Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 19

Raynera vs.

Hiceta  CA: Raynera’s bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the
-monica- proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were negligent; If so, whether such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera
 Petitioner Edna Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother
and legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne
 Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver,
respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer, involved in the accident.
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
 March 23, 1989, at about 2am:
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
- Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle
doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”
traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang,
Proximate cause is “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
- The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
hour. The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both
would not have occurred.”
sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were
two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs
metal plates.
taken of the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates
- The asphalt road was not well lighted.
installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights
- At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into
on top of the steel plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard
the left rear portion of the trucktrailer, which was without tail lights.
to the rear of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that
- Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper
there were no tail lights.
Geraldino D. Lucelo rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center.
- Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre,
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents’ truck was visible in
pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers
 At the time of his death, Reynaldo was the manager of the Engineering
per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they
Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation; 32 y/o; had a life
were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land
expectancy of 65 y/o; annual net earnings of not less than P73,500
Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136), respondents installed 2 pairs of
 Heirs of deceased demanded from respondents payment of damages arising
lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle’s cargo load extended beyond the bed
from the death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident
or body thereof.
 Respondents refused to pay the claims
 Petitioners filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages against respondents
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the
owner and driver of Isuzu truck
victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
- Sought recovery of damages for the death of Raynera caused by the
vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped
negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway,
with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the
without tail lights
service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
 Respondents:
- Truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50watts bulbs were
a dark portion of the road, with no tail lights, license plate and early
on top of the steel plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. Virgilio
warning device
Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and
 TC: in favor of petitioners; found respondents negligent because the truck had
its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. In light of these
no license plate and tail lights; there were only 2 pairs of red lights, 50 watts
circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the victim had been
each, on both sides of the steel plates; the truck was improperly parked in a
driving too fast and did not exercise due care and prudence demanded of him under
dark area; the respondents’ negligence was the immediate and proximate
the circumstances.
cause of Raynera’s death; reduced responsibility of respondents by 20% on
account of victim’s own negligence
 Respondents appealed to CA
It has been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are the eyewitness’ testimony of Ike Aldemita that petitioner Nardo had
presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.” overtaken the motorcycle driven by Saycon and therefore, was the negligent
The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full party.
control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

STEPHEN CANG VS HERMINIA CULLEN WON Petitioners was negligent and should be held liable for the damages
-jeanelle- sustained by respondent’s driver.


 RTC correctly disregarded the testimony of Aldemita.

 The court cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted allegation of Nardo
during his testimony that Aldemita was not the person (multicab driver)
 This case was about a claim for damages which was precipitated by a
he saw during the time of the accident. He claimed that the person who
vehicular accident involving a taxicab owned by (petitioner) Stephen Cang
testified in court was not the driver of the multicab who was at the
and driven by (petitioner) George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by
scene of the accident that night.
(respondent) Herminia Cullen and driven by Guillermo Saycon.
 Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, occupying the middle portion of
 The court found that Aldemita’s testimony was as uncertain and filled
the outer lane. The taxi, on the other hand, was traveling on the inner lane
with so many inconsistencies. The court believes in either two
and slightly behind, but to the left of the motorcycle.
possibilities – Aldemita did not really actually and exactly see the whole
 Respondent alleged that the taxi veered to the right and sideswiped the
incident or he was lying through his teeth. Thus the court cannot give
motorcycle, then attempted to speed away.
weight to his testimony.
 That as a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured.
 Petitioners claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into the taxi.
 That (petitioner) Nardo appeared to be consistent, sincere and certain
 Respondent, as employer, paid all of Saycon’s hospital and medical
in his statements. He appeared to be acknowledgeable in his work as a
expenses. That due to the injuries of Saycon, he was unable to work. So she
driver. He conveyed a degree of credibility when he testified. The court
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners.
gave more appreciation to his testimonies.

