CASE NAME FACTS
Salazar v.
Achacoso (1990).
Todd v. United Todd and others were indicted under a Revised
States (1895). Statue which provides that:
"If two or more persons in any state or territory
conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,
any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying
to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and
truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property, on account of his having so
attended or testified, . . . each of such persons shall
be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred
nor more than five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less
than six months nor more than six years, or by both
such fine and imprisonment."
U.S. v. Arceo Arceo entered Tiongson’s house around 8-9pm,
(1904) without the latter’s consent. He wounded Tiongson
using his bolo and took some money. The Court
found defendants guilty of entering the house of
another with violence and intimidation.
RATIO
ISSUE: whether a preliminary examination before a
commissioner is a proceeding "in any court of the United
States" within the meaning of section 5406. NO.
That a commissioner is not a judge of a court of the United
States within the constitutional sense is apparent and
conceded. He is simply an officer of the circuit court,
appointed and removable by that court.
A preliminary examination before him is not a proceeding in
the court which appointed him or in any court of the United
States. Such an examination may be had not merely before
a commissioner, but also before any justice or judge of the
United States, or before any chancellor, judge of a state
court, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other state
magistrate.
As a preliminary examination before a commissioner
cannot be considered a case pending in any court of the
United States, it follows that this indictment is fatally
defective, and charges no offense against the laws of the
United States.
See doctrine
DOCTRINE
A judge is a “public officer,
appointed to preside and to
administer the law in a court of
justice; the chief member of a
court, and charged with the control
of the proceedings and the decision
of questions of law and discretion”.
The inviolability of the home is one
of the most fundamental of all
individual rights declared and
recognized in the political codes of
civilized nations. No one can enter
into the home of another without
the consent of its owners or
occupants.
The privacy of the home- the place
of abode, the place where a man
with his family may dwell in peace
and enjoy the companionship of his
wife and children unmolested by
anyone, even the king, except in
rare cases- has always been

Microsoft In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the
Corporation v. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a
Maxicorp (2004) surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that
Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems)
were being produced and packaged within the
premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a
civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-
installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their
purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the
receipt was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant
before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as
witness. He also brought the computer unit they
bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled
with the object and documentary evidence they presented,
are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe
that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold
within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there. The fact that
the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in
Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the warrant
void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
regarded by civilized nations as one
of the most sacred personal rights
to which men are entitled. Both the
common and the civil law
guaranteed to man the right to
absolute protection to the privacy
of his home. The king was powerful;
he was clothed with majesty; his
will was the law, but, with few
exceptions, the humblest citizen or
subject might shut the door of his
humble cottage in the face of the
monarch and defend his intrusion
into that privacy which was
regarded as sacred as any of the
kingly prerogatives. The poorest
and most humble citizen or subject,
may, in his cottage, no matter how
frail or humble it is, bid defiance to
all the powers of the state; the
wind, the storm and the sunshine
alike may enter through its
weather-beaten parts, but the king
may not enter against its owner’s
will; none of his forces dare to cross
the threshold of even the humblest
tenement without its owner
consent
Probable cause is “concerned with
probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage,
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are
those of reasonably prudent man,
not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full blown trial
 added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that
the software in the computer unit bought by
Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge,
convinced that there is a probable cause for a case
of copyright infringement and unfair competition
committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding
warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the
warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision
it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not
in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the proceeding
in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
Qua Chee Gan v. The Court of First Instance denied the petition for
Deportation Board writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by
(1963) the petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang
charged petitioner before the Deportation Board.
The crimes:
•Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central
Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong
•Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of
arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951).
Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set
free.
determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it
was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s
findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his
name.
Issues: This requirement- to be determined
by a a judge- is not found in the
1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport Fourth Amendment of the US
aliens. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill,
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority or in the Jones Act, all of which do
to file warrants of arrest. not specify who will determine the
HELD: existence of probable cause. Hence,
1. YES under their provisions, any public
Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative officer may be authorized by the
Code – Deportation of subject to foreign power. — Asubject legislature to make such
of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be determination, and thereafter issue
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or the warrant.”
repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines EXCEPT UPON PRIOR INVESTIGATION,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such
case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge
or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than
these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses.”
* In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created
the Deportation Board to conduct investigations.
2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual
order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for
deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar,

