D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V.

Chan-Gonzaga

Petition v. Respondent (AUTHOR OF DIGEST) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Date | Citation | Ponente ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 23
SUMMARY​: 1. Lagman v. Hon. Medialdea, GR 231658, July 4, 2017 and MR, February 6,
Blah blah blah 2018 - SARMIENTO

Section 24
DOCTRINE: 1. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance – 235 SCRA 630 [1994] - MANALANG
Blah blah blah
Section 25
1. Garcia v. Mata – 65 SCRA 517 [1975] - TAYLO
FACTS: 2. Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387, Dec. 10, 2003 - DINSAY
3. Demetria v. Alba – 148 SCRA 208 [1987] - ALCANTARA
1. Blah 4. Araullo v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III, GR 209287, July 1, 2014 and MR
2. Blah [February 3, 2015] - NOEL
3. Blah
Section 26
1. Cordero v. Cabatuando – 6 SCRA 418 [1962] - REMOLLO, P.
ISSUES:
2. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board – 151 SCRA 208 [1987] - ALCAZAR
1. Bold relevant issues - Yes/No
2. W/N ____ - Yes/No Section 27
3. W/N _____ - Yes/No 1. CIR v. CTA – 185 SCRA 329 [1990] - ONG
2. Gonzales v. Macaraig – 191 SCRA 452 [1990] - HILADO
3. Philconsa v. Enriquez – 235 SCRA 506 [1994] - TALION
RULING: ​(copy paste)
Section 28
RATIO: (divided per issue) 1. Lung Center v. QC, GR 144104, June 29, 2004 - FERNANDO
2. CIR v. DLSU, G.R. 196596, G.R. 198841, G.R. 198941, November 9, 2016 -
W/N _____ - Yes/No BAUTISTA
1. Blah Section 29
2. Blah 1. Philippine Coconut v. Republic – 663 SCRA 514 [2012] - TAMAYO
3. Bold relevant ratio
Section 30
1. First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA – 237 SCRA 519 [1994] - REMOLLO, D.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: ​None
Section 32
1. SBMA v. COMELEC – 262 SCRA 492 [1996] - OCAMPO
2. Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC – 270 SCRA 106 [1997], and MR [1997] - SY
3. Lambino v. COMELEC, GR 174153, GR 174299, October 25, 2006 - ANTE

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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Lagman v. Hon. Medialdea (Main Decision) (SARMIENTO)
Jul. 4, 2017| ​G.R. No. 231658​ | J. Del Castillo
SUMMARY​:
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In connection with the
timeline ​set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of such proclamation.
This prompted several petitioners to file the present petition on the argument that the
declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis and that there is no rebellion or
invasion in Marawi or in any part of Mindanao. Hence, they argue that there is no valid
ground to declare martial law. One of the issue in this case is whether the power of the
Court to review on the sufficiency of factual basis of the proclamation of martial law is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court ruled that ​the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of
the writ of ​habeas corpus ​and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of both
the Court and Congress. The Court further differentiated the judicial power to review and
the Congressional power to revoke (​See table). ​The power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but are likewise independent
from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to
review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress. In the
end, ​the Court ​FINDS ​sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216
and ​DECLARES ​it as ​CONSTITUTIONAL.
In the MR, as to the extension of Martial Law, the Court ruled that the Congress did
not ​commit grave abuse of discretion for precipitately approving the extension of
martial law because the 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to
shorten or extend the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus.​ As to the manner in which Congress
deliberated on the President's request for extension, the Constitution, under
Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the right to promulgate its own rules
to govern its proceedings​.
DOCTRINE:
The power of the Court to review is independent​ ​actions taken by Congress to revoke.
FACTS:
1. Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
2. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with
the passing of time.
3. Lagman Petition:
a. The declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because:
i. There is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It
argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion​, ​since
there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof
from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.
ii. There is only a ​threat ​of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent
danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of
martial law.
iii. The President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived and
hyperbolic accounts.
iv. The Report only included events either took place long before the conflict in
Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having
already been arrested
v. The President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or
any ranking official
4. Cullamat Petition
a. Proclamation No. 216 is unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis
that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration.
It failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the ​entire
Mindanao.
5. Mulamad Petition:
a. Martial law is a measure of last resort and should be invoked by the President
only after exhaustion of less severe remedies
b. The President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use;
moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the
exigencies of the situation.
6. The Consolidated Comment by the OSG:
a. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the authority or
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law.
ISSUES:
1. ​WON the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution ​is
independent of the actions taken by Congress? (YES, THE REVIEW OF THE
COURT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE REVIEW OF CONGRESS) ​(pertinent to Article
VI, Section​ 23):
2. W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, ​the Court ​FINDS ​sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and ​DECLARES ​it as ​CONSTITUTIONAL. ​Accordingly, the
consolidated Petitions are hereby ​DISMISSED.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

RATIO: 4.
1. W/N the power of the court to review is independent of the actions taken by
Congress? (YES)
1. The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said
presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending 5.
the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus ​and imposing martial law are subject to the
veto powers of the Court and Congress.
2. Judicial power to review v. the congressional power to revoke
JUDICIAL POWER TO REVIEW CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO
REVOKE 1.
The Court may strike down the Congress may revoke the
presidential proclamation in an proclamation or suspension,
appropriate proceeding filed by any which revocation shall not be set 2.
citizen on the ground of lack aside by the President.
sufficient factual basis.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the Congress may take into
factual basis of the proclamation of consideration not only data 3.
suspension, the Court considers available prior to, but likewise
only the information and data events supervening the
available to the President prior to declaration. 4.
or at the time of the declaration; it
is not allowed to "undertake an
independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.”
In Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, ​the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its
own power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its
bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting
and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a
stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding.
Therefore, the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived
inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.
2. W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president? (NO)
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and
involves ordinary police action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power
whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion.
The only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or
in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. The extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law
may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
requires it.
Limitations of martial law and or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus: (1) time limit of 60 days, (2) review and possible revocation of congress, (3)
review and possible nullification of SC
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights a d individual freedom. As
such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by t e Congress, and review
by the Court

Court does not look into the Congress could probe deeper
absolute correctness of the factual and further; it can delve into the
basis. accuracy of the facts presented
before it

The Court's review power is Congress' review mechanism is

passive; it is only initiated by the automatic in the sense that itmay
filing of a petition "in an appropriate be activated by Congress itself at
proceeding" by a citizen. any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
3. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly,
they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of Congress, It should be noted that the
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with
veto powers independently from each other.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

MR AS TO THE EXTENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION
OF MARTIAL LAW (SARMIENTO)
Feb. 6, 2018 | G.R. No. 235935 | J. Tijam
FACTS:
1. The MR are consolidated petitions, filed under the third paragraph, Section 18 of
Article VII of the Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of ​habeas
corpus​ in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018
2. In the MR, one of the issues raised by the petitioners is: “(h) ​The Congress committed
grave abuse of discretion for precipitately and perfunctorily approving the extension of
martial law despite the absence of sufficient factual basis.”
3. Petitioners assail not only the sufficiency of the factual basis of this extension, but
also the manner in which it was approved.
4. The OSG argues that:
a. The determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis to justify the extension of
martial law became the duty of Congress after the President's request was
transmitted..
b. The manner in which Congress approved the extension ​is a political question,
outside the Court's judicial authority to review. Congress has full discretion on
how to go about the debates and the voting. The Constitution itself allows the
Congress to determine the rules of its proceedings. The Court does not concern
itself with parliamentary rules, which may be waived or disregarded by the
legislature
b. Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension,
upon the President's initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion
or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
2. When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension,
as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a "joint
executive and legislative act" or a "collective judgment" between the President and
the Congress.
3. As to the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President's request for
extension, the petitioners characterized the same as done with undue haste.
However, the Court ruled that this is not subject to judicial review. The Congress is
empowered to enact its own rules as to such pronouncement.
4. No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the
right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings​.
5. Thus, Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus​.

ISSUE: ​WON the Congress committed grave abuse of discretion for precipitately and
perfunctorily approving the extension of martial law despite the absence of sufficient
factual basis.​ (NO)

RULING: ​WHEREFORE​, the Court ​FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 and ​DECLARES it as ​CONSTITUTIONAL​.
Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby ​DISMISSED​.

RATIO:
On the issue of Congressional check on the exercise of martial law and suspension
powers
1. The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus​. Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension
powers thus consists of:
a. First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of ​habeas corpus,​ and to revoke such
proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is
made. The Congress' decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot
be set aside by the President.