PETITIONERS’ ANSWER  That it was not the taxi that bumped the motorcycle. It was the
motorcycle that bumped the taxi. That at the time of the accident,
- That Nardo was not driving the taxi as Cang’s employee, but that Nardo was Saycon, the driver of the motorcycle, did not have a license but only
leasing the taxi from him. That Nardo did not sideswipe the motorcycle driven by had a student driver’s permit. That Saycon was not wearing the proper
Saycon, nor did Nardo speed away after the incident. They maintained that protective headgear and was speeding.
Nardo’s taxo was on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle that veered
into Nardo’s lane and bumped the taxi.  Section 30 of RA 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
- Petitioner also claimed that Saycon was driving the motorcycle without any provides that
protective protective headgear and that the latter was not authorized to drive the
motorcycle since he only had a student’s permit. “xxx No student driver shall operate a motor vehicle unless
possessed a valid student-driver’s permit and accompanied by
a duly licensed driver”
 RTC – ruled in Cang and Nardo’s favor
 Court of Appeals – Reversed RTC’s ruling. Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the
accident. Corrollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil Code states that:
 Petitioners now seek reversal of the CA decision. They argue that CA erred
in reversing the judgment rendered by the Trial Court; giving credence to “Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time diligence required in supervising her employee. She cannot recover from
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.” petitioners what she paid for the treatment if her employee’s injuries.

 Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he should not have been GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
driving alone. The law clearly requires that the holder of a student- vs.
driver’s permit should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY BUNGABONG, and MICHAEL
operating a motor vehicle. There is the matter of not wearing a helmet GALVEZ, Respondents.
and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that he was -joy-
 ARTICLE 2179 Civil Code provides:
“ When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But On 2 April 1996, the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and at the Manila International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. Upon touchdown, the Twin
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to disembark its
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall passengers. After the last passenger disembarked, PACs pilots started the engine of
mitigate the damages to be awarded.” the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other end of the
 The Court gave more credence to Nardo’s version of the accident that
The Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. Upon reaching runway 13,
he was on his proper lane, that he was not speeding, and that it was PACs pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point to request clearance right
the motorcycle that bumped into his taxi. The Court had established before crossing runway 13. Without such clearance, PACs pilots proceeded to cross
that the accident was caused wholly by Saycon’s negligence. It held that runway 13.
the injuries and damages suffered by Cullen and Saycon were not due
to the acts of petitioners but due to their own negligence and Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, was preparing for take-off along
recklessness. runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and start on runway 13 and
the ATO issued the clearance. While already on take-off roll, one of the pilot caught a
 Lastly, when an employee causes damage due to his own negligence glimpse of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway
while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum 13.The PAL pilots attempted to abort the take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft.
presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of However, the Boeing 737 still collided with the Twin Otter.
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family, Thus, in the
On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch
selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
112) of Pasay City a complaint35 for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casiño,
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With
Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and ATO’s traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing 737 that figured
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and in the collision, intervened.
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.

 The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a student’s permit is, TRIAL COURT: the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola,
proof that Cullen was negligent- either she did not know that he only Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATO’s traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air
had a student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this traffic controller, respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial court further held
deficiency. That she failed to exercise the diligence required of her as that the direct cause of the collision was the negligence of Casiño and Isaac, as the
an employer is supervising her employee. pilots of the Boeing 737 that collided with the Twin Otter

 That Saycon, who caused the accident and, as such, he cannot recover CA: Affirmed in toto
indemnity for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as Saycon’s
employer, was also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of
PETITIONER GSIS points out that PAC’s pilots were the ones guilty of negligence as  Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
they violated the Rules of the Air, which provide that right of way belongs to the aircraft immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
on take-off roll and the aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses that such damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. GSIS posits that PAC, Bungabong, and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care,
and Galvez should be held solidarily liable to pay GSIS the cost of repairing the insured the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
aircraft. damages to be awarded. (Emphasis supplied)
 Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, PAC and its pilots, whose
ISSUE: own gross negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of their
own injuries, must bear the cost of such injuries. They cannot recover
damages. Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages, which
Who among the parties is liable for negligence under the circumstances.
PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed against PAL, Casiño, Isaac, ATO,
Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr. should have been dismissed for lack of legal

For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly negligent. Gross PLDT vs CA
negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. Topic: CONCEPT OF COMPLETE DEFENSE

We find it hard to believe that PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked Facts:
to the left and to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer
evening in April and the Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, Action for damages by private respondent spouses against PLDT for the injuries they
outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights on before and during the actual take-off roll. sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth
The only plausible explanation why PAC’s pilots did not see the Boeing 737 was that and fell into an open trench, an excavation by PLDT for the installation of its
they did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing the active runway. underground conduit system.

