Annotations On Citizenship

928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence
ANNOTATION
TOUCHY ISSUES ON CITIZENSHIP: A CENTURY HENCE

By
DAVID G. NITAFAN*
_____________________
§ 1.Foreword, p. 928
§ 2.The Principle of jus soli and jus sanguinis, p. 929
§ 3.Were There Philippine Citizens Before the Treaty of Paris, p. 930
§ 4.Were there Philippine Citizens After the Treaty of Paris but Before July 1, 1902?, p.
931
§ 5.May Citizenship be Conferred by Judicial Fiat?, p. 936
_____________________
§ 1. Foreword
It was on 10 December 1898 that the formal articles of capitulation of Cuba, Porto Rico
and the Philippines, from the Spanish Crown to the United States of America, was signed
in Paris, France. These articles came to be known as the Treaty of Paris, and that was
almost a century ago.
As to be expected and is always the case in matters of conquest or cession of territories,

the problems of adjustments concerning the territory and of the allegiance of the
inhabitants of the territories involved, are likely to arise.
Under international law upon such transfer of territory, the relations of the native
inhabitants with their former sovereign
________________
* Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila.
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are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the new government
which has acquitted their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers
the allegiance of those who remain in it.1
This general rule, however, does not preclude the old and new sovereigns from agreeing
on the terms and conditions of the transfer of allegiance of the inhabitants from one to the
other. This was what actually happened to some inhabitants of the Philippines.
§ 2. The principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis.

One of the touchiest issues concerning the citizenship of the inhabitants of the Philippines
upon the change of sovereignty over the Islands from Spain to the United States is the
application of the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis. Apparently, and despite several
cases which reached the Supreme Court, such an issue has yet to be settled with clarity
and finality.
According to Hershey, jus soli is the law of the place of one’s birth as contrasted with jus
sanguinis, the law of the place of one’s descent or parentage.2
Jus soli is the doctrine whereby citizenship depends generally upon the place of birth; the
principle of nationality by place of birth.3
On the other hand, jus sanguinis is the right of blood. The law of the place of a person’s
descent or parentage.4
Stated differently, the principle of jus soli takes into account the place of birth as
determinative of one’s citizenship, irrespective of the nationality of the parents, whereas,
jus sanguinis considers the nationality of the parents as determinative of the citizenship of
the child irrespective of the place of birth of the latter.
There are countries of the world which apply one or the other
________________
1 American Insurance Co. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. (U.S.), 511; 7 L. ed., 242, 255.
2 Hershey, International Law, p. 237.
3 Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 322.
4 Gabra vs. Mendoza, 1 A.C.R. 57.
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930
of these principles. Jus Sanguinis is said to prevail in Germany, Austria, Hungary,

Sweden and Switzerland. 5 Jus Soli prevails in common law countries, like the United
States and England.
Still, there are those which apply both principles to ascertain allegiance of their
inhabitants.
§ 3. Were there Philippine citizens before the Treaty of Paris?

This is one of the touchy questions which was apparently not settled by any law or
judicial pronouncement.
The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on the subject of citizenship which were in
force in the Philippines when the Treaty of Paris was entered into between Spain and the
United States, were as follows:
“Art. 17. The following are Spaniards:
“1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

“2 . Children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
“3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
“4. Those who, without said papers may have acquired a domicile in any town in the
monarchy.
“Art. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority, have the nationality of
their parents.
“In order that the children born of foreign parents in Spanish territory may enjoy the
benefits granted them by paragraph 1 of article 17, it shall be indispensable requisite that
the parents declare, in the manner and before the officials specified in article 19, that they
choose, in the name of their children, the Spanish nationality, renouncing any other.
Art. 19. Children of foreign parentage born in Spanish domains must state, within the
year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the Spanish
nationality granted them by article 17.
“Those who are in the kingdom shall make this declaration before the official in charge
of the civil registry of the town in which they reside; those who reside abroad, before one
of the Consular or Diplo-
________________
5 Hershey, op cit., p. 237.

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931
matic Agents of the Spanish Government, x x x”6
If the foregoing provisions were to be applied, it would seem that there were no
Philippine citizens before the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States.
Of course, the revolutionaries, who never recognized Spanish subjection of their country
considered themselves Filipinos, but to be recognized as citizens of a nation under
international law, there must be other countries which recognize such status.
§ 4. Were there Philippine citizens after the Treaty of Paris but before July 1, 1902?
Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provided as follows:
“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by
the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or
may be removed therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including
the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory
in which they may reside.
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”
From this provision, (a) Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, who fail to preserve
their allegiance to Spain in the manner therein provided “shall be held to have renounced
it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory,” (b) but the “political status of the
native inhabitants xxx shall be determined by the Congress” of the United States.
________________
6 As quoted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, 23 Phil. at pp. 319-320.
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It must be noticed that the above provision of the treaty does not speak of any
“citizenship” (as it merely uses “nationality”). Under the general rules of international
law, the allegiance of the inhabitants with Spain was dissolved and a new one is
established with the new sovereign. Thus, it was held that “all laws therefore in force
which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the
substituted sovereign, lost their force.”7 It was held, however, in a 1947 case that mere
birth in the Philippines of alien parentage did not confer Philippine citizenship “because
the common law principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States was not extended to the Philippines.”8
It was only on 1 June 1902 that the Congress of the United States enacted the so-called
Philippine Bill of 1902, Section 4 of which read as follows:
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, xxx: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands, who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.”9
It is thus seen that it was only when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was enacted that the new
sovereign—the United States—recognized or spoke of “citizens of the Philippine
Islands,” and “Philippine citizenship.”
What then was the political status of the Spanish subjects,
_________________
7 Government vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728, 746, citing Alvarez y Sanchez vs.
United States, 216 U.S. 167.
8 Tan Chong & Lam Swee Sang vs. Secretary of Labor and Commonwealth, 79 Phil.
249, 45 O.G. 1268.
9 This was re-enacted in Section 2 of the Jones Law of 1916.

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natives of the peninsula, who did not opt to preserve their allegiance to Spain, and the
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands after the exchange of ratifications of the
Treaty of Paris and before the enactment of the Philippine Bill?
It must also be noticed that the Philippine Bill merely legislated on the Spanish subjects,
natives of the Peninsula, who did not preserve their allegiance to Spain, referred to in the
first paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris, but was silent as to the “native
inhabitants” referred to in the second paragraph thereof. What then was the political
status of these native inhabitants?
Attempting to answer this question, the majority opinion in a 1948 case, stated as
follows:
“x x x There seems to be no doubt that the lack of treaty stipulation regarding Spanish
subjects residing in the Philippine Islands, who were not born in Spain, was merely due
to an oversight. It was not deliberate for the purpose of reverting them to the citizenship
of their country of origin, for a change of citizenship must be voluntary or by an act,
expressed or implied, of the citizen or subject. Hence, it may safely be asserted that the
second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris is not a limitation upon the power
of the United States to determine the political status of all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and continued to reside therein.
There being no limitation, as there could be none, the petitioner, who was an inhabitant of
the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is
a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act of Congress of 1 July
1902 and of section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution
he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution.”10
This opinion, however, must have overlooked certain material facts relative to the
Palanca case. Thus, Mr. Justice Perfecto, dissenting, pointed out the following facts:
“On February 4, 1894, after having acquired Spanish citizenship, Palanca married Cesaria
Cano Torres. Since then he considered him-
________________
10 Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 583-584—Padilla, J.

