Nocum v.

Laguna Tayabas Bus Co

Nocum, plaintiff, was a passenger of the defendant’s Bus No. 120, then making a trip within the
barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, who got injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Plaintiff sued Laguna Tayabas for Breach of Contract of Carriage.

The Trial Court held Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable since it did not observe the extraordinary
or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the Civil Code. It further states that the
defense of fortuitous event is unavailing.

The Trial Court’s decision is based on the witness, Severino Andaya, who states that a man with box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus and the box was place under the seat. They left
Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion occurred, the plaintiff was thrown
out. There were 37 other passengers who got injured.

The bus conductor said that such box belongs to a passenger whom he didn’t know and states that it
contained miscellaneous items and clothes. From its appearance there was no indication that the
contents of the box were explosives and firecrackers.

The dispatcher said that they were not authorized to open the baggage of passengers because the
instruction from the management is to call the police if there were packages containing articles which
were against regulations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is liable for breach of contract of carriage?

RULING:

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is not liable for damages. In overland transportation, the common
carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the contents of packages or
bags, particularly those hand carried by passengers.

No doubt, the views of the trial court do seem to be in line with the reasons that the Code
Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft of the Civil Code. Indeed,
in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with the Commission that by requiring
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
by creating a presumption of negligence against them.

It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus
by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it and
according to the trial court “if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the
contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger
to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees
should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.”

However, the Supreme Court considered the opinion that the law does not require as much. Article
1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
“according to all the circumstances of each case.” In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same
qualification: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.”

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers, allowance
must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with
him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to
be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made
as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in
compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental
sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling
would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily
the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
 NEGROS NAVIGATION CO v CA (compare to mecena)
Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila and going to Bacolod.

Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several
of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found
and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought
for the death of other passengers. In Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1)
allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage,
(2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the
full extent.

Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and
trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the
record of this case.

Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit. Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this
Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should
be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal
circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if private
respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case.
Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presently presented.

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
award would naturally vary or differ in each case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages.
Korean Airlines v. CA
Facts:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially
listed as a “chance passenger”. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was
cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL officer
pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he was barred from taking the flight.
When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was unable to report
for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was
informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the
other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available,
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold KAL
liable for breach of contract
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to what extent
Held:
(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was aggravated in this
case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed"
passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus
causing him embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz
shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed through customs
and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to
Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:

a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed
breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-
appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for
moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped
off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely
and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to
moral damages.
c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been
fully established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so
expressly pleaded in the complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for
the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is not so
serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of P100,000
as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
PAL V CA
FACTS:

 October 23, 1988: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City. But, due to typhoon Osang,
the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
 PAL gave out cash assistance of P100 and P200 the next day.
 Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL’s expense because he did not
have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. He instead shared with a co-
passenger Andoni Dumlao and stayed at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao
 October 25, 1988: Pantejo discovered that co-passangers Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank were reimbursed by PAL for their hotel stay.
 He told Oscar Jereza, PAL’s Manager for Departure Services that he will
sue for discrimination and it was then that he offered P300.
 RTC: Ordered PAL to pay P300 actual damages, P150,000 moral
damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P15,000 attorney’s fees, and
6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until paid, plus
costs of suit
 CA: affirmed but deleted attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
ISSUE: W/N PAL was in bad faith so award for damages is proper

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION regarding the

computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards

 No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and

prejudicial conduct. More importantly, it has been sufficiently established
that it is petitioner’s standard company policy, whenever a flight has been
cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to
provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups.
 PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers
and in discriminating Pantejo. He was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government position
and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected
him to ridicule, shame and anguish. His refusal to accept the
P300.00 proffered as an afterthought when he threatened suit
was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that
his co-passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes
the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code.
 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the awards for actual,
moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons
meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable.
 interest of 6% imposed by respondent court should be computed from the date of rendition of
judgment and not from the filing of the complaint

Calalas v. CA

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned

and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.

Issues:

(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this caseN(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required
in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it
is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutescaso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause
of the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING: No.First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of
carriage. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver,
because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-
delict. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. But
in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and
respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part,
which makes him liable.
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 546

Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas,
Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at the left
side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left eye. He was then immediately brought by
private respondent’s personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.

Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks and the stroking of the bus by a bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one
such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not however, make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort, committed by a
stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of the family.

Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit,
conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao
residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of petitioner, and informed him about the plot of the Maranaos. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board
the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later
went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the
bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped
out of the vehicle.Caorong was shot to death as a result.

