A.
Article 2180
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains; in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
B. What is the principle of vicarious or imputed liability?
It states that one is not only liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but also
for those persons for whom he is responsible under the law.
The liability for the acts of others enumerated in the article is known as
vicarious liability or imputed liability.
 Respondeat superior – the negligence of the servant is conclusively
the negligence of the master.
C. What is the basis of vicarious liability?
The Principle of Pater Familias: The reason for the master’s liability is
negligence in the supervision of his subordinates. The master, however, in
pater familias will be freed from liability if he can prove that he had
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage
D. Who are persons/parties liable vicariously?
- The father and mother
- Guardians
- The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise;
- Employers
- the State
- Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
E. Who are considered minors under Art. 2180?
Minors here refer to those who are below 21 years and not to those
below 18 years. (Reason: the law reducing the majority age from 21 to
18 years DID NOT AMEND these paragraphs)
F. Is the actual tortfeasor exempt from liability? NO.
- The minor
- Pupil
- Ward
- Students
- Employee
- Apprentices
- Special agent
...who actually committed the delictual acts are not exempted by the
law from personal responsibility.
 They may be sued and made liable alone as when the person
responsible for them or vicarious obligor proves that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family
 Or when the minor or insane person has no parents or guardian =
they are answerable with their own property.
G. What is the reason for the vicarious liability of the parents?
The vicarious or civil liability of the parents is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them in proportion to their means”, while on the other hand,
gives them the rights to correct and punish them in moderation.
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H. When is the mother liable?
The mother is liable only in case of death or incapacity of the father.
I. What is the effect of the absence of the father?
If the father is absent, especially when the absence is the one referred
to under Articles 390 or 391 of the Civil Code, the mother who is present
and with whom the minor children live with will be the one vicariously
liable.
J. What are the requisites to hold parents liable vicariously?
a) The child is below 21 years
b) The child committed a tortuous act to the ddamage and prejudice
of another person.
c) The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether
single or married.
K. Exconde v. Capuno, GR No L-10134 , Apr 27 1960
L. Salen v. Balce, GR No L-14414
M. Are de facto guardians covered by paragraph 3 of Art 2180?
- De facto guardians are relatives and neighbors who take unto
themselves the duty to care and support orphaned children
without passing through judicial proceedings.
It is but just that if the children commit tortuous acts while living with
them and are below 21 years of age, the law should be applied by
analogy. This is to compel them to exercise control and supervision over
the orphans over whom they voluntarily assumed the duties of
parenthood.
N. What are the requisites of employer’s liability under
paragraph of Art 2180?
a) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another;
b) That the service is to be rendered in accordance with orders which
the employer has the authority to give at all times;
c) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.
O. Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, GR No 174156
P. Discuss the vicarious liability of owners and managers.
Paragraph 4 of Article 2180 refers to owners and managers of
establishments and enterprises and those who have employees under
them. In effect, the owners are employers if they are also the managers
of their establishments or enterprises. A mere manager, who does not
own the business, is not to be considered an employer because as
manager, he is just a high class employee. HOWEVER, a manager who
is not an owner but who assumes the responsibility of supervision over
the employees of the owner may be held liable for the acts of the
employees.
The responsibility of the employer for the tortuous acts of his employee
is well-settled in this jurisdiction.
The liability here applied to all those who by their industry or profession
or other enterprise have other persons in their service or under their
supervision.
Q. Castillex Industries Corp v. Vasquez Jr GR No 132266
R. What is the nature of an employer’s liability under 2180
Paragraph 5 speaks of employers even if not engaged in business. In
fact, it covers the tortuous acts of household helpers like
- Family cooks, gardeners, yayas, servants, etc.
It made clear that the employers referred to in Paragraph 5 need not
be engaged in business or industry as contradistinguished from Par. 4
which requires engagement in business on the part of the employers as
the law speaks of “establishment or enterprise”
S. Distinguish between the primary and subsidiary liability of
employers?
 If the injured party chooses to file a civil action for damages based
on quasi-delict under Art 2180 & succeeds in proving the negligence
of the employee, the liability of the employer is primary, direct and
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 solidary. It is not conditioned on the insolvency of the employee =
the injured party may recover from the employers directly,
regardless of the solvency of their employees.
 If the injured party chooses to file a criminal case against the
offender and the latter was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
the civil liability of the employer is subsidiary = the employer
cannot use as defense the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family; the judgment pronouncing the employee to be also
civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the
actuality of that liability but also to the amount.
Employer’s subsidiary liability – there must be evidence establishing
that:
a. he is indeed the employer of the convict
b. he is engaged in some kind of industry
c. that crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his
duties
d. execution against the employee is unsatisfied
T. May an employer who is made liable solidarily seek
reimbursement from the employee?
YES. He may seek reimbursement from the latter for the amount he
paid to the offended party for the satisfaction of the claim.
U. When is the State liable?
The state is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees when they are acting as special agents
V. What are the aspects of liability of the State?
 Public or governmental – the state is only liable for the tortuous
acts of its special agents.
 Private or non-governmental – when the State is engaged in
private business or enterprises. It becomes liable as an ordinary
employer.
W. What is the rationale for the liability of school heads and
teachers?
School heads and teachers stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parents and are called upon to “exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child
X. Palisoc v. Brillantes, GR No L-29025
Y. Filamer Christian Institute v. CA, GR No 75112
Z. What is the available defense for a person being held under
Art 2180?
They shall be exempted from liability if they can prove that they have
exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage.
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence
which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise with regard to his own
property.
AA. Victory Liner, Inc v. Heirs of Malecdan, GR No. 154278
BB. Article 2181
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
CC. Article 2182
If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action
against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
DD. Article 2183
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
EE. Vestil v. IAC, GR No 74431
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K. G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate
civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante
Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was
sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on
March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a
jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor
did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from
the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

