CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

File No. 7

V. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

a. SENATE (COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATIONS; TERM OF OFFICE)

SEC. 2, 3 AND 4.

Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators

who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall
serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of
which he was elected.

b. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Particulars Senate House of Representative

Composition 24 Senators Not more than 250

Age 35 yrs. old 25 yrs. old.

Citizenship Natural-born citizen of the Natural-born citizen of the

 Phils. Phils.

Able to read and write Able to read and write

Registered voter Registered voter in the

district in which he shall be
Residency elected – n/a party list
Resident of the
Philippines for at least 2 Resident of the said district
years immediately for at least 1 year
Term preceding the election immediately preceding
election – n/a to party-list
6 years
3 years
Unless otherwise provided
by law, term of office Unless otherwise provided
Term Limit commence at noon of June by law, term of office
30, next following the commence at noon of June
election. 30, next following the
election.
Not more than 2
consecutive years. Not more than 3 consecutive
years.

Note: The qualifications of both Senators and Members of the House are
limited to those provided by the Consttution. Congress cannot, by law,
add or subtract from these qualifications.

i) Composition (District Representatives; Party-list

Representatives) Sec. 5

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of

not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum

of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.

Senate – 24 elected at large by the qualified voters of the

Philippines;

House of Representatives – not more than 250 members consisting

of:

a. District Representatives – elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area;

b. Party-list Representatives – shall constitute 20% of the total number

of representatives elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

District Representative Party-list Representative

Elected according to legislative Elected nationality with party-

district by the constituents of such list organizations garnering at
district. least 3% of all votes cast for the
party-list system entitled to 1
seat, which is increased
according to proportional
representation, but is in no way
Must be a resident of his legislative to exceed 3 seats per
district for at least 1 year immediately organization
before the election.
No special residency
Elected personally, by name. requirement.
 Voted upon by party or
Does not lose seat if he/she changes organization. It is only when a
party or affiliation. party is entitled to
representation that it designates
who will sit as representative.

If he/she changes party or

In case of vacancy, a special election affiliation, loses his seat, in
may be held provided that the which case he/she will be
vacancy takes place at least 1 year substituted by another qualified
before the next election. person in the party /
organization based on the list
A district representative is not submitted to the COMELEC.
prevented from running again as a
district representative if he/she lost In case of vacancy, a
during the previous election. substitution will be made within
the party, based on the list
A change in affiliation within months submitted to the COMELEC.
prior to election does not prevent a
district representative from running A party-list representative
under his new party. cannot sit if he ran and lost in
the previous election.

A change in affiliation within 6

months prior to election
prohibits the party-list
representatives from listing as
representative under his new
party or organization.

CASES

• We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein
a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of
 party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives.

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that

only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen
by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise,
in a legislature features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.

The three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-

representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter
how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not
the entire House (Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, GR 136781, Oct.
06, 2000).

• Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot

be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." For its part, Section
2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Sec. 2 of RA 7941 mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which
will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens, who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and who lack well-defined constituencies;
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of

the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is
easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a

traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the

people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but
more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we
repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, Organizations and
parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives."
 Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according
to its express terms (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Comelec, GR
147589, June 26, 2001).

ii) Apportionment of Legislative Districts

1. Maintain proportional representation based on number of

inhabitants;

o Each city with not less than 250 thousand inhabitants,

entitled to at least one (1) representative;
o Each province, irrespective of the number of inhabitants,
entitled to at least one (1) representative.
2. Each district must be contiguous compact and adjacent.
Gerrymandering is not allowed.

Gerrymandering – formation of one legislative district out of separate

territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.

3. Reapportionment within 3 years following

return of every census.

CASES

• According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make an

apportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that
the bill, which later became Republic Act 3040, was based upon a
report submitted to the President by the Director of the Census on
November 23, 1960. Petitioners maintain that the apportionment
could not legally rest on this report since it is merely "preliminary"
and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand, respondents
point out that the above letter says the report should be considered
"official for all purposes." They also point out that the ascertainment
of what constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for
Congress action. This issue does not clearly favor petitioners,
because there are authorities sustaining the view that although not
final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be
considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be
based thereon even in matters of apportionment of legislative
districts.

The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the
House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several
 provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants." In our resolution on August 23, we held that
this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave
Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of
inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while
Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with
less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both
five members having been assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857)
was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only;
(e) Bulacan vs. with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less
inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with
387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of
unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3
whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2
each. And then Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas,
Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323
inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145)
was given 5.For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution
declaring that Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the
Constitution and is therefore void (Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

• The Constitution ordains:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts, as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into
existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each
province shall have at least one member" in the House of
Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative
districts within a province. The requirements concerning the
apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof
refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts,
and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces,
under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general
tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an
 Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of,
or other conditions under which a province may be created, except,
perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of
120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is
not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of
fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces,
with the consequent creation of additional representative districts
without complying with the aforementioned requirements. , the
constitutional command to the effect that "each representative
district shall comprise . . . contiguous and compact territory" is, not
absolute, but, qualified by the phrase "as far as practicable." In the
case at bar, the delimitation of the provinces involved therein is based
upon the tribes or ethnic groups inhabiting the same (Felwa vs. Salas,
18 SCRA 606).