RTC dismissed the complaint stating that Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion
ofproviding its buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioner’s duty. The evidence
showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyondpetitioner’s control.

CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious
plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety precautions at all.One
available safeguard that could have absolved Fortunefrom liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel insensitive and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this
measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing totakenecessary precautions to
ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

RULING:

1. Petitioner is liable.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of
other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the
act.
• Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons
and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier is liable for
failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
• Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the
part of the victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither
an act of negligence or recklessness.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. Seizure of Petitioner’s Bus is not a Case of Force Majeure

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen,
is inevitable. To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to
take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in
the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second
requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case.
Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses,
petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the
bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liabilty.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so
the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come
from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated

Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
HELD: Mangune Spouses.

First defense: Last Clear Chance

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

Second defense: the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence

Respond cuourt said the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of
impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal
position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark
of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact. Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the
sudden U-turn executed by Manalo.

ThirD defense: Substantial factor test

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Respondent court said the
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort
to avoid the accident.

It cannot be also said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel
was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50
kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in
3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in
only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision
is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due
to a fortuitous event.

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and
the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur supra.

However, The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his . In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his

BUSTAMANTE V CA

Facts:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor
No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite.
The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s seat to the last rear
seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent
act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the
liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of
Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrineof last clear chance as between the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability.

Lara v. Valencia
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao.The defendant is
engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumberconcession in Cotabato. Lara went to said
concession upon instructions of his chief toclassify the logs of defendant which were about to be
loaded on a ship anchored inthe port of Parang. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound
for Davao andwere seated at the back on an improvised bench. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-
up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death.

As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes
to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their
destination
The Supreme Court stated that there is nothing to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or
without taking the precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar
circumstances. There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
unforeseen accident by the fact that at the time the deceased was half-asleep and must have fallen from
the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy,
rough and full of stones. The Supreme Court also states that they may rather attribute the incident to
lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open and he was then in
crouching position. Indeed, the law provides that “A passenger must observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid injury to himself” (Article 1761, NCC), which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.
PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine

Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved
to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep
creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases
involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son
and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding
that the accident was a fortuitous event.
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard
thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755,
new Civil Code)
HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of
the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the
carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the
passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective
equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has.
We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection
of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a
very cautious person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and
therefore the knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from responsibility.

Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals

In 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded Japan Airlines (JAL) flight No. JL 001 in San
Francisco, California bound for Manila.

Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and
Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061.As an incentive for
travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the
airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.Upon arrival at Narita, private
respondents were lodged at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on
the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering
it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their
unexpected overnight stay.
On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to
Manila was again cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay
in Narita.

Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to
pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on
board JL flight No. 741.Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25,
1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before the RTC of Quezon City.
To support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide
care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and
accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted
that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On
the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right
to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure.The trial court rendered its
judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for damages.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision of the CA, which, affirmed the trial court’s finding.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. Failing in its bid to
reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if
the delay were caused by force majeure.

No.
In a plethora of cases it was ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind
and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued
with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of
care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.

However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or
damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the
defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective. Accordingly,
there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the
general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL
was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers
incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of
travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils
involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all,
common carriers are not the insurer of all risks

YOBIDO V CA ( ALAM MO NA TO)

VDA. DE NUECA v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts:

At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958, Fermin Nueca brought 7 sacks of palay to Manila Railroad Co. (MRC) at its
station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, to be shipped to the municipality of Libmanan of the same
province.

He paid P 0.70 as freight charge and was issued Way Bill No. 56515.

The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of Train 537. Passengers boarded the train and shunting
operations started to hook a wagon thereto.

Before the train reached the turnoff switch, its passenger coach fell on its side some 40 m from the
station. The wagon pinned Nueca, killing him instantly.

Nueca’s widow and children bring this claim for damages, alleging that the Nueca was a passenger and
his death was caused by MRC’s negligence.

MRC disclaimed liability stating: (1) it exercised due care in safeguarding the passengers during the
shunting operation, (2) Nueca was not a passenger but a trespasser, (3) even if Nueca were a passenger,
he illegally boarded the train without permission by not paying the fare, (4) the mishap was not
attributable to any defect in MRC equipment, (5) that the accident happened due to force majeur.