| Page 4
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the
father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV,
p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of
Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with
them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles
154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum
of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgement relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers
of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It
cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position
to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the

| Page 5
words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptors y artesanos" used
in the Italian and French Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the City School Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. His father could not properly
refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance of the school authorities. The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children, the
school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or scout master was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor to drive the
jeep without being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the pupils, the school authorities are the ones answerable for that
negligence, and not the father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would
avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art.
1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.

L. GR No. L-14414 Apr 27, 1960 107 Phil. 748

SEVERINO SALEN v. JOSE BALCE

On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest
thereon from July 18, 1952, plus attorney's fees and other incidental expenses.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that that law refers to quasi-delicts
and not to criminal cases.

After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with costs. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was
also single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiffs, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of
execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name. Thereupon,

| Page 6
plaintiffs de manded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the
present action.

The question for determination is whether appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed
against him.

In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee must be determined under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts, the trial court made the following observation:

"The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code). But there is no law which holds the father either primarily
or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a minor of 18 years. Under Art. 101 of the Penal Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts committed by his
son if the latter As an imbecile, or insane, or under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without discernment. Under Art. 102, only inkeepers and tavern-
keepers are held subsidiarily liable, and under Art. 103 of the same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply only to 'employers, teachers, persons
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge, of their duties.' By the
principle of exclusio unus execlusio ulterius, the defendant in this case cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of Gumersindo Balce who has been convicted of
homicide for the killing of the plaintiff's son Carlos Salen.

"Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the plaintiffs, is not applicable to the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not to obligations which
arise from criminal offenses. Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses is governed by the provisions of the. Penal Code and civil liability arising from civil
negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly refers to obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts. And obligations arising from criminal offenses are never obligations arising, from quasi-delicts (Commissioner's note). And according to Art. 2177, the responsibility for
fault of negligence under Art. 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code * * *.'"

While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, we disagree with the contention
that the subsidiary liability of persona for acts of those who are under their custody should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing
the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain rights without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court.

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act
under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished
but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from
criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which
is our Civil Code.

| Page 7
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.

