Case Title
Rule 60 - REPLEVIN
G.R. No. 102998 July 5, 1996
BA Finance Corporation vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals and Roberto M.
Reyes
VITUG
G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993
Romeo S. Chua vs. The Hon.
Court Of Appeals, Dennis Canoy
And Alex De Leon
BIDIN
Ruling Where the court awards damages based on Articles 19 and 20 of the
New Civil Code and not on the deprivation of personal properties
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and
of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to
regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained
from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would
G.R. No. 86792 March 21, 1990
allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action
Spouses Marino and Lina Joel
and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature
Sapugay vs. Hon. Court of
and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
Appeals, Mobil Philippines, Inc.
and Ricardo Cardenas
The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his
REGALADO
right to the possession of the property and his legal basis therefor.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established.
A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced
only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his
obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin, in the instant case,
has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure of the object
covered by the chattel mortgage.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for
property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown
that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The
reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would
be interference with the possession before the function of the law had
been performed as to the process under which the property was
A.M. NO. P-07-2384 June 18,
taken.
2008
Kenneth Hao vs. Abe Andres,
Where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there
Sheriff IV, RTC 16, Davao City
is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by
QUISUMBING
the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting claims over the seized
property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or
an interpleader ​filed by the Government in the proper court​, not
necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however,
where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the
filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "​dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its
reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of
complainant,​" or the criminal information has actually been
commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are
conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to
question the validity of the search warrant in the ​same court which
issued it and not in any other branch of the said court.
subject of the replevin bond, recourse on the bond for the payment of
such damages is not proper.
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against
any loss that he may suffer by being compelled to surrender the
possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the action. He
cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed
to have the judgment entered for the return of the property. Nor is the
surety liable for payment of the judgment for damages rendered
against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for
fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and
unconnected with the defendant's deprivation of possession by the
plaintiff. Indeed, even where the judgment was that the defendant
was entitled to the property, but no order was made requiring the
plaintiff to return it or assessing damages in default of a return, it was
declared that until judgment was entered that the property should be
restored, there could be no liability on the part of the sureties.
The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately
delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the
seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in
delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for
whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds
no legal justification.
Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain
ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter.
Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific reason
or objective. ​In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to
give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the
bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the return of
the property by filing a counterbond​.
It must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in
replevin is executed by taking possession of the property specified
therein, such property is in ​custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is
Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he
passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he
committed a clear neglect of duty.
 Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of There was no trial on the merits. The Regional Trial Court's dismissal
replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of for failure to prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice to re-filing.
Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor In this particular instance, any writ of seizure, being merely ancillary
of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. to the main action, becomes ​functus oficio. The parties returned to
the status quo as if no case for replevin had been filed. Thus, upon
G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013
Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for petitioner to return the
Spouses Deo Agner and Maricon
never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of van to Asuten.
Agner vs. BPI Family Savings
a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot
Bank, Inc.
be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is
PERALTA
the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or finally decided, resolved, or terminated, regardless of whether the
concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully applicant fails to renew the bond. The applicant will be liable to the
granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent surety for any payment the surety makes on the bond, but only up to
to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, the amount of this bond.
there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.
G.R. No. 210950 Aug. 15, 2018 Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only
Milagros P. Enriquez vs. the Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond be double
In other words, ​to recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. the value of the property.
bond for preliminary attachment, injunction or receivership), it is LEONEN
necessary: There is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ of
seizure in a replevin be double the value of the property. The bond
(1) that the defendant-claimant has secured a favorable judgment in functions not only to indemnify the defendant in case the property is
G.R. No. 195450 Feb. 1, 2017
the main action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause of action and lost, but also to answer for any damages that may be awarded by the
Development Bank of the
was not, therefore, entitled to the provisional remedy of replevin; court if the judgment is rendered in defendant's favor.
Philippines vs.
(2) that the application for damages, showing claimant's right thereto
Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio, In His
and the amount thereof, be filed in the same action before trial or Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a judgment on
Capacity as Presiding Judge,
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes the merits in the defendant's favor, and second, an application by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
executory; defendant for damages. Neither circumstance appears in this case.
Davao City, Country Bankers
(3) that due notice be given to the other party and his surety or When petitioner failed to produce the van, equity demanded that
Insurance Corporation, Dabay
sureties, notice to the principal not being sufficient; and Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the value of the van. The
Abad, Hatab Abad, Omar Abas,
(4) that there should be a proper hearing and the award for damages Regional Trial Court would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of the
Hanapi Abdullah, Rojea Ab
should be included in the final judgment. entire bond in Asuten's favor, considering that there was no trial on
Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex
the merits or an application by Asuten for damages.
Abedin, Et Al., Represented By
Likewise, to avoid multiplicity of suits, all incidents arising from the
Their Attorney-In-Fact, Mr. Manuel
same controversy must be settled in the same court having Rule 61 – SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
L. Te
jurisdiction of the main action. Thus, the application for damages
MENDOZA
must be filed in the court which took cognizance of the case, with due G.R. No. L-59906 Oct. 23, 1982
notice to the other parties. Buenaventura San Juan vs. Hon. The order of December 24 fixing the amount of support pendente lite
Manuel E. Valenzuela, Judge of is not final in character in the sense that it can be the subject of
In this case, DBP filed the application for damages long after the the Court of First Instance of Rizal modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the
order of dismissal had become final and executory. and Dorotea Mejia ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
ESCOLIN