Records show that PAC’s pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested Complaint alleged that:
clearance to cross the active runway. ATO points out that PAC’s pilots should have
made a full stop at the holding point to ask for updated clearance right before crossing  respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left
the active runway. Had PAC’s pilots done so, ATO would by then be in a position to uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light
determine if there was an aircraft on a take-off roll at the runway. The collision would or signs.
not have happened.  because of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
After assiduously studying the records of this case and carefully weighing the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
arguments of the parties, we are convinced that the immediate and proximate  the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
case of the collision is the gross negligence of PAC’s pilots.
PLDT contended that:
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and  injuries sustained by respondents were the result of their own negligence.
without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, the fact that PAC’s  the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte & Co. an
pilots disregarded PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and
crossing an active runway was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such the conduit system.
gross negligence on the part of PAC’s pilots, the collision would not have happened.
PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their
 The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is agreement, PLDT not be answerable for any injuries arising from the negligence of
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot Barte or any of its employees.
recover damages.
CFI rendered decision in favor if the plaintiff spouses: Respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to their own injuries but goes
to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
 PLDT ordered to pay the plaintiffs moral damages, exemplary damages and and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
attorney's fees.
 L.R. Barte & Co. ordered to reimburse whatever amount the PLDT has paid to The presence of warning signs could not have prevented the accident; the only purpose
the plaintiff. of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
Both PLDT and the spouses appealed, the latter appealing only as to the amount of
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents
damages. Barte did not appeal.
to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the
 CA reversed CFI’s decision and dismissed the complaint, holding that inside lane towards the accident mound.
respondent spouses were negligent and absolving PLDT from the claim for
damages. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their
 1st MR denied. own failure to exercise due care was the cause thereof. One should exercise a
 2nd MR granted. CA affirmed in toto the CFI’s decision. reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
 WON the respondent spouses’ own negligence was the proximate cause of knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there.
the accident. (YES)
 WON PLDT should be held liable for damages sustained by the spouses from A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the accident. (NO) the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
Ruling: negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies
on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.
not imputable to negligent omission on the part of PLDT.
CA’s 2nd decision set-aside. CA’s 1st decision reinstated and affirmed, absolving PLDT.
 Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had
remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the mound.
 Plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the mound.
 Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25kph as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE
speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the mound. The PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondents.
jeep would not have climbed the mound several feet. The jeep must have -zyka-
been running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked at 25kph, plaintiffs would
not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have
suffered their injuries.
 Plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family NEGLIGENCE
to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights,
but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the A collecting bank is guilty of contributory negligence when it accepted for deposit a
mound in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25kph, even on dim post-dated check notwithstanding that said check had been cleared by the drawee bank
lights, his failure to see the mound in time to brake the car was negligence on which failed to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period.
his part. The mound was relatively big and visible. If he did not see the mound
in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the FACTS:
existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.
With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the
accident so as to avoid hitting the mound.
On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. RESPONDENT – filed MR. Denied by PCHC BOD.
Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner's
Kawit Branch. -filed a petition for review in the RTC

The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of Marciano RTC – affirmed Arbitration Committee’s decision.
Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch.
RES – appealed to the CA
Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
CA – set aside the RTC judgment and ruled for a 60-40 sharing of the loss as it found
petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in accepting what is clearly a post-dated
The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of MMGI. check. The CA found that petitioner’s failure to notice the irregularity on the face of the
check was a breach of its duty to the public and a telling sign of its lack of due diligence
On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds therein were in handling checks coursed through it.
PET – MR denied by CA
A month later, Silva discovered the debit of ₱1,000,000.00 from his account. In
response to Silva’s complaint, respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum.
Hence, this Petition
On March 21, 2003, respondent returned a photocopy of the check to petitioner for the
reason: "Postdated." Petitioner, however, refused to accept and sent back to
respondent a photocopy of the check.

The check was tossed several times from pet. to res, and back to pet. until on May 6, (2) WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
2003, Res. requested the PCHC to take custody of the check.
Acting on the request, PCHC directed the respondent to deliver the original check and
informed it of PCHC’s authority under Clearing House Operating Memo (CHOM) to split (Petitioner argues that the CA should have sustained PCHC’s finding that despite the
50/50 the amount of the check subject of a "Ping-Pong" controversy. antecedent negligence of petitioner in accepting the postdated check for deposit,
respondent, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint before the Arbitration consequences had it not negligently cleared the check in question. Petitioner pointed
out that in applying the doctrine of last clear chance, the PCHC cited the case of
Committee, asserting that respondent should solely bear the entire face
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals)
value of the check due to its negligence in failing to return the check to
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period.

