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US v Ang Tang Ho GR L-17122, February 27, 1922

Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,
authorizing the governor-General “fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the
Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang
Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than
that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of
the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Issue: Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the
Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the
law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what
conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for
any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the
Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General

Philippines Today, Inc v NLRC, G.R. No. 112965 January 30, 1997

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc (PTI) is the owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of national and
international circulation, while the individual petitioners are officers and members of the board of directors of
PTI. On the other hand, Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr was employed by PTI as a senior investigative
reporter of the Philippine Star and later on became the chief investigative writer and to the publisher.
Respondent Alegre filed a request for a 30 day leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the
advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further medical consultations abroad. Four days later, he
wrote a "Memorandum for File" which includes the following statements:
“It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than the publisher himself,
to join him at the Philippines Today, Inc., and the STAR Group of Publications, I was unwittingly signing my own
death warrant as well. The insults he had later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had spread
around, casting doubts on my personal and professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul, causing
metaphysical death.”……
“By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society: ECONOMIC
INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.”…..
“When push comes to a shove . . . anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M HAVING IT ALL!”…..
“Thank you for everything. God bless.”
Respondent Alegre received a reply from Petitioner Belmonte, the chairman of the board stating therein
that the Board decided to accept the former’s resignation. Alegre thereafter wrote Belmonte expressing surprise
over the acceptance of his “resignation” because according to him no such move, however implicit it may be, and
no such letter has ever been made by him. As a result of the aforementioned facts, Alegre accused petitioners of
illegal dismissal.
Counsel for the petitioners on the other hand, explained that the acceptance of Alegre's resignation was
a collective decision of the board of directors since "nobody in his right mind would write a memorandum of the
sort he wrote and still not resign. To them, the memorandum was tantamount to a resignation even if Mr. Alegre
did not say so in so much words."
Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners, the labor arbiter dismissed said
complaint and held that while it be said that nothing therein mentions about resigning from his position as
Assistant to the Publisher, a perusal of the letter as a whole shows that the intention of the complainant was to
resign from his post.
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC adopting the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary of resignation as a "formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office," it held that the Respondent
did not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and operative resignation. The
NLRC further held that the Respondent was constructively dismissed without just cause because Alegre did not
intend to resign but the board interpreted it as tantamount to resignation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre addressed to Petitioner
Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation.

HELD:
After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a careful deliberation on the
peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions of
private respondent, the SC hold that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation.
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The SC said that there is merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are more in
accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly deduced from Alegre's
memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation
of what constitutes "resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the word without relating it to
the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise
of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal
interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and holistic view must be taken in order to render
a just and equitable judgment.
In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job at the pleasure of his
employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer. Corollarily, he
likewise must repose trust and confidence in his employer or, at the very least, his immediate superior. But any
superior hurled with invectives from a confidential employee, much more one occupying a managerial position at
the same time, will definitely lose trust and confidence in the latter. And there can be no way to interpret such
letter other than as a withering of trust and confidence by the employee in his boss. The use of offensive
language can only mean expression of disloyalty and disrespect. It renders the writer unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position. It is beyond human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust
in each other to continue to work together effectively, not to say, harmoniously.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID G.R. No. L-6355-56 August
31, 1953

Facts
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received
by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax,
payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately
after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General
reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.

Issue(s)
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members
of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No.
590 constitutional?

Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said
taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the court believes that this is
a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any
part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine laid
down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction
of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that
taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered “not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law”, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this
sense, the court is of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental
principles underlying the separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges
salaries, dissenting opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the
Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
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ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. Hence, court
affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges’ salaries.

People vs. Jabinal, February 27, 1974

Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license
or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had
appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and
carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the
cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by
the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the
court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim
“legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the
appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was
held not to be punishable.

_____________________
*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to
be “peace officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not
explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to
carry a firearm.

Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al. Nos. 24116-17 August 22, 1968

Facts:
1. The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland Cement Company (CPCC)
municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No. 21 on cement factories located in the
same municipality.
2. The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to the remedies provided
under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Treasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the
account.
3. The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo
cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the
Plant Manager did not agree with the letter but acknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same
day he was notified.
4. The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the Revised Administrative
Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest bidder. The proceeds thereof shall be utilized
in part of the satisfaction of the municipal license tax & penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga,
Cebu.
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5. The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale shall be on July 27, 1962.
However, no sale was held on the date specified & in the appealed decision, that there was a stipulation
by the parties where the auction took place on January 30, 1962.
WHO WHAT WHERE DECISION
Cebu Portland Petition (2 separate RTC Denied
Cement Company actions: Validity of
the distraint & the
sale at a public
auction of the bags
of cement)
Cebu Portland Motion for Supreme Court Denied
Cement Company Reconsideration

Issue
1. Whether the distraint was valid.
2. Whether the auction sale was valid

Decision
Decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto. With costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
1. CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal Treasurer did not lapse and
therefore, the distrain is invalid. This is not true. According to the Revised Administrative Code, ‘the
municipal treasurer may seize & distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any
property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question xxx”.
With this, the law gives an authority to the municipal treasurer to seize & distrain properties
regardless of the provisions or conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for application and
not for interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend the law.
2. The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the sale cannot take place ‘less
than 20 days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property xxx’. Since the first notification
for distrait was in July 6, 1961 & the sale was on January 30, 1962, the requisite for the notification
was more than complied with. The sale was only delayed due to the deferment made by the CPCC.
Even if the sale was made only in January 1962, the Treasurer informed the CPCC’s acting officer
that he would again advertise for the public sale of the said bags of cement. With this, the validity of
the date of the said auction sale cannot be contested.

University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs Auditor General

Facts:

Petitioner Cristino Jamias was a Professor of English Language and Literature and concurrently Head of the
University Publications Department. His service had been unquestionably continuous for more than fifteen years
before he reached the age of 65 years on July 20, 1961. Dean (now Regent) Tomas S. Fonacier of the U.P.
College of Arts and Sciences requests that Jamias' service be extended for one academic year for he had been
commissioned to write the history of U.P. but had just finished half of it.
The Auditor General held that the Board of Regents was without power to extend the services of U.P. professors
beyond the compulsory limit of 65 years. GSIS wrote Prof. Jamias that his services rendered after the
compulsory retirement age were illegal; and that he (Jamias) was not entitled to compensation. Then followed
the directive of U.P. Auditor Alfredo Liboro that Prof. Jamias' salary be withheld.

Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines (U.P.) may extend the tenure of a
professor beyond the retirement age by law fixed at 65 years.

Ruling:
No. As government employees, U.P. professors are compulsorily covered by the Retirement Law,
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, which creates a uniform retirement system for all members of the GSIS.
The applicable retirement law at the time Prof. Jamias reached retirement age of 65 years on July 20, 1961 was
Section 4 (a), Commonwealth Act 186

SEC. 4. Scope of application of System. — (a) Membership in the System shall be compulsory upon all regularly
and permanently appointed employees, xxx upon all teachers except only those who are substitutes xxx
It makes eminent sense to say that the deletion of the University of the Philippines from the exception cannot be
of de minimis effect (insignificant).
It may be said that in accordance with Republic Act 660, retirement was automatically compulsory at age 65 if
the employee had completed 15 years of service; except that upon specific approval by the President of the
Philippines, an employee might be allowed to continue to serve after the age of 65 years if he possessed special
qualifications and his services were needed. This power given to the President by Republic Act 660 was granted
also by Republic Act 728 to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. However, when Sec. 12(e) of Commonwealth Act 186 (as amended by RA
3096, the law here applicable) took effect on June 17, 1961, this grant of power to extend the service of an
employee beyond the age of 65 was eliminated. Such elimination operates to repeal the eliminated provision.
Retired employee may be retained in the government beyond 65 years of age finds support from Section 12(d)
of Commonwealth Act 186 (as amended by RA 3096)
(d) An employee separated from the service who is receiving an annuity shall not be eligible again to
appointment to any appointive position or employment under any 'employer' unless the appointing authority
determines that he is possessed of special qualifications and his medical examination has been approved by the
System, in which event he shall not be entitled to payments of his annuity during the period of his new
employment. Upon the termination of his new appointment, the payments of the annuity which were
discontinued shall be resumed.
To harmonize Section 12(d) with Section 12(e) — as it stood amended by Republic Act 3096 — is to hold that a
retired employee who is receiving annuity from the GSIS may be reappointed to the government service only if
he has not yet reached the age of 65 years. The prohibition in Section 12(e) against the extension of the service
of a retirable government employee where the conditions for automatic and compulsory retirement exist is so
patent and so clear that it will not admit of any other construction that would violate legislative intent.
But….
The unique and peculiar circumstances under which Prof. Jamias' services were sought, engaged and harnessed
anew, sufficiently justified a special contract of services up to April 15, 1962. This the Board of Regents had
authority to do, even as it had no power to extend his original term. The questioned resolution must be viewed
in this sense. He is thus entitled to payment of his salary up to the last named date.
Upon the view we take of this case —
-vote to grant the writ of prohibition prayed by the petitioners
-permanently enjoined from withholding the salary of petitioner Cristino Jamias corresponding to the extended
period of service from July 20, 1961 to April 15, 1962
-GSIS is hereby permanently enjoined from deducting any amount from petitioner Jamias' five-year retirement
annuity
(in short, bawal magextend ng tenure ang Board of Regents, but may compensation parin na mabibigay kay
Prof. Jamias kasi nakapagtrabaho na siya lagpas sa retirement date niya)

Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007

FACTS

 Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap
against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other
contractors were pre-qualified
 Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook
the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100%
completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
 DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s
license as contractor having expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License
Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void
and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that
payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the
District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was
likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the
contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
 CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%

ISSUE: WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
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RULING

A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him
from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a
bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of
contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use
an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain
meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear.
It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the
payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 453 SCRA 70 (March 8, 2005)

Facts:
Masada entered into a 1 year contract to provide security services to NFA-REGION 1. Upon the expiration of the
said contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under same terms and condition.
The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) issued wage orders mandating increases in the
daily wage rate. Masada requested NFA to increase the of the monthly contract rate1. NFA only granted the
request only with respect to the increase in daily wage. Respondent filed a case for recovery of sum of money
against NFA with the RTC.