• It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960;

that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years
thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its
Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise,
became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen,
respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions,
proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act
No. 4913, are null and void.

It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an

apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census
made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became a Republic
Act No, 3040, purporting to in make said apportionment. This Act
was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the
apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to
the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.

Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the
failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period
stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional
Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its
House of Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of
this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on
"apportionment within three years after the return of every
 enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that
Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does
not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such
obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its
Members have become de facto officers.

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935,

Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said
fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in
the Constitutional pursuant to which:

". . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed
by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present Assembly districts . . ."

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of
the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to
make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies
necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the
representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said
period (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774).

• Reapportionment (attempts to change the way voting districts are

delineated) issues are justiciable questions, thus enabling federal
courts to intervene in and to decide reapportionment cases (Baker vs.
Carr, 369 US 186).

• The Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may

be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise
fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
 indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty (Mariano vs.
Comelec, 242 SCRA 211).

• Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,

Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3
to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new
province was created. . . ."
Presiding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring
the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District
of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a
regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could
devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for
petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal
vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative
districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4),
Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power
to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can
strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself
make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by
directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte
(Montejo vs. Comelec, GR 118702, March 19, 1995).

iii) Qualifications (Section 6)

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.

CASES

• The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is

that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence

qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
election law, it actually means only "domicile.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue (Marcos vs. Comelec,
248 SCRA 300).

• The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the

House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which
he seeks election for a period of not less than one (I) year prior to the
elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning
in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electrocal Tribunal of the House of Representatives this
Court held that the term "residence" has always been understood as
synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his

permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of

Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno
and Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City

is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. As
the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
While a lease contract may be indicative of respondent's intention to
reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially
since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and
respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for
only one(1) year, because he has other "residences" in Manila or
Quezon City.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an

actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue (Aquino vs. Comelec,
Sept. 18, 1995).
• The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as
follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond
to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those

citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening
period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated
himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of
any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however

reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications 17 and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes

by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States
at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
and (5) political and economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,

repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides
or last resided.

In Angara v. Republic, the Court held:

. . .. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965

and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1)

a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
 Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of,
Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of

Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2
of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof (Bengson vs. HRET, GR 142840. May 7, 2001)

iv) Term of Office (Section 7, 8 and 9)

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be

elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of
the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall
be held on the second Monday of May.

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of

Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.

iv) Compensation (Section 10)

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

v) Privileges (Section 11)

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.

a. Freedom from Arrest

Ø Legislators are privileged from arrest, and not to prosecution for

criminal offenses, while Congress is “in session” only (whether regular
or special) with respect to offenses punishable by up to 6 years of
imprisonment.

b. Parliamentary Immunity

CASES
• "The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place." (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the

aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" — that is to say in Congress — used in
this provision.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said
letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 714).

• As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made

privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege under Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue
of their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity
and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed. It further
correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of
malice, not having shown the truth thereof, or that they were
published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even
from the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise
of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and
sincerity of public officials.
The trial court aptly observed that "(A)t the time of the publication of
the defamatory imputation, the plaintiff was not a candidate for any
public office there being no election to be held and his term of office
as Senator would not expire until several years more. As a member of
the Senate of the Philippines, he was answerable to said body for any
misconduct committed as a Senator because it had the authority to
take disciplinary action against any member thereof. Had the
defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because of
malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made
against an American, should have been filed with the Senate or any
 of its Committees. The defendant did not do so but instead made the
accusations publicly by causing them to be given widest publication
by all the metropolitan newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the
charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon.
Committee of the Senate."
The trial court likewise properly rejected defendant-appellant's claim
of defensive libel thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the defendant
on the argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and
accordingly the former was justified to hit back with another libel. The
emphasis laid had been misplaced and based upon a wrong premise.
The defendant was charged with the commission of certain
anomalous transactions in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works
and Communications and the same were filed with the Investigation
Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the
Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, the said charges, even
assuming that they contain defamatory imputation, would not be
libelous because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a privileged
communication." (Antonino vs. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70).

• Issue: Did the actions of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal

Security fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and not
violate the First Amendment? The Court held that the Senate
Subcommittee's actions were legitimate and did not violate the
Fund's First Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger argued that the
power to investigate, even through a compulsory mechanism like a
subpoena, is "inherent in the power to make laws." Furthermore, the
investigation was related to and aided in furthering a "legitimate task
of Congress," namely, the investigation of the Internal Security Act.
Burger disregarded the Fund's claim that the investigation was being
conducted to expose its beliefs, many of which were "unorthodox or
unpopular." He reasoned that the legitimacy of a congressional
investigatory action is not derived from the motives of the members
or by the information that the investigation uncovers (Eastland vs. US
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 US 491).

• Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v.

McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and
discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in
newsletters and press releases were not because they were not
"essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the
legislature's "deliberative process (Hutchinson vs. Proxmire, 443 US 111).”

vi) Disqualifications and Disabilities (Section 12, 13 and

 14)

Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify
the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are
authors.

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.

Disqualification When Applicable

1. Cannot hold any other office or During his term. If he does so, he
employment in the Government or forfeits his seat.
any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
GOCCS or their subsidiaries.

2. Legislators cannot be appointed If the office was created or the

to any office. emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was
elected.
3. Legislators cannot personally
 appear as counsel before any During his term of office.
court of justice, electoral tribunal,
quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies.
During his term office.
4. Legislators cannot be financially
interested directly or indirectly in
any contrct with or in any
franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or When it is for his pecuniary
instrumentality thereof, including benefit or where he may be called
any GOCC or its subsidiary. upon to act on account of his
office.
5. Legislators cannot intervene in
any matter before any office of the
government.

CASES

• The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public

officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. A strict scrutiny of
classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals. The election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class (People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 03, 2000).

vii) Discipline

CASES
• Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other
place." Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place"
than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which
petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in
debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a

fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be
disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere (Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863).
• Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the
Court to act not only in the settlement of “actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but
also in the determination of “whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of
discretion committed by any government instrumentality has
evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable
to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary,
despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains
to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any specific
Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two
 branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel
door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not,
or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people,
not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by
the Charter itself (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 128055, April 18, 2001).

c. INTERNAL GOVERNMENT (SECTION 15 AND 16)

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty
of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of
its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to
any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
 i) Sessions, Adjournment, Officers

Sessions: (Sec. 15)

Regular Sessions:
o Congress convenes once every year on the 4th Monday of July
(unless otherwise provided for by law).
o Continues in session for as long as it sees fit, until 30 days before
the opening of the next regular session, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays.

Special Sessions:
Called by the President at any time when Congress is not in session.

Adjournments:

1. Neither House can adjourn for more than 3 days during the time
Congress is in session without the consent of the other House.
2. Neither can they adjourn to any other place than that where the
two houses are sitting, without the consent of the other.

Officers: (Sec. 16)

1. Senate President
2. Speaker of the House; and
3. Such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Election of Officers
o By a majority vote of all respective
members.

Quorum to do business:
1. Majority of each House shall constitute a quorum.
2. A smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent members.
3. In computing a quorum, members who are outside the country and
thus outside of each House’s coercive jurisdiction are not included.

Discipline:
1. Suspension – needs concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its members and shall
not exceed 60 days. Or,
2. Expulsion – concurrence of 2/3 of
ALL its members.
 CASES

• The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times.

When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total." The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority",
much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing
that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the

Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group,
party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than
the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is
the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method
of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by this Court. Notably, the Rules of the
Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for
such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof . At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is
 devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their observance
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority (Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998).

ii) Quorum

Majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day ro
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner
and under such penalties as such House may determine (Sec. 16 (2), Art.
VI)

CASES

• The basis for determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate

shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and
within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.

When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall

constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference
between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority
of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum (Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17).

iii) Internal Rules

o As part of their inherent power, they can determine their own rules.
Hence, the courts cannot intervene in the implementation of these rules
insofar as they affect the members of Congress.
 CASES

• The President shall nominate and with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and air forces from the rank of captain or
commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
he maybe authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments. The other provision is
worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess.
In the former the President nominates, and only upon the consent of
the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named
assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments.
It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is
complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is
effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress (Pacete vs. Secretary of
Commission on Appointment, 40 SCRA 58).”

• The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression,

all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. It would
be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
 deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body
(Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR 127255, Aug. 14, 1997).

viii) Journals and Enrolled Bill

Journals

Enrolled Bill – is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the
certifications of the presiding officers of each House. Thus where the
certifications are valid and are not withdrawn, the contents of the
enrolled bill are conclusive upon the courts as regards the provision of
that particular bill.

Conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President (Mabanag v, Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.1).

General rule: the journal is conclusive upon the courts but an enrolled
bill prevails over the contents of the Journal.

Note: Enrolled bill prevails (Field v. Clark, 143 US 649), except to

matters, which under the Constitution, must be entered into the Journal
(Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714).

CASES

• The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among

other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep a
journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." Section
275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the
"official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
the United States and of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the
court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section
stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and
may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence
(US vs Pons, 34 Phil 729).”

• It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides
two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or
by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of
the legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding Officers and
 secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended
(Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

• It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
— the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree (Casco Chemical vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347).