MRC presented evidence showing there was no mechanical defect, but it did not explain why the
accident occurred or show that force majeur caused the mishap.
The lower court absolved MRC of liability and held that Nueca was a trespasser since he did not buy any
ticket, and in any case, was not in a proper place for passengers.

Issue:

1. W/N Nueca was a passenger?

2. W/N MRC is liable?
3. Was the accident due to MRC’s negligence or force majeur?
4. Is Nueca liable for contributory negligence?

Held:

1. No, Nueca was not a passenger thus, MRC did not owe him extraordinary diligence.

A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with
the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an equivalent.

The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the care of the carrier, or
directly under its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a passenger, and is accepted as such
by the carrier – as where he makes a contract for trasportation and presents himself at the proper place
and in a proper manner to be transported.

Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a passenger, he was never
accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported.

2. Yes, the liability of railroad companies to persons upon the premises is determined by the
general rules of negligence relating to duties of owners/occupiers of property.

While railroad companies are not bound to the same degree of care in regard to strangers who are
unlawfully upon the premises of its passengers, it may still be liable to such strangers for negligent or
tortious acts.

Here, Nueca was not on the track, but either unlawfully inside the baggage car or beside the track.

It is normal for people to walk on the track or roadbed when there is no oncoming train and to walk
beside the track when a train passes. This practice is tolerated by MRC. Generally, MRC’s stations are
not enclosed, and is easily accessible to the public.

1. MRC is negligent; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.

The train was under the complete control of the railroad company at the time of the accident. The
baggage car would not have been derailed if the train had been properly operated.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.

4. No.

An invitation to stay in the premises is implied from the lack of prohibition to outsiders to keep off the
premises, hence, a stranger who is injured by a derailed train while staying beside a railroad track is not
guilty of contributory negligence.

Note: Our law on common carriers is lifted from Anglo-American statutes.

DANGWA V CA

FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated
forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective
destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of
Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in
the operation of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not
absolute insurers of the public at large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the
cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and
compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders
(EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril
to a passenger while he is attempting to board the same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition =
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito
on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old,
Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga,
bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The conductor
of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No
fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged in
accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of
their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from
the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind,
but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the
baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop,
it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board without getting
his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of
a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter
damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident, and
therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for
his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter,
after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent
had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code
to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers.
The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus
even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.

Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals

On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila.
Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank connecting
the vessel to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank, disembarked through
the third deck, which was at the same level with the pier. An hour after the passengers disembarked,
Pioneer stevedoring started to operate in unloading the cargo from the ship. Viana then went back,
remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At that time, while he was pointing at the crew
of the vessel to where his cargoes were loaded, the crane hit him, pinning him between the crane
and the side of the vessel. He was brought to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May 15). The
parents of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed a motion for
reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an order absolving Pioneer from liability but not
Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the incident.

HELD:

Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at bar.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule
is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely
by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and
so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into
account such other factors.
Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract where all that is required of
plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier,
that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant
case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while
such relation subsists.

Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeal

The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van
of Bulletinalong the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified
that he went to the leftlane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane.
Before he passed by the Fiera, hesaw the van of Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was
driven by one Felix Angeles. The collisionoccurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact caused thejeepney to turn around and fall on its left
side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyeswho eventually died due to
the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and
Mallari Jr., andalso against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Co.
The complaint alleged thatthe collision which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by the fault
and negligence of both drivers of thepassenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

ISSUE:

WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel.

Yes.The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve onthe highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a)
and (b), of RA 4136 as amended,otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. A
driver abandoning his proper lane for thepurpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and notto proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is specialnecessity for keeping to
the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left handside relying
upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing toconsider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o’clock in the morning mindlessly
occupied the left laneand overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the
proximate cause of the collisionresulting in the death of Israel was the sole negligence of the driver
of the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., whorecklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art.2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehiclehas been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallaris failed to presentsatisfactory evidence to
overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari
Sr., whoadmittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in anaction based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the partof the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of damages sought by the passenger.

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the
heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad
and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by
the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA
and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert
evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where
they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death
or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under
Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is
established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the
liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages

is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was
deleted/\.