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self a Spanish subject. He registered as such in the Spanish Consulate General in Manila
and as late as March 2, 1942, received from the said consulate duplicate certificate No.
548. In 1941 he instituted this case to acquire Filipino citizenship. On April 12, 1945,
when he married Rosa Gonzales, his present wife, he made it appear in the contract of
marriage that he was of Spanish nationality.”11
and concluded as follows:
“Upon the facts in this case, it seems unnecessary to engage in a fruitless long discussion
and interpretation of the Treaty of Paris and applicable legal provisions. The proceedings
which took place in the lower court appear to be highly anomalous. What Palanca failed
to obtain by direct procedure, was granted to him in an indirect way.
“There is no question as to his Spanish citizenship. He was of that firm conviction even
after he obtained in 1944 a decision allowing him to be registered as a naturalized
Filipino. On April 12, 1945, he stated in a public document, one of the most solemn that
he could ever execute, his marriage contract with his present wife Rosa Gonzales, his
Spanish nationality.”12
Aside from the factual approach made by Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Hilado, joined
by Mr. Justice Briones, also dissented, dissecting the legal aspect, as follows:
“xxx my construction of the treaty is that the High Contracting Parties agreed to exclude
from what would have been the ordinary operation of international law as regards the
political status of the territorial inhabitants: (1) those Spanish subjects who were natives
of Spain and (2) native inhabitants of the territories. All others were to be subject to the
rules of international law.
“In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 332-333, this Court said:
“ ‘The relations which the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall bear to the acquiring
state are generally determined by the treaty of cession. xxx’
“That determination was made in Article IS, 1st paragraph, of the Treaty of Paris, as to
the ‘Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula,’ and agreed to be made, under the 2nd
paragraph of the same Article,
________________
11 80 Phil. at pp. 585-586.
12 80 Phil. at p. 589.
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935
by the Congress of the United States thereafter. As to the rest of the territorial inhabitants
who owed Spain natural allegiance based ‘upon the law of nature and the code of nations’
(Tobin vs. Walkinshaw, 23 Fed. Cases, 1346, 1348), International Law fixed their
political status, as declared by Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. vs. 356
Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. (U.S.), 511; 7 Law. ed., 242, 255, as follows:
“ ‘xxx On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government
which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers
the allegiance of those who remains in it xxx.’
“Such transfer of allegiance, being independent of the will of the inhabitants concerned,
logically refers to that allegiance which attached to them in the first instance
independently of their personal volition. This does not include naturalized citizens
without whose voluntary choice and election should never have become such citizens of
the country of adoption nor owed it allegiance. The citizenship and allegiance of such a
pure creature of the municipal law of the country of adoption. The country of adoption
had the power under its municipal law to admit him to naturalized citizenship but if that
country should in (the) future cede the territory to another power, the naturalized citizen
who remains in the territory is thereby released from his voluntary allegiance of the
ceding power, and the citizen is remitted to his original status (Tobin vs. Walkinshaw,
supra). Consequently, said ceding power cannot transfer the allegiance of said citizen to
the acquiring power.
“As said in the Tobin case,
“ ‘xxx No power existed in one government to transfer, or in the other to receive, the
voluntary or statutory allegiance of a naturalized citizen. xxx.”13
As may be observed, the dissenting opinions were the more logical conclusions that
should have been reached, in contrast with the majority, which was a strained conclusion
amounting to conferring citizenship by judicial fiat.
It must also be recalled that pursuant to the authority granted to the Philippine Legislature
to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, as provided in the proviso
of the above-quoted provision of the Philippine Bill, Act No. 2937
________________
13 80 Phil. at pp. 598-600.
936
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entitled the Naturalization Law was enacted. “Naturalization Law’ provides for the
manner and procedure for acquiring citizenship, so it does not apply to inhabitants who
were already citizens. What was the political status of the native inhabitants whose
citizenship were not determined by the Treaty of Paris nor by the Philippine Bill or Jones
Law and who had not applied for naturalization (acquisition of Philippine citizenship)
under Act No. 2937?
The Palanca case, supra, could not in any manner be applied to answer this question
because Palanca was not a “native inhabitant” but a “naturalized Spanish subject.”
§ 5. May citizenship be conferred by judicial fiat?

This is the most controversial question. As inferred from the previous discussion, it is the
inherent power of evey state to determine, by its municipal law, who may be its citizens.
And since citizenship is a matter of policy, exercise of such policy determination belongs
to the legislative department and obviously not to the courts. Since as already shown, the
Philippine Legislature’s authority was merely to determine by law acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, and since the Congress of the United States had not legislated on
the “native inhabitants” as contemplated in the second paragraph of Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris, there is absolutely no legislation insofar as those inhabitants are
concerned.
Moreover, the Philippines, prior to July 4, 1946, could not have legislated on the matter
because it was not then a sovereign state within the contemplation of international law. In
abandoning the jus soli principle in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee
Sang vs. Commonwealth, 14 a unanimous Supreme Court said:
“Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest,
of their Filipino citizenship those who had been declared to be Filipino citizens, upon
whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or
principle of res
________________
14 79 Phil. 249, 45 O.G. 1268 (1947).
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adjudicata.” 15
This pronouncement obviously recognize the principle of conferment of Philippine

citizenship by judicial fiat. Prior to the Tan Chong-Lam Swee Sang reconsideration
resolution, the following cases actually conferred citizenship by judicial fiat by the
erroneous application of the principle of jus soli:
(a) In a 1909 case, the Supreme Court in effect held that a male person born in the
Philippines, of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, the latter being domiciled in the
Philippines and subject to the jurisdiction of its government, was considered prima facie a
citizen of the Philippines; and the fact that he, at the age of 14, went to China and
remained there until 1897 when he returned to the Islands where he had since
continuously resided, was not sufficient in itself to change his status as a citizen of the
Philippines.16
(b) In a 1911 case, the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus was born in the Philippines
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother in the year 1880. The father lived continuously
in the Islands for about sixty years, and acquired considerable real and personal
properties therein. The applicant lived in the Philippines for 11 years when he was sent to
China, where he ramained until January, 1911. On the date he returned to the Islands, he
asserted that he was a native and citizen thereof, with the bona fide intention of making it
his permanent home and country, but was denied entry “solely on the theory that he is an
alien of Chinese race who presents none of the statutory proofs that he is a member of the
exempt class of Chinese persons.” It was also admitted that “he would have returned
sooner to the Philippines had it not been for certain financial difficulties, and that he
never intended to expatriate himself and had never taken active steps to that end.” Held:
Applicant is a Filipino citizen and not subject to deportation.17
________________
15 79 Phil., at p. 258; italics supplied.

16 United States vs. Go-Ciaco, 12 Phil. 490—Willard, J., see also Muñoz vs. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 494, 496-497 (1911).
17 Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, supra Moreland, J.
938
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R was born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines on July 6, 1889, his father being a native
of China and his mother a Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country until the year
1895, when he went to China and never returned, dying there about the year 1900. In
May, 1901, R., who was then a minor, was sent to China by his widowed mother for the
sole purpose of studying, and returned in October, 1910, being then about 21 years and 3
months of age. Quare: Under these circumstances can it be said that Congress (of the
United States) in enacting section 4 of the Philippine Bill intended to prohibit R who
happened to be temporarily absent from the Philippines from reentering this country?
Held: Surely, such could not have been the intention of Congress. To so hold would have
the effect of excluding him from his native country, from home and all that home means,
from his mother, brothers, and sisters, and compel him to live in practically a strange
country and among strange people. If he had actually remained in the Islands, no one
would ever have thought of deporting him as being a subject of the Chinese empire.18
V was born in the city of Cebu on the 11th day of October 1892, and had lived in the
Philippines since his birth, except for about six months, when his father, by reason of ill
health, took him and his two sisters to China. His father died there shortly after their
arrival. He, together with other members of his family, immediately returned to the
Philippines. His father was a Chinese person. His mother was a Filipina woman. All of
his relatives live in the Philippines. When he left the country it was with the express
intention of returning. Held: V is a citizen of the Philippines and entitled to remain here
and it was an abuse of authority on the part of the Insular Collector of Customs to
exclude him. 19
O was born in the Philippines of a Filipina mother and a Chinese father, educated in
China, who returned to the Philippines when he was twenty one years of age, is
presumptively a Philippine citizen as he has not by his own acts expressly or
________________
18 Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), 23 Phil. 315, 338—Trent, J.

