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Foreword 1
Executive summary 2
1. Introduction 3
2. Reactor performance 6
7. Safety performance 22
8. Conclusions 24
Appendix 1: Definitions 25
The World Nuclear Association is the organization that represents the global
nuclear industry. Its mission is to promote a wider understanding of nuclear
energy among key international influencers by producing authoritative
information, developing common industry positions and contributing to the
energy debate.
Working group reports present the consensus views of these expert members
on important specific issues. To this extent they provide a voice for the global
nuclear industry; however the views of working groups do not necessarily
reflect the views of the World Nuclear Association’s individual member
companies.
This report reflects the research of the World Nuclear Association’s Capacity
Optimization Working Group. The group was constituted to identify means
by which nuclear operators worldwide can maximize the performance of their
plant. In order to progress towards this goal, this report establishes a status
baseline and undertakes high-level analysis to understand at what point the
global industry currently stands and what the dominant issues in utilization of
the installed capacity base are.
This is the third edition of the Optimized Capacity: Global Trends and Issues
report. The first was published in April 2010 and contained data drawn from the
IAEA Power Reactor Information Service (PRIS) for the two years up to the end
of 2008. A second edition was published in 2012 which included PRIS data up
to the end of 2010. This edition, contains PRIS data to the end of 2012 as well
as new sections exploring some of the factors affecting capacity in more detail.
1
Executive summary
This report draws upon data collected in the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) Power Reactor Information Service database to present a
snapshot of the performance of the world’s operating nuclear power reactors
as well as a breakdown of the principal causes of capacity loss for the period
2010-2012.
While the idling of the Japanese fleet resulted in a decrease of the global
average capacity factor to 72% in 2012 (down from 77% in 2010) the global
median capacity factor remains at about 84%. There is however a range of
performance levels around that median with a long tail of reactors showing
clear potential for improvement. Best performing units still regularly achieve
greater than 90% – an industry benchmark. The potential for >90% capacity
factors does not appear to be limited by reactor age and can be achieved
by any of the major reactor types. This serves as testimony to the general
robustness of existing nuclear technology and the commitment of the
organizations involved.
2
1 Introduction
In 2012 the world’s operating nuclear • Prevent the emission of about 2.8
reactors supplied 2,346 TWh of billion tonnes of carbon dioxide
electricity at an average capacity per year2 and numerous other
factor of 72.2%. This number was atmospheric pollutants.
down compared to the 2011 figure of
2,518 TWh (average capacity factor of The performance of the nuclear
77.4%) due largely to the progressive fleet should therefore be of interest
idling of reactors in Japan which to a wide range of stakeholders.
followed the accident at Fukushima Among these are the plant operators
Daiichi. For 2011, total global who stand to make financial gains
supply was 22,202 TWh1, meaning through more efficient operations,
that nuclear-generated electricity but also included are policymakers,
accounted for 11.3% of the total. regulators and the general public,
who are primarily concerned with
The best performing reactors in the the adequate supply of affordable,
world regularly exceed capacity reliable and clean electricity.
factors of 90%. There is thus great
scope for improvement in the This third edition is intended as a
performance of the global reactor broad overview of the global trends
fleet, not only through the restart of influencing reactor performance with
the Japanese fleet but also through emphasis on the period 2011-2012.
the improvement of day-to-day In keeping with the previous editions,
operations. If an industry-wide the primary focus of the report will
average capacity factor of 90% were be on plant capacity factors and
to be achieved then, based on the 369 analyzing them in terms of region,
GWe of available capacity at the end technology age and other criteria.
of 2011, this would: The methodology remains mostly the
same, however since the time period
• Result in about 2,900 TWh of covers the accident at Fukushima
baseload electricity generation per Daiichi and the subsequent idling of
year, an amount equivalent to ~13% the Japanese fleet, some adjustments
of total global demand in 2011, have been made. Several new
without the addition of any extra sections have been introduced
capacity. which examine in detail some of the
1
From IEA Electricity Information 2013
2
Estimated if coal had been used as a
direct replacement at 963 grams of CO2
per kWh Figure 1: Plant maintenance
3
factors which lead to capacity loss – from policy at the end of 2010.