Pestano v. Sumayang
Sumayang, accompanied by another person, was riding a motor vehicle on a highway in Cebu.
While turning left at a junction, Sumayang was violently hit by a speeding bus driven by Pestano.
Sumayang and his companion died due to the accident. The heirs of Sumayang filed a civil action
against Pestano and Metro Cebu Bus Company, the owner of the Bus driven by Petano. A witness
named Nies accounts that before Sumayang turned left, the former had raised his left arm as a
signal but was run over by the bus and was thrown 14 meters away. Pestano alleges the victims
were negligent because 15-20 meters away, he had already blown the bus horn and even blew it a
second time when he got near but could only step on the brake after the bus had hid the motor
vehicle. RTC and CA held Pestano liable and also held Metro Cebu Bus liable for negligence.

WON Metro Cebu Bus may be liable for the acts of Pestano.

HELD:

There were factual findings that the bus had a defective speedometer and the Company was held to
have shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and supervision of employees. Under Articles
2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by
their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the
master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in supervision of the
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowing Pestano to ply his route with a defective
speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the
supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not
in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestano was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the
proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by
law.

LUDO V CA
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2001februarydecisions.php?id=113

Philippine rabbit v IAC nasa taas pero ito topic

JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
 Facts: Herein JUNTILLA was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from Danao City
to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol Camoro and registered
under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at
the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm
aside from the injuries he suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back.
Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City.
Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was beyond their control, taking into
account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it
blew up.
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event

HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.

 passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
 at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear
tire blows up
 passenger jeepney was overloaded
 3 passengers in the front seat
 14 passengers in the rear
 caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
 (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent
of the human will.
 (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
 (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
 (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
 In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was
 caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers
not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits,
and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus
insuring the safety of passengers at all times
 the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage,
and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by
the respondents
 respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any
amount for failure to prove such damages during the trial
 findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu

Bayasen v. Court of Appeal

Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, went to barrio
Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from the Saint Theodore’s Hospital in Sagada, viz., Elena
Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit
as they had requested for a ride to Ambasing. Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather
flowers, again asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which
he intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed them to ride, Elena sitting herself between
him and Dolores. On the way, at barrio Langtiw, the jeep went over a precipice. About 8 feet below
the road, it was blocked by a pine tree. The three were thrown out of the jeep. Elena was found lying
in a creek further below. Among other injuries, she suffered a skull fracture which caused her death.
ISSUE:

Whether or not negligence can be ascribed to the accused herein.

RULING:

It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep
and not the “unreasonable speed” of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove
or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at “an unreasonable speed”. It is a well-known
physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on
account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the
car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault.

No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the moment he
felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road,
parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and avoid the
embankment Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-driver who
skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course.
The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime
charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

Cervantes v. CA
On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner Nicholas Cervantes a
round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which is valid until March
27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately
booked a flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane would
make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there on April 2, petitioner made
arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April 2, he was not allowed to board due to the
expiration of his ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given due course by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

(1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of
validity of petitioner's ticket
(2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper

Held:

(1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that there was a need to
send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension of the period of validity of his ticket.
Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond
his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said
third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover
damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.

(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL acted in bad
faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San Francisco. In awarding moral damages
for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the
one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a
strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up
ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it
should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No
injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to
accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.

Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, and the existence of bad faith is established.
The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed
only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Here, there
is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An award for attorney's fees is also improper.

CALALAS V CA – CHECK TAAS ON PRESUMPTION

Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Company

That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba,
Laguna to Manila; That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train
guard of the Manila Railroad Company assigned in Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened
to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he
was going to report for duty; That Devesa’s tour of duty on that day was from 9:00 a.m., until the
train to which he was assigned reached La Union at 7:00 p.m. of the same days;

That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same dating back
during the Japanese occupation; That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with the
carbine furnished to him by the Manila Raildroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon
seeing him inside the train coach; That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the wound which he
sustained from the shot fired by Divesa. It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted of homicide
by final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Appelant’s contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no
liability attaches to it as employer of the killer.

Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is liable for the intentional assault committed by its
employee.

No while the a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents
or employees by virtue of the contract of carriage, this responsibility extends only to those that the
carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it.

The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco because of personal grudge was entirely
unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Company. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate
that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist
between each one of its many employees and anyone of the thousands of eventual passengers
riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore” caso fortuito” within the definition of the
old civil code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances and pursuant
to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the appellant’s contract of safe carriage with the late
Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. Moreover, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had
no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to
Manila. When Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
Fernando La Union trains, and he was in the Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the
starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00
a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding and the killing
of Gillaco was not done in line of duty.

The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the railroad
had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa’s assault can not be deemed in
law a breach of Gillaco’s contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.

Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co

Nocum, plaintiff, was a passenger of the defendant’s Bus No. 120, then making a trip within the
barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, who got injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Plaintiff sued Laguna Tayabas for Breach of Contract of Carriage.

The Trial Court held Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable since it did not observe the extraordinary
or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the Civil Code. It further states that the
defense of fortuitous event is unavailing.

The Trial Court’s decision is based on the witness, Severino Andaya, who states that a man with box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus and the box was place under the seat. They left
Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion occurred, the plaintiff was thrown
out. There were 37 other passengers who got injured.

The bus conductor said that such box belongs to a passenger whom he didn’t know and states that it
contained miscellaneous items and clothes. From its appearance there was no indication that the
contents of the box were explosives and firecrackers.

The dispatcher said that they were not authorized to open the baggage of passengers because the
instruction from the management is to call the police if there were packages containing articles which
were against regulations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is liable for breach of contract of carriage?

RULING:

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is not liable for damages. In overland transportation, the common
carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the contents of packages or
bags, particularly those hand carried by passengers.

No doubt, the views of the trial court do seem to be in line with the reasons that the Code
Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft of the Civil Code. Indeed,
in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with the Commission that by requiring
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
by creating a presumption of negligence against them.

It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus
by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it and
according to the trial court “if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the
contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger
to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees
should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.”

However, the Supreme Court considered the opinion that the law does not require as much. Article
1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
“according to all the circumstances of each case.” In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same
qualification: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.”

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers, allowance
must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with
him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to
be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made
as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.

Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in
compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental
sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling
would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily
the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO v CA (compare to mecena)

Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila and going to Bacolod.

Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several
of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found
and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought
for the death of other passengers. In Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1)
allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage,
(2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the
full extent.

Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and
trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the
record of this case.

Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit. Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this
Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should
be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal
circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if private
respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case.
Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presently presented.

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
award would naturally vary or differ in each case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages.
Korean Airlines v. CA
Facts:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially
listed as a “chance passenger”. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was
cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL officer
pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he was barred from taking the flight.
When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was unable to report
for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was
informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the
other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available,
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold KAL
liable for breach of contract
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to what extent
Held:
(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was aggravated in this
case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed"
passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus
causing him embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz
shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed through customs
and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to
Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:

a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed
breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-
appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for
moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped
off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely
and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to
moral damages.
 c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been
fully established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so
expressly pleaded in the complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for
the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is not so
serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of P100,000
as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
PAL V CA
FACTS:

 October 23, 1988: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City. But, due to typhoon Osang,
the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
 PAL gave out cash assistance of P100 and P200 the next day.
 Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL’s expense because he did not
have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. He instead shared with a co-
passenger Andoni Dumlao and stayed at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao
 October 25, 1988: Pantejo discovered that co-passangers Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank were reimbursed by PAL for their hotel stay.
 He told Oscar Jereza, PAL’s Manager for Departure Services that he will
sue for discrimination and it was then that he offered P300.
 RTC: Ordered PAL to pay P300 actual damages, P150,000 moral
damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P15,000 attorney’s fees, and
6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until paid, plus
costs of suit
 CA: affirmed but deleted attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
ISSUE: W/N PAL was in bad faith so award for damages is proper

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION regarding the

computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards

 No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and

prejudicial conduct. More importantly, it has been sufficiently established
that it is petitioner’s standard company policy, whenever a flight has been
cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to
provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups.
 PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers
and in discriminating Pantejo. He was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government position
and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected
him to ridicule, shame and anguish. His refusal to accept the
P300.00 proffered as an afterthought when he threatened suit
was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that
his co-passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes
the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code.
 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the awards for actual,
moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons
meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable.
 interest of 6% imposed by respondent court should be computed from the date of rendition of
judgment and not from the filing of the complaint
Calalas v. CA

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned

and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.

Issues:

(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this caseN(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required
in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it
is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutescaso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause
of the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING: No.First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of
carriage. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver,
because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-
delict. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. But
in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner and
respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part,
which makes him liable.

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

180 SCRA 546

Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas,
Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at the left
side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left eye. He was then immediately brought by
private respondent’s personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.

Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks and the stroking of the bus by a bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one
such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not however, make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort, committed by a
stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of the family.

Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit,
conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao
residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of petitioner, and informed him about the plot of the Maranaos. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board
the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later
went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the
bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped
out of the vehicle.Caorong was shot to death as a result.

