1.

Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista

v.
Francisco Lindo and Welhilmina Lindo
G.R. No. 208232
March 10, 2014

FACTS:

Alfredo Bautista sold his free-patent land to several vendees, including respondents Lindo. Three years after the
sale, Bautista filed a case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the exercise of his right to repurchase the land within
five years under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act.

Respondents Lindo later ceded to Epifania Bautista, Alfredo’s successor-in-interest, a portion of the land through a
compromise agreement. However, other respondents moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the selling price of
the land is only ₱16,500, which is below the ₱20,000 jurisdictional threshold of the RTC.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Bautista failed to allege that the value of the
land exceeds ₱20,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction of subject matter.

HELD:

NO. The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being one for
specific performance.

In Russel v. Vestil, it was held that if the complaint is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or the RTCs would depend on
the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such actions are cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary
estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

Bautista sold his land covered by a free patent. The right to repurchase in CA 141 was implicitly integrated and
made part of the deeds of sale, thus being a binding prestation which he can enforce. He did file a case to enforce
this right, thus making his action one for specific performance.
 2.

[G.R. NO. 177583 : February 27, 2009]LOURDES BALTAZAR and

EDISON BALTAZAR, Petitioners, v. JAIME CHUA y IBARRA,
Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Jaime and Jovito were charged before the RTC Manila, Branch 27 with the
crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide for the death of Ildefonso
Baltazar and the wounding of Edison Baltazar.

On 13 February 1997, petitioners Lourdes Baltazar (Lourdes) and Edison

Baltazar (Edison), through counsel, filed a motion for reinvestigation of the
cases. On November 18, 1993, the late Carmen Cruz-Zamora (Zamora) filed
a Complaint against respondent Multiwood International, Inc.
(Multiwood).

In the meantime, the cases were re-raffled to Branch 37 of the Manila RTC
presided over by Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo (Judge Hidalgo) and docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 97-161168 and No. 97-161169. Despite the transfer of
the cases to the sala of Judge Hidalgo, Judge Cruz, nonetheless, acted on
Lourdes and Edison's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 18
November 1997

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo (Judge Hidalgo) acted on the

case with jurisdiction;

SUPREME COURT RULING:

It must be noted that the 18 November 1997 Order of Judge Cruz granting
the motion of the prosecution to Withdraw the Information for Murder and
Frustrated Murder was in effect an affirmation by the trial court of the
Justice Secretary's directive to downgrade the crimes against Jovito and to
exclude Jaime from these crimes. As discussed earlier, such grant by Judge
Cruz, absent any independent evaluation on his part of the merits of the
resolution of the Justice Secretary, constituted an abdication of his power,
rendering the said Order void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that orders
which are void can never attain finality. Since the 18 November 1997 Order
is void, the same has never attained finality. Besides, assuming arguendo
that the 18 November 1997 Order was valid, the same could not have an
adverse effect on the 7 December 2004 Order of Judge Hidalgo. As has
been noted, a timely motion for reconsideration was filed on the 18
November 1997 Order and Judge Cruz merely stated therein that he could
not resolve the merits of the dropping of Jaime from all the cases and the
downgrading of the crimes charged since the subject cases were already
transferred to Judge Hidalgo. In the subject order of Judge Cruz, he even
stated that the said issues could only be resolved by Judge Hidalgo, before
whom the cases were pending. In other words, since Judge Cruz was
divested of jurisdiction, the issue of the dropping of Jaime from all charges
and the downgrading of the charges against Jovito was not resolved by the
18 November 1997 Order. It was therefore proper for Judge Hidalgo to
resolve such issue since he had jurisdiction over the cases.

SO ORDERED.
 3.

Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc. Vs. Union Bank of the Philippines / Union Bank of the
Philippines
Vs.
Bignay EX-IM Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 171590 & G.R. No. 171598. February 12, 2014

© Geh Gabriel

FACTS:

Alfonso de Leon, married to Rosario, mortgaged a real property in favor of Union Bank of the Philippines
in 1984. the given land is located in Esteban Abada, Loyola Heights, Quezon City which was later foreclosed and
sold at the auction to Union Bank. On the other hand, Rosario filed a case in 1988 against Alfonso and Union Bank
for the annulment of the prior mortgage, claiming that her husband mortgaged the property without her consent
and for conveyance. While the case was pending, Bignay Ex-Im Philippines, Inc. (Bignay) offered to purchase the
disputed property.

On December 20, 1989, the Deed of Absolute sale was executed between Union Bank and Bignay
conveying the property to the latter for 4 million pesos. On December 12, 1991, the case was decided by the court
in favor of Rosario annulling the given contract and declaring her as the owner of the undivided one-half of the
subject property. As a result, Bignay was evicted from the property. On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed a case for
breach of warranty against eviction under articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages against Union
Bank. The trial court rendered its decision on March 21, 2000, in favor of Bignay, ordering Union Bank to reimburse
the cost of the land and the value of the constructed building thereon, since the bank has acted in bad faith. At the
same time, the trial court dismissed the bank’s counterclaim without prejudice because it did not acquire its
jurisdiction since the bank did not pay the docket fees.