Miscellaneous Provisional Remedies

 SEC. 14. ​Interim Reliefs. — Upon filing of the petition or at anytime
before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:
● Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or
judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
G.R. Nos. 184379-80 April 24,
immediate family be protected in a government agency or
2012
by an accredited person or private institution capable of
Rodolfo Noel Lozada, Jr., Violeta
keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an
Lozada and Arturo Lozada vs.
organization, association or institution referred to in Section
President Gloria Macapagal
3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the
Arroyo
officers involved.
SERENO
● Inspection Order. — The court, justice or judge, upon
verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession or control of a designated land or
other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.
A.M.NO.07-9-12-SC
25 SEPT. 2007
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized
Interim Reliefs under Writ of
to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of
Amparo
making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect
the constitutional rights of all parties. The order ​shall expire five (5)
days after the date of its issuance​, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.
● Production Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon
verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or
electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence
G.R. No. 230324 Sept. 19, 2017
relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit
Lorie Marie Tomas Callo vs
their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf
Commissioner Jaime H. Morente
of the movant.
CARPIO
● Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to
the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty
and security. Having been originally intended as a response to the
alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address
the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action.
Section 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the
parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence, or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals
the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to
have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing amparo situations.
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty, or security has
already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action
to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously
provide relief to violations of a person’s constitutional right to life,
liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other
hand, enforced disappearances has been defined by the Court as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law.
Elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA
No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz:
● That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
● That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
● That it be followed by the State or political organization’s
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
 whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is
● That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the
of time. same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the
right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where
he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national
security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
Section 7. ​Special Provisional Remedies.​ - In cases of violence
among immediate family members living in the same domicile or SEC. 27. ​Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank
household, the ​Family Court may issue a restraining order against the Deposits, Accounts, and Records.​ - The provisions of Republic Act
Republic Act No. 8369
accused of defendant upon verified application by the complainant or No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of
An Act Establishing Family Courts,
the victim for relief from abuse. the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle
Granting them Exclusive Original
anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of
Jurisdiction over Child and Family
The court may order the ​temporary custody of children in all civil probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) ​a person
Cases
actions for their custody. The court may also order ​support pendente charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to
lite​, including ​deduction from the salary and ​use of conjugal home commit terrorism​, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
and other properties in all civil actions for support​. organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member
of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or
group of persons, may ​authorize in writing any police or law
enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized
in writing by the anti-terrorism council ​to: (a) examine, or cause the
Republic Act No. 9372 examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
Provisional Remedies under records in a bank or financial institution​; and (b) gather or cause the
Human Security Act of 1997 gathering of any relevant information about such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or
financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall
not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired
information, when so, ordered by and served with the written order of
the Court of Appeals. (*​an exception to the Bank Secrecy Law​)

SEC. 28. ​Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and

Records​. - The ​written order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the
examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism​; (2) of any judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or
group of persons in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering
of any relevant information about the same from said bank or
financial institution, ​shall only be granted by the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals ​upon an ex parte application to that effect of a
police or of a law enforcement official ​who has been duly authorized
in writing to file such ex parte application ​by the Anti-Terrorism
Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte
application, ​and ​upon examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts
that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records​: (1) of
the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of persons; or (3)
of any member of such organization, association, or group of
persons.
SEC. 39. ​Seizure and Sequestration​. - The ​deposits and their
outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other
implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1)
to any person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional
Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism​; (2) to a judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member of
such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized,
sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or
conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security
of the people or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as
may be reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family
including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's
medical needs upon approval of the court​.
Republic Act No. 9262 March 8,
2004
An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
therefore, and for other purposes
SECTION 8. ​Protection Orders​. - A protection order is an order
issued under this act ​for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this
Act and ​granting other necessary relief​. The relief granted under a
protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently
regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order
shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection
orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection
order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent
protection order (PPO).
SECTION 14. ​Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How. - ​Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the ​Punong Barangay o ​ rdering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b)
of this Act. A ​Punong Barangay ​who receives applications for a BPO
shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ​ex parte ​determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay ​is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. I​ f the BPO is issued by a ​Barangay Kagawad t​ he order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the ​Barangay Kagawad
that the ​Punong Barangay ​was unavailable at the time for the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ​ex parte B ​ PO, the ​Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad ​shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is
personal service.
SECTION 15. ​Temporary Protection Orders. – T ​ emporary
Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the
court on the date of filing of the application after ​ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in
a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall
be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on
the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the
TPO.
SECTION 16. ​Permanent Protection Orders.​ – Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the court
after notice and hearing.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where the court is
unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued
is due to expire, the court shall continuously extend or renew the TPO
 for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until final
judgment is issued.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in
Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until revoked by
a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was
issued.
to determine whether the TEPO may be extended until the
termination of the case.
The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor the
existence of acts that are the subject matter of the TEPO even if
issued by the executive judge, and may lift the same at any time as
circumstances may warrant.

A.M. NO. 00-8-10-SC December
2, 2008
Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the
must determine whether or not the PPO shall become final. Even in a issuance of a TEPO.
dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear Section 10. ​Prohibition against temporary restraining order
showing that the act from which the order might arise did not exist. (TRO) and preliminary injunction.​ - Except the Supreme Court, no
court can issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against lawful
actions of government agencies that enforce environmental laws or
Section 7. ​Stay Order. - If the court finds the petition to be sufficient prevent violations thereof.
in form and substance, it shall; not later than five (5) working days
from the filing of the petition, ​issue an order: (a) appointing a
rehabilitation receiver and fixing his bond​; (b) ​staying
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and
whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise,
against the debtor, its guarantors and persons not solidarily
liable with the debtor​; ​provided​, that the stay order shall not cover
claims against letters of credit and similar security arrangements
issued by a third party to secure the payment of the debtor's
obligations; ​provided, further​, that the stay order shall not cover
foreclosure by a creditor of property not belonging to a debtor under
corporate rehabilitation; ​provided, however​, that where the owner of
such property sought to be foreclosed is also a guarantor or one who
is not solidarily liable, said owner shall be entitled to the benefit of
excussion as such guarantor; xxxxx

The issuance of a stay order does not affect the right to commence
actions or proceedings insofar as it is necessary to preserve a claim
against the debtor.

