Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

DOI 10.1007/s12124-009-9091-1
R E G U L A R A RT I C L E

Constructivisms from a Genetic Point of View:

A Critical Classification of Current Tendencies

José Carlos Sánchez & José Carlos Loredo

Published online: 24 March 2009

# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract In this paper, we propose a critical classification of contemporary

constructivist orientations. Our fundamental theoretical reference is the notion of
genesis, understood as the construction of reality in a way that is neither relativist
nor positivist-realist. We identify a nucleus of classic, genetic constructivism that
revolves around the ideas of Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky and discuss two
tendencies that distort the spirit of that nucleus: objectivism and subjectivism.
Objectivism rules out the psychological, constructive activity of the subject,
subordinating (or just reducing) it to objective structures either from nature (like
genetic endowment or neural functioning), or from culture (like language or social
practices). Subjectivism completely detaches the objectivity of knowledge from its
construction on the part of the subject, reducing it to the mere product of individual
interest, view, or irrationality. Thus, subjectivism is the non-constructive way to
conceive the subject. Then, we attempt to show the dialectics that exists between
these two tendencies and the scope of our criteria by analysing a representative (non
exhaustive) group of authors who are defined as constructivists or who bring
important elements to the debate about constructivism.

Keywords Constructivism . Co-constructivism . Constructionism . Objectivism .

Subjectivism . Genetic Psychology

Introduction

The term “constructivism” and other related terms or expressions are used
abundantly in psychology and close disciplines. Nevertheless, the term hardly has

J. C. Sánchez (*)
Facultad de Psicología, Universidad de Oviedo, Plaza Feijoo s/n, Oviedo, Asturias 33003, Spain
e-mail: jocasan@uniovi.es

J. C. Loredo
Facultad de Psicología, UNED, Ciudad Universitaria, Madrid 28040, Spain
e-mail: jcloredo@psi.uned.es
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 333

any power to unify this group of theoretical concepts. It has served to categorize the
ideas of authors as disparate as Bourdieu, Brouwer, Foerster, Glasersfeld, Gergen,
Kelly, Latour, Lorenzen, Maturana, Pask, Piaget, Shotter, Vygotsky, and Watzlawick...
It is clear that the concept of construction can be understood in many and diverse
forms.
Amongst authors such as Chiari and Nuzzo (Chiari and Nuzzo 1996), Le Moigne
(Le Moigne 1995) and Mascolo and Pollack (Mascolo and Pollack 1997) there have
been several useful attempts to organize the panorama of constructivist tendencies.
Keeping these works in mind we would like to adopt a wider point of view that
analyzes the huge variety of constructivist viewpoints by paying attention not only to
their empirical psychology, so to say, but also to how they understand the process of
the construction of knowledge itself and the relation between knowledge and reality.
Also, we have tried to cover as many theoretical tendencies as possible in order to
enrich the panorama of contemporary constructivist viewpoints. The price to be
payed —we must acknowledge— is to be neither completely exhaustive nor
completely respectful to every aspect of each author´s ideas. The risk is worth only
if the resulting global view can enrich the understanding of that author in some
respect.
Thus our classification (Table 1) does not intend to be a mere listing of the ideas
of various authors. Furthermore, we do not find it possible to propose a neutral
classification that does not contain some theoretical compromise. In this sense, we
would like to establish a critical perspective, based on some central ideas of classical
constructivism, which clarifies, we think, the cluttered panorama of contemporary
constructivist viewpoints. In order to do this, we will take as our reference the
historical tradition that comes from Kant, Darwin, Wundt and Helmholtz and goes
through to current work done by authors such as Glasersfeld, Valsiner or Deacon,
passing through Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky (centre column of the table). We will,
however, argue that even within this core of constructivism there are ideas that are
not completely congruent with each other, as well as having a tendency to drift
toward two extremes which we believe causes them to loose the specificity that
constructivism has as a powerful and original theoretical perspective. We have called
these two extremes, or opposite trends, subjectivism and objectivism. Some authors
who are normally considered to be constructivists have been included in one or the
other of these extremes. We have also considered some authors that do not define
themselves as constructivist but we feel are relevant in order to enrich the meaning
of constructivism (for example Edelman or Deacon).
The table presents a map of the most representative options. It should not be
taken —we insist— as an exhaustive list nor have all the details from the
mentioned authors been analyzed. We have chosen those authors and ideas that we
consider to be the most significant and our commentary does not imply that we do
not value the rest of their contributions. In addition, the placement of a specific
author in the table can be questioned, as it is our judgement about that perspective.
Nevertheless, this judgement forms a part of the general argument that underlies
the logic of the table. The table is at the same time referring to different concep-
tions of knowledge construction and different conceptions of reality (constructed
or not). So, our classification pertains simultaneously to epistemological and
ontological fields.
334 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

Table 1 Contemporary constructivist tendencies

Subjectivisms Realm of Constructivism Objectivisms
Psychological activity is understood in terms of genesis
Psychological activity produces reality but is Knowledge and truth are constructed contextually Psychological activity is explained by objective entities such
conceptualized in a subjective, non genetic way as genes, the brain, culture, language and systems, etc.
Characteristic tension
Subjectivism --------------------------------------------------------------------- Objectivism

