SUCCESSION
Compilation of Cases
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
WILLS
10. Riera vs. Palmaroli
11. Seangio vs. Reyes
12. Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
13. Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez
14. Enriquez vs. Abadia
15. Jimenez vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 14851 September 13, 1919
ANTONIA RIERA Y BOTELLAS, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE PALMAROLI, Consul General for Spain, VICENTE
PALMAROLI, Administrator of the Estate of Juan Pons y Coll,
and the Honorable Pedro Concepcion, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, respondents.
Wolfson and Wolfson for petitioner.
Antonio V. Herrero for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition filed in the Supreme Court under
section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Antonio Riera
y Botellas, the purpose of which is to vacate an order of the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila admitting to
probate the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and to cause the
application for probate to be set for rehearing in the Court
of First Instance. The respondents having been required to
answer, the cause is now here heard on petition and
answer, no formal proof having been as yet submitted.
For the purpose of the solution of the questions arising in
this case, the facts may be taken to be as follows: Juan
Pons y Coll, a Spanish subject resident in the Philippine
Islands, died on April 16, 1918, in the city of Manila. The
petitioner is the widow of the deceased and was at the time
of her husband's death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the
Balearic Islands.
On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli,
Consul General for Spain in the Philippine Islands,
produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila
a document dated on March 16, 1918, purporting to be the
will of Juan Pons y Coll, and asked that it be admitted to
probate. Publication was accordingly made, and on May 20,
1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.
Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca
and the city of Manila and to the lack of adequate means of
communication between the two places — a difficulty then
greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European
War — the petitioner received no information of the probate
proceedings until after November 14, 1918. She had,
however, received information of the fact of her husband's
death on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an
attorney employed by her in Palma de Mallorca addressed
a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson, attorneys in the city of
Manila, requesting them to look after the interests of the
petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband. Said
communication was not received by the attorneys
mentioned until November 11, 1918, when promptly began
the investigations necessary to enable them to act in the
matter; and on November 29, 1918, they appeared in the
Court of First Instance in behalf of the petitioner and moved
that the order of probate of May 20, 1918, be set aside in
order to allow the petitioner to enter opposition. This
application was made under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and was denied by the Court of First
Instance on the ground that more than six months had
elapsed since the date of the order of probate and prior to
the filing of the motion.
The present application was thereupon made to the
Supreme Court on December 21, 1918, under section 513
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated.
The will to which reference has been made purports, for
reasons stated therein, to deprive the petitioner of
participation in the testator's estate — a step which the test
at or says he was authorized to take under the foral
regimen prevailing in the Balearic Islands. It is therefore,
apparent that the probate of the will was in fact prejudicial
to the petitioner, as alleged; and the petitioner claims that,
as a party interested in the estate, she is entitled to be
heard in the matter of the probate of the will, having been
prevented from appearing and contesting the original
application by circumstances over which she had no
control.
The order of the Court of First Instance of May 20, 1918,
against which relief is sought, is attacked by the petitioner
on grounds having relation chiefly to the formalities
incident to the execution of the will. In the first place it is
said that if the will be considered with reference to our
statutes generally applicable to wills, it is void for failure to
comply with the requirements of Act No. 2645 of the
Philippine Legislature. In this connection attention is
directed to the fact that the will is not signed on the left
margin of each page by the attesting witnesses and the
pages are not numbered as Act No. 2645 requires. In the
second place it is said that if the will in question be
considered as the will of a Spanish subject, provable under
the special provisions of section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, then it must be treated as void, for failure to
comply with various requirements — unnecessary to be
here stated in detail — of the Spanish laws in respect to the
manner of execution of wills. As will be at once apparent
from an examination of section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, if the will was in fact provable as the will of a
Spanish subject, under that section, and was admitted to
probate as such, compliance with the requirements of our
local laws relative to the execution of wills was not
necessary. In such case the provisions governing the
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execution of the will are to be sought in the laws of the
country of which the testator was a subject.