specifically outages and maintenance, The accident also affected nuclear
plant engineering projects, and policies for operating reactors in
regulatory and market factors. Switzerland and Belgium, although
in a less severe fashion than in
1.1 Issues in review Germany. In Belgium, a case was
introduced to limit reactor lifespans
2010-2012 to 40 years if ‘alternative’ generation
The third edition of this report could be found. In Switzerland,
covers the period of the March 2011 a policy to prevent replacement
accident at the Fukushima nuclear of reactors has been discussed
plant in Japan. The accident and its although not formally adopted.
repercussions continue to influence
the nuclear industry worldwide. In North America
Japan the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
The further rapid exploration and
accident led to a progressive idling
discovery of shale gas deposits has
of the country’s fleet of 50 operable
continued to reduce North American
reactors as they were stopped for
energy import dependency and
refuelling and maintenance and
power market prices. It has also had
subsequently not permitted to restart3.
A long period of uncertainty followed an impact on the competitiveness of
before it was finally determined that nuclear plants at a time when many
a new regulatory agency would units have been operating 25-35
be formed and new operating years and are undergoing upgrades
requirements drawn up before to ensure safe long-term operation
operators could apply to restart. for a period of 60 years or longer.
The increasing use of shale gas for
The fate of nuclear power in Japan was power has decreased consumption
at times in serious doubt, with several of coal in the US, freeing up large
prime ministers in quick succession amounts for export to Europe or
expressing different preferences over China and affecting markets there.
a phase-out and the speed with which Some US reactors have experienced
that should occur. In September 2012 serious technical problems, which
the Liberal Democratic Party under coupled with market conditions and
Shinzo Abe won the national election regulatory requirements, eventually
on what can best be described as the resulted in their permanent shutdown
least anti-nuclear platform with a stated earlier than expected. Crystal River
intention to work towards restarting unit 3 was offline since 2009 after
most reactors as soon as possible. At delamination was discovered in the
the time this report was going to press containment, leading to eventual
only one Japanese reactor had been permanent closure in 2013. The two-
restarted. unit San Onofre plant was idled at the
beginning of 2012 as a result of rapid
The accident also had a profound wear and degradation of tubes in
impact on Germany. Massive public replacement steam generators. The
3
Two of the Ohi reactors were allowed to backlash led the Merkel government plant was also closed in 2013.
operate for longer than others due to a severe to order the final closure of eight
power shortage in the Kansai region reactors without any supporting case In Canada, Gentilly 2 was permanently
4
For more information consult Development from the country’s regulator. A phase- shut down at the end of 2012 as
And Integration Of Renewable Energy: Lessons
out policy for the remaining reactors the regional Quebec government
Learned From Germany, Finadvice, July 2014
5 was introduced that would see them deemed refurbishment of the 30 year-
The amount has since been reduced as some
nuclear units were closed and is now closer to all close by 2022. A similar phase- old unit to be too expensive. It was
€1.5 billion out had only just been removed the only reactor in the province.
4
Europe The period also saw a dramatic of Environment. In structure this
Large subsidies and support escalation of nuclear taxes in some body resembles the US regulatory
for wind and solar generation European countries. A reactor-fuel system where staff report to a five-
in Germany and neighbouring tax was introduced in Germany and person commission. In South Korea
countries are reducing European controversially kept following the the Nuclear Security and Safety
power prices on the spot market, country’s nuclear policy turnaround. Commission was launched in 2011,
while simultaneously increasing The tax netted the government effectively replacing the Korea Institute
the price paid by customers4. As approximately €2 billion per year5. An of Nuclear Safety (KINS) in this role.
a result, European utilities are existing reactor tax in Belgium was KINS continues to exist as a technical
facing major unplanned asset effectively doubled in 2011, netting advisory body. In China a review of
devaluations, balance sheet write- the government an estimated €550 the regulator resulted in a suspension
downs and depressed outlooks. million per year. of licences for new-build projects that
This is tightening budgets and lasted until the end of 2012.