Kenneth Gergen, Jonathan Potter
Reality is constructed by discourse based on the
consensus of individual and group interests
Explicit relativism. Irrational psychology (based on
desire or interest)
Edinburgh´s School (Barnes, Bloor)
Scientific products are the result of negotiations and
consensus. Irrational psychology (based on interests)
Humberto Maturana
Humans (observers) and animals (autopoietic
machines) interpret or define their relation to the world
Baldwin
Genetic psychobiology and organic selection Gerhard Roth
Dialectic psychosocial construction of self The brain (initial reality) constructs our phenomenological
reality
Piaget
Genetic psychology and theory of the phenocopy Francisco Varela
Construction of the subject-object duality Explicitly criticizes subjective constructionism and solipsism
Subject and object are coordinated from the beginning. Truth
Vygotsky is based on utility
Sociohistorical context of construction emphasized
Human simbolic activity emphasized.
Theory of Complex Systems
Baltes et al.; Oyama, Quartz & Sejnowski:
Ernst Von Glasersfeld the multilevel interaction of systems generates brain
Truth as an adaptive utility development and psychological activity
Knowledge = viable models

Barbara Rogoff
Heinz Von Foerster Development as enculturation Berger & Luckmann
The observer defines their own individual-mental reality, Plurality of cultures Reality as a social construction
Although there is a supposed inaccessible noumenic Subjects are like marionettes to socio-cultural context
reality James Wertsch Pragmatic sense of construction
Development by way of sociocultural interaction
And emphasis on mediation
Paul Watzlawick Bruno Latour
The pragmatics of communication and language define Rejection of the subject/object distinction
reality Jaan Valsiner Objects have their own agency
Integration of Piaget-Vygotsky. The active caracter of imitation Multilevel interaction between “humans” and “non-humans”
Pragmatic idea of construction

Robert Wozniak
Integration of Piaget-Vygotsky-Gibson.
Social construction of knowledge does not impede
realism whose substrate resides in perception.

Erlangen School (Lorenzen)

The “method” of the construction of reality is operational, not formal
The search for a universal objective language

Terrence Deacon
C o-evolution of mind-language and
construction reciprocates both. Organic selection

Gerald Edelman
Neural Darwinism vs. nativism and modularity
Organization of the brain by means of activity

Theoretical components that could just as easily be placed in the opposite column (Subjectivism vs.
Objectivism) are italicised.

Occasionally, certain ideas from the same author may belong to one of the extremes
of the table while others may belong to the opposite. In fact, some names could appear
in more than one place in the table. This is the case for Berger and Luckmann, who
subsume psychological activities under objective social structures (right column of
Table 1) but fall back on the pragmatism of consensus as the basis of knowledge (left
column). In order to reflect these kinds of situations, we have indicated the theoretical
aspects of the authors that could just as easily fit into the other column with italics.

The Objectivism-Subjectivism Dialectics and the Genetic Core

of Constructivism

Subjectivism assumes a negative conception of psychology in that no form of

objectivity can be founded on the activity of the subject given that the nature of that
action is understood as either not epistemologically reliable or irrational, driven by
desire, interest or passion. This tradition goes back to Plato and his idea of an
irrational soul that acts as an obstacle to true knowledge, which can only be reached
through the rational soul (Plato 1977, 2002). Of course, Plato’s main interest is to
show that true knowledge exist and can be reached, but it has to be reached by avoiding
the influence of this lower irrational soul, by which the platonic tradition in philosophy
and religion depicts the features of our “biological” nature. What we call subjectivism
focuses this irrational conception (or part) of the lower —natural— functions.
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 335

Many centuries later, the subjective idealism of Hume (2007) and Berkeley
(1982) ended up taking this lack of trust in epistemological competence to the
extreme of solipsism: an absolutely individual mind that can not be sure of anything
apart from itself. This kind of mental individualism constituted a new refinement in
the history of subjectivism, now carried out by Hume without the help of a platonic
rational soul. Nevertheless, the platonic irrational soul has not disappeared. A
conception of human nature as mainly selfish and hedonistic has been very common
to the present. It can be found from the philosophy of the Enlightenment period
(“homo homini lupus”) to Freud’s psychology.
Classical constructivist psychology, as presented in Baldwin’s work, specifically
develops a notion of subject in clear opposition to an individualistic and hedonistic
concept of the mind and also to the bias of thinking that our most basic nature is
irrational. The key to constructivist psychology is the idea of development
understood as a genesis. This genesis is not, however, a creation out of nothing. It
means the creation of something new by way of a synthetic transformation of
something that previously existed. It has a logic that Baldwin begins to describe by
way of different circular reactions within the new developmental —or genetic—
psychology. What the subject does produce —by way of previous socialization and
adult innovations— is epistemologically relevant. For subjectivism there is no
genesis in this sense. What is produced, in that case, is an individual interiorisation, a
biased interpretation of the world.
Objectivism attempts to reduce psychological phenomenon to some type of
objective reality, be it genes, the brain, the environment, culture, language, etc.
These types of objective structures are not thought of as essential products of the
activity of the subject. On the contrary, it is activity, in all cases, that is defined in
accordance with these structures. Objectivist perspectives also ignore the existence
of genesis: objective reality produces subjective reality, but not the opposite. The
objective exits before the subjective. Physicalism and reductionism (materialism in
general) tend to express themselves in an objectivist way when they refer to the
subject. Objectivism, however, is not the same as materialism. Social sciences and
philosophies of history have often tried to extend their categories to explain or
reduce human behaviour in an “objective” way (structural, ecological, historical,
socioeconomic, semiotic, political…).
Historically there has been a very concrete point where objectivism meets
psychology: when positivism needs to define “facts” through sensorial “experience”,
as was the case in Ernst Mach’s work. However, behind objectivism as well, there is
often a negative conception of psychology that impedes the recognition of the
capacity to construct truths or objective structures that are present in the activity of
the subject. If the subject is defined through interest, irrationality or desire, it is
difficult to imagine that their actions could give rise to any objectivity. The
difference between the objectivist and subjectivist perspectives stems from the fact
that the subjective tends to result in relativist or nihilistic positions while the
objective always maintains a realist perspective —although not necessarily
reductionist-materialist, as we have seen— that subordinates its negative conception
of psychology. For the subjectivist perspective, the psychological genesis of
objectivity is impossible because subjects are defined by interest, perspective, bias,
prejudice and irrationality. For the objectivist perspective, objectivity is possible but
336 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

it is not a product of the activity of the subjects but rather it comes before it and
explains it. Objective structures are what produce the organization of the world, in
which subjects will have to comply —or, at best, reflect or represent —.
In clear opposition to both objectivism and subjectivism, the intention of classical
constructivism has always been to understand that what is real is a construction, but
that the construction is not subjective in the subjectivism sense. The activity of the
subjects generates structures that acquire a certain objective autonomy (as realities or
truths), although they cannot be taken as the ultimate reference to explain subjects’
activity, given that they themselves have been constructed. We could call it
“subjectual” activity to distinguish it from “subjective” activity in the subjectivist
sense already pointed out. The relation between the subjects’ activity and the
corresponding objective structures is therefore strictly dialectic: the subject does not
act in a vacuum without objective realities but neither do objective realities exist
prior to any construction, nor do they maintain themselves as if they were entities.
Constructivism came about historically as an attempt to give sense to a theory of
the construction of knowledge that, situating the locus of activity in the empirical
subject (organic, social and historic), was able to develop a positive (subjectual, not
subjective) conception of psychology. It attempts to understand psychological
activity, not as an obstacle in reaching objectivity but rather the complete opposite:
as the only way to construct it. Kant can be thus considered the starting point for
constructivism. He stated that “reason has insight only into that which it produces
after a plan of its own” (Kant 1970: 20). However, he conceived the subject as a
“transcendental” constructor, rather than considering it part of nature (perhaps
because he viewed physical nature as an absolute deterministic machine, in a
objectivist sense). The transcendental subject started to become a “natural” subject in
the 19th century by way of at least two paths. On one side, through the development
of darwinian evolutionism and comparative psychology, which placed intelligence
inside organic nature (animal intelligence) and conferred to it a decisive role in the
processes of adaptation. On the other side, through sensory physiology and the new
experimental psychology, which studied, in a human subject made of flesh and blood
(and culture), the synthetic or genetic activity characteristic of Kant’s transcendental
subject, which Wundt also called “apperception” (Fernández 2005; Sánchez et al. 1995).
Baldwin is the first author who tries to formulate a complete genetic psychology
that is not reduced to the psychology of infant development and does not try to
distance itself from the problem of the relation between ontogeny, phylogeny and
sociogenesis (see Cairns 1992; Richards 1987; Wozniak 1998, 2001). In his view,
the subject is ontologically formed from a set of general conditions for action, which
are now part of the philogenetic inheritance that was constructed, at some moment in
the history of the evolution of the species, as morphologic stabilizations of adaptive
activities in a way consistent with the theory of organic selection (Sánchez and
Loredo 2007). In addition, the upbringing of the subject is psycho-social, given that
the self is constituted from interaction with others. The subject is not originally
individual: the self and the alter are born together.
Although there are, of course, some limitations to his view, we consider that
Baldwin’s is the most promising version of constructivism because 1) it excludes
any sense in which an objective or primal subjective reality can be talked about
(Baldwin 1911, 1915), 2) it coordinates subject, object and society in a psychosocial
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 337

theory of development that understands imitation to be an activity of reconstruction,

not of mere copying (Baldwin 1899, 1906), and 3) it coordinates ontogeny and
phylogeny by way of a theory —organic selection— that impedes any objectivism
be it biological determinism or genetic reductionism (Baldwin 1917). Perharps the
most radical baldwinian statement is that of considering reality as a whole
construction. This statement gets past Kant’s noumenon, because for Baldwin there
is no reality that is not constructed:
“It is evident that each objective meaning found to be, for the process that gets
it, in its own sense ’real’, is ipse facto real in that sense and for that mode. A
being having perceptual consciousness only, would have its perceptual ‘real
world’. [...] Now to try to go back of these deliverances of experience, and to
ask what is really real —ontologically real, or real ‘in itself’— is simply to
attemp again to do what each of these modes has already once attempted:
to construe all experience in one mode of the real. The ontologically, or
‘really’ real is simply that which satisfies interest in the impersonal and
detached —the logical or theoretical interest” (Baldwin 1911: 55).
The perspectives of Piaget and Vygotsky contain components that perhaps get
further away from the constructivism Baldwin outlines. Although it is not pertinent
to go into further detail now, we refer to aspects such as latent Lamarckism in
Piaget’s theory of the phenocopy, the inclination of Piaget to formally define the final
stages of development, the tendency for Vygotsky to assume the existence of a split
between animal —or lower— behaviour, and the culturally mediated behaviour, or
the excessive weight that the Vygotskyan perspective puts on a Marxist socio-
historic objectivism. But, altogether, we believe that the works of these authors
constitute an essential step forward in the constructivism outlined by Baldwin at the
end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The best theories of
constructivism are those that attempt to simultaneously carry on a psychobiological
and sociogeneticaly founded explanation not only of the genesis of subjectual activity
but also the genesis of objectivity. The constitution of the subject takes place by way of
organic (non spiritual) and social (non individual) functions. The progressive
individualization is precisely what makes it part of provisionally necessary realities
(we could call them “objectuality” to distiguish from the objectivity in the objectivist
sense we have seen before) and of a group of common values and aspirations which
are susceptible to becoming universal (to gaining validity).

The Realm of Constructivisms and some “Attractions”

As can be seen in Table 1 we distinguish three main theoretical areas to align

different authors or schools to the three main trends we have already presented:
objectivism, subjectivism and constructivism. Of course, drawing lines on a paper is
much easier than unravelling conceptual networks. Our table could be seen as a
classification of constructivist views in a kind of “magnetic field”, in which poles or
“atractors” are subjectivism and objectivism, with the “centre of equilibrium” being
the network of ideas we have already taken and explained from classic constructivists
(Piaget, Vygotsky, Baldwin). These ideas define the realm of constructivism. Thus we
338 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

have a group of contemporary authors that can be considered as belonging to the realm
of constructivism but who are also “attracted” to one side or the other (subjectivism
and objectivism) to some extent. We even have authors who seem to want to cross the
lines. Finally we have authors we consider mainly representatives of the ideas of
subjectivism or objectivism and threfore we depict them into these areas, in spite of the
fact that some of them are known as “constructionists” or “radical constructivists”.
As we have said in the introduction, we will provide a selection of representative
authors and we will characterize them in a few words. Let us face the risk and let us
test if the clasiffication helps us to understand the complex network of “attractive
powers” that defines the variety of constructivisms.
Let’s begin with Ernst von Glasersfeld. This author knows the ideas of Baldwin,
uses the genetic epistemology of Piaget and underlines the need for a socio-genetic
point of view with respect to the formation of the self in the interaction with others.
His constructivist viewpoint is considered radical because it assumes that all
knowledge is an active construction and constitutes an adaptive function for the
human being considered as an empirical and organic subject (Glasersfeld 1985,
1994, 2000). Nevertheless, we think that Glaserfeld’s approach too easily renounces
the foundation of a genetic conception of truth or objectivity and tends toward
subjectivism when knowledge is defined in terms of mere models that are viable,
contextual and useful in the world of experience (Glasersfeld 1994: 26–27). The
rejection of realism seems to be equivalent to the rejection of (or a prevention
against) any alternative notion of reality and truth.
“As agents (authors) of our own experiential reality we attribute continuity to
ourselves as its constructors. We cannot do otherwise, because the world we
come to know is based on the creation of regularities which we are able to
impose on the flux of experience. [...] However, from my constructivist
perspective, it is this very agent who constructs the notions of space and time,
and I am therefore reluctant to refer to the agent’s continuity as ‘existence’.
The words ‘to be’ and ‘to exist’ are far too firmly linked to the philosophers’
traditional ontology in which they are intended to describe a world that is and
exists in itself. The continuity I have in mind, in contrast, is a phenomeno-
logical construct of the experience and, as such, warrants no conclusions about
an ontological reality” (Glasersfeld 2000: 5–6).
An example of the tendency of constructivism to slip towards objectivist positions
can be seen in work by Barbara Rogoff (Rogoff 1991), which is formulated from
other assumptions closer to the vygotskyan tradition. This author emphasizes
participation in intersubjective cultural practices as a key for development but her
description of the processes of participation tends to forget the fact that interaction
between subjects is based on a genetic logic, that is to say, on reconstructive processes of
shared objectuality on the part of the subjects. Therefore, the danger of loosing sight of
the psychogenetic explanation and substituting it for an unspecified, almost phenom-
enological explanation of interaction arises. Additionally, any possible criteria of truth
or objectivity with respect to constructed knowledge, tends to become restricted to the
referent cultural environment and therefore the problem of relativism appears again. In
Rogoff´s work the genetic logic of construction tends to be blurred and substituted by
social practices, which seem to provide meaning and structure to the activity. Subject’s
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 339

participation is required, anyway. There is a slight tendency to a sociocultural

explanation of action (a slight attraction towards social objectivism).
Among neovygotskyan constructivism there are other authors who also
emphasize the role interaction plays between subjects and insist on the fact that it
takes place in a specific sociocultural context. Perhaps to avoid the risks that we
have attributed to the perspective of Rogoff —the use of generic or too descriptive
analysis of the interactions—, authors such as James V. Wertsch or Jaan Valsiner try
to draw attention to the more concrete processes of mediation by which the subject is
formed. In any case, Wertsch’s position (Wertsch 1991) seems smoothly shifted
toward the objectivist extreme in that it owes much to the semiotics of Bahktin, and
so understands mediation —the intervention of cultural structures at the heart of
psychogenesis— in fundamentally symbolic terms. For him, the development of the
subject should be studied from semiotic cues. Given that the semiotics of Bahktin
defines semiotic processes as essentially collective processes, the identification of a
genetic logic that would enable the formation of a subject does not constitute a
theoretical necessity any longer. Perhaps we could say that Wertchs´s position shows
a slight sign of the tendency towards a concept that is widespread in linguistic
objectivism (that language builds our minds).
The sociocultural approach of Jaan Valsiner (Valsiner 1994; Valsiner and Van der
Veer 2000; Valsiner and Rosa 2007) gets away from this semiotic derivative and tries
to integrate the traditions of Baldwin and Piaget, on one hand, and Vygotsky and
Soviet psychology, on the other. This author explicitly vindicates Baldwin’s work
and defends a co-constructivist point of view. For him, this is not a new label, but
rather a return to the classic authors in order to develop a dialectic perspective
regarding the relation between the individual subject and the sociocultural context.
Although Valsiner tends to define construction in semiotic terms, he also defends the
complimentary nature of the piagetian and vygotskyan traditions and criticizes those
points of view that exclude them. His work distances itself from other perspectives
that assume that the internalization of cultural structures on the part of the subject is
passive or that the objectivity of cultural tools such as language, institutions or the
different symbolic systems, which form the subject’s social environment, are
sufficient to explain the ontogenetic development of the subject. Furthermore, it is
necessary to identify the psychogenetic processes that are needed for internalization
to take place. The subject also needs to reconstruct the cultural guidelines of its
environment. Valsiner claims that the neovygoskians who understand internalization
as a passive process betray Vygotsky, who underlined the active character of co-
construction. Imitation is active. Semiotic mediation allows the world to acquire
meaning, but, because of it, the subject re-elaborates social experience in novel
ways. Considering our criteria, Valsiner’s position is a good example of a “well
balanced” contemporary constructivism. The advantage of such a position is not “to
be classical” but to be capable of including a wide range of current contributions in a
consistent theoretical network, including those contributions belonging to the
authors attracted to some degree by objectivist or subjectivist poles. In this sense
we want to make clear that our criticism of the authors refers to their core theoretical
positions and that this does not prejudge the value of their empirical contributions.
Another author that has proposed formulas to coordinate piagetian and vygotskian
points of view is Robert H. Wozniak. In a similar way to Valsiner, he has
340 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

vindicated the work of Baldwin (Wozniak 1998). He also assumes genetic logic and
compliments it with a social and intersubjective characterization of development.
However, he introduces a third element, which we think distorts the constructivist
sense of his proposal and brings him closer to objectivist positions. We are referring
to the ecological theories of perception by James J. Gibson. For Wozniak, the way to
avoid the limit of subjective relativism is to identify some dimension of development
that does not depend on the process of construction and therefore guarantees an
objective starting point, even though, from a determined level, the development is
understood as a dialectic and progressive construction of the subject and object in a
social context. This basic level, which comes before construction, is defined as the
balance between the “affordances” of the environment and the “attunement” of the
organism (Wozniak 1992, 1993). Moreover, this balance seems to be understood by
Wozniak as an encounter between the innate physical structure of the organism and
the basic objective structure of reality, both being immediately previous to the
process of construction:
“Energy arriving at perceptual systems is rich in higher order invariant
structure bearing a regular relation to properties of the environment. Invariant
structure has the potential to inform experience, to give it a particular pattern of
changing organization over time. Yet, from a constructivist perspective,
information is not by itself a sufficient condition for experience.”
“Experience not only has form, it has meaning. The construction of experience
requires the detection and attribution of meaning to information from the
environment” (Wozniak 1993: 78–79).
Wozniak’s position could be considered as an smart example of the very
widespread approaches that could be called “limited constructivism”: construction is
effective only from certain level onwards (usually some kind of lower and mechanical
processes, or some evolutionary stage). Now constructivism prefers to rest on a realist
(objectivist) background or basis. This is really an old and radical problem.
The School of Erlangen and the so-called “constructive philosophy” (Lorenzen
1982, 1987; see also Butts and Brown 1989) also seem to look for an objective
anchor for construction, although in this case the authors appeal to language
understood as a universal structure. In fact, the members of the school come from the
fields of logic, and mathematics and not from the psychological or biological
disciplines. Despite this, they criticize the formalism of logical positivism and
propose a non formal operationalism that considers that the most relevant elements
in the analysis of knowledge are the operations that produce it. Human action is
therefore fundamental for knowledge. Only the concrete procedures, by which this
action is able to become objective, reveal the process of the construction of
knowledge (Lorenzen 1982, 1987). Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to reach a
general definition of human rationality (not only scientific rationality) and a
universal and practical implementation of this rationality in an ethical way. In the
introduction to the English translation of his main theoretical book, Paul Lorenzen
summarizes that position:
“Constructive philosophy is philosophy in the critical spirit of Kant, but with
the tools of modern philosophy of science. The decisive points of Kant are
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 341