Another irregularity in the admission of the will in question
to probate, as stated in the petition, is that the document
produced in court and actually proved as the will of the
decedent was not the original but a copy certified by the
Spanish Consul General in this city from the records of his
own office, the will having been executed before him on
April 16, 1918, pursuant to authority contained in the
Treaty between the United States and Spain proclaimed on
April 20, 1903.
The question here presented in therefore this: Can a party
who is interested in the estate of a deceased person, and
who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from
opposing the probate of the will, obtain from the Supreme
Court, under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
order for a rehearing in the Court of First Instance, it being
alleged that she will was not executed with the formalities
required by law and hence was improperly admitted to
probate?
In the case of the Estate of Johnson (39 Phil. Rep., 156),we
held that a Court of First Instance has the power, under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside an
order admitting a will to probate and to grant a rehearing of
the application to admit the will, upon a showing from a
person interested in the estate to the effect that the order
of probate was erroneous and that the applicant had been
prevented by conditions over which he had no control from
appearing at the original hearing and opposing the probate
of the will. It was also suggested in Banco Español-Filipino
vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921) that the remedy conceded
in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
supplementary to that conceded in section 113 of the
same Code; and it was added that apart from these
remedies there is no other means recognized in our
procedure whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding
in the same cause, procure a judgment to be set aside with
a view to the renewal of the litigation.
We shall now proceed to consider somewhat more closely
the effect of the two sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
above cited, in relation to each other and with special
reference to the facts now before us. To this end it is
desirable to confront the text of the provisions in question:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative
from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect: Provided, That
application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after
such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
SEC. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court
of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto
is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, and the Court of
First Instance which rendered the judgment has
finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy
exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the
rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter,
setting forth the facts and praying to have such
judgment set aside. . . .
By comparing these two provisions it will be seen that the
operative equity which is contemplated as the basis of
relief is similar, if not identical, in both cases, inasmuch as
the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,
"contemplated in section 113, is substantially the same as
the "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence" of
section 513. It is true that fraud is not mentioned as
aground of relief in section 113; but as was indicated in
Mortera and Eceiza vs. West of Scotland Insurance Office,
Ltd. (36 Phil. Rep., 994), if a judgment is procured by
concealed fraudulent practices the party injured may
sometimes at least be relieved on the ground that there
was an excusable neglect on his part in failing to discover
and defeat such practice. With this prefatory observation
we proceed to consider the restrictions placed upon the
use of the remedy conceded in section 513.
The first point to which we direct our comment has
reference to the lack of an adequate remedy in the Court of
First Instance. It is expressly declared in section 513 that
the remedy granted thereby is available only in case "the
Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has
finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that
court." A moment's inspection of the entire section is
sufficient to show that the quoted words are not
homogeneous with the remainder of the section, and
moreover they are not well adjusted to the sense and effect
of section 113. The inference is plain that they were
inserted in section 513 probably by way of amendment and
by a person other than the original author. The person who
wrote these words evidently supposed that by the mere fact
of adjournment a Court of First Instance loses the power to
entertain an application for relief of the character here
contemplated. It is quite obvious, however, that the power
granted in section 113 continues for six months regardless
of the adjournment of the court. In our judicial system a
Court of First Instance exists in each province, and a clerk
is maintained at the place appointed for the holding of
court, whose duty it is to receive and file applications,
petitions, and complaints of all sorts. Consequently when
an application for relief against any judgment is properly
made under section 113, and filed in the court, the matter
is before the judge for action upon the convening of the
next session. The mere fact of adjournment cannot really
have the effect of shortening the period of six months
allowed in section 113. In many American jurisdictions,
however, the ending of the term of court terminates
absolutely the power of the court over its judgments. To a
person whose mind is imbued with this idea, the words
"When . . . the Court of First Instance which rendered the
judgment has finally adjourned" can only be understood as
referring loosely to cases where the Court of First Instance
has by the affluxion of time lost all power to set aside or
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modify its judgment; and this we consider to be its true
meaning. The consequence is that the remedy conceded in
section 513 is available, other conditions concurring,
whenever the Court of First Instance is powerless to grant
relief, without regard to the six months limitation fixed in
section 113. The sense of this construction may perhaps
be further elucidated by saying that the controlling idea is
the want of adequate remedy in the Court of First Instance;
and the reference to final adjournment in section 513 is to
be taken merely as explanatory of the want of remedy in
that court and not as embodying any absolute restriction
upon the remedy conceded in section 513.
