THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. L-67451. September 28, 1987.

] PL_QOT_01

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS,

INC., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special
Third Civil Cases Division),HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as
Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, MORRIS G.
CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING
CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF LAND
REGISTRATION, respondents.

Land Registration; Torrens System; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over all

application for registration of land titles is conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance of the province where land is situated and is acquired upon the filing
of the application and is retained up to the end of the litigation.—Under Act
No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347 (1914),
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces in which the
land sought to be registered is situated. Jurisdiction over land registration
cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in court of the
application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The
issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land registration
process; and as such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.

Same; Same; Reconstitution: Act 3110 was enacted to aid and benefit
litigants so that when records are lost at any stage of judicial proceedings.
they may reconstitute lost records and continue the case at the stage where
the records were destroyed—The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the
spirit and intention of the reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was
not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its
provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and
benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of
judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and starting all over
again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they
fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they
lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case
at the stage when the records were destroyed). Applying the doctrine in
the Nacuadecision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not have to
commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage
where records are available. The land registration case itself remained
pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction
over it.

Same; Same; An innocent purchaser for value is one who bought the
property relying on the certificate of title of the registered owner without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and
pays a full price for the same.—Carpo bought the disputed property from the
Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before
Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October
9,1970, However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of
registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book
for the Province of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued.
It was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale
between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property,
and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo, pp.
270-273.) Thus, at the time of sale, there was as yet no Torrens title which
Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent
purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is
in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest.

Same; Same; In successive registrations where more than one certificate

is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitted to the estate or interest—ln this
jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails . . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming
under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person
is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earlier certificate issued in respect thereof . ,.. ." (Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia v. CA, Nos. L-48971 and
49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.) TCT No. 20408, derived from OCT
1609, is therefore superior to TCT No. 303961, derived from OCT 8629.

Same; Same; Actions; Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem
nor in personam but characterized as quasi-in-rem and is conclusive only
between the parties.—ln this connection, it must be emphasized that the
action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove
clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in
question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and
by filing the thirdparty complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking
the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are
governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act
No, 386), and Rule 64. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies, Rules of
Court. Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.(McDaniel v. McElvy,
108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties. (Sandejas v, Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).

DECISION

CORTES,J p:
The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are the
subject of this petition started in 1927 when an application for their
registration under the Torrens System was first filed. In the present petition
for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Realty)
and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Macondray) seek a
reversal of the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, and an affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision of December
29, 1982. Cdpr
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m.,situated in the vicinity
of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by
three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408, issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,which was derived from OCT No.
1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394
in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-
29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name
of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued
on October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC
Case No. N-11-M (N-6217),GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971
in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on
July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206, GLRO Record
No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera thereafter referred to as Vera Court),for "declaration of
nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants
were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,Macondray Farms, Inc. and the
Commissioner of Land Registration. Subsequently, however, Carpo
withdrew his complaint as against the last named defendant, and the
answer filed on behalf of said government official was ordered stricken off
the record. The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408, as well as OCT
No. 1609 from which it was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch
VI, then presided over by Judge Andres Reyes thereafter referred to as
the Reyes Court) which issued the order dated May 21, 1958 directing the
issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting as a land registration
court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the
original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which
was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost
and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution;
hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a
certificate of title. LLjur
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court
was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing the order of May
21, 1958, was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for the
registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 (and the two
other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and 976, with which said case had been
jointly tried and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had rendered a
decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga
(father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty and
Macondray),which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. It was
alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null and void, having been
issued over a parcel of land previously registered under the Torrens
System in favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party
complaint against the Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (hereafter referred to as QCDFC) and the Commissioner of
Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985 in the
name of QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land subject of the
dispute between Carpo and the two corporations, Realty and Macondray.
They thus prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued on July 22, 1971, OCT
No. 8931 issued on July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985 derived from OCT No. 8931 be declared null and void.
In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity
of its own title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null
and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint against Carmelino
Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia, Felicisimo Alvendia, Josefina Alvendia,
Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G. Miranda, and Feliciano G.
Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels of land from them. It prayed
that in the event of an unfavorable judgment against it, fourth party
defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase price which the
corporation paid to them. However, QCDFC failed to prosecute its case,
and the fourth-party complaint was dismissed for lack of interest.
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20,
1981, sustaining the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question
and declaring the titles of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null
and void.
On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court
docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the lower court.
It also asked that it be allowed to appear directly to this Court as it was
raising only questions of law. After respondents filed their comments to
said petition, this Court passed a resolution dated October 19, 1981
referring the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
for proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals,
through its Ninth Division, with Justice Patajo as ponente, concurred in by
Justices Gopengco and Kapunan, set aside the decision of the trial court
and rendered a new one upholding the validity of the title in the name of
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void the titles in the
name of Calpo and QCDFC.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. In
the meantime, by virtue and pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals was
reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). As a
consequence, there was a reraffling of cases and the case was assigned
to the Second Special Cases Division which, however, returned the
records of the case for another re-raffling to the Civil Cases Divisions as it
deemed itself without authority to act on a civil case in view of the
allocation of cases to the different divisions of the IAC under Section 8
of BP 129. The case was then assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division,
composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia, Zosa and Bartolome.
Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices
Camilon and Bidin were assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division.
On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases
Division, with Justice Zosa as ponente, concurred in by Justices Camilon
and Bidin, promulgated its Resolution granting Carpo's motion for
reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the decision of December 29,
1982, and affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition
docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I.
The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (for brevity, referred to herein as
SPECIAL DIVISION) which promulgated the disputed
RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and, as such, not vested
with jurisdiction and adjudicatory power to pronounce any decision
of final resolution for the Court.
 II.
On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is legally
vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory powers under the
provisions of BP 129, it decided questions of substance contrary
to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court
because:
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION's Resolution of May 2, 1984
amounted to a denial to the Petitioners of their right to appeal
and judicial review over fundamental issues of law duly raised
by them in their Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
56471),as authorized by the Constitution (Art. X, sec. 5 (2)
(e),the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Rule 42,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that the
decision of the Court of Appeals could not have gained the
nature of a proper and valid judgment" as the latter had no
power to pass upon the appealed judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (the Vera Court),as appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy;
Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by
giving a perverted and obviously unjustified and illogical
interpretation of the RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, holding and declaring that "it has
in effect erased or cancelled the validity of (the DECISION of
December 29, 1982), when the said RESOLUTION merely
"RESOLVED to return the records of the case . . . for reraffling and
reassignment . . . in view of the allocation of cases to the different
Divisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court under Section 8
of BP 129."
III.
The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed
judgment of the lower court in effect sanctioned the contemptible
disregard of law and jurisprudence committed by Judge Vera,
which call for an exercise of the power of supervision;
IV.
The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of May
2, 1984 a deliberate falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a
purchaser in good faith and for value when there is absolutely no
evidence, whether written or testimonial, that was presented by
Carpo, or by anyone else that he was, in fact, a purchaser for value
and in good faith — a material matter which was neither alleged
 nor referred to in the complaint and in all the pleadings, nor
covered by any of the exhibits presented by all of the parties herein
and solely on the bases of which the case at bar was submitted
by the parties for consideration and decision.
1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court which promulgated the
Resolution of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the provisions
of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory
power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP 129, to wit:
Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.— The Intermediate
Appellate Court shall exercise its powers, functions and duties,
through ten (10) divisions, each composed of five members. The
Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising
administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions.
Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions.— Of the ten (10) divisions of
the Court, four (4) divisions, to be known as Civil Cases Divisions,
shall take cognizance of appeals in civil cases originating from the
Regional Trial Court; two (2) divisions, to be known as Criminal
Cases Divisions, of appeals in criminal cases originating from the
Regional Trial Courts: and four (4) divisions, to be known as
Special Cases Divisions, of original actions or petitions, petitions
for review, and appeals in all other cases, including those from
administrative agencies, except as provided in Section 9 hereof.
Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate Justice, the
appointment of a member of the court shall specifically indicate
whether it is for the Civil Cases Divisions, the Criminal Cases
Divisions, or the Special Cases Divisions of the Court. No member
of the Court appointed to any of the three classes of divisions shall
be assigned to any of the other classes of divisions,except when
authorized by the Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the
Intermediate Appellate Court en banc, if the exigencies of the
service so require. ...(emphasis supplied)
As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was composed
of Justice B.S. de la Fuente, as Chairman. Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano
Zosa, and Floreliana Bartolome, as Members. In view, however, of the
voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia and Bartolome from taking part in
the case, Justices Bidin and Camilon were reassigned to the Third Civil
Cases Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division. cdrep
Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division,
not being one of the ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with
jurisdiction, had no adjudicatory powers. It is also alleged that the
reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is violative of the injunction
against appointment of an appellate Justice to a class of divisions other
than that to which he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show
that what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to
another class. For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases
Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division,
while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases
Division. The two therefore come from the same class of divisions to which
they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the
Special Third Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two
(2) "regular" members, is still within legal bounds. Otherwise, a situation
would have arisen where a regular division could not decide a particular
case because some members thereof inhibited themselves from
participating in said case.
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the
correctness of the ruling of the IAC that the CA Decision of December 29,
1982 could not have gained the nature of a proper and valid judgment
(since appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy) and that the
Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or cancelled the validity
of said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2, 1984:
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively
an acknowledgment by the Division that promulgated it that the
earlier Decision dated December 29, 1983 rendered in a Special
Civil Action case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530, was not
appropriate and beyond the authority of the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals to promulgate. The said Resolution was actually
a statement that the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had
over-stepped its bounds by reviewing in certiorari proceedings a
decision in a purely civil case that should have passed through the
processes of an ordinary appeal. We are not aware of any legal
doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a petition for
review on certiorari upon purely questions of law, such as that filed
by petitioners herein, as an ordinary appeal. Neither can we find
any legal basis or justification for the elimination by the appellate
court of the essential requisites then prescribed for the validity of
an appeal, such as the submission of a formal notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of these
mandatory requisites, the appeal could not have been deemed
perfected and ought to have been dismissed outright.
The Court does not agree.
 There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of
First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary
appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an
appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter category belong
cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these
modes have different procedural requirements. prLL
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for Certiorari with
this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the
Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court
as it was raising only questions of law. However, this Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first
filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After all,
a petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v.
Resuello, L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure
outlined in Rule 45 which, unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a
notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera
Court "cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision
because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely,
petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of
certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a
substitute for appeal. Those cases are not in point. They refer to the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and not to appeal by way of
certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the
Resolution dated July 25, 1983 of the Second Special Cases Division (to
which the case was assigned after the reorganization under BP 129) as
having "erased or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth
Division, A perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely made
clarification about the nature of the case and why it should be reassigned
to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There was not the slightest
implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the
Ninth Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted
the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's
motion for reconsideration. It would have been incongruous to grant a
motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and set it aside, if in the first place
it did not have any validity. It would have been necessary only to declare
its invalidity.
 3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court,
and the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the
validity of the title in the name of Carpo and declaring null and void the
titles in the values of Realty and of QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint filed by Carpo, which was the same basis
for the rulings of the Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the
Reyes Court had no authority to issue the order of May 21, 1958 directing
the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-
in-interest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land registration court and
also because the original records of LRC Case No 657, Record No. N-
29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still
pending reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act
No. 2347 (1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to
land was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective
provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is
acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is
retained up to the end of the litigation. The issuance of a decree of
registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as
such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed
on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No.
657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2, and 3, Plan
Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among
Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other
cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo
Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino
Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and
identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court
issued a consolidated decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
En meritos de todo lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los
lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del plano Psu-47035 a nombre de Estanislao
Mayuga, desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar y
Eduardo Guico con respecto a dichos lotes ...
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in its decision dated November 17, 1939 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 Por todas las consideraciones expuestas, confirmamos la
decision apelada en cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los
lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de su plano y que equivalen a los lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del
plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plano de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the
petition was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed
(See Guico v. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name,
Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a
petition with the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he
was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the
issuance of a decree of registration over the property adjudicated in favor
of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be overemphasized that the petition
filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but a
continuation of, the original land registration proceedings initiated by
Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same
vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
was continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which
jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original
applications. cdrep
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the
petition of Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land
Registration to issue a decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan
Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga
in lieu of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC
Case No. 657 were not properly reconstituted, then there was no pending
land registration case. And since the Reyes Court was acting without a
pending case, it was acting without jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's
Memorandum, pp. 2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27
SCRA 1119) where this Court said that upon failure to reconstitute
pursuant to law, "the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of the
decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file an action
anew for the registration in their names of the lots in question," citing the
case of Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92 Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases.
The basis of said ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, An Act to provide
an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the records of pending
judicial proceedings and books, documents, and files of the office of the
register of deeds, destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other
purposes.
 However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure
to reconstitute records on the status of the case in its entirety, was
modified in the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93 Phil. 595 [1953]),where
this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in
the sense that Section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only
where the records in the Court of First Instance as well as in the
appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not reconstituted,