Section 1. ​Attachment in environmental cases. - The provisional

AM 09-6-8-SC April 13, 2010
Rules of Procedure In
Environmental Cases
remedy of attachment under Rule 127 of the Rules of Court may be
availed of in environmental cases.
Section 8. ​Issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO). - If it appears from the verified complaint with a prayer
for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) that the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury, ​the executive judge of the
multiple-sala court before raffle or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court as the case may be, may issue ex parte a ​TEPO
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from date of the receipt of
the TEPO by the party or person enjoined. Within said period, the
court where the case is assigned, shall conduct a summary hearing

Spousal support (also called maintenance) is financial support to help
with living expenses paid to a former spouse under an agreement or
court order. You can apply for spousal support if:
● you were married,
● you lived together in a marriage-like relationship for at least
two years, or
● you lived in a marriage-like relationship for less than two
years and have a child together.
Section 1. ​When Issued, - Upon receipt of a verified petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon application under oath of
any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may issue
provisional orders and protection orders with or without a hearing.
These orders may be enforced immediately, with or without a bond,
and for such period and under such terms" and conditions as the
court may deem necessary.
PROVISIONAL ORDERS
A.M. NO. 02-11-12-SC ● spousal support;
Spousal Support ● child support to the common children of the spouses
Section 3. ​Child Support. - The common children of the spouses
shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or
both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.
● child custody
The court may award provisional custody in the following order
of preference: (1) to both parents jointly; (2) to either parent taking
into account all relevant considerations under the foregoing
paragraph, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit; (3} to the surviving grandparent, or
if there are several of them, to the grandparent chosen by the child
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the
grandparent is unfit or disqualified; (4) to the eldest brother or sister
over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(5) to the child's actual custodian over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; or (6) to any other person deemed by the
court suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the child.
● visitation rights
● hold departure order (pending resolution of the petition, no
child of the parties shall be brought out of the country
without prior order of the court; and
Section 6. ​Hold Departure Order​. - Pending resolution of the
petition, no child of the parties shall be brought out of the country
without prior order from the court.
The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may
issue ex-parte a hold departure order, addressed to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, directing it not to allow the departure of
the child from the Philippines without the permission of the court.
The Family Court issuing the hold departure order shall furnish
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation of the Department of Justice a copy of the hold departure
order issued within twenty-four hours from the time of its issuance
and through the fastest available means of transmittal.
● order of protection
● administration of common property
Section 8. ​Administration of Common Property​. - If a spouse
without just cause abandons the other or-fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the court may, upon application of the
aggrieved party under oath, issue a provisional order appointing the
applicant or a third person as receiver or sole administrator of the
common property subject to such precautionary conditions it may
impose.
The receiver or administrator may not dispose of or encumber
any common property or specific separate property of either spouse
without prior authority of the court.
The provisional order issued by the court shall be registered in
the proper Register of Deeds and annotated in all titles of properties
subject of the receivership or administration.
Rule 62 - INTERPLEADER
 The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks
that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon
the same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among
themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or
payment of the obligation. "The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability."
G.R. No. L-25138 Aug. 28, 1969
Rule 62, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court requires as an
Jose A. Beltran, et al.
indispensable element that "​conflicting claims upon the same
vs. People's Homesite & Housing
subject matter are or may be made" against the
Corporation
plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the
TEEHANKEE
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants​."
The record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by
defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may
properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate
among themselves. ​While the two defendant corporations may
have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such
conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they
involve or affect the plaintiffs​.
There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the
defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the
aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the
defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the
G.R. No. L- 26443 March 25,
action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
1969
Makati Development Corporation
Where the conflicting claims involve the right to receive a particular
vs. Pedro C. Tanjuatco and
sum, the amount of the sum claimed determines the jurisdiction. The
Concrete Aggregates
issue is who between or among the defendants is entitled to collect
CONCEPCION
the same and the amount is the object of the action. There is no merit
in the contention that the subject matter of the litigation is not the
sum, but the right “to compel the defendants to litigate among
themselves.
G.R. NO. 193494 March 7, 2014
Lui Enterprises Inc. vs. Zuellig
Pharma Corp. and the Philippine
Bank Communications
LEONEN
G.R. No. L-23851 Mar. 26, 1976
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club,
Inc. vs. Lee E. Won alias Ramon
Lee and Bienvenido A. Tan
CASTRO
Rule 63 – DECLARATORY RELIEFS AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
At any rate, ​an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be
declared ​in default​. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, ​a claimant who fails to answer within the
required period may, on motion, be declared in default​.
The ​consequence of the default is that the ​court may "​render
judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in
respect to the subject matter​." The Rules would not have allowed
claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would
"​ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit​."
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a
position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must be prepared to
show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder
defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said
suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to
proceed to final judgment. It was aware of the conflicting claims of the
appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long
before it filed the present interpleader suit. Yet it did not interplead
Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation and to defend itself
therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it
and said judgment has already been executed. It is therefore too late
for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader
To now permit the Corporation to bring Won to court after the latter's
successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the
membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish
the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of
interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits
of the favorable judgment.

G.R. No. 137794 Aug. 11, 2010
Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo vs. Hon. Judge Belen B.
Ortiz
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 175064 Sept. 18, 2009
Province of Camarines Sur,
represented by Governor Luis
Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr.
vs. Honorable Court of Appeals;
and City of Naga, represented by
Mayor Jesse M. Robredo
CHICO-NAZARIO
The ​first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been
defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are
affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a
declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The ​second
paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an
instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate
ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.
The subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory
relief are exclusive​, ​viz:​ Under this rule, only a person who is
interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an
action to determine any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder." This means that the subject matter must refer to a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or
ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of
expressio unius est exclussio alterius​.
A court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the
purview of the words "other written instrument​," as contended by
appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already
provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may
be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient
prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute;
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only
issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
● there must be a justiciable controversy between persons
whose interests are adverse;
● the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and
● the issue is ripe for judicial determination
G.R. No. 150806 Jan. 28, 2008
Eufemia Almeda and Romel
Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing
Industries, Inc.
NACHURA
G.R. No. L-27247 April 20, 1983
Baguio Citizens Action Inc., and
Junior Chamber of Baguio City,
Inc. vs. the City Council and City
Mayor of the City of Baguio
DE CASTRO
Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as
no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances.
As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in
view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In
this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory
relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on
appeal, initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the
resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory
relief, as follows:
● The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance;
● The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction;
● There must have been no breach of the documents in
question;
● There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests
are adverse;
● The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
● Adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. Therefore,
the non- joinder of persons who have claim or interest which would
be affected by the declaration is not a jurisdictional defect.
It is not a jurisdictional defect. The non-inclusion of the squatters
mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this
case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of Baguio.
In the case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court
would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties
because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council
to enact the Ordinances in question.
Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the
controversy would be binding upon the squatters.