It may be argued that the words "and the Court of First
Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court"
were intended to be applicable exclusively to the case
where the Court of First Instance might, if not already
adjourned, grant relief under section 113, but is prevented
from so doing solely by reason of the fact of adjournment.
This would seem at first blush to be the literal sense of the
words used, but it gives to the provision an application so
narrow as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator;
for under section 113 the power of the Court of First
Instance to grant relief is limited to applications made
within six months after entry of the judgment against which
relief is sought. If the meaning be as here suggested, the
relief grantable by the Supreme Court under section 513
would also be necessarily limited to applications made
within six months, or at most, within sixty days after the
expiration of six months, and then only when it should
appear that the lower court had finally adjourned before the
six months within which it could have granted relief had
expired. In this view the sole function served by section 513
is to make sure that a person may obtain relief in the
Supreme Court whenever the Court of First Instance had
adjourned before six months after judgment entered; and
no relief could be granted by the Supreme Court upon
applications made after the expiration of eight months from
the date of the judgment.
We consider this interpretation incorrect. It can hardly be
supposed that section 513 would have been incorporated
in the Code if the only idea was to enable a party having a
right to relief in the Court of First Instance under section
113 to direct his petition to the Supreme Court only when
the Court of First Instance has adjourned prior to the end of
six months after judgment entered. If such were the idea,
the provision in question is, as we have already seen,
superfluous. The real purpose of section 513 in our opinion
is to enable an injured party under the conditions stated to
apply to the Supreme Court without reference to the six
months limitation expressed in section 113; and the
expression "when the Court of First Instance . . . has finally
adjourned," as used in section 513, must not be
understood as referring exclusively to adjournment within
six months after judgment entered.
It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and
capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning
of the words used may be rejected if the result of adopting
such meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the
legislature had in view. It is declared in article 1281 of the
Civil Code that if the words of a contract appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties,
the intention shall prevail. This rule is there stated with
respect to the interpretation of contracts; but the same
idea may be accepted, though guardedly, as applicable in
the interpretation of statutes, and more especially those of
a remedial nature. Statutes of this kind are liberally
construed to promote the object which the legislature may
be supposed to have had in view.
From what has been said it will be seen that the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to entertain a petition of the
character of that now before us begins in point of time
when the period has passed within which it was competent
for the Court of First Instance to entertain an application
under section 113; and apart from the requirement that the
application must be made to the Supreme Court within two
months after the petitioner first learns of the rendition of
judgment against which relief is sought, there is no
absolute limit to the period within which the application
may be made. But of course if relief from a judgment is
sought by timely application in the Court of First Instance,
and the application is there denied, no petition based on
the same ground will thereafter be entertained in the
Supreme Court under section 513, as the proper remedy in
that case would be to appeal from the action of the Court of
First Instance. (Rabajante vs. Moir and Rances, 28 Phil.
Rep., 161.)
Proceeding now to a further comparison of sections 113
and 513, it is noteworthy that while the power of the Court
of First Instance to grant relief under section 113 extends
to the setting aside of any judgment, order or proceeding
whatever, the power of the Supreme Court under section
513 is limited to granting a new trial upon judgments
rendered upon default.
Now what is the meaning of "judgment rendered upon
default," as used in section 513? The reference is of course
to the default mentioned in section 128 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Simon vs. Castro and Castro, 6 Phil. Rep.,
335,337.) A default, such as is there intended, can only
arise in contentious litigation where a party who has been
impleaded as a defendant and served with process fails to
appear at the time required in the summons or to answer
at the time provided by the rules of the court. The
proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation in
any sense, because nobody is impleaded or served with
process. It is a special proceeding, and although notice of
the application is published, nobody is bound to appear
and no order for judgment by default, is ever entered. If the
application is not opposed, the court may allow the will on
the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only (sec.
