A. National territory Sec. 21.

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
North Cotabato v. Government of RP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008
Article X. (Local Government)

FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays.
as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the
be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato

for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
The agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and
structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework
jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The
of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act (IPRA).

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over

autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and
Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when
constitutional approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region.
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional
because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
thereof. provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus 2. Creation of sources of revenues;
for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
of people’s participation in the peace process.
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
Article III (Bill of Rights)
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, access to official records and to documents and 8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy 9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
limitations as may be provided by law.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that
state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
its transactions involving public interest.

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may

LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct be proposed by:
periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be
obtained.” 2. A constitutional convention.

Article VII (Executive Department) Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be
reconciled with the present constitution and laws “shall come into
force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework.” The
president’s authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the
required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to
amend thereiThe South China Sea has, especially in contemporary
times, emerged as a region of great interest to global players, in
terms of strategic and economic interests of the competing States.
As Foreign Policy puts it, “There’s no tenser set of waters in the
world than the South China Sea. For the last few years, China and
its neighbors have been bluffing, threatening, cajoling, and suing
for control of its resources.”[2]
To best understand the current situation in the South China Sea
from a legal point of view, it is imperative to refer back to the
judgment passed by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration last year, in response to the claims brought by
Philippines against China, primarily regarding maritime rights,
entitlements and zones in the South China Sea, as well as for the
protection of the marine life and the environment of the region,
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982.
China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the
‘Nine Dash Line’ on its official maps of the region in question;
other stakeholders, however, dispute this claim, as shown in the
arbitral proceedings. As is noted:
… While it was the Philippines which brought the case, it wasn’t
the only interested party in the Asean. Three other members have
claims to parts of the South China Sea or the Spratly Islands or the
Paracels that conflict with China’s expansive nine-dash theory:
Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Indonesia, Asean’s largest
economy, has continuing run-ins with Chinese fishing vessels and
occasionally with the Chinese Coast Guard in its exclusive
economic zone.[3]
Now, as the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) heads
towards working on the enforcement of this arbitration award
from last year (2016), and attempting to employ a code of
conduct for the South China Sea, it becomes even more important
to look at the arbitral ruling from an objective vantage point.
Philippines vs. China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016
The South China Sea Arbitration was conducted between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), under the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
arbitration is related to disputes between the Parties regarding
the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements, the status of
certain geographic features, and the lawfulness of certain actions
taken by China in the South China Sea; in particular, the following
four issues, as raised by Philippines:
To resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the source of
maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea;
To resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the
entitlements to maritime zones that would be generated under
the Convention by Scarborough Shoal and certain maritime features
in the Spratly Islands that are claimed by both the parties;
To resolve a series of disputes concerning the lawfulness of China’s
actions in the South China Sea, vis-à-vis interfering with Philippine’s
rights, failing to protect and preserve the marine environment, and
inflicting harm on the marine environment (through land
reclamation and construction of artificial islands);
To find that China has aggravated and extended the disputes
between the Parties by restricting access to a detachment of
Philippines Marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.
While China and Philippines are both parties to the UNCLOS, China
specifically made a declaration in 2006 to exclude maritime
boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute
settlement. In addition, China has shown disagreement with
Philippines’ decision to take the matter to arbitration and has
decided neither to agree with the decision of the Tribunal nor to
participate in the proceedings.
The Tribunal, on its end, has taken cognizance of these factors and
has purported to not deal with delimiting maritime boundaries.
Furthermore, the Tribunal did not bar the proceedings, on the basis
of Article 9 of Annex VII of UNCLOS[4]. In addition, the Tribunal also
noted that despite China’s absence from the proceedings, since it is
a party to the UNCLOS, the decision of the Tribunal would, in fact,
be binding upon it, pursuant to Article 296 (1)[5] and Article 11 of
Annex VII[6].
China’s Foreign Ministry, further, stated its position with regard to
the proceedings by publishing a Position Paper in 2014[7]. It claimed
that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the matter because:
The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial
sovereignty over the relevant maritime features in the South China
Sea;
China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral
instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through
negotiations;
Philippines’ disputes would constitute an integral part of maritime
delimitation between the two countries.
The Tribunal considered China’s Position Paper as a plea on
jurisdiction, and conducted a separate hearing on the issue of
jurisdiction and admissibility. Additionally, the Tribunal also declared
that it would honour China’s declaration of 2006 and the UNCLOS
and would neither delve into issues of maritime boundary
delimitation or questions of sovereignty. The Philippines also stated
that it, “does not seek in this arbitration a determination of which
Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them.
Nor does it request a delimitation of any maritime boundaries.”[8]
Pursuant to this, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction[9] in
October 2015, in which it concluded that it did indeed have
jurisdiction in the case, as per Philippines’ Final Submissions[10],
and that China’s lack of participation would not prove to be a bar to
its proceedings. It, further, concluded that the treaties China was
relying on were either political in nature and not legally binding[11],
or that they did were legally binding and yet did not bar either Party
from alternative means of dispute resolution[12]. In accordance
with Article 283 of the UNCLOS[13], the Tribunal found that this
requirement was met in the diplomatic communications between
the Parties and that Philippines’ initiation of proceedings under the
UNCLOS did not constitute an abuse of of process as claimed by
China.
The Tribunal, proceeding with the first two submissions made by
the Philippines, considered the validity of China’s claim to historic
rights in the maritime region of the South China Sea and the
‘Nine-Dash Line’. Through a lengthy analysis of the text and
context of the Convention, in line with the principles set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tribunal
established that the Convention supersedes any treaties in force
before its coming into force. It questioned China’s claim to
historical rights in the region, and established that China’s state
practice does not show that China had been enjoying any
historical rights in the South China Sea; rather, it was enjoying the
freedom of the high seas and since it did not create bar to other
states’ usage of the same, it could not be understood as being a
historical right. Furthermore, since China’s publishing of the same
in its Notes Verbales in 2009, many states have objected to its
claim as well. “The Tribunal concludes that the Convention
superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.”[14] However,
the Tribunal also concluded that its jurisdiction was limited to the
claims of historic rights on the maritime region and not to the
land masses in the South China Sea, i.e. if it can claim historic
rights on any of the islands, then it may also be able to claim
maritime zones (as per the Convention) on the basis of these
islands.
Next, the Tribunal looked at Philippines’ submissions 3 to 7,