G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
Commissioner of Customs vs
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel
BARREDO
GR No. L-29673 Nov. 12, 1987
The Visayan Packing Corporation
vs the Reparations Commission &
CA
NARVASA
G.R. No. 137794, Aug. 11, 2010
Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo vs Hon. Judge Belen B.
Ortiz
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 193978 Feb. 28, 2012
Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E.
President Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III
BRION
The declaration here is not a mere exercise in futility because a
declaration on the nullity of the ordinance, would give the squatters
no right which they are entitled to protect. The party most interested
to sustain and defend the legality of the Ordinance is the body that
passed it, the City Council, and together with the City Mayor, is
already a party in these proceedings.
Because of the absence of allegations seeking material or affirmative
reliefs in a petition for declaratory relief, it has been held that when
the main case is for declaratory relief, a third-party complaint is
inconceivable. The relief sought in this kind of pleading is
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party
defendant in respect of the claim of the plaintiff against him.
Accordingly, this relief cannot be granted because, in a declaratory
relief, the court is merely interpreting the terms of the contract.
There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory
relief that proscribes ​the filing of a counterclaim based on the
same transaction​, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A
special civil action is after all not essentially different from all ordinary
civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules
of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter
which makes necessary some special regulation. But the Identity
between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules
governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions
if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for
prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner
tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy
must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it,
except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Court's primary jurisdiction.
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are
availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.
Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
G.R. No. 176579 June 28, 2011
Wilson P. Gamboa vs. Finance
Secretary Margarito B. Teves
CARPIO
G.R. No. 167391 June 8, 2011
Phil-Ville Development and
Housing Corporation vs. Maximo
Bonifacio
VILLARAMA, JR.
Rules of Court, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to assail the
validity of EO 7.
However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition
of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has
far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court treats the
petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.
In short, it is ​well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has
far-reaching implications​. As this Court held in Salvacion:
The ​Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief​. However​, exceptions to this rule
have been recognized​. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching
implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be
treated as one for mandamus.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the
other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and
make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and
not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that
whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites
must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable
title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein. Thus, the cloud on
title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4)

G.R. No. 170656 Aug. 15, 2007
The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority and Bayani
Fernando vs. Viron Transportation
Co., Inc.
CARPIO MORALES
G.R. No. 219340, Nov. 07, 2018
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. The fourth
element is not present in the case at bar.
Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding
quasi in rem. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named a
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only
as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who joined in
the action.
The judgment in a petition for declaratory relief can be carried into
effect ​without ​requiring the parties to pay damages or perform
any act as when the petitioner’s complaint is captioned as Quieting of
Title and Damages, but all that the petitioner prayed for is for the
court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of respondent.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief
petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in
the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial
determination. The requirement of the presence of a justiciable
controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening
seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy.
An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court. It is predicated on the attendance of several
requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must
be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and
the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites were patently wanting.
Firstly​, the ​third requisite was not met due to the subject of the
action (i.e. statute) having been infringed or transgressed ​prior to the
RULE 64 – REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. Nos. 179431- 32 June 22,
2010
Luis K. Lokin, Jr., as the second
nominee of Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) vs.
Commission on Elections and the
House of Representatives
BERSAMIN
G.R. No. 185812, Jan. 13, 2015
Maritime Industry Authority vs.
Commission on Audit
LEONEN
institution of the action. ​Secondly, the apprehension of the Standard
that it could be rendered technically insolvent through the imposition
of the iniquitous taxes imposed by Section 108 and Section 184 of
the NIRC, laws that were valid and binding, did not render the action
for declaratory relief fall within the purview of an actual controversy
that was ripe for judicial determination. ​Lastly​, Standard's adequate
remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST deficiency for taxable
year 2011 was not the action for declaratory relief but an appeal
taken in due course to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the
judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the
Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
While Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general
rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for different
reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court,
while Section 3 of Rule 64 expressly provides for only thirty (30) days.
The ‘fresh-period’ rule used in Rule 65 however, does not
similarly apply to the timeliness of petitions under Rule 64.
The Court has consistently held that findings of administrative
agencies are generally respected, unless found to have been tainted
with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
The aggrieved party can assail the decision of the Commission on
Audit through a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 before this court.
A petition under Rule 64 may prosper only after a finding that the
administrative agency committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Not all errors of the
Commission on Audit is reviewable by this court.
It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment

G.R. No. 213525 Jan. 27, 2015
Fortune Life Insurance Company,
Inc. vs. Commission on Audit
(COA) Proper
BERSAMIN
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim
and despotism. We find that no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be attributed to the Commission
on Audit in this case.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from
the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of
fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due
course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court
committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or
modification of the challenged judgment or final order. In contrast, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit
(COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised
except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In
the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition
for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the
latter, ​the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed
under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned
from the notice of denial.
The belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse.
As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having
wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied.
G.R. No. 185544 Jan. 13, 2015
The Law Firm of Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
vs. The Commission on Audit
and/or Reynaldo A. Villar and
Juanito G. Espino, Jr. in their
capacities as Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively.
BERSAMIN
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
G.R. No. 200670 July 6, 2015
CLARK INVESTORS AND
LOCATORS ASSOCIATION INC.
vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
VILLARAMA, JR.
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
has a reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the
motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however, specifies that
the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings
of the constitutional commissions is thirty (30) days from receipt of
the decision, order, or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was
enacted in the Rules of Court.
The difference between Rule 64 and Rule 65 has already been
exhaustively discussed by this court in Pates v. Commission on
Elections:
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it
expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for
substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most
patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2,
Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for
the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision
or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the
intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration
deductible from the originally granted 30 days (instead of the fresh
period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following
requisites must concur:
● it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
● the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
● there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
RR 2-2012 was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on Section
244 of the NIRC. Section 244 is an express grant of authority to the
Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations
for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. And
since RR 2-2012 was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on
Section 244 of the NIRC, ​such administrative issuance is
therefore quasi-legislative in nature which is outside the scope
of a petition for certiorari.