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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (MANALANG)
Aug. 25, 1994 | 235 SCRA 630 | J. Mendoza
SUMMARY: ​Petitioners claim that Expanded VAT Law is unconstitutional. The Bill
that proposed E-VAT originated from the House of Representatives, but the Senate
passed their ​own version of the Bill. They claim that while the Senate may add or
amend the House Bill, it must retain the essence of the House Bill, based on Article
VI Section 24 of the Constitution.
Issue:​ Whether the E-VAT Law was unconstitutional? NO.
It is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” from the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the
House may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole bill creating an entirely distinct bill.
To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power to 1) “concur with
amendments” and 2) propose amendments.” It would violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
FACTS:
1. These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions
filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
2. Petitioners claim that R.A. No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution.
3. Petitioners admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where
it passed three ​readings. ​They also admit that afterwards it was sent to the Senate
where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee
4. What they are contending is that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. ​Instead what the Senate did ​was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630)
which it approved on May 24, 1994.
5. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to
amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text
of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (​only the text​) of the House bill."
6. Thus they believe that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is
in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630. It is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the
Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in
the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.
ISSUE: Whether Section 24 Article VI of the Constitution was violated? NO.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. No. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The
possibility of a third version by the conference committee may even occur. At this
point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill
may be produced.
2. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as
the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality
of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
3. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.
4. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as
a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot
enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed
and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own
version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two
chambers of Congress. The Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come
from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.
5. In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "​but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.​ "
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Garcia v. Mata (TAYLO)
Jul. 30, 1975 | 65 SCRA 517 | J. Castro
SUMMARY​:
Petitioner argues that his reversion to inactive status on Nov. 15, 1960 was in violation of
para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600, which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned
service. The issue of the case is whether or not para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600. A perusal of
the challenged provision fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation
item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. ​While R.A. No. 1600 appropriated
money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, para. 11 refers
to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the
reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It was a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against
"riders" to the general appropriation act. Also, any provision contained in the body of an
act that was neither fairly included in the subject expressed in the title nor germane to or
properly connected with that subject is nullified and rendered inoperative. The subject of
R.A. No. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the
operation of the government,” to which para. 11 thereof is neither fairly included nor
germane or properly connected.
DOCTRINES:
1. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
2. No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner:
a. Reserve officer on active duty with the AFP. ​Held the rank of Captain, with
monthly emolument of PHP478
b. When R.A. No. 1382 took effect → Had 9 years, 4 months, and 12 days of
accumulated active commissioned service with the AFP
i. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1382 → Reserve officers with at least 10 years of active
accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of
the approval of this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status
c. When R.A. No. 1600 took effect → Had 10 years, 5 months, and 5 days of
accumulated active commissioned service with the AFP
i. Para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600 → That reserve officers with at least 10 years
of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active
duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to
inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or
upon their request
d. Nov. 15, 1960 → reversion to inactive status​ based on R.A. No. 2334
2. Petitioner brought an action for "​Mandamus ​and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the
court ​a quo ​to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff of the AFP to reinstate him in the active commissioned service, to readjust his
rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status → DISMISSED.
a. The court ruled that para. 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines" in R.A. No. 1600 is unconstitutional.
3. Petitioner argues that his reversion to inactive status on Nov. 15, 1960 was in
violation of para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600 which prohibits the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated
active commissioned service.
4. Respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained
therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935
Constitution, which reads:
a. “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation
bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein;
and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to
such appropriation.”
ISSUE: W/N ​para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600 is unconstitutional → YES
RULING: ​ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower
court dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
1. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. No. 1600 fails to disclose its
relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation
Act as a whole.
a. While R.A. No. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the
Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, para. 11 refers to the
fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and
the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
2. In the language of the respondents-appellees, "​it was indeed a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure i​ n violation of the constitutional inhibition against
"riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
3. The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
a. This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected
with that subject.
b. The title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. It is "a
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject."
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

c. The subject of R.A. No. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to

"appropriating funds for the operation of the government." Any provision
contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or
any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, ​if a
provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted
subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active
duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such
provision is inoperative and of no effect.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
J. Barredo → ​Respondents acted in accordance with Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 2334, stating
that ​"(r)eserve officers on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval
of this Act, with the exception of those covered by section three of this Act, shall be
reverted to inactive status within three years from the approval of this Act." Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 2334 consequently repealed para. 11 of R.A. No. 1600. Lastly, ​no member of the
army has a vested right in his employment, status or rank therein.