concerning the nature of the features in the South China Sea. It
differentiates between low-tide elevations[15], high-tide
features[16] and rocks[17]. In its Award on Jurisdiction, the
Tribunal clarified that:
This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the features,
notwithstanding any possible question concerning whether
low-tide elevations may be subjected to a claim of territorial
sovereignty. Nor is this a dispute concerning sea boundary
delimitation: the status of a feature as a “low-tide elevation”,
“island”, or a “rock” relates to the entitlement to maritime zones
generated by that feature, not to the delimitation of such
entitlements in the event that they overlap.[18]
The Philippines put forward three categories for classifying
low-tide elevations: where a low-tide elevation is located within
12 miles of a high-tide feature[19], where the low-tide elevation is
beyond 12 miles but within the state’s exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf[20], and where the low-tide elevation is located
beyond the areas of natural jurisdiction[21].
For the purpose of identifying the nature of the features in the
South China Sea, the Tribunal relied upon satellite imagery that
had been conducted on the area and direct surveys that had been
carried out, by navies or otherwise, in the area, and relied upon
maps that were sufficiently detailed. They chose a certain tidal
height to maintain uniformity across the features, and decided to
rely, in cases where there had been significant man-made changes,
alterations or construction on the features, upon
maps/imagery/surveys that depicted the features as they had
been in their original form.[22]
Again the Tribunal relied upon statements previously made by
China to obtain their stance on the nature of the features, since
China had neither submitted any document to the Tribunal nor
had it discussed these in its Position Paper.
The Tribunal concluded that Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef,
Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef and Gaven Reef
(North) were all found to be high-tide features. The Tribunal
further noted that for the purposes of Article 121(3), the high-tide
features at Scarborough Shoal and the reefs were rocks that cannot
sustain human human habitation or economic life of their own and
so have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The
Tribunal found the same to be true of the Spratly Islands and so
concluded that China, therefore, has no entitlement to any
maritime zone in the area of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal;
they do, however, form part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines as they lie within 200 nautical
miles of the Philippines’ coast and there are no overlapping
entitlements in the area with respect to China.
On the contrary, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Subi Reef,
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal were all found to be
low-tide elevations, of which Hughes Reef lay within 12 miles of
McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe Island, Gaven Reef (South) lay within
12 miles of Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island, and Subi Reef lay
within 12 miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy Cay on the reefs to
the west of Thitu.
In the issue of Chinese interference with the living and non-living
resources (primarily concerned with fishing practices in the South
China Sea and oil and gas exploration and exploitation) of the
Philippines, the Tribunal considered diplomatic statements from
China to the Philippines and regulations related to the matter that
China had passed domestically. The Philippines put forward four
contentions related to living resources: China’s prevention of fishing
by Philippine vessels at Mischief Reef since 1995, and at Second
Thomas Shoal since 1995, China’s revision of the Hainan
Regulation[23] and China’s moratorium on fishing in the South
China Sea in 2012[24]. The Tribunal finds that China had breached
Articles 77[25] and 56[26] of the Convention through the operation
of its marine surveillance vessels (which interfered with Philippines’
oil and gas exploration) and through its moratorium on fishing which
interfered with the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines,
respectively.
The Tribunal also found China in breach of Article 58 (3)[27] of the
Convention, due to its failure to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged
ships in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, failing to
respect the sovereign rights of the Philippines over its fisheries in its
exclusive economic zone.
Submission 10 of the Philippines related to China’s interference with
Philippines’ fishing vessels and practices in the Scarborough Shoal.
While both the states had conflicting views on the situation (China
believed that it was Philippines who was causing the interference)
and both claimed historic rights (Philippines distinguished this by
clarifying that it only referred to historic fishing rights) to the region,
the Tribunal opined that China was, in fact, in contravention of the
Convention by interfering with the traditional fishing practice of the
Philippines in its exclusive economic zone through the deployment
of its official ships in the region. The Tribunal also noted that this
decision does not depend on the question of sovereignty, and that
the Tribunal once again refrained from commenting on the matter.
Philippines’ successive contention related to China’s activities on
the reefs in the South China Sea, with regards the practices it had
adopted for the purpose of large-scale construction and reclamation
at seven locations in the Spratly Islands[28], and its practices with
regards to fishing[29] in the South China Sea. Philippines claimed
that China had been harming and causing damage to the marine
environment of the South China Sea through these practices and
despite objections from the surrounding states, China had not
ceased its actions. It was also noted that while some of the fishing
ships were not state-appointed ships and were being manned by
non-state actors, the Chinese government had neither condemned
their actions nor made any efforts to stop them from proceeding.
The Tribunal, assisted by three independent experts on coral reef
biology, expert briefs and satellite imagery, found that China was
in breach of the Convention for failing to stop the fishing vessels
from engaging in harmful harvesting practices[30] and also for its
island-building activities[31]. The Tribunal further opined that
China’s construction on Mischief Reef, without authorization from
Philippines was in violation of Philippines’ sovereign rights in its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and a breach of the
Convention[32].
The next consideration before the Tribunal was the demeanour of
China’s law enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal[33] and the
lawfulness of these actions. The Philippines also raised the issue
under the relevant provisions of the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at Sea, 1972
(COLREGS). The Tribunal found that China, through the actions of
its law enforcement vessels, endangered Philippine vessels and
personnel and created a serious risk of collision and found China
in breach of Article 94 of the Convention[34].
The Tribunal, in response to Submission 14 of the Philippines,
opined that China had, in the course of the proceedings of this
arbitration, aggravated and extended its disputes with Philippines,
through its actions of dredging, artificial island-building and
construction activities[35].
Lastly, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make any further
declaration, owing to the fact that both the parties are already
parties to the Convention and are already obliged to comply with
it.
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
GR No. 212426, 2016-07-26
Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court
RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated
January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents
for the Philippine government, with the United States of America,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its
implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not
a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA
must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the
issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it
interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of
foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the
plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting
the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a
treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial
entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the
words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has
been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry
need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the
Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of
US troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting
treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading
the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive
agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the
obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It
fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and
VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration
has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision.
Principles:
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis
rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction
strictly abhors.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of
the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be
given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a
construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and
meaning of the said constitutional provision.
Capitol Wireless, Inc, vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas G.R. No.
180110, May 30, 2016
“Municipal waters” includes “not only streams, lakes, and tidal
waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private
ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public
forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also
marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to
the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel
with the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it.”
Although the term “municipal waters” appears in the 1991 LGC in
the context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a
fee by LGs, its inclusion in Book II which covers local taxation means
that it may also apply as guide in determining the territorial extent
of the local authorities' power to levy real property taxation (Capitol
Wireless Inc. v. Provincial Government of Batangas, G.R. No.
180110, May 30, 2016).
Unless otherwise provided in the 1991 LGC, no contract may be
entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the LGU
without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A
legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous
place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay
hall (Section 22[c], 1991 LGC). Without the council authorization/
ratification, the contract is unenforceable.
Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of
Law Students -vs- Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec
DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource
Information Authority and Davide Jr.
-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
RA 9522
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the
demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and
included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing
of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The
amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which
the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline
while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of
Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator
assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory
of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the
country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other
states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national
security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives
of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen
suit, since it is the citizens who will be directly injured and
benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is
merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone
and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS
III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under
the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a
result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic
doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by
RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to
the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth
is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the
Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime
of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA
9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country
will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the
length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what
the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and
Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from
the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the
classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and
State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice
with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with
the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners
contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the
Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to
the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The
Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over
the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless
whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will
not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining
freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of
international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal
law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the
Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it
just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their
right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation
of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation
of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community
will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the
prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with
the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for
its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
B. Declaration of principles and State policies
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to
property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet
(10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known
as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those
who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was
neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before
the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based
or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and
non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost
deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right
may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
 Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative
remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to
regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners
are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment
of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression
with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that
the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at
bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and
present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought
to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling
and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is
readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private
property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary
or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction
that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied
upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of
the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does
not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration
of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers
and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with
other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the
Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of
our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement
and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of
our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that
Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for
national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not
conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit,
restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied
in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has
some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike
in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on
the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in
weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their
common interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO,
developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization.
Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the
WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law
of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
Kulayan et. al. vs. Gov. Tan et. al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering
of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
one province to another but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his
right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos
even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police
power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates
due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion
in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder
and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid
price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a
plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao
Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the
creation of such region were later on known as the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted
by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President
to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O
No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13
of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate
provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
that the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.aw
They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that
the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge
regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative
regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no
standard to guide the President’s discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation
dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in
1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because
the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not
only the administration of local governments but also the
direction of executive departments which the law requires should
have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over
local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves
are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power
conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described as
"administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national