RTC dismissed the complaint stating that Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion
ofproviding its buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioner’s duty. The evidence
showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyondpetitioner’s control.

CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious
plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety precautions at all.One
available safeguard that could have absolved Fortunefrom liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel insensitive and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this
measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”

ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing totakenecessary precautions to
ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

RULING:

1. Petitioner is liable.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of
other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the
act.
• Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons
and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier is liable for
failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
• Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the
part of the victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither
an act of negligence or recklessness.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. Seizure of Petitioner’s Bus is not a Case of Force Majeure

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen,
is inevitable. To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to
take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in
the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second
requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case.
Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses,
petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the
bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liabilty.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so
the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come
from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated

Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
HELD: Mangune Spouses.

First defense: Last Clear Chance

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

Second defense: the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence

Respond cuourt said the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of
impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal
position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark
of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact. Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the
sudden U-turn executed by Manalo.

ThirD defense: Substantial factor test

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Respondent court said the
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort
to avoid the accident.

It cannot be also said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel
was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50
kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in
3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in
only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision
is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due
to a fortuitous event.

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and
the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur supra.

However, The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his . In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his

BUSTAMANTE V CA

Facts:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor
No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite.
The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s seat to the last rear
seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent
act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the
liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of
Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrineof last clear chance as between the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability.

Lara v. Valencia
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao.The defendant is
engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumberconcession in Cotabato. Lara went to said
concession upon instructions of his chief toclassify the logs of defendant which were about to be
loaded on a ship anchored inthe port of Parang. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound
for Davao andwere seated at the back on an improvised bench. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-
up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death.

As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes
to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their
destination
The Supreme Court stated that there is nothing to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or
without taking the precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar
circumstances. There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
unforeseen accident by the fact that at the time the deceased was half-asleep and must have fallen from
the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy,
rough and full of stones. The Supreme Court also states that they may rather attribute the incident to
lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the pick-up was open and he was then in
crouching position. Indeed, the law provides that “A passenger must observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid injury to himself” (Article 1761, NCC), which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.

PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine

Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved
to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep
creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases
involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son
and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding
that the accident was a fortuitous event.
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard
thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755,
new Civil Code)
HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of
the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the
carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the
passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective
equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has.
We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection
of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a
very cautious person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and
therefore the knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from responsibility.

Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals

In 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded Japan Airlines (JAL) flight No. JL 001 in San
Francisco, California bound for Manila.

Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and
Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061.As an incentive for
travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the
airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.Upon arrival at Narita, private
respondents were lodged at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on
the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering
it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their
unexpected overnight stay.
On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to
Manila was again cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay
in Narita.

Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to
pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on
board JL flight No. 741.Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25,
1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before the RTC of Quezon City.

To support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide
care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and
accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted
that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On
the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right
to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure.The trial court rendered its
judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for damages.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision of the CA, which, affirmed the trial court’s finding.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. Failing in its bid to
reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if
the delay were caused by force majeure.

No.
In a plethora of cases it was ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind
and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued
with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of
care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.

However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or
damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the
defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective. Accordingly,
there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the
general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL
was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers
incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of
travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils
involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all,
common carriers are not the insurer of all risks

YOBIDO V CA ( ALAM MO NA TO)

VDA. DE NUECA v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts:

At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958, Fermin Nueca brought 7 sacks of palay to Manila Railroad Co. (MRC) at its
station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, to be shipped to the municipality of Libmanan of the same
province.

He paid P 0.70 as freight charge and was issued Way Bill No. 56515.

The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of Train 537. Passengers boarded the train and shunting
operations started to hook a wagon thereto.

Before the train reached the turnoff switch, its passenger coach fell on its side some 40 m from the
station. The wagon pinned Nueca, killing him instantly.

Nueca’s widow and children bring this claim for damages, alleging that the Nueca was a passenger and
his death was caused by MRC’s negligence.
MRC disclaimed liability stating: (1) it exercised due care in safeguarding the passengers during the
shunting operation, (2) Nueca was not a passenger but a trespasser, (3) even if Nueca were a passenger,
he illegally boarded the train without permission by not paying the fare, (4) the mishap was not
attributable to any defect in MRC equipment, (5) that the accident happened due to force majeur.

MRC presented evidence showing there was no mechanical defect, but it did not explain why the
accident occurred or show that force majeur caused the mishap.