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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Rodolfo C. Farinas v. Executive Secretary (DINSAY)
Dec. 10, 2003 | GR 147387 | J. Callejo, Sr.
(Disclaimer: I don’t know how this case is related to Sec. 25, Art. VI of the
Constitution. There is no mention of appropriations of Congress in this case)
SUMMARY​: The petitioners of this case challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 14
of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act) for being a rider. They claim this particular
provision which actually repeals Secs. 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which in effect does not render an elective official not ipso facto resigned from
office upon his filing of CoC is a not germane to the subject matter of the law, and
that it discriminates appointive officials. The SC upheld the validity of the said
provision on the basis of liberal construction; it held that such provision may be
considered in furtherance of such subject, providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. The title and objectives of RA 9006 is
comprehensive enough to include the repeal provided for in Sec. 14.
DOCTRINE: Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners allege that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 (The Fair Elections Act),
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), is
unconstitutional ​for violating Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
required every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
More so, the alleged provision constitutes a proscribed rider.
2. Section 67 of the OEC provides that “Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
3. Petitioners pointed out the dissimilarity and germaneness of R.A. 9006 and Sec. 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
4. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other
hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy.
5. Petitioners contend that Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials; hence, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. On the other
hand, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations by invoking the Enrolled Bill
Doctrine.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Sec.14 of RA 9006 is a proscribed rider - NO
2. W/N Sec. 14 of RA 9006 violate of the equal protection clause - NO
3. W/N the ‘Enrolled Bill’ doctrine is applicable to this case - YES
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
RATIO:
1. No, it is not a rider.
a. SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
b. To prevent the evils of the log-rolling and underhanded encroachments, the
Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly interpreted as to hinder the
power of legislation. Thus, the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a rational and not a technical construction. As long as the
provisions does not veer away with the foreign and general subject, the Court
held that an act may contain any number of provisions.
c. Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public. It is apprehended that the legislators were acquainted or had knowledge
of the provision repealing Sec. 67 of the OEC as it was comprehensively
deliberated upon by the members of the House. More so, the petitioners had
expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to the enactment of the
law.
2. No, it does not violate the equal protection clause.
a. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. By repealing Sec. 67 but retaining Sec. 66 of the OEC, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to
the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy.
The provisions do not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
for all persons belonging under the same classifications are treated similarly.
3. Yes, it is applicable.
a. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses
of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court
finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities assumed by the petitioners for the alleged procedures are merely
procedural, and which the Court have no concern with​.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Demetrio G. Demetria et al v. Hon. Manuel Alba (ALCANTARA)
Feb. 27, 1987 | G.R. No. 71977 | J. Fernan
SUMMARY: ​Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec. 44 of PD No. 1177,
otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 for failing to specify the
objectives and purposes the funds are made and thus the undue delegation of
legislative powers to the executive. SC held it to be unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: ​Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item
from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
FACTS:
1. Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec. 441 of PD No. 1177, otherwise
known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
2. Petitioners, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa, prayed for the
ff:
a. Sec. 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public
moneys
b. Sec. 44 is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and
purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
c. Sec. 44 allows the president to override the safeguards, form and procedure
prescribed by the constitution in approving appropriations
d. Sec. 44 of the same decree amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers
to the executive.
e. The threatening and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the
implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines
are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
f. The Solicitor General alleged that the petition has become moot and academic
after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was
enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
1
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
ISSUE: WoN PD 1177 is unconstititional? YES.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
RATIO:
1. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus
limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were
specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
2. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege
granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer
is to be made. ​It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Araullo v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III​ ​(Main Decision) (NOEL)
Jul. 1, 2014 | G.R. No. 209287 | J. Bersamin
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is a program where savings of
government projects from 1) unreleased appropriations; 2) withdrawal of
unobligated allotments; and 3) unprogrammed funds, were used to augment the
funding of other projects not specified in the GAA. This was designed to boost the
economy of the country. The issuances allow the augmentation of projects not
considered in the GAA to be implemented. It declares savings those coming from
said sources and uses them to augment existing projects. DAP is not an
appropriation measure that necessitates a law to implement it. However, the
unreleased appropriations and withdrawn obligated allotments cannot be
considered savings. They contravene Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) which requires for a valid
​ uthorizing the transfer funds ​within their respective offices;​
transfer: 1) a ​Law a
2) funds transferred are ​Savings;​ and 3) Purpose of the transfer is to
Augment.G ​ AAs authorizing the transfer are unconstitutional because the GAA
allowed the augmentation/transfer of any item outside the Executive. There were
no savings because the funds transferred didn’t even reach the agency to which it
was appropriated for, hence was not used/fulfillment and were not considered to be
excess. The projects that were funded were not projects under the GAA, hence it
was not augmented, as envisioned by the provision. The cross-border transfer was
also prohibited as per Art. VI, Sec. 25(5). However, the Court applied the doctrine
of operative fact and did not require those who benefited from the DAP to return
the money spent.
FACTS:
1. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate which reveals that
some Senators had been allotted an additional 50 M each as “incentive” for voting in
favor of the impeachment of CJ Corona
2. Sec. Abad clarified that the funds released to the Senators based on their request for
funding and it was not the first time that releases from DAP had been made since
2011.
3. The DAP was instituted to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had
caused the growth of the GDP to slow down. The DAP were usually taken from 1)
unreleased appropriations under Personal Services; 2) Unprogrammed funds; 3)
Carry-over appropriations unreleased from previous year; and 4) budgets for
slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects
4. The legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings are: Sec. 25(5), Art. VI which granted to
the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general
appropriations law, Sec. 49 and Sec. 38 of EO 292 (Admin code) and the General
Appropriation Acts (GAAs) of 2011-2013 and the provisions on savings and priority in
use of savings.
ISSUES:
1. W/N DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the Constitution?
2. W/N the DAP and all other executive issuance implementing the DAP violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI insofar as:
a. They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
withdrawn from government agencies as “savings” as the term is used in
Sec. 25(5), in relation to the GAAs 2011-2013
b. They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not
provided in the GAAs for the Executive department
c. They “augment” discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs
RATIO:
Overview of the Philippine Budget Cycle: 4 Phases
1. Budget Preparation
a. DBM issues a budget call and the agencies submit their respective agency
budget proposals
2. Budget Legislation
a. Period commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s budget, up
to the approval by the President of the GAA
b. House drafts the General Appropriations Bill. Senate would conduct its own
hearings. Then comes the Bicameral Conference Committee
3. Budget Execution
a. Execution phase is the primary function of the DBM, tasked to perform the ff:
issue programs and guidelines, prepare an allotment and cash release program,
release allotments, issue disbursement authorities
b. Allotment is different from appropriation because the latter is the general
legislative authority to spend
4. Accountability
a. Ensures that the funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized and may be
examined by performance targets and outcomes, accountability reports, review
of performance and COA audits
Explanation of DAP
1. Was designed to promote economic growth due to the deceleration on government
project implementation and payment schedules due to the efficiency and
transparency goal of the Aquino administration
2. Was meant to be a stimulus package for fast-track public spending to push economic
growth by investing on high-impact projects to be funded from the savings generated
during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds
3. The projects under the DAP were chosen based on:
a. Multiplier impact on the economy and infrastructure development
b. Beneficial effect on the poor
c. Translation into disbursements
DAP Sources and Disbursements
1. Sources of the DAP: total of 72.110 billion pesos
a. Unreleased personal services appropriations
b. Unreleased appropriations
c. Unprogrammed fund from 2010
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
d. Carryover appropriation from 2010
e. Budget items from realignment
NBC No. 541
1. According to the circular, “in the event that a measure is necessary to further improve
the operational efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend
or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the
GAA
2. All released allotments which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012 shall be
immediately considered for withdrawal, based on substantial carryover
appropriations. The allotments may be reissued for the original program, realigned to
cover additional funding or used to augment existing programs of any agency to fund
programs not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or
implemented during the year
DAP is not an appropriation measure so there’s no violation of Art. VI, Sec. 29
1. Pres. Aquino did not usurp legislative power because the president has sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation, pool savings and identify projects to be funded
2. No appropriation because the money was already provided for by Congress through
the GAA
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the
DAP were NOT savings, and the use of such appropriations contravened Sec.
25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
1. Although executive discretion and flexibility are necessary in the execution of the
budget, any transfer of appropriated funds should conform to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI
a. The expenditure process requires substantial discretion for administrators
b. Historically, Sec. 25(5) is intended to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the
power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other
high officials of the government named – the exception in favor of the high
officials named in Sec. 25(5) limiting the authority to transfer savings only to
augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as
exclusive
2. Requisites for valid transfer of appropriated funds under Sec. 25(5) Art. VI:
a. There is a law authorizing the President, President of Senate, Speaker of
House, Chief Justice, and heads of ConCom to transfer funds within their
respective offices
b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations
for their respective offices
c. Purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices
3. First Requisite: GAAs of 2011-2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize
transfers of funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under the DAP were
unconstitutional
a. The provisions in the GAAs were unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the
phrase “for their respective offices” contained in Sec. 25(5). Under the
Constitution, the phrase only authorizes transfers of funds within their offices (no
cross-border)
b. The GAA literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item
in the GAAs even if it belonged to an office outside the executive
4. 2​nd​Requisite: There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the
DAP because funds used in DAP are NOT savings under the constitutional
provision
a. What constitute Savings? SC enunciated certain principles
i. 1​st​: Congress wields the power of the purse
ii. 2​nd​: Executive is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and spend the