631, Code Civ. Proc.), provided none of the reasons
specified in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
disallowing the will are found to exist. If any interested
person opposes the probate, the court hears the testimony
and allows or disallows the will accordingly. From such
judgment any interested person may appeal to the
3
Supreme Court within twenty days. (Sec. 781, Code Civ
Proc.) Though the action taken by a Court of First Instance
in thus allowing or disallowing a will is properly
denominated a judgment, it is not a judgment rendered
upon default even though no person appears to oppose the
probate.
It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section
513 can have no application to the order of May 20, 1918,
legalizing the will of Juan Pons y Coll; and this is necessarily
fatal to the petition before us. This consequence follows
regardless of any irregularities that may have occurred in
the Court of First Instance in admitting the will to probate
and regardless of any error which that court may have
committed in the action taken upon the proof submitted at
the hearing. It is not alleged that any fraud has been
attempted or committed, or that the document probated is
any other than a testamentary memorial in which the
decedent actually gave expression to his desires with
regard to the disposition of his property. But if fraud had
been charged — as, for instance, if it were alleged that the
purported will is forged document — the remedy, if any
exists, would not be found in a proceeding under section
513, but in an original action in the Court of First Instance.
It thus becomes unneccessary to inquire whether the will in
question was in fact executed in conformity with the
requirements of law — either of these Islands or of Spain.
As a result of this decision it cannot be denied that, without
any fault on the part of the petitioner or her attorneys, she
has been deprived not only of the opportunity of opposing
the will and appealing from the order of probate but also of
the opportunity of applying to the Court of First Instance for
relief under section 113. Even assuming that she could
have procured the disallowance of the will by either of
those methods — a point upon which no pronouncement
can here be made — it is obvious that the impossibility of
her thus obtaining relief was due to circumstances peculiar
to this case; and the possibility of occassional hardship
cannot affect the validity of our procedure for the probate
of wills (Estate of Johnson, supra.)
A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance
whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the
disposition of his property after his death. Out of
consideration for the important interests involved the
execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by
numerous safeguards, among which is the provisions that
after death of the testator his will may be judicially
established in court. The action of the court in admitting a
will to probate has all the effect of a judgment; and as such
is entitled to full faith and credit in other courts. The
proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to
be in the nature of a proceeding in rem,and upon this idea
the decree of probate is held binding on all persons in
interest, whether they appear to contest the probate or not.
The proceeding is not a contentious litigation; and though
the persons in interest are given an opportunity to appear
and reasonable precautions are taken for publicity, they are
not impleaded or required to answer.
As has been repeatedly stated in the decisions of this court,
the probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due
execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its
provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate
of Juan Pons y Coll, it should appear that any provision of
his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will
must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition
made by law must prevail. The petitioner is therefore free to
appear in the Court of First Instance at the proper juncture
and discuss the questions of the validity of such provisions
of the will as affect her interests adversely; and so far as
we can see, on the facts before us, this is her only
recourse. But if the will in question was in fact proved as
the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intrinsic validity of its provisions
must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to
this testator.
After the resolution embodied in the preceding opinion had
been adopted by the court, but before the decision had
been promulgated, the attorneys for the petitioner moved
that an order be entered for the submission of evidence
and that the clerk of this court be appointed commissioner
to take the same, upon designation by him of the time and
place therefor.
The step indicated would be proper if the facts stated in the
petition had been found sufficient to entitle the petitioner
to relief, but inasmuch as the petition is in our opinion
insufficient, the making of the order suggested becomes
unneccessary.
In this connection it may be well to estate that when a
petition for relief in the exercise of our original jurisdiction
is presented to this court, we are accustomed to consider
the case as being at all times before us for the purpose of
determining the legal sufficiency of the petition; and when it
is found at any stage of the proceeding that the allegations
of the complaint are insufficient to entitle the petitioner to
relief of any sort, it is our practice to enter an order upon
our own motion dismissing the petition. Where the defect
apparent in the petition is of a sort that might be cured by
amendment, the order of dismissal is made conditional
upon the failure of the petitioner to amend within a period
stated. On the other hand where the defect is manifestly
incurable it is proper to make the order of dismissal
absolute, and such appears to be the correct practice.