19 Vaño Uy Tat Tong vs. Insular Collector of Customs (1912), 23 Phil. 480, 483—
Johnson, J.
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impliedly repudiated his Philippine citizenship and had chosen Chinese citizenship, but
has always considered himself to be a Filipino and has elected to remain as a Philippine
citizen, and therefore qualified to purchase public agricultural lands.20 The principle of
jus soli had also been applied by Mr. Justice Laurel which he decided after the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution.21
The 1941 cases of Tan Chong and Lam Swee Sang were, however, the subject of motions
for reconsideration, which were resolved by the Supreme Court in 1947.22
The reversal of a jus soli doctrine, applied in the above-catalogued cases was done in the
following words:
“xxx The principle of jus soli was the rule in this jurisdiction until the 30th day of
September, 1939, when in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor (68 Phil. 649), this
Court abandoned it and held that a person of Chinese parentage born in the Philippines in
1914 is not a citizen thereof, because she followed the citizenship of her Chinese parents
and she is not a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of section 2 of the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. But in the case of Torres and Gallofin vs.
Tan Chim xxx decided on 3 February 1940, and Gallofin vs. Ordoñez, decided on 27
June 1940 xxx this Court reverted to the rule of jus soli laid down in the cases prior to the
decision in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra.
“The Solicitor General heeding the opinions of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. G.S.
Messermith, of 15 January 1938; of the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Alvey
A. Adee, dated 12 September 1921, and the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington
Wilson, of 5 April 1912, who held that a person born in the Philippines of alien parentage
is not a citizen thereof, because the common law
________________
20 Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion (1934), 59 Phil. 440, 445—Malcolm, J.
21 Torres and Gallofin vs. Tan Chim (1940), 69 Phil. 518; Gallofin vs. Ordoñez (1940),
70 Phil. 287; Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1941); 73 Phil. 307; Lam Swee Sang vs.
Commonwealth (1941), 73 Phil. 309. The jus soli principle was also recognized in Lim
Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 Phil. 84; United States vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil. 924; and
also Go Julian vs. Collector of Customs, 59 Phil. 612.
22 79 Phil. 249, 45 O.G. 1268.
940
940
principle of jus soli or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
was not extended to the Philippines—the same opinion upon which the Solicitor General
had relied in the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, supra, in his contention that the rule
applying the principle of jus soli in this jurisdiction should be abandoned—urges this
Court to reconsider its decisions in the cases under consideration.
“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx
“We are not unmindful of the importance of the question submitted to us for decision. We
know that the decision upon the motion for reconsideration in these cases is momentous.
We have given the time and the thought demanded by its importance. While birth is an
important element of citizenship, it alone does not make a person a citizen of the country
of his birth. Youth spent in the country; intimate and endearing association with the
citizens among whom he lives; knowledge and price of the country’s past; belief in the
greatness and security of its institutions, in the loftiness of its ideals, and in the ability of
the country’s government to protect him, his children, and his earthly possessions against
perils from within and from without; and his readiness to defend the country against such
perils, are some of the important elements that would make a person living in a country
its citizen. Citizenship is a political status. The citizen must be proud of his citizenship.
He should treasure and cherish it. In the language of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, ‘the
question of citizenship in a nation is of the most vital importance. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition.’ (U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark, supra.)
Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly.
Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle
of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would encourage dual
allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such
persons might claim to be citizens.
“The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine
or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if
found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not
and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty
of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the
law in force.
“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx xx
“Considering that the common law principle or rule of jus soli obtaining in England and
in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, has
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never been extended to this jurisdiction xxx; considering that the law in force and
applicable to the petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is
sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill, xxx, as amended by Act of 23 March 1912, which provides
that only those ‘inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands,’ we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the first case
and the applicant in the second case, who were born of alien parentage, were not and are
not, under said section, citizens of the Philippine Islands.”
With this pronouncement it was thought by every one that the controversy as to the
applicability of jus soli in this country had become settled. Everyone was, however,
proven wrong. For in a 1952 case, and notwithstanding the finding that the principle of
jus soli was never extended to the Philippines, the Roa ruling was again applied. In this
late case, Mr. Justice Tuason, writing for the Court, stated:
“On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a
full-pledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the Constitution, when jus
soli had been the prevailing doctrine. xxx
“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
“x x x Certainly, it would neither be fair nor good policy to hold the respondent an alien
after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and the Government had confirmed his
Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principles that had the force of law. On several
occasions the Secretary of Justice had declared as Filipino citizens persons similarly
circumstanced as the herein respondent. x x x”
Mr. Justice Padilla, the ponente in the Tan Chong-Lam Swee Sang reconsideration
resolution, concurred in this decision but not on the Roa doctrine. He rested his
concurrence on the fact that when Uy was born out of wedlock on 28 January 1912 of a
Filipino mother and a Chinese father, he was a Filipino; when his father and mother got
married in 1914 (meaning he was legitimated) he acquired the citizenship of his father;
but when his father died on 17 February 1917, his mother reacquired her Philippine
citizenship, and Uy, being then a minor, followed the
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citizenship of her mother.
The latest case on citizenship, decided by the Supreme Court in an 8-7 split decision, was
just determined on May 31, 1991. In this latest case, the pronouncement of one William
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen, was based on circumstances which are not provided by
positive legislation.
When shall we stop conferring citizenship by judicial fiat? When will Congress take the
initiative of setting a policy through positive legislation?
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. TOUCHY ISSUES ON
CITIZENSHIP: A CENTURY HENCE, 197 SCRA 928, May 31, 1991
800
Naturalization As a Mode of Reacquiring Phil. Citizenship
ANNOTATION
NATURALIZATION AS A MODE OF REACQUIRING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

By
DAVID G. NITAFAN*
______________
§ I.The Case Under Annotation, p. 801

§ II.Legal Conclusions in the Decision, p. 803
§ III.Law on Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship, p. 804
§ IVModes of Losing Philippine Citizenship, p. 810
§ V.Modes of Reacquiring Philippine Citizenship, p. 812
§ VI.Naturalization as a Mode Reacquiring Philippine Citizenship and Procedures, p. 812
§ VII.Requirements of Naturalization which may Not Be Required in Naturalizations for
Reacquisition of Citizenship Under Com. Act No. 63, p. 817
§ VIII.Comments and Observations, p. 818
____________
The very recent en banc decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Governor Juan G.
Frivaldo,1 brought to the fore many legal problems which may perhaps merit the notice
not only of the members of the legal profession but also of the judiciary and the
legislators. This is so because a careful reading of the laws on reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship reveals its muddled state, causing not only confusion but probably errors on
the part of many.1a
_______________
*Author is an incumbent Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Manila. He is an alumnus

of the Manila Law College, graduating therefrom as Valedictorian of its law Class 1956.
1 Republic v. De La Rosa, etc., et al., and its companion cases, G.R. Nos. 104654,
105715 & 105735, June 6, 1994.
1a See related annotation in 197 SCRA 928, et seq.
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§ I. The Case Under Annotation

Sp. Proc. No. 91-58645 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Manila, was a “Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the
Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63,” assigned to Branch 28 of said court
presided over by respondent Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa.2
As recited in the decision, the following proceedings took place in the case:
“In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set petition for hearing on March
16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last
publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The
order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous
place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp.
24-26).
“On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a ‘Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of
Schedule,’ where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March
15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be
cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
“The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the
petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy
thereof posted.
“On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He
submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order
dated October 7, 1991 issued by the Publisher of the Philippine Star (Exh. ‘A’); (2)
Certificate of Publication of the order issued by the National Printing Office (Exh. ‘B’);
(3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. 3-10; (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the
National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exh. ‘C’ and ‘C-2’); (5)
Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. ‘D’); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. ‘E’);
(7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh.
_______________
2 The decision, however, refers to it as one to be “re-admitted x x x as a Filipino citizen

under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473).”
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‘F’); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the
record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. ‘G’); and (8) Certificate of
Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. ‘H’).
“Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision,
disposing as follows:
“ ‘WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-
admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting
upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen’ (Rollo, p. 33).
“On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).” (Pages 3-4, Decision)
Among the factual findings in the decision, which induced the Court to conclude that the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition; and that the decision rendered
in favor of Juan G. Frivaldo was “an anomaly,” and, therefore, null and void, are the
following:
“x x x private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country
during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and
eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
“He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that
repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost
their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request
to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House
of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
“He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date,
without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General.
He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
“It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and
that the public was well-informed of his
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petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.
“Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath
of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the
waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the
applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is no basis to do so. In
his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with,
claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites
his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon for six terms.” (pp. 9-11, Decision)
§ II. Legal Conclusions in the Decision

In adjudging adversely against Governor Frivaldo as heretofore intimated, the Court
made the following legal expositions:
“Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization

under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed
by the law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements
which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he
believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a
citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost
her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
“The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of
private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of
allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
“Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional
(Po Yi Bo [sic] v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and
posting of the petition and the order must be in its full text for the court to acquire
jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
“The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character; (2) that he
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resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak
and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or
if he is excused from said, the justification therefor.
“The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yo Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA
400 [1992]).
“Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7
of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his
certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
“The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
“A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted
from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First
Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
“Section 1 of RA. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be
able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated
himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
“Even discounting the provisions of RA. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.” (pp. 11-13, Decision)
§ III. Law on Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

For a start, it is perhaps relevant to state that the laws on Philippine citizenship were and
are as muddled as the decisions on the matter.
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a. Prior to American occupation.—The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on the

subject of citizenship, which were in force in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899,
were as follows:
“Art. 17. The following are Spaniards:
“1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