budget in accordance with it
iii. 3​rd​: Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution, hence
the grant to the President the power to augment. But, congress does not
allow the executive to override its authority thereby exceeding the delegated
authority
iv. 4​th​: Savings should be actual, real or substantial or something that exists
presently in fact and not something hypothetical, possible, potential or
theoretical
b. Savings must be construed strictly against expanding the scope of the power to
augment. The power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for
which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized.
i. This was the definition of savings under the GAAs—savings could be
generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled or upon
the need being no longer existent
ii. “free from any obligation or encumbrance” = appropriation was already
obligated and the appropriation was already released
c. DBM is wrong in stating that part of the savings under DAP came from “pooling
of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased personal services
appropriations slow moving projects and discontinued projects” since they are in
itself UNRELEASED. These appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to
which they were allocated under the GAAs and have remained with the DBM
d. Unobligated allotments were encompassed by the first part of the definition of
“savings” under the GAA – ‘portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance.” But this was
qualified by 3 instances. As such, it could not be indiscriminately declared as
savings without determining the existence of the instances
i. Maintenance and other Operating expenses (MOOE) appropriations are
divided into 12 monthly allocations, hence savings could be generated
monthly from the excess or unused MOOE. Thus, MOOE for future months
are not savings and cannot be transferred
e. Petitioners accused respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to
have a larger fund available for discretionary spending which would deprive
funding for projects with existing appropriations under the GAAs. Nonetheless, it
cannot be considered as Impoundment
i. Impoundment: refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds
made available by Congress.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
ii. Withdrawal of unobligated allotments cannot be considered compoundment
because it only entailed transfer of funds, and not the retention or deduction
of appropriations.
5. 3​rd​Requisite: No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to
augment deficient items not provided in the GAA
a. Under the provision, the purpose of the transfer should be to augment an item in
the general appropriations law for the respective office” – augment means to
enlarge or increase in size
b. The GAAs set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP
item to be augmented must be deficient – an appropriation for any PAP must first
be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings
c. Upon review of the 7 packets of evidence, SC concluded that the “savings”
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriations in the GAAs
i. Disaster Risk Exposure Assessment and Mitigation project (DREAM),
DOST-PCIEERTRD (Philippine council for industry, energy and emerging
technology research and dev’t, etc.
d. The President is still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAA
despite the authorization to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the
laws because by not limiting it, would be a violation of the separation of powers.
6. 3​rd​Requisite: Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the
Constitution
a. By providing the president, senate president, house speaker, CJ and heads of
ConCom the authorization to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective
offices”, Sec. 25(5) has delineated borders between their offices such that funds
appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item. Such transfers are
cross-border transfers/augmentations
i. They are strictly prohibited
7. Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue
targets not having been exceeded was invalid
a. Unprogrammed appropriations: those that provided standby authority to incur
additional agency obligations for priority projects when revenue collections
exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated.
b. Requirement that revenue collections must still exceed original revenue targets
for the release of such funds
c. However, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole and not
individually – which did not happen in this case
Doctrine of Operative Fact applies
1. Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
2. It is applicable in this case because the adoption and implementation of the DAP and
its related issuances were executive acts, which could include all the acts of the
executive.
3. If funds were to be reversed, then it would cause more harm than good
a. DAP has helped stimulate the economy and funded numerous projects
b. Effects of DAP can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially since they relied on the validity of
the DAP
Araullo v. Benigno Simeon Aquino III​ ​(MR) (NOEL)
Feb. 3, 2015 | G.R. No. 209287 | J. Bersamin
1. Power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA
2. Aquino et al contended that it is not required that Congress could create allotment
classes within an item since what is required is for Congress to create items to
comply with the line-item of the President
3. In Belgica v. Ochoa, SC held that an “item” that is distinct and several part of the
appropriation bill, in line with the item veto power of the President, must contain
“specific appropriations of money” and not be only general provisions.
4. The item referred to by Sec. 25(5) is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in
the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class.
There is no specificity either in the Constitution or in the GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class.
a. President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only
veto the item to which the expense category belongs to
5. Accordingly so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside
a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for
augmentation.
6. Nonetheless, this does not take away from the ruling that only DAP projects found in
the appropriate GAAs may be subject of augmentation by legal accumulated savings.
7. Court partially grants the petitions and declares the following acts under the
DAP, NBC No. 451 and related Executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Sec. 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
a. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,
and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and
without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
GAA;
b. The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appopriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
c. The funding of projects that were not covered by an appropriation in the
GAA.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Cordero v. Cabatuando (REMOLLO, P.)
Oct. 31, 1962 | G.R. L- 14542/ 6 SCRA 418 | J. Regala
SUMMARY:
A case was filed by the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the DOJ through its
lawyer, Cordero. The case is against landlord Romana, and was for “reinstatement
and reliquidation of past harvests.” At this time, the law in force was RA 1199.
Landlord Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero from representing the tenant
Salazar because under the law in force at the time, representation of indigent
tenants should be made by the DOLE. This was granted by the Court. Meanwhile,
RA 2262 was passed, amending RA 1199. Under the new law, the Tenancy
Mediation Commission (of the DOJ) is to represent indigent tenants (Article 19 and
20). The constitutionality of the amending provisions was raised for violation of
Section VI, Article 26(1) of the Constitution ("No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill).
The SC upheld its constitutionality. ​The constitutional requirement is complied
with as long the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which
is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, will be regarded as valid. It said that the provisions of
sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly germane to, and are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the one general subject,
agricultural tenancy.
DOCTRINE: In bold.
FACTS:
1. RA 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, while RA 2263 is the new law amending the
RA 1199.
2. Basically, Sections 19 and 20 of the amending law are being assailed for violating
Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution.
3. Antecedent Facts: The Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the DOJ, through its Trial Attorney (herein petitioner Cordero) filed a
case with the 2ndRegional District of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Cordero was
the counsel of Vicente Salazar, the tenant petitioner in that case, against landlord
Leonardo Sta. Romana. The case was for "for reinstatement and reliquidation of past
harvests."
4. Landlord Leonardo subsequently filed a "Motion to Disqualify Counsel and To Set
Hearing at Cabanatuan City, praying among others for the disqualification of
petitioner Manuel A. Cordero to act as counsel tenant Vicente Salazar.” The judge
granted the said petition. MR was filed but was denied.
5. In its order, the Court of Agrarian Relations upheld landlord Leonardo’s claims and
held, among others: ​(a) ​that the representation of indigent tenants should be done by
the DOLE as provided in Section 54 of RA 1199; ​(b) ​Circular No. 5 (1957) of the
Agricultural Tenancy Commission, as approved by the Secretary of Justice, creating a
Tenancy Unit Counsel in the Mediation Division, is ​ultra vires a ​ nd has no legal force;
(c) ​the Mediation Division has been existing without the sanction of any statute.
6. Section 54 of RA 1199 (old law): representation of indigent tenants should be done by
the DOLE. Here, representation by Cordero is under the Tenancy Unit Council of the
DOJ
7. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued, enjoining the execution of the said order.
Meanwhile, RA 2263, amending the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines (RA
1199) was passed. It provided, among others, that:
a. In all cases wherein a tenant cannot afford to be represented by counsel, it shall
be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to represent
him, upon proper notification by the party concerned, or the court of competent
jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel ​de oficio f​ or the indigenttenant.
(Section 54, Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 2263).
8. Because of the new law, Cordero filed a Manifestion contending that the case is now
moot and academic. As required by this Court, respondent judge, thru counsel, filed
his Comment on the said Manifestation; it was alleged therein that before the
enactment of RA 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division, nor was there any
law creating the same and defining its functions.
9. He said that its only basis for existence, therefore, are sections 19 and 20 of Republic
Act No. 2263 which are null and void because the Constitution provides that "no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." He further contended that nowhere in the titles of
Republic Act No. 1199 and Republic Act No. 2263 is the creation of the Tenancy
Mediation Division ever mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19, Republic Act
No. 2263 falls under the first class of prohibited bills.
ISSUE: ​W/N Sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263, amending Sections 53 and 54 of RA
1199 are constitutional under Article VI, Section 21(1)? ​YES.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, made permanent.
RATIO:
1. Article VI, Section 21(1) of the Philippine Constitution reads: No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.
2. It is to be noted that the basic law, Republic Act 1199, is called "The Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines."
3. The constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law are related,
and are germane to subject matter expressed in the title of the bill.
4. The title of Republic Act No. 2263 reads as follows: "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY- NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT
OF THE PHILIPPINE." The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the
law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural
Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be
regarded as valid
5. The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly
germane to, and are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the one
general subject, agricultural tenancy.
6. Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation,​ 66 Phil. 483
a. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the object.
Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of
the Act.
7. Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,​ 73 Phil. 288
a. The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the
enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical rather than
technical construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement
if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject.
8. People v. Carlos,​ 78 Phil. 535- basically said the same thing.
a. The only amendment brought about by Republic Act No. 2263 is the transfer of
the function of representing these indigent tenants to the Department of Justice,
apparently to consolidate in the latter Department the functions relative to the
enforcement of tenancy laws. In essence, therefore, there is no change in the
set- up established by Republic Act No. 1199 and that provided for by Republic
Act No. 2263. There is only a transfer of functions from one department of the
government to another.
9. Shortly after the enactment of the amending law, DOLE issued a circular transferring
to the Tenancy Mediation Division of the DOJ the former’s function of representing
indigents, through its public defenders, before the Agrarian Court.
10. To declare sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2 null and void would in effect
upset the transfer of duty of representing indigent tenants from the public defenders
of the DOLE to the trial attorney in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of
these provisions of Republic Act No. 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory
of, intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in
the DOJ.
11. For these reasons, We hereby declare sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act
No. 2263 valid and constitutional.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:​ None