A case in point is Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, the facts of which are as follows:

"Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in the company of his father, Delfin Capuno. He is a student of the Balintawak Elementary School in the City of San Pablo and
a member of the Boy Scout Organization of his school. On March 31, 1949, on the occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of San Pablo, Dante
Capuno was one of those instructed by the City School Supervisor to join the parade. From the school, Dante Capuno, together with other students, boarded a jeep. When the
jeep started to run, Dante Capuno took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidro Caperiña died as a consequence. The corresponding criminal action for double homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted
against Dante Capuno. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperiña reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the
accused. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense charged against him. In line with said reservation of Sabina Exconde, the corresponding civil action for
damages was filed against Delfin Capuno, Dante Capuno and others."

In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante Capuno arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, this Court made the following ruling:

"The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the 'duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means', while, on the other hand, gives them the 'right to correct and punish them in moderation (Arts. 134 and
135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove."

Another case in point is Araneta vs. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off. Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts of this case are aft. follows:

"On March 7, 1961, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo
grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with
him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly
pulling from his pocket a Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, causing him to drop
backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life
and death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he rallied and after some time finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative injury to the
jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited
and morose after leaving the hospital."

| Page 8
Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty, but in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the court suspended the proceedings as prescribed
toy Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario, to recover material,
moral and exemplary damages. The court of first instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages and attorney's fees. From this decision, the Aranetas
appealed in view of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This Court affirmed the decision but increased the indemnity to P18,000.00. This is a typical case of parental
subsidiary liability arising from the criminal act of a minor son.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellee to pay appellants the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the
filing of the complaint, and the costs.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O. GR No 174156

Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas,

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Filcar Transport Services (Filcar), challenging the decision[2] and the resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86603.

The facts of the case

On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and
President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle of the intersection
when another car, traversing President Quirino Street and going to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas car turned clockwise. The
other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number.

After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar.

Espinas sent several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car. On May 31, 2001, Espinas
filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, and the case was raffled to Branch 13. In the complaint, Espinas
demanded that Filcar and Carmen Flor pay the amount of P97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his car.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of
Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flors personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

| Page 9
 Atty. Flor, for his part, alleged that when the incident occurred, he was attending a birthday celebration at a nearby hotel, and it was only later that night when he noticed a small
dent on and the cracked signal light of the car. On seeing the dent and the crack, Atty. Flor allegedly asked Floresca what happened, and the driver replied that it was a result of a
hit and run while the car was parked in front of Bogota on Pedro Gil Avenue, Manila.

Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen
Flor both said that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties.

The MeTC Decision

The MeTC, in its decision dated January 20, 2004,[4] ruled in favor of Espinas, and ordered Filcar and Carmen Flor, jointly and severally, to pay Espinas P97,910.00 as actual
damages, representing the cost of repair, with interest at 6% per annum from the date the complaint was filed; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. The MeTC ruled that Filcar, as the registered owner of the vehicle, is primarily responsible for damages resulting from the vehicles operation.

The RTC Decision

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the MeTC decision.[5] The RTC ruled that Filcar failed to prove that
Floresca was not its employee as no proof was adduced that Floresca was personally hired by Atty. Flor. The RTC agreed with the MeTC that the registered owner of a vehicle is
directly and primarily liable for the damages sustained by third persons as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of a vehicle registered in its name. The RTC added
that the victim of recklessness on the public highways is without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. Thus, the only recourse is to
determine the owner, through the vehicles registration, and to hold him responsible for the damages.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA partly granted the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86603; it modified the RTC decision by ruling that Carmen Flor, President and General Manager of Filcar, is not
personally liable to Espinas. The appellate court pointed out that, subject to recognized exceptions, the liability of a corporation is not the liability of its corporate officers because a
corporate entity subject to well-recognized exceptions has a separate and distinct personality from its officers and shareholders. Since the circumstances in the case at bar do not
fall under the exceptions recognized by law, the CA concluded that the liability for damages cannot attach to Carmen Flor.

The CA, however, affirmed the liability of Filcar to pay Espinas damages. According to the CA, even assuming that there had been no employer-employee relationship between
Filcar and the driver of the vehicle, Floresca, the former can be held liable under the registered owner rule.

