,
and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from
that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which
justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the
mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So
one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket
and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the
tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I
am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
 A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't
have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
notebook." He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in
French — "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the
best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry
in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule.
It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition
of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in
evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat
fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts
below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not
intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here —
should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary
damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily
with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates
of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from
reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo
Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability
and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At
the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman,
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death
of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of
merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death
of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman
and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court
stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said
that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit
by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The
appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish
the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court; viz:
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual
findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that
the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome.
Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to
fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of
carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and
Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence
imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence
in ensuring the safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common
carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common
carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be
in pursuance to the contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts
of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or
of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by
the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate
court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, 10 an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the
high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either
case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under
the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence
or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the
one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. 16 Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the
parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules
on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there
is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of
the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO,
respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting issue posed is whether the
subsequent action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or
merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must
therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article
1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can
be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City,
an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other
goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12
August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite
soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or
particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some
fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter
in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the Regional
Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination;
subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of Health informing her that the
samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the
foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the
usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00
to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989;
she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of
damages but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay
her P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the
damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued
that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In
her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages
which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on
an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article
1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related
pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing
administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a
contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint
should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court in its
Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for proper determination and
disposition. 8 The public respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case
No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of
warranty as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is
four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show
that it is an action or damages arising from respondent's act of
"recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items
intended to be sold or public consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in
legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action are the
facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the
defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger
Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code,
the existence of contractual relations between the parties does not
absolutely preclude an action by one against the other for quasi-
delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was
held that) although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in
origin and in nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales
was taken, the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an
action or breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale
of defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public
respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL
PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S
IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the primary
legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on
its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties
under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the
parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-
delicts and that since private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of
implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six months room delivery
of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's
implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between
withdrawing from the contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with
damages in either case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for
rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from
a quasi-delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a
contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the
private respondent insists that since her cause of action is based on quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil
Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of
action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations
in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for
public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden
defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the
vendee may elect between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages
either
case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud,
in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on
obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also
demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according
to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of
their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the
pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of
the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise fromquasi-delict, i.e.,
the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-
class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-
carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the
relation between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing
products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other
grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as defined in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should
by no means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral
damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.