Shadwick v. City of Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a
Tampa (1972) warrant issued by a clerk of the municipal court. He
moved the court to quash the warrant on the ground
that it was issued by a nonjudicial officer in violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. When
the motion was denied, he initiated proceedings in
the Florida courts by means of that State's writ of
common law certiorari.
Worldwide Web Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45
Corporation v. of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision and
People of the the Resolution of the CA reversing the quashal of the
Philippines (2014) search warrants previously issued by the RTC.
The applications for warrants to search the office
premises of petitioner WWC, and of petitioner
Planet Internet, alleged to be conducting illegal toll
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of PD No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or
Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and
prejudice of PLDT.
Petitioners also committed theft, because through
their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and
equipment and with clear intent to gain, they
illegally stole business and revenues that rightly
belong to PLDT.
Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and
intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in
investigations were still ongoing and no order for
deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of
1951: declared illegal
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways:
1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant
to Section 69 of the RAC
2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation
by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613
Crime was an act profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing
of US dollars.
City charter provision authorizing municipal court clerks to The issuing authority must meet
issue arrest warrants for breach of municipal two tests, namely; he must be
ordinances held to comport with requirements of the neutral and detached and he must
Fourth Amendment that warrants be issued by a neutral be capable of determining whether
and detached magistrate who must be capable of probably cause exists for the
determining whether probable cause exists for issuance of requested arrest or search.
the warrant. The clerks, though laymen, worked within the
judicial branch under supervision of municipal court judges,
and were qualified to make the determination whether
there is probable cause to believe that a municipal code
violation has occurred.
Is an application for a search warrant a criminal action? A general warrant is “(a) search or
The Supreme Court held that an application for a search arrest warrant that is not particular
warrant is not a criminal action. as to the person to be arrested or
As held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104879, 6 the property to be seized. It is one
May 1994, 232 SCRA 249), an application for a search that allows the seizure of one thing
warrant is a “special criminal process,” rather than a under a warrant describing another
criminal action. and gives the officer executing the
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, warrant the discretion over which
merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in items to take”.
our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of
the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed
to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is
in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
Is the conformity of the public prosecutor necessary to
question an order quashing search warrants?
NO. The Court has consistently recognized the right of
parties to question orders quashing those warrants.
bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment
of access and bypass charges in its favor while
“piggy-backing” on its multi-million dollar facilities
and infrastructure, thus stealing its business
revenues from international long distance calls.
Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of
Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting
the use of customs premises equipment (CPE)
without first securing type approval license from the
latter.
The RTC granted the application for search warrants.
Accordingly, the warrants were issued against the
office premises of petitioners, authorizing police
officers to seize various items.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15
central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even
personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and
broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet
Internet filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not
constitute theft;
(2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a
crime;
(3) the search warrants were general warrants; and
(4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were “fruits
of the poisonous tree.”
Accordingly, the Court sustained the CA’s ruling that the
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before
an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants.
May an order quashing a search warrant be the proper
subject of an appeal?
It depends. Where the search warrant is issued as an
incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still “something
more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.”
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and
issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the
order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process.
There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
In this case, the applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to
pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued
were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing
left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an
appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
What is a general warrant?
It is defined as “a search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to
be seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer
executing the warrant the discretion over which items to
take.
State the rule in describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized in a search warrant.
The search warrant must satisfy the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be seized
A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized
in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when
it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in
the description of the things to be seized when the things
described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection
 The RTC granted the motions to quash on the
ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants. Thus, the properties seized
under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was
denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of
the CA ruling which was subsequently denied.
Brinegar v. United Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court
States (1949) for a violation of the Liquor Enforcement Act of
1936, on charges of transporting intoxicating liquor
into Oklahoma contrary to the laws of that State. He
challenged the validity of his conviction because of
the use in evidence against him of liquor seized in a
search of his automobile without a warrant and
allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment. At
the hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress this
evidence, it appeared that one of the federal agents
who made the search and seizure had arrested
petitioner five months previously for illegally
transporting liquor; that he had twice seen
petitioner loading liquor into a car or truck in
Missouri, where the sale of liquor was legal, and that
he knew petitioner had a reputation for hauling
liquor. This officer, accompanied by another,
recognized petitioner and his car, which appeared to
be heavily loaded, going west in Oklahoma not far
from the Missouri line. They gave chase, overtook
petitioner, and forced his car to the side of the road.
Upon interrogation, petitioner admitted that he had
twelve cases of liquor in his car, whereupon the
officers searched the car, seized the liquor and
arrested petitioner.
U.S. v. Addison In the 23d of December, 1912, the appellant
between the items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services
and business. Prior to the application for the
search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that
they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers,
lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such
as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations.”
Held: Probable cause as the very name
1. The facts taking place before petitioner made the implies, deal with probabilities.
incriminating statements were sufficient to show probable These are not technical; they are
cause for the search, and the evidence seized was the factual and practical
admissible against petitioner at the trial. considerations of everyday life on
2. The officer's knowledge that petitioner was engaging in which reasonable and prudent men,
illicit liquor-running was not based wholly or largely on not legal technicians act”.
surmise or hearsay; the facts derived from his personal
observation were sufficient in themselves, without the
hearsay concerning general reputation, to sustain his
conclusion concerning the illegal character of petitioner's
operations.
3. It was not improper to admit as evidence on the issue of
probable cause the fact that the officer had arrested the
petitioner several months before for illegal transportation
of liquor, although the identical evidence was properly
excluded at the trial on the issue of guilt.
4. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable
caution that a crime is being committed.
Petitioner was convicted in the federal district court for a
violation of the Liquor Enforcement Act. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari.
Section 106 of General Orders No. 58 reads: "Any person It is defined as “such reasons,
(1914) subscribed and swore to an affidavit wherein he
stated that on or about the 20th of that month at
8.30 a. m. he saw various bottles containing
compounds of opium in an aparador situated in the
upstairs sala of the house of John McStay in Lucena,
Tayabas. On the same day the Court of First Instance
issued a search warrant, based upon that affidavit,
directing the sheriff to search the house of McStay
and seize the opium. In compliance with this warrant
the sheriff proceeded immediately to search the
house, but found nothing of a contraband nature,
and so reported to the court. Subsequent thereto,
and on the 3d day of January, 1913, John McStay
filed a sworn complaint (denuncia), charging the
appellant with the "crime of malicious prosecution"
and alleging that the appellant did, on the 23d day of
December, 1912, willfully and maliciously, with the
sole intent and purpose of gratifying his personal
resentment against the complainant, procure and
obtain, without any probable cause whatever, a
search warrant "of the person, residence, and place
of business of the undersigned, by signing and
swearing before the Honorable Herbert D. Gale,
judge of the Court of First Instance, certain
malicious, false, and defamatory statements, known
to be false and defamatory by said accused." On the
11th of April, 1913, the provincial fiscal filed a formal
complaint against the appellant charging him with
the same crime and setting forth the same
allegations as in the complainant’s denuncia. After
trial, the judgment above stated was duly entered.
People v. Sy Juco An agent of the BIR alleged that fraudulent books,
(1937) letters, and papers or records were being kept in the
building occupied by the defendant. After the
complainant made his affidavit, the judge issued the
questioned warrant commanding the peace officers
to search said building. Among the items seized was
an art mental filing cabinet claimed by the
petitioner-appellant to be his and to contain some
letters, documents, and papers belonging to his
clients.
who shall procure a search warrant maliciously and without supported by facts and
probable cause, and any officer who shall unlawfully exceed circumstances, as will warrant a
his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the cautious man in the belief that his
same, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than action, and the means taken in
one year or by a fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos, prosecuting it, are legally just and
or by both such fine and imprisonment."cra proper.”
virtua1aw librar
This section requires that both malice and absence of
probable cause must exist concurrently in order to justify a
conviction. If the appellant’s act in making the affidavit was
malicious and unfounded, but there was probable cause for
such act, he must be acquitted. "In a legal sense," says
Greenleaf (vol. 2, sec. 453, 16th Ed.) , "any unlawful act
done willfully and purposely to the injury of another, is, as
against that person, malicious." Malice cannot be inferred
from the fact that no opium was found in the house of the
complainant by the sheriff. Addison acquitted.
Whether the search and seizure is valid? NO Furthermore, it is “such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the
The affidavit did not state that the books, documents, or issuance of warrant, that are in
records referred therein are being used or are intended to themselves sufficient to induce a
be used in the commission of fraud against the cautious man to rely upon them
government. It assumes that the entire building is occupied and act in pursuance thereof.”
by the defendant against whom the warrant was exclusively
issued when the only ground upon which the assumption is
based on is a mere hearsay and when in fact part thereof
was occupied by the appellant. The search warrant did not
ask that the things belonging to the appellant and to others
also be searched. The warrant has gone beyond what had