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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board (ALCAZAR)
Jun. 18, 1957 |151 SCRA 208 | J. Melencio-Herrera
SUMMARY​:
Petitioners assalling the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise
the videogram industry. Petitioner assails the validity of Section 10 of the decree that
allowed the LGUs to tax videogram operators. It was stated that the one-subject-one-bill
rule of the Constitution was violated. The issue in this case is ​whether PD 1987 is
unconstitutional due to the tax provision. NO. The assailed provision is allied and
germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of
the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
DOCTRINE:
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. The claim that
Section 10 is a rider has not merit.
of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its
title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the decree.
2. The express purpose of the decree to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Whereas Clause 2 (taxation of videogram) and Whereas Clause 5 (use of tax money
for regulation of videogram).
3. Those whereas clauses explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the presidential decree, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its
Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title.
4. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. The
claim that Section 10 is a rider has not merit.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: ​None

FACTS:
1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators
adversely affected assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987
entitled ​"An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers
to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. ​Petitioner assails the following
section as violating the one-subject-one-bill rule and that ​Section 10 thereof, which
imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter of the decree.
2. Section 10​. T​ ax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms​. — Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent
(30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease
or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.

ISSUE: ​Whether PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision. NO.

RULING: ​Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1. The assailed provision is allied and germane to, and is ​reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE​, which is the regulation
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
CIR v. CTA (ONG)
May 14 1990 | L-47421 | J. Medialdea
SUMMARY​:
Manila Golf is claiming that it is exempted from paying caterer’s taxes under the law.
However, CIR said that they’re liable and made an assessment on them. In response,
Manila Golf said that the assessment had no basis because Marcos vetoed the entire
Sec. 42 aka the entire law imposing caterer’s tax. The CIR said that no, the entire sec. 42
wasn’t vetoed but only a particular phrase. CTA upheld Manila Golf’s position and said
that they were excluded because the President could only veto an entire section, not just
portions. So, CIR appealed. The issue in this case is whether the President could veto
portions only, or does it have to be the entire section? The SC said that under the
Constitution, the President could veto portions of a tax law, it doesn’t have to be the
entire section. Given this, Manila Golf is liable for the tax since the entire section on which
it bases its exemption wasn’t vetoed.
DOCTRINE:
To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's
hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a
provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense
of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be
prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would
be perpetrated rendering that power inutile.
FACTS:
1. In the previous case of CIR vs. Manila Hotel, the SC upheld the power of the state to
impose the 3% caterer’s tax.
2. Respondent Manila Golf is a nonstock corporation and maintains a golf course and a
clubhouse with a lounge, bar, and dining room which are for the exclusive use of its
members. It charges on a cost plus expense basis. It claims that it should be
exempted from paying caterer’s taxes were it not for the last paragraph of RA 6110,
Sec. 191-A.2
3. CIR contests the exclusion of Manila Golf from the application of RA6110, and
assessed the club fixed taxes as operators of golf courses and restaurants, and also
caterer’s tax for the sale of food and wine from September 1969 to December 1970.
4. Manila Golf protested, saying that the assessment had no basis. It said that President
Marcos Vetoed the entire Section 42.3
2
​Sec. 191-A Caterer’s Tax ​Where the establishments are operated or maintained by clubs of any kind or
nature (irrespective of the disposition of their net income and whether or not they cater exclusively to members
or their guests) the keepers of the establishments shall pay the corresponding tax at the rate fixed above​.
(Emphasis supplied)
3
SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which imposes a caterer's tax of three percent of the gross receipts
of proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places; three percent of gross
receipts from sale of food or refreshment and seven percent on gross receipts from the sale of distilled spirits,
fermented liquors or wines, on proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places,
including clubs, where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are served; and twenty percent of gross
receipts on proprietor or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places
maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret,
5. Manila Golf’s protest was denied by CIR, who maintains that Sec. 42 was not entirely
vetoed, but merely the worlds “hotel, motels, and resthouses” on the ground that it
might restrain the development of hotels.
6. The CTA opined that the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill, but only
an entire item.
ISSUE: W/N the Presidential Veto is applicable only as against entire sections of
tax laws? NO. Such veto can also apply to specific portions.
RULING: THE PETITION IS GRANTED. MANILA GOLF IS LIABLE FOR THE TAX.
SECTION 161-A IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.
RATIO:
1. The President may veto specific portions of the tax law and is not limited to vetoing
entire sections of tax laws.
2. The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses
in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole section. The CTA opined that the
President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item.
3. Obviously, what the CTA meant by "item" was an entire section. We do not agree. But
even assuming it to be so, it would also be to petitioner's favor (as it would render the
entire exemption nonexistent). The ineffectual veto by the President rendered the
whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at all and it, therefore, became law as
an unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever.
4. An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular
kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a
revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates
the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate.
5. To construe the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the President's
hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also
approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section
at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which
was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a
revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile.
- NO SEPARATE OPINION FOR THIS CASE -
night or day club, or which are accessible to patrons of said establishments by means of a connecting door or
passage.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Gonzales v. Macaraig (HILADO)
Nov. 19, 1990 | 191 SCRA 452​ | ​J.​ ​Melencio-Herrera
SUMMARY: Members of Congress questioned the constitutionality of the exercise
of the president of his item-veto power. The President vetoed provisions of the
1989 and 1990 General Appropriations Bill which prohibited the President, Senate
Pres, Speaker of HOR, and CJ of the SC, from augmenting appropriations from
their savings. The petitioners argued that the president only has the power to veto
an item and not a provision. The Court held that the powers of the president to veto
an item also extends to provisions which are distinct and severable parts of a bill.
The power to veto a provision came from the 1935 Constitution and the elimiation
of that proviso in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution did not result to the elimination of
that power since it is basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may
be subject of a separate veto.
FACTS:
1. Congress passed the 1989 General Appropriations Bill, which eliminated or
decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.
2. The President signed the Bill into law but vetoed 7 special provisions and 1 general
provision.
3. The petitioners, ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate,
questioned the constitutionality of the veto of the General Provision and filed a
petition for prohibition/mandamus.
4. Section 55 (General Provision) of the Appropriations Act that was vetoed:
a. "SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of
appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to
Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
5. The reason for the veto was that it would violate Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution. It would prohibit the power of the President, CJ, Senate President, and
Speaker of the HOR to augment any item in the general appropriation law for their
respective offices from savings in other items in their respective appropriations.
6. A similar provision appears in the 1990 General Appropriations Bill. However, the
“use of savings” appears in a different provision in the 1989 Bill, while the similar
provision is commingled in Sec. 16 of the 1990 Bill.
7. Petitioners contend that the president vetoed “provisions” and not “items”.
ISSUE: WON the veto of the Section 55 of the 1989 Bill and Sec. 16 of the 1990 Bill
is unconstitutional. - NO.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is
UPHELD and this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. Par. 1 of Section 27 of Article VI of the Constitution provides for the general
veto power of the president which would veto the entire bill, while Par. 2 is
the item-veto or line-veto power of the president.
2. Originally, the item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation
bills and was based from the Organic Act of 1916. 1935 Constitution
broadened it to include veto of a provision. 1973 Constitution made it simple
and removed the provision part in the 1935 Const. 1987 Const is a verbatim
reproduction of the 1973 Const except for the authority exercising it.
However, notwithstanding the elimination of any reference to the veto of a
provision, the extent of the President’s veto power in the 1935 Constitution
has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces
the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject
of a separate veto.
3. In the true sense of the term, provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in
its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates and does not
relate to the entire bill.
4. The Court also discussed the inappropriateness of the provisions because
they are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, which violates
Sec 25(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
5. The provisions also impaired the constitutional and statutory authority of the
President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation
from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The power of
augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation of
money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
An appropriation being a setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for a specific purpose.
Dissenting Opinions:
The point of the dissenting opinions is that the item-veto power of the president refers
to items only and does not extend to provisions. It also points out that Congress
should be allowed to provide a condition on the power to augment since it required
that no savings can be used to augment an appropriation disapproved by Congress
or to restore an appropriation previously reduced by Congress.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Philconsa v. Enriquez (TALION)
Aug. 19, 1994 | 235 SCRA 506 | Quiason, J.
SUMMARY​:Petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of the president’s veto over
several provisions under the General Appropriations Bill. The provision on Debt Ceiling
was vetoed on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA.” Issue is WON the President can veto the Special Provision on
the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86.3M for said
purpose. YES. The SC held that it is readily apparent that the special provision is an
INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION referring to funds other than the P86B appropriated in
the GAA. The vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act
and to reverse the debt payment policy. Thus, the repeal of said law should be done in
a separate law, not in the appropriations law. The general rule is that the President has
to veto the entire bill, and not merely parts thereof. The exception is the power of the
President to veto any particular item (item veto) in an appropriations bill. Here, the
president must veto the entire item. A GAB is a special type of legislation whose content
is limited to specified sums of money. Because the Constitution requires that provisions
in an appropriation bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriation to which
it relates, any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which extends its
operation beyond the item will be considered an INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION,
WHICH CAN BE VETOED SEPARATELY. Thus the scope of this item veto
(inappropriate provision) should be any provision: 1) which does not relate to any
particular item; 2) which extends the operation beyond the item of appropriation; 3) an
unconstitutional provision which are intended to amend other laws. Therefore, the veto
1.of the special provision on debt service is VALID. It is an inappropriate provision. It
refers to funds other than the P86B appropriated in the GAA. This should be the subject
of a separate legislation, not through the GAA.
DOCTRINE:​ In bold.
FACTS:
1. The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President.
It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
2. Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. The
President signed the bill into law (GAA) and on the same day, delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress
to override the vetoes. Specifically, the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which
he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
a. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot
be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of
public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant
to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987
b. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities
and Colleges (SUC’s),
c. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
d. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with
the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
e. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,”
which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3
on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall
not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
f. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
g. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress.
ISSUE:​ (relevant to Sec 27):
1. W/N Senators who filed cases had standing? ​YES
2. W/N the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution/ does
President the power to veto “provisions” of an Appropriations Bill? ​NO
3. W/N the President can veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86.3M for said purpose. YES
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to (1) G.R.
Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be
used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness"
prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the
veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation
for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b)
Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
RATIO:
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling (Veto sustained)
1. This provision read: The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
2. President vetoed it without vetoing the P86.3M appropriation for debt service in said
Article, in his speech he basically said: Yes, we need to pay our debts, but in a more