NFA CONTENTION: Respondent cannot demand an adjustment on the said salary benefits because it is bound
by their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay only the increment in the daily wage.

Pre-trial Issue: WON respondent is entitled to recover from NFA wage related benefits of the security guards.

RTC Ruling: NFA is liable to pay the security guards’ wage related benefits pursuant to RA 6727, because the
basis of the computation of said benefits, like overtime pay, holiday pay, SSS and Pag-ibig premium, is the
increased minimum wage. It also found NFA liable for the consequential adjustments in administrative costs
and margin. NFA appealed to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed

ISSUE(Supreme Court): WON the liability of principals in service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and the
wage orders issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment in the minimum wage.

HELD/ RULING:

Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is ordinarily shouldered by the employer. Section 6 of RA
6727, however, expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or indirect employers in construction projects
and establishments providing security, janitorial and similar services.
The court found merit in NFA’s contention that its additional liability under the aforcited provision is
only limited to the payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage rate i.e. the rate for a
regular eight (8) hour work day.

Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in Section 6
pertains to the “statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to
pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay,
premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the
statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject
provision.

Moreover, the law secures the welfare of the workers by imposing a solidary liability on principals and the
service contractors. Under the second sentence of Section 6 of RA 6727, in the event that the principal or client
fails to pay the prescribed wage rates, the service contractor shall be held solidarily liable with the former.

1
Consisting of: (1)daily minimum wage of the security guards; (2) overtime pay; (3) holiday pay (4)13th month pay; (5) holiday and
rest day pay; (6) Social Security System [SSS]; (7) Pag-ibig premiums as well as administrative costs and margin.
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The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB
pursuant to RA 6727. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater liability than that mandated by Section 6
of the Act, its obligation is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage rates which, as
admitted by respondent, had already been satisfied by NFA. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, one of
the modes of extinguishing an obligation is by payment. Having discharged its obligation to
respondent, NFA no longer have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal right of
respondent. The latter’s complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the
increased minimum wage rate, should therefore be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 2004 decision and the April 30, 2004 resolution of
the Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner National Food Authority’s appeal and motion for
reconsideration, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76677, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondent MASADA Security Agency, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43988, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon, City, Branch 83, is ordered DISMISSED.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. American Express International, Inc. (PHILIPPINE

BRANCH), G.R.No. 152609. June 29, 2005

Facts: American Express international is a foreign corporation operating in the Philippines, it is a registered
taxpayer. On April 13, 1999, [respondent] filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess
input taxes in the amount of P3,751,067.04, which amount was arrived at after deducting from its total input
VAT paid of P3,763,060.43 its applied output VAT liabilities only for the third and fourth quarters of 1997
amounting to P5,193.66 and P6,799.43, respectively. The CTA ruled in favor of the herein respondent holding
that its services are subject to zero-rate pursuant to Section 108(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 and Section
4.102-2 (b)(2) of Revenue Regulations 5-96. The CA affirmed the decision of the CTA.

Issue: Whether or not the company is subject to zero-rate tax pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1997.

Held: Services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing,
manufacturing or repacking of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP, are
zero-rated. Respondent is a VAT-registered person that facilitates the collection and payment of receivables
belonging to its non-resident foreign client, for which it gets paid in acceptable foreign currency inwardly
remitted and accounted for in conformity with BSP rules and regulations. Certainly, the service it renders in the
Philippines is not in the same category as “processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods” and should,
therefore, be zero-rated. In reply to a query of respondent, the BIR opined in VAT Ruling No. 080-89 that the
income respondent earned from its parent company’s regional operating centers (ROCs) was automatically
zero-rated effective January 1, 1988. Service has been defined as “the art of doing something useful for a
person or company for a fee” or “useful labor or work rendered or to be rendered by one person to another.” For
facilitating in the Philippines the collection and payment of receivables belonging to its Hong Kong-based foreign
client, and getting paid for it in duly accounted acceptable foreign currency, respondent renders service falling
under the category of zero rating. Pursuant to the Tax Code, a VAT of zero percent should, therefore, be levied
upon the supply of that service.
As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax.
Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while
imports are taxed. VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP.” Thus, for the supply of
service to be zero-rated as an exception, the law merely requires that first, the service be performed in the
Philippines; second, the service fall under any of the However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the
destination principle; that is, for a zero percent categories in Section 102(b) of the Tax Code; and, third, it be
paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP rules and regulations. Indeed, these
three requirements for exemption from the destination principle are met by respondent. Its facilitation service is
performed in the Philippines. It falls under the second category found in Section 102(b) of the Tax Code,
because it is a service other than “processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods” as mentioned in the
provision. Undisputed is the fact that such service meets the statutory condition that it be paid in acceptable
foreign currency duly accounted for in accordance with BSP rules. Thus, it should be zero-rated.

(1) Facts:

Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of
AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in
the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the
1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated
sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes,
subject to the provisions of Section 112.”
 8

In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that, as a
VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly to the
Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
your service income is automatically zero rated xxx”
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as
they partake of the nature of tax exemption.
CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA affirmed this
decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the processing, manufacturing or
repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP.

Issue: W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund

Held: Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate:

(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines
which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other
service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when
paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated.
Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating.
As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the
tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated,
while imports are taxed.
In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of consumption
of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the consumption is not. The
services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has
gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under
the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT.
However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for services
that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance
with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and thus should be
zero-rated:
(1) Service be performed in the Philippines
(2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code
(3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

SENOVILLA VS. HERMOSISIMO 100 PHIL 501

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1956/dec1956/gr_l-10662_1956.html

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10662 December 14, 1956
ROQUE SENARILLOS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EPIFANIO HERMOSISIMA, ET. AL., respondents-appellants.
Antonio Abad Tormis for appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Upon petition of Roque Senarillos (appellee before us) and after due hearing, Judge M. M. Mejia of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (in Case no. R-4001), issued a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents Municipal
Mayor and Council of Sibonga, Cebu, to reinstate petitioner to the position of Chief of Police of Sibonga, Cebu,
declaring null and void his removal from that post, although the same was approved by the council and confirmed
by the Director of Civil Service and the Board of Civil Service Appeals; and required the respondents Municipal
Treasurer of Sibonga and Provincial Treasurer of Cebu to pay petitioner Senarillos his salary at P840.00 per
annum from January 3, 1952, and taxing costs against respondents Municipal Mayor and Council of Sibonga.
Respondents have appealed.
The parties are agreed that Roque Senarillos, being a civil service eligible, was appointed Chief of Police of
Sibonga, Cebu, and served as such until January 2, 1952. On that date, upon charges filed by one Roque
Geraldizo and despite his denials, Senarillos was suspended by the Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, and investigated
 9