The CA relied on the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and to third persons while the vehicle is being operated. Citing
Erezo, et al. v. Jepte,[6] the CA said that the rationale behind the rule is to avoid circumstances where vehicles running on public highways cause accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. In Erezo, the Court said that the main aim of motor

| Page 10
vehicle registration is to identify the owner, so that if a vehicle causes damage or injury to pedestrians or other vehicles, responsibility can be traced to a definite individual and that
individual is the registered owner of the vehicle.[7]

The CA did not accept Filcars argument that it cannot be held liable for damages because the driver of the vehicle was not its employee. In so ruling, the CA cited the case of
Villanueva v. Domingo[8] where the Court said that the question of whether the driver was authorized by the actual owner is irrelevant in determining the primary and direct
responsibility of the registered owner of a vehicle for accidents, injuries and deaths caused by the operation of his vehicle.
Filcar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated July 6, 2006.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue

Simply stated, the issue for the consideration of this Court is: whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the
damages caused to Espinas.

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas car; and it is on the basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily
and directly liable to Espinas for damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.[9] Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This
general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by ones act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who
committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

| Page 11
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable
for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another.[10] In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

As its core defense, Filcar contends that Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code is inapplicable because it presupposes the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. According to Filcar, it cannot be held liable under the subject provisions because the driver of its vehicle at the time of the accident, Floresca, is not its employee but
that of its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor.

We cannot agree. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is
made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom,[11] we ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent
driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.

In that case, a tractor registered in the name of Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) figured in an accident, killing and seriously injuring several persons. As part of its defense,
Equitable claimed that the tractor was initially leased to Mr. Edwin Lim under a Lease Agreement, which agreement has been overtaken by a Deed of Sale entered into by Equitable
and Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine). Equitable argued that it cannot be held liable for damages because the tractor had already been sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident and
the negligent driver was not its employee but of Ecatine.

In upholding the liability of Equitable, as registered owner of the tractor, this Court said that regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator
insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.[12] The Court further stated that
[i]n contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.[13] Thus, Equitable, as
the registered owner of the tractor, was considered under the law on quasi delict to be the employer of the driver, Raul Tutor; Ecatine, Tutors actual employer, was deemed merely
as an agent of Equitable.

| Page 12
 Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of
the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered
owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable

The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle
registration, which has been discussed by this Court in Erezo, and cited by the CA in its decision:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient
or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways. [emphasis ours]

Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

As explained by this Court in Erezo, the general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying
public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other
damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available to them.

To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by
passing on the blame to another who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some
motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the
damages caused in case of accidents.

These same principles apply by analogy to the case at bar. Filcar should not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the blame to another party; in
this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver, Floresca. Following our reasoning in Equitable, the agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor
vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.

Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these
defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape
primary liability for the damages caused to Espinas.

| Page 13
The public interest involved in this case must not be underestimated. Road safety is one of the most common problems that must be addressed in this country. We are not unaware
of news of road accidents involving reckless drivers victimizing our citizens. Just recently, such pervasive recklessness among most drivers took the life of a professor of our state
university.[14] What is most disturbing is that our existing laws do not seem to deter these road malefactors from committing acts of recklessness.

We understand that the solution to the problem does not stop with legislation. An effective administration and enforcement of the laws must be ensured to reinforce discipline among
drivers and to remind owners of motor vehicles to exercise due diligence and vigilance over the acts of their drivers to prevent damage to others.

Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the damages
sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of motor
vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas
car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the responsible operation of motor
vehicles by its citizens.

This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for
the injury caused to another.

The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner of the motor vehicle, but the inconvenience cannot outweigh the more important public policy being advanced by the law in
this case which is the protection of innocent persons who may be victims of reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated February 16, 2006 and the resolution dated July 6, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner
Filcar Transport Services.

SO ORDERED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| Page 14
Q. G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL, INC., respondents.

DECISION

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.

The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and
time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to
the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay
whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad
and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.[1]

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation
(hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctors Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July
1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation.[2]

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

| Page 15
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is only vicarious
and not solidary with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and
medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.

Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the
deceaseds contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5
September 1988 until fully paid.[4]

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the
fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours
because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned
task.

Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.

On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner
and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred
in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceaseds wages and by
jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition
upon the Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the
original reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by
ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore the inescapable
fact remains that said employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since petitioner
adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to
refute.