innovative way, and this is not the appropriate way and besides, these can be
addressed by Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292. The GAA is
NOT the appropriate legislation to amend or repeal these laws.
3. The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the
item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an item
veto.
4. The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process. That is why it is found in Article VI than in Article VII. There is, therefore,
sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
5. Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely
parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general
veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a
general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27 [2]). In so doing, the
President must veto the entire item.
6. The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on
debt service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item
"shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisos are germane to and have a
direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation
is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. The said provisos, being
appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said
provisions is void.
7. SC: In order to obviate any misunderstanding, we are sustaining the veto of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein
requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be
subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the
Congress of the Philippines . . ."
8. Inappropriate provision doctrine: Just as the President may not use his
item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither
can the legislature deprive the President of the constitutional powers conferred
on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general
appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The
President’s constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot
be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the President to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing `items' of expenditures
essential to the operation of government.
9. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto.
Nor can it circumvent the President’s veto power over substantive legislation
by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature
would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of
a co-equal responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine.
10. In order to avoid the legislature using its appropriation power to infringe on the
President’s constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation and the
President encroaching on the constitutional powers of the legislature, the court held
that ​when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation
bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the President’s item
veto power over general appropriation bills.​
11. There are other vetoes made: VALID VETOES: 1) the debt servicing; 2) the State
Univ and Colleges. revolving fund; 3) the purchase of military equipment (this is an
inappropriate provision. It is a rider. It provided for Congressional approval); 4) the
AFP pension – the AFP Chief of Staff has no power to augment; 5) Deactivation of
CAFGU (another rider, inappropriate provision)
12. INVALID VETOES: 1) the 70%-30% (administrative vs. contract) ratio for road
maintenance. Congress provided that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out, but the President wanted 70% to be
contracted out because it would be more efficient, economical. When the president
vetoed, he argued that it was inappropriate. VETO INVALID. The provision is
APPROPRIATE. It specifies how the said item shall be expended, 70%
administrative, 30% contract. This cannot be vetoed separately from the items to
which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense; 2) purchase
of AFP medicines- this is also APPROPRIATE PROVISION. This is in compliance
with the drug policy of the DOH, it directly relates and is inseparable from
appropriation.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PADILLA CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION: Disagrees with the majority's
pronouncements which would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in
the appropriations act based on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions."
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
​ ot an ​item, ​in an
"inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a ​provision, n
appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG CONCURRING (on the pork barrel issue): Agrees that it lies with Congress to
determine in an appropriation act the activities and the projects that are desirable and
may thus be funded. Once such identification and the corresponding appropriation
therefor is done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there. Members of Congress,
more than the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of
their own respective constituents. There is no legal obstacle, however, in their making,
just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to, ​albeit n ​ ot necessarily conclusive
on, the President for the purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law,
to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority,
however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise would be
constitutionally impermissible.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Lung Center v. QC (FERNANDO)
Jun. 29, 2004 | G.R. No. 144104 | J. Callejo, Sr.
SUMMARY: ​Lung Center (LC) is a non-stock/non-profit entity created by PD 1823.
It leases part of its property to various private parties for clinics, canteens, stores,
and an enterprise called Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. It accepts and
serves paying and non-paying patients and gets its income from paying patients
and annual government subsidies. LC alleges that it is a charitable institution
because most of its facilities are for charity purposes therefore exempt from RPT.
Respondent argues that LC is not because it failed to prove that it is a charitable
institution and the properties are directly and exclusively for charitable purposes.
The SC held that LC is a charitable institution but the portion which is leased to
private individuals are not exempt from RPT because these are not actually, directly
and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
DOCTRINE: ​The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers ​property
taxes only. ​As Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, explained: ". . . what is exempted is not the institution
itself . . .; ​those exempted from real estate ​taxes are lands, buildings and
improvements actually, ​directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable
or educational purposes.
FACTS:
1. The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823.
2. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and
small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as
their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services.
Another portion is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise
known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
3. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical
services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from
paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.
4. On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property
taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution.
It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity
patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients.
5. The respondents aver that the petitioner is not a charitable entity. The petitioner’s
real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate taxes under P.D. No.
1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it failed to prove that it is a
charitable institution and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively
used for charitable purposes. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential
Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 - YES
2. W/N the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes. -
NO
RULING: ​IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is ​PARTIALLY
GRANTED​. The respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby ​DIRECTED to
determine, after due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof
which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due
thereon as provided for by law.
RATIO:
W/N the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential
Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 - YES
1. The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution.
2. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements
which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of
the actual work performed, that character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness
of the beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the properties.
3. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and
its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients,
whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private
benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
W/N the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes. -
NO
1. Its real properties are not exempt from real property taxes.
2. The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution is for the
property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160 which
provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to
prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purpose.
3. The portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real
property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
CIR v. DLSU (BAUTISTA)
Nov. 9, 2016 | ​G.R. No. 196596​ | J. Brion
SUMMARY​:
The BIR assessed DLSU for deficiency taxes. DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution, protested the assessment and principally anchored its petition on Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, which reads: All revenues and assets of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. The SC agreed with DLSU’s argument.
Unlike Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution (pertaining to charitable institutions,
churches, parsonages or convents, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries), which exempts
from tax only the assets, i.e., "all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes...," Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) categorically states that "[a]ll revenues and assets... used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties." A plain
reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require
that the revenues and income must have also been sourced from educational activities or
activities related to the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all revenues is
unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues
and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, then
said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes and duties. For all these reasons,
we hold that the income and revenues of DLSU proven to have been used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes. (But
the SC still held DLSU liable for the other taxes.)
DOCTRINE:
Unlike Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution (pertaining to charitable institutions,
churches, parsonages or convents, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries), which exempts
from tax only the assets, i.e., "all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes...," Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) categorically states that "[a]ll revenues and assets... used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."
A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not
require that the revenues and income must have also been sourced from educational
activities or activities related to the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all
revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the
revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
FACTS:
1. The BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following deficiency
taxes: (1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores
operating within the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAT) on business income; and (3)
documentary stamp tax (DST) on loans and lease contracts. The BIR demanded the
payment of P17,303,001.12, inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty for taxable
years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
2. DLSU protested the assessment. The Commissioner failed to act on the protest; thus,
DLSU filed a petition for review with the CTA Division. DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution, principally anchored its petition on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of
the Constitution, which reads: All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
3. The CTA partially granted DLSU’s petition by canceling the assessment on the latter’s
loan transactions. Both the CIR and DLSU moved for reconsideration but the CTA
division still held DLSU liable for deficiency income tax. DLSU filed a petition for
review before the CTA En Banc arguing, among others, that he CTA Division erred in
finding that a portion of DLSU's rental income was not proved to have been used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
ISSUE: ​Whether DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes. –
YES.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 196596 and AFFIRM the December 10,
2010 decision and March 29, 2011 resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA
En Banc Case No. 622, except for the total amount of deficiency tax liabilities of De La
Salle University, Inc., which had been reduced.
We also DENY both the petition of De La Salle University, Inc. in G.R. No. 198841 and the
petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 198941 and thus AFFIRM
the June 8, 2011 decision and October 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc in CTA En Banc Case No. 671, with the MODIFICATION that the base for the
deficiency income tax and VAT for taxable year 2003 is ₱343,576.70.
RATIO:
1. Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the 1987 Constitution refers to two kinds of educational
institutions: (1) non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2) proprietary
educational institutions. DLSU falls under the first category.
2. The tax exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions is conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their assets,
revenues and income for educational purposes.
3. We find that unlike Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution (pertaining to
charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries), which exempts from tax only the assets, i.e., "all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes...," Article XIV, Section 4 (3) categorically states that "[a]ll
revenues and assets... used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."
4. Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the conduct of
business operations. It may refer to the sale of goods, rendition of services, or the
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return of an investment. Revenue is a component of the tax base in income tax, VAT
and local business tax (LBT). Assets, on the other hand, are the tangible and
intangible properties owned by a person or entity.
5. A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not
require that the revenues and income must have also been sourced from educational
activities or activities related to the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase
all revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long
as the revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes
and duties.
6. The tax exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions, unlike the exemption that may be availed of by proprietary educational
institutions, is not subject to limitations imposed by law.
7. Under the Tax Code, a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is classified as a
tax-exempt entity under Section 30 (Exemptions from Tax on Corporations) while a
proprietary educational institution is covered by Section 27 (Rates of Income Tax on
Domestic Corporations).
8. Consistent with Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, these limitations do not
apply to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions. Thus, we declare the last
paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code without force and effect for being contrary to
the Constitution insofar as it subjects to tax the income and revenues of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purpose.
9. For all these reasons, we hold that the income and revenues of DLSU proven to have
been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from
duties and taxes. (But the SC still held DLSU liable for the other taxes.)