“2. Children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
“3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
“4. Those who, without said papers may have acquired a domicile in any town in the
Monarchy.
“Art. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority, have the nationality of
their parents.
“In order that the children of foreign parents in Spanish territory may enjoy the benefits
granted them by paragraph 1 of article 17, it shall be an indispensable requisite that the
parents declare, in the manner and before the officials specified in article 19, that they
choose, in the name of their children, the Spanish nationality, renouncing any other.
“Art. 19. Children of foreign parentage born in Spanish domains must state, within the
year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the Spanish
nationality granted them by article 17.
“Those who are in the kingdom shall make this declaration before the official in charge
of the civil registry of the town in which they reside; those who reside abroad, before one
of the Consular or Diplomatic Agents of the Spanish Government, x x x”3
“According to Mr. Justice Trent, a reading of article 17, above copied, is sufficient to
show that the first paragraph affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality
(citizenship) by place of birth, jus soli. The second, that of jus sanguinis; and the last two
that of free election, with the first predominating.4
b. During the American occupation.—Upon the cession of the Islands by Spain to the
United States by the Treaty of Paris, concluded between the two countries on the 10th
day of Decem-
_______________
3 As quoted in Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 319-320 (1912).
4 Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, at p. 323; see also Go Julian v. Government, 45

Phil. 289, 293 (1923).
806
806
ber, 1899, the said treaty, among others, provided as follows:
“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by
the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or
may remove therefrom, x x x In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”5
Thus, section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 provided:
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature (is) hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.”6
The above provision was re-enacted as Section 2 of the Philippine Autonomy Act7 in a
rephrased version, as follows:
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5 Article IX, Treaty of Paris.
6 Also as quoted in Roa v. Collector, supra.
7 Also known as the Jones Law of 1916.

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807
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.”
The result was that both the United States and Spain have recognized, affirmed, and
adopted the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth (jus soli), by blood (jus
sanguinis), and by election, with the first predominating, to paraphrase the Roa and Go
Julian cases.
In pursuance of the enabling proviso of the foregoing organic act, the Philippine
Legislature enacted Act No. 2927,8 providing for those who may become Philippine
citizens by naturalization (Sec. 1), who are disqualified from being naturalized (Sec. 2),
the qualifications and special qualifications of applicants for naturalization (Secs. 3 & 4),
and a judicial procedure to be followed in naturalization proceedings (Secs. 5-12) as well
as the effects of naturalization on the spouse and children of the petitioner (Sec. 13) and
the manner of cancelling the certificate of naturalization (Sec. 14).
c. During the Commonwealth period.—This was the law, as amended by Act No. 3448,
in force in this country when the 1935 Constitution was adopted. This Constitution
provided for those who are citizens of the Philippines, as follows:
_______________
8 Otherwise known as the “Naturalization Law,” approved and effective 26 March 1920.
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808
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
“(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law,” aside from providing that—
“Sec. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.”
Under the aegis of this Constitution, two important legislations were enacted by the
Commonwealth National Assembly, namely:
(1) Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing for the ways in which Philippine citizenship
may be lost or reacquired,9 and
(2) Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the “Revised Naturalization
Law.”10
The latter law repealed Act No. 2927, as amended.
Additionally, Com. Act No. 625, provides for the manner in which the option to elect
Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen.11
d. Under the Republic—In addition to Rep. Acts Nos. 106, 530, 965, 2639 and 3834,
some significant changes on the laws on
_______________
9 Approved and effective 21 October 1936; italics supplied. This law was amended by
Rep. Acts Nos. 106 approved 2 June 1947; 965 approved 20 June 1953; 2639 approved
22 June 1963; and 3834 approved 22 June 1963.
10 Approved and effective 17 June 1939. This law was in effect amended by Rep. Act
No. 530, approved 16 June 1950, which provides for a six-month waiting period before
hearing and a two-year probation period after the grant of a petition for naturalization
before the petitioner may be allowed to take his oath of allegiance.
11 Approved 7 June 1941.

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809
citizenship were brought about by the Constitutions subsequent to the 1935 Charter.
Thus, the 1973 Constitution embodied a modified provision concerning citizenship, as

follows:
“Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.12
“(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
“Sec. 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to
have renounced her citizenship.
“Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
“Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.13
The foregoing provisions were transplanted into the present Constitution, with slight
modifications, as follows:
“Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
constitution;
“(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
“(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
“(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
“Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizen-
_______________
12 Compare this with Sec. 1(4), Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution.
13 Article III, 1973 Constitution; italics supplied.
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ship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
“Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
“Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
“Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.”14
Under the 1973 Constitution, there were no significant legislations touching on Philippine
citizenship. Under the present Constitution, we are not also aware of any legislation
touching on reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, Com. Act 63 as amended, remains to be the principal legislation governing

the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
§ IV. Modes of Losing Philippine Citizenship

Section 1 of Com. Act No. 63, as amended by Rep. Act No. 106, provides as follows:
“How citizenship may be lost.—A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
“(1) By naturalization in foreign country;

“(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
“(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided, however, That
a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country;
“(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of
his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
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14 Article IV, 1987 Constitution; italics supplied.
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“(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/ or offensive pact of alliance
with the said foreign country; or
“(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled
to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
“(5) By cancellation of the certificates of naturalization;
“(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted;
and
“(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
“The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural
born Filipino citizen** from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-
American countries shall not produce loss or forefeiture of his Philippine citizenship if
the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed
upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired.”15
Obviously, Governor Frivaldo lost his Philippine citizenship under paragraph (1) of the
above provision since he was naturalized in the United States as shown by his Certificate
of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. H).
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** A natural born citizen is now defined by the Const.
15 Last par. added by Rep. Act No. 2639, approved 18 June 1960.
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§ V. Modes of Reacquiring Philippine Citizenship

Section 2 of Com. Act No. 63 provides as follows:
“How citizenship may be reacquired.—Citizenship may be reacquired:
“(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualifications
prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven;
“(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman
who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in
accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status; and
“(3) By direct act of the National Assembly (now Congress).”
Rep. Act No. 2630, however, provides that—
“Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.”
In this connection, shedding off one’s citizenship is called “expatriation,” which is one’s
act of voluntarily abandoning his citizenship.16 Under American jurisprudence,
expatriation is an inherent right of every person.
§ VI. Naturalization as a Mode of Reacquiring Philippine Citizenship and Procedures

a. Naturalization as a mode of acquiring citizenship.—A reading of both Com. Acts Nos.
63 and 473 reveals that naturalization is both a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship or for reacquiring the same. As a mode of initial acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Com. Act
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16 See Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra.

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No. 473, as amended. Said law and Rep. Act No. 530 provide for the procedure to be
observed in naturalization proceedings as well as the issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization. According to the decisions, the procedure therein provided must be
strictly complied with.
b. Naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship.—Naturalization, as a

mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship, is provided for in Com. Act No. 63, section 2,
par. 1 of which, as heretofore quoted, provides that “Citizenship may be reacquired: (1)
By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualifications
prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven.”
Section 3 of the same law further provides that:
“The procedure prescribed for naturalization under Act Numbered twenty-nine hundred
and twenty-seven, as amended, shall apply to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided, That the
qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sections three and four of said Act
shall not be required: and provided further,
“(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization;
“(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living; and
“(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which
he was a citizen or subject.”
As heretofore intimated, Com. Act No. 473 repealed Act No. 2927, with the following
repealing clause:
“Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by Act Numbered

Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled ‘The Naturalization Law’ is repealed:
Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any prosecution, suit,
action, or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matters, the laws, or parts of laws
repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and
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814
effect.”17
The proceeding involved in the case of Governor Frivaldo was, no doubt, a naturalization
for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Com. Act No. 63.
With the repeal of the old naturalization law, to which Com. Act No. 63 makes reference
insofar as certain requirements and procedures for naturalization to reacquire Philippine
citizenship are concerned, the question arises: WHAT ARE NOW THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF AN APPLICANT FOR NATURALIZATION TO
REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND THE PROCEDURE TO BE
OBSERVED IN SUCH PROCEEDING?
Had the repealing clause of Com. Act No. 473 used the phrase “repealed and
superseded,” in lieu of the word “repealed” simply, perhaps there is not much to the
question posed.
In any event, it is apparent that the provisions of Com. Act No. 473, which correspond to
the repealed provisions of Act No. 2927, must be deemed applicable to naturalizations for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Com. Act No. 63, inspite of the absence of a
clear reference thereto.
Naturalization for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Sec. 2(1) of Com. Act No.
63 is subject to the condition “That the applicant possess(es) none of the disqualifications
prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven.
Section 2 of Act No. 2927 provided for those “who are disqualified” from being
naturalized. Sec. 4 of Com. Act No. 473 now provides for such disqualifications, as
follows:
“The following can not be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
“(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
“(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
“(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
“(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
“(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable con-
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17 Sec. 22, Com. Act No. 473.