G.R. No. 175792 Nov. 21, 2012
RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and
ARTEMIA MAGTOTO vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and
LEONILA DELA CRUZ
DEL CASTILLO
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and
with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate​. Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision of the
CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As
G.R. NO. 168088 April 3, 2007
such, this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a
SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK,
wrong mode of appeal.
INC. vs. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and DOMINIC G. AQUINO
CALLEJO, SR.
The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the
petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory.
Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters and
which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
proceedings. ​A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the proper remedy to question an improvident
interlocutory order. On the other hand, a final order is one that
disposes of the whole matter or terminates the particular proceedings
or action leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined. It is one that finally disposes of the pending
action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court.
The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character.
It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue
only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by
an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . As long
as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed
in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party
raised factual and legal issues; or a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.68
A cert writ may be issued if the court or quasi-judicial body issues an
order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.69 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Moreover, a party is entitled to a writ of certiorari only if there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate relief in the ordinary course
of law.
The raison d etre for the rule is that when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
In such a situation, the administration of justice would not survive.

G.R. No. 168612 Dec. 10, 2014
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
CORPORATION (PHILEC) vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND
MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB),
Department of Labor and
Employment, RAMON T.
JIMENEZ, in his capacity as
Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC
WORKERS' UNION (PWU),
ELEODORO V. LIPIO, and
EMERLITO C. IGNACIO
LEONEN
G.R. No. 199384 Sept. 09, 2015
LE SOLEIL INT'L. LOGISTICS
CO., INC., AND/OR BETH UMALI,
REYNANTE MALABANAN, AND
EUGENIO S. YNION, JR. vs.
VICENTE SANCHEZ, DAVID R.
CONDE, AND NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
PEREZ
Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision - not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision - the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
The proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the
award or decision before the Court of Appeals.
The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or decision
shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from
receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose
to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the
motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for
reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal."
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." An
extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari may be filed only if
appeal is not available. If appeal is available, an appeal must be
taken even if the ground relied upon is grave abuse of discretion.
As an exception to the rule, this court has allowed petitions for
certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal "(a) when the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when
the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs
issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
A petition for certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed.8 The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of
parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Rules of procedure must
be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules
prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.
Applying the foregoing statutory and jurisprudential rules in the case
at bar, we agree with the disquisition of the CA that petitioners failed
to seasonably perfect their appeal rendering the Decision of the
NLRC dated 25 April 2011 and its Resolution dated 14 June 2011,
final and executory.
In this case, there is no debate that petitioners incurred in delay in
filing the petition for certiorari before the appellate court. While
petitioners concede that the filing of the appeal was three days late,
they however invoke the indulgence of the Court to liberally apply the
rules to pave the way for the resolution of the case on the merits. A
careful scrutiny of the pleadings submitted by petitioners reveals,
however, that there is no compelling reason to except this case from
the operation of the general rule since none of the exceptions
enunciated in the jurisprudence is attendant herein.
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent
action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only
if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari will prosper only
if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"​Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, refers to the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice
or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
G.R. No. 230953 June 20, exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
2018 perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
GOVERNMENT SERVICE contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA patent and gross.
V. ASTUDILLO vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS - CEBU Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not
CITY AND FORMER JUDGE MA. interchangeable admits of exceptions. This Court has, before, treated
LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
PERALTA particularly: (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when
there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of rules.
. Apart from Demonteverde's bare allegations in her pleadings and
her own testimony that her case falls under the exception to the
general rule that if appeal is available, certiorari is not a remedy,
there is nothing on record that would warrant the grant of her motion
for reconsideration and the setting aside of the CA's June 19, 2014
Resolution.
 Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy is granted only under the In the case at bar, the Court finds that the interest of substantial
conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: justice warrants the relaxation of the rules and treats Visitacion’s
Petition for Certiorari as an appeal. This is especially true considering
● the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial that the same was filed within the reglementary period to file an
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of appeal.
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
● there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate G.R. No. 197665 Jan. 13, 2016
remedy in the ordinary course of law. P/S INSP. SAMSON B.
BELMONTE, SPO1 FERMO R.
GALLARDE, PO3 LLOYD F.
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of SORIA, PO1 HOMER D.
G.R. No. 176508 Jan. 12, 2015 In the foregoing pronouncement, petitioners herein directly elevated
authority; there is ​excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends GENEROSO, PO1 SERGS DC.
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO the instant case before the Court failing to advance any compelling
its power or acts without any statutory authority; ​grave abuse of MACEREN, PO3 AVELINO L.
ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF reason for the Court to allow the same. In fact, ​they even raised
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of GRAVADOR, PO2 FIDEL O.
BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. issues concerning public respondent’s factual findings, contrary
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other GUEREJERO, and PO1 JEROME
vs. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, to the rule that parties who appeal directly to this Court must
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by T. NOCHEFRANCA, JR. vs.
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, only raise questions of law. It is clear, therefore, that the Court
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility; and such exercise OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, has ample reason to dismiss petitioners’ recourse.
is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL
or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all MILITARY AND OTHER LAW
REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON
in contemplation of law. ENFORCEMENT OFFICES,
CITY
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
BERSAMIN
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in the Court is in PERALTA
disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the
writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed
extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court ordinances for the payment of garbage was done in the exercise of its
enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial function.
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY
afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more A respondent is said to be exercising ​judicial function ​where he has
MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There being the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
CITY, CITY TREASURER OF
violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
QUEZON CITY, AND CITY
dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
Quasi-judicial function​, on the other hand, is “a term which applies
PERALTA
to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
The Court had extensively differentiated an appeal from certiorari. bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
Thus, it is settled that appeal and certiorari are two different remedies facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
which are generally not interchangeable, available to the litigants. their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
G.R. No. 194214 Jan. 12, 2015
Further, in Butuan Development Corporation vs. CA, the Court held
MARILOU
that the special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for an The OSG correctly argued that the respondents, in their official
PUNONGBAYAN-VISITACION vs. G.R. No. 209283 March 11, 2015
appeal. Nevertheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari capacities as ​Chairperson and Members of the CHR, did not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES CECILIA RACHEL V.
are not interchangeable admits exceptions, to wit: (a) when public engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions; they did not
AND CARMELITA P. QUISUMBING vs. LORETTA ANN
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties
PUNONGBAYAN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V.
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are but simply undertook to initiate the investigation of the
MARTIRES CARDONA and NORBERTO
null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry was not a
DELA CRUZ, in their capacities as
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith, quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties
Chairperson and Members,
exception (c) applies to the present case. were heard and penalties were imposed. It was at most, an
respectively, of the COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
BRION
G.R. No. 207145 July 28, 2015
GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO
BENEDICT P. GALON,
DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V.
APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S.
OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA,
NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C.
CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q.
ROSALES, MA. LUISA
NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE
PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,
INC. vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T.
ONA, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Health
(DOH); and FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC)
PERALTA
exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct
and different from the concept of adjudication. The power to
initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own
distinct personality and is recognized by no less than the
Constitution.5 Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in its actions.
In issuing and implementing the subject circulars, respondents were
not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to
exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. ​The issuance
and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH
of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of
their quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the
nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in their
exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of
the government.
Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie
against herein respondents' issuances. It is beyond the province
of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in
jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error committed by a court,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless
such court, board, or officer thereby acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the ​correction of errors of
jurisdiction​, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse
of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
With respect to the Court, however, ​the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C.
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the
BERSAMIN
second paragraph of Section 1.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set
right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected
parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
republican system of checks and balances.