In its Answer with Counterclaims, Respondent charged petitioner with gross As well established by the records, both petitioner and respondent were admittedly
negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the first place. It contended negligent in the encashment of a check post-dated one year from its presentment.
that petitioner’s admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause of
the loss.
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
PCHC ARBITRATION COMMITTEE – decision in favor of petitioner.
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
Finding both parties negligent in the performance of their duties, the Committee applied
the doctrine of "Last Clear Chance" and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant
respondent alone and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon
that assumption.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. required to conform for his own protection."
Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure
to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, IN THIS CASE:
which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.
Admittedly, petitioner’s acceptance of the subject check for deposit despite the one
IN THIS CASE: year postdate written on its face was a clear violation of established banking regulations
and practices. In such instances, payment should be refused by the drawee bank and
The evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment returned through the PCHC within the 24-hour reglementary period. As aptly observed
by the CA, petitioner’s failure to comply with this basic policy regarding post-dated
of the subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check
checks was "a telling sign of its lack of due diligence in handling checks coursed through
sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification it."
It bears stressing that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a
As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised
Roman paterfamilias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is
ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect expected," considering the nature of the banking business that is imbued with public
upon seeing the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could interest. While it is true that respondent's liability for its negligent clearing of the check
have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner is greater, petitioner cannot take lightly its own violation of the long-standing rule
would have not credited the amount thereof to the payee’s account. against encashment of post-dated checks and the injurious consequences of allowing
such checks into the clearing system.
AS TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: (What petitioner omitted to mention is that
in the cited case of case of Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA) – “while the Court found Petitioner repeatedly harps on respondent's transgression of clearing house rules when
petitioner bank as the culpable party under the doctrine of last clear chance since the latter resorted to direct presentment way beyond the reglementary period but
it had, thru its teller, the last opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client glosses over its own negligent act that clearly fell short of the conduct expected of it
as a collecting bank. Petitioner must bear the consequences of its omission to
simply by faithfully observing its own validation procedure, it nevertheless ruled that
exercise extraordinary diligence in scrutinizing checks presented by its
the plaintiff depositor (private respondent) must share in the loss on account of depositors.
its contributory negligence.”
*** the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code:

“When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his Valenzuela vs CA
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the -em-
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be TOPIC: CONCEPT OF INCOMPLETE DEFENSE OR CONTRIBUTORY

Explaining this provision in Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, the Court held: Facts:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards
"The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. xxx xxx xxx" seeked help. She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon.
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he
suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his
and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the groud. She was sent to UERM brakes at the proper time and distance, it was not even necessary for him to swerve
where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car
artificial one. Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 since there is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the
(aritificial leg)] right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao.

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally 2. NO.
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of required to conform for his own protection.
this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty
salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as emergency rule- an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
employer emergency was brought by his own negligence.
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the
flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk
and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain) She parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.


1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies

1. NO with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a Phoenix, and was earlier driven by Carbonel, was parked on the right-hand side
bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously of the street (i.e., on the right-hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump
self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s place, the same could
truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick
give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
company car to Li. collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

4. YES. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and
opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries
accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
* CFI- rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and ordered the petitioner to pay
jointly and severally for damages.
The damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be * IAC- affirmed the decision of the trial court.
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body
ISSUE: Whether or not Dionisio is contributorily negligent in the collision.
would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. YES.
All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful. * The factual circumstances as found by the Court are:
(1) No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the
accident nor was any found in his car.
(2) According to Patrolman Cuyno, that people who had gathered at the scene
of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its
vs. headlights on.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO (3) We believe petitioners' theory that Dionisio purposely shut off his
-gaddi- headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the
police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far
NEGLIGENCE (4) We do not believe that the evidence of Patrolman Cuyno, to the effect that
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car, is sufficient
FACTS: to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his
driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
At about 1:30 am of November 15, 1975, Dionisio was on his way home from
* The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that Dionisio
a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken "a shot or two" of
was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving
liquor. He was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection not
faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
far from his home when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
intersection and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
out onto the road lane.
some 2.5 meters away from his car.
* We agree with the CFI and IAC that the legal and proximate cause of the accident NAPOCOR vs. Heirs of Casionan (2008)
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump -pochi-
truck was parked by Carbonel.
* We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that
the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of
due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though NEGLIGENCE
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

* Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" Petitioner: Installed the sagging electrical transmission lines
doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was Respondents: Parents of Deceased Noble Casionan
negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the
accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear TOPIC: CONCEPT OF INCOMPLETE DEFENSE OR CONTRIBUTORY
chance" must bear his own injuries alone. NEGLIGENCE
* The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction
by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found FACTS:
its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in Deceased Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. Petitioner NPC installed high-
the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the
or rule that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence transmission lines sagged and dangled, and posed a great threat to passersby who
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the were exposed to the danger of electrocution. Verbal and written requests were sent
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or to NPC to institute safety measures to protect users of the trail.
omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that Noble and his co-pocket miner carried one pole on his shoulder. A buzzing sound was
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. heard when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire then Nobles fell on the ground.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role the common law last clear chance The cause of death was found to be cardiac arrest due to electrocution.
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
Respondents filed a claim for damages against the NPC.
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the high-tension transmission
* Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from
lines. If Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.
its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in RTC: defendant NPC guilty of Negligence (Quasi-Delict)
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence was the legal or proximate cause of - the negligence of NPC in maintaining the high-tension wires was established
the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or by preponderance of evidence (by several requests and demands that their
physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" transmission lines were dangling and sagging)
or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that CA: RTC Decision affirmed
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of
the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the Issue: WON Petitioner was negligent? YES. “But even if We walk the extra mile, the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. finding of liability on the part of petitioner must stay.” - SC

Relevant Issue:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing WON the award for damages should be deleted/mitigated in view of the contributory
the aggregate amount of damages which Dionisio is entitled. negligence of the victim? NO. The deceased was not negligent.

1. Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by
attributing negligence to the victim.

In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of preventing derailment
accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have been negligent In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the violation of a
in ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate
due to an accident. cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what
was intended to be prevented by the statute.
Negligence Contributory Negligence

The failure to observe, for the [the] conduct on the part of the
protection of the interest of injured party, contributing as a legal
another person, that degree of care, cause to the harm he has suffered, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly IBAA)
precaution, and vigilance which the which falls below the standard which vs. CA, Ford Philippines Inc., Citibank
circumstances justly demand, he is required to conform for his own -monica-
whereby such other person suffers protection.

Contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own FACTS:
injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. Plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check in favor of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue as payment of percentage or manufacturers sales taxes.
If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper
to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision
that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the Upon presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid
injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code: to IBAA as collecting or depository bank.

When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and 1. The first check was cleared containing an indorsement that "all
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed."
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff The same, however, was replaced with two (2) IBAA's managers'
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to checks based on a call and letter request made by Godofredo Rivera, Ford's
be awarded. General Ledger Accountant, on an alleged error in the computation of the
tax due without IBAA verifying the authority of Rivera. These manager's
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown checks were later deposited in another bank and misappropriated by the
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard syndicate. (NBI discovered that these checks were later deposited with the
of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. Pacific Banking Corporation by Alleged members of a syndicate.)
IN THIS CASE: the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used
by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform 2. The last two checks were cleared by the Citibank but failed to discover that
passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally the clearing stamps do not bear any initials. The proceeds of the checks
touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from were also illegally diverted or switched by officers of PCIB — members of
Dalicon to Itogon. the syndicate, who eventually encashed them.

Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary Ford, which was compelled to pay anew the percentage taxes, sued in two actions for
routine to other workers in the area. collection against the two banks (PCIB and Citibank) barely six years from the date
the first check was returned to the drawer. The direct perpetrators of the crime are
now fugitives from justice.

RE: WON he is negligent because deceased was engaging in pocket mining

Citibank alleges that the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury is the gross negligence of person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the
defendant IBAA in indorsing the Citibank check in question. latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against
the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was
RTC: Ordering the defendants Citibank and PCIB, jointly and severally, to pay the the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41 representing the face value of plaintiffs Citibank
2) Accordingly, we need to determine whether or not the action of Godofredo Rivera,
CA: Modifies RTC decision, dismissing complaint against Citibank Fords General Ledger Accountant, and/or Alexis Marindo, his assistant, was the
proximate cause of the loss or damage. As defined, proximate cause is that which,
in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
ISSUE: WON PCIBank was clearly negligent when it failed to exercise the
cause produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
diligence required to be exercised by it as a banking institution thus, is liable to
bear the burden of loss of these millions? YES
Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
RULING: by any efficient, intervening cause produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), which provides:
It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable
When title defective -- The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate
defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the instrument, or cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR.
any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful
means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith The degree of Ford’s negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the
or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud. proximate cause of the injury to the parties.