The Union Bank appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which ruled that Union Bank had timely
paid its docket fees at the time it filed its Answer Ad Cautelam on November 4, 1994, as evidenced by the receipts
and the rubber stamped mark on the face of the answer itself. Hence, the trial court should have made a ruling
thereon. Bignay filed a Motion for Partial reconsideration questioning the ruling on the bank’s counterclaim. On
the other hand, Union Bank took an exception to the application of the decision of the trial court through its
Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied the respective motions of both parties. Thus,
it lead Bignay to initiate its petition for Review on Certiorari which was followed by the filing of the same by Union
Bank. These petitions were then ordered consolidated by the Supreme Court through its resolution.

ISSUES:

1. In a permissive counterclaim, when should the docket fees be paid to enable the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case?
2. In the event of non-payment of docket fees for permissive counterclaims, can the court dismiss the said
counterclaims?
HELD:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that docket fees should be paid after the trial court had ruled that the
counterclaim is a permissive one. The bank in this case never raised the given issue that it had already paid the
corresponding fees in its motion for reconsideration considering that the trial court had already dismissed its
 counterclaim. The opportunity to cause the counterclaim be reinstated was only during the time that such
case was pending before the trial court.
2. Yes. The SC upheld the trial court’s decision in dismissing the counterclaims due to non-payment of docket
fees because it did not acquire its jurisdiction over the case.

Hence, the SC dismissed the counterclaim of Union Bank.

 4.

G.R. No. 159926 January 20, 2014

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA, Respondents.
Ponente: LUCAS P. BERSSAMIN

FACTS:

On various dates in 1993, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of

petitioner corporation (Pinausukan, for short), executed four real estate.
Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure
of the mortgages, Pinausukan, represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman,
brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real
estate mortgages in the RTC on October 4, 2001 (Civil Case No. 01-0300).
The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing
scheduled on September 5, 2002 despite having agreed thereto.
Accordingly, on October 31, 2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 01-
0300 for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.
On July 24, 2003, Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the
CA seeking the nullification of the order of October 31, 2002 dismissing
Civil Case No. 01-0300. On July 31, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition for
annulment. On September 12, 2003, the CA denied Pinausukan’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not CFI had jurisdiction over the annulment of property;

SUPREME COURT RULING:

The jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment had been
lodged in the CFI as a court of general jurisdiction on the basis that the
subject matter of the action was not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Section 56, paragraph 1, of Act No. 136 (An Act providing for the
Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands), effective on June 11, 1901,
vested original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the
subject of litigations is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The CFI
retained its jurisdiction under Section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296 (The
Judiciary Act of 1948), effective on June 17, 1948, which contained a similar
provision vesting original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation."

In the period under the regimes of Act No. 136 and Republic Act No. 296,
the issues centered on which CFI, or branch thereof, had the jurisdiction
over the action for the annulment of judgment. It was held in Mas v.
Dumara-og that "the power to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not
only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in which the judgment was
rendered." In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Torres, the Court declared that "the
jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance
belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the judgment." In
Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz, the Court enjoined a branch of the
CFI of Rizal from taking cognizance of an action filed with it to annul the
judgment of another branch of the same court.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment
or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The
former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action.
The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order
issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in
Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, "in this sense it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." But the defect of lack
of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be
waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly.
 5.

G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS

ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND
RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners,

vs.

FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., Respondent.

Ponente: JUSTICE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the

Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of
general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director
Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet
Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily
Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous
article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of
the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each
defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica
Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building,
Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.

In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina

efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because
the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He made a
second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that
petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted
service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return dated
September 22, 2005.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

RULING:

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the

summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first
in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of
the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were
"always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always
roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those
present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no
likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours
of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them
in person within a reasonable time would be futile.

The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not

expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to
resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal
service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time
was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in
insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such
strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, which
governs.
 The court indeed acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant considering that while the rules is strict in insisting personal
service on the defendant, but the court do not stick to such strictness
should the circumstances already justify of resorting to substituted service.
The spirit of the procedural rules which governs.
 6.

[G.R. No. 109853. October 11, 2000]

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S.

AMATONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Province of Zamboanga del Norte (represented by Gov. Isagani S. Amatong) filed with
the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) for
“Illegal Collection Of Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining Order.” Petitioner alleged
that as per electric bills issued by ZANECO increased the Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) Petitioner
claimed that the increase was arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) did not
sanction the collections.

Petitioner also alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate increase from
the National Power Corporation (NPC) was not implemented yet due to a restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent to desist from
imposing, charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other additional charges upon its end-users in
Zamboanga del Norte and to refrain from cutting off the electric lines of those who refused to pay the
questioned charges, pending determination of the litigation.

Petitioner submits that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board or the regular
trial courts, while respondents position is that jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification
Administration. What is before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals, that reversed the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte denying
petitioner’s motion for dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power bills
by an electric cooperative?
HELD:
The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within
the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration, despite the enactment of Executive Order
No. 172, creating the Energy Regulatory Board. The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the
imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is
that respondent charged its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did
not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a
result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or
not the charges are legal is the NEA.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is
afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. The premature invocation
of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of the case. It AFFIRM in toto with the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
 7.
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: .

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987
dated April 30, 1998and its resolution dated October 15, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court