In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the
purpose of explaining the situation more clearly, permitted
ourselves to refer to at least one detail not stated in the
petition, as where we state that the will purports to
disinherit the petitioner. This fact, however, if not admitted,
is incontrovertible and apparent from the copy of the will
exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point that no
decisive influence on the decision. Our opinion therefore is
to be taken as an expression of our opinion upon the legal
sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon the statements
contained therein.
As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this
court to grant relief in the case before us is really due to the
4
fact that the remedy conceded in section 513 admitting
wills to probate. The defect from which the petition suffers
is therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be
aided by the taking of proof. The request for an order
allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied,
and judgment absolute will be entered dismissing the
petition with costs.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the
orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC),
dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of
preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo
C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter
of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng
Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of
the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to
manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the
event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–
93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should
take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because
testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon
ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe
rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at
siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni
Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga
may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng
kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng
anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si
Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo
Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995
sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
5
 Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No.
98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were
consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic
will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest
son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon
to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not
barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same,
and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when
on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate
court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic
validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the
intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir
or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being
omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is
concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to
do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when,
on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING
WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE
CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S
WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS
LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF,
THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES
PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL
THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH
INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING
THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively
mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
6
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place
to be published three weeks successively previous to the
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and,
b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees
and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no
preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on
its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were
preterited in the holographic will since there was no
institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the
holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically
valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate
case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render
nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was
presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by
him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as
regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons
that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be effected through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form
of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that
the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as
well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found
guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been
convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support
the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child
or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed,
by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a
dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not
be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the
limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one
who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present
case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is
7
convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot
be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes
that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless
the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should
have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10,
1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent
judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-
93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid
testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA
DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of
partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
counter-project of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a
widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named
Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except
Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February
2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren,
namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon,
Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of
all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two
small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household
furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of
P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development
Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and
by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament
of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate,
and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her
bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly
issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr.
Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed
commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He
filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same
was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12,
1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
8
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time
of her death thus had a total appraised value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (¹/7 of the
half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate
children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six
children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of
the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix
to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. .................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5,
1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a
basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas
(appellant) are admittedly considered to have
received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely,
Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the
properties respectively given them in the will, plus
cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the
other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the
properties that they received in the will less the
cash and/or properties necessary to complete the
prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of
the grandchildren remain
untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own
counter-project of partition dated February 14,
1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of
the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were
proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½)
of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half
(½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of
the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total
shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties
left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to
them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not
compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to
reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the
sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the
testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically
her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the
names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-
half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be
deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-
appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among
them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their
respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the
executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and
907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when
the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of
partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the
portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore
the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if
upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy,
which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil
Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain
heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as
aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest
beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the
oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to
meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a
practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last
wishes of the testatrix."
9
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-
appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the
following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in
the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to
the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to
reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus
their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept
payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of
some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the
proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the
avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul
of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included
the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof
that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred"
and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs.
Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as
of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the
intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears
that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither
these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their
own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by
these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the
appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix'
testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of
her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will,
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations
as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and
the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be
paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory
heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first
paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that
"(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his
estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to
their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard
for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the
testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be
fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall
be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they
may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-
appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential
to complete their respective legitimes of
P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas,
who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was
recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which
has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present
Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that
Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter
vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an
act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators
doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question
does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce
must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other
codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of
partition as approved by the lower court rather than the
counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-
10
appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary
disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half
and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the
disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the
estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory
heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a
distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix'
will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would
further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the
Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution
made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of
two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter,
Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory
heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of
the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to
a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in
the deceased's will which was being questioned by the
other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion
Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of
said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the
death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of
the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts.