We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.

Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water.

Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating
from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the
paper as not filed.
| Page 16
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, there has been compliance
with the aforequoted provision.

As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the petition are the
following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the
date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary
period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also
stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.

Now on the merits of the case.

The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent
death caused by ABAD.

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.

Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should
be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task.[5]

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor
on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators[6] and banks.[7] The Court of Appeals
cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.[8]

| Page 17
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is
a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject
to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.[9] Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of
the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.

Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in
holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned
tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[10]

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.

ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was
then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.

No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employers
business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts.

In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employees assigned tasks includes any act
done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances.

We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:

I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

| Page 18
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope
of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to
reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.

II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some
special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though
he uses his employers motor vehicle.

The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the
employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go
to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or
roving commission rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be
acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the
direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.

III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during
the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is
some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is
normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the
fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer
as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies
Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner’s place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.

At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the
private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy! This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about
2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it,

| Page 19
was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial
Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.

SO ORDERED.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X. G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of
"Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard,
Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon,
at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the
Board of Directors of the institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased
belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2,
1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates,
and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground
floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon
made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows
| Page 20
until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he
was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the
incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a
disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he
had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th
and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries
of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.3 It held that "(T)he
act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this
article of the Code."4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads
of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the
teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960).5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power, considering that the deceased was only
between sixteen and seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
| Page 21
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-
school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court
finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious.

1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to to the
case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows]6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In
these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the
torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which
was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the physical injury inflicted by his
son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been
established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the decision, was
whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor
son, (which issue was resolved adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code,
for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical Institute being
admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly
and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to
defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party
defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated
since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes

| Page 22
and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person."
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly provided
for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole
time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards
that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa
in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of
the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the
fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student
who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in
the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied,
must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-
defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to
protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the
factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs.
Pantoja,15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had
expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court thereby
adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to
P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages awarded,
besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the

| Page 23
exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages,
as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows:

1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador
Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing
defendants' counterclaims.

Y. G.R. No. 75112 | August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court
of Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha.
The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be
directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee
of the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of
the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy
ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.

After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision
penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and actual
expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.

| Page 24
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was
assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed
free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-
79) According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a
sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident
(6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job
demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day.

It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577,
80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner
by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars
from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.

| Page 25
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid
liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in
the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one
is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed
to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil.
768, 772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it
the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering
that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a
driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private
| Page 26
respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act
not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
demonstrated.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court
decision is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

AA. G. R. No. 154278. December 27, 2002

VICTORY LINER, INC. petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, in
Civil Case No. 3082-R, ordering petitioner and its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr., to pay damages to the heirs of Andres Malecdan, who had been killed after being hit by a bus while
attempting to cross the National Highway in Barangay Nungnungan 2 in Cauayan, Isabela.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner is a common carrier. Private respondent Elena Malecdan is the widow of the deceased, while private respondents Veronica, Virginia, Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola, Manuel
and Valentin Malecdan are their children.

Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay Nungnungan 2, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela.[3] On July 15, 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., while
Andres was crossing the National Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as
Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing, respondent hit the old man and the carabao
on which he was riding. As a result, Andres Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over.[4] The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus
proceeded to its destination without helping him.

The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdans neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who was resting in a nearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on his
left shoulder, from which bone fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the Cagayan District Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival.[5] The

| Page 27
carabao also died soon afterwards.[6] Lorena executed a sworn statement before the police authorities. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property was filed against the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo Joson, Jr.[7]

On October 5, 1994, private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Baguio City,[8] which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found
the driver guilty of gross negligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and
its driver were held liable for damages. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts of:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;
c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;
d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; and
f. The costs of the suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant Victory Liner, Inc. against the plaintiffs and the third-party complaint of the same defendant against the Zenith Insurance Corporation are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the modification that the award of attorneys fees was fixed at P50,000.00.[10]

Hence, this appeal raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING
P200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES WHICH IS DOUBLE THE P100,000.00 AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR COMPLAINT AND IN
GRANTING ACTUAL DAMAGES NOT SUPPORTED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPTS AND SPENT WAY BEYOND THE BURIAL OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING
THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES WHICH WERE NOT PROVED AND CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO FINDING OF
BAD FAITH AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH
DISREGARDED THE APPELLANTS TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS EXERCISED EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES, OR STATED DIFFERENTLY, WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE APPEALED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE AND EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[11]

We find the appealed decision to be in order.