• The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed

to the judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements are by it
accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity: "An omission at the time of
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion….The vital difference between initiating policy, often
involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a
formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which
choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting
law is inescapably making law (Morales vs. Subido, 27 SCRA 131).”

• Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly

approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of
the approved bill. It has been held that this procedure is merely a
mode of authentication, to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill
being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
ready for his approval or rejection. It may be noted that the enrolled
bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department
"to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if
the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity
 of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records
of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are
silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no

ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body
(Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714).

d. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

i) Composition

The Senate and the House shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be composed of:

1. 3 Supreme Court Justices to be designted by

the Chief Justices; &
2. 6 members of the Senate or House, as the
case may be.

The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Note: The congressional members of the ET’s shall be chosen on

the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and party-list organizations.

CASES

• Is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to

interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House
Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party? Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that
question. Under the said provision, the Justices held the deciding
votes, and it was impossible for any political party to control the
voting in the tribunal. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in
a sea of politicians. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the
House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared
by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. The resolution of the
House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast
his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc (Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792).

• The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) —

requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. We do not agree with petitioners' thesis. We opine that
in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the
 plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article
VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. For a Tribunal
to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and
"legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of
a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest (Abbas vs. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651).

ii) Powers

1. Sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and

qualification of their respective members (Sec. 17, Art.VI);

2. Rule-making power

CASES

• The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests

relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for
either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members
of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives
subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. Even after
the elections, the COMELEC is still empowered by Section 6 (in
relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates (Aquino vs. Comelec, GR
120265, Sept. 18, 1995).

• Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the

House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members.
Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza,
 the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo
warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days
after Daza's proclamation (Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807).

iii) Jurisdiction over Proclamation Controversy

Ø Each electoral tribunal shall be the sole judge of all CONTEST

relating to the election, returns; and qualifications of their respective
members. This includes determining the validity or invalidity of a
proclamation declaring a particular candidate as the winner.
Ø An ‘election contest’ is one where a defeated candidate challenges
the qualification and claims for himself the seat of a proclaimed
winner.
Ø In the absence of an election contest, the
Electoral Tribunal is without jurisdiction. However, the power of each
House to expel its own members or even to defer their oath-taking
until their qualifications are determines may still be exercised even
without an election contest.

CASES

• Article VI thereof states: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. . . .The foregoing
constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised
Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. In
the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta, the Court, in
interpreting the aforesaid constitutional provision, stressed the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over its members.
In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the
proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the congressional race
for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to file
an electoral protest with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) (Caruncho vs. Comelec, GR 135996, Sept. 30, 1999).

e. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (SEC. 18 & 19)

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.

Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on

Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized
with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission
on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session,
at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon
it.

i) Composition

1. Senate President as ex-officio chairman;

2. 12 Senators: and
3. 12 Members of the House.

Note: The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are elected on the basis of

proportional representation from the political parties and party-list
organizations.

Voting / Action
1. The Commission shall rule by majority vote of all
members.
2. The chairman shall only vote in case of a tie.
3. The Commission on Appointments shall act on all appointment within
30 session days from their submission to Congress.

CASES

• The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is

mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
 majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by
sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By
requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority
party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To
allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on
the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.

A political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be

able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so
that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a
membership in the Commission on Appointments. We do not agree
with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to
the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not
contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily
include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives. What the Constitution requires is that there be at
least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in
Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members
"to discharge such powers and functions herein conferred upon it
(Guingona vs. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).”

ii) Powers

1. Acts on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of

Congress from their submission; and
2. Promulgates its own rules of proceedings.

CASES

• Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
 rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress

may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.The second,
third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? In the
1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was
to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549).

f. POWERS OF CONGRESS

i) General Legislative Power

a. general plenary power (Sec. 1, Art VI);

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.

b. specific power of appropriation;

c. taxation and expropriation;
d. legislative investigations;
e. question hour.

CASES
• The doctrine is well established in the various States of the Union
that the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operates
to deprive the courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the
judicial functions. A constitutional court when exercising its proper
judicial functions can no more be unreasonably controlled by the
legislature than can the legislature when properly exercising
legislative power be subjected to the control of the courts. Each acts
independently within its exclusive field. In a certain sense these
courts are not constitutional courts. In a broader sense, and for the
purposes of construing and testing the validity of the Acts of the
Philippine Legislature, they are constitutional courts, because they,
like the Legislature, exist by virtue of a written Organic Law enacted
by the supreme legislative body. The validity of all legislative Acts
must be determined by their compliance with this Organic Law, and
the determination of the legal question of compliance or
noncompliance therewith is a judicial question, which must in the
last analysis be determined by the judiciary. This principle is
inherent in every government organized under the American system
which distributes the powers of government among executive,
legislative and judicial departments (Ocampo vs. Cabangis, 15 Phil. 626).

ii) Inherent Legislative Power

a. police power

Ø The power vested in the legislature by the constitutionto make,

ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

Law of overruling necessity – power promoting public welfare by

restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.