657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could,
as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of
the proposed partition of the properties, especially when,
as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the
testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of
devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of
the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of
her real properties to the respective heirs. From this
erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs
passes to them by operation of law and that the testator
can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder
of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory
heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the
nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have
to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate
constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and
assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appear from the whole context of the will and the
disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated
use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to
convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the
free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore,
the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were
by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and
not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were
therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the
compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her
testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this
wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law
enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties
I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The
testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be
taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard
to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors'
own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article
912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-
appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with
the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee
who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does not exceed that of the
disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course,
the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and
of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of
the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that
"(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if
the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime
shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the
construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not
imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has
no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of
a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the
testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely
some properties by will which would call for the application
of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The
amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.
11
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by
oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise
necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code and this has been complied with in the approved
project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to
the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime
being completed with real properties of the estate instead
of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition.
The properties are not available for the purpose, as the
testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to
her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible
to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her
manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to
her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee.
The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed
by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was
approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and
hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none
is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or
that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing
value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the
testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or
justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the
testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof
must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every
subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and
properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record
that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of
her inheritance, which, per the parties'
manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the
adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of
either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that
she should receive in both projects of partition." The
payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments
in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-
impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last
will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and
sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors would receive their
cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received
them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the
project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value
was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the
present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed. Without cost.
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of
Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and
DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roerto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28,
1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on
February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven.
She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by
their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated
February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial
will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the
owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b)
that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land
which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it
was her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that
their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her
husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.
She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the
probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary
capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The
oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate
certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached
thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18,
1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of
the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate.
12
On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation
of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of
respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement,
which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that
their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended
that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr.
were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973
"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of
the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it
appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator
of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower
court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the
testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the
southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not
partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the
nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his
counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The
lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case.
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of
petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for
"leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of
Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña
claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also
of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will
which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected
a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be
converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion
of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to
creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose
B. Guyo, in their comments dated October 15, 1973
manifested their conformity with the motion for the
issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will
be declared void for being contrary to law and that an
intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña,
assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in
order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted
the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void.
So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the
petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for
hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not
abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973.
The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and
published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of
petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be
held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M.
Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked
for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had
no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of
the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated
March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by
Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob
and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated
Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of
the petition for the probate of the will was without their
consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him
that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the
motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the
motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it
declared the will void on the basis of its own independent
assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in
passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449.
Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December
26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April
30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1äwphï1.ñët
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of
February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting
the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 ,
it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the
will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil
13
Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and
others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be
separated from the invalid without defeating the intention
of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S.
873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern
half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because,
although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and
Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But
That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may
be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix
should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080
of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to
keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing
enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right
granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property
is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire
conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had
renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more
children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no
right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the
other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a
period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate
should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would
at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of
her death unless there are compelling reasons for
terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary
rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership
(Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights
and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1]
Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower
for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on
collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition
therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the
creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and
partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be
equitably divided among the children and the surviving
spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving
husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation
of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became
a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the
effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the
will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the
creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property
acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby,
as if the testator had it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or
devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to
him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to
the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes
his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and
her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the
manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that
she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal
estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to
her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra,
where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and
preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the
preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the
sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and
devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil
Code).1äwphï1.ñët
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving
spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover,
he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced
his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with
the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled
order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the
will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's
duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838,
Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967,
21 SCRA 428).
14
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence
of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that
the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is
incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs.
Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is
the first and principal law in the matter of testaments
(Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An
interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition
operative takes precedence over a construction that will
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy
especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided
and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079,
February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the
testator must be followed and the dispositions of the
properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs.
Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator
as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is
better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos,
L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred
in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or
regular administrator has been appointed. The record
reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to
creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has
been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in
providing that "immediately after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against
the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said
court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor
or regular administrator and not that of a special
administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed
to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such
claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1,
Rule 88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate
court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special
administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate
Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the
decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit
any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration,
the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a
strict accountability. A court employee should devote his
official time to his official duties and should not have as a
sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and
June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18,
1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is
affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further
proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with
this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND
SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B.
G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish
priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A".
Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943,
in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an
evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value.
On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no
will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other
two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which
the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator)
signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of
the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals,
and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the
last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the
said three witnesses signed their names on the last page
after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be
a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and
15
at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil
Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to
carry out the intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24,
1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are
appealing from that decision; and because only questions
of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to
us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article
810 thereof provides that a person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed.
It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was
executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died
in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law
at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution
of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not
folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin
by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two folios of the will
were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and
were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they
were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the
case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879,
referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to
sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the
testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two
folios or leaves; three pages having been written
on, the authenticity of all three of them should be
guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix
and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to
the same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question,
it appears that the left margins of the six pages of
the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto.
The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645
by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with
the testator at the left margin of each of the five
pages of the document alleged to be the will of
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an
obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we
apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows
holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were
invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower
court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly
provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made."
The above provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will
is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator,
the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his
estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case
of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome
doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator
should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted
to in order to carry out said intention, and that when
statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the
death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law
for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should
be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the
legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new
legal requirements of execution of wills which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution
then upon his death he should be regarded and declared
as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more
liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate
a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57
Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.
16
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and
TEODORA GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable
Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-
G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v.
Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties
and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-
appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of
this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of
Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel
of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay),
Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in
the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square
meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin
Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos
Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his
father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez.
After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land
was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos
Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal
shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case
Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued
on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate
daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the
property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436
square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto
Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a
contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the
former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the
latter, who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an
affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased
uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275
was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone
over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband,
instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern
portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters
occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint and holding the
defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of
the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay
to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as
damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent
Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court
of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in
toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of
five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego,
dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the
Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for
reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June
3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the
aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner
raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ,
IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ,
HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE
(EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS
MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE
(EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN
QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA
GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO,
ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-
23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE
APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES
PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring
that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia
Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and
therefore, had no right over the property in question.
Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove
that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument
that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of
Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia
Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos
Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally
transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the
property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263
of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with
or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by
other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . .
(Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso
portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original
Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit
"F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate
must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of
1889.
this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889
(which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez
died and which should be the governing law in so
far as the right to inherit from his estate was
concerned), a child must be either a child
legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an
acknowledged natural child — for illegitimate not
natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of
1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the
common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria
Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be
considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos
Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and
therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and
consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate
spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in
so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary
conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of
the litigated portion of the land could not even legally
transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who
accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to
herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can
immediately discern another error in the decision of the
respondent court, which is that the said court sustained
and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the
case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424,
January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the
Torrens System may not be acquired by
prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners. They merely claim to have
acquired by succession, their alleged title or
interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein
are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case,
concluded that respondents had acquired the property
under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such
conclusion, because there is one very marked and
important difference between the case at bar and that of
the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner
Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being
registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In
the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that
lands registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited
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case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was
respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-
interest would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos
Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of
land which includes the portion now in question, from
February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No.
50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land
covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the
title of the registered owner of the land covered by the
certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 531)
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act or the law which
established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the
Philippines is that the stability of the landholding system in
the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in
the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court
has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title
and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the
appellee to file an action to recover possession based on
its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and
June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.

Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property SO ORDERED.

remained good and continued to be good when she
segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A")
in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land
and which is the land in dispute was always covered by
a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount
of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever
defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that
the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action
to recover possession of the portion of the land in question
based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No.
82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under
the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong,
L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43
O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)

The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner

Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the
case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605),
held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right
to recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the
litigation.

In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no

absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank
injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs
of their rightful inheritance.

Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed

for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the
land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment.
Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-
indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership
with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia
Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or
other heirs.

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