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First. Victory Liner, Inc. no longer questions the findings of the Regional Trial Court that Andres Malecdan was injured as a result of the gross negligence of its driver, Ricardo
Joson, Jr. What petitioner now questions is the finding that it (petitioner) failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employee. Petitioner argues,

With all due respect, the assignment of three inspectors to check and remind the drivers of petitioner Victory Liner of its policies in a two-and-a-half hour driving distance, the
installation of tachometers to monitor the speed of the bus all throughout the trip, the periodic monitoring and checking of the trips from one station to another through a trip ticket
from station to station, the regular periodic conducting of safety and defensive driving [training sessions] for its drivers are concrete and physical proofs of the formulated operating
standards, the implementation and monitoring of the same, designed for the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.[12]

It explained that it did not present bus driver Joson, Jr. on the witness stands because he had been dismissed from the company after the incident, which it found was a breach in
the company regulations. Petitioner blames private respondents for the death of their father, Andres Malecdan, who was already 75 years old, for allowing him to plough their field
by himself.[13]
The contention has no merit.
Article 2176 provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in
the performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.[14] The rationale
for the rule on vicarious liability has been explained thus:

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to profit by it, it
is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability
insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the
greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.[15]

Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.[16] For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection
of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.[17]

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In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.[18] With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.[19] These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.[20]

In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.s written examination, actual driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological examination,[24] NBI clearance,[25]
physical examination,hematology examination, urinalysis, student driver training, shop training, birth certificate, high school diploma[32] and reports from the General Maintenance
Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to work as a professional driver.[33] However, as the trial court
noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving experience.[34]

Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the company were given seminars on driving safety at least twice a year.[35] Again, however, as the trial court noted
there is no record of Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar.[36] Petitioner likewise failed to establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip
tickets, speed meters and reports of field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioners bus was running at a very fast speed when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the
deceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the supervision of its driver Joson, Jr.

Second. To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.[37] We cannot
take into account receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death
anniversaries.[38] In this case, the trial court awarded P88,339.00 as actual damages. While these were duly supported by receipts, these included the amount of P5,900.00, the
cost of one pig which had been butchered for the 9th day death anniversary of the deceased. This item cannot be allowed. We, therefore, reduce the amount of actual damages to
P82,439.00.00. The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and children of the deceased underwent intense moral
suffering as a result of the latters death.[39] Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Under the circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the
purpose of the law in allowing moral damages.[40]

On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court.[41]

Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[42] In this case, petitioners driver Joson, Jr.
was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed along the national highway and overtaking another vehicle which had stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross. Worse, after the
accident, Joson, Jr. did not stop the bus to help the victim. Under the circumstances, we believe that the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is proper.

Finally, private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees. Under Art. 2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are
awarded. In the recent case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[43] we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be reasonable. Hence, private
respondents are entitled to attorneys fees in that amount.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17, 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. is ordered to pay the
following amounts to the respondent heirs of Andres Malecdan:
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 1. Death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
2. Actual damages in the amount of Eighty-Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P82,439.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and
6. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
EE. G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had
nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The
Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-
rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes
independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness,
P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there
are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she

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is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him
("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as
many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin.8 She at least implied that they did not pay any
rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother,
Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog.10
Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied
paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which
strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at
the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her
own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it
virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the
house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys
with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16

The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the
contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The
Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first,
Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
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 COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give
the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called
Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

A: Yes, sir. 18
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to say under oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which
can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton
Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have
appeared death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal
if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory failure which leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies.
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death.
Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause
of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the
possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog
was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for
the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done
to the animal.

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house
that bit Theness.

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According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69,
as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by
the civil damages to which they are entitled.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

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