CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, DIGESTS

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to

delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase
“[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and
constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the
same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued; The second paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this
Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral
and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s
consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor,
there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting

provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does
not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically
dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case
can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is
extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against
“decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to
the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and
perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely
apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in
that they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the
manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly
determinative of the existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the
trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.