Soliven v. Soliven broadcasted the statement that President
Makasiar (1988) Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The
President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't
be sued because the President was immune from
suit.
President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for
libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
Lim Sr. v. Judge Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his
Felix (1991) security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin at the airport vicinity in Masbate. Dante
Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
been applied for, and the agents who executed it
performed acts not authorized by the warrant. The search
warrant was unreasonable, it being evident that its purpose
was solely to fish evidence or search for it by exploration.
Search warrants have not been designed for such purpose.
ISSUES: What the Constitution underscores
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate is the exclusive and personal
criminal proceedings against the petitioners responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself to the existence of
HELD: probable cause. In satisfying himself
Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal of the existence of probable cause
proceedings. for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege personally examine the
of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of complainant and his witnesses.
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance Following established doctrine and
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of procedure, he shall: 1.) personally
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the evaluate the report and the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the of probable cause and, on the basis
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the or 2.) if on the basis thereof he finds
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in no probable cause, he may
which the President is complainant cannot raise the disregard the fiscal’s report and
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from require the submission of
proceeding against such accused. supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent to the existence of probable cause.
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the Sound policy dictates this
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice procedure, otherwise judges would
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely be unduly laden with the
the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be preliminary examination and
assumed and imposed by any other person. investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on the
hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts.
ISSUE: The prosecutor can do the
examination of the complainant
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by and witnesses. “However, there
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and should be a report and necessary
recommendation that a probable cause exists. documents supporting a fiscal’s
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, the court
issued an order finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of herein petitioners.
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of
the petitioners and recommended the amount of
P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each
of the accused. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C.
Alfane was designated to review the case containing
261 pages.
Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the
finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners
but differed in the designation of the crime in that
the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only
be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated
Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the
killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case
for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of
Dante Siblante."
MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied. Fiscal
Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
four (4) separate information of murder against the
twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no
bail. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed
with us a verified petition for change of venue and
was granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (from
Masbate to Makati RTC)
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by
respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners
questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest
because it was not personally determined by the
judge as he relied solely on the certification or
recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable
cause exists. RTC dismissed their petition upholding
the validity of the arrest warrants.
bare certification. All of these
HELD: should be before the judge.”
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by
the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to
make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of
the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable
cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever necessary.
He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when
the circumstances of the case so require.
Petition granted.
Borlongan Jr. v. Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery
Pena (2007) of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages
and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and
petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion
to dismiss, including several documents as evidence.
Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified.
He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with
the City Prosecutor.
The prosecutor found probable cause and the
Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of
arrest were issued for the petitioners / accused.
Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted
to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of
Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter
a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty”
for them. The accused questioned the validity of the
warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that
posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the
warrant of arrest despite posting bail? YES
HELD:
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail
constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is
true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after
posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she
waived her right to question the finding of probable cause
and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the
respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing
proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable
cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of
his conduct is possible. x x x.
As it now stands, the judge shall “1.)
personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable
cause, and on the basis thereof, he
may already make a personal
determination of the existence of
probable cause” or “2.) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists,
he may disregard the prosecutor’s
report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable
cause.”