Basis : public necessity and the right of the State and of the public to
self-protection and self preservation.

Who may exercise: generally the legislature, but also upon valid
delegation:

1. the President
2. Administrative bodies
3. Law making bodies of LGU
 b. power of taxation

Ø power by which the State raises revenue to defray the necessary

expenses of the Government that covers persons, property, or __________.

Basis : power emanating from necessity. ( ____ theory)

Who may exercise: generally the legislature, but also upon valid
delegation:

1. Law-making bodies of LGUs (Sec. 5,

Art. X); and;
2. The President under Sec 28 (2), Art VI of the Constitution or as an
incident of emergency powers that Congress may grant to him under Sec.
23 (2), Art. VI).

c. eminent domain
Ø power of the State to forcibly take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation.

Basis : necessity of the property for public use.

Who may exercise: generally the legislature, but also upon valid
delegation:

1. the President
2. Law-making bodies of LGUs;
3. Public corporations; and
4. Quasi-public corporations

iii) Limitations

a. Substantive Limitations
- Limitations on specific powers (Section
30 and 31)

Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.

Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be

enacted.
- Bill of Rights
- Implied limitations: no irrepealable law,
non-encroachment, non-delegation

b. Procedural Limitations

-One Bill, one subject (Section 26)

Ø only one subject to be stated in the title of
the bill (Sec, 26 (1), Art. VI);
Ø Every bill shall embrace only one (1) subject, as expressed in the title
thereof, which does not have to be a complete catalogue of everything
stated in the bill. A title expressing the general subject of the bill and all
the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject is
sufficient.

Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

CASES

• The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are:

1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are
being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related
and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The
title of RA 8189 is "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a
subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS,
ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION,
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which
provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the
subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
 registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to
follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien
provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of
continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing
that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively
titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity (Guzman vs. Comelec, GR
129118, July 19, 2000).

Sufficiency of Title

CASES

• The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. To require every end
and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be
unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley

writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be
difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the
object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous
legislations connected therewith."We are convinced that the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law (Philippine Judges Assn vs. Prado, GR 105371, Nov. 11, 1993).

• The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient

standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the
power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is
included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. First, the
 question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It
may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation (Chiongbian vs. Orbos, 245
SCRA 253).

Bills that must originate exclusively from the House

Ø The initiative for filing of ART bills must come from the House, but it
does not prohibit the filing in the Senate a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from House, so long as the action by the Senate is
withheld pending the receipt of the House bill (Tolentino v. Sec. of
Finance, 235 SCRA 630).

Ø Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills (ART Bills) shall originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives (sec. 24, Art. VI).

Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

CASES

• Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not

"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law
— but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be
a rewriting of the whole (Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, GR 115455, Aug.
25, 1994).

• The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the
Senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting
its own version of a revenue bill. the power of the Senate to propose
amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as
on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact
revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is
 passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate
certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This
follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress. In sum,
while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate
may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Without
H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630.
Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H.
No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on
second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on
first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the
House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee (Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, GR 115455, Motion
for Recon., Oct. 30, 1995).

Three readings on separate days

Ø 3 readings on separate days; printed copies of the bill in its final form
distributed to members 3 days before its passage, except if President
certifies to its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency; upon its last reading, no amendment allowed and the vote
thereon taken immediately and the yeas and nays entered into the
Journal (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI).

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.

Bicameral Conference Committee

g. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (SEC. 27)

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

i) Approval of Bills

Bills that must originate in the House of Representatives:

1. Appropriation bill;
2. Revenue and tariff bills;
3. Bill authorizing increase in public
debts;
4. Bill of local application; and
5. Private bills (Sec. 24, Art. VI)

Procedure for Approval of Bills:

1. Bill is approved by both chambers;
2. President approves and signs it;
3. If the President vetoes the bill, returns the bill with presidential
objections to the House of origin. Veto may be overridden upon vote of
2/3 of all members of the House of origin and the other House and;
4. Presidential inaction for 30 days from receipt of the bill (bill becomes a
law as if the same has been signed by him.

How a Bill becomes Law;

1. Approved and signed by the President;
2. President veto overridden by 2/3 of all members of both Houses;
3. Failure of the President to veto the bill and to rturn it with his
objections to the House where it originated within 30 days after the date
of receipt;
4. A bill calling a special election for President and Vice-President under
Sec. 10, Art. VII becomes a law upon third and final reading.
 ii) Presidential veto

General Rule: If the President disapproved a bill enacted by

Congress, he should veto the entire bill. He is not allowed to veto
separate item of a bill.

Exception : Item-veto in case of appropriation, revenue and tariff bill

(Sec. 27(2), Art. VI).