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tagious disease;
“(f) Person who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
“(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom [the United States and] the Philippines (is)
at war, during the period of such war;
“(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country [other than the United States,] whose laws
do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.”
Section 3 of Com. Act No. 63 provides that “The procedure prescribed for naturalization
under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven, as amended, shall apply to
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next
preceding section,” which means that the procedure for naturalization provided for under
sections 7 to 14 of Com. Act No. 473 must be applied.
But it is also provided in the same section of Com. Act No. 63 that “the qualifications and
special qualifications prescribed in sections three and four of said Act (No. 2927) shall
not be required.” Sections 2 and 3 of Com. Act No. 473 now correspond to sections 3 and
4, of Act No. 2927, respectively, the requirements-provided thereunder of which must be
deemed dispensed with, yet Com. Act No. 63 nonetheless requires the following:
“(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization;
“(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living; and
“(3)That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
he was a citizen or subject.”17a
________________
17a Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 63; italics supplied.
816
816

so that inspite of the reference to the procedure provided in the Naturalization Law, such
procedure is not adopted in toto by Com. Act No. 63.
Collating the provisions of Com. Acts Nos. 63 and 473, the following must now be the
qualifications of an applicant for naturalization to reacquire Philippine citizenship under
the first mentioned law, to wit:
1. That the applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in
a foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship;18
2. That he must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization;19
3. That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the application)
in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living;20
4. That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
he was a citizen or subject;21
5. He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;22
6. He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of his ideas;23
7. He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;24
8. He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;25
_______________
18 Sec. 1(1) & (2), Ibid.
19 Sec. 3(1), Ibid.
20 Sec. 3(2), Ibid.
21 Sec. 3(3), Ibid.
22 Sec. 4(a), Com. Act No. 473.
23 Sec. 4(b), Ibid.
24 Sec. 4(c), Ibid.
25 Sec. 4(d), Ibid.
817
VOL. 232, JUNE 6, 1994
817
9. He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;26

10. He must have, during the period of his residence (of not less than six months before
filing his application) in the Philippines, mingled socially with the Filipinos, or have
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;27
11. He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war,
during the period of such war;28
12. He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.29
The above must not only be alleged by the applicant in his petition but he must also prove
them during the trial, although judicial notice may be made of item No. 10.
§ VII. Requirements of Naturalization which may Not be Required in Naturalizations for

Reacquisition of Citizenship Under Com. Act No. 63
a. Section 5 of Com. Act No. 473 requires that prior to the filing of his petition for
admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant shall file a declaration of intention.
Obviously, this is not required of an applicant for naturalization to reacquire Philippine
citizenship since the period of residence required of him is shortened to only six (6)
months, thereby rendering compliance thereto an impossibility. The rule is that the law
should not be construed as requiring an impossibility for this would result to absurdity.
b. Under section 9 of Com. Act No. 473, only the petition must be published once a week
for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of
general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, but said petition and the
order of hearing must be posted in the building where the court holds office. Thus, said
section reads in its pertinent part as follows:
_______________
26 Sec. 4(e), Ibid.
27 Sec. 4(f), Ibid.
28 Sec. 4(g), Ibid.
29 Sec. 4(h), Ibid.
818
818
“Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to
publish the same at the petitioner’s expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in
the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province
where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of
the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where
said office is located x x x.” (Italics supplied)
§ VIII. Comments and Observations

a. The decision states that “Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to
follow the procedure prescribed by said law.” (p. 11, Decision). The premise of the
statement is contrary to a finding in the same decision that “On September 20, 1991,
petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: ‘In the Matter of Petition of Juan
G. Frivaldo to be Readmitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act
No. 63.’ (pp. 2-3, Decision).
Clearly, therefore, Governor Frivaldo did not choose to reacquire Philippine Citizenship
under the Revised Naturalization Law (which is Com. Act No. 473), but expressly
petitioned to reacquire Philippine Citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63.
b. The decision also states that “The law does not distinguish between an applicant who
was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen.” It is believed that
this statement is not only inaccurate but too sweeping as to have any doctrinal value. C.A.
63 explicitly provides that the applicant “x x x shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before, he applies for naturalization” (Sec. 1[1]), while for an ordinary
applicant for Philippine citizenship under C.A. 473 “must have resided in the Philippines
for a continuous period of not less than ten years” (Sec. 2, Second). An ordinary applicant
for naturalization under C.A. 473 “must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than five thousand pesos x x x or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation” (Sec. 2, Fourth), and that “he must be able to speak and write English
or Spanish and any of the principal languages” (Sec. 2, Fifth), but such qualifications are
not required of an
819
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819

applicant for naturalization to reacquire Philippine citizenship under C.A. 63 because
Sec. 3 thereof expressly dispensed with them.
The laws do distinguish between an applicant for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

and an applicant for citizenship who was not previously a citizen of the Philippines.
The foregoing also renders inaccurate the pronouncements in the decision that the
petition allegedly lacked allegations, among others, “(2) that the (petitioner) resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years” (obviously the ponente was
referring to Sec. 2, Second, C.A. 473), and “(3) that he is able to speak and write English
and any one of the principal dialects” (obviously referring to Sec. 2, Fifth, C.A. 473),
because C.A. No. 63 expressly shortens the residence requirement to only at least six
months prior to the filing of the application, and that the other qualification requirements
are dispensed with (Sec. 3).
As between the more general provisions of C.A. 473 and the specific provisions of C.A.
63, it is axiomatic that the latter must control, a universally settled rule that of statutory
construction that need no citation of authorities.
c. The decision furthermore states that “Under Section 9 of the x x x x law (obviously
referring to C.A. 473), both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for
hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks x x x,” (italics
supplied). The very text of the law, heretofore quoted with emphasis on the relevant
parts, clearly requires only the publication of the petition. Precisely, the decisions in Po
Yo Bi v. Republic (205 SCRA 400, 411) cited by the ponente, and in the earlier case of
Co Y Quing Reyes v. Republic (104 Phil. 889, 890-891 [1958], emphasized this fact, in
effect overruling the clearly erroneous dictum in Ong Son Cui v. Republic (101 Phil. 649
[1957]).
d. The third matter which would definitely catch the attention of the reader is the
application of Rep. Act No. 530 to applications for naturalization to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under C.A. 63. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 530 provides that “no petition for
Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the
application become executory until after two years from its promulgation
820
820

x x x” (Sec. 1), which must have been the basis of the pronouncement in the decision
under annotation that the law “does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens.”
An alien applicant for Philippine citizenship for the first time under C.A. 473 is clearly
differently situated from one applying for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
C.A. 63. The qualifications required of each are not the same, as above discussed, so that
the laws themselves recognize the distinction.
An initial applicant for citizenship may be said that he is applying for convenience (so as
to take advantage of rights and privileges enjoyed and granted only to citizens), whereas
such intention may hardly be imputed to one seeking to reacquire Philippine citizenship.
This was the reason why Rep. Act No. 530 was enacted—to afford the authorities longer
period to investigate and check the background of an initial applicant for citizenship.
Where there is substantial basis for distinction, it is not violative of the equal protection
clause for the law and the courts to recognize such distinction and discriminate in favor
of one class from the other, and it is a well-settled axiom of statutory construction that the
intention of the law is the law itself.30
These annotations, however, should not be understood as advocating the thesis that the
High Court committed an error in concluding that Governor Frivaldo had not validly
reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization. What is sought to be emphasized is
the need not only for accuracy but also precision in stating the basis or reasons to support
a legal conclusion.
Decisions of the Supreme Court perform the function of not only giving ends to
controversies but also of providing guides for all others, lower courts in particular and the
public in general, in future cases. As stated in certain decisions of the Supreme Court
itself, the pronouncements of the High Court should serve as example from which all
other courts should take their bearing. There is, therefore, clearly a need that they should
embody pronouncements that command deference that would have doctrinal effect.
_______________
30 Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra.
821
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821

Decisions of the Highest Court are records for posterity. To quote Mr. Justice Sanchez,
“let it not be said that the administration of justice in this country suffers from too many
human imperfections.”31
——o0o——
_______________
31 Luque v. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165, 178 (1969).
822
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Naturalization As a
Mode of Reacquiring Phil. Citizenship, 232 SCRA 800, June 6, 1994
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996
795
A Landmark Decision on Citizenship
ANNOTATION
A LANDMARK DECISION ON CITIZENSHIP

