IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY.

LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL.

A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC; December 10, 2013. LEONEN, J

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable. (Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)

Facts: Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to invalidate the
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted
that on the IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official
of the IBP who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended
By-Laws, the resignation takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign period. Atty.
Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a Certificate
of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao. Hence, he
is considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP. Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of
Governors' approval of Atty. Chaguiles succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two
grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting
where his replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a replacement.
Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP
Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region; thus, the IBP Board of
Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.

In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x x x x[x] In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for
whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from
among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as
governor for the unexpired portion of the term.

In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by
saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be
appointed or elected.As for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has
been the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is only for a very short period of
time, it is usually the Board of Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer in charge to
serve the unexpired term." Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent
Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon. A.M. No. 13-
05-08-SC: The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the election of the IBP
Executive Vice President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was elected IBP
Governor for Southern Luzon. Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming
that the IBP election of the EVP was marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent
hostility, manifest bias and prejudice, as well as the presiding officers absolute lack of
independence and that the election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which requires that
the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano emphasized that Atty.
Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguiles appointment as governor
was itselfultra vires, and therefore, voidab initio.

Issues: [1] Whether the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra vires, therefore
restraining her to exercise functions relative to the position?

[2] Whether the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws and
restrained Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties?

Held: As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new Governor for
Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected.As Atty. Chaguile is no longer serving as
IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from
exercising the functions of such office is no longer an available relief.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. (Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August
31, 2010)

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as Governor for
Northern Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this office, especially her
participation in the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP EVP, which is the subject of the
second Administrative Matter. We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon in a de facto capacity. To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements
must be present: 1) There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith. Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460

In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the
IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is
not a mere volunteer,"that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of
Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority,Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473
Phil. 844 (2004).
The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it characterized as a
"tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who vacates his or her office
shortly before his or her term expires. Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this
supposed tradition cannot earn our imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by
the IBP Board of Governors, the authority of replacement governors was derived from a
process, which, though irregular,enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.

Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the IBP By-
Laws "violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to
the contrary." CIVIL CODE, Art. 7.We do not validate the IBP Board of Governors erroneous
practice. To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot countenance this. No amount of previous
practice or "tradition" can validate such a patently erroneous action."

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto
capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer. Accordingly, all official
actions of Atty. Chaguile asde facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon must be deemed valid,
binding, and effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified for the
office. It follows that her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013
are in order. DENIED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) vs.
ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, et.al
G.R. No. 179492 June 5, 2013, LEONEN, J.:

This Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the
issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service and
the serious implications the case may cause on the effective administration of the executive department.

Facts :

Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DARFU XII) is a

government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and
regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials
and employees of DA-RFU XII.

On March 30, 2004, Executive Order No. 304 (EO 304) was passed designating
Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all
departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region
shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City

On April 1, 2005, a Memorandum by the Department of Agriculture (DA)

Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana was issued. It directed Officer-in Charge (OIC)
and Regional Executive Director of DA- RFU XII, Abusama M. Alid, to:

(1) Directed to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, finance and
operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal City.
(2) Action plan for transfer should be submitted to Edmund Sana’s office not later
than 6 April 2005 so that appropriate funding can be processed.
(3) Execution of the plan should commence by 16 April 2005 or earlier so that
concerned personnel can benefit from the summer break to make personal
arrangements for the transfer of their work base.

On April 22, 2005, a memorandum was addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap. Herein,
private respondents opposed the implementation of the April 1, 2005 Memorandum alleging
that :

(1) In 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement

during one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall
remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not covered by the
suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry
 (DTI), Department of Tourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE)

(2) On March 7, 2005, they appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture that the
implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. A copy of the Petition was
attached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the physical
transfer will entail and the plight of employees who have already settled and
established their homes in Cotabato City

On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees

Association-12 (DAEAS-12) President Osmeña I. Motañer to then President Macapagal- Arroyo.
After which, this was referred to DA Secretary Yap for his information and appropriate action.

Respondents justified their appeal saying that:

(1) A building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole
staff of DARFU XII. On the other hand, there is no building yet in Koronadal City
where rent is very expensive.
(2) If the regional office remains in Cotabato City, the government need not spend
over ₱7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment
hauling and construction.
(3) Respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in
Tantangan has a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of
occupancy by the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as per information
from an auditor.

On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the
regional office to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South
Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried out on May 21, 2005

Respondents file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 of Cotabato City

RTC granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the assailed
Order of the trial court is contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in DENR v.
DENR Region 12 Employees

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order

Hence, the current petition.

Issue:

I. Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions?
II. Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion
for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?
III. Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed Resolutions?

Ruling :

I.

Yes. A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45.

Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent
action. Consequently, the March 21, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
Petition via Rule 65 as well as its August 16, 2007 Resolution denying reconsideration are the
final Resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, these
Resolutions would attain finality if these are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the
trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would also become unassailable.

II.

Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.

Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration
need not be filed where questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court.

In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is
necessity to address the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service and the serious implications the case may cause on the effective
administration of the executive department.

The instant Petition involves the effective administration of the executive department
and would similarly warrant relaxation of procedural rules if need be. Specifically, the fourth
clause of E.O. No. 304 states as follows: "WHEREAS, the political and socio-economic
conditions in SOCCSKSARGEN Region point to the need for designating the regional center
and seat of the region to improve government operations and services."

III.

No. The disputed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals dwell solely on the
indispensability of the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court before filing a
Petition via Rule 65; thus, the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed.
 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and
authorized representative Norma Tan, vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding
Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA,
EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES"

G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013, LEONEN, J.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls
the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.

Facts:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly

authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City
Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any
motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

On May 7, 2003, respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car belonging to Jeffrey Walan
which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such
car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.

On May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.

On May 23, 2003, petitioner Jadewell filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City charging the respondents for the felony of robbery which was
later dismissed. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, however, respectfully submit that the
acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these
cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of
such ordinance.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.

In their motion to quash, respondents argued, among others, that the offense charged in
this case was committed on May 7, 2003. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the
Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5)
months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the
accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was
filed.

On the other hand, the petitioner argued that the offenses charged have not yet
prescribed. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on
October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23,
2003, well within the prescribed period.

In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and dismissed the cases.

Issue:

Does the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance?

Ruling:

No. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two
months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of

the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
 As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also

featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed
on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information

shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings.
 ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN
AS ARARO PARTY-LIST, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

LEONEN, J

"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The party’s interest must be direct, substantial, and material.

Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as
ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. In the May 10, 2010
elections, it garnered a total of 147,204 votes and ranked 50th. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc, then sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, initially proclaimed 28
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of 35 seats guaranteed and additional seats,
based on the COMELEC’s count of 121 Certificates of Canvass or a total of 29,750,041 votes for
the Party-List System.

This prompted the petitioner to file a Petition for Review for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, praying for the modification of the COMELEC's interpretation of the formula stated in
BANAT v. COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from
total number of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total
number of votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified; and enjoin the public
COMELEC from proclaiming the remaining winning party-list candidates until it modifies the
interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by the
petitioner.

As the Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining Order, the National Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution proclaiming the winning party-list groups. The said resolution
applies the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to arrive at the winning party-list groups
and their guaranteed seats, where:

Number of votes of
party-list
Proportion or
= Percentage of votes
Total number of votes garnered by party-list
for
party-list candidates
 The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or
equal to 2% to entitle a party-list candidate to 1 seat in the first round. There will be a second
round if the total number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total
number of party-list seats available.

If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is
computed by getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats
awarded in the second round), the next in the party-list ranking will be given 1 seat each until
all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning
groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.

The petitioner suggests that this formula is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that
were not made for any party-lists were not counted. It argues that the correct interpretation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes.

Notably, a comparison of the figures resulting from the formula used by the COMELEC
and that of ARARO would show:

With Divisor of total

With Divisor of votes
valid votes cast for
cast for the party-list
party-list system minus
system as proposed by
votes cast for
ARARO
disqualified party-lists
(37,377,371)
or invalid votes
(30,264,579)

Votes garnered by
147,204 147,204
ARARO

Votes garnered over

total votes cast for party- 0.4864 0.3939
lists (%)

Guaranteed Seat 0 0

ISSUE: Taking into consideration the foregoing, does the petitioner have the legal standing to
institute the present case?

HELD:
 None. The petitioner is not considered as a real party-in-interest.

"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The party’s interest must be direct,
substantial, and material.

In this case, the petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT
and proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the proportional representation
of party-list candidates in the House of Representatives. However despite any new
computation, ARARO’s proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system whether
valid or invalid still fails to secure one seat for ARARO. Reviewing the figures presented by the
petitioner would show that the petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury
from the application of the formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning
party-lists in the assailed National Board of Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed
by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a
guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal
standing to raise the argument in the Supreme Court.
RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9946 OF MRS. PACITA A. GRUBA, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF THE LATE MANUEL K.
GRUBA, FORMER CTA ASSOCIATE JUDGE.
A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013
LEONEN, J

An initial look at the law might suggest that the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is limited to those
who retired prior to the effectivity of the law. However, a holistic treatment of the law will show that the
set of amendments provided by Republic Act No. 9946 is not limited to justices or judges who retired
after reaching a certain age and a certain number of years in service. The changes in the law also refer to
justices or judges who "retired" due to permanent disability or partial permanent disability as well as
justices or judges who died while in active service. In light of these innovations provided in the law, the
word "retired" in Section 3-B should be construed to include not only those who already retired under
Republic Act No. 910 but also those who retired due to permanent disability. It also includes judges and
justices who died or were killed while in service

FACTS: This case involves a judge of the Court of Tax Appeals who died while in service. He
died at the age of 55 years, two (2) months, and six (6) days. He died prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9946, which substantially amended the benefits provided in Republic Act No.
910.

Manuel K. Gruba (Judge Gruba) was born on April 19, 1941. He began his government service
on December 3, 1979 as Senior Revenue Executive Assistant I at the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
He rose from the ranks at the Bureau of Internal Revenue until he was appointed as an
Associate Judge of the Court of Tax Appeals on September 17, 1992.

On June 25, 1996, Judge Gruba passed away. The cause of his death was natural and was
reported as brain stem/midbrain stroke, basilar artery thrombosis, embolic event. He was 55
years old when he died. He was in government service for a total of 16 years, six (6) months,
and 21 days. In those years, he rendered service for three (3) years, nine (9) months, and eight
(8) days in the Judiciary.

The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 1996, this Court approved the application filed by Mrs.
Gruba. Per certification dated October 25, 2012 by the Court of Tax Appeals’ Office of
Administrative and Finance Services, the five-year lump sum retirement benefit under Republic
Act No. 910 was remitted to the Government Service Insurance System effective June 26, 1996.
A total of ₱1,486,500.00, representing the five-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba, was
paid to his heirs.

On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No.
9946. Republic Act No. 9946 provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension
benefits, among others. The law also provides a retroactivity provision which states:

“SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have retired prior to the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the members of the Judiciary:
Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be prospective.”

On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act
No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs.
Gruba. She received ₱1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to
April 2012.

In a Resolution dated November 27, 2012, this Court revoked the Resolution dated January 17,
2012 and directed the Court of Tax Appeals to discontinue the payment of the survivorship
pension benefits to Mrs. Gruba. However, this Court stated that Mrs. Gruba was not required to
refund the survivorship pension benefits received pursuant to the Resolution dated January 17,
2012.7

This Court required the Office of the Chief Attorney to report on the matter. In a Comment
dated May 14, 2013, the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended that the heirs of Judge
Gruba be entitled to the 10-year lump sum death benefit under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946.

ISSUES: (1) Whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba;
(2) Whether the heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits
under Republic Act No. 9946; and

(3) Whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the same law.

RULING:

This Resolution adopts in part the recommendation of the Office of the Chief Attorney. We
decide the first two issues in favor of the heirs of Judge Gruba. However, we deny the
application for survivorship pension benefits of Mrs. Gruba.

The rationale for retirement benefits

Retirement laws are social legislation. In general, retirement laws provide security to the elderly
who have given their prime years in employment whether in the private sector or in
government. These laws ensure the welfare of individuals who are approaching their twilight
years and have limited opportunities for productive employment that give them a steady
income stream. In the private sector, retirement packages are usually crafted as "forced savings"
on the part of the employee.

In government, lucrative retirement benefits are used as an incentive mechanism to encourage

competent individuals to have careers in government. This Court often states:

“Retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance
into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary
objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment
and render faithful and efficient service while so employed.”

On several occasions, this Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its
purpose. In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon:
“Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to
provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to
earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts
are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.”

This general principle for retirement benefits applies to members of the Judiciary. However,
Congress made a special law specifically for retiring justices and judges. This law on "retirement
pensions of Justices arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to
guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary." Aside from guaranteeing judicial
independence, a separate retirement law for justices and judges is designed to attract intelligent
members of the Bar to join the Judiciary. It compensates for the opportunity cost of having
profitable private practices.

The rationale for death benefits

Aside from considering old age retirement benefits, the law also protects the welfare of the heirs
and surviving spouses of employees who die before or after retirement. "The law extends
survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or
pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the
death of the wage earner or pensioner."

The law usually takes into account the nature of the employment and the vulnerability of the
individual to risks that might lead to an early demise. Therefore, military and justices and
judges, by virtue of are given generous death benefits. The law recognizes the threats these
kinds of government employees face because of their positions. In order to minimize the
adverse effects of unexpected deaths while in service, the law extends benefits to the deceased
employee’s loved ones. It is also the law’s way of sympathizing with the loss of these families.
Death benefits remind the heirs that despite their loss, their departed loved one had valuable
contributions to society, and the State is grateful for these contributions. These benefits also
provide more incentive for the independence of those who serve in the Judiciary. They allow
peace of mind since members of the Judiciary know that they could provide for their spouse
and their children even beyond their death.
Issue 1

Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba.

Republic Act No. 9946 applies retroactively to those who died or were killed while they were in
government service.

Judge Gruba who passed away prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is still covered
by the law by virtue of Section 3-B. "Retired" here is not construed in the strict dictionary
definition but in its more rational sense of discontinuance of service due to causes beyond one’s
control. It should include the cessation of work due to natural causes such as death. Therefore,
the death of Judge Gruba produces effects under Republic Act No. 9946 for his family.

Issue 2

The heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under Section 2
of Republic Act No. 9946, subject to the availability of funds.

Judge Gruba’s death follows the second scenario under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9946. He
died due to natural causes while serving the Judiciary. He rendered 16 years, six (6) months,
and 21 days in government service, thereby complying with the 15-year service requirement
under the law. His heirs became entitled to a lump sum of 10 years gratuity computed on the
basis of the highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
representation, and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and
additional compensation allowance.

The fact that the heirs of Judge Gruba received death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 prior
to amendments in Republic Act No. 9946 does not preclude the heirs from receiving the 10-year
lump sum in full. This is the effect of the retroactivity mentioned in Section 3-B of Republic Act
No. 9946. This is also in keeping with a policy declaration under Article XVI, Section 8 of the
Constitution stating that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and
other benefits due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors."

Issue 3

Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9946.

The fact that the heirs of Judge Gruba received death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 prior
to amendments in Republic Act No. 9946 does not preclude the heirs from receiving the 10-year
lump sum in full. This is the effect of the retroactivity mentioned in Section 3-B of Republic Act
No. 9946. This is also in keeping with a policy declaration under Article XVI, Section 8 of the
Constitution stating that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and
other benefits due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors."

However, Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9946.

When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, she was not claiming
additional gratuity benefits. She was invoking the second paragraph of Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 9946.

According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, survivorship pension benefits are given to
surviving spouses of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges or justices who are
eligible to retire optionally. This means that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship pension,
the deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, (2) have rendered at least fifteen
years in the Judiciary or in any other branch of government, and in the case of eligibility for
optional retirement, (3) have served the last three years continuously in the Judiciary.

Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship pension benefits if her late husband were
eligible to optionally retire at the time of his death. It was unfortunate that Judge Gruba died
five years short of the optional retirement age. However, survivorship benefits are an offshoot
of retirement benefits.

We note, however, that if Judge Gruba were eligible to optionally retire under Republic Act No.
9946 at the time of his death and despite the fact that he passed away prior to the amendatory
law’s passage, his widow would have been entitled to the survivorship pension. The law was
passed on January 13, 2010, and any surviving spouse of a judge or justice who died prior to
this date but was retired or eligible to retire optionally should be covered by Republic Act No.
9946 by virtue of its retroactivity clause.
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171428; November 11, 2013

LEONEN, J.:

"Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction
is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of
law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy."

Facts:

Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It was
incorporated on April 23, 1979 to operate ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign
trade. Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from public respondent Development
Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named the M/V
Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, Development Bank of the Philippines required that the
following conditions be met:

1) A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which by then had been
renamed the M/V Sterling Ace;

2) Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, as

well as respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should
become liable jointly and severally for the amount of the loan;

3) The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including proceeds of Charter

and Shipping Contracts, should be assigned to Development Bank of the
Philippines; and

4) Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned no less than 67% of

the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company. The
percentage of shares assigned should be maintained at all times, and the
assignment was to subsist as long as the assignee, Development Bank of the
Philippines, deemed it necessary during the existence of the loan.

On May 12, 1981, petitioner signed the Assignment of Shares of Stock with Voting Rights.
Petitioner then signed the May 12, 1981 promissory note in December 1981. He was the last to
sign this note as far as the other signatories were concerned.
The loan was approved by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines on March 18, 1981.
The vessel was acquired on September 29, 1981 for $5.3 million.

On December 3, 1981, respondent corporation Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. through respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Development Bank of the
Philippines. The deed stated that the assignor, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.:

x x x does hereby transfer and assign in favor of the ASSIGNEE (DBP), its
successors and assigns, future earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace,"
including proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, it being understood that
this assignment shall continue to subsist for as long as the ASSIGNOR’S
obligation with the herein ASSIGNEE remains unpaid.

On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he was
severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. He required
that its board of directors pass a resolution releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the
loan contract with Development Bank of the Philippines. In addition, petitioner asked that the
private respondents notify Development Bank of the Philippines that he had severed his ties
with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.

The accounts of respondent Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. in the Development Bank of the
Philippines were transferred to public respondent Asset Privatization Trust on June 30, 1986.

Presently, respondent Asset Privatization Trust is known as the Privatization and Management
Office. Its present function is to identify disposable assets, monitor the progress of privatization
activities, and approve the sale or divestment of assets with respect to price and buyer.

On January 29, 1987, the M/V Sterling Ace was sold in Singapore for $350,000.00 by
Development Bank of the Philippines’ legal counsel Atty. Prospero N. Nograles.

When petitioner came to know of the sale, he wrote respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines to express that the final price was inadequate, and therefore, the transaction was
irregular. At this time, petitioner was still bound as a debtor because of the promissory note
dated May 12, 1981, which petitioner signed in December of 1981.

Petitioner filed several Complaints against respondents, praying that the promissory note be
declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage of the
vessel and the note in question.
In the Complaints, petitioner alleged that respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh, together with Vicente
L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas, had exercised deceit and fraud in causing petitioner to
bind himself jointly and severally to pay respondent Development Bank of the Philippines the
amount of the mortgage loan. Although he had been made a stockholder and director of the
respondent corporation Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., petitioner alleged that he had never
invested any amount in the corporation and that he had never been an actual member of the
board of directors. He alleged that all the money he had supposedly invested was provided by
respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh. He claimed that he only attended one meeting of the board.

Petitioner further claimed that he had been excluded deliberately from participating in the
affairs of the corporation and had never been compensated by Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. as a
director and stockholder. According to petitioner, when Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was
organized, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh had promised him that he would become part of the
administration staff and oversee company operations. Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh had also
promised petitioner that the latter’s son would be given a position in the company. However,
after being designated as vice president, petitioner had not been made an officer and had been
alienated from taking part in the respondent corporation.

In their Answers to the Complaints, respondents raised the following defenses against
petitioner: Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines categorically denied receiving any
amount from Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s future earnings and from the proceeds of the
shipping contracts. It maintained that equity contributions could not be deducted from the
outstanding loan obligation that stood at ₱245.86 million as of December 31, 1986.

The trial proceeded with the petitioner serving as a sole witness for his case. In a January 4, 1996
Decision,34 the Regional Trial Court ruled:

WHEREFORE, this Court, finding and declaring the Promissory Note (Exhibit
"C") and the Mortgage Contract (Exhibit "A") null and void insofar as plaintiff
DR. ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH is concerned, hereby ANNULS and VOIDS those
documents as to plaintiff, and it is hereby further ordered that he be released
from any obligation or liability arising therefrom.

All the defendants’ counterclaims and cross-claims and plaintiff’s and

defendants’ prayer for damages are hereby denied and dismissed, without
prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents Ruperto V. Tankeh, Asset Privatization Trust, and Arenas immediately filed their
respective Notices of Appeal with the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with regard to the denial of his prayer for damages. After this Motion had been
denied, he then filed his own Notice of Appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of any competent proof, Ruperto V. Tankeh did
not commit any fraud. Petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh was unable to prove by a preponderance
of evidence that fraud or deceit had been employed by Ruperto to make him sign the
promissory note. The Court of Appeals reasoned that:

Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. The
plaintiff clearly failed to discharge such burden. (Citations omitted)

With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment and ordered
that plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 25, 2005 that was denied in a Resolution42
promulgated on February 9, 2006.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, petitioner’s
failure to show that there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
merited the dismissal of the Complaint.

Issue:

WON the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Ruling:

Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a

Rule 45 Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, this Court made the distinction
between a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:

Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not

errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light: When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
 exercised when the error is committed x x x. Consequently, an error of judgment
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari.

xxxx

Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy.

In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court
of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to
uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the
Court of Appeals’ exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of the
appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals,
and to this Court via Rule 45.

Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
"committed grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the
discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari.
This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for
review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to
comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.
In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing a Petition for
Review. His Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation of facts and law on the part of
the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy
of certiorari, this Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the
interest of substantial justice
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. RETIRED JUDGE
GUILLERMO R. ANDAYA, Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181; June 25, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 09-4-174-RTJ)

LEONEN, J.:

“In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondent's cessation from office.”

Facts:

On January 19, 20, and 21, 2009, a judicial audit docketed as A.M. No. 09-4-174-RTC was
conducted on the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, then presided by the
respondent Judge Guillermo R. Andaya.

In a Memorandum and now Hon. Associate Justice Jose P. Perez recommended that a fine be
imposed on respondent Judge in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00). The fine,
which was to be deducted from his retirement or terminal leave benefits was recommended
based on the findings that respondent Judge failed to take appropriate action, resolve the
pending motions and decide a number of civil and criminal cases.

In a Resolution dated April 29, 2009, the Second Division of this Court resolved to docket the
judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against respondent for gross incompetence,
inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty against Judge Guillermo R. Andaya, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, who retired on March 27, 2009.

Meanwhile, another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. 09-11-477-RTC, arose in relation
to the Certificate of Clearance that the respondent Judge filed in relation to his application for
Compulsory Retirement Benefits.

In a Memorandum dated November 9, 2009, then Court Administrator and now Hon. Associate
Justice Jose P. Perez commended the imposition of a fine, to be deducted from his
retirement/gratuity benefits, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The
recommendation was made upon the finding that the respondent Judge had failed to decide
forty-five (45) cases submitted for decision beyond the reglementary period of three (3) months
as per the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases.
In a Resolution dated November 24, 2009, the Court resolved to redocket A.M. No. 09-11-477-
RTC as A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and impose a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on the
respondent Judge for his failure to decide forty-five (45) cases submitted for decision, with the
amount to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.

The respondent Judge sent a letter dated March 4, 2010 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, manifesting that: (a) both A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 involves the
charge of gross inefficiency; and (b) that "the Court had not been given the opportunity to
appreciate his explanation regarding his health conditions" since he did not know about A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2208 until he received a copy of the Resolution of this Court dated November 24,
2009.

Respondent prayed for the Court to take cognizance of: (a) his health problems; (b) the fact that
he had already been fined Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for gross inefficiency in A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2208; (c) that he has not received any benefit since he retired on March 27, 2009; and (d)
that he had served the government for thirty-four (34) years, twenty-two (22) of which were in
the judiciary.

In a Memorandum dated June 11, 2010 signed by Court Administrator Marquez, the Office of
the Court Administrator ("OCA" for brevity) noted that the respondent Judge paid the Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) fine in the other complaint on April 14, 2010. The OCA also noted
that twenty-three (23) criminal cases and nine (9) civil cases included in the March 2009
Monthly Report of Cases in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 were included in the present complaint. The
OCA then reiterated its recommendation that respondent Judge be fined, but that the amount
be reduced from Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Respondent then sent a letter dated August 17, 2010 reiterating his manifestations in the letter
dated March 4, 2010. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the present case for the sake of
justice tempered by leniency on the following grounds: (a) his serious health problems that
affected his work efficiency in the last months of his service; (b) the penalty in A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2208 was imposed without him being given a chance to explain; and (c) he has served twelve
(12) years as an assistant city prosecutor, three (3) years as a Municipal Trial Court judge, and
nineteen (19) years as a Regional Trial Court judge.

In subsequent letter pointed out an apparent overlap between A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and the
present complaint and prayed that the two not be considered as separate complaints because to
do so would be akin to splitting the causes of a complaint. Respondent also prayed for the early
resolution of the present case.

In response to the letter, the OCA sent a Memorandum dated February 16, 2011, bringing to the
attention of the Court what respondent claimed as a similarity in the offenses involved in A.M.
No.RTJ-09-2208 and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 and the possibility that he may be penalized twice
for the same offense.

In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, the Court resolved to approve the release of
respondent's retirement benefits subject to the retention of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
and pending the resolution of the present case. On January 24, 2012, the Court issued a
Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 considering the case as closed and terminated.

Issue:

WON the Court can acquire administrative jurisdiction over a Judge by filing a new
administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public official.

Ruling:

No. A review of the records shows that the judicial audit was conducted on January 19, 20, and
21, 2009 during the respondent Judge's incumbency. However, the administrative complaint was
docketed only on April 29, 2009 after his compulsory retirement on March 27, 2009.

In the case of Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo
City, Davao del Norte, a Memorandum recommending that court's presiding Judge, Jesus L.
Grageda, who compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009, be held liable for not ordering a
prompt investigation as to missing court exhibits and properties and be made to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) was submitted by the OCA to the Court on July 10, 2012,
or more than two (2) years after he retired. In dismissing the complaint against him, We ruled
that:

In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must
be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost
by reason of respondent's cessation from office. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Hamoy, the Court held that:

Respondent's cessation from office x x x does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. The Court's jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office
during the pendency of the case.

In the present case, Judge Grageda's compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to
institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can
no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative
case against him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the
appropriate civil or criminal case against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression.
(emphasis provided)

Similarly, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda, the Court dismissed
another pending administrative case against him, thus:

Records show that Judge Grageda compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009 while the judicial
audit was conducted at RTC, Br. 4, Panabo City from November 17 to November 26, 2009. The
OCA then submitted its report only on March 24, 2010, which was re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter on April 28, 2010, or months after Judge Grageda retired from the
judiciary. Consequently, his retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant
administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court,
much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the
judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service.
As held in the case of OCA v. Judge Celso L. Mantua [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8, 2012]:

This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial
audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend
the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never
given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit.

In light of these pronouncements, the Court has lost jurisdiction to find him liable for the cases
and motions left unresolved prior to his retirement.

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint against respondent

Judge GUILLERMO R. ANDAYA, formerly of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena
City, Quezon, is DISMISSED. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administrator is DIRECTED to release the Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) retained from his
retirement pay unless withheld for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.