Exception to The Exception:

- Doctrine of inappropriate Provision – a provision that is

constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled
out for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue “item”
(Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452)

- Executive Impoundment - refusal of the President to spend

funds already allocated by Congress for specific purpose. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Philconsa v.
Enriquez, GR. No. 1131105, Aug. 19, 1994).

iii) Pocket veto

- occurs when :

1. the President fails to act on a bill and;

2. the reason he does not return the bill to the Congress is that
Congress is not in session.

Note: Not applicable in the Philippines because inaction by the

President for 30 days never produces a veto even if Congress is in
recess. The President must still act to veto the bill and communicate
his veto to Congress without need of returning the vetoed bill with his
veto message.

iv) Item veto

Line – item veto – is the power of an executive to nullify or cancel

specific provisions of a bill, usually budget appropriations, without
vetoing the entire legislative package.

CASES
• The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she
cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto
power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the
money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President
is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including
its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has
wisely provided the "item veto powers" to avoid inexpedient riders
being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or
items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in
an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. We
distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner: "The
terms item and provision in budgetary legislations and practice are
concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the
details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. An 'item' of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill.” Thus, the
augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay
retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of
appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the
Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no
specific appropriation of money involved (Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA
133).

v) Legislative veto; One-House Veto

Legislative veto - exists in governments that separate executive and

legislative functions, action by the executive can be rejected by the
legislature.

CASES

• The legislative veto was a simple concept to retain some control

over power delegated to the president to reorganize executive branch
agencies. At the same time it became apparent that the legislative
veto might be a means for exercising congressional control over
administrative regulations. However, the rule of law states that
Congress may not promulgate a statute granting to itself a legislative
 veto over actions of the executive branch inconsistent with the
bicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
House of Representatives vetoing the Attorney General's
determination is constitutionally invalid, unenforceable, and not
binding (Immigration Service vs. Chadha, 462 US 919, 77 L.Ed.2d 317).

• The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a

part of the legislative process. That is why it is found in Article VI on
the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive
Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution. As the Constitution is explicit that the
provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must
"relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it
follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can
be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category
of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly
these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are
matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in
separate enactments ( Phil. Constitution Assn vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506).

h. POWER OF THE PURSE (SEC. 24, 25, ART. VI; 20 - Art. VII, SEC.
20 AND 22)

Article VI

Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government
as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general

appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall

strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;

however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be

disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

Article VII

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans

on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for
loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which would have
the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within

thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of
the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources
of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.

Ø No money shall be paid out of the National Treasury EXCEPT in

pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Ø BUT: This rule does not prohibit continuing appropriations. E.g. for
debt servicing. This is because the rule does not require yearly, or
annual appropriation.

Appropriation Law - a statute, the primary and specific purpose of

which is to authorize release of public funds from the treasury.
Ø The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts (Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla
and Photokina Marketing Corp. GR No. 151992, Sept. 18, 2002).

i) Implied limitations on appropriation measure

1. must specify public purpose; and

2. sum authorized for release must be determinate, or at least
determinable.

CASES

• Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the

aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio
when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of
the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the
legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when
the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a
new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation,
but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and
thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990
budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it
cannot be enforced. The Court, however, is not persuaded. Section 3,
Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This
transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by
its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then
President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in
 force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or
are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked (Guingona vs. Carague, 196
SCRA 221).

ii) Constitutional limitations and rules

Constitutional limitations on special appropriations
measures:

1. must specify public purpose for which the sum was intended; and
2. must be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer or to be raised by corresponding revenue proposal
included therein (Sec. 25(4),Art. VI).

Constitutional Rules on General Appropriations Laws (Sec. 25, Art.

VI)

Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government
as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general

appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall

strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;

however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
 (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

a. Riders

i. Is a provision which does not relate to a particular appropriation

stated in the bill.
ii. Since it is invalid provision under Section 25(2), the President may
veto it as an item.

b. Prohibition against transfer of

appropriation

Rule: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations

BUT the following may, BY LAW, be authorized to AUGMENT any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriation 1. President, 2. President of
the Senate 3. Speaker of the House of Representatives 4. Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court 5. Heads of the Constitutional Commissions

CASES

• Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James

Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject
only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose
the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is
lodged in the Congress.

The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the

project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be
as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The special
provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of
Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the
 GAA of 1994. Each member of Congress is allotted for his own
operating expenditure a proportionate share of the appropriation for
the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of
expense, Sec. 16 of GAA of 1994 allows him to transfer his allocation
in said item to another item of expense.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress

to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense
category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited
by Section 25(5) Article VI of the Constitution. Under the Special
Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members
of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the
best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether
there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that
need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval,
these two officials will have to see to it that:

(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in

the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and

(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the

items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be
made (Phil. Constitution Assn vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506).

c. Purpose

CASES

• Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the

constitution, public funds may be used only for public purpose. The
right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its
right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for
one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the
use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the
public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
 incidentally serve the public (Pascual vs. Sec. Of Public Works, 110 Phil
331).