by a "police committee" composed of three councilors, created by Resolution No. 2. Series 1952, of the municipal
council. Notwithstanding express protest on the part of Senarillos that the investigation should not be conducted
by a committee, but by full council, as provided by Republic Act 557. the committee proceeded to try his case,
and on April 15, 1952, rendered an adverse decision, signed later by the municipal council. This decision was
appealed to, and on August 28, 1952, was affirmed by, the Commissioner of civil Service, and later in October,
1954, by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.lawphil.net
In the meantime, upon the expiration of the original period of suspension, Municipal Mayor Hermosisimo again
suspended Senarillos on the strength of Administrative Case No. V-6, which was never tried; and as the sixty days
of the second suspension expired, the Chief of Police was reinstated on May 25, 1952. However, on July 9, 1952
the Municipal Mayor filed a criminal case for swindling against Senarillos, and suspended him for the third time.
The criminal case was dismissed on July 24, 1954. Then on April 27, 1955, Senarillos resorted to the Court of First
Instance for relief.
That the investigation of police officers under Republic Act No. 557 (as distinguished from section 2272 of the
Administrative Code) must be conducted by the council itself, and not by a mere committee thereof, is now
established jurisprudence and no longer open to question since our decision in Festejo vs. Mayor of Nabua, 96
Phil., 286; 51 Off. Gaz. p. 121, reaffirmed in subsequent decisions.
The second reason for invalidating the investigation is the fact that the charges were investigated by a committee
of the city council, not by the council itself. While it is true that we had held in Santos vs. Mendoza, 48 Off. Gaz.,
No. 11, p. 4801, that such a procedure is valid, the law has been changed since the above decision. Republic Act
No. 557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee of the council. We held that the
change meant that the investigation should be by the council itself (Festejo vs.Municipal Mayor of Nabua, G.R.
No. L-4983, prom. December 22, 1954). We affirmed this doctrine in the recent case of Covacha vs. Amante,
G.R. Nos. 8790-8797, August 14, 1956, 52 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p. 5109).
Therefore, it is clear that under the present law, the "police committee" constituted by the Municipal Council of
Sibonga had no jurisdiction to investigate the appellee Chief of Police; hence the decision against him was invalid,
even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors, specially since the petitioner called attention from the beginning
to the impropriety and illegality of the committee's actuations, and of his trial by only some and not all the
members of the council. The subsequent reaffirmation of their decision by the Civil Service authorities could not
validate a proceeding that was illegal and ab initio void.
That the decision of the Municipal Council of Sibonga was issued before the decision in Festejo vs. Mayor of
Nabua was rendered, would be, at the most, proof of good faith on the part of the police committee, but can not
sustain the validity of their action. It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon Republic Act
557 constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.lawphil.net
Respondents also claim that petitioner was guilty of laches, on the strength of Unabia vs. Mayor of Cebu, 99 Phil.,
258 and related decisions. Suffice it to observe that the persistent efforts of the appellee to secure from the Civil
Service authorities a reversal of the unlawful decisions of the Municipal Council of Sibonga, and the harassment
and prosecution to which he was subjected by the mayor, who suspended petitioner-appellee three times, are
more than adequate evidence that the appellee did not sleep on his rights or abandon his office. His appeal was
finally decided by the Civil Service on October of 1954, and this case was filed less than a year later, in April 1955.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the sole modification that the reimbursement of
petitioner-appellee's salary shall not include the pay corresponding to the period from May 26, to July 8, 1952,
since it was stipulated (p. 14) that he was paid for that time. Costs against respondents, Municipal Mayor and the
Council of Sibonga, Cebu. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, April 2, 2001

Doctrine:
• Case Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in which the Bureau of
Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of undocumented aliens, specifically those found guilty
of illegally entering the Philippines with the use of tampered and previously cancelled passports
• What is habeas corpus: Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another,
commanding the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place
Facts:
• Petitioner, Tung Chin Hui, a “Taiwanese National” arrived in the Philippines as a temporary visitor.
Days after his arrival, he was arrested and was turned over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID)
• Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his
detention was illegal, which was granted by the RTC and ordered his release.
• Prior to the decision of the CA, a petition for certiorari was raised by Petitioner to the SC, questioning
the late filing of the notice of appeal by the Respondents against the petition for habeas having been
done beyond the 48 hour reglementary period, thus the notice of appeal should have been
dismissed. The Court denied the petition since the reglementary period for ordinary appeal, which is
15 days, also applies to the filing of an appeal from a judgment regarding habeas corpus. Thus, the
issue regarding the reglemantary period has become final.
 10

• CA reversed the trial court decision, and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The CA held that
petitioner could not seek relief through habeas corpus since he was found guilty of violating Sec. 37
(a) Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, for allegedly holding a passport that had already been
cancelled and that its holder was not the real Tang Chin Hui.

Issue: Whether or not the confinement of Petitioner was legal

Held:
• Under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, those aliens who remain in the
Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition (in the present case being the condition of
presenting unexpired passports) shall be arrested.
• Such violation of 37(a) was properly charged and a deportation order was issued.
• Petitioners contentions that no evidence was presented showing him to be an undocumented alien is
unmeritorious. The return of the writ by the respondents, which shows Petitioner was lawfully
charged of violation the PIA, is considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint.
• In addition to the Return of Writ, attached to it were official letters of the Taiwan Economic and
Cultural Offices, which show that Petitioner was actually named Chen Kuan-Yuan, and was using a
passport already cancelled by the Taiwanese Government
• The Petitioners confinement being legal, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 171815 August 7, 2007

Facts:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) is a publicly listed company with two principal stockholders: Union Cement
Holdings Corp. (UCHC), a non-listed company with 60.61% shares, and Cemco Holdings, Inc. (Cemco) with
17.03%. Majority of UCHC’s stocks were owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. (BCI) with 21.31%;
Atlas Cement Corp. (ACC) with 29.69%; and Cemco with 9%.

BCI informed the Phil. Stock Exchange (PSE), thru a disclosure letter, that it and its subsidiary ACC had passed
resolutions to sell to Cemco BCI’s stocks in UCHC equivalent to BCI’s 21.31% and ACC’s 29.69% (total = 51%).

As a consequence of the disclosure, the PSE inquired to the SEC as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule
19 of the Implementing Rules of SRC is not applicable to the purchase by Cemco of the majority shares of UCC.

The SEC responded to the query that the Tender Offer Rule is not applicable, which was also confirmed by the
SEC En Banc in a Resolution/Letter dated July 27, 2004.

Aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company, which is the minority stockholder of
UCC sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the rule on mandatory tender offer, which was
however refused by Cemco.

Thus, a Share Purchase Agreement was executed by ACC and BCI as sellers, and Cemco as buyer.

Respondent National Life filed a complaint against Cembco, UCC, UCHC, BCI and ACC, with the SEC asking it to
reverse its Resolution/Letter dated July 27, 2004, and to declare the purchase agreement void, and further
prayed that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC shares. In their Comment, they uniformly
argued that the tender offer rule is applicable only to a direct acquisition of the shares of the listed company and
did not extend to an indirect acquisition arising from the , purchase of the shares of a holding company of the
listed firm.

SEC’s Ruling: in favor of respondent National Life and directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for
UCC shares to respondent National Life and other holders of UCC shares in accordance with Section 9(E), Rule
19 of SRC.

Cemco challenged the SEC’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint and its authority to require Cemco
to make a tender offer for UCC shares.

CA’s Ruling: SEC decision is affirmed

Issues:
1. Whether or not SEC has jurisdiction over the complaint and to require Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC
shares to respondents
2. Whether or not the rule on mandatory tender offer rule applies to indirect acquisition of shares in a listed
company
 11

Ruling:
1. YES, the SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended IRR of the SRC and Section 5.1(n) of the
SRC, which provides to wit:

13. Violation

If there shall be violation of this Rule by pursuing a purchase of equity shares of a public company at
threshold amounts without the required tender offer, the Commission, upon complaint, may nullify the said
acquisition and direct the holding of a tender offer. This shall be without prejudice to the imposition of other
sanctions under the Code.
5.1. The commission shall act with transparency and shall have the powers and functions provided by this
code, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the Corporation Code, the Investment Houses law, the Financing
Company Act and other existing laws. Pursuant thereto the Commission shall have, among others, the
following powers and functions:

Xx x

(n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied from, or
which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the Commission to
achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.

The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general adjudicative power which is implied from the
express powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to carry out, the
performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it. As a regulatory agency, it has incidental power to
conduct hearings and render decisions fixing the rights and obligations of the parties

Moreover, Cemco is barred from questioning the jurisdiction of SEC because it had participated in all
proceedings before the SEC and prayed for affirmative relief.

2. YES. The SEC and the Court of Appeals accurately pointed out that the coverage of the mandatory tender
offer rule covers not only direct acquisition but also indirect acquisition or “any type of acquisition”.

Under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8799, it is stated:

Tender Offers. 19.1. (a) Any person or group of persons acting in concert who intends to acquire at least
fifteen percent (15%) of any class of any equity security of a listed corporation or of any class of any equity
security of a corporation with assets of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) and having two hundred
(200) or more stockholders with at least one hundred (100) shares each or who intends to acquire at least
thirty percent (30%) of such equity over a period of twelve (12) months shall make a tender offer to
stockholders …..

Under the existing SEC Rules, the 15% and 30% threshold acquisition of shares under the foregoing provision
was increased to 35%, and further provided that the mandatory tender offer rule is still applicable even if the
acquisition is less than 35% when the purchase would result in ownership of over 51% of the total outstanding
equity shares of the public company.

AFFIRMED.

Notes:
Tender offer is a publicly announced intention by a person acting alone or in concert with other persons to
acquire equity securities of a public company. It is an offer by the acquiring person to stockholders of a public
company for them to tender their shares therein on the terms specified in the offer. It is in place to protect
minority shareholders against any scheme that dilutes the share value of their investments. It gives the minority
shareholders the chance to exit the company under reasonable terms, giving them the opportunity to sell their
shares at the same price as those of the majority shareholders.

A public company is defined as a corporation which is listed on an exchange, or a corporation with assets
exceeding P50,000,000.00 and with 200 or more stockholders, at least 200 of them holding not less than 100
shares of such company.

Rolando Canet v. Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004

I. The Facts:
 12

Petitioner Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Respondent Julieta Decena was
the Mayor. Canet was allowed to operate and maintain a Cockpit in Bula as per Resolution No. 049. In 1999, the
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 001, regulating the operation of cockpits and other related
game-fowl activities in Bula and providing penalties for any violation to its provisions which was denied by
Decena because it does not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting and other related game-fowl
activities and a separability clause. The Sangguniang Bayan resolved to shelf the Ordinance indefinitely.

