Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
Ozamiz & Capistrano for petitioners.
Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner & Laput for respondents.
MORAN, J.:
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio,
Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children
named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on
October 2, 1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was
survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In
Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his children by the
first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already received their
corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary
to what the testator had declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second marriages intestate heirs
of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the
existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the
testator could freely dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be reviewed in this
petition for certiorari.
The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the foregoing facts, the omission of the children of the first
marriage annuls the institution of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the will
may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the testator may dispose of as legacy and
to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment, to said children of the second marriage.
The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code, which read in part as follows:
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
is not proven, ... shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited; but
the legacies, betterments, and other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no encroach upon
the legitime, shall be valid.
The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the impression that the testator had intended
to disinherit, though ineffectively, the children of the first marriage. There is nothing in the will that supports this
conclusion. True, the testator expressly denied them any share in his estate; but the denial was predicated, not
upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the belief, mistaken though it was, that the children by the first marriage
had already received more than their corresponding shares in his lifetime in the form of advancement. Such
belief conclusively negatives all inference as to any intention to disinherit, unless his statement to that effect is
prove to be deliberately fictitious, a fact not found by the Court of Appeals. The situation contemplated in the
above provision is one in which the purpose to disinherit is clear, but upon a cause not stated or not proved, a
situation which does not obtain in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals quotes Manresa thus:
En el terreno de los principios, la solucion mas justa del problema que hemos hecho notar al comentar
el articulo, seria distinguir el caso en que el heredero omitido viviese al otorgarse el testamento, siendo
conocida su existencia por el testador, de aquel en que, o naciese despues, o se ignorase su existencia,
aplicando en el primer caso la doctrina del articulo 851, y en el segundo la del 814. (6 Manresa, 354-
355.)
But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el terreno de los principios) and not
on the express provisions of the law. Manresa himself admits that according to law, "no existe hoy cuestion
alguna en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos, ya se refiera a personas vivas al
hacer el testamento o nacidas despues. Este ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a los descendientes
legitimos, siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima." (6 Manresa, 381.)
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one of voluntary preterition of four of the children by the
first marriage, and of involuntary preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage,
and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code, which read in part as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in
the will, they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is,
therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not
at least manifest.
Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the
Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. (Art. 814, Civil Code;
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908 and February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no such
legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided,
according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express provision therefor is made in the will,
the law would presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 479.) In the will here in
question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any
legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is
accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have
already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from
his will, would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed, without prejudice to the widow's
legal usufruct, with costs against respondents.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Laurel and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO
YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus
Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the
sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the
resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally
known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square
meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858
(8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio
and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear
why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not
attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record
does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that
Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question
but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was
informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694
(29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a
portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of
Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title
also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum
of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in
Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de
Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8
on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on
April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to
Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato
Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return"
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the
land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said
accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and
another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to
Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and
assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce,
forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella
in connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to
the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said
defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid
decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated
October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and
773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773
could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the
Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of
a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773
and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and
823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against
said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was
not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only
because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding
said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous
order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No.
5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting
that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment
therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24
Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and
19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the
Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of
possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new
title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of
P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961
until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of
P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been
passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were
estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses'
cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in
question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a
valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens
"before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question"
in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof
executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic)
hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate
children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's
fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura,
Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31, 1983 30
affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-
appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly
invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are
any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial
court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription
of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and
father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in
Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely
waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on
Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated
November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or
indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally
passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due
process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review
the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private
respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason,
who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties
thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the
court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in
Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses
have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474
now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be
reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the
petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on
the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on
November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil
Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the
actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different
matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of
his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor
of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of
prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed
in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be
heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become
final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo
Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his
death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from
his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
 that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From
the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring
those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into
the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their
totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With
this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which
are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the probate of the two wills of the late
Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-
special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending
probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain
shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the
sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, 2
the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency
estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of
P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence,
there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in
question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship
agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be
the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either
or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be
the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
 We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of
us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or
withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and
discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of
Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total
sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent, held
that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly, assuming that it is a
mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is
hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the
estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the estate, but the same
order is sustained in all other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to include
provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati,
in the inventory of actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's
death. With costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our decisions in
Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has
been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other words, the
bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-
038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we
rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the
other, but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1)
that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera
"served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person
deposits money in the bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that
Ana Rivera served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from
him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself
and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although
there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence, then,
of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which
recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that
they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or
the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of
either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article
1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do
something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the
occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already
stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the
furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda
died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana
were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determining the
event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This contract,
as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died
before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as
Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had
 died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be
conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held by
the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a
joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the
case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have
arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that
one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the
Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of
an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an
event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the
sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to
fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been
categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was
the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may
be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere
cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the
legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has
been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes,
or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has
acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we
hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of
the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution, dated
February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14,
1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000
in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in
his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in
Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of
the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of
the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills
were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new
Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as
the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and
because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be
witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father
Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements
for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on
the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied
with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even
by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879,
referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on,
the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and
her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the
document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of
the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its
probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not
allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by
the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an
expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the
law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or
when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of
the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be
followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that
all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that
when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities
required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that
from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By
parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the
execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an
estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force,
namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645,
amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills,
in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by
the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these
facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation
shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render
the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as
follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or
dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him
to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and
every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the date
Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No.
12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice
Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that
the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an
entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred
after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a change in the
statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the execution of a will, when such change is
made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator. ( See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any
textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in
many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and that a will not executed
in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The
reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper
executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the
law in force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga.,
1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the
will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect.
This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or
Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to
testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern
view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the
sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon
[1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs.
Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when
the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according
to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful
right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a
case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the
testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to
the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he
lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go
into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of Alabama and
New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary formalities, should
be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities
required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection, under such
circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be
respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of
bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act
when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until
a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give
them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case
of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP.
Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar
Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof
provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act
No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello
vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In
the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of
the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being
"if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of wills
inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the
transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the
act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is
not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as
established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of
Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to
probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable
Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al.,
v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977
denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that
parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan
actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin
Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his
father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of
land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in
equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8)
was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-
indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto
Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby
the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle.
Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone
over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the
eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her
son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant,
Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant
the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special
division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion
for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein
petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT
BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1")
EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME
THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7")
EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA
JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE
ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND
CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS
TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as
Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question.
Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate
daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the
estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that
portion of the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . .
(Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original
Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil
Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez
died and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was
concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged
natural child — for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria
Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because
Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab
and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional
rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of
the litigated portion of the land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who
accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision of the
respondent court, which is that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the
case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but
plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by succession, their
alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property under
litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and
important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez'
name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under the Torrens System
may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners." ( Rollo, p. 38) Even in the
said cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering
a tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate
of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat
the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she
segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the
land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of
possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the
right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question
based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred
under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v.
Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in
the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez
executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of the parcel of
land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application
is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of
the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his
pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy
to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the law which
established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding
system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles covering the properties. And to
this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to file an action to recover
possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977
and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity
to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There
is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as
to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 54919. May 30, 1984.]