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash,

Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise
expressly contained a stipulation that they were not
waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.
On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to
enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality
of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when
the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there
was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from
raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court.
The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be
deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.

Yao Sr. v. People Petitioners were officers and owners of Masagana, a ISSUE: The activity is mainly based on the
(2007) corporation engaged in the sale and distribution of Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of discretion of the judge, hence there
LPG. They were charged with violation of Intellectual corporate entity is applicable in the case. is no hard-and-fast rule in the
 Property Code because they used the containers of
Petron and Shell.
conduct of the examination.
RULING: However, it is necessary that the
The Supreme Court reiterated that it is a examination must be “probing and
fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation exhaustive and not merely
is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, routinary, general, peripheral,
directors or officers. However, when the notion of legal perfunctory, or performa”
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons or in the case of
two corporations merge them into one. Hence, in this case,
liability will attach personally or directly to the officers and
stockholders.
The findings of the Court show that petitioners, as
director/officers of Masagana were utilizing the corporation
in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell. As such, the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate entity applies.

Bache Co. v. Ruiz A search warrant may be said to

(1971) particularly describe the things to
be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow…
or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact- not of law- by
which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and
seizure…; or when the things
described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is
being issued…

People v. Rubio, Appellant’s house was searched on the strength of a
(1932) warrant issued to internal revenue agents and seized
from therein fraudulent books, invoices, and
records.
Whether the search warrant was illegal and void for failure In many cited cases, it is ruled that
to particularly describe the things to be seized? NO. technical description is not
necessary to issue a valid search
While the place to be searched and the property to be warrant
seized under a search warrant must be particularly
described in the warrant, yet the description is required to
be specific only in so far as the conditions will ordinarily
allow. By the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
Alvarez v. Court of The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
First Instance Board of the DOJ presented to respondent Judge an
(1937) affidavit that petitioner kept in his house books,
documents, and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money lender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the
law. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own personal knowledge of the facts. Upon
the affidavit in question, respondent judge issued
the warrant, ordering the search of petitioner’s
house as well as seizure of the books and documents
mentioned.
Whether there was a sufficient probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant?
The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by
reason of the manner in which the oath was made.
Therefore, the search warrant in question and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents, and other
papers are illegal. The warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who
had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Search warrant and seizure and the orders of the
respondent court authorizing the retention of the books
and documents declared illegal and are set aside.
thus “books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits, and other papers used
by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging
a usurious rate of interest, in
violation of the law” was held to be
a sufficient description. The Court in
validating the description ruled that
“no other more adequate and
detailed description could have
been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof”
and furthermore the “officer of the
law who executed the warrant was
thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles,
which he did.”

Jethro Intelligence In the case of Jethro and Yakult v. SOLE, the

& Security Corp. inspection and enforcement powers of the SOLE
and Yakult were put into play. In this case, Jethro and Yakult
Philippines v. entered into a security service agreement where the
Secretary of Labor former will provide security guard in the latter’s
and Employment premises. Garcia, one of the security guards
(2009) deployed by Jethro, filed a complaint with the DOLE
Regional Office for underpayment of wages,
legal/special holiday pay, premium pay for rest day,
13th month pay, and night shift differential. The
DOLE Regional Director conducted an inspection in
the premises and several violations were discovered
in the proceeding such as keeping of payrolls and
daily time records in the main office, underpayment
of wages, overtime pay and other benefits, and non-
registration with the DOLE as required under
Department Order No. 18-02. These violations
prompted the DOLE Regional Director to order
petitioners to pay the complainants for failure to
rectify their violations within the period imposed.
The petitioners filed an appeal, first with the
Secretary of Labor, later on with the Supreme Court.
The enforcement order was held valid.
Veridiano v. In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Issues: In many Supreme Court cases, it
People of the Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,[5] Veridiano was Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting was held that “there is no hard and
Philippines (2017) charged with the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being permitted or authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72
grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
During trial, the prosecution presented PO1
Guillermo Cabello (PO1 Cabello) and PO1 Daniel
Solano (PO1 Solano) to testify.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of
January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain
PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias
"Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was
on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to
PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara)
who were both on duty.
Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello
and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano
inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna.
The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was
caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in
his possession.
On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari
that "he was illegally arrested." fast rule in determining when a
He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is search and seizure is reasonable. In
"inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a any given situation, "[w]hat
poisonous tree.'" constitutes a reasonable ... search
Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to ... is purely a judicial question," the
comply with the rule on chain of custody. resolution of which depends upon
ith regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search the unique and distinct factual
conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued circumstances. This may involve an
that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the inquiry into "the purpose of the
search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless search or seizure, the presence or
search. absence of probable cause, the
Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived manner in which the search and
his right to question any irregularity that may have seizure was made, the place or
attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted thing searched, and the character of
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. the articles procured.”
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana Moreover, it was emphasized “a
leaves was seized in violation of his right against search incidental to a lawful arrest
unreasonable searches and seizures. requires that there must first be a
He asserts that his arrest was illegal. lawful arrest before a search is
Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
insufficient to constitute probable cause that would arrest must precede the search; the
support a valid warrantless arrest. process cannot be reversed. For
Hence, under Article III, Section 2,[51] in relation to Article there to be a lawful arrest, law
III, Section 3(2)[52] of the Constitution, the seized tea bag enforcers must be armed with a
containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] valid warrant.”
being the fruit of a poisonous tree."[53]
The following issues are for this Court's resolution:First,
whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;Second,
whether there was a valid warrantless search against
petitioner; andLastly, whether there is enough evidence to
sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in
flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not
exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law
enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip
they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to
support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be