Meanwhile, Canet filed an application for mayor's permit but was was denied by Decena on the ground that
under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan authorizing the same. Citing Resolution No. 049, allowing him to operate a cockpit, and local municipal
tax ordinances, which generally provides for the issuance of a mayor's permit for the operation of businesses,
Canet sued Decena and sought to be given permit.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business
permit to petitioner without a municipal ordinance that would empower her to do so.

III. The Ruling:

No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor's permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
Sec. 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on respondents
administrative prerogatives. Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit,
Resolution No. 049, authorizing Canet to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur
cannot be implemented. Also, the municipal tax ordinances relied upon by Canet contain general provisions for
the issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be pain
in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl activities. Even on the assumption that there is in fact a
legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details
thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by a judicial fiat.

CHAPTER 3 - AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

https://caseseverywhere.blogspot.com/2015/07/ebarle-vs-sucaldito.html
EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO

FACTS
The petitioner, Bienvenido Ebarle, is the then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for
election for the same position. He has been charged for the violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. RA No. 3019, and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code by the herein respondents.
The petitioner claims on his defense that the respondents failed to comply with the provisions of EO N.O. 264,
“Outlining the Procedure by Which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with
Commission of Irregularities Should Be Guided”, prior to their criminal recourses.

ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of EO No. 264 are applicable to the respondents.

HELD
No, EO No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The title speaks of
“commission of irregularities”. There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal offenses, that is to say,
crimes. Even though crimes amount to irregularities, the aforesaid Order could have very well referred to the
more specific term, had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.

https://pdfslide.net/documents/statcon-digest-2mw.html

Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

FACTS:

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for
reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions,
to enjoin further proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71,
5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of
prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies
 13

on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with
the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to their
criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to
administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses,"

that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order
could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself
applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules
and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public
officials. It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific
reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were
intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms
as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling
parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a
candidate for re-election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were
dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-
Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the
procedure how complainants charging the government officials and employees with the
commission of irregularities should be guided.

Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and

not to criminal complaints

Held: Petition dismissed

Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks of

commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to make it
applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms like “accused,”
“convicted,” and the like.

http://pinoycasedigest.blogspot.com/2012/08/people-of-philippines-v-purisima-case.html

People of the Philippines v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)

FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly
weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime,
viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy.

ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.

HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine
the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
 14

can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

https://lexphil.blogspot.com/2013/11/agcaoili-v-suguitan-gr-no-24806.html

Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis
Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and
emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili
received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should cease to be a justice because
he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to
which he asserted that he will not cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the
enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo
warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo
warranto

Held: No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216 provides “Nothing
herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be
commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought
against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right
to hold the office, arose.” The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence,
it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the court made is with
regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to public officials, the
sentence after the word “committed;” should not be treated as a separate thought from the preceding phrase.
In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.

http://lexaequitas.blogspot.com/2017/08/julio-agcaoili-vs-alberto-suguitan-case.html

JULIO AGCAOILI vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN, 48 Phil. 676 (1926)

Facts:
Julio Agcaoili is the judge of the Court of first instance of Province of Ilocos Norte. The petitioner protested the
actions of Under Secretary of Justice Luis P. Torres which relinquish him (petitioner) due to the petitioner’s over
age requirement pursuant to the Act No. 3107, which provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of 65 years.”

The petitioner patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest which he
presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having received any reply to his
protest, filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte on
the 23d day of April, 1925.

Issue:
Whether or not the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when applied to
justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041?

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3301

99 Phil. 253

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering respondents to reinstate petitioner as
foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal, Office of the City Engineer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day from the date of
his removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the most pertinent of which are as
follows: Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day
On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana,
and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was
transferred from the City Health Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, petitioner sought
to be reinstated but his petition was not headed by the respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that petitioner is a person in the
Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as
 15

amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and
section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution. The court further held that the notation at the bottom of petitioner's
appointment to the effect that his appointment is "temporary pending report from the Government Service
Insurance System as to the appointee's physical and medical examination" did not make his appointment merely
temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint, the names of the persons holding the
Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer, City Auditor and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they being designated only
by their official positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings and of the judgment. As said
persons were sued in their official capacity, it is sufficient that they be designated by their official positions.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words "Civil Service" in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the
Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words, "civil service," in section 670, Revised
Administrative Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the
above-mentioned sections of the Constitution. We see no validity in this argument. Capital "C" and "S" in the
words "Civil Service" were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar
provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference between the use of capitals in the former
and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the
benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil
Service; hence, the same rights and priviliges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are
so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not
true of those appointed to the classified service. This can not be a valid reason for denying previleges to the
former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void
and petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84
Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778)
There is, however, an, additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted by the
attorneys for the respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that as petitioner was removed on June
16, 1953 and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15 days, petitioner should no
longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having abandoned his office.
We can not or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to such
illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered
as having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to he reinstated. These defenses are valid defenses to an
action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899,
decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and
the following ruling therein contained:
"A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to take
steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the
order of removal * * * and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case of
unreasonable delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to recover
its emoluments." (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which may be deemed to
be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States, 11 months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office and of the
right to recover its emoluments. H6wever, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the
period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Proceedure (Act No. 190). We find this
provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which
they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There
are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons
claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may
be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The
following considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the
civil service:
"Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for
one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice
may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases. "And there is good
justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be
subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples' interest requires that such right should be
determined as speedily as practicable." (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.Gaz., 18], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an
office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so 1&at title Government may not be
faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office,
although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in
view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo
warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to
file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having
abandoned his office.
 16

One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the objection as to the delay in
filing the action is raised, for the first time in this Court, not having been raised in the court below. The above
circumstance (belated objection) would bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we consider
it to be essential to the petitioner's right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is essential: to
petitioner's cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the action.
"We would go farther by holding: that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the
existence of the cause, of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it
cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss." (Abeto vs.
Hodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a cause of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a defense (section 10,
Rule 9),
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as petitioner was dismissed on June 16, 1953 and did not file
his petition for mandamus for his reinstatement until July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year, he is deemed:
to have abandoned his right to his former position and is not entitled to reinstatement therein by mandamus.
Without costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B., and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
DISSENTING:
CONCEPCION, J.,
I dissent. Delay in bringing an action can have no more effect than that of prescription of action or laches. It
affects merely the "enforcement" of a right of action, not the existence thereof. The period of one year for the
commencement of the auction in quo warrantoproceedings is prescribed in the Rules of Court which would be
unconstitutional if the same should seek to affect the cause of action, for then they would impair substantive
rights.

https://lexphil.blogspot.com/2013/11/in-re-estate-of-johnson-gr-no-12767.html

In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918

Facts:

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in
the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of P231,800. The will was written
in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with
the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not
have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of
his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father’s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week publication of the
notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute concerned which
reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might
be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the
“state”, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because during
this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).

https://dokumen.tips/documents/people-vs-abilong-gr-no-l-1960-digest.html
EN BANC; [G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG,

defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947,

in the City of Manila, Philippines, Florentino
Abilong, the accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during
 17

which he should not enter any place within the

radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila for
attempted robbery, evaded the service of said
sentence by going beyond the limits made against
him and commit vagrancy.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penalty
on the accused under article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of
service of "destierro."

RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the
English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of
the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in
the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of
liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the
present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the
City of Manila. Under the case of People vs.
Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor
General that "it is clear that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
penalty when he enters the prohibited area."

http://thebattybarrister.blogspot.com/2018/02/estrada-v-sandiganbayan-case-digest.html

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or
a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the
offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 o

https://www.academia.edu/37159919/ESTRADA_vs._SANDIGANBAYAN_CASE_DIGEST

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST

Estrada vs. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding probable cause
thatpetitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense of
plunder, and that he beprosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The
petitioner contended that RA 7080 wasunconstitutional, on the grounds
that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, thusviolating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the
 18

terms it uses, particularly: combination, series and unwarranted. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial
challenge to question the validity of RA7080.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to
itsviolation of the right of the accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress toclassify it as such.

RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms sovague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the firstessential of due process of law.The over-breadth doctrine states that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of a possible
“chillingeffect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

ANALYSIS:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general terms or the
failure todefine the terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some
comprehensible guideas to what would render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner
cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of
imprecise language.

2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed
innocent until provenotherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
the guilt of the accused withproof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away
with proof of each and everycomponent of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every
criminal act done, it is enough that theprosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.

3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration in RA No.
7659 (whichhas been declared as constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is amalum in se.