G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA,
Presiding Judge, MCTC,
Compostela-New Bataan,
Compostela Valley Province vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
REYES
G.R. No. 212686, Sept. 28, 2015
SERGIO R. OSMENA III vs.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, EMMANUEL R.
LEDESMA, JR., SPC POWER
CORPORATION AND THERMA
POWER VISAYAS, INC.
VILLARAMA, JR.
It is clear that the ​JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself
any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. ​However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
G.R. No.173861 July 14, 2014
JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC ​and
BASIT vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
in the exercise of its expanded judicial power​, the Court assumes
COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF
jurisdiction over the present petition. ​But in any event, even if the
SAN FERNANDO; (Pampanga)
Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition
represented by its Presiding Judge
should still be dismissed.
HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S.
FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
The Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the
CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not only to settle actual
PAMPANGA and ALLIED
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
DOMECQ PHILIPPINES, INC.
enforceable but, to determine whether or not there has been a grave
DEL CASTILLO
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. ​We thus
have the duty to take cognizance of allegations of grave abuse
of discretion in this case, involving the sale by PSALM of a
power plant, which supposedly contravenes the policy on
competitive public bidding.
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein
the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, ​when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court
will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the
defendant, ​any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected
only by appeal. The determination made by the trial court
regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its
jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in
making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of
jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that ​rulings of the trial court
on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during
the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be
the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. ​They
must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly
taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits
of the case.
Any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment
of evidence is correctible by appeal, not certiorari, as the same would
only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. In
particular, the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude
Evidence based on its assessment that the evidence sought to be
suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the proper exercise
of its jurisdiction. Assuming that the RTC’s determination is
erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but of
judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.

G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in
AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS,
accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
INC. (CREBA)
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted
vs. THE SECRETARY OF
in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any
AGRARIAN REFORM
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.
PEREZ

G.R. No. 208587 July 29, 2015
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC
COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.
DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS,
KENNETH PACIS, and SHIRLEY
DOMINGUEZ vs. CECILIA
LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP, and
PURITA DOMINGUEZ
VELASCO, JR.
G.R. No. 140189 Feb. 28, 2005
GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME
SERVICES CORPORATION
(GSMSC), FERRY CASINOS
LIMITED and PIONEER
INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION vs. JENNIFER
ANNE B. ACUA, HAYDEE ANNE
B. ACUA, MARITES T. CLARION,
MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ,
GRACIELA M. TORRALBA and
MARY PAMELA A. SANTIAGO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise
when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually
used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful
and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise
of discretion is imperative.
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that ​there are
three material dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari​ brought under Rule 65:
● the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received;
● the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration
when one such was filed; and
● the date when notice of the denial thereof was received.
This requirement is for the purpose of determining the timeliness of
the petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to
perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and
executory.
As a general rule, these requirements are mandatory, meaning,
non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.
In the case before us, ​the failure to comply with the rule on a
statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since
the dates are evident from the records.
Indeed, where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment
rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their
due weight because labor determinations should not only be
secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem. ​In this case, the
Court of Appeals aptly found compelling reasons to disregard
respondents procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent
injustice.
G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014
Jesus G. Crisologo and Nanette B.
Crisologo vs. JEWN
Agro-Industrial Corporation
G.R. No. 175723 Feb. 4, 2014
The ​City of Manila​, represented
by Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., and
Ms. Liberty M. Toledo, in her
Capacity as the City Treasurer of
Manila vs. ​Hon. Caridad H.
Grecia-Cuerdo​, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay
City; SM Mart, Inc.; SM Prime
Holdings, Inc.; Star Appliances
Center; Supervalue, Inc.; Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc.;
Watson Personal Care Stores,
Phils., Inc.; Jollimart Phils., Corp.;
Surplus Marketing Corporation
And Signature Lines
PERALTA
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their
averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses
Crisologo in the case prevents the latter’s recourse via Rule 65.
However, is an exception​. ​In many instances, the Court has
ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to
promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. ​Rules of procedure are
tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice;
thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving
reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to
aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause.
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the
recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong the
denial of due process to the persons whose interests are
indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a
protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a
petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last
remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. ​To prevent
multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of
justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down
the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part
of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it.
Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo
were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this
controversy arose.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases.
In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ
of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
 perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.
Also, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when
there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules as when
there is a significant.
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted
exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the
authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. ​This case tests the
constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of
key government institutions - namely, the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution.