People of the PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez
Philippines v. were on duty; a certain Edwin Lojera arrived at their
Calantiao (2014) office and asked for police assistance regarding a
shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears
that while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic
dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting
him to follow said vehicle until they reached along
8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City.
Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them
was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th
Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they
found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle,
two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns
towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3
Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1
Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag
containing two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from
Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then
turned over to SPO3 Pablo Temena, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for
investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the
bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his
initials, “NM”. Thereafter, said specimens were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical
analysis. The result of the examination conducted by
P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa revealed that the same
was positive for marijuana.
On Calantiao’s defense the taxi he and his
companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost
collided with another car. Reyes then opened the
window and made a “fuck you” sign against the
persons on board of that car. That prompted the
latter to chase them and when they were caught in a
committed.
ISSUE: The purpose of allowing a
warrantless search and seizure
Whether or not that the allegedly seized items are incident to a lawful arrest is to
inadmissible evidence in accordance to plain view doctrine. protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person
HELD: arrested, who might be armed with
a concealed weapon, and to
In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to prevent the latter from destroying
reiterate the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search evidence within reach. It is
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest therefore a reasonable exercise of
is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the State’s police power to protect
the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that (1) law enforcers from the injury
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his that may be inflicted on them by a
escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be person they have lawfully arrested;
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is and (2) evidence from being
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to to ensure the safety of the arresting
prevent its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful officers and the integrity of the
arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the evidence under the control and
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not within the reach of the arrestee.
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter’s reached. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means
the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested. In Valeroso, however, the Court held
that the evidence searched and seized from him could not
be used against him because they were discovered in a
room, different from where he was being detained, and
was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not
be considered as one within his immediate control that he
could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against
him. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black
bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the
bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s
 traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano; one of the persons
on board of that other car alighted and kicked their
taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano
slapped the latter and uttered some words, police
officer poked his gun against Reyes and when
Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao
and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought
to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected
to body frisking and their wallets and money were
taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents
and informed them that they will be charged for
drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown
to them and said police officer told them that it
would be sufficient evidence against them.
possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control. This is so because
“objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.” “The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It
serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be
a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. ”The Plain
View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s
situation because the police officers purposely searched
him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in
Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part
of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