CONCLUSION:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, isCONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

https://lawreviewhurjaelubag.wordpress.com/2017/01/30/estrada-v-sandiganbayan-g-r-no-14560-36-scra-394
-november-19-2001/

Facts:
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
Ruling:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
 19

as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080
1. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.
1. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger
socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to
dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself
in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of people it governs over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as
it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may be “saved”
by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,
the transcendent value of all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the persons making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terorrem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech
 20

http://victormorvis.blogspot.com/2014/04/celestial-nickel-mining-corporation-v.html

Celestial Nickel Mining Corporation v Macro-asia (Environmental Law)

G.R. No. 169080, December 19, 2007

FACTS:
On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and
Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to
September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke's Point,
Palawan.
Infanta's corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January 26, 1994 and
subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation, on November 6, 1995.
Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims
of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA)
of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR. The petition was docketed as DENR Case No.
97-01.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infanta's (now Macroasia)
mining lode claims.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia's lease contracts on the following grounds: (1) the nonpayment of
Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of
Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the
concentration of Macroasia on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of nickel ore
from Celestial's property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to commercial production; and (7)
the willingness of Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* POA: the POA found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically abandoned their areas/mining claims
but likewise had lost all their rights to the mining claims. The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the
following Mining Lease Contracts * MAB: affirmed POA. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its
work obligations from 1986 to 1991.
However, contrary to the findings of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that had prior and
preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial. In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial
could exercise the secondary priority and preferential rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults,
other qualified applicants could file.
(motion for reconsideration) Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated that it did not abandon its
mining claims, and even if mining was not listed among its purposes in its amended Articles of Incorporation, its
mining activities were acts that were only ultra vires but were ratified as a secondary purpose by its stockholders
in subsequent amendments of its Articles of Incorporation.
(special motion for reconsideration) Macroasia averred that the power and authority to grant, cancel, and revoke
mineral agreements is exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary. Macroasia further pointed out that in
arrogating upon itself such power, the POA whimsically and capriciously discarded the procedure on conferment
of mining rights laid down in Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and DENR
Administrative Order No. (AO) 96-40.
* MAB (on issue of jurisdiction): The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement
was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate
claims or contests during the MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already granted and
subsisting.

IRONIC DECISIONS OF THE CA

* CA (Celestial appeal): affirmed the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution which declared Macroasia's seven
mining lease contracts as subsisting; rejected Blue Ridge's claim for preferential right over said mining claims;
and upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral
agreements.
* CA (Blue Ridge's appeal): granted Blue Ridge's petition; reversed and set aside the November 26, 2004 and
July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB; and reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97
and 057-97. The Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasia's lease contracts; granted Blue Ridge prior and
preferential rights; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes,
which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE: who has authority and jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements under RA 7942 in relation to PD
463 and pertinent rules and regulations?

HELD: DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral
agreements based on the following reasons:
1. The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative
authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987;
 21

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that a. manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of
all mineral resources of the country; b. has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public
domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands; c. has the power to oversee, supervise,
and police our natural resources which include mineral resources.
Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987
is the power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
2. RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources.
To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations implementing PD 463 was issued. Sec. 44 of
the CMAO provides:

SEC. 44. Procedure for Cancellation.––Before any mining lease contract is cancelled for any cause enumerated
in Section 43 above, the mining lessee shall first be notified in writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given
an opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why the lease shall not be cancelled.
If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the former may warn the lessee,
suspend his operations or CANCEL THE LEASE CONTRACT (emphasis supplied).

Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463 and its implementing rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with the executive order, continue in force and effect.
When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was no provision on who could cancel mineral agreements.
However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and
DENR AO 96-40, not being contrary to any of the provisions in them, then it follows that Sec. 44 serves as basis
for the DENR Secretary's authority to cancel mineral agreements.
Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve mineral agreements or contracts and the
implied power to cancel said agreements.
3. Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or
recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or
approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.
Sec. 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau (MGB). e. To CANCEL OR TO RECOMMEND
CANCELLATION AFTER DUE PROCESS, MINING RIGHTS, mining applications and mining claims for
non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the authority to cancel mineral
agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB Director. As a matter of fact, the power to cancel
mining rights can even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to the MGB Director. Clearly, it is the Secretary,
not the POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral
agreements.
4. The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred
from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral
agreement/ FTAA.
As the MGB is under the supervision of the DENR Secretary, then the logical conclusion is that it is the DENR
Secretary who can cancel the mineral agreements and not the POA nor the MAB.
5. Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050
and MRD-52,[50] the cancellation of which they sought from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that
the parties are the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now DENR Secretary) as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. [which declares that the lessor can order
the lease cancelled)

RATIO: (1) RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on March 3, 1995, repealed the provisions of
PD 463 inconsistent with RA 7942. Unlike PD 463, where the application was filed with the Bureau of Mines
Director, the applications for mineral agreements are now required to be filed with the Regional Director as
provided by Sec. 29 of RA 7942. The proper filing gave the proponent the prior right to be approved by the
Secretary and thereafter to be submitted to the President. The President shall provide a list to Congress of every
approved mineral agreement within 30 days from its approval by the Secretary. Again, RA 7942 is silent on who
has authority to cancel the agreement.
Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by the Bureau of Mines Director whose decisions were
appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to the President, RA 7942 now provides for the creation of
quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the applications and
mineral agreements. Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay down the procedure, thus:
SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators.––There shall be a panel of arbitrators in the regional office of the Department
composed of three (3) members, two (2) of whom must be members of the Philippine Bar in good standing and
one [1] licensed mining engineer or a professional in a related field, and duly designated by the Secretary as
recommended by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director. Those designated as members of the panel shall
serve as such in addition to their work in the Department without receiving any additional compensation. As
much as practicable, said members shall come from the different bureaus of the Department in the region. The
presiding officer thereof shall be selected by the drawing of lots. His tenure as presiding officer shall be on a
yearly basis. The members of the panel shall perform their duties and obligations in hearing and deciding cases
until their designation is withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty (30) working days, after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
and decide on the following:
 22

(a) DISPUTES INVOLVING RIGHTS TO MINING AREAS;

[NOTE: The phrase “disputes involving rights to mining areas” refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition
to an APPLICATION FOR MINERAL AGREEMENTS. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional
Office of the MGB.
Clearly, POA's jurisdiction over “disputes involving rights to mining areas” has nothing to do with the cancellation
of existing mineral agreements.]

(b) DISPUTES INVOLVING MINERAL AGREEMENTS OR PERMITS;

[A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an area applied for by an applicant
based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is not a “dispute” involving a mineral agreement
under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another. The
applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral
agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area. He has no legal right to such
mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between the applicant and the parties to the mineral
agreement. The court rules therefore that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on the
breach thereof even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the
jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and not POA. Such petition is excluded from the coverage of the POA's
jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral agreements under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.]
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 78. Appellate Jurisdiction.—The decision or order of the panel of arbitrators may be appealed by the party
not satisfied thereto to the Mines Adjudication Board within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof which must
decide the case within thirty (30) days from submission thereof for decision.
SEC. 79. Mines Adjudication Board.—The Mines Adjudication Board shall be composed of three (3) members.
The Secretary shall be the chairman with the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the
Undersecretary for Operations of the Department as members thereof.
(2) SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.––The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the States mineral resources including
those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the public domain.

THE SECRETARY SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO MINERAL AGREEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE
GOVERNMENT UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR, promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act.
SEC. 29. Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.––x x x.
The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall give the proponent the prior right to areas covered by the
same. THE PROPOSED MINERAL AGREEMENT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY and copies thereof shall
be submitted to the President. Thereafter, the President shall provide a list to Congress of every approved
mineral agreement within thirty (30) days from its approval by the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied.)

OBITER DICTA:
(1) a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in the grant of a mining agreement.
It has not yet been transformed into a legal and vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR
Secretary. Even if Blue Ridge has a preferential right over the subject mining claims, it is still within the
competence and discretion of the DENR Secretary to grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems best to
pursue the mining claims over and above the preferential status given to Blue Ridge. Besides, being simply a
preferential right, it is ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting mining lease contracts of Macroasia.
http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2117

56 Phil. 483
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted by Arturo V. Escalante, who is in Bilibid Prison. On
November 14, 1928, he was convicted of estafa and sentenced to two years, eleven months, and eleven days
of presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P4,836.53, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. This penalty is the minimum of the maximum degree of the penalty
provided in article 634, paragraph No. 3, of the Penal Code then in force, that is, presidio correctional in the
minimum and medium degrees, i. e., six months and one day to four years and two months of presidio
correccional, because the amount abstracted exceeds 6,250 pesetas.
Estafa in that amount (P4,836.53) not exceeding P6,000 is punished in the Revised Penal Code, in force since
the first of this year (article 315, paragraph 3), with a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in the maximum
degree to prision correccional in the minimum degree, i. e., four months and one day to two years and four
months of imprisonment.
The Attorney-General, recommending that the petition be granted and the petitioner set at liberty, submits the
following computations:
"4. If the minimum of the maximum degree were to be imposed under the new Penal Code (it being the grade
imposed in the original decision of the Supreme Court), the computation of the total term which petitioner has to
serve is as follows:
 23

Year Month Day

"Minimum of the
1 8 1
maximum........................................................
"Subsidiary
6 20
imprisonment........................................................
2 2 21