restricting the ability of utilities to In general plant performance in other
invest in new generating capacity. major European nuclear power fleets Overview
Gas plants exhibiting high marginal were satisfactory but availability 2011 and 2012 have been some
cost are being hit particularly hard. was affected by ongoing backfitting of the most challenging years for
The growing intermittent capacity programmes such as the replacement the global nuclear power plant
base is increasing the need for of nuclear and conventional island fleet. Many of these challenges are
load following in both German and systems and components prolonging expected to remain or even intensify
neighbouring reactors, with huge outages in countries such as France, during the upcoming years. Market
peaks in photovoltaic generation Switzerland, the UK and Sweden. price pressures drive the need to
and wind energy occurring with optimize plant performance for
increasing frequency. Asia economic operation, and to maximize
Japan, China and South Korea production in order to increase
In Spain, a generous renewables have all embarked upon reforming financial returns. In the future, plant
incentive saw a large-scale uptake their nuclear regulators. One of capacity factors are expected to
of the technology, particularly wind the most frequently heard lessons come under pressure by subsidized
energy, leading to spiralling power of the Fukushima accident is that intermittent electricity generation in
costs. New tax laws introduced in the Japanese regulator was not many countries, which may result in
2012 placed the burden of market sufficiently independent. These base-load plants needing to curtail
recovery on all generators. This, countries have responded to this output. Nuclear power plant closures
coupled with re-licensing concerns, while at the same time increasing in these markets are a real possibility
resulted in the owner of the Garoña their regulator’s resources. A new and unless governments take steps to
nuclear power reactor not filing expanded Japanese regulator – the preserve disptachable low-carbon
for licence renewal in 2012, with Nuclear Regulatory Authority – was capacity or to incentivise flexible
operations ceasing in 2013. formed and placed under the Ministry nuclear operations.
5
2 Reactor performance
Reference unit
power
Available Unavailable
capacity capacity
Availability
Capability
6
Where the data comes from
Note: The data model, performance indicators and data used in this report are drawn from figures held in the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) www.iaea.org/pris/ which
constitutes the most complete and authoritative technical data bank on nuclear power reactors in the world. The same
terminology is also applied, with the exception of the capacity factor which the IAEA refers to as ‘load factor’. More
detailed definitions of these performance values and indicators can be found in Appendix 2 of this report.
To highlight the current limits Several distinct time periods are performers category remain the
of achievable performance, a discussed throughout the report. A same across these time periods.
distinction is drawn between snapshot of performance over one However they may change between
the entire global fleet of nuclear year is presented for 2012. However editions of this report.
reactors (All reactors) and the top most plant operating cycles are
performing 10% (best performers) longer than this, meaning that Most of the analysis presented
as determined by their energy some indicators should be derived here makes use of median capacity
availability factor averaged over five over a longer period in order to be factors rather than averages,
years. Other performance indicators meaningful – five years was the effectively removing weighting due to
are then derived separately for period chosen (1 January 2008 - 31 long-term shutdowns or chronically
these two groups. Availability is December 2012). A ten-year period underperforming plant. The report is
used instead of capacity factor to is also used to allow comparison designed to address factors affecting
determine best performers so as not over the longer term (1 January everyday operation – rather than
to discriminate against units which 2003 - 31 December 2012). It highlight units which are shutdown
load follow or are subject to other should be noted that the individual for long periods due to regulatory
grid limitations. units which comprise the best reasons or major refurbishment.
Generation supplied External energy loss Planned energy loss Unplanned energy
loss
7
Impact of the Fukushima nuclear 2.1 The global picture
accident on report statistics
90
For this edition of the report the
Japanese reactors are excluded
from most figures and statistics. 85
Were these reactors to have
been included, this would have
80
prevented any meaningful
comparison being made between
%
65
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Median Without LTS Weighted average Without LTS
While the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear if a typical value for the Japanese fleet
accident and resulting reactor were included. Judging from the dashed
shutdowns in Japan and Germany lines, it seems that the Fukushima
have had profound effects on the accident may even have over-
global nuclear industry, operating shadowed a slight rise in the global
performance in the rest of the global median capacity factor over the last two
fleet does not appear to have suffered. years. Whether or not this is the case6
The solid lines in Figure 4 shows it is evident that overall the trend in the
the impact of the Japanese reactor median global reactor performance has
shutdown, while the dashed lines been mostly flat for the past decade
provide an indication of what the global with most of the improvement taking
fleet capacity factor would have been place through the 1990s.