By
DAVID G. NITAFAN*
___________
§ 1.Preliminary statement, p. 795

§ 2.Naturalization and repatriation defined; distinguished, p. 796
§ 3.Who may be repatriated?, p. 797
§ 4.Loss of citizenship by marriage, p. 798
§ 5.Repatriation procedure, p. 801
§ 6.Observation and recommendation, p. 801
_____________
§ 1. Preliminary statement
During the entire history of the Supreme Court seldom had we seen a reported decision
wherein the ponente spelled out in bold relief the formula used or adopted in arriving at
the conclusion reached. The decision in the Frivaldo cases,1 penned by Mr. Justice
Panganiban,2 exactly did just that.
_______________
* Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, and a Professor of
Law.
1 G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755, promulgated 28 June 1996.
2 When the appointment of Mr. Justice Panganiban as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court was announced in the newspapers, many lawyers were asking why other more
known lawyers and jurists were not tapped instead. The Author had the fortune of having
collaborated with Justice Panganiban in some cases during his early practice of law and
can vouch for the thoroughness and sophistication with which the good Justice analyzed
legal questions and situations.
796
796
Thus, the joint majority decision in said cases contains the following auspicious
beginning:
“In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and
upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.”3
Of course, it is not here being said that in many decisions of the Supreme Court, it
sacrificed substance in favor of form or letter. What we are trying to emphasize is that
many decisions had not spelled out the formula used in so clear a proposition as what was
done in the case under annotation.
§ 2. Naturalization and repatriation defined; distinguished

Lexicographers have defined the word “naturalize” as the process “to confer upon an
alien the rights and privileges of a native subject or citizen, to adopt into a nation or state
and place in the condition of natural-born subjects.” On the other hand, “repatriate” is “to
send back or return to the country of birth, citizenship, or allegiance,” while
“repatriation” is “return or restoration to one’s own country.”
Evident from these dictionary definitions of these words is that naturalization is a process
or proceeding, while repatriation may only involve physical transfer of persons from one
country to another. Repatriation had originally referred to the return of soldiers captured
by an enemy state to the state where they belong after the cessation of hostilities and
declaration of peace.
Eventually, however, repatriation was given a legal meaning—i.e., a mode of reacquiring
citizenship.4 Bouvier defines repatriation as “the regaining (of) nationality after
expatriation.”5
________________
3 Italics supplied.
4 See par. 2, sec. 2, Com. Act No. 63.
5 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2887.
797
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996
797
Currently, in American law, naturalization has been defined as the judicial act of
adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. It
implies the renunciation of a former nationality and the fact of entrance into a similar
relation towards a new body politic.6 Naturalization is the act or proceeding by which an
alien becomes a citizen; the act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the
privilege of a native citizen; the admission of a foreign subject or citizen into the political
body of the nation, and the bestowal on him of the qualities of a citizen or subject.7
The most important point decisively determined in the decision under annotation is the
distinction between naturalization and repatriation. Thus, the decision states that
“*** unlike naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political
life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking
to reacquire his previous citizenship.”
§ 3. Who may be repatriated?

Our laws enumerate the persons who may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation, as follows:
(1) Deserters of the Army, Navy and Air Corps;

(2) A woman who lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien,8 after the
termination of the marital status;
(3) Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship; and
(4) Natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship now desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship.
__________________
6 2 Am. Jur. 661.
7 3 CJS 832.
8 Rep. Act No. 106 provides that loss of citizenship by marriage of a Filipino woman
takes place only if by virtue of the laws of the foreigner husband’s country, the woman
acquires her nationality.
798
798
The first and second paragraphs in the above enumeration are expressly provided for in
par. 2, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 63; the second paragraph being also
mentioned in Presidential Decree No. 725.9
The third paragraph is expressly provided for in Rep. Act No. 2630, approved 22 June
1960;10 while the fourth is expressly provided for in Pres. Decree No. 725, supra.
§ 4. Loss of citizenship by marriage

In specific reference to paragraph 2 in the above enumeration, the 1973 Constitution has
provided that “a female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to
have renounced her citizenship.”11 This provision was, however construed as operating
only prospectively, so that female Filipinos who married aliens prior to the effectivity of
the 1973 Charter were not benefited thereby. Thus, there was perceived a loophole or
void in the law, and this was precisely the situation sought to be remedied by Presidential
Decree No. 725. The first three whereas clauses of this decree read as follows:
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who married an alien
to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the
law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of
Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after
the death of their husband or the termination of their marital status;
_________________
9 P.D. 725 is published in 71 O.G. (30) 1605.
10 Rep. Act No. 2630 is published in 56 O.G. (37) 5727.
11 Sec. 2, Art. III, 1973 Constitution.
799
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996
799
It is obvious that this Presidential Decree had done away with the requirement of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 that repatriation may only be availed of by the Filipino
woman after the termination of her marriage to the alien. Likewise, those Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of marriage under the condition provided
for in Republic Act No. 106 (see Note 8 above) may reacquire her Philippine citizenship
irrespective of whether her marriage to her alien husband subsists. Presidential Decree
No. 725 was clearly intended to remedy the serious disadvantage of the Filipino wife, and
in this respect the law was correctly held as a remedial or curative statute, and according
to settled jurisprudence, it may be applied retroactively.
The retroactive or prospective application of Pres. Decree No. 725 was not, however, the
decisive issue passed upon in the decision in the case of Governor Frivaldo. It is the
retroactive or prospective effect of the repatriation granted to Frivaldo which was really
determined.
In this connection, in England, it has been held that where the electors have personal and
direct knowledge of the ineligibility of the majority (winning) candidate, the vote cast for
such candidate are void, and the minority candidate is elected. In the United States,
however, the great current of authorities sustains the doctrine that the ineligibility of the
majority (winning) candidate does not elect the minority candidate, and this is without
reference to the question as to whether the voters knew of the ineligibility of the
candidate for whom they voted.12 This had been and still is also the rule in the
Philippines.13
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was confronted with the question of whether an alien,
who was otherwise qualified but who had not declared his intention to become a citizen
of the United States, and who had been elected to a country office,
_________________
12 Privett vs. Bickford, 26 Kan. 52; see also Barnum v. Gilpin, 27 Mich. 466, 38 Am.
Rep. 304.
13 Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238; Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435; Labo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1.
800
800
may lawfully hold the same if, before the term of office to which he was elected
commences, he makes such declaration and becomes a lawful elector of the State and of
the country wherein he was elected. The court held:
“The precise question under consideration is **** a new one, and we are left to decide it
upon what we deem to be sound principles. We have already seen that the grounds upon
which a person not an elector is excluded from holding public office is, that the powers
and functions of a free and independent government was instituted, that is, by the
electorate thereof. So if a person who is not an elector attempts to exercise the functions
of a public office, the courts, upon proper proceedings being instituted for that purpose
will oust him. This is one thing. But to hold that a person qualified to hold such office
when the term for which he was elected commences, is disqualified merely because he
was not an elector when he was elected two months before, is another and very different
thing.
What then is the nature and effect of the disqualification under consideration? In my
judgment it is not that a person who is not an elector only because of some
disqualification which he has the power to remove at any time, is hereby rendered
ineligible to be elected to a public office for a term which is to commence at a future
time; but it is that a person thus disqualified shall not be eligible to hold such office. Such
disqualification does not relate to the election to, but to the holding of, the office. I think
this principle is substantially asserted in Cushing’s Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies. Section 78 is to the effect that in cases where the disqualification is not
derived from the personal character of the individual, or inflicted by way of punishment,
and where it is that the individual ‘shall be incapable of holding’ the office, until the
disqualification is removed, this does not render him incapable of being elected, but only
prevents him from exercising the functions of the office until it (the disqualification) is
removed.”14
and the decision concluded:
“By giving this effect to the disqualification which the relator was under when he was
elected, but which was removed before the commencement of the term of office to which
he was elected, we give
________________
14 State ex. rel. Schuet v. Murray, 28 Wis. 96—Lyons, J.; italics in the original.
801
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996
801
force and effect to another fundamental principle of free government, equally as

important as that which we have discussed, which is that the will of the majority,
constitutionally expressed, must be obeyed.”
The facts and ruling in this case have very impressive relevance to the case of Governor
Frivaldo.
§ 5. Repatriation procedure
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides that
“Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
(Republic) of the Philippines and registration (of such oath of allegiance) in the proper
civil registry.”15
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 2630 provides that the persons therein referred to—
“*** may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.”
§ 6. Observation and recommendation