maintained: the primacy of ‘practical’ (i.e., ethicopolitical) reason over

‘theoretical’ (i.e., technical) reason, justified by a demonstration that our
theories in logic, mathematics, and physics are instruments made by us for our
technical purposes. ”[...]
In contrast to analytic philosophy, in constructive philosophy our talking about
what we are doing (about aour praxis) is not taken as something given that has
to be analyzed but as something to be constructed by us. The construction has
to be done methodically, that is, step by step, without gaps and without circles.
Methodical language construction starting from pretheoretic praxis and leading
to theories supporting praxis [...]. After the pragmatic turn we know that we
have to look for a pretheoretical praxis before any methodical language
construction can begin. The praxis for which supporting political theories have
to be constructed is the praxis of lawmaking, that is, the verbal praxis of
arguing about legal norms. [...]
“The moral principle of Kant is is reconstructed for the lawmaker as the
principle of rational argumentation, that is, argumentation that uses only
impersonal, transsubjective arguments” (Lorenzen 1987: ix–x).
In our opinion, what is missing from the School of Erlangen is a conceptuali-
zation of psychological function that allows the embodiment of this abstract
rationality that seems to be defined exclusively as thought, in accordance with
logical or mathematical operations. This abstract thought should be contextualized in
the functional architecture of the subject —organic, natural—, and rationality should
be linked to the sociocultural context in which the subject develops.
Terrence Deacon and Gerald M. Edelman also share a tendency to gravitate
towards objectivism. Their work does not come from the field of psychology, but
rather biology and neuroscience. Nevertheless, it can enrich constructivism. Deacon
adopts a bio-semiotic point of view and brilliantly uses a version of Baldwin’s
organic selection to acknowledge the reciprocal constitution of the brain and
language throughout human development (Deacon 1997). In contrast with innatist
and mechanistic approaches that treat language (or any other function) as a mere
product of previous brain structures or computational modules, Deacon points out
that during evolution linguistic activity itself was a new source of selective pressure
that contributed to the modern morphological configuration of the human brain.
What Deacon does not do, however, is generalize this principle to all —non
linguistic— human and animal activity as would be suggested by Baldwin. He does
not appeal to genetic psychology to describe the activity of the subjects. Instead he
uses a semiotic approach. Perhaps the problem with semiotics, from a genetic-
constructivist point of view, is that semiotic realities need to be genetically
explained, not the reverse, because simbolic and linguistic functions are derived or
developed —evolutionary and ontogenetically— from simpler organic functions.
Taking semiotic relations as primary realities is a kind of realism, a linguistic
objectivism (symbol makes our minds).
Gerald Edelman tries to integrate data from experimental psychology, neurology
and biochemistry to demonstrate how “higher” psychological functions come about
during the course of development (Edelman 1987, 1990, 1993). This is understood
342 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

in terms of a dialectic between biological maturation and experience. His neural

Darwinism —a neurological analogue to natural selection— describes a process of
formation of neural networks that are functionally specialized in accordance with the
simultaneous process of learning by trial and error. This could be interpreted from
the perspective of genetic logic: the stabilization of the neural connections is
mediated by the activity of the subject (Sánchez 1998). Nonetheless, Deacon does not
use genetic psychology. Instead, he tends to emphasize biochemical explanations, in
a way that is very common nowadays (neurochemical objectivism).

The Objectivist Perspectives

Gerhard Roth is also situated in the realm of neuroscience and shows a clear
interest in constructivism. He affirms that what we call reality is a construction of the
brain. This construction is, however, only a hypothesis of objective reality (Roth
2004). For him there is no way to confirm the existence of the external world.
Roth’s proposal is —we think— a very good example of the “high tension” between
subjectivism and objectivism that characterizes neurological constructivist perspec-
tives when genetic psychology, or at least a functional conception of the brain, like
Elderman’s, is not taken into account. On one hand we are told that the only
objectivity possible is objectivity created by each particular brain but this seems to
trap us in a subjective solipsism. On the other hand, we are implicitly told that the
only objective reality is the brain. The brain is therefore considered a fundamental
and unquestionable reality that subordinates all posterior construction of knowledge
(see also Roth and Wullimann 2001).
Francisco J. Varela, who insists that subject and object are inherently
interdependent, has offered an astute criticism of the subjective solipsism of some
so-called constructivisms (Von Foerster for example). From his perspective, it is not
possible for the subject to reduce the object. Varela uses phenomenology to buttress
his perspective, but also adds the idea of an intersubjective self which seems to be
inspired by Buddhist philosophy (Varela 2004). For him the fact that knowledge is
an organic construction does not mean that some reference to objective or external
reality is lost forever and that we have to settle for hypothetical models whose
veracity is always put into doubt. In this sense, Varela, in our judgement, is much
closer to an ideal (and classic) constructivism than many constructivists. However,
we do not think that phenomenology is an effective substitution for genetic logic
because the “presence” of the object, which phenomenology takes as its starting
point, is exactly what needs to be explained in psychogenetic terms. Thus, Varela´s
rejection of subjectivism leads him not to a constructivist view but to a very
particular (mystic?) kind of realist affirmation of objectivity.
The next objectivist perspectives which we would like to discuss are related to
Complex Systems Theory. This theory is usually presented as an alternative to
reductionism, given that it postulates an interaction, on many levels, between diverse
components of organic and non-organic reality. Susan Oyama is one of the well-
known representatives of this orientation (Oyama 2005; Oyama et al. 2001). Basing
her work in the Developmental Systems Approach, she speaks of constructivist
interactionism with the intention of distancing herself from those who postulate an
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 343