100
92
83
80
Number of reactors
60
52
41 43
40
27
24
16 18 17
20
13 13
8 6 4
0
≤30% 35-40% 45-50% 55-60% 65-70% 75-80% 85-90% >95%
30-35% 40-45% 50-55% 60-65% 70-75% 80-85% 90-95%
Year
6
It can only be confirmed over subsequent
years to see if the trend persists Figure 5: Histogram of individual plant capacity factors 2008-2012
8
60 The Figure 5 histogram contains a long
tail of reactors that have experienced
lengthy shutdowns and energy loss.
50
Improving the performance of these
Number of reactors not operated
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
entire Japanese fleet is progressively
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
9
Figure 7 also reveals the consistently profound economic impacts on
high performance of the Belgian, the country as it has switched to
German and Swiss reactors. All three more expensive coal, gas and fuel
countries experienced a negative oil imports. It has also adversely
backlash following the Fukushima affected the vendors and fuel cycle
accident which imposed reactor companies in the nuclear industry
lifespan limitations and considerations through a sudden and substantial
of phase-out policies despite this reduction in market size. However
excellent operational record. In the the Japanese plant capacity factors
case of Germany, following the have not been high historically,
accident the government immediately thanks largely to a regulatory
forced the closure of eight units requirement for a mandated annual
without any safety basis. Since then 60-day outage and inspection. It
the country has increased its reliance is for this reason that the removal
on coal-fired generation. of the Japanese reactors from the
global statistics has had little impact
The biggest impact of the Fukushima on the median capacity factor and
accident was the subsequent may even have caused it to rise
idling of the 50 remaining operable when the idled reactors are not
Japanese reactors. This has had accounted for.
100
80
Median capacity factor (%)
60
40
20
0
BWR GCR LWGR PHWR PWR Worldwide
2012 2003-2012
Figure 8: Long- and short-term capacity factors by reactor type (excluding Japanese reactors)
7
On 7 October 1994 Pickering 7 commenced
an outage after generating continuously for
894 days
10
Figure 8 shows the median Both GCRs and PHWRs exhibited It is evident that technology selection,
capacity factor recorded by the strong performance in 2012, well at least for all major types available
different main reactor types. For above the 10-year average. The today is not a fundamentally limiting
most types the 2012 capacity GCR is another reactor type which factor for operating performance. In
factor is higher than the 10-year is expected to disappear within 15 fact increasing experience and focus
average, indicating that long-term years as the UK closes them down on improvement continues to yield
performance may improve in the and gradually replaces them with positive results across the different
future for these types. Only BWRs new LWRs. Major upgrades are not reactor types. This is a significant
saw a performance decrease for expected for the AGRs and the plans achievement and stands as a
2012, however it is worth noting that for long-term operation are modest, benchmark that any future reactor
Japan is home to 24 BWR reactors with most reactors expected to shut design – PWR, BWR, PHWR or an
which now sit idle – a significant down in the 2020s achieving an advanced reactor concept – must
fraction of the 82 operational BWRs average life span of 45 years. seek to match.
worldwide. All of the operable
reactors in Japan are either PWRs The PHWR is a technology that Only one fast breeder reactor (FBR)
or BWRs, but the performance of continues to be actively marketed is currently operating and has
both reactor types continues to via the Candu 6 and ACR-1000, therefore been omitted from statistical
be strong globally. The 10-year with indigenous designs under analysis in this report. The Russian
capacity factors for PWRs and construction in India. With the designed BN-600 at Beloyarsk 3 has
BWRs have not changed much benefit of a mid-life refurbishment achieved a lifetime capacity factor to
since the last edition of this report. the intended operating life of these date of 74.1%, a promising result for
designs can been extended up to this design and future fast reactors.
It is the LWGRs that have exhibited 60 years. PHWRs are capable of the
the clearest performance gain in the same performance levels as light In general, no significant global
last two years. The 10-year average water alternatives. The design can age-related trend in capacity factor
has improved by about 4% since be refuelled online, meaning that can be detected from Figure 9. This
the last report edition, a respectable maintenance and inspections rather is good news for older plants, which
achievement for a reactor type that now than refuelling determines the length can maintain historic output levels,
exists only in the Russian Federation of the operating run. It also means that and also for newer plants, which do
and which is expected to be phased PHWR units hold the title for the longest not appear to require any ‘run-in’
out over the coming decade. uninterrupted period of generation7. time, suggesting that good practice
in operations is being passed on.