As we have observed in an earlier annotation,16 our laws and jurisprudence on
citizenship, including the acquisition, loss and reacquisition of the same, is so muddled
that there is clearly a need to place our citizenship laws in a unified set of legislation. It is
hoped that Congress will find time to put up a Citizenship Code or any other legislation
of the same thrust.
——o0o——
_______________
15 Words in parenthesis supplied.
16 232 SCRA 804.
802
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. A Landmark Decision
on Citizenship, 257 SCRA 795, June 28, 1996
558
Some Legal Effects of Dual Citizenship and Dual

Allegiance of Philippine Nationals
ANNOTATION
SOME LEGAL EFFECTS OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE OF

PHILIPPINE NATIONALS
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*
______________
§ 1.Lack of Uniformity in the Law on Nationality, p. 559

§ 2.Multiple Nationality, p. 560
§ 3.The Principle of “Effective Nationality” or Genuine Link, p. 561
§ 4.Citizenship Qualification of Individuals as Candidates for Electoral Positions, p. 563
§ 5.Distinction Between Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance, p. 568
§ 6.Abandonment of Philippine Citizenship, p. 569
§ 7.Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship, p. 570
§ 8.US “Green Card Holders” Disqualified for Electoral Positions, p. 571
§ 9.Dual Loyalties and Allegiance of Green Card Holders under the Election Code, p.
572
_______________
The decision of the Supreme Court in CIRILO R. VALLES, Petitioner versus

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, Respondents,
GR No. 137000, promulgated on August 9, 2000 resolved some issues on the
qualification of individuals possessing dual nationality seeking elective positions. The
Supreme Court, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation have been confronted with cases of Filipinos having two nationalities either
by birth, by marriage or by naturalization, or when the principle of jus soli and jus
sanguinis apply to the same individual.
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
559
VOL. 337, AUGUST 9, 2000
559

The Commission on Elections has been likewise confronted with the citizenship
qualification of candidates whose fathers or mothers are aliens or they are married to
foreign spouses and have one way or another acted as foreigners while at the same time
claim to be Philippine citizens.
§ 1. Lack of Uniformity in the Law on Nationality

Citizenship or nationality of individuals is basically the domain of the internal law of the
state. The determination of the nationality of an individual vary as each state has the
prerogative to determine of its municipal law who are its nationals. This situation is
mainly caused by Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Conflict of Laws on Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which provides that: “It is for each State to determine who are its
nationals. Under the basic principle of Conflict of Laws, however, the municipal law
must be recognized by other states insofar as it is consistent with international
convention, international customs, and the principles of law generally recognized with
regard to nationality.”
Article 2 of the Hague Convention also states that questions as to whether a person
possesses the nationality of a particular State “shall be determined in accordance with the
law of the State.” Thus, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution (1987) enumerates who
are Filipino citizens, namely:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2 of the above article is a significant change as a child born of parents one of
whom is not a Filipino citizen is a Filipino citizen but may be claimed by the state of the
alien spouse as its citizen.
560
560

§ 2. Multiple Nationality
The lack of uniformity in municipal law with respect to the determination of nationality
unavoidably gives rise to difficult problems of statelessness and multiple nationality.
Attempts to reduce or eliminate causes of such conflicts of nationality laws were made,
first, through the League of Nations, which prepared at its 1930 Codification Conference
a Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which has been brought into force, but
only among a limited number of states. Some international instruments have been
concluded such as the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961 (UN Doe,
A/CONF. 9/15) and the European Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality, 1963 (58 AJIL, 573 [1964]). Instruments have been drafted to provide for the
compulsory application of the principle of jus soli in certain cases, in order to reduce or
eliminate the possibilities of statelessness. This concept is embodied in the Convention
on the Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930. The contracting states agreed under said
Convention to accord nationality to a person born in their territory who would otherwise
be stateless (Art. I), and also to a person, not born in the territory of a contracting state,
who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of one of his parents at the time of the
person’s birth was that of that state (Art. 4). Statelessness may follow also from the
existence of the two opposing principles regarding the nationality status of a wife. The
Convention of 1961, which followed the ideas adopted by the 1930 Convention (Art. 8),
provides that if the law of a contracting state entails loss of nationality as a consequence
of marriage or termination of marriage, such loss must be conditional upon possession or
acquisition of another nationality (Art. 5 [I]), and that if the law provides for loss of
nationality by one spouse as a consequence of the other losing or being deprived of that
nationality, loss by the former must be conditional upon possession or acquisition of
another nationality (Art. 6). (Manual of Public International Law, Sorensen, ed. [1968], p.
477)
In order to reduce the causes of multiple nationality, some efforts to confer upon an
individual possessing multiple nationality the right to choose one and divest himself of
the other resulted in the provision set forth in the 1930 Convention, which provided that a
person might renounce one of his nationalities with the authori-
561
VOL. 337, AUGUST 9, 2000
561

zation of the state whose nationality he desired to surrender and that this authorization
should not be refused in the case of a person who had his habitual and principal residence
abroad (Art. 6). This idea is also adopted in the European Convention on Reduction of
Cases of Multiple Nationality of 1963 (Art. 2 [1,2]). (Sorensen, op. cit., p. 477)
Some international efforts have also been made with a view to reducing multiple
nationality or statelessness arising respectively out of naturalization or expatriation. The
European Convention of 1963 provides that the nationals of the contracting states who
acquire of their own free will, by means of naturalization, the nationality of another state,
shall lose their former nationality (Art. I [I]). On the other hand, the 1961 Convention,
which adopted the concept of the 1930 Convention, provides that if the law of a
contracting state permits voluntary expatriation, it must not result in loss of nationality
unless the individual possesses or acquires another nationality (Art. 7 [I]).
International efforts have had then, so far, only a limited effect and, in so far as the
determination of nationality is still within the competence of each state, multiple
nationality or statelessness does not fully cease to exist. The status of a person having
multiple nationality is provided for in the 1930 Convention on Conflict of Nationality
Laws. He may be regarded as its national by each of the states whose nationality he
possesses (Art. 3). The state may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals
against a state whose nationality such a person also possesses (Art. 4; see Salem Case
[1932] 2 RIAA, I 161). Such a person is treated within a third state as if he had only one
nationality (Art. 5). (Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 477-478)
§ 3. The Principle of “Effective Nationality” or Genuine Link

A state confronted with a problem of the nationality of an alien who may be claimed by
two states, was resolved by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case (155
CJ Rep., 4 [1955]). Nottebohm, a German national by birth became a resident of
Guatemala where he established business and acquired assets.
562
562

He made occasional trips to visit his relatives in Germany and other countries.
After the outbreak of World War II in 1939, to avoid the seizure of his property as enemy
alien assets, he applied for naturalization as a citizen of Liechtenstein. Under
Liechtenstein law, he would lose his former nationality, although this effect could be
waived; he had to prove that he lived in that principality at least three years, which
requirement could also be dispensed with by way of exception; and he had to pay certain
fees. His naturalization was forthwith approved.
After Guatemala entered World War II against Germany, Nottebohm was taken into
custody and removed to the United States as a dangerous enemy alien. Meanwhile,
Guatemala proceeded against his properties as an enemy alien.
Liechtenstein filed action asking the Court to declare the act of Guatemala in arresting,
detaining and expelling Nottebohm and seizing his property as a breach of international
law.
The International Court of Justice ruled that the bond of nationality must reflect genuine
connection between the individual and the State.
The facts clearly establish the absence of any bond of attachment between Nottebohm
and Liechtenstein and, on the other hand, the existence of a long-standing and close
connection between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no way
weakened. That naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with
Liechtenstein, nor did it any way alter the manner of life of the person upon whom it was
conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation. In both respects, it
was lacking in the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be entitled
to be respected by a State in the position of Guatemala. It was granted without regard to
the concept of nationality adopted in international relations.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such

circumstances, Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to
Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be
inadmissible.
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Some Legal Effects of Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance of Philippine Nationals
§ 4. Citizenship Qualification of Individuals as Candidates for Electoral Positions

The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled in various ways the issue as to whether a
candidate for electoral positions is a Filipino citizen in cases of doubts on the issue of
citizenship. The Supreme Court ruling is not quite consistent on the matter as will be
noted in the following cases.
The qualification of Emilio “Lito” Osmeña to be elected governor of Cebu was raised
before the Supreme Court. In Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990), “Lito” filed
his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu in the 1988 local elections. Petitioner Jose Aznar, as incumbent Provincial
Chairman of PDP-Laban Provincial Council, filed a petition with COMELEC for the
disqualification of private respondent Osmeña on ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. Submitted by Aznar was
a certificate issued by the Immigration and Deportation Commissioner stating that
Osmeña is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration. “Lito”
maintained that he is a Filipino citizen being the legitimate child of a Filipino; that he is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport; that he had been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than
six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under CA.
No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
The Supreme Court ruled that Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens and who are not.
564
564

Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent
is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private
respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship.
Dissenting opinions were written by Justices Padilla, Melencio-Herrera and Cruz. In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, stressed that “because Osmeña obtained Certificates
of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old
and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. It is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states
or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a
brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a
student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there
is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express,” it stands to reason
that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation,
either “express” or “implied.”
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it
actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such
dual citizenship
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or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.”
Justice Melencio-Herrera said that “dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth,
a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his
life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship. That election was made by
private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or
declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled
to so register because of the “uncooperativeness” of the past regime, he could have, under
the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.”
Justice Cruz, in his dissent, said that “when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he
is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms “citizen” and “alien” are mutually
exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the case at
bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the
question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under CA. No. 63 is by
“express renunciation” thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245
(1989), there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as naturalized
citizen of the United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the
case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), the petitioner not only took a
similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in
which he stated that he was not a Filipino. The fact that his naturalization was later
revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. “Express
renunciation” is a separate mode of losing citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on
“naturalization in a foreign country,” which is another different mode. When a person
rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still loves
her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to
whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his woman to whom he has totally and
solemnly
566
566

transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time
simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has
abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.”
In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), Labo, Jr. was elected mayor of Baguio
City in 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed by private respondent Luis Lardizabal
on ground that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines hence ineligible for the
elective position. The COMELEC on May 12, 1982 finding the petitioner to be a citizen
of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
on Sept. 13, 1988, holding that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines since it was
contained in the official statement of the Australian Government through its consul in the
Philippines that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of
his naturalization in 1976.
The petitioner did not question the authenticity of documents evidencing his
naturalization, neither did he deny that he obtained an Australian passport. However, he
maintained that he asked for a change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence. He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him.
The Court ruled that even it is assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in
Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a
matter between him and his adopted country. What is to be considered is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claimed, did not mean that he has been
automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 725,

Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation. It does not
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567

appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He did not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
It is for this reason that the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his
application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the
reason for the court to deny claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The Court concluded that the petitioner was not on the day of the local elections on
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 631 (1999) was a case of the application of the jus soli
and jus sanguinis on the same person. The Commission on Elections declared that movie
star Eduardo Manzano is disqualified to be elected Vice Mayor of Makati. Upon motion
for reconsideration, COMELEC reversed the previous ruling and declared Manzano to be
qualified as Vice-Mayor of Makati.
It appeared that respondent Eduardo Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
USA. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and law
under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of
six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel
document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
At the age of majority, he registered himself as voter, and voted in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. The
Court held that under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.
568
568

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted
on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City.
§ 5. Distinction Between Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance

In ruling that Manzano is a Filipino citizen and he was therefore, qualified to be elected
Vice Mayor of Makati City, the Court distinguished dual citizenship with dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto, and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
The Court reaffirmed different types of citizenship under Article IV of the Philippine
Constitution. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by the act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, sec. 40 (d) and in Republic Act
No. 7854, sec. 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” In including sec. 5
in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who main-
569
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569

tain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence the
phrase “dual citizenship” in RA No. 7160, sec. 40 (d) and in RA No. 7854, sec. 20 must
be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
§ 6. Abandonment of Philippine Citizenship

The issue of abandonment of Philippine citizenship was raised in Frivaldo v. COMELEC,
174 SCRA 245 (1989). The petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon and subsequently assumed office. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter filed with the COMELEC for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation on ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
US in 1983.
Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the US as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he has sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos, that his naturalization was not impressed with voluntariness,
but was “merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad.”
In its decision, the Court held that:
“If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under Commonwealth Act. No. 63 as amended by the Commonwealth Act No.
473 and the Presidential Decree No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
xxx
This court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
570
570

country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believe, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified.
It will be noted that Juan Frivaldo invoked the Nottebohm case (155 ICJ, Rep 4 [1955])
decided by the International Court of Justice. The Supreme Court however held that the
said case did not apply. The principle is stated is Article 5 of the Hague Convention of
1930 of the Conflict of Nationality Laws which reads:
“Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he
had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status
and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such
person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country
with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.”
The Court ruled that the Nottebohm case was not relevant to the petition because it dealt
with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No
third state is involved in the case of Frivaldo. In fact, even the United States is not
actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or
not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws. The Supreme Court can decide this question alone as sovereign of our
own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that “it is for
each State to determine under its law who are its nationals.”
§ 7. Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

Juan Frivaldo later reacquired Philippine citizenship. In a 1996 decision (Frivaldo v.
COMELEC, 257 SCRA 721 [1996]), Juan Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes
in three (3) successive elections but was twice declared by the Supreme Court to be un-
571
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571

qualified to hold office due to his alien citizenship. He claimed to have reassumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. It was established that he took his oath of
allegiance under the provisions of PD 725 at 2 pm on June 30, 1995, much later that the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
The Court held that:
“Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore

incumbent upon him to show that he reacquired citizenship . . . Under Philippine law,
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation.
x x x it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. x x x But to remove
all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted
to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation, of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.”
§ 8. US “Green Card Holders” Disqualified for Electoral Positions

The issue of qualification to run for a local post was raised in Caasi v. Court of Appeals,
191 SCRA 229 (1990), not on citizenship but on residence in the Philippines. Two cases
were consolidated both concerning the disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of Merito Miguel, for the position of Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan. Miguel won but Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate objected that Miguel was a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of America and not of Bolinao. Miguel
admitted that a green card was issued to him by the U.S. Immigration Service, but denied
that he was a permanent resident of the U.S. He also alleged that he obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the U.S. for his periodic medical
examinations and to visit his children there; that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan and voted there in all the previous elections. The COMELEC dismissed the
petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card did not sufficiently es-
572
572

tablish Miguel’s abandonment of his residence in the Philippines. Likewise, because he

met the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials, there was no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The Court, in its review of the COMELEC decision, ruled that:
“To be ‘qualified to run for elective office’ in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy
for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
‘disqualified to run for any elective office’ “ (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel’s admission that he held a green card proved that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The records of this case did not
show proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal
mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. The Court, therefore, held that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in
the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the
time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for
elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code).
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one
year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of
that municipality on January 18, 1988.
§ 9. Dual Loyalties and Allegiance of Green Card Holders under the Election Code
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Om-
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573

nibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold
elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.
The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our
country ‘without mental reservations or purpose of evasion.’ The assumption is that those
who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they
must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their
choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. (Caasi v. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 229 [1990])
Miguel insisted that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in
the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other
words, he would have the Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under
false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his
other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a
party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both
worlds so to speak.
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver
of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the
local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
——o0o——
574
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Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance of Philippine Nationals, 337 SCRA 558, August 9,
2000

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928

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

TOUCHY ISSUES ON CITIZENSHIP: A CENTURY HENCE

As to be expected and is always the case in matters of conquest or cession of territories,

* Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila.

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

§ 2. The principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis.

2 Hershey, International Law, p. 237.

3 Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 322.

4 Gabra vs. Mendoza, 1 A.C.R. 57.

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

of these principles. Jus Sanguinis is said to prevail in Germany, Austria, Hungary,

§ 3. Were there Philippine citizens before the Treaty of Paris?

“Art. 17. The following are Spaniards:

“1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

5 Hershey, op cit., p. 237.

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

matic Agents of the Spanish Government, x x x”6

6 As quoted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, 23 Phil. at pp. 319-320.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

What then was the political status of the Spanish subjects,

9 This was re-enacted in Section 2 of the Jones Law of 1916.

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

10 Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 583-584—Padilla, J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

and concluded as follows:

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

“As said in the Tobin case,

13 80 Phil. at pp. 598-600.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

§ 5. May citizenship be conferred by judicial fiat?

14 79 Phil. 249, 45 O.G. 1268 (1947).

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

This pronouncement obviously recognize the principle of conferment of Philippine

15 79 Phil., at p. 258; italics supplied.

17 Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs, supra Moreland, J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

18 Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), 23 Phil. 315, 338—Trent, J.

VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

20 Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion (1934), 59 Phil. 440, 445—Malcolm, J.

22 79 Phil. 249, 45 O.G. 1268.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx

“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx xx

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“x x x xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Touchy Issues On Citizenship: A Century Hence

citizenship of her mother.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED