AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No.

171951, August 28, 2009)

Doctrine: A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended.
FACTS: Amado Garcia and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the morning of September 1999 that lasted
the until the evening of that day. Because of the blaring noise of the videoke machine that the two were
enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the group to quiet down. Two days after, the met again on a wedding and
again, Chy told the two to stop singing. On the next day, the two, now with a friend, decided to have a
drinking session and later moved to Punta.
On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. The petitioner suddenly assaulted Chy and struck him on the lower
part of his head with a bottle. When Chy found a way to escape, he rushed to his home and phoned his
wife and told her to call the police. When they arrived, they found Chy unconcsious and later pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital
The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The petitioner contended that he
should only be charged with slight physical injuries as his assault on Chy was not he cause of his death.
ISSUE: WON Garcia is liable for Manuel Chy’s death
RULING: YES. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from
the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC are: (a) the intended act is felonious;
(b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by
the actor’s wrongful acts. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not
alter petitioner’s liability for his death. a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he
intended.

FILOMENO URBANO vs. CA (G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988)

Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.

FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused the
flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the
soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment of the
wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed that he
was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.
RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the case to
the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.

RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in
violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him
by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to
his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected
with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct

1
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to
the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLITO VILACORTA (G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011)

Doctrine: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
FACTS: In the early morning of January, while Danilo Cruz was buying bread from the store of Cristina
Mendeja located in Navotasm, Villacorta suddenly appeared out of nowhere and stabbed Cruz in the left
side of his body using a sharpened. Mendeja chased Villacorta but did not succeed to caught him. When
Mendeja returned to the store, her neighbor Aron was already tending to the wounds of Cruz, removing
the bamboo stick out of his body.
Cruz was brought to the hospital on January 23, 2002 where he was treated as an out-patient. Twenty-
three days later, on February 14, Cruz was once again rushed to the hospital because of the symptoms of
tetanus infection. He later died on the next day.
RTC found accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CA further affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Cruz appealed to SC and argued that he is only liable for the crime of slight physical injuries as stabbing of
Cruz is not the direct cause of his death.

ISSUE: WON Villacorta is guilty of murder.

RULING: NO. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz
was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was
admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following
day, on February 15, 2002.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment was entered finding Villacorta
guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of 30 days arresto menor.

PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES FLORA

G.R. NO. 125909
The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo and the
attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were found to have conspired to kill Ireneo. However, during the
commission of the crime, Emerita was also killed and Flor hit by a bullet.
HELD:
Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the
intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and
no one else. Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired
at Emerita and Flor can be convicted for the murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLLY ADRIANO (G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015)
Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’, or he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.

2
FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others, overtook a policecar and
Honda CRV. With intent to killd, treachery, and abuse of superior stregth, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the
driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and eventually die.
Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found
accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulana.
CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan.

(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission
of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of
his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v.
Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from
that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of
the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado‘, or he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims,
Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material facts
in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL T. SALES (G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011)
Doctrine: In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended
to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.
FACTS: In the night of September 2002 in Camarines Sur, appellant Noel T. Sales beaten his two sons Noel
Jr. and Noelmar because they failed to return home after joining the fluvial procession of Our Lady of
Penafracia. Sales whipped his son with a piece of wood approximately one meter in lenght and one and a
half inches in diameter. After he was finished beating his sons, his wife, Maria, noticed that there was a
crack in the head of Noemar so they brought him to a quack doctor, who said that Noemar was already
dead.
Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The
pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep
and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was
then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.
The wake of the child lasted only for a day and his body was never examined by a physician.
Sales surrendered to the police the day after.
RTC found Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Sales appealed to CA but the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Appellant raised the argument that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To
substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

ISSUE: WON Sales was responsible for the death of Noemar.

RULING: YES. Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
xxxx
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

3
Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries,
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

INTOD vs CA
G.R. No. 103119
October 21, 1992

FACTS:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire.

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER CA: Affirmed in toto

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime (YES)

HELD:

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus,
legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.
In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal
intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.

GEMMA T. JACINTO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR No. 162540, July 13, 2009)

Doctrine: The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual
FACTS: Petitioner Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check amounting to Pho
10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to

4
Megafoam, she deposited it to her account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and
CA ruled that the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari
to SC.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.