100
What is not looked at here is the cost
of keeping older plants performing
90 at historic levels, and whether this
cost is comparable with the cost of
Median capacity factor (%)
50
40
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
Figure 9: Long- and short-term capacity factors by reactor age (excluding Japanese reactors)
11
3 Available capacity and
energy loss
This section explores the causes by unplanned losses. Accounting
of energy loss in the global reactor for only 5% are factors which are not
fleet. The differences between an under plant management control.
average reactor – as represented This includes environmental and grid
by the median value derived for all limitations.
reactors – and a hypothetical best
performer (median of the top 10% of In this figure unplanned losses have
reactors) are compared, revealing been split into two components,
characteristic profiles for each. demonstrating the importance of
unplanned extensions to planned
Figure 10 shows that best performers outages. Clearly planned outages
maximize their availability and minimize and reductions are most important,
the amount of unavailability compared but unplanned causes should also
with other units. They reduce both be addressed – especially since
planned unavailability and unplanned they tend to entail extra economic
unavailability, demonstrating that long consequences to operators such as
outages are not strictly necessary the need to purchase replacement
for problem-free operation. For best power and to perform unexpected
performers then, planning for success corrective maintenance. They also
and being able to stick to that plan is disrupt power system planning.
important. Outage scope does not
have to be cut, and risk does not have
to be transferred onto the operating
3.1 Planned energy loss
cycle. It follows that there are clear Figure 12 shows the amount of
efficiency gains to be made by poor energy lost per reactor year due
performing units in this area. to different planned causes10 and
therefore provides some level of
The best capacity factor performers insight into the financial impacts on
represent a range of technologies8, operators. Combined maintenance
vendors, regions9 and countries, and refuelling outages are the
suggesting that performance is dominant cause of planned energy
somewhat independent of these loss across both best performers
choices. Best performers achieved a and ‘all reactors’, however, best
median capacity factor of 94.4%. performers lose only half the energy
in these planned outages compared
Figure 11 shows that globally about with the average of all reactors.
95% of unavailable capacity is within
plant management control. Planned Units undergoing major
losses are most significant, followed modernization, or backfitting,
Best
94.43 4.79
performers
8
PWR, BWR and PHWR all appear in the
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
list of best performers
9
North America, East Asia and Europe all Percentage
appear in the list of best performers
Availability factor (%) Planned unavailability (%)
10
This is a break with the two previous
Unplanned unavailability (%) External unavailability (%)
editions of this report, which showed
the relative percentage of energy loss
incidents per reactor year by cause Figure 10: Availability of reactor units (2008-2012)
12
are missing entirely from best
72% Planned performers for the reason that this
has a large impact on availability,
14% Unplanned forced enough to knock these units out of
the best performing category for
9% Unplanned extension the time period covered. Of course
modernization and major engineering
5% External work provides other benefits such
as greater life expectancy, long-term
reliability and potentially increased
reference unit power. Modernization
is often required by the regulator in
order to permit continued operation.
13
Root cause Plant equipment
problems
The root cause is the initiating event
Regulatory
(or omission) in the chain of events
requirements
which leads to the unplanned loss.