The lower court absolved MRC of liability and held that Nueca was a trespasser since he did not buy any
ticket, and in any case, was not in a proper place for passengers.

Issue:

5. W/N Nueca was a passenger?

6. W/N MRC is liable?
7. Was the accident due to MRC’s negligence or force majeur?
8. Is Nueca liable for contributory negligence?

Held:

3. No, Nueca was not a passenger thus, MRC did not owe him extraordinary diligence.

A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with
the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an equivalent.

The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the care of the carrier, or
directly under its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a passenger, and is accepted as such
by the carrier – as where he makes a contract for trasportation and presents himself at the proper place
and in a proper manner to be transported.

Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a passenger, he was never
accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported.

4. Yes, the liability of railroad companies to persons upon the premises is determined by the
general rules of negligence relating to duties of owners/occupiers of property.

While railroad companies are not bound to the same degree of care in regard to strangers who are
unlawfully upon the premises of its passengers, it may still be liable to such strangers for negligent or
tortious acts.

Here, Nueca was not on the track, but either unlawfully inside the baggage car or beside the track.

It is normal for people to walk on the track or roadbed when there is no oncoming train and to walk
beside the track when a train passes. This practice is tolerated by MRC. Generally, MRC’s stations are
not enclosed, and is easily accessible to the public.

2. MRC is negligent; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.

The train was under the complete control of the railroad company at the time of the accident. The
baggage car would not have been derailed if the train had been properly operated.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.

4. No.

An invitation to stay in the premises is implied from the lack of prohibition to outsiders to keep off the
premises, hence, a stranger who is injured by a derailed train while staying beside a railroad track is not
guilty of contributory negligence.
Note: Our law on common carriers is lifted from Anglo-American statutes.

DANGWA V CA

FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated
forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective
destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of
Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in
the operation of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not
absolute insurers of the public at large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the
cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and
compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders
(EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril
to a passenger while he is attempting to board the same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition =
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito
on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old,
Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga,
bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The conductor
of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No
fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged in
accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of
their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from
the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind,
but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the
baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop,
it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board without getting
his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of
a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his
daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent.

For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter
damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident, and
therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for
his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter,
after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent
had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code
to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers.
The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus
even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.

Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals

On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila.
Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank connecting
the vessel to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank, disembarked through
the third deck, which was at the same level with the pier. An hour after the passengers disembarked,
Pioneer stevedoring started to operate in unloading the cargo from the ship. Viana then went back,
remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At that time, while he was pointing at the crew
of the vessel to where his cargoes were loaded, the crane hit him, pinning him between the crane
and the side of the vessel. He was brought to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May 15). The
parents of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed a motion for
reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an order absolving Pioneer from liability but not
Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the incident.

HELD:

Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at bar.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule
is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely
by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and
so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into
account such other factors.

Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract where all that is required of
plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier,
that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant
case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while
such relation subsists.

Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeal

The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van
of Bulletinalong the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified
that he went to the leftlane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane.
Before he passed by the Fiera, hesaw the van of Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was
driven by one Felix Angeles. The collisionoccurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact caused thejeepney to turn around and fall on its left
side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyeswho eventually died due to
the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and
Mallari Jr., andalso against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Co.
The complaint alleged thatthe collision which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by the fault
and negligence of both drivers of thepassenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

ISSUE:

WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel.

Yes.The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve onthe highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a)
and (b), of RA 4136 as amended,otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. A
driver abandoning his proper lane for thepurpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and notto proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is specialnecessity for keeping to
the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left handside relying
upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing toconsider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o’clock in the morning mindlessly
occupied the left laneand overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the
proximate cause of the collisionresulting in the death of Israel was the sole negligence of the driver
of the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., whorecklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art.2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehiclehas been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallaris failed to presentsatisfactory evidence to
overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari
Sr., whoadmittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in anaction based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the partof the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of damages sought by the passenger.

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the
heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad
and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by
the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA
and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert
evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where
they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death
or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under
Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is
established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the
liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages

is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The award was
deleted/\.