RULING: NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. ,

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons
or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega
Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to
the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash
to replace the value of said dishonored check.
Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG

G.R. No. L-43530
August 03, 1935

FACTS:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robbery.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and
C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar
on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of attempted
trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumst
ances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpe
trator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown t
hat the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property be
longing to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intent
ion was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he s
ucceeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other
offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is w
anting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be i
nferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts submi
tted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intentio
n must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances o
f injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under consideration d
oes not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the accused must be tak
en into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as t
he record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and
in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

RENATO BALEROS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 138033, February 22, 2006)

5
RPC ART 6
Doctrine: Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
FACTS: In early morning of December 1991, Renato Baleros went to the dormitory room of Martina
Lourdes T. Albano (Malou), palced himselp on top of her, and pressed a hankerchief soaked in chloroform.
Malou struggled to free herself in the hands of Baleros and succeeded by grabbing his sexual organ and
squeezing it.
Malou went straight to Marvilou and said “”may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako”.
The morning after, the police said to the tenants of the dormitory to grab the things that are theirs. The
room was left with an unclaimed bag which Christian, one of the tenants, knew right away that was
Renato’s. Among the contents of the bag was a hankerchief with a volatile substance.
They later found out that Renato was a suitor of Malou which she rejected a week ago.
RTC found Renato guilty of attempted rape. CA further affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: WON Renato is guilty of attempted rape.
RULING: NO. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or
intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned
article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present
case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the
pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit
a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
Assailed decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D.
Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and
is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory
penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

Fe Abella Y Perpetua vs. People of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 from the Decision2 and Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 and August 11,
2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN affirming with modifications the
conviction4 by the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe Abella y
Perpetua petitioner) for the crime of frustrated homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella
Benigno). The RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1) day to eight 8)
years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1) day to twelve 12) years of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay Benigno P100,000.00 as consequential damages, P10,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred, plus the
costs of suit.5 The CA concurred with the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA modified the penalty imposed to six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s award in favor of Benigno of
(a) P10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding to the medical expenses allegedly incurred; and (b) P100,000.00 as
consequential damages. In lieu of the preceding, the CA ordered the petitioner to pay Benigno P30,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as temperate damages.6

Antecedent Facts

On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and trisicad driver, was charged with
frustrated homicide in an Information7 which reads:

6
That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault, harm and
hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting the
injury described below, to wit:

• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and

• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able intervention of the medical attendance
rendered to the said victim.

Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC. 8

After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.

The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno; 10 (b) Amelita Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro
Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13(Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon
from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter
was hacked by the petitioner.

The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television
in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring trouble in a
nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio).
Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they
dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in each
of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted
to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the
scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used
to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the hospital 15 while the
petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.16Benigno incurred an expense of more than P10,000.00 for hospitalization, but lost
the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and
was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised
wound left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was
discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection, since the scythe used in the hacking was not
sterile, complications and infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by Benigno, but
fortunately did not.21

The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner;22 (b) Fernando Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the
petitioner; and (c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).

The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and
his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking incident
occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner
gathering woods to make a hut.25 Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner drinking tuba
in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26

The RTC Ruling

On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the Judgment 27 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove the
guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50
and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1)
day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant Benigno Abella the
sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.28

The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No disinterested witnesses were presented to
corroborate the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6, 1998.
Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC accorded more credence to the
averments of the prosecution witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner, positively,
categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show that
Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.

7
The RTC awarded P10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical expenses he incurred despite the
prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay P100,000.00 as
consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for the award.

The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on
Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental especially since he had no motive
whatsoever which could have impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent
to kill.

The CA Ruling

On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision 30affirming the petitioner’s conviction for the crime
of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:

Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of
the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and
(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner attacked Benigno with deadly weapons,
two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting
Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend himself.

Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate, testified that Benigno suffered from a hack
wound on the left neck, and an incised wound on the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been caused
by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have resulted to death without proper medical attendance.
Benigno was hospitalized for about a month because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the neck) shows the
nature and seriousness of the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for the timely
intervention of medical science.31(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum." 32 The
CA explained that:

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of consummated homicide is reclusion
temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty for
a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision
mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor . To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be reduced by
one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum
of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision correccional. 33 (Citation omitted)

The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and consequential damages as there were no competent
proofs to justify the awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is entitled to P30,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded when some pecuniary loss has been incurred, but the
amount cannot be proven with certainty.35

Issue

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of whether or not the RTC and the CA erred
in rendering judgments which are not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not corrected,
will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner.37

In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate relevant facts, which if considered,
would justify either his acquittal or the downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner
points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind.
Had there been an intent to kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time, he had
two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and unexpected, providing
Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand. Benigno
could not have been unaware of the danger facing him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno
thus approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit with the latter’s scythe.