Human factor
It is suspected that a root cause related
analysis for unplanned energy
loss events would reveal a very Fire
significantly higher proportion
of human factor-related causes, Fuel problems
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
Turbine and
auxiliaries
Electrical power
supply systems
Main generator
systems
Reactor and
accessories
Feedwater and main
steam system
Reactor cooling
systems
Steam generation
systems
Reactor I&C
systems
Miscellaneous
systems
Safety
systems
Reactor auxiliary
systems
Fuel handling and
storage facilities
Circulating water
systems
All other I&C
systems
Safety I&C systems
(excluding reactor I&C)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
GWh
Best 10% All reactors
14
Figure 15 shows the causes of 3.3 Factors affecting f) Public relations
unplanned energy loss due to g) Fuel availability
individual component systems. It is
availability h) Surveillance extensions
ranked in order of importance with The list below sets out the factors (component level)
respect to the ‘all reactors’ class that have been identified as affecting i) Mandated outage operations
although the profile is similar for best availability. The following sections of requirements
performers. Unsurprisingly, best this report investigates the first four j) Long-term operation
performers experience less energy factors – outage down to regulation &
loss across all component systems; market – in more detail. 5) Fuel
however it is interesting to note the a) Design
comparative size of the difference for 1) Outage b) Reliability
some systems. a) Duration c) Front and back end
b) Frequency (limiting factor)
As with previous editions of the c) Scope d) Fuel loading cycles
report, the turbines, generators and d) Management (12, 18, 24 months)
electrical power supply systems lead e) Cost
to the greatest unplanned energy f) Planning 6) Environment
loss. In fact if all the other systems a) Ultimate heat sink
were to be combined, they would 2) Maintenance and equipment b) Severe weather
account for less energy loss than reliability c) Earthquake
those three in the ‘all reactors’ class. a) User interface d) Tsunami/flooding
Focusing on these areas in particular, b) Lifecycle management,
be it through improved maintenance (asset management) 7) Organizational factors and human
or system replacement, and sharing c) Predictive maintenance performance
of operating experience and other d) Online maintenance a) Human resource availability
relevant information, could lead to e) System redundancy b) Training and education
improved capacity factors globally. f) Component failure requirements
g) System diagnostics c) Safety culture
It is noteworthy that the safety h) Culture of operations d) Knowledge management
systems only represent a limited i) Digital controls e) Governance (centralized/
share of the lost production. This decentralized)
suggests that the focus on nuclear 3) Engineering f) Financial decision making –
safety has concrete benefits. a) Power uprates financial steering model
Safety systems are maintained in b) Plant modernization g) Worker satisfaction – strikes
such a manner that they are rarely c) Design change processes
unavailable and thus rarely cause (lifecycle management) 8) Safety performance
production losses. d) Ageing – longer-term a) Scrams
management b) Controlled shutdowns
Of interest is the amount of energy e) Thermal performance c) Limited condition operation
loss due to the electrical power f) Grid issues
supply system. That so much loss 9) Finance
can be attributable to a system which 4) Regulation & market a) Cost benefit
is common to so many other forms of a) Licences/licensing b) Investment analysis
infrastructure is somewhat surprising b) Working regulations
and further research is warranted. c) Market conditions 10) Supply chain processes
d) Baseload versus load following a) Contract management
e) Greenhouse gas emission b) Partnerships and alliances
abatement schemes c) Procurement
15
4 Outages and
maintenance
Outages are a period of time in requirements, surveillance, and
which a nuclear power plant shuts backlog management. If a unit
down (stops producing power) in experiences an unplanned outage,
order to perform routine or required a maintenance outage may follow
maintenance, replacements, and/or based on management decision
refuel the reactor11. They are periods and root cause analysis of the event.
of intense activity at nuclear plants Some utilities use maintenance
and the aim is usually to get on-line outages to shorten their refuelling
again as quickly as possible. outage and will perform a short
maintenance outage during the run
cycle. Maintenance outages are
4.1 Types of outage
more common for reactor types
Depending on their management capable of online refuelling such as
models, utilities may have several Candus and AGRs.
different designators for outage
type, however all usually employ the As in all well-executed projects, a
three main categories: refuelling, strict timetable must be adhered
maintenance or forced. to or the sum of the duration of the
refuelling and maintenance outages
The main purpose of a refuelling will subtract from the unit run-cycle
outage is to replace fuel that is efficiency and drag down the overall
depleted of fissile isotopes (most capacity factor.
importantly uranium-235). Using the
refuelling duration as a guideline, A forced outage can be defined
other maintenance can be performed as emergent or unforeseen, based
in the outage time window. This is a on degradation of safety or key
good rule of thumb for the creation equipment. An emergent shutdown
of a baseline outage schedule. can initiate a forced outage that is
Maintenance activities can be administratively based. New industry
performed on equipment that is not issues, surveillance or committed
usually accessible when the reactor is corrective actions can also initiate
running or fuelled, or equipment that a forced outage. Work control
supports the primary system function organizations usually compile lists of
during reactor operation or shutdown equipment that can be worked on if a
activities. It also creates opportunities forced outage situation should occur.