• An attempt was made to take money out of the government

treasury, which belongs to the City of Manila, a municipal
corporation, and apply it to the payment of a debt which a public
corporation claims to have against the city. That proceeding was in
direct conflict with the express provisions of section 3 of the Jones
Law. It violates that portion of the section which says that no money
shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation by law; and the other provision which says that all
money collected on any tax levied or assessed for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund in the treasury and paid out for
such purpose only. Here, the defendants propose to take public
money from and out of the government treasury, which is in a special
fund, and which was assessed, levied and collected for a special
purpose, and pay it over to a public corporation. No authority has
been cited, and none will ever be found to legalize such a proceeding
(Manila to pay the claim of the Metropolitan Water District against
the City of Manila (City of Manila vs. Posadas, 48 Phil 390).

• The question raised refers to the alleged violation of the

Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of
the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public
money or property shall ever be appropriated ...for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church... except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium. The prohibition herein
expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church
and state. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No.
4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to
the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the
case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government ( Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64
Phil 201).”

i. POWER OF TAXATION (SEC. 28)

Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents

appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

CASES

• If the Legislature has the power to impose a tax... then "the

judicial cannot prescribed to the legislative department of the
Government limitation upon the exercise of its acknowledge powers."
That the Philippine Legislature has the power to impose such taxes,
we think there can be no serious doubt, because "the power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent,
that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any
restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. It reaches to every trade or occupation;
to every object of industry, use, or enjoyment; to every species of
possession; and it imposes a burden which, in case of failure to
discharge it, may be followed by seizure and sale or confiscation of
property. No attribute of sovereignty is more pervading, and at no
point does the power of the government affect more constantly and
intimately all the relations of life than through the exactions made
under it." If a case were presented where the abuse of the taxing
power of the local legislature was to extreme as to make it plain to
the judicial mind that the power had been exercised for the sole
purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed
consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which
the Philippine Government rests, then it would be the duty of the
courts to say that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of
the power, but was the exercise of an authority not conferred. The
only limitation, in so far as these questions are concerned, placed
 upon the Philippine Legislature in the exercise of its taxing power is
that found in section 5 of the Philippine Bill, wherein it is declared
"that the rule of taxation in said Islands shall be uniform." A tax is
uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject of it is found. The words "uniform
throughout the United States," as required of a tax by the
Constitution, do not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geographical,
uniformity, and such uniformity is therefore the only uniformity
which is prescribed by the Constitution. "Uniformity," as applied to
the constitutional provision that all taxes shall be uniform, means
that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.
The rule does not require taxes to be graded according to the value of
the subject or subjects upon which they are imposed, especially
those levied as privilege or occupation taxes. We can hardly see
wherein the tax in question constitutes double taxation. The fact that
the land upon which the billboards are located is taxed at so much
per unit and the billboards at so much per square meter does not
constitute "double taxation." Double taxation, within the true
meaning of that expression, does not necessarily affect its validity.
And again, it is not for the judiciary to say that the classification
upon which the tax is based "is mere arbitrary selection and not
based upon any reasonable grounds." The Legislature selected signs
and billboards as a subject for taxation and it must be presumed
that it, in so doing, acted with a full knowledge of the situation
(Churchill vs. Concepcion, 34 Phil 969).

• The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land

tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the
parties who presides over the church and who has to take care of
himself in order to discharge his duties. In therefore must, in the
sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but
also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of
man. Except in large cities where the density of the population and
the development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land
for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case
of a convent, it use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which
comes under the exemption. In regard to the lot which formerly was
the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for
commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being
used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious
festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions,
which also comes within the exemption. Malcolm, in his dissenting
opinion elucidate that The Assessment Law exempts from taxation
"Cemeteries or burial grounds . . . and all lands, buildings, and
improvements use exclusively for religious . . . purposes, but this
 exemption shall not extend to property held for investment, or which
produces income, even though the income be devoted to some one or
more of the purposes above specified." (Administrative Code, sec.
344; Act No. 2749, sec. 1.) That is the applicable law (Bishop of Nueva
Segovia vs. Prov. Board, 51 Phil 352).

• A tax refers to a financial obligation imposed by a state on persons,

whether natural or juridical, within its jurisdiction, for property
owned, income earned, business or profession engaged in, or any
such activity analogous in character for raising the necessary
revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government. An often-
quoted definition is that of Cooley: "Taxes are the enforced
proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the
state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and
for all public needs." As distinguished from other pecuniary
burdens, the differentiating factor is that the purpose to be
subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax then is neither a penalty
that must be satisfied or a liability arising from contract. Much less
can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee as a
manifestation of an exercise of the police power. It has been settled
law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-encompassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property
carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. Unlike
a tax, it has not for its object the raising of revenue but looks rather
to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not
only as between individuals but also as between private parties and
the political society. To quote from Cooley anew: "Legislation for these
purposes it would seem proper to look upon as being made in the
exercise of that authority ... spoken of as the police power. The
conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that the Motor Vehicle Act
requires the payment not of a tax but of a registration fee under the
police power. Hence the inapplicability of the section relied upon by
defendant-appellee under the Back Pay Law. It is not held liable for a
tax but for a registration fee. It therefore cannot make use of a
backpay certificate to meet such an obligation (Republic vs. Philippine
Rabbit Busline, 32 SCRA 211).

j. POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION (SEC. 21 AND 22)

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.