The Board of Directors of Ford, we note, did not confirm the request of Godofredo
Pursuant to this provision, it is vital to show that the negotiation is made by Rivera to recall Citibank 1st Check. Rivera’s instruction to replace the said check with
the perpetrator in breach of faith amounting to fraud. The person negotiating PCIBanks Managers Check was not in the ordinary course of business which could have
the checks must have gone beyond the authority given by his principal. prompted PCIBank to validate the same.
If the principal could prove that there was no negligence in the performance of As to the preparation of Citibank 2nd and 3rd, it was established that these checks
his duties, he may set up the personal defense to escape liability and recover from were made payable to the CIR.Both were crossed checks. These checks were
other parties who, through their own negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. apparently turned around by Fords employees, who were acting on their own personal
In this case, we note that the direct perpetrators of the offense, namely the capacity.
embezzlers belonging to a syndicate, are now fugitives from justice. They have, even Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a
if temporarily, escaped liability for the embezzlement of millions of pesos. We are thus drawer-payors confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had
left only with the task of determining who of the present parties before us unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the
must bear the burden of loss of these millions. It all boils down to the question bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of
of liability based on the degree of negligence among the parties concerned. some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer.[21] This rule likewise applies to
1) WON Ford was guilty of the imputed contributory negligence that would the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold
defeat its claim for reimbursement given that its employees, Godofredo them in their possession.
Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of the syndicate? Therefore, we have to scrutinize, separately, PCIB’s share of negligence when the
no syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.
On this point, jurisprudence regarding the imputed negligence of employer in a master- (Another issue of this case but not about contributory negligence…)
servant relationship is instructive. Since a master may be held for his servants wrongful
act, the law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if that act is negligent or
wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE DECISION: THE COURT MITIGATES THE DAMAGE
conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is DUE TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE…
liable.[18] The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third
Finally, we also find that Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect  COL Realty filed a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict.
the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its passbook,
statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a  Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of the
reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may driver, Aquilino (COL Realty’s) which was the proximate cause of the
in the exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue
bank’s [PCIB] liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon
to six percent (6%) per annum.
prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. He further claimed that
As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, responsibility he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred, that he exercised the
arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the driver.
circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall reduce the damages that he may recover.  MeTC – Exculpated Ramos from liability
 Court of Appeals –
It affirmed the view that Aquilino (the driver of COL Realty) was negligent in
PCIBank, known formerly as Insular Bank of Asia and America, is declared
solely responsible for the loss of the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per
04867 (1st Check) Certification of the MMDA, the crossing of vehicles at that area was not
allowed in view of the construction of that area. That barricades were placed
along that area in order to prevent motorists from crossing. Nonetheless,
Aquilino crossed through certain portions of the barricade which were
broken, thus violating MMDA rule.
It likewise noted that at the time of the coliision, Ramos’ vehicle was moving
at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing
NEGLIGENCE construction. It therefore found that the driver Rodel (Ramos’) guilty of
contributory negligence for driving the Ford at high speed along a busy
 A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan owned by
C.O.L Realty Corporation and driver by Aquilino, and a Ford Expedition, ISSUE: WON Ramos may be held liable. NO
owned by Lambert Ramos and driver by Rodel. A passenger of the Sedan,
Estela Maliwat was rushed to the hospital for treatment.
 COL Realty averred that its driver Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota
Altis at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour and had just crossed the  ARTICLE 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
center lane of Katipunan Avenue when the Ford Expedition violently rammed immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
against the cars right rear door and fender. damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
 Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
of the Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. the damages to be awarded.

 COL Realty demanded for reimbursement for the expense incurred in the  ARTICLE 2185. Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is presumed
repair of its car and hospitalization of Estela but the same was unheeded by that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
petitoners (Ramos). of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
 If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the vs.
latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN
superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
the complaint is made. -joy-
 Applying the principles of law, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. It was the proximate cause of the accident and thus,
precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by the respondent
from the accident.
A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
 Proximate cause is defines as that cause, which, in natural and bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan,
produces injury, and without which the result would have not occurred. fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress,
 If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against the crossing, the to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Suddenly, the
accident would not have happened. Thus, a prudent and intelligent deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The certificate of death
person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution".
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid
natural; and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer petitioner advanced the theory, as a special
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction.
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.