to perform periodic inspections The key to minimizing the impacts
and refurbishments, allowing of a forced outage is to be prepared
longer run cycle times. Refuelling and execute the required work in the
outages (with some maintenance) most efficient time possible.
typically span 17 to 120 days in
length and are performed every 12, Several factors can affect timing and
18 and 24 months depending on outage duration, such as location,
licence requirements and technical regulatory and market environment,
specifications – especially fuel and conduct of maintenance
11
performance. approach. Most operators, especially
In the IAEA’s PRIS database, a ‘partial’
outage refers to any power reduction. of PWRs and BWRs, use refuelling
A full outage refers to a shutdown. This No refuelling takes place in a outages to also conduct necessary
difference does not affect the figures maintenance outage, rather activities maintenance for the reasons outlined
shown in this report
concentrate on equipment repair above, with the aim being to then
12
Guidance for optimizing nuclear power
that can be executed with fuel in run breaker-to-breaker – i.e. without
plant maintenance programmes
13 the core of the reactor. This type of stopping or reducing the licensed
A minimum of two classes – critical and
non-critical – but three or four is typical, outage is usually scheduled and is power output for any reason until the
with one being run-to-failure performed as result of maintenance next refuelling outage. This means
16
that outages are regularly spaced 4.2 Maintenance and vary but it is important to include the
and timed to occur at a period of low operator’s own experience as well
energy demand, or perhaps when
equipment reliability as that of others, and to be aware of
human and tooling resources are programme existing industry best practice.
available for fleet operators. Some Every nuclear operator should
operators will engage in refuelling- aim to maximize availability while Not all equipment issues are resolved
only outages, where little or no ensuring that critical safety-related by maintenance optimization.
maintenance is conducted. This systems and components are well- Obsolescence and replacement or
strategy has been demonstrated to maintained. The key to achieving redesign of a component system
be effective but creates the need this is to introduce a programme of must be addressed by a lifetime
for additional maintenance outages, maintenance optimization, a process management programme. Nuclear
and so does not necessarily result in which can best be summarized plants worldwide are at different
greater overall availability. as “the right work on the right stages of plant life management
equipment, at the right time”12. initiatives. Some are seeking greater
Outage management is a key factor availability in the near term, while
for safe and economic nuclear To help determine the best others are optimizing over the longer
plant performance. It involves the maintenance approach, each system, term and considering power uprates
coordination of diverse factors such structure or component should first and life extension. It is important to
as operational strategy, available be categorized according to its ensure that lifetime management
resources, nuclear safety, regulatory safety significance13. This judgement plans are in line with the business
and technical requirements and should be based on three factors: needs of the company.
includes all activities and work 1) impact of failure (economic and
hazards both in the lead-up to and safety); 2) risk of occurrence; and 3)
during the outage itself. A competitive detectability. Highest maintenance
market environment for electricity priority should be given to safety-
generation has significant implications related components where the risk of
for nuclear power plant operations occurrence is high and the failure is
and has been one of the major drivers not detectable until the component is
for more efficient outages. called on to perform.
Shortest 9.3
Average
best 28.8
performers
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Days
Figure 16: Refuelling outage durations for BWR and PWRs (2012)
17
5 Engineering impacts on
operation
There are times in a plant’s maintenance (O&M) costs varying
operational life where engineering according to individual operator
work can have substantial impacts efficiency and national regulatory
on capacity factors and sometimes requirements. Well-managed plants
require shutdown for lengthy periods. with low O&M costs and a limited
Two such events are life extensions need for retrofitting can produce
and power uprates. electricity at very low cost.
18
5.2 Power uprates Stretch power uprates
An uprate is a process by which the These are typically up to 7% and are
reference unit power of a reactor is within the design capacity of the plant.
increased so that it becomes capable The uprate level achieved is plant-
of producing additional electricity. specific and depends on the operating
This comparatively cheap form of margins included in the design. Stretch
capacity addition typically involves power uprates usually involve changes
changes to the plant’s components, to instrumentation setpoints but do not
operating, maintenance and accident involve major plant modifications.
response procedures as well as a
corresponding licensing effort. The Extended power uprates
larger the uprate, the more work is These are greater than stretch power
required in all of these areas. uprates and have been approved
for increases as high as 30%16.