"The petitioner was also sentenced to 2 months

and 16 days' imprisonment for a violation of
conditional
2 16
pardon .............................................................
"Total term to be
2 5 7
served......................................................
"This total term does not include allowances for good conduct.
"5. Petitioner entered Bilibid on January 17, 1929, and hence has already served more than three
years of imprisonment, which is more than the total term above computed.
"6. If, on the other hand, the maximum of the maximum were to be imposed under the new
Penal Code (section 315, paragraph 3), the petitioner would still be entitled to his discharge
because of allowances for good conduct which he can invoke in his favor, in accordance with the
records of the Bureau of Prisons. The computation of the penalty will then be as follows:
Year Month Day
"Maximum of the maximum............................................. 2 4
"Subsidiary imprisonment............................................... 9 10
"Sentence for violation of conditional pardon................. 2 16
"Total ............................................................ 3 3 26
"Good-conduct allowances to which entitled on
3 years, 1 month, 10 days................................ 5 26
"Net term to be served........................................... 2 10 .......
"So that petitioner should have been released at all events on November 16, 1931.
"7. In both cases, therefore, petitioner, having already served more than three years, is entitled
to be now discharged under the provisions of article 22 of the new Penal Code." (Pages 1, 2 and
3, Answer of the Attorney General, Rollo.)
Article 22 of the Revised-Penal Code, to which the Attorney-General refers, reads as follows:
"Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws, shall have a retroactive effect in so far as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at ^the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." With reference to the
application of prior laws, the Code provides the following:
"Art. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the
time of their commission."
Inasmuch as the law in this case is more favorable to the accused, and the latter has not been shown to be an
habitual criminal, article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code now in force must be applied to the estafa
of which the petitioner was convicted; and inasmuch as he has already served that penalty, he must be set at
liberty immediately.
Some light is thrown on the intention of the new law with reference to its being retroactive when favorable to
the accused, by the interpretation of its provisions by the chairman and a member of the committee created to
draft the present Revised Penal Code. Judge Anacleto Diaz, the chairman of the committee, says the following in
a communication addressed to Justice George A. Malcolm of this court:
"I was present when the proposed bill referred to was discussed in the Joint Committee as I had
been assigned to assist it in any way possible. I was also present when the bill as amended by the
Joint Committee was finally submitted and approved by the two Houses, and I can positively say
that the two articles were accepted and passed without any discussion whatsoever. In view of
this, I believe that the two articles referred to must be construed, taking into consideration not
only their literal meaning but the purpose in view of the law-making body that first approved art.
22 (art. 23, P. C. of Spain) as understood by the courts and the authorities called upon to
construe the same.
"There seems to be no doubt that the purpose of art. 366 is to give the benefit of the retroactivity
of a penal law as expressly and unmistakably stated in art. 22 to any person that may be found
under the circumstances therein provided."
Representative Quintin Paredes, member of the committee in charge of drafting the new Code, and also of the
Committee for the Revision of Codes of the Eighth Legislature, expresses himself as follows upon the point in a
communication likewise addressed to Justice Malcolm:
"In reply to your letter of the 26th instant, just received yesterday, I wish to inform you that I
believe the members of the House Committee on Revision of Codes which introduced and
recommended the bill that was later enacted as the 'Revised Penal Code' intended to give said
code retro-active effect in so far as it favors a person guilty of a felony, although at the time of its
 24

enactment a final sentence has already been pronounced and the convict is serving the same,
provided that he is not an habitual criminal. To emphasize this intention, section 366 providing
that 'felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of this code shall be punished in
accordance with the codes or acts in force at the time of their commission' was preceded by the
saving clause 'without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code/ which to
my mind means that while felonies and misdemeanors committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of the Revised Penal Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in
force at the time of their commission, the same should not be the case if such Code or Acts are
unfavorable to the guilty party, for the general principle on the retroactivity of favorable penal
laws, recognized in article 22, should then apply."
And lest it be doubted that article 22 of the Revised Penal Code applies to said Code, Representative Quintin
Paredes adds the following:
"The use of the words 'penal laws' in general, instead of 'this Revised Penal Code and any other
penal laws' in article 22, may give room for a doubt as to whether said article meant to include in
the phrase 'penal laws' the same Revised Penal Code that was establishing the provision. But this
doubt, I think, should not be entertained inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code is itself a penal law
and the phrase 'penal laws' is broad enough to include all laws that are penal in character."
As we have just held in the case of Laceste vs. Santos (page 472, ante), it is evident that the principle that penal
laws are retroactive so far as they favor the accused, is sanctioned by the present as well as the former Penal
Code.
The petition for habeas corpus being justified, it is hereby granted, and let the petitioner be at once set at
liberty, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villla-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

http://simplelawstudent.blogspot.com/2013/05/peope-v-manantan.html

Peope v. Manantan

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-14129_1962.php

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan
claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service,
shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of
Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and
justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in
the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.",
which includes all kinds of judges.

A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee.
Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace"
were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the
said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
 25

intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the
application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of
such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws.

Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its
encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because
they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

http://gabatovinson.blogspot.com/2016/08/commissioner-of-customs-vs-court-of-tax.html

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS. vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and JOSE PASCUAL. G.R. No. L-31733.
September 20, 1985.

FACTS:

Pascual is the registered owner of motor boat which was apprehended by the Navy for carrying untaxed blue
seal cigarettes.

For failure of anybody to claim ownership over the cigarettes, the same were forfeited in favor of the
Government.

During the forfeiture proceedings against the vessel, Pascual claimed that when he demanded the captain to
return the boat back to Manila, it failed, and the next notice to him about the boat was the apprehension of the
Navy. The captain, Joloc, claims that a friend asked him to load his fish for a fee and upon reaching his friend's
boat, he was forced by armed men to load the cigarettes.

The Collector of Customs decided to forfeit the boat in favor the government. The Collector ruled that since the
vessel was hired for a fee through its captain, to ferry the untaxed cigarettes, there was a contract of carriage
entered into between Joloc and the owner of the cigarettes thus Pascual is bound by the acts of his agent.

ISSUE: Whether the boat should be forfeited by the government.

RULING:

YES. Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code is violated in this case. Forfeiture proceedings are in the
nature of proceedings in rem and are directed against the res.

Even if Pascual had no actual knowledge that his boat was used illegally does not render the vessel immune
from forfeiture because the forfeiture proceedings in this case was instituted against the vessel itself. Such
defense is personal to him but cannot absolve the vessel from liability of forfeiture.

Moreover, the Section 2530 prescribes in an unequivocal term the imposition of the penalty of forfeiture in cases
of unlawful importation of foreign articles regardless of whether such importation occurred with or without the
knowledge of the owner of the vessel.

https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2012/08/15/dra-brigida-buenaseda-et-al-vs-sec-juan-flavier-et-al-g-r-no-1067
19-september-21-1993/

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993]

FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was
issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the
 26

private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme
Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in
his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no
direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government
official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions
have not been met in the instant case”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in
offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed
against said officials and employees.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official
or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the
word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges

https://thestudentandthelaw.wordpress.com/2016/07/24/republic-v-meralco-g-r-no-141314/
Republic v. MERALCO (G.R. No. 141314)

Facts:

MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average
increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should the
COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the
latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report
found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess
amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.

Issue: Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.

Ruling: YES.

The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and
statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When
private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only
and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation
may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same
is subject to public regulation.

In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates
while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not
give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return
on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility
upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services
rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests.

https://vdocuments.mx/san-miguel-vs-inciong.html
G.R. No. L-49774 February 24, 1981
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (CAGAYAN COCA-COLA PLANT), petitioner,
vs.
Hon. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor and CAGAYAN COCA-COLA FREE WORKERS
UNION,respondents.

Actions sought to be redressed:

 27

On January 3, 1977, Cagayan Coca-Cola Free

Workers Union, private respondent herein, filed a
complaint against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan
Coca-Cola Plant), petitioner herein, alleging failure or
refusal of the latter to include in the computation of
13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or
maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days
and special holidays, including pay for regular
holidays and night differentials.
The Regional Office No. 10 ruled in favor of the union
which ordered herein petitioner “to pay the
difference of whatever earnings and the amount
actually received as 13th month pay excluding
overtime premium and emergency cost of living
allowance.” The order of the Regional Office was
affirmed by herein public respondent Deputy
Minester Inciong in behalf of the Minister of Labor.

Issue:
Whether or not payments for sick, vacation or
maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days
and special holidays, including pay for regular
holidays and night differentials are included in the
computation of 13th-month pay under Presidential
Decree 851

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:

Public respondent's consistent stand on the matter
since the effectivity of Presidential Decree 851 is that
"payments for sick leave, vacation leave, and
maternity benefits, as well as salaries paid to
employees for work performed on rest days, special
and regular holidays are included in the computation
of the 13th-month pay.
On its part, private respondent cited innumerable past
rulings, opinions and decisions rendered by then Acting
Labor Secretary Amado G. Inciong to the effect that, "in
computing the mandatory bonus, the basis is the total
gross basic salary paid by the employer during the
calendar year. Such gross basic salary includes: (1)
regular salary or wage; (2) payments for sick, vacation
and maternity leaves; (3) premium for work performed
on rest days or holidays: (4) holiday pay for worked or
unworked regular holiday; and (5) emergency allowance
if given in the form of a wage adjustment."