 As to Rodel’s contributory negligence (Ramos’ driver) Issue: W/N Petitioner not liable for the death of the disease on the ground of
negligence by the deceased (W/N maxim Volenti non fit injuria applies)
The Court find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s
contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s Held:nawp
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the
event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent (COL Realty) case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon.
have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.
As testified by the witnesses, the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on
their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her
property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril
or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property . Clearly, an emergency
was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred,
was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as  Rodrigo Arnaiz, with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo
she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as Generalao, was driving his car along the NLEX at about 65kph. As the vehicle
heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
petitioner's negligence several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the
scattered sugarcane.
Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and
-ron- PNCC in the RTC.

TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK RTC ruled in favor of Latagan against PASUDECO for actual and moral damages,
dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence. The case as
Facts: against the PNCC was dismissed.

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) the franchisee that operates and On PASUDECO’s appeal the CA rendered affirmed the RTC decision with modification.
maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. CA ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was
merely contributory to the cause of the accident. PASUDECO failed to properly
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from supervise its men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor admitted that he was at
Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the appellate court held both
bridges along Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan.
for its trucks to enter and pass through NLEX exit at San Fernando going to its milling
factory. Petition for review filed by PNCC with SC.

TRB and PASUDECO entered into MOA, where the latter was allowed to enter and pass Issue:
through the NLEX. One of the terms and conditions in MOA states “Accidents or
damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be  WON PNCC should also be held liable in solidary with PASUDECO. (YES)
the responsibility of PASUDECO”. Ruling:

PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the MOA. PNCC informed PASUDECO It is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the
that it interposed no objection to the MOA. NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were
removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was
 PNCC security supervisor and co-employees, while on patrol, saw a pile of
still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have
sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by
road in Km. 72.
 They placed lit cans with diesel oil and lane dividers in the north and at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
southbound lanes to warn motorists of the obstruction.
The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB,
 They went to PASUDECO’s office to inform them of the problem. They
requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. since respondent Latagan was not a party thereto.
 PASUDECO’s equipment supervisor told them that no equipment operator was
Both defendants, PASUDECO and PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the
available as it was still very early. Nonetheless, he told them that he would
maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties.
send someone to clear the affected area.
 PNCC security supervisor went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. The obligation of PNCC should not be transferred to other parties by virtue of a private
 PASUDECO men arrived and cleared the highway of the sugarcane. They agreement. Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It
stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area leaving does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who
a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. are not privies to the MOA.
 PNCC security supervisor thought there was no longer a need to man the
traffic. Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers.
There must be an observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of
the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby
that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway. communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and
the same were entirely consumed.
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and
that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive All of these houses were of light construction with the exception of the house of
negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered
PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. with nipa and cogon

As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more blowing at the time.
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
It does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose house
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first
although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the
of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion others.
each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they An action was instituted jointly by Rodriguez and three others in the CFI of
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article Albay to recover a sum of money as damages resulting from said fire.
2194 of the Civil Code.
TRIAL COURT: Rendered judgment against the defendant company in favor of the
Anent respondent Arnaiz’s negligence in driving his car, it was only contributory, and plaintiffs and awarded to them damages. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
considered the same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor as provided under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code. PLAINTIFF:

Petition Denied. It was alleged in the complaint - which is admitted to be true - that DEF was
conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of the fire, in the ff respects:
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. (1) in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in charge of the
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant. locomotive;
-zyka- (2) in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated
without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting
(3) in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known
inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity.


PLAINTIFF (P) - REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, Domingo Gonzaga, Cristina Luna, Perfecta The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio
Losantas Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant
company, though exactly how far away from the company's track does not appear.
That after the railroad track was laid, company notified Rodriguez to get his house off
FACTS: the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position.