Sanchez v. People Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11 of
of the Philippines Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu.
(2014) He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
SPO1 Elmer Amposta together with other CSUs
Hernandez, Tagle, and Monzon, acted on the
information that Jacinta Marciano was selling
drugs to tricycle drivers. They were dispatched to
Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite, to conduct an
operation.
While at the place, they waited for a tricycle going
to, and coming from the house of Jacinta. After a
few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying
Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The
group chased the tricycle. After catching up with
it, they requested Sanchez to alight. It was then
Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante
delicto hence a search warrant was no longer necessary?
It is observed that the Court of Appeals confused the
search incidental to a lawful arrest with stop-and-frisk
principle.
A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and
should not be confused with the search incidental to a
lawful arrest envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. The law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made, the process cannot be reveresed.
The arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach
The plain view doctrine, as
reiterated by the Supreme Court in
its various decisions, states that
“objects falling in the plain view of
an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain
view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the
law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of
the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer
 they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Sanchez if he could see the
contents of the match box which the latter agreed
to. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a
small transparent plastic sachet which contained a
white crystalline substance. Suspecting that it was
a regulated drug, the group accosted Sanchez and
the tricycle driver. They were brought to the
police station.
The forensic chemist from NBI found that the said
susbtance was shabu.
Ermita Malate On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila
Hotel and Motel passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following
Operators v. City provisions questioned for its violation of due
of Manila (1967) process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000
o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every
24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and
petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Philippine Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
Blooming Mills (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
Employees front of Malacañang to express their grievances
Organization v. against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
Philippine
Blooming Mills After learning about the planned mass
Co., Inc. (1973) demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called
for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During
the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that
for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any that the item he observes may be
money or property found which was used in the evidence of a crime, contraband or
commission of the crime. otherwise subject to seizure.”
As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is
a limited protective searcch of outer clothing for
weapons. Where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
apoliceman and makes reasonable inquiries, he is
entitled for the protection of himself.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process However, the Constitution also
requirement of the constitution? acknowledges hierarchy of rights.
The phrase “life, liberty, and
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to property” enunciates the hierarchy
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is of rights and the primacy of life and
no violation o constitutional due process for being liberty over property. While these
reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of three rights are being protected, if
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such liberty of the person is involved,
a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the “the standard for the validity of the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor governmental acts is much more
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity rigorous and exacting, but where
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises the liberty curtailed affects at the
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being most the rights of property, the
devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police permissible scope of regulatory
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is measure is wider.
dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of
lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
Issue: In curtailment of rights, a law that
restricts property rights is
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated sufficiently valid if there is a mere
the CBA? reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by
Held: the law and its object or purpose.
However, an infringement of
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, human right, such as liberty,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is requires the existence of a grave
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and and immediate danger of a
 the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers'
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for
petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal
course of their business which may result in the loss
of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of
the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs
if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may
be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and
regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No
Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and
the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Philippine Apparel In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976
Workers Union v. collective bargaining agreement, the Union
NLRC (1981) submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the
company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but
due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with
the Department of Labor praying that the parties be
assisted in concluding a collective agreement.
Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties
continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September
1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for
a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file
employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile,
on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" substantive evil, which the State
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their seeks to prevent. Such requirement
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of is more stringent. Given these
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," circumstances, there is a greater
permitting government regulation only "with narrow caution involved in deprivation of
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru life and liberty since it is a
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the foundational right in which all other
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of rights arose from. Such right can
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as only be restricted or limited if there
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil is a great and immediate danger.
and political institutions; and such priority "gives these On the other hand, in restricting the
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting right to property, the only
dubious intrusions." requirement is a valid connection
with the means or methods
employed and the objective or
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of purpose of the regulation. This is
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances because “always with the explicit or
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when implicit reminder that property has
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and social dimension and that the right
women by whom we shall be governed.” to property is weighted with a social
obligation.”
Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining The importance of labor as primary
the agreement falls under the exceptions. national interest was emphasized in
various court rulings. This is
Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into because the survival of a state and
on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force its people depends on work force.
and effect, although the increase on the first year was “The stability of the economy does
retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the records not depend on the employer alone,
that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid but on government economic
before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the policies concerning productive in all
exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules areas. It is the living wage of
implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected workers, which is the basis of a
contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was stable economy. If the company
no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion cannot pay a living wage, it has no
 enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for
an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance
ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase
was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the
company. The controversy arose when the
petitioner union sought the implementation of the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in
the collective bargaining agreement. The company
alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily
wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial
compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so
that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per
month, contending that that since there was already
a meeting of the minds between the parties as early
as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were
made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within
the exemption provided for in the Rules
Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other
hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD
1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the
negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against
the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued
by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and
referred the case to the parties to resolve their
disputes in accordance with the machinery
established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
From this order, both parties appealed to the
Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting
aside the order appealed from and entering a new
one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit,
relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor
that agreement between the parties was made 2
April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1
April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions
provided for in paragraph k of the rules
implementing PD 1123. The union filed for
reconsideration, but the Commission en banc
dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the
petition.
People v. Dela Ramos, an attorney of the Philippine Overseas and
expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It business operating at the expense
must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong of the lives of its workers.”
premise or representation on the part of the company. The
company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 As stated in one case, “The
April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for preservation of the lives of the
employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, citizens is a basic duty of the
among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting State...”
the fact that negotiations were still being held on other
unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items
(which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the
word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123,
and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123
should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement
between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is
no distinction between interpretation and explaining the
extent and scope of the law; because where one explains
the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus,
the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is
not only wrong as it was purely based on a
misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes
beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set
aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the
company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance
provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of
P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage
increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
to all covered employees; with costs against the company.
Piedra (2001). Employment Agency (POEA) received a tip from an
unidentified person that a certain Carol Dela Piedra
was doing illegal recruitment activities. Based on this
tip, the POEA enforcers conducted an entrapment
operation with one of them, Eileen Fermindoza,
posed as a job applicant. Prior to the entrapment
operation, the POEA enforcers first conducted
surveillance around the area where they interviewed
two job applicants. The next day, the entrapment
operation was commenced. Fermindoza entered the
house of the accused and filled out a job application
form. There were other job applicants inside the
premises where the recruitment was being
conducted. Three of these applicants also submitted
their application forms. Fermindoza then raised her
hand, a signal for the raiding team to enter the
premises. In a certification presented by the POEA,
Dela Piedra has no license or authority to engage in
illegal recruitment. During the raid, the POEA
enforcers had seized the application forms of Josilyn
Villa, Shirley Estrada, Cora Iglesia, Jocelyn Santos,
Jennifer Alejandro, Geraldine Reyes, Lilibeth Estrada,
and Geraldine Sunga, and also the diploma of Shirley
Estrada , together with a photocopy of her passport,
and a certification that Jasmine Alejandro rendered a
service as Staff Nurse with the Camp Navarro
General Hospital. The Court convicted Dela Piedra of
illegal recruitment.