interaction between the organism and the environment which are understood as
independent entities. In her view the most important thing is interaction and only
from it can the components of the organism and the environment arise. They are
emergent properties of a developmental process:
“When the focus is on development, most of the moves I try to head off
involve agency ‘from the inside-out’, for this is where one most often
encounters the notion of internally driven, goal-directed forces, tipically
thought of as emanating from the DNA. When we turn to evolution, we find
the opposite: the constructor is ‘the environment’, or ‘natural selection’, or
even ‘mother nature’. Although it may seem unnecessary [...] to say there is no
constructor, then, it is not the practice of personification that I am contesting,
but rather the notion of form-giver separate and independent from that which is
formed. Because DSA [Developmental Systems Approach] does not make the
usual move of casting development and evolution as contrasting sorts of
processes, one controlled from the inside (‘programmed’, perhaps) and the
other from the outside (‘contingent’, ‘historical’), the sense of construction is
similar for both: the appearance over time of an interactive product, in this
sense emergent rather than prefigured or predefined” (Oyama 2005: 273–274).
Perspectives like this pose a serious criticism against both innatist and
environmentalist reductionism. Nevertheless, we believe that it substitutes the
specificity of the relation between subject and object (which implies purpose,
memory, meaning, experience, etc.) for a nonspecified multilevel interaction that, in
the end, seems to refer to an objective reality with a physicalist character, defined as
a group of physical systems and subsystems mutually affecting one another. The
absence of a genetic logic destroys any possibility of understanding the construction
of knowledge as a product of a dialectic relation between subject and object which
cannot be reduced to the type of relations that are given by the physical world. It is
not by chance that other ideas based on a systemic point of view, such as neural
constructivism (Quartz and Sejnowski 1997) or biocultural co-constructivism (Baltes
et al. 2006), reproduce the same problem. Although these authors, just as Deacon or
Edelman, try to suggest a way for learning processes and cultural influence to
ontogenetically configure the brain, they do it without incorporating a psychogenetic
perspective and end up translating psychological functions to neural connections, in
line with connectionist models or mechanistic interpretations of learning. In this way
psychology loses its own ontological identity and gets trapped between two
objective realities: the physical and the cultural.
Far removed from this type of physicalist constructivism, we can find the social
constructivism of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann who emphasize the
individual and contextual nature of knowledge in each human society (Berger and
Luckmann 1966). This perspective reduces all knowledge to ideology, to a product
of social interests and forces. Therefore, everything that human beings believe about
reality is a social construction. Psychological activity exists for Berger and
Luckmann, in fact they interpret it in terms of “internalization”, but this activity
has no autonomy and is reduced to a mere reflection of suprasubjective cultural
structures (Berger and Luckmann 1966, chap. 3). The internalization is passive.
Psychological phenomenon are formal and materially subordinate to the processes of
344 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

socialization in the individual. Because of this, we have placed these authors in the
column of Table 1 that corresponds to objectivist orientations: for these authors,
social objectivity is fundamental and explains all “psychological” processes. This is
an example of social objectivism.
Bruno Latour, the last author we have placed in the right column of the table,
has probably been the most astute in pointing out that a rejection of objectivity,
understood as something apart from the activity of the subject (objectivity in a
realistic sense), does not mean an open defence of relativism. In his criticism of the
Edinburgh school and social constructivism (Latour 1987), he points out that, even
from a pragmatic point of view, the fact is that objective structures do exist and
therefore we are forced to explain how they have been constructed, because we form
a part of them. Nonetheless Latour defends the idea that constructivist principles are
not only situated in the subject but also in objects (Latour 2002, 2004). In fact, he
explicitly rejects the genetic psychology of Piaget, arguing that the structures of
knowledge cannot be translated into psychological terms because this would
hypostasize them (Latour 1986, 1996). According to Latour, activity is distributed
in a network of interactions between “humans” and “non-humans” —this is the way
he redefines subjects and objects— in such a way that the network itself appears to
be an objective structure from which everything arises. Thus the so called Actor-
Network Theory (Latour, 2005) ends up looking like a description of an external
reality which is the network of humans and non-humans interacting. This is a
particular and fuzzy sort of objectivism: the network is the whole thing, the objective
reality. There is also a (postulated) constructive process whithout a constructive
genetic logic (for a criticism see Loredo 2009).

The Subjectivist Perspectives

The constructionist theories of Jonathan Potter (Potter 1996; Potter et al. 1984) and
Kenneth J. Gergen (Gergen 1991, 1994, 2001) defend a point of view that is
related to that of Latour, in that they place the construction of knowledge in the play
between shared social meanings. We have placed these authors in the column that
corresponds to the subjectivists because they assume a negative conception of
psychology that goes hand in hand with their explicit defence of relativism. For them
there is no other “reality” than that which is dictated by consensus, and consensus
depends on individual and collective interests (Gergen 1991, chap. 4; Potter 1996,
chap. 4). In the end, discourse is not even a structure that could be considered as an
objective reference for action, but rather it is seen itself as a way of action, however
irrational or pragmatic (Potter 1996, chap. 8). Gergen even defends the idea that it
makes no sense to search for a theory of the subject: the only thing that makes sense
is to develop a plurality of discourses and practices related to the subject. He seems
to consider that the only alternative is to practice a scrupulous respect for any
possible way of understanding psychology (Gergen 1994, chap. 1). This is in favour
of a desirable plurality that, according to him, can only oppose intellectual
dictatorship and the exclusion of theories based on prejudice and interest. The only
thing that is important is the proliferation of novelty (this same idea is held by Bruno
Latour, for example in Latour 2001: 337). There are no criteria from which to judge
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 345