security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act,
among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the
title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.”
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian
supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period
only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither
does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the
task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of
the Constitution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2,
1940Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et
al.Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a
taxpayer of Manila filed apetition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the National
Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street
from 7:30 Am to12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along
Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth
Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from
the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director
recommended to the Secretary the approval of there
commendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications.The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940. The Mayor
of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass
and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue: 1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained
of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure thewell-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoidobstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. Inenacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations ofpublic convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestionof
traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at thebottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in
order to promotethe general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, andwith business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subject to all kindsof restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health, andprosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights
ofthe individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be madeto prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither shouldauthority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall intoslavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty isprecisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.2. No. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, theadoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stabilityof
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of
a propereconomic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of thecommunity, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existenceof all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est
supremalex.Social justice must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity ofinterdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protectionthat should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force inour social and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramountobjective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and ofbringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”THE PETITION IS DENIED
WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law:
Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds:
1.Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
 2.The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class
suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for
the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
Resident marine mammals of the protected seascape Tañon strait
V. Sec. Angelo Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.
Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for the exploration,
development and production of petroleum resources at the
offshore of Tanon Strait.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claimed”
that they have the legal standing to file this action since they
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.
Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also asserted their right to sue
for the faithful performance of international and municipal
environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In
this regard, they propounded that they have the right to demand
that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral
international instruments that the Philippine Government had
signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their
right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have
stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build
awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as
stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment
pursuant to the public trust doctrine. (See: Oposa case).
They also contended that the Court may lower the benchmark in
locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. (See: Oposa
case).
Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals have
no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires
parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.
They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the
petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them
were still unborn.
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged
their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards are not
the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand
to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.
Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real
party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.
Ruling in favor of the petitioners, the Supreme Court
Held: Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship
has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes.
The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The
ordinary corporation is a “person” for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or
charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air
that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and
modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life
it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter,
fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are
dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The
river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.
Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of
water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a
logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with destruction.
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists
seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the
need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to
court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be
either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It
further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real
party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been
consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively
applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure.”
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (399 Phil. 721
(2000) held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of
a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation
of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases became effective, the Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to
be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that
there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess
the legal standing to file this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals
of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, E.G. Toothed Whales,
Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, Joined in and
Represented by Human Beings Gloria Ramos & Rose Liza
Eismia-Osorio, etc. v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771,
April 21, 2015 & companion cases, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Ass'n. of Small Land Owners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations
or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No.
7942 to “govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources.”
On April 9, 1995, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. But shortly before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, (March 30th), the President entered
into an Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato. Subsequently, DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise
known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942 which was also later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter
being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are present to raise
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942.
HELD:
When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.” The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited to
the determination of actual cases and controversies.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical
questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.
Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La
Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous
people’s cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a
community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP,
members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas
also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. These petitioners
have standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA
as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They claim that
they would suffer “irremediable displacement” as a result of the
implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining
activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the
appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to
that of respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA’s
validity.