People v. Boneng Various documents were also seized in the premises

(1999) of Bridget Boneng who was engaged in illegal
recruitment activities when the POEA enforcers
conducted an entrapment operation. Boneng had no
license of authority to conduct recruitment
activities. The Court also convicted Boneng of illegal
recruitment.
People v. Burgos Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the ISSUES/HELD: To validate a warrantless arrest,
(1986) authorities at the headquarters of the Philippine 1. Whether Burgos’ warrantless arrest and the search of his one of the requirements is “the
Constabulary (PC). He claimed that that Ruben house were illegal – NO. officer arresting a person who has
Burgos and his companions forcibly recruited him to 2. Whether he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt – NO just committed, is committing, or
be part of the NPA. Burgos allegedly threatened him RATIO: about to commit an offense must
and his family with a firearm. Burgos’ warrantless arrest was illegal since his case does have a personal knowledge of the
The following day, a team, headed by PC officer not fall under any of the exceptions. Since his warrantless fact. The offense must also be
Bioco, found Burgos plowing his field. They arrest is illegal, the warrantless search conducted on his committed in his presence or within
questioned him regarding the firearm he allegedly
used to threaten Masamlok. Burgos denied
possession of the firearm. However, Burgos’ wife
pointed to where the gun was hidden, where the
gun was indeed found. Accused then admitted
possession of the gun but claimed that it was issued
to him by Nestor Jimenez. He also pointed to the
location of subversive documents hidden in a stock
pile of cogon.
Ruben Burgos was convicted by the RTC of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion.
The RTC reasoned that Burgos’ arrest without
warrant was justified since the authorities received
an urgent report of his involvement in subversive
activities from a reliable source. The trial court also
justified the search as valid since it was incidental to
a lawful arrest.
Burgos appealed his conviction on the ground that
his warrantless arrest and the search of his house
were illegal.
incidental to such arrest is also illegal. There being no his view”.
admissible evidence, the prosecution failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution “…no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides the
exceptions when an arrest may be made without warrant:
1. when in his presence, person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
2. when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
3. When person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment.
These exceptions, however, are extremely construed. Thus,
the trial court erred in applying the exception.
For there to be a valid warrantless arrest, an offense must
be committed in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. In this case, there was no such personal
knowledge since the arresting officers’ knowledge stemmed
solely from Masamlok’s report and firearm’s location was
given by Burgos’ wife. Nor was Burgos in actual possession
of any firearm or subversive document when he was
arrested, nor was he committing any act which could be
described as subversive since he was merely plowing his
field.
The People’s claim that arrest is lawful using the
reasonableness test is erroneous. The reasonableness test
applies only as to the perpetrator’s identity, not the crime.
A crime must be in fact be committed first. It is not enough
to reasonably suspect that a crime may have been
committed.
In this case, when Burgos was arrested the authorities
merely suspected that the accused committed a crime
solely on Masamlok’s testimony. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. Subsequent

In the Matter of In February 1988 agents of the Commission on
the Petition for Immigration and Deportation apprehended the
Habeas Corpus of: accused in their residences by virture of Mission
Andrew Harvey, Order issued by then Commission Miriam Defensor
John Sherman, and Santiago. The three accused were among the 22
Adriaan van Del suspected alien pedophiles, 17 opted for self
Elshout v. deportation while the others were released due to
Honorable lack of evidence. Only the three accused have chose
Commissioner to face the deportation proceedings.
Miriam Defensor During the raid, Andrew Harvey was foud to be with
Santiago (1988) two young boys, Richard was with two naked boys
inside the room while Van Del Eshout admitted that
the two children have been in his care and live-in for
quite sometime.
In March 1988 deportation proceedings were
constituted for their being undesirable alien.
Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued by
Commissioner Santiago against the three accused for
violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Imigration
Act and Sec 69 of the Administrative Act. The three
accused then filed petition for bail which was denied
by the Commissioner. This resulted to the filing for
petition for writ of habeas corpus and challenging
the authority of the Commissioner to issue warrant
and detain the three accused pending the
determination of the probable cause
recovery of the gun based on the wife’s testimony doesn’t
make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, the search done
incidental to such arrest is also unlawful.
Hence, the evidence gathered was inadmissible in evidence.
Having no additional evidence to prove his guilty, Burgos
should be acquitted.
Issue: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner is valid ?
Held: Yes the warrant issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration is valid. Section 37 of the Immigration Law
empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue
warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is
constitutional. The requirement of probable cause, to be
determined by the Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings. Deportation proceedings are administrative in
character, summary in nature and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings.
It is essential however, that the warrant issued by the
Commissioner shall give the alien sufficient information
about the charges, relating the facts relied upon.
Denial of the commission to grant bail is also in order since
in deportation proceedings, the right to bails is not a matter
of right but a discretion on the part of the Commissioner of
Immigartaion. The deportation proceedings do not partake
the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee
to bail may not be invoked against aliens in the deportation
proceedings.
It is of course well-settled that
deportation proceedings do not
constitute a criminal action. The
order of deportation is not a
punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264
U.S., 32), it being merely the return
to his country of an alien who has
broken the conditions upon which
he could continue to reside within
our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos,
33 Phil., 397). The deportation
proceedings are administrative in
character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307
U.S., 22) summary in nature, and
need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the ordinary court
proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53
F. [2d], 155). It is essential,
however, that the warrant of arrest
shall give the alien sufficient
information about the charges
against him, relating the facts relied
upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is
also essential that he be given a fair
hearing with the assistance of
counsel, if he so desires, before
unprejudiced investigators (Strench
vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte
Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153).
However, all the strict rules of
evidence governing judicial
controversies do not need to be
observed; only such as are
fumdamental and essential like the
right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs.