CONTENTIONS OF HEREIN PETITIONER:

1.) Presidential Decree 851 speaks only of basic
salary as basis for the determination of the
13th-month pay;
2.) Submits that payments for sick, vacation, or
maternity leaves, night differential pay, as well
as premium paid for work performed on rest
days, special and regular holidays do not form
part of the basic salary;
3.) Concludes that the inclusion of those
payments in the computation of the 13th-
month pay is clearly not sanctioned by
Presidential Decree 851.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The Court finds petitioner's contention meritorious.
The Court cited the provisions of the law in dispute
which are Section 1 of Presidential Decree 851 and
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations.
Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing
rules, the basic salary of an employee is used as the
basis in the determination of his 13th-month pay
 28

Any compensations or remunerations which are

deemed NOT part of the basic pay is excluded as
basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.
Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations
are deemed not part of the basic salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted
pursuant to Presidential Decree 525
and Letter of Instructions No. 174;
b) Profit sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or
integrated as part of the regular basic
salary of tile employee at the time of
the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975

Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and

Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851
issued by the then Labor Secretary Blas
Ople, OVERTIME PAY, EARNINGS AND OTHER
REMUNERATIONS ARE EXCLUDED AS PART OF
THE BASIC SALARY AND IN THE COMPUTATION
OF THE 13TH-MONTH PAY.
The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances under
Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions No.
174, and profit sharing payments indicate the
intention to strip basic salary of other payments which
are properly considered as "fringe" benefits.
Likewise, the catch-all exclusionary phrase "all
allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the basic
salary" shows also the intention to strip basic
salary of any and all additions which may be in
the form of allowances or "fringe" benefits.
Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more
emphatic in declaring that earnings and other
remunerations which are not part of the basic salary
shall not be included in the computation of the 13th-
month pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior
Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all
remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an
employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and
more controlling Supplementary Rules and
Regulations which categorically, exclude from the
definition of basic salary earnings and other
remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A
cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that
what has hitherto been the subject of a broad
inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary rules and Regulations cure the
seeming tendency of the former rules to include all
remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary
The all-embracing phrase "earnings and other
renumeration" which are deemed not part of the basic
salary includes within its meaning payments for sick,
vacation, or maternity leaves. Maternity premium for
works performed on rest days and special holidays
pays for regular holidays and night differentials. As
such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and
shall not be considered in the computation of the
13th-month they, were not so excluded, it is hard to
find any "earnings and other remunerations"
expressly excluded in the computation of the 13th-
 29

month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would

prove to be Idle and with no purpose.
According to the Court, the conclusion finds basis in
Section 87 and Section 93 of the Labor Code.
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional
compensation other than and added to the regular
wage or basic salary, for reason of which such is
categorically excluded from the definition of basic
salary under the Supplementary Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851.
It is likewise clear that prernium for special holiday
which is at least 30% of the regular wage is an
additional compensation other than and added to the
regular wage or basic salary. For similar reason it
shall not be considered in the computation of the
13th- month pay.

http://littlemissfuturelawyer.blogspot.com/2011/08/taxation-case-digest-pldt-vs-city-of.html

Taxation Case Digest: PLDT vs City of Davao, et.al.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. (PLDT)
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO and ADELAIDA B. BARCELONA, in her capacity as City Treasurer of Davao

GR. No. 143867 March 25, 2003

____________________________
TAX EXEMPTIONS vs. TAX EXCLUSION; “IN LIEU OF ALL TAXES” PROVISION
____________________________

Facts:

PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The franchise tax was paid “in lieu of
all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to RA 7082. The exemption from “all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof” was subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC), which at the same time gave
local government units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income received or
earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1, 1992.

The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part provides: Notwithstanding
any exemption granted by law or other special laws, there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the
preceding calendar year based on the income receipts realized within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.

Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (Globe) and Smart
Information Technologies, Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained “in leiu of all taxes” provisos.

In 1995, it enacted RA 7925, or the Public Telecommunication Policy of the Philippines, Sec. 23 of which
provides that any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may
hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises. The law took effect on
March 16, 1995.
In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro exchange, it was required
to pay the local franchise tax which then had amounted to P3,681,985.72. PLDT challenged the power of
the city government to collect the local franchise tax and demanded a refund of what had been paid as a local
franchise tax for the year 1997 and for the first to the third quarters of 1998.

Issue:

Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23, PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from payment of the local
franchise tax in view of the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart.

Held:

Petitioner contends that because their existing franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes” clauses, the same grant of
tax exemption must be deemed to have become ipso facto part of its previously granted telecommunications
franchise. But the rule is that tax exemptions should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law
“expressed in a language too plain to be mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the charters of Globe and of
 30

Smart grant tax exemptions, then this runabout way of granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct, “clear
and unequivocal” way of communicating the legislative intent.

Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec. 23 of RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption from
regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). For instance, RA
7925, Sec. 17 provides: The Commission shall exempt any specific telecommunications service from its rate or
tariff regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and reasonable rates of tariffs. Another
exemption granted by the law in line with its policy of deregulationis the exemption from the requirement of
securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications company imports equipment.
Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too
plain to be mistaken.

http://hajbp.blogspot.com/2013/06/hilado-v-cir-100-phil-288_29.html

EMILIO Y. HILADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COURT
OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS; G.R. No. L-9408, October 31, 1956;
Bautista Angelo J

Facts:
On March 31, 1952, petitioner filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City wherein he
claimed, among other things, the amount of P12,837.65 as a deductible item from his gross income pursuant to
General Circular No. V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue. On the basis of said return, an
assessment notice demanding the payment of P9,419 was sent to petitioner, who paid the tax in monthly
installments, the last payment having been made on January 2, 1953.
Meanwhile, on August 30, 1952, the Secretary of Finance, through the Collector of Internal Revenue, issued
General Circular No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared void his general Circular No. V-123 but laid
down the rule that losses of property which occurred during the period of World War II from fires, storms,
shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible in the year of actual loss or
destruction of said property. The deduction was disallowed and the CIR demanded from him P3,546 as
deficiency income tax for said year. The petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied so he filed a
petition for review with the CTA. The SC affirmed the assessment made by the CIR. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: 1. Whether Hilado can claim compensation during the war; and
2. Whether the internal revenue laws can been enforced during the war

Ruling:
1. No. Assuming that said amount represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim which was not paid,
the same would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner, the last installment he
received from the War Damage Commission, together with the notice that no further payment would be made
on his claim, was in 1950. In the circumstance, said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950
gross income. In the second place, said amount cannot be considered as a "business asset" which can be
deducted as a loss in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable as a matter of right, but is
dependent merely upon the generosity and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of 1945, there
was absolutely no law under which petitioner could claim compensation for the destruction of his properties
during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the
payments of claims by the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its discretion to be exercised in the
manner it may see lit, but the non-payment of which cannot give rise to any enforceable right.
2. Yes. It is well known that our internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were continued
in force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation
government. As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period and income tax payment were
effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are deemed to be the laws of the occupied territory and
not of the occupying enemy.

http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2011/12/torts-and-damages-case-digest-abs-cbn-v_2316.html

ABS-CBN V. CA (1999), G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999

Lessons Applicable: Who may recover (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code

FACTS:
 Viva, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN through its vice-president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of 3 film
packages or 36 titles from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first refusal
 Mrs. Concio informed Vic through a letter that they can only purchase 10 titles to be schedules on
non-primetime slots because they were very adult themes which the ruling of the MTRCB advises to be aired
at 9:00 p.m
 31

 February 27, 1992: Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio with a list consisting of 52 original movie
titles as well as 104 re-runs proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights for P60M (P30M cash and P30M worth
of television spots)
 April 2, 1992: Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III met wherein Del Rosario
allegedly agreed to grant rights for 14 films for P30M
 April 06, 1992: Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-president for Finance discussed the
terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN
 April 07, 1992: Ms. Concio sent the proposal draft of 53 films for P35M which Viva's Board rejected since they
will not accept anything less than P60M
 April 29, 1992: Viva granted RBS exclusive grants for P60M
 RTC: Issued TRO against RBS in showing 14 films as filed by ABS-CBN.
 RBS also set up a cross-claim against VIVA
 RTC: ordered ABS-CBN to pay RBS P107,727 premium paid by RBS to the surety which issued their bond to
lift the injunction, P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for "Maging Sino Ka Man" in various
newspapers, P1M attorney's fees, P5M moral damages, P5M exemplary damages and costs. Cross-claim to
VIVA was dismissed.
 ABS-CBN appealed. VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed seeking moral and exemplary damages and
additional attorney's fees.
 CA: reduced the awards of moral damages to P2M, exemplary damages to P2M and attorney's fees to
P500,000. Denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was RBS and not VIVA which was actually
prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN

ISSUE:
1. W/N RBS is entitled to damages. -YES
2. W/N VIVA is entitled to damages. - NO
HELD: REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in favor of VIVA Productions, Inc.