Limitation on Power of Legislative Investigation:

1. must be in aid of legislation;

2. in accordance with duly published rules of procedure; and
3. right of person appearing in, or affected by such inquiry shall be
respected.

Legislative
Question Hour (Sec. Investigation
22) (Sec. 21)

As to persons who may Only a department Any person

appear head

As to who conducts the Committees

investigation Entire body

As to the subject matter Any matter for the

Matters related to the purpose of
department only legislation

CASES

• E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive

officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the
possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such
withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of
the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise
 known as the power of inquiry, is in order.The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-
extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a
proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject
of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the
operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold
that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who
are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
From the discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege,
both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle
emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of
being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464),
GR 169777).

• The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both

houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The
power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self
(Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767).

• The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential

and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information — which is not frequently true — recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
 requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to congress the power
to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by
necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any
other person. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within
the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.
The power of the Court is limited to determining whether the
legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or
investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court
cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of
Congressional discretion; and, it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness
is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the
separation of powers (Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29).

• It was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the
authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question
pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the
information, i. e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive
power. It is now contented by petitioner that if he committed an
offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because
he refused to reveal the identity of the person in accordance with the
demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish
him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought through the
ordinary processes of the law, i.e., by the institution of a criminal
action in a court of justice. American legislative bodies, after which
our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if the
contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the
legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its
legitimate functions. The principle that Congress or any o fits bodies
has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to
effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it
 cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme
within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of
the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must
resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because
it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity (Arnault vs. Balagtas, 97 Phil
358).

k. POWER TO DECLARE EXISTENCE OF STATE OF WAR

CASES

• By Acts of Congress the President is authorized to call out the

militia and use the military and naval forces to suppress insurrection
against the government of a state or the U.S. The proclamation of the
blockade is official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state
of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a
measure. The President was bound to meet the war in the shape it
presented itself, without waiting for Congress. Congress passed an
Act “approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts,
proclamations, and orders of the President as if they had been issued
and done under the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress (The Prize Cases, 67 US 635, 17 L.Ed. 459).

• Whether the U.S. involvement was a “War,” and if so could the

petitioner be ordered by the Executive to participate absent a
declaration? The rule is that Congress shall have the power to
declarations of war. Court ruled the issue was not justiciable, lacked
a controversy on which a determination could be rendered. Conflicts
between the Congress and the President are not justiciable issues the
petitioner can raise. The plaintiff argued that the Vietnam conflict is
not a war, and if so, Congress has not declared it to be such. The
defendant argue that the President can take emergency action to
protect the security of the U.S. and further military action only
requires approval of Congress not a formal declaration of war (Mora vs.
McNamara, 389 US 934, 19 L.Ed. 2D 287).
l. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (SEC. 32)

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Initiative – power of the people to propose amendments to the

Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election
called for the purpose.

Referendum - power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation

through an election called for that purpose.

CASES

• Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2.

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of

this right. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. This provision is not self-executory.

If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the

implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
 right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to

the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our
reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt
that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution
which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass (Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR 127325, March 19, 1997).

i) Indirect Initiative

Ø Exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to the

Congress or the local legislative body for action.

CASES

• There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a

referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and
Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other,
thus:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to

the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.There are three (3) systems of
initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on
statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through

a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
 (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of
two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition
to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people
to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he
explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt
or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative
body and which in most cases would without action on the part of
electors become a law." The process and the voting in an initiative
are understandably more complex than in a referendum where
expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" of "No" in the
ballot.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration
and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its
authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue
relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of
these "people-power" features of our Constitution (SBMA vs. COMELEC,
GR 125416, Sept. 26, 1996).

ii) Recall

CASES

• Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before

the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a
public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the
absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not
undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the
people in a representative democracy. Section 3 of its Article X also
reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code
which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
 referendum. . ..”The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337
entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983." Section 54 of its
Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of
local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government
unit concerned. Effective January 1, 1992, Congress enacted R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991which
provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a
preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed
of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities. The alternative mode of
initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is an
innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the
effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the
performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this
mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the
Constitution (Garcia vs. COMELEC, GR 111511, Oct. 5, 1993).

iii) Loss of confidence, a political question

CASES

• Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost

confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 9 "Loss of
confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by
the same electorate. 10 The constituents have made a judgment and
their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been
ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the
signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for
the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid
and has legal effect (Evardone vs. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464, 472).