Pestano v. Sumayang
Sumayang, accompanied by another person, was riding a motor vehicle on a highway in Cebu.
While turning left at a junction, Sumayang was violently hit by a speeding bus driven by Pestano.
Sumayang and his companion died due to the accident. The heirs of Sumayang filed a civil action
against Pestano and Metro Cebu Bus Company, the owner of the Bus driven by Petano. A witness
named Nies accounts that before Sumayang turned left, the former had raised his left arm as a
signal but was run over by the bus and was thrown 14 meters away. Pestano alleges the victims
were negligent because 15-20 meters away, he had already blown the bus horn and even blew it a
second time when he got near but could only step on the brake after the bus had hid the motor
vehicle. RTC and CA held Pestano liable and also held Metro Cebu Bus liable for negligence.

WON Metro Cebu Bus may be liable for the acts of Pestano.

HELD:

There were factual findings that the bus had a defective speedometer and the Company was held to
have shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and supervision of employees. Under Articles
2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by
their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the
master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in supervision of the
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowing Pestano to ply his route with a defective
speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the
supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not
in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestano was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the
proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by
law.

LUDO V CA
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2001februarydecisions.php?id=113

Philippine rabbit v IAC nasa taas pero ito topic

JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
 Facts: Herein JUNTILLA was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from Danao City
to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol Camoro and registered
under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at
the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm
aside from the injuries he suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back.
Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City.
Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was beyond their control, taking into
account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it
blew up.
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event

HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.

 passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
 at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear
tire blows up
 passenger jeepney was overloaded
 3 passengers in the front seat
 14 passengers in the rear
 caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
 (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent
of the human will.
 (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
 (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
 (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
 In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers
not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits,
and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus
insuring the safety of passengers at all times
 the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage,
and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by
the respondents
 respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any
amount for failure to prove such damages during the trial
 findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu

Bayasen v. Court of Appeal

Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, went to barrio
Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from the Saint Theodore’s Hospital in Sagada, viz., Elena
Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit
as they had requested for a ride to Ambasing. Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather
flowers, again asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which
he intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed them to ride, Elena sitting herself between
him and Dolores. On the way, at barrio Langtiw, the jeep went over a precipice. About 8 feet below
the road, it was blocked by a pine tree. The three were thrown out of the jeep. Elena was found lying
in a creek further below. Among other injuries, she suffered a skull fracture which caused her death.
ISSUE:

Whether or not negligence can be ascribed to the accused herein.

RULING:

It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep
and not the “unreasonable speed” of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove
or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at “an unreasonable speed”. It is a well-known
physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on
account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the
car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault.

No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the moment he
felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road,
parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and avoid the
embankment Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-driver who
skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course.
The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime
charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

Cervantes v. CA
On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner Nicholas Cervantes a
round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which is valid until March
27, 1990. On March 23, 1990, petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately
booked a flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane would
make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there on April 2, petitioner made
arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April 2, he was not allowed to board due to the
expiration of his ticket. He filed a complaint for damages. It was not given due course by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

(1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of
validity of petitioner's ticket

(2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper

Held:

(1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that there was a need to
send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension of the period of validity of his ticket.
Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond
his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said
third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover
damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.

(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL acted in bad
faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San Francisco. In awarding moral damages
for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the
one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a
strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up
ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it
should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No
injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to
accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.

Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, and the existence of bad faith is established.
The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed
only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Here, there
is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An award for attorney's fees is also improper.

CALALAS V CA – CHECK TAAS ON PRESUMPTION

Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Company

That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba,
Laguna to Manila; That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train
guard of the Manila Railroad Company assigned in Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened
to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he
was going to report for duty; That Devesa’s tour of duty on that day was from 9:00 a.m., until the
train to which he was assigned reached La Union at 7:00 p.m. of the same days;

That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same dating back
during the Japanese occupation; That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco with the
carbine furnished to him by the Manila Raildroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon
seeing him inside the train coach; That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the wound which he
sustained from the shot fired by Divesa. It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted of homicide
by final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Appelant’s contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no
liability attaches to it as employer of the killer.

Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is liable for the intentional assault committed by its
employee.

No while the a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents
or employees by virtue of the contract of carriage, this responsibility extends only to those that the
carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it.
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco because of personal grudge was entirely
unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Company. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate
that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist
between each one of its many employees and anyone of the thousands of eventual passengers
riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore” caso fortuito” within the definition of the
old civil code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances and pursuant
to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the appellant’s contract of safe carriage with the late
Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. Moreover, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had
no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to
Manila. When Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
Fernando La Union trains, and he was in the Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the
starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00
a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding and the killing
of Gillaco was not done in line of duty.

The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the railroad
had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa’s assault can not be deemed in
law a breach of Gillaco’s contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.