SEPARATE OPINIONS: ​None

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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Philippine Coconut v. Republic (TAMAYO)
Jan. 24. 2012 | 663 SCRA 514 | J. Velasco
SUMMARY​:
In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which was to be sourced from a PhP
0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy, PhP 0.02 was
placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers
declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as having the
largest membership. Several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. The duty of collecting
and administering the funds was left to the Philippine Coconut Authority. PD 755
authorized the PCA to use the collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the
collections in the said bank. A part of the funds led to acquisition of the First United Bank
(FUB), later renamed UCPB, and a large block of SMC shares. The farmers’ UCPB
shares were originally registered in the name of PCA for the eventual free distribution
thereof to and registration in the individual names of the coconut farmers. The FUB was
the bank of choice which the Pedro Cojuangco group had control of. The plan was for
PCA to buy all of Cojuangco’s shares in FUB. However, the direct sale did not ensue as it
was made to appear that Cojuangco JR had the exclusive option to acquire the FUB’s
controlling interests. Two agreements stemmed from the acquisition of the commercial
bank. PCA was able to purchase for the coconut farmers the shares of stock for P200 per
share. But it was stated that Cojuangco Jr. shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%
of the 72.2%. After the EDSA Revolution, PCGG and it issued numerous orders of
sequestration, among which were those handed out, as earlier mentioned, against shares
of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the names of (a) more than a
million coconut farmers and (b) the CIIF companies, including the SMC shares held by
the CIIF companies. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64
(Republic v. COCOFED), 40 the Court declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public
funds. And purchased as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial
ownership thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according to the
Court, to the government.
DOCTRINE:
Section 29(3)
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.
The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof
should revert back to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as
a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.
FACTS:
1. In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to
administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which was to be sourced from a PhP
0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy, PhP 0.02 was
placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers
declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as having
the largest membership.
2. Several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund. The duty of collecting and administering
the funds was left to the Philippine Coconut Authority.
a. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF)
and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as a trust fund to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible
oil.
b. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance
the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm
c. PD 755​ Section 1. Declaration of National Policy.
i. a.) the State shall provide credit facilities to coconut farmers
ii. an “Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank” must be executed
iii. the PCA is authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it
acquired to the coconut farmers
d. P.D. No. 961​, as later amended by P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry
Code) stated that the [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as
herein authorized, shall not be construed … as special and/or fiduciary funds, or
as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation
of PD 711; … the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof
as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their private capacities.
3. PD 755 authorized the PCA to use the collections to acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the collections in the said bank. A part of the funds led to acquisition of the
First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB​, and a large block of SMC shares.
The farmers’ UCPB shares were originally registered in the name of PCA for the
eventual free distribution thereof to and registration in the individual names of the
coconut farmers.
4. The FUB was the bank of choice which the Pedro Cojuangco group had control of.
The plan was for PCA to buy all of Cojuangco’s shares in FUB. However, the direct
sale did not ensue as it was made to appear that Cojuangco JR had the exclusive
option to acquire the FUB’s controlling interests. Two agreements stemmed from the
acquisition of the commercial bank:
a. Agreement dated May 1975, entered into by and between Cojuangco, Jr., for
and in his behalf and in behalf of "certain other buyers," and Pedro Cojuangco,
purportedly accorded Cojuangco, Jr. the option to buy 72.2% of FUB’s
outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option shares," for brevity), at
PhP 200 per share.
b. Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the
Coconut Farmers of the Philippines​. It had PCA, for itself and for the benefit of
the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco, Jr. the shares of stock subject of
the First Agreement for PhP 200 per share. As additional consideration for PCA’s
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buy-out of what Cojuangco, Jr. would later claim to be his exclusive and personal
option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco, Jr. shall receive equity in
FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully paid shares.
5. PCA was able to purchase for the coconut farmers the shares of stock for P200 per
share. But it was stated that Cojuangco Jr. shall receive equity in FUB amounting to
10% of the 72.2%.
6. After the 1986 EDSA even, one of the priorities of then President Corazon C.
Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly
amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives. The Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) was created through E.O 1 and the PCGG issued
numerous orders of sequestration, among which were those handed out, as earlier
mentioned, against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in
the names of (a) more than a million coconut farmers and (b) the CIIF companies,
including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies.
7. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v. COCOFED),
40 the Court declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds. And purchased
as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial ownership thereon
and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according to the Court, to the
government.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the coconut levy funds are considered as public funds of the government-
YES
2. W/N there was undue delegation of legislative power-YES
3. W/N the doctrine of operative fact is applicable in this case-NO
RULING: ​THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF
STOCK TOTALING 33,133,266 SHARES AS OF 1983 TOGETHER WITH ALL
DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID AND ISSUED THEREON AS WELL AS ANY
INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF
PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
USED ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY, AND ORDERED RECONVEYED TO
THE GOVERNMENT. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1.W/N the coconut levy funds are considered as public funds of the government-
YES
The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for
public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of
stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
1. Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced
proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by
virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government. The
coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the following reasons:
a. The coconut funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on
the coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts.
b. PD No. 276, which created the Coconut Consumer[s] Stabilization Fund (CCSF),
mandated the levy on the coconut products.
c. PD No. 961 and PD No. 1468 stated that the PCA is empowered to impose and
collect a levy.
d. PD No. 276 stated that they were not voluntary payments or donations by the
people. They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions.
2. The funds were clearly imposed for a public purpose for they were collected to
advance the government’s policy of protecting the coconut industry. The industry is
one of the great economic pillars of our nation.
3. Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues, but also to provide means for the
rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with
public interest as to be within the police power of the State.
4. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is
still public in character. The coconut industry is one of the State’s concerns and acts
to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of the population, but
also of export earnings in the sustained growth of our economy.
Coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government.
5. The third Whereas clause of PD No. 276 treats them as special funds for a specific
public purpose. On the other hand, PD No. 1234 specifically declared the CCSF as
a special fund for a special purpose, which should be treated as a special account in
the National Treasury.
6. The proceeds from the coconut levy shall be deposited with the PNB, then a
government bank, or any other government bank under the account of the CCSF, as
a separate trust fund, which shall not form part of the government’s general fund.
The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance
thereof should revert back to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent
reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private
capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.
7. Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on
taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special
purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has
been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the
government.
8. Evidently, the CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer
purchases of coconut products. The provisions of P.D. No. 276 intended the fund
created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire
coconut industry.
9. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and
1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: “[the coconut levy] fund and
the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers
and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;” or the coconut levy fund shall
not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not
therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on; or the
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UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut
farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for which the CCSF was
established.
10. The challenged presidential issuances are unconstitutional for
a. decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers
and, therefore, negating the public purpose
b. reclassifying the coconut levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or
invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary
to the original purpose for which the fund was created.
c. removing the coconut levy fund away from public funds which normally can be
paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law.
11. Converting public funds into private assets was illegally allowed and mandated, by
these provisions. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
Constitution.
12. Therefore, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the
coconut levy fund – a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers, is
therefore void.
2.W/N there was undue delegation of legislative power-YES
1. Clearly, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute
to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full
disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any
conditions or restrictions that would advance the law’s national policy or public
purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Thus, when 51,200,806 shares in the bank remained undistributed, the PCA deemed
it proper to give a "bonanza" to coconut farmers who already got their bank shares,
by giving them an additional share for each share owned by them and by converting
their fractional shares into full shares. The rest of the shares were then transferred to
a private organization, the COCOFED, for distribution to those determined to be
"bona fide coconut farmers" who had "not received shares of stock of the Bank." ….
3. The PCA thus assumed, due to lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that
it had complete authority to define who are the coconut farmers and to decide as to
who among the coconut farmers shall be given the gift of bank shares; how many
shares shall be given to them, and what basis it shall use to determine the amount of
shares to be distributed for free to the coconut farmers. In other words, P.D. No. 755
fails the completeness test which renders it constitutionally infirm
4. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
5. In the instant case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. As
may be noted, the decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for
free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial
commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such
bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut
farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a
coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares
shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the
number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be
determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
3.W/N the doctrine of operative fact is applicable in this case-NO. The doctrine of
operative fact is not applicable in this case.
1. General Rule: An unconstitutional act is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it is inoperative as if not passed at all.
2. Exception: doctrine of operative fact, which nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact (Yap v. Thenamaris)
a. It is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden of those who relied on the invalid law
b. But the court will not apply the Operative Fact doctrine when it would be
iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified based on
an unconstitutional law
3. In this case, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB
shares.
4. The coco levy funds which were used to purchase the UCPB shares were public
funds. If the shares were to be distributed to private individuals (coconut farmers), it
would be violative of the principle that public funds are for public purpose.
5. Also, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended
beneficiaries of said benefit.
6. Applying the Operative Fact doctrine would serve injustice to the Government, to the
coconut industry, and to the people who contributed to the public funds, and therefore
expect that the Government would use them for public purpose.
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First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (REMOLLO, D.)