Morano v. Vivo Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah
(1967) from Fukein, with a minor child from prior marriage,
Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a temporary visitor’s
visa as mom-immigrant for 2 months upon posting
P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She
soon married to Esteban Morano, a Filipino Citizen,
on January 24, 1962 and gave birth to a child,
Esteban Morano, Jr. After several extensions to
prolong stay in Philippines, their visas expired on
Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner
of Immigration (COI) on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a letter,
to leave the country on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with
warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to
leave and confiscation of bond.
Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for
Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their ACR, to
stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary
injunction from confiscating their bond. They argue
that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon
marriage to Esteban Morano by virtue of Section 15
of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised
Naturalization Act). Likewise, it argues that Section
37 of the Naturalization Law is unconstitutional for
allowing the COI to issue warrant of arrest and
effecting deportation without judicial intervention
enshrined in the Constitution. CFI decided partly
against petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both
appealed to SC.
Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock
vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay
evidence may even be admitted,
provided the alien is given the
opportunity to explain or rebut it
(Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577;
Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp.,
437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81
Phil. 682 [1948]).
Issues: “Section 37 of the Immigration Law,
which empowers the Commissioner
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban of Immigration to issue warrants for
Morano makes her a Filipino citizen. the arrest of overstaying aliens is
constitutional. The arrest is a stop
Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law preliminary to the deportation of
empowering the COI to issue a warrant of arrest, and the aliens who had violated the
deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is condition of their stay in this
unconstitutional for are covered by the Constitutional country.”
mandate on searches and seizures without judicial
intervention required under the Constitution on searches
and seizures.
Ruling:
Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must show that she
possess all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law
requiring as follows:
 Valid marriage; and
 Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963,
petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all
the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Thus,
she did not become a Filipino citizen.
Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an
attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does
not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final
order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The
constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in

Forbes v. Chuoco April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit
Tiaco (1910) in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the plaintiffs alleging that on the 19th of
August, 1909, under the orders of the said W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent to
Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R.
Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the police
and of the secret service, respectively, of the city of
Manila, and that having been able to return to these
Islands he feared, as it was threatened, that he
should be again deported by the said defendants,
concluding with a petition that a preliminary
injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in
this case prohibiting them from deporting the
defendant, Chuoco, and that they be sentenced to
pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.
Respondent argued that It is true that the said
defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11 others or his
nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned
to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R.
Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W.
Cameron Forbes, but the said expulsion was carried
out in the public interest of the Government and at
the request of the proper representative of the
Chinese Government in these Islands.
The said complaint having been filed with the
the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or
incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given offense
or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to
carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a
legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to
petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and judgment
declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing COI to
cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary
injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set
aside; and in all other respects, the decision appealed is
hereby affirmed.
ISSUE: “Expulsion is a police measure,
Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case having for its object the purging of
relating to the exercise of this inherent power in the the State of obnoxious foreigners. It
deportation of aliens, for the purpose of controlling this is a preventive, not a penal process,
power vested in the political department of the and it can not be substituted for
government. criminal prosecution and
punishment by judicial procedure.”
HELD:
Under the system of government established in the
Philippine Islands the Governor-General is "the chief
executive authority," one of the coordinate branches of the
Government, each of which, within the sphere of its
governmental powers, is independent of the others. Within
these limits the legislative branch cannot control the
judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch, nor either the
executive department. In the exercise of his political duties
the Governor-General is, by the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands, invested with certain important
governmental and political powers and duties belonging to
the executive branch of the Government, the due
performance of which is entrusted to his official honesty,
judgment, and discretion. So far as these governmental or
political or discretionary powers and duties which adhere
and belong to the Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it
is universally agreed that the courts possess no power to
supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their
discharge or exercise.
 defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting the petition,
issued against the plaintiffs the injunction requested,
prohibiting them from deporting the defendant
Chuoco Tiaco.

The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and

presented a motion asking that the injunction be
dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that
the facts set out in the complaint did not constitute
a motive of action, and that the latter was one in
which the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an
injunction against the plaintiffs for the reasons set
out in the complaint; notwithstanding which, the
defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the demurrer
and disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint
and the injunction standing.

Kishu Dalamal v. Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged,
Deportation Board together with other aliens, with having committed
(1963) certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank
Rules and Regulations before the Deportation Board
in a complaint filed by a Special Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice.
Whenever, therefore, the President exercises his power of It cannot be exercised in aid of an
deporting an alien upon prior investigation conducted in investigation.
the manner and form prescribed in Section 69 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, he does so, not only as an act
of state, but also "under the combined powers" of the
President and the Legislature. As an act of state, the
President has the inherent power to order the deportation
of an alien and as incident thereof, his arrest, while at the
same time that power may be deemed vested in him thru
delegation by the Legislative thru the enactment of
appropriate statute (Section 69, Revised Administrative
Code). But insofar as his power to order the arrest of an
alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his
appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if
he is liable to deportation, or as an incident of his inherent
power to deport to make effective his deportation order,
assuming only arguendo that he has such incidental power,
that power cannot be delegated either under the principle
of delegata potesta non potest delegari[1] or upon the
theory that it is non-delegable because it involves the
exercise of judgment or discretion.