POLLY CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, Respondents.

Ermelo P. Guzman for Petitioner.

Armando Z. Gonzales for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; GRANT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW OPPOSITION TO PROBATE OF WILL IN CASE AT BAR, NOT A CASE OF. — We
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he allowed withdrawal of petitioner’s
opposition to the probate of the will. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The
records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the
case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since
the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte,
there being no other opposition to the same.

2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF WILL; PROBATE COURT, SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. — As a

general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478).

3. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILLS GOVERNED BY THE NATIONAL
LAW OF THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Articles 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. In the case at bar, although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion Campos was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.. Therefore, the law governing Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Under the Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are
provided for, and all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

THE PROVINCE WHERE THE ESTATE IS LOCATED HAS JURISDICTION. — The settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it
was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING JURISDICTION OF COURT IN CASE AT
BAR. — Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief.
It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (See Saulog Transit,
Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private Respondent.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74,
Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila
on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her
lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix’ death, her last will and
testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had
declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among
other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions
of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the
same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte
presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of
the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124,
(Exhibit D); that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b); that while in temporary
sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in
the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan’s Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of
administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin, all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late
Adoracion C. Campos.

"WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed
probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of
a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition,
acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set
aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means.
According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in
connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition
was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions for
postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of
January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing
provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission
for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the
future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor’s motion to set aside previously filed."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on
this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to
present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the
same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been
questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face patently null and void, and a
fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13,
1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged
upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was
denied on September 12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction when:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion
to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos,
thus, paving the way for the ex-parte hearing of the petition for the probate of decedent will.

"2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated instrument),
or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the
distribution of the estate — the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented,
within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.

"3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate
in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession.

"4) He denied petitioner’s petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to support the Petition
for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of
the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
"5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a usual
resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case (De Borja v. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner’s opposition to the reprobate of the
will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support
petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco
Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the
petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was
his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose
P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed
the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty.
Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly
in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.chanrobles law library :
red

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court’s
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s
will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should
have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at
the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Art. 16 par. (2).

x x x

"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. 1039.

"Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of
Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

x x x

"The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the
law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis."cralaw virtua1aw library

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that
what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for
relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should
have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when
his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he
requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to
vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be
embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as
alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).chanrobles
law library

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, J.:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed
July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of
the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix
and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are
defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly
admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and
three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently
has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby
changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at
the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said
sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into
consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets
which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume
that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the
statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence
of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another
signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on
another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance
the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures
written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient
security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been
removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not
this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the
signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet
are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can
add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the
witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second
contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right
to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last
will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which
the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu
and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its
face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably
a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary
himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the Court of
Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands of human relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley, married
Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They reared a boy named
Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in his 1945 marriage
contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that
Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. That
explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad. Agapito also
became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was
declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I
(p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in
another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita)
admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's appointment as
guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco
or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named
Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito)
and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of
Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the surname
Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is
residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas
Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years old. That will
which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans
Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her
estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her death, she was
a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in
that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo) and the
executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will.
The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S. Yuipco, to
hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court
are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the following day, April
1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to
allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn
Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to
eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in
possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's
estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to
set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of
the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not
Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they questioned
the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming
Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted
heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with
counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that
Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by
means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were
procured by fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that
Marina was not qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina, who swore that the
alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus motion to set
aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the
will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of
the will and stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-
121, Record). Nenita was not aware of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who swore that
Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125, Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's
granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son
but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of
administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the reconsideration
of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated
her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is
written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate
proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record),
was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to
Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge
Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the
testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know
English, the language in which the win was written. (In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any
finding that the will was written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito
(the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the will, did not take into account
the consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the testatrix did not
know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of
kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to withdraw
from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record of
the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not
change his decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the
case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of
the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from
the Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the complaint. He merely
pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976
she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did not mention
Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from having access to
the record of the testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the record. Evangeline "
strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand
pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any
knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court Administrator's
memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be
declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix
and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate
a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but
the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did
not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May
24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the administrative
case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the
testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the
instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to
206, Revised Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious misconduct or
inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of
judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably
negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection
which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974,
55 SCRA 107, 119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the
testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into
Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a language
not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of
the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written
in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where
Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language
of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress
and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have
noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the
probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary
for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer employed in the
judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's
disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), De Castro, Ericta and Escolin JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.