these novelties because for him to search for them is the same as imposing a filter on
the proliferation of the plurality of practice and discussion. In the abstract of an article
dedicated to responding to various commentaries on his work, Gergen condenses his
posture in the following way, which suggests that whoever does not accept his
relativism can only be a traditional realist with a nostalgia for pure rationality:
“The present critiques are framed within a tradition that views argumentation
as a pathway to truth, objectivity and purity of reason. The constructionist
dialogues substantially refigure these criterial concepts, conceptualizing them
as artefacts of historically and culturally situated communities. Troubles begin
when any particular community begins to declare alterior realities null and
void. The constructionist dialogues invite us to replace questions of truth in all
worlds with communal deliberation on the future outcomes —both for
psychology and global cultures— of varying forms of intelligibility. In this
respect, constructionist discourse harbours the potential for enormous gains in
creative collaboration, a condition I find far more promising that the bounded
worlds of realism and rationalism favoured by these critiques. A liberal
constructionism would not abandon the traditions from which these critiques
emerge, while the unbridled expansion of any of these traditions would
eliminate all save its own” (Gergen 2001: 419).
The Edinburgh School is another source of relativistic positions. For its members
(Barnes 1987; Bloor 1991; Barnes and Bloor 1982) scientific results are not quite
objective structures that constrain the behaviour of the subjects but rather the
products of negotiation, the play between the interests of different “guilds”, social
demands and technology. Although these authors do not share the emphasis on language
(understood as discourse) with other constructionists, they do share the subjectivist
conception of psychology, which is now focused on the concept of “interest”.
In the ideas of Humberto Maturana we can find another type of subjectivism. It
would also be entirely possible to place his work next to the objectivist orientations
because of his use of systemic and cybernetic concepts, but instead, we would rather
focus on the fact that he emphasizes the idea of a human observer without offering a
clear criteria for objectivity, limiting himself to suppose that the observer merely
interprets that which he observes. Maturana also accepts the dualism between
animals and humans. Animals are auto-regulated machines, self organizing systems
(this is the objectivist side). Humans, thanks to language, are capable of observing
the reality of self organizing systems and non self organizing systems and
interpreting them, thus producing knowledge. However, there is no objective
criterion for this knowledge (this is the subjectivist side). Only language can
determine the meaning. Unfortunately, it does not seem that Maturana considers
appealing to psychology in order to understand the constitution of the human subject
or the origin of language (Maturana 1988, 2004).
Paul Watzlawick can be said to move in the arena of systemic orientations,
mostly applied to psychotherapy. Watzlawick defends a conception of “reality” as a
discursive and pragmatic construction (Watzlawick 2004). “Mental illness” is also a
social construction. Psychotherapy consists then of a reorganization of the meaning
of the subjects life and so an essential role is given to communication —verbal and
non verbal—. Watzlawick’s theory of psychological activity is focussed (almost
346 Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349

restricted) on communication. There is no objectivity except that of the practical

processes of communication between subjects and the individual elaboration of vital
meaning. Suffering —the fact that people suffer from “psychological” problems— is
perhaps the only residue, like a noumenal reality, that opposes the liberty and the
desires and interests of the subject.
The last author we would like to mention here is Heinz von Foerster. His
“radical constructivism” (Foerster 1982, 1984) is also linked to Systems Theory and
cybernetics. Although his point of view is similar to that of Maturana, he defends an
explicit relativism that is based on the idea that the world and “truth” are created by
each individual subject. Foerster therefore seems to accept solipsism. For him, there
is no alternative to the conception of knowledge as a representation of an external
reality. Given that this external reality is impossible to verify, everything has to be in
the subject’s mind. If there is something real out there we can only make individual
interpretations. Objectivity is not constructed: as in the case of Maturana, the subject
is limited to being an observer that registers or describes things that do not represent
anything but themselves. In our view, Von Foerster´s view is a paradigmatic case of
subjectivism.

Conclusion

The field of tensions we have presented through our classification and our authors´
examples can clarify to some extent the almost chaotic field of current constructivisms.
Ours is a critical classification aimed at contrasting different constructivist paths and
assessing their consistency. Consistency is a key word, an index of truth in a
constructivist sense —neither representation nor pure relativism—. As we have argued,
a more consistent constructivism can be advanced by extending the “classic”
evolutionary-genetic-sociohistorical constructivism, that links elements from Kant,
Wundt, Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky, at the very least. This hiper-complex theory
permits us to critically integrate findings and ideas from a variety of fields (evolutionary
theory, brain development, experimental and developmental psychology, human
evolution, human history, social practices, and classic philosophical problems
concerning ontology and epistemology) in such a way others cannot.
There is a two-face structural problem that undermines the consistency of
constructivism, “attracting” it either to realism (the objectivists temptations that
blur the meaning of the astonishing discovering that “reality” is objectual,
constructed —not objective—, and that at the same time is being constructed) or
to subjectivism (that blurs the specific meaning of subjectual —not subjective—
genesis). Both atracting poles are classical, strong and widespread. They have their
own consistency in some particular ways. We think their consistency also depends
on our own constructivist weakness as expressed, for instance, by the subjectivist
distortion currently made by radical constructivisms or by the difficulties of
integrating the most important aspects of Piaget and Vygotsky. It is a dialectical
relation between competitors. Constructivism can only be developed by critizing
realism and subjectivism. This can be done by developing its own structure,
originality, and consistency. Thus our paper is also a portrait of the limitations of
constructivism.
Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332–349 347

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José Carlos Sánchez (Ph.D., Psychology, University of Oviedo, 1994) is Professor of the Department of
Psychology at Oviedo University (Spain). He has published in the areas of history of psychology and
theory of psychology. He currently teaches history and theory of psychology, and basic psychological
processes. His areas of interest are history of psychology, comparative psychology, evolution and organic
selection theory, constructivist traditions and conceptions of ‘function’ in the behavioral sciences, and
aesthetics in psychology.

José Carlos Lorendo (Ph.D., Psychology, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1999) is
Assistant Professor of the Department of Psicología Básica I at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a
Distancia (National University for Open Education) in Madrid, Spain. He currently teaches history of
psychology, history of psychology in Spain, and epistemology. His areas of interest are history of
psychology, constructivist traditions in the behavioral sciences, and technologies of subjectivity.