Mar. 10, 1994 | 237 SCRA 519 | J. Nocon
SUMMARY​:
This case revolves around the question where are appeals from decisions of the
Board of Investments (BOI) filed?
First Lepanto applied before the BOI to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles" which was approved. Mariwasa Manufacturing (Mariwasa) filed an MR with the
BOI – DENIED. Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA pursuant to Circular
1-91. Lepanto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the CA does not have
jurisdiction, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article 82 of the E.O. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. 226).
CA denied. Lepanto then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC,
alleging that the CA did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment. SC ruled that
pursuant to the grant in the Constitution allowing the SC to promulgate its rules, SC
issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals
from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Moreover Art. XII, Sec. 30 of the Consti. Says that “No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. As provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.” Therefore, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions
of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:​ Who has jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision of the BOI?
THE CA based on Circular 1-91.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED.
RATIO:
1. Presently, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present procedure
before this Court.
2. E.O. 226 was issued at a time where the executive department had power to issue
laws. BUT the Constitution provides that No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence.
3. The question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should
be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right
to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or
final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected.
Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to
respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen
(15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.
4. Therefore, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226
insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of
the BOI are concerned.

DOCTRINE:
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. As provided
in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence

FACTS:
1. First Lepanto applied before the Board of Investments (BOI) to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed
floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles" which was approved.
2. Mariwasa Manufacturing (Mariwasa) filed an MR with the BOI – DENIED. Mariwasa
then filed a petition for review with CA pursuant to Circular 1-91 (this was issued by
the SC),, which prescribed the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from
final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to
eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure
3. Lepanto filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction citing Article 82 of E.O. 226,
which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court. CA sided with Mariwasa and asked Lepanto to comment on
Mariwasa’s petition.
4. Lepanto did not want to comment and instead filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
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SBMA v. COMELEC (OCAMPO)
Sept. 26, 1996 | 262 SCRA 492 | J. Panganiban
SUMMARY:
Congress created the SEZ via a law which required certain municipalities to
express their concurrence if they wanted to join. Morong, one of the municipalities,
submitted a resolution approving their joining. Garcia and co. disagreed with the
resolution and asked for amendments concerning certain areas like “virgin forests”
and Grande Islands be returned to Bataan. ​Garcia wanted to exercise their
power of initiative provided for in the Constitution and LGC. ​COMELEC prepared
referendum. ​SBMA said that the issue was moot, ​referendum improper​, and
proposals were ​ultra vires​. ​SC said that issue was not moot since the earlier
case only concerned whether a resolution could be subject of initiative or
referendum. ​Referendum is improper, initiative is what is intended. Initiative is
when the people propose their own laws or legislation on their own
prerogative, referendum is when the legislators (Congress or LGU) asks
people if they approve or reject a law. ​In this case Garcia and friends disapprove
of a law so they want to pass their own, which makes in initiative. ​Ultra vires ​issue
is premature for SC to decide ​since they are just proposing laws and SC reviews
laws. There’s no law to review yet.
DOCTRINE:
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of
law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body.
FACTS:
1. Congress passed RA7227 creating the Subic Special Economic Zone (SEZ).
a. SEZ was basically all the areas where the US military bases were,
which would eventually be turned over to the PH.
b. RA7227 s12 provided that the LGUs of the municipalities would
have to submit a resolution if it agreed to be part of the SEZ.
2. The LGU of Morong submitted a resolution (PKB 10) pursuant to RA7227
expressing absolute concurrence with the move to be part of SEZ.
3. Garcia and co., residents of Morong and other affected areas, did not agree
completely with PKB10, and petitioned with the LGU of Morong to
change/annul it.
a. Among the things Garcia wanted was that the “virgin forests” and
Grande Island be given to Bataan and to reevaluate the division.
4. LGU of Morong submitted the proposed amendments to Congress.
5. Garcia was unsatisfied so they exercised their power of initiative under the
Local Government Code.
6. COMELEC eventually issued a resolution preparing for referendum.
7. SBMA opposed this saying that there was already a final judgment,
COMELEC made a mistake by preparing for referendum instead of initiative,
and the proposed amendments would result in a municipality amending
national law and is ​ultra vires​.
ISSUES:
1. WON there is res judicata? NO
2. WON referendum is the proper course of action? NO
3. WON it is time to rule if it’s ultra vires? NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is
REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceeding consistent with
the foregoing discussion. No costs.
RATIO:
1. NO. ​The only issue in the first case was whether or not a resolution can be
the subject of initiative and referendum. The reason this issue was brought
up was because the LGC only mentions ordinances, but that’s too narrow.
2. NO. Referendum is NOT proper in this case because Initiative is what is
called for. ​The two procedures are different. ​Initiative is how the people
can propose to amend the Constitution, enact national legislation, or
enact local laws independent of legislators. Referendum is when
Congress or LGUs ask people to vote “YES” or “NO” concerning
legislation.
a. One of the main differences is that ​initiative is initiated by the
people while referendum is initiated by the legislators. ​Another
difference is that ​initiative is the people passing, amending, or
modifying laws, while referendum is just asking for approval
or rejection. ​The distinction is important because COMELEC
would have to supervise initiative more closely. Care must be
exercised that no petition embracing more than one subject is
submitted, but alternatives may be submitted.
3. NO. ​While LGUs can only legislate local laws and cannot effect national
legislation that’s not an issue here yet. ​At this point they are only
proposing laws so it would be premature to shut them down by saying
it’s ​ultra vires​. COMELEC however if it sees that the people are proposing
beyond their capacity in an initiative can and should step in. SC also pointed
out that proposals concerning “virgin forests” and Grande Island are the
subject of national legislation and Garcia cannot just return them to Bataan
via local legislation.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC (SY)
Main Decision: March 19, 1997 | G.R. No. 127325 | 270 SCRA 106 | J. Davide, Jr.
SC En Banc Resolution on MR: June 10, 1997 | G.R. No. 127325 | 270 SCRA 106 |
En Banc (see p. 4 of this digest for the SC En Banc Resolution on MR)
SUMMARY: ​Atty. Jesus S. Delfin (Delfin) filed a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People s Initiative” (“Delfin
Petition”). Petitioners herein Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., joined by
intervenors, sought to prohibit the COMELEC from hearing the case. ​ISSUE 1:
W/N RA 6735 (long title: An Act Providing For A System Of Initiative And
Referendum And Appropriating Funds Therefor) (which is the implementing
legislation on the process “Initiative”) was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the Constitution – SC: YES. HOWEVER, the RA 6735 (the
implementing legislation) failed to comply with the “completeness” &
“sufficient standard” tests (see MR) ​to cover the system of initiative under the
Constitution. There were only a few provisions that mentioned the initiative on
amendment to the Constitution as opposed to the other national and local laws. No
rules were really set, which would have been necessary especially since this is the
Constitution. It actually necessitates more rigorous standards. It cannot be
consequently delegated to the COMELEC because a power cannot be delegated,
subject to certain exceptions. It must have been shown that the delegation itself
was valid, which was not the case at bar. ​ISSUE 2: W/N COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is valid. — SC: VOID. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under RA 6735. ​ISSUE 3: W/N COMELEC
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. — SC: NO. The petition was
not a proper initiatory petition because the 12% signature requirement was not
followed. ​ISSUE 4: W/N the instant petition is viable despite the pendency in
the COMELEC of the Delfin petition — SC: YES. The case was ripe for judicial
determination and Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of
transcendental importance.
As regards the MR decided by the SC en banc on June 10, 1997, with 13 SC
Members having taken part in the deliberations, and only 6 having voted to grant
the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be as they are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY, the arguments therein set forth not being sufficient
cogency to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decision of 19 March 1997.
DOCTRINE: ​R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
“empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
FACTS​:
1. This is a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
Defensor-Santiago, et al. The case the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative" hereafter, Delfin Petition
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order: (1) Fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of
said Order; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all regions of the
country to assist petitioners and volunteers is establishing signing stations.
3. The provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the Petition is a
copy of the proposed amendments, with the proposition of lifting the term limits of all
elective government officials.
4. According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters in the
country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
5. Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order (a) directing
Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, and the notice of hearing in 3 daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense"; and (b) setting the case for
hearing
6. Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
7. Petitioners filed this SCA for prohibition raising the following arguments:
a. The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed. In fact, there is a pending Senate Bill for this;
b. R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle initiative on the Constitution it is inadequate, unlike in the other
modes of initiative which had subtitles under RA 6735. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left
to some future law.
c. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
d. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ​ultra vires insofar as ​initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
e. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof.
f. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people s initiative; neither
the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has
realigned funds for the purpose.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
8. Private respondents commented on the petition by saying that, among other things:
a. RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution;
b. The pending Senate Bill is just a duplication of RA 6735;
c. The lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under
the 1987 Constitution is not a “revision” of the Constitution, but only an
“amendment”
d. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are
not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of law;
e. Section 9 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an
initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite;
f. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by: (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735,
which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
9. COMELEC, through the OSG, alleged the validity of the Delfin Petition.
10. DIK, MABINI, IBP and LABAN filed a Motion for Intervention, alleging the same
position as Defensor Santiago.
11. Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 were both valid but he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition. The said
petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic
Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
ISSUES:
1. W/N R.A. 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution –
YES RA 6735 was intended to include initiate on amendments to the
Constitution. BUT IT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
2. W/N the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is valid – ​NO
3. W/N the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition – ​NO
4. W/N it is proper for the SC to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC – ​YES
HELD:
1. YES, RA 6735 was intended to include initiate on amendments to the
Constitution. BUT IT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
12. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: “SEC. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.”
13. However, said provision is not self-executory, as observed from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Committee.
14. Private Respondents therefore assert that RA 6735 is the implementing legislation of
the said Constitutional mandate. We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history
reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
a. But a careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer to the question of
whether R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress
to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right”
15. First: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
a. Even though it mentions the “system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body...” it is considered as a
delayed afterthought.
b. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution.
16. Second: Although there are Sections defining “initiative on amendments to the
Constitution”, mentioning it as one of the 3 systems of initiative, and restating the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters who must submit
the proposal, it is still inadequate because the Act does NOT provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
a. Also, Section 5, paragraph c requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be. However, It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the “provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution.”
17. Third: While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (“Nat l.
I&R”) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (“Local I&R”), no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution.
18. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on only national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A.
No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order
of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
19. We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is subsumed under the subtitle on Nat l. I&R because it is national in scope.
20. Our reading of the Subtitles on Nat l. I&R and Local I&R leaves no room for doubt that
the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature
and character.
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga
21. It is “national initiative,” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law,
or a law which only Congress can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is proposed to be
adopted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of
autonomous regions or LGUs can pass.
22. There were no rules set as to the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. R.A.
No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system by merely paying it a
reluctant lip service. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi[judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
2. NO, COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 IS VOID.
23. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735.
24. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
3. NO, COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF OR ACQUIRING JURISDICTION
OVER THE DELFIN PETITION.
25. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein as prescribed by the
Constitution and RA 6735. Without the required signatures, the petition CANNOT be
deemed validly initiated.
4. THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE
COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
26. Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because
the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and a case that is ripe for judicial determination.
27. In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) GRANTING the instant
petition; (b) DECLARING R. A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation; (c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300
of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and (d) ORDERING the COMELEC to
forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, J.: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
28. Concurring: Delfin petition must be dismissed
29. Dissenting: It is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee that the
intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature
VITUG, J.: CONCURRING
30. The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional
imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to
the COMELEC.
FRANCISCO, J.: DISSENTING AND CONCURRING
31. Dissenting: Petitioners view of lack of subtitle in the law on initiative to amend the
constitution manifests selective interpretation of the law. The provisions of Republic
Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every
law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.
32. Concurring: COMELEC cannot take any action indicative of its having already
assumed jurisdiction over the Delfin petition. It is unaccompanied by the required
signatures, which burden they intended to shift to the COMELEC. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance
with the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
33. Concurring: Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no
government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.
34. Dissenting: While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority
openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it
contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. No law can
completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. ... I respectfully submit that
taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2 , R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people s power to amend the
Constitution.
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JUNE 10, 1997 SC EN BANC RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
35. “With 13 Members having taken part in the deliberations, and only six 6 having voted
to grant the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be as they are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY​, the arguments therein set forth not being sufficient
cogency to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decision of 19 March 1997.”
36. The separate opinions of Justices Davide, Puno, Francisco and Hermosisima are
attached [see next Section].
SEPARATE OPINIONS ON THE SC EN BANC RESOLUTION DENYING THE MR
WITH FINALITY
DAVIDE, JR, J. SEPARATE OPINION:
37. Contrary to the claim of the movants, these two issues do, in fact, raise the issue of
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735. At its core lays the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power and the exceptions thereto, both of which are fixed and invariable
subjects of constitutional law
38. What we said, in plain and simple language, was that R.A. No. 6735 failed to comply
with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests, hence Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 authorizing the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules could not cure the
infirmity. It is settled that the validity and enforceability of a delegation of rule-making
power hinges upon compliance with the aforementioned tests.
39. The plea then that we hearken to the intent of R.A. No. 6735 ..., or that we apply a
liberal construction to give life to an intent not so expressed in the statute as passed,
is but a ploy to tempt us to engage in judicial legislation.
40. We need only stress that the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. The exercise of the right
thereunder is dependent upon a valid implementing law.
43. I retain the view I have already expressed in my previous Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion in this case.
44. Private respondents’ proposal is a mere "amendment" and not a "revision" of the
constitution. A cursory reading of private respondents petition and its attached petition
for initiative in the 1987 Constitution filed with the Commission on Elections envisages
the alteration of some specific provisions of the constitution all relating to a single
subject.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
45. I reiterate my adherence to the position of the majority that the Delfin petition should
be dismissed on the ground that, failing to contain names and/or signatures of "at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein," the Delfin petition is fatally defective, being in violation of Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
46. I see now that there is an equally compelling and valid rationale which builds and
sustains the interpretation that R.A. No. 6735 is a substantial compliance on the part
of Congress. R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently laid down the necessary minimum standards
for a valid and complete statute treating of the matter of, among others, the initiative
proceedings to amend the Constitution.
(This digest is based on the A2015 digests)

PUNO, J.: SEPARATE OPINION

41. Consistent with my prior stand, I vote to partially grant the motions for reconsideration
that seek a modification of our decision holding that "R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution in concerned" and "declaring void those parts of
Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of the initiative or amendment to the Constitution."
42. There are 4 overriding concerns here: (1) The need to recognize the clear intent of
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 6735; (2) The need to comply with our traditional duty
to interpret R.A. No. 6735 to effectuate its intent. R.A. No. 6735 represents the
wisdom and the will of two co-equal branches of government — the Legislative and
the Executive; (3) The need to avoid the danger of overchecking the power of
Congress to make laws, which will put in peril the fundamental principle of separation
of powers. From time immemorial, courts have only invalidated laws that offend the
Constitution; and, (4) The need to enforce the new provision of the provision of the
Constitution giving our people a direct, participatory role in its amendment.

FRANCISCO, J. SEPARATE OPINION

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Lambino v. COMELEC (ANTE)
Oct. 25, 2006 | G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299 | J. Carpio
SUMMARY:​On Feb. 15, 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. Lambino filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under section 5(b) and ( c ) and Section 7 of R.A. No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed changes will shift the
present bicameral-presidential system to a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government. COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to
the SC’s ruling in Santiago v COMELEC and because there’s not a single word,
phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state the text of the proposed changes attached to it.
Hence, the initiative is invalid based on Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution, the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
DOCTRINE:First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential
elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such proposal in a
petition. The full text may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full test. An initiative that gathers
signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of
the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
gigantic fraud on the people. Thus the initiative violates Sec. 2, Art XVII of the
Const disallowing revision through initiatives.
FACTS:
1. On Feb. 15, 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution.
Lambino filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under section 5(b) and ( c ) and Section 7 of R.A. No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
2. The proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-presidential system to a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
3. Lambino Group claims that (a)their petition had the support of 6,326,952 individual
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
4. COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the SC’s ruling in
Santiago v COMELEC. Lambino Group elevated the matter to SC, which also threw
out the petition.
5. There’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state the text of the proposed
changes attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the sig sheet.
The omission is fatal according to SC.
ISSUE: W the initiative is valid. NO.
RULING: ​WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
RATIO:
1. Section 2, Article XVII of the Const. Is the governing provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this
provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text
of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution show that the essence of amendments directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. These means two essential elements must be present.
a. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
b. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in
a petition.
2. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such proposal in a petition. The full text may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full test. An initiative that gathers
signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of
the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
gigantic fraud on the people. Thus the initiative violates Sec. 2, Art XVII of the
Const disallowing revision through initiatives.
[Amendment or revision? Might be asked]
1. Any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
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 D2020 | Political Law Review | Dean Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga

2. An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts
or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress
specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous.
In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
J. Puno, dissenting:
1. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a
reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.
2. Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution
provides, and I quote:
a. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten ​per centum o ​ f the total number of
registered voters, or which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three ​per centum o​ f the registered voters thereof.
3. In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative
power, there are reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are
specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and
initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress
with the people.
4. Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII,
Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads,
and I quote:
5. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve ​per centum ​of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three ​per centum o ​ f the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
6. We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the
exercise by the people of the right of initiative and referendum.

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