but not where the records of the Court of First Instance are intact
and complete, and only the records in the appellate court were lost
or destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason for this view
is that section 29 of Act 3110 is found among the sections and
provisions dealing with the reconstitution of records in the Court of
First Instance in pending civil cases, special proceedings,
cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act (No.) 3110 . . .
will show that there are separate procedures for the reconstitution
of records in the Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec.
53; for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now
including the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the
reconstitution of records in the office of the Register of Deeds,
from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed
records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47,
under which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace
records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete
and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where
said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. The law
contemplates different stages for purposes of reconstitution. ...
...(S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was
pending trial in the Court of First Instance at the time the
record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers to the
stage where the case had been tried and decided but was still
pending in the Court of First Instance at the time the record
was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the stage where the
case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals)
at the time the record was destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they
are not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to
the next preceding stage where records are available, but not
beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next
preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the
great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also
of the court which must again perforce admit pleadings, rule upon
 them and then try the case and decide it anew, — all of these,
when the records up to said point or stage are intact and complete,
and uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx
...(T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur
the expenses and (suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident to
the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the
possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the
jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the
pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when
all along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the
trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all
this should appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair
and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not
committed any negligence or fault at all.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of
the reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated
to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains
no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that
when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings,
instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may
reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for
reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the
advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at
the stage when the records were destroyed). cdll
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the
parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go
back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land
registration case itself remained pending and the Court of First Instance
of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when all that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration
Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the
issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which
had become final (SeeGovernment v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002;
Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961],1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968],25 SCRA 316).There are
however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of
Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao
Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of this Court
affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication
forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of registration.
 Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its
jurisdiction as a land registration court when it issued the order directing
the issuance of a decree of registration, "substituting therein as registered
owner Dominador Mayuga, in lieu of the original adjudicates, Estanislao
Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the
provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in
consonance with the ruling of this Court in theGuico decision, and the
decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and
November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said order and
rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and
QCDFC, the Special Division also relied on Carpo's being an innocent
purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never
raised as an issue in the trial court. A perusal of the records of the case
reveals that no factual basis exists to support such a conclusion. Even
Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for
value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527
of the Civil Code. Cdpr
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value
only if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the
registered owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606
[1928],Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963],7 SCRA 351.) He is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates. (Fule v. De Legare, supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original
registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada
Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970.However, it was
only later, on October 13, 1970,that the decree of registration in favor of
the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of
Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the
same day October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale between
the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the
Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo, pp. 270-
273.) cdrep
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo
could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser
for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no
better position than his predecessors-in-interest.
 The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of
Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by
Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the
title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando
oposicion de Florentino Baltazar ...con respeto a dichos lotes ..." As such
successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land
registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated
by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as well as
the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador
Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve
years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails ...In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who
is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof .." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596;
Garcia v. CA, Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)
TCT No. 20408, derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT
No. 303961, derived from OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as
thirty-party defendant inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action
against it is neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief in respect of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that
Realty had no cause of action against it since the third party complaint did
not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC also
assails the Vera Court decision in that it declares QCDFC directly liable to
Carpo and not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera
Court, nor from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29,
1982, nor from the resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division
dated May 2, 1984 — all of which voided QCDFC's title to the disputed
property. Hence, said decisions/resolution have become final and
executory as regards QCDFC. LexLib
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party
complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the
relief being sought by the latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's
claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances of the case
compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed
property. ** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to put to rest these conflicting claims over the property. After all,
QCDFC was afforded full opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its
claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as testimonial
evidence. It was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which,
however, was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et al.,the original
registered owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of
Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or
thirteen (13) years after the issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier
than OCT No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title
must prevail over that of QCDFC.
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation
alleging that the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-
46953, Jose N. Mayuga et al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms,
Inc.,Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,et al., and moved for consolidation of the
two cases involving as they do the same property. By Resolution of August
29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by
Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from
title to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in question
and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by filing
the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the
court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are
governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act
No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies, Rules of
Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem,nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam,but being against the person in respect of
the res,these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.(McDaniel v.
McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421
[1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's
final determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal
Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and the Decision of December 29, 1982 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.