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November
10, 2015
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman vs.
Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.
PERLAS-BERNABE
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with xxx the ​principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of proceedings before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or
certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that [d]ue
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for
opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or the final determination of the petition [for certiorari] before taking
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was
factual circumstances of the case. before this [C]ourt.
G.R. No. 180147, Jan. 14, 2015
Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. ​vs.
Jurisprudence states that ​"[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the We, however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial
Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al
mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of courtesy in Go v. Abrogar and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these
PEREZ
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine cases, we expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy to
the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and
speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner held that the principle of judicial courtesy applies ​only if there is a
from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of strong probability that the issues before the higher court would
the lower court or agency, x x x.​" be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court. Through these cases, we
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule clarified that the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the
requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a exception rather than the rule.
petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) ​where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
 The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
"the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the
petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal
the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. ​Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited​, because to do
so -
G.R. No. 220598 April 18, 2017
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority is not wanting to
vs. People of the Philippines and
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or
the Sandiganbayan, (First
mandamus. ​In the exercise of our superintending control over
Division)
other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
BERSAMIN
each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other
courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII. ​The prohibition
contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an
insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of
the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. ​We have had many
rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v.
Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for
certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer
to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess
of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
et al. vs. Hon. Salvador C.
Medialdea, et al
DEL CASTILLO
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that
it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of
his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for
Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would,
therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial
would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words,
the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and
different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith
will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it.
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court.

G.R. No. 231671 July 25, 2017
Alexander A. Padilla, Rene A.V.
Saguisag, Christian S. Monsod,
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Rene B.
Gorospe, and Senator Leila M. De
Lima vs. Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of the
Senate of the Philippines, as
represented by Senate President
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, and
the House of Representatives, as
represented by House Speaker
Pantaleon D. Alvarez
G.R. No. 231694
Former Sen. Wigberto E. Tanada,
Bishop Emeritus Deogracias S.
Iniguez, Bishop Broderick Pabillo,
Bishop Antonio R. Tobias, Mo.
Adelaida Ygrubay, Shamah
Bulangis and Cassandra D.
Deluria vs.
Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives,
Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel Iii,
President, Senate of the
Philippines, and Pantaleon D.
Alvarez, Speaker, House of the
Representatives
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of
certiorari.
As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a
petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise
is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
It bears to mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance
of both a writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very
same act - which, in the Tañada Petition, the non-convening by
the two Houses of the Congress in joint session - is
contradictory, as the former involves a mandatory duty which
the government branch or instrumentality must perform without
discretion, while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of
the government branch or instrumentality but which was
exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
​Nevertheless, if the Court is to adjudge the petition for certiorari
alone, it still finds the same to be without merit. To reiterate, the two
Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session
only after deliberations among their Members and putting the same to
vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. Premises
considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
did not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.
PROHIBITION
G.R. No. 164242 Nov. 28, 2008
Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and
Convoy Marketing Corporation vs.
Advertising Board of the
Philippines
Austria-Martinez
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be
entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites:
● it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or
person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial;
● the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without
or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and
● there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising ​judicial function ​by which he
has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights
of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. ​Quasi-judicial function
is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. ​Ministerial function is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of
his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a
tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and
authority of a private organization, composed of several
members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it
by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case.
The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the
use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in
a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against
private individuals or corporations so acting.

G.R. No. 238467, Feb. 12, 2019
Mark Anthony V. Zabal, Thiting
Estoso Jacosalem, and Odon S.
Bandiola vs. Rodrigo R. Duterte,
President of the Republic of The
Philippines; Salvador C.
Medialdea, Executive Secretary;
and Eduardo M. Año, [Secretary]
of the Department of Interior and
Local Government
DEL CASTILLO
Suffice it to state, however, that the use of prohibition and mandamus
is not merely confined to Rule 65. These extraordinary remedies may
be invoked when constitutional violations or issues are raised.
As far back as Tañada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally
declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and
countless others. In Tañada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.' Once a
'controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court, as in the
instant case, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
It must be stressed, though, that resort to prohibition and mandamus
on the basis of alleged constitutional violations is not without
limitations. After all, this Court does not have unrestrained authority to
rule on just about any and every claim of constitutional violation. The
petition must be subjected to the four exacting requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, viz.: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case. Hence, it is not enough that this petition mounts
a constitutional challenge against Proclamation No. 475. It is likewise
necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the
Court sustains the propriety of the recourse.
Notwithstanding petitioners' lack of locus standi, this Court will allow
this petition to proceed to its ultimate conclusion ​due to its
transcendental importance. ​After all, the rule on locus standi is a
mere procedural technicality, which the Court, in a long line of cases
involving subjects of transcendental importance, has waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters and legislators to sue in cases of public
interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by a
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014
Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A.
Fernandez and Manuel V.
Fernandez vs. Puerto Princesa
City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and
City Council of Puerto Princesa
City
MENDOZA
government act.[36] More importantly, the matters raised in this case,
involved on one hand, possible violations of the Constitution and, on
the other, the need to rehabilitate the country's prime tourist
destination.
There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately
meant to impair the right to travel. All told, the Court sustains the
constitutionality and validity of Proclamation No. 475.
MANDAMUS
Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the respondents to
pay the just compensation. Mandamus is a command issuing from a
court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of
the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce
a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is
his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which
he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds:
● that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the
action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station;
● that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which he is entitled.
On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus
cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and
will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature
of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate
to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus
lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would
be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the
public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To
preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it,
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
Arturo M. De Castro,
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement
and President Gloria Macapagal -
of municipal funds therefor.
Arroyo
BERSAMIN
The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having
already validated the claim. As such, the claimants had no alternative
except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to
adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445.
Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without
any remedy at all. Hence, petition for mandamus is not proper.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed
to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available
to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with:
● the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
● it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by law;
● the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law;
● the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
● there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the
90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution
for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will
be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby
effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time
granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment.
 The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that
sets it apart from the other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to
compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty.
In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that
mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has ​a clear legal right
to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the
respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. The
petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal
G.R. No. 160932 Jan. 14, 2013
right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling
Special People, Inc. Foundation,
duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
represented by its Chairman,
Roberti P. Cericos vs. Nestor M.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus
Canda, et al.
is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of
duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary. ​A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.
Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus
G.R. No. 173428 Nov. 22, 2010
generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not
FROILAN DEJURAS vs.
the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves
HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his
the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be performed
official capacity as Secretary of
involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be
Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF
directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It
AGRARIAN LEGAL
is, nonetheless, also available to compel action, when refused, in
ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the
LAND USE AND POLICY
exercise of judgment in a particular manner. ​However, this rule
PLANNING INSTITUTE, the
admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or
REFORM ADJUDICATION
palpable excess of authority.
BOARD, all of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief is not properly compellable by
DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO;
mandamus inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on the
ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME
part of the DAR to find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that
HOLDINGS, INC.
needs to be protected and that the acts of SMPHI are violative of
PERALTA
such right.
G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN
JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY
HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA,
WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN
BEHALF, AND BERTENI
CATALUÑA CAUSING vs. THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS,
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),
PERALTA (EN BANC)
GR NO. 213948 April 18, 2017
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI
PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC.,
CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR CULTURE
AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF
THE PHILIPPINES
CARPIO
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a
ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done​." The tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the
act specifically enjoined by law​. This is opposed to a discretionary
act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.
The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and
commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on
the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. With
respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including
his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy
ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on
the basis of academic freedom. The matters raised in the petition
were within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the court to decide.
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot
be availed against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue,
petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and
there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues
when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer
sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party
seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such
act.
The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend "to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either."

WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
G.R. Nos. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority​,
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports,
Department of Health, Department
of Agriculture, Department of
Public Works and Highways,
Department Of Budget And
Management, Philippine Coast
Guard, Philippine National Police
Maritime Group, and Department
of the Interior and Local
Government vs. ​Concerned
Residents Of Manila Bay​,
represented and joined by Divina
V. Ilas, Sabiniano Albarracin,
Manuel Santos, Jr., Dinah Dela
Peña, Paul Dennis Quintero, Ma.
Victoria Llenos, Donna Caloza,
Fatima Quitain, Venice Segarra,
Fritzie Tangkia, Sarah Joelle
Lintag, Hannibal Augustus Bobis,
Felimon Santiaguel, and Jaime
Agustin R. Oposa
VELASCO
In exceptional cases, ​the Court has granted a prayer for
mandamus to compel action in matters involving judgment and
discretion, only "to act, but not to act lone way or the other," and
only in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority.
The Supreme Court ruled that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila
Bay can be compelled by mandamus. It enumerated the enabling
laws and issuances of each concerned agency and held that the
mentioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear,
categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate
of each agency/petitioner under the law.
Petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on
one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other,
are two different concepts. The government agencies (petitioners) are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded
from choosing not to perform these duties.
It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the
petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under
them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.
G.R. No. 199199 Aug. 27, 2013
Maricris D. Dolot​, Chairman Of
The Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-Sorsogon, Petitioner
vs. ​Hon. Ramon Paje​, In His
Capacity As The Secretary Of The
Department Of Environment And
Natural Resources, Reynulfo A.
Juan, Regional Director, Mines
And Geosciences Bureau, Denr,
Hon. Raul R. Lee, Governor,
Province Of Sorsogon, Antonio C.
Ocampo, Jr., Victoria A. Ajero,
Alfredo M. Aguilar, And Juan M.
Aguilar, Antones Enterprises,
Global Summit Mines Dev't Corp.,
And Tr Ore
REYES
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be
availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined
by law. The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) ​Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of
the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of
acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the
RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would
eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus
and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the
case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the
effective performance of said tasks. ​It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final
return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds
that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction
of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of
continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing
compliance with a final judgment as ​it “permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
 The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition
for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately:
“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. – The filing of a petition
for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing
of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.”
In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. Section 15, Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases enumerates the
reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, to wit:
G.R. No. 206510 Sept. 16, 2014
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO,
petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment
Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa
granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
D.D. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
capacity as Commander of the
US. 7th Fleet
● Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
VILLARAMA
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
● Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
● Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
● Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports
on the execution of the final judgment; and
● Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, except the award of damages to individual
petitioners.
G.R. No. 207257 Feb. 3, 2015
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in
his capacity as SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR) vs. HON.
TEODORO A. CASIÑO
DEL CASTILLO (EN BANC)
G.R. No. 194239 June 16, 2015
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, on behalf of the
Residents of West Tower
Condominium and in
representation of Barangay
Bangkal, and others, including
minors and generations yet unborn
vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
FIRST GEN CORPORATION and
their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS,
JOHN DOES, and RICHARD
DOES
VELASCO JR.
The parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of
kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions
of fact— and, thus​, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and
prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal
link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the
petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the
proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was
shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of
allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under
Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file
the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation.
The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case​.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides
that ​"[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary
principle in resolving the case before it."
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the
cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the
effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established
with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is
not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of
defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different
from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the

G.R. No. 209165 April 12, 2016
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS,
INC. vs. AGHAM PARTY LIST
(represented by its President Rep.
Angelo B. Palmones)
CARPIO
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human
health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum
leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the
residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
The Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC
and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the
civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy:
● there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
● the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and
● the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the
burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated
or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and
(3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a
condition sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was
violated or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by
Agham that two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and
the Philippine Mining Act – were violated by LAMI was not adequately
substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to
establish environmental damage were mere general allegations.