DEF operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay
Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the
roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials of the main defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was
roof to nipa. an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that
circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his
It is contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of right of action, because:
Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad
Company, and that for this reason the company is not liable. (1) that condition was not created by himself;
(2) because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore
TRIAL COURT: Rendered judgment against the defendant company. From this with the consent of the Railroad Company
judgment the defendant appealed. (3) because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would
not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
FROM NEGLIGENT ACTS OF DEFENDANT. The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio
Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his
HELD: NO. occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and
above what the law itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be
DISCUSSION: remembered that the company could at any time have removed said house in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.
It is to be inferred that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad
Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that this *** From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed from is in all
plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of building his respect in conformity with the law, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs
Afialda vs Hisole
The company, upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the -em-
owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a
trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed position, he
undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from Facts:
fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed
with ordinary care. Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was tending the
IMPORTANT PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE COURT: animals, he was gored by one of them and consequently died of his injuries. Thus,
herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister who depended on him for support, filed the action
But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might for damages. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court upon granting a motion
result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently, the plaintiff had taken the present
to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of appeal.
another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of
the ordinary prudent man. Issue:

IN THIS CASE: Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is
caused to the animal’s caretaker.
The proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of
the defendant in causing this fire. Ruling of the Court:
Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker subsidiarily to him.
of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under * This reasoning misconceived Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Nowhere in our
Article 1902 of the same code. In the case at hand, the animal was in custody and general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his appliances for his workmen. His obligation falls under civil rather than criminal
business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, jurisprudence. Civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to
including himself. Being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party
take the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”, which is should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
significant for the claim for damages under the said article. precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
* Contractual obligation exists in this case and therefore binds the employer to provide
Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 safe appliances for the use of the employee. It was the duty of the defendant to build
of the Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen
complaint contained no allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the from unnecessary danger. It is plain that it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident
Workmen’s Compensation Act. Hence, it alleges no cause of action. could not have occurred. Consequently, the negligence of the defendant is established.
* Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a
risk incident to his employment and, as such, one assumed by him.
M. H. RAKES VS. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY * It is evident that this cannot be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to
-gaddi- repair the track or to duly inspect it, for the employee is not presumed to have
stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused upon
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of
the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can
relieve the defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff
the consequences of an act or omission not his own. This doctrine, known as "the
* Rakes- one of a gang of eight black laborers in the employment of the defendant,
fellow-servant rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the Malecon in Manila.
- claims that one hand car was used in this work. Yobido vs. CA and Spouses Tumboy (1997)
* Atlantic- proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon -pochi-
which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that
the ends of the rails projected beyond the cars both in front and behind. TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
* The rails are secured to the cars without side pieces or guards to prevent them
from slipping off.
Petitioners: Owner, and driver of Yobido Liner Bus
* Rakes- contends that the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
Respondents: Passengers
* Atlantic- contends that some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope.
* At a certain spot, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset,
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
*This case involves a common carrier presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
amputated at about the knee.
negligently in case of death or injuries to passengers.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant company is liable.

* The cause of the sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie, which was the Spouses Tumboy and their minor children boarded Yobido Liner bus. However, the left
immediate occasion of the accident, is found by the trial court to have been the recent
front tire of the said bus exploded, resulting to physical injuries of respondents.
typhoon. A fellow-workman of the plaintiff swears that the day before the accident, he
called the attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked him to have it repaired. Respondents filed breach of contract of carriage and damages before RTC.
However, no effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.
Petitioners raised the affirmative defense of fortuitous event. (It was going slow
* It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the because of the zigzag road and the tire that exploded was brand new.)
remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official
RTC: Petitioner is liable: Driver’s failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the
in transporting passengers safely to their place of destination  it was running fast; passenger.
the driver was cautioned to slow down but did not.

A tire blowout is a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment

which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough or In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ contention that they should be exempt from
rigid check-up before it took to the road. liability because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that could not
have been foreseen, must fail.
CA: Affirmed RTC. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:

(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the
Explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous event. debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito,
Owing to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier and its or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
obligation to exercise the utmost diligence of very cautious persons to carry the (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, it is the burden his obligation in a normal manner; and
of the defendants to prove that the cause of the blow-out was a fortuitous (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
event. injury resulting to the creditor.

ISSUE: WON the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is a

fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from liability for the death of a passenger? As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event
NOT FORTUITOUS EVENT. PETITIONER IS NOT EXEMPTED FROM LIABILITY. which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other
words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause
of injury or loss.
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be
considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation.
As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to
the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its
passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and
without injury.
However, when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law LIABLE? YES. A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force
presumes that the common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides: majeure or fortuitous event alone.

The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are death or injury resulting from an accident.
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and IN THIS CASE: No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to
1755. adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.
Article 1755 provides that (a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. Article
Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code prescribes the amount of at least
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable P3,000 (now, P50,000) as damages for the death of a passenger.
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code
or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event.[11]Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or