1. YES.
 One is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of
the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be
awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise, It case of good faith, the
damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the
constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the
plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
 The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It
arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of cause of
action. Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on
actual damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
 In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the
bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, Clearly then, it was not
necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS
paid for the counterbond
 Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for lack of sufficient
legal basis.
 Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases
where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly
fall only under item (10) of Article 2219
 (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
 The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person
and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot,
therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. A corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set
aside, since RBS is a corporation.
 exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances in quasi-contracts, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner
 32

 It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code.
 There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. If damages result from a
person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1952/may1952/gr_l-4316_1952.html
G.R. No. L-4316 May 28, 1952
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, as Chairman
and Members, respectively; of the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO
GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as an interested party, respondents.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for petitioner.
Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg, Hon. Potenciano Pecson and Hon. Ramon R. San Jose in their own behalf. Antonio V.
Raquiza and Marcelino N. Sayo for respondent Antonio Guillermo.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Honorables
Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
to restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent
Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder in
G.R. No. L-2188. * The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly
ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of
amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted were committed "not in furtherance of the resistance
movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh
Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on
October 2, 1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. The respondents filed
answers independently of each other, and with the exception of Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose the
petition, alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio Guillermo from
invoking his right to the provisions of the amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the case
against him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and conclusive and is merely an obiter
dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation of the administrative orders implementing the President's
Amnesty Proclamation, the respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition.
The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio Guillermo was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte on September 16, 1946, and as amended information, on July 15, 1947. The Court
of First Instance rendered judgment on March 29, 1948. Thereupon, Guillermo presented an appeal to this Court,
and this Court rendered its judgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's Counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration, but this motion was denied on July 13, 1950. On June 20, 1950, even before his motion for
reconsideration was acted upon, respondent Guillermo filed a motion with this Court for the suspension of the
proceedings and the reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, but this motion was
denied by this Court on July 13, 1950. Antonio Guillermo filed his petition for amnesty for respondent Commission
on July 8, 1950. On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo were remanded to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the execution of the judgment, and on October 17, 1950, the
respondent Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to forward the records of
the case to it, and on November 9, 1950, it is set the case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General.
It was at this stage that this action of prohibition was filed in this Court.
The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the holding of this Court that the
respondent Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is
without any legal foundation, and must be dismissed. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not
upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects"
(Newman vs.Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39 citing United States ex rel.
Johnston vs. Clark County Court, 96 U.S. 211, 24 Ed. 628), or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle
which it is not required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15), or an opinion of the court which does not embody its
determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate
determinations of the judge himself (29 Words & Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in
G. R. No. L-2188 **against respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that the said
respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on
an issue expressly raised by the party appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case.
It is not an opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was not
unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and
of law directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately
entered by the Court after arguments on both sides had been heard. This Could not have avoided determining
the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision.
Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it can readily be seen that it had before
it evidence of the claim of amnesty expressly raised before the Court, and its ruling that appellant was not entitled
thereto.
 33

xxx xxx xxx

Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position appellant also contends that granting for
the sake of argument that the accused was the author of the crime, there is proof "that the ill-starred seven were
charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese.
The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant does not claim that he killed the seven
victims because he had proof and believe that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely says that they were
charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the Japanese.
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable. We are satisfied from the proofs that the
massacre in question was committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a
fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to hinder and not a further the resistance against the
Japanese enemy. It was a shame: and it would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize the memory of the
unfortunate victims of such lust for power of and supremacy as spies and traitors to their country, in the absence
of the competent proof as they really were. We spurn the baseless suggestion as rank injustice.
A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue before the corresponding guerrilla
amnesty commission in view of our ruling in the case of Viray vs. Crisologo, et al.*** G. R. No. L-2540, in which
we held that the fact that the defendant has declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the
beginning of his trial before a court martial does not preclude him from invoking it after he was found guilty and
convicted. The express holding of this Court is that case is as follows:
In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at
the beginning of his trial before the court martial does not now preclude him from invoking it, specially after he
was found guilty and convicted. Before his trial he may and he must have entertained the idea and the belief that
the killing was justified and was done in the performance of his duties as an official according to the criminal law,
and that consequently there was no need for amnesty. However, after the court martial had disagreed with him
and disabused him of his belief, he realized the necessity of invoking amnesty. There is nothing in the law that
stands in his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his opinion covers and obliterates the act of which
he had been found criminally responsible.
We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that case the defendant did not invoke the
benefits of the amnesty at the time of the trial or on appeal, and only did so after he had been adjudge guilty and
convicted, while in the case at bar he did so. It is true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead
amnesty, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the act charged against him as an
offense were disclosed at the trial, from which facts and circumstances he later predicated the issue, before this
Court, that he was entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo did not
expressly plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case. But the rules on the criminal procedure do not
include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule 113, Rule of Court.) Even without an express plea of amnesty,
a defendant may submit evidence that the commission of the act imputed to him falls within the provisions of the
amnesty proclamation, without a previous formal announcement of such a defense before or during the trial. And
even without such express plea, if the court finds that the case falls under the provisions of the amnesty
proclamation, it is the duty of the court to declare the fact, if the fact justify such a finding, and extend the
benefits of the amnesty to him.
. . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove that his case falls within the terms of this
amnesty. If the fact is legally proved, the trial judge shall so declare and this amnesty shall be immediately
affective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged. (Proclamation No. 8, September 7,
1946, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)
That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect is inferred from the claim of his
counsel in the case against him that "there is proof that the ill starred seven were charged with being spies for
the Japanese." Not only that, he expressly raised that issue in this Court on appeal. May he rise this issue again
before the guerrilla amnesty commission, and thus have this administrative body reverse or change the finding
of this Court?
Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no longer be permitted to do so in view of
"the general rule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and
conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed it has
been well said that this more maxim is more than a rule of law, more even than an important principle of public
policy; and that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society." (Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22
Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to make the ruling that respondent
Guillermo is not entitled to amnesty, that the guerrilla amnesty commissions are the first ones to pass upon
petitions for amnesty, that regular judicial tribunals can not rule upon such an issue (of amnesty) unless it has
first been resolved by a commission, and that these are not judicial tribunals but administrative bodies acting as
arms of the executive in carrying out the purposes of the amnesty proclamation, which is merely a form of
executive clemency. It is true that the grant of amnesty originates in an exclusive act. But the proclamation was
issued under expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10 (6)], was expressly sanctioned by the
Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946), and has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a
law. That the cognizance of applications for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty commissions are mere
screening bodies is not denied, but there is nothing in the proclamation to support the contention that the
authority to decide any claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions alone, to the exclusion of the
courts. Neither can it be denied that any one charged before the courts may claim as a defense, waive the filing
 34

of an application therefor, and submit evidence thereof in the trial of his case. In this latter case it would be a
cumbersome procedure, indeed, if said defense were first required to be submitted to commission for decision,
latter to be reviewed by a court. The only sensible interpretation of the law is that while all applications should be
passed upon by commissions, an accused may, instead of filing an application, choose the alternative remedy of
just raising the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And if this second alternative is chosen, the
applicant should be declared estopped from contesting the decision, as well as the authority of the court that
adversely passed upon his claim.
But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important, that attend respondent Guillermo's
petition for amnesty. He is not one filed during the pendency of this case in the Court of First Instance it is a
petition filed after final judgment of conviction in this Supreme Court. It does not appear in the record that during
the one and a half-year period (September 16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was being coursed and
tried in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, that he ever filed an application for amnesty. Neither does it
appear that the provincial fiscal has ever reported Guillermo's case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission for
Ilocos Norte, pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnesty proclamation. Nor did Guillermo ever claim amnesty
as his defense at the time of the trial. May we not justly infer from these positive circumstances that, during all
the time the case was pending and up to the filling of appellant's brief in the Supreme Court, amnesty was never
thought of as a defense, either by the accused himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying the case? As a
matter of fact, this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this Court of Appeal was a "last-ditch plea."
Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20, 1950, after this Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense
of amnesty, and before his motion for reconsideration was denied. We are therefore, constrained to hold that his
present petition is not entirely free from a reasonable suspicion as to its ends and purposes. It seems to us to be
a last desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction rendered
against him. Of course, no court of justice would countenance such ill-advised attempt.
The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Guillermo's application. We also find this
contention to be correct. Administrative Order No. 11, which creates the guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly
assigns to the Seventh "cases from the different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court."
(Emphasis ours.) Said administrative order was promulgated on October 2, 1946, on which date the criminal case
against respondent Guillermo was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. His case was a case
in the province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. Respondents cite
administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated December 1, 1948 to support their claim that
the Seventh has jurisdiction of the application, because of that date Guillermo's case was already pending in the
Supreme Court. This department order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of the appointments of new
Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different
commissions, which the President had already done. Besides, it can not be interpreted to modify the President's
administrative order apportioning the cases among the amnesty commissions.
In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the
benefits of amnesty, is not an obiter dictum but a pronouncement on a material issue, and is final and conclusive
against him and may not, under the principle of res judicata, be again raised in issue by him in any tribunal,
judicial or administrative; (2) that having voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the consideration of his
case, he is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse
ruling; (3) that this petition is an ill-advised attempt of doubtful good faith, to arrest or delay the execution of a
final judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the application for amnesty.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
November 24, 1950, made absolute, with costs against respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
86 Phil., 395.
**
86 Phil., 395.
***
85 Phil. 354.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY AUDITOR,
and the CITY ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day. On June
16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and later
by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred
 35

from the City Health Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but his petition was not heeded by the Respondents.

On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a person in the
Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as
amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 4 of Art XI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of capital in the words “Civil Service” in the Constitution and the use of small
letters for the “civil service” in the Revised Administrative Code indicates that the protection only pertains to the
classified service.

DECISION:

We see no validity in this argument. Capital “C” and “S” in the words “Civil Service” were used in the Constitution
to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see
no difference between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for
excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified
service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service;

Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so
designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true
of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former
that are granted the latter.

As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void
and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84
Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778)