The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People 38 where this Court found the downgrading of a conviction from
attempted murder to physical injuries as proper considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot the
victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s body.39

Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and
incised wound in the hand. Such being the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so extensive
because it did not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure" while the incised wound in the hand, which only
required cleansing and suturing, merely left a slight scarring. 40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for seventeen (17)
days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious ones.

In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of the instant petition. The OSG stresses
that the petitioner raises factual issues, which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the development of infections or
complications on the wounds is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The petitioner’s intent

8
to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and the
circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely medical assistance rendered to him.

If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick,
fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been sufficient.
However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving behind a big, open and gaping wound.

This Court’s Ruling

The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas 42 is instructive anent what is the subject of review in a
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law.
It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.43(Citations omitted)

In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the courts a quo that the petitioner had a
homicidal intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could have
caused his death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are patently factual in nature requiring
no less than a re-calibration of the contending parties’ evidence.

It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among
which is, "when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain relevant
facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x." 44 However, the factual backdrop and circumstances
surrounding the instant petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.

Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual issues, still, the instant petition is
susceptible to denial.

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused
had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance.45

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to
prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds
he inflicted on his victim.46

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack, much less kill Benigno. The
petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the
accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that
had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave right
after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The attending physician
certified that the injury would require medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged
from the hospital the following day.

In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in his
left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were open
wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not a
sterile instrument contaminated with other things."48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could
have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September
23, 1998.

From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was
determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination
to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and
leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and left hand, it
perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period of his
confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he
pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already

9
delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a
timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of
the crime charged.

The Court modifies the award of damages.

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the payment of the consequential damages awarded
by the trial court in the absence of proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of
the absence of supporting receipts but entitlement is shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may be
awarded.49In the instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and underwent medical
treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is prudent to award temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.50

Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis
to award moral damages as ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on
Benigno would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury. 52

WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated October 26, 2010 and August 11
2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00
and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for damages shall be subject to
interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.53

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs REGIE LABIAGA (G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013)
Doctrine: In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
FACTS: Sometime in December of 2003 in Iloilo, accused Regie Labiaga (Regie) and three others conspired,
confederated and helped one another, with an unlicensed firegun, willfully and unlawfully shot Judy Conde
(Jojo) in different parts of her breast whiched caused her death thereafter. The same individuals also
conspired to kill Gregorio Condea and later succeeded.
Appellant said that the shooting of Conde was an act of self-defense Conde challenged him to a gunfight.
RTC ruled out his defense.
RTC convicted the appelant of murder adn frustrated murder. CA affirmed the decision with modifications
as to civil indemnities.
ISSUE: WON Regie is guilty of frustrated murder.
RULING: NO. In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. Since
Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty
for attempted murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under
Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
Appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

ARISTOTLE VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007)

Doctrine: Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same.

FACTS: Sometime in May 1994, petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside SM North EDSA by
security guard Lorenzo Lago, unloading cases of detergent Tide Ultramatic on an open parking space.
Minutes later, petitioner loaded the cartons of detergent while Calderon was looking into a taxi and
procedeed to leave the parking area. Lago stopped the cab, checked the cartons, and asked for a receipt
but Valezuela and Calderon reacted a fled on foot. The same were apprehended on the scene and the
stolen merchandise recovered was worth P12,090.

10
The two pleaded not guilty. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend to buy snacks when they heard a
gunshot fired by Lago. Calderon, on the other hand, said that he was with his cousin when he heard a
gunshot fired by Lago that caused everyone to flee on the viscinity.
RTC convicted the appellants guilty of consumated theft. CA affirmed. Petitioner contends that he was only
guilty of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprefended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose the articles stolen.
ISSUE: WON Valenzuela is guilty of consumated theft.
RULING: YES. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed
by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. After that point has been
breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender
never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted On the other hand, the
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the
crime is complete.

The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that
all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender.

The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic
of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime, and
accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.

We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. That it has
taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code
does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion.