In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have
standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of
which the FTAA was executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to
the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it.
In other words, they contend that petitioners are not real parties
in interest in an action for the annulment of contract.
Public respondents’ contention fails. The present action is not
merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and
mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA,
which they submit is unconstitutional. As the case involves
constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether
petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have
legal standing.
Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial
review – that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity – WMCP points out that the petition was filed only
almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not
raised at the earliest opportunity.
The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question
of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the
execution of the state action complained of. That the question
of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid
reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule
would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse
into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to
promptly file a case to challenge the same.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law;
IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretary, GR 127882, Jan. 27,
2004
FACTS:
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through
the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around
the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the
area's underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the
Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,
wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval
of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the
DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to
drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate
original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground
that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform
terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving
oil exploration and extraction.
HELD:
No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and
utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed
by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President
Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or
local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to
the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,
although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with
the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.
This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections
expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in
statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the
letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a
statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed
below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a
contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and
Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos
under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed
lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517
transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three
Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA)
with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and
AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed
the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for
mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the
sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing
the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin,
PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as
part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and
PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether
the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous
to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu
invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for
consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII
hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the
two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute
immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by
the Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our
presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook … .”
In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the
session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.
Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous
governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to
the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the
extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution
that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to
commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within
the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their
erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two
regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution,” with legislative and executive machinery to exercise
the powers and responsibilities specified therein
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to
a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
“self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in
the second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services
18. AKBAYAN et.al. vs. Aquino et.al. G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May
2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters
on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the
COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides
that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that
the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election
activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to
conduct a special registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and
the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special
registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and
must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance.
However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President
issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow
the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had
been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim
Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set
up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ
of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The
post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related
to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong
to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any
action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight,
as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was
declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY
CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES
WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE
AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE
LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES
THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.
Francisco Jr., vs. HREP, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Francisco v House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003
Facts:
November 28, 2001: the 12thth Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
impeachment Proceedings, superceding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thth Congress.
July 22, 2002: the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
June 2, 2003: former President Joseph Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.
October 22, 2003: The House Committee on Justice ruled that
the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form” but voted
to dismiss it for bbeing “insufficient in substance.”
October 23, 2003: The second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of representatives,
most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Art. XI of the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”
Petitioners:
Atty. Ernesto Francisco, alleging that he has a duty as a member
of the IBP to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment. The first three petitions which were
filed prayed for the issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the HOR from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to
the Senate. no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
Plead for the Court to exercise judicial review to determine the system of check and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
validity of the second impeachment complaint. interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to
Respondents: defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
HOR through Speaker Jose De Venecia submitted a branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Manifestation asserting that the Supreme Court has no Constitution.
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the HOR (an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the 2. Yes, the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Constitution) from the performance of its constitutionally Impeachment Rule contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI as these
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.” 3. Yes.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela) praying that “the consolidated petitions be manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues one year period following Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.
affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, Conclusion
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court
to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld Impeachment Proceedings – unconstitutional Second impeachment
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution. complaint against CJ Hilario Davide - unconstitutional
The exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers’ decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under
which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.
Issues:
1. W/N the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings
2. Whether Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution
3. Whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution
Ruling:
1. The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. The “moderating power” to “determine the proper
allocation of powers” of different branches of government and to
“direct the course of government along constitutional channels” is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”
Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves
(Angara v. Electoral Commission). The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. The
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the the Constitution. There exists