Most nuclear uprates to date have These uprates require significant
taken place in the USA. The US modifications to major balance-of-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission plant equipment such as the high
(NRC) – has devised a three tier pressure turbines, condensate
classification system15 which is well- pumps and motors, main generators,
known and used internationally. and/or transformers.
19
6 Regulatory, policy and
market factors
Even if a unit is technically safe and were shut following the discovery
sound, it cannot always operate at of suspected flaws in their reactor
full reference unit power. Nuclear vessels18. The associated outages
power facilities are subject to took nearly 10 months to perform
intense scrutiny that often results in with over 10,000 maintenance tasks
conditions imposed on operation. and other checks carried out before
Any safety or security related restart was eventually permitted. The
concerns which do emerge can result units have since been shut down
in additional maintenance costs, again as new information caused
shutdowns and less income as well the regulator to re-evaluate the
as possible financial penalties. seriousness of the flaws.
20
power per minute can be permitted
for the primary response of the
plant to grid frequency fluctuations.
However, the increased effect of
cyclic thermal and mechanical loads
on equipment induced by such
flexible operation mode can lead to
higher wear and tear on components
and accelerate material ageing
processes. This increases the need
for planned outages and associated
cost of maintenance, especially on the
chemical and volume control system
(for boron adjustment in PWRs) and
the control and safety rod system.
Investigations have determined that
load-following operations increase
overall maintenance costs.19
300
250
200
GWh
150
100
50
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
France Belgium Germany
21
7 Safety performance
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
Scram rate per 7000 hours critical
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
20
The industrial safety accident rate
tracks the number of accidents among
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
employees that result in lost work time,
restricted work, or fatalities. See WANO’s Capacity factor intervals %
annual Performance Indicators online
publication, www.wano.info/en-gb/ Figure 18: Average number of automatic scrams for capacity factor intervals (2008-2012)
library/performanceindicators.
22
Number per 200,000 hours worked / Number per 1,000,000 hours worked
1.04 0.58 0.33 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12
5.20 2.90 1.63 1.30 0.78 0.85 0.74 0.68 0.62
1.5 7.50
1.2 6.00
0.9 4.50
0.6 3.00
0.3 1.50
0.0 0.00
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Stations 169 192 203 208 216 217 211 195 196
reporting
Five-year frequency One-year frequency
Figure 19: The industrial safety accident rate - image courtesy WANO20
23
8 Conclusions
24
Appendix Definitions
1
For more detailed definitions and descriptions of accepted measurement
techniques for the following values and performance indicators please refer to
either the IAEA PRIS database or the World Association of Nuclear Operators’
Performance Indicator Program Reference Manual
Values
25
Indicators
Capacity factor (CF)
The ratio of the energy which the unit produced over the period, to the
reference energy generation over the same time period
CAPACITY FACTOR (%) = (EG/REG) x 100
This indicator reflects the actual energy utilization of the unit for electricity and
heat production.
(Note: this is sometimes known as load factor.)
26
Forced loss rate (FLR)
The ratio of all unplanned forced energy losses during a given period of time
to the reference energy generation reduced by energy generation losses
corresponding to planned outages and unplanned outage extensions of
planned outages during the same period.
FLR (%) = FEL/[REG-(PEL+OEL)] x 100
where FEL is unplanned forced energy losses and OEL is unplanned outage
extension losses.
This indicator reflects the plant’s ability to maintain systems for safe electrical
generation when it is expected to be at the grid dispatcher’s disposal.
27
Appendix Tables of reactor
2 performance by type
Median CF PUF UUF XUF FLR
Totals: 81.11 10.69 1.96 0.19 1.58
BWR 83.48 10.13 1.86 0.06 1.24
FBR 58.11 35.76 5.56 0.45 6.53
GCR 70.96 11.43 16.74 0.01 14.77
LWGR 76.08 17.19 1.88 0.17 1.86
PHWR 74.09 7.47 3.12 0.53 3.00
PWR 84.27 10.72 1.42 0.21 1.18
Figure 20: Performance indicator by reactor type, all reactors (2008-2012)
28
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