Hence, the petition is DENIED

JOVITO CANCERAN v. PEOPLE, GR No. 206442, 2015-07-01

Facts:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery
Department, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Jovito Caneeran, conspiring,... confederating together and mutually helping one
another with his co-accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever
Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner... thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega
Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus, performing all the acts of execution which...
would produce the crime of theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of accused's will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega
Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of
Ponds White Beauty Cream, to the damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega Center.
Version of the Prosecution
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc), a security guard;
and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer of Ororama Mega Center
(Ororama), as its witnesses. Through their testimonies, the... prosecution established that on or about
October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Caneeran approach one of the counters in Ororama; that Caneeran was
pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00; that Ompoc went
to the packer and asked if the boxes had... been checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer,
they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of
Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20; that Caneeran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon
reaching... the Don Mariano gate, Caneeran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being
questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he

11
tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal... belongings were deposited in the office
of Arcenio
Version of the Defense
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser of La
Tondena, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to buy medicine for his wife. On his way out,
after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person of around 20... years of age requested him to pay
for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man who gave him P1,440.00
for payment of two boxes labelled Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person
because he was struck by his... conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that
after paying at the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three
persons ran after him, and he was caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he
was... mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110 cellular phone
and cash amounting to P2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while a certain Amion
took his necklace.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People[8] that under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), there is no crime of "Frustrated Theft." Canceran was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, eight (8) months of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months... of reclusion temporal, as maximum
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for the first time. The CA
held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea and so the first
jeopardy never attached.[11]
The CA also debunked Canceran's contention that there was no taking because he merely pushed the cart
loaded with goods to the cashier's booth for payment and stopped there. The appellate court held that
unlawful taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender gained... possession of the thing,
even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the same.[12]
Issues:
Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction. He insists that there was already double
jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second
case.
Ruling:
No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached
Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. The rule of double jeopardy
has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any... other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded
upon the law of reason, justice and conscience
Principles:
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal... jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[28]
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy before the RTC.
Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same must still fail
because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a... valid plea. He himself admitted that he
was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was able to do so. Second,
there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was not terminated by reason of acquittal
nor conviction but... simply because he posted bail. Absent these two elements, there can be no double
jeopardy.

PEOPLE VS. PAREJA

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place
on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.

12
 9
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old ]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused–appellant Bernabe
Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged
twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.

The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not
in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while
AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to
undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise
inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately
stood up and rushed outside of their house.

Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear
that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the
incident to anyone.

AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to
AAA, [i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by
[Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around
while she and her half–siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her
breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother
who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was
asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said
incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x
x x many times x x x.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional
Medico–Legal Report Number 2004–03–0091. Her medico–legal report stated the following
conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5–7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic

Ruling of the RTC

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of
the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents,
11
respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04–1558, for want of evidence.

In Crim. Case No. 04–1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is meted
out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and
2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.

In Crim. Case No. 04–1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12

The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due
to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify about what she had witnessed in
March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident
for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being
hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she
was sleeping at that time.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

13
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on January
19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556 and 04–1557, to
wit:

13
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04–1556
to 04–1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Issues

15
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court and posited before us the following errors as he did
before the Court of Appeals:
I

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16

17
In his Supplemental Brief Pareja added the following argument:

The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped. 18

Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in
convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA
for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged
sexual abuse.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.

Core Issue: Credibility of AAA

Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
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inconsistencies.

We find such argument untenable.

When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines
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that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them
as follows:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)

The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the “assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment
and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts–and when his findings
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
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Court.” While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial
reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s
credibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No.
03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz
GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as maximum; and is

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ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

NORBERTO CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014)

Doctrine: The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

FACTS: In December 1993, Norberto Cruz (Norberto) and his wife went to La Union to sell plastic and glass
wares. Along with them is AAA and BBB. Upon reaching their destination, they set up a tent in order that
they will have a place to sleep.
At around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. The person was
Norberto who was mashing her breast and touching her private parts. He fought back and kicked Norberto
twice. He was not able to pursue his lustful desires; he offered AAA money and told her not to tell the
incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later, when AAA retured to her tent, she again saw Norberto
touching private parts of BBB.
Later that day, they reported the incident to the police. Norberto was summoned to the police station
which resulted to an argument. He deined the allegations contending that there were many people around
who were preparing for the “simbang gabi”, and that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in
the municipal hall could hear them.
RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS. CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape
in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of attempted rape.
RULING: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the
only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to
rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands
and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her.
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’s intent to lie with the female.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female Without such showing, only the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is committed.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. In People v. Bugarin, the
Court said that The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit
rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not
inferable from the act of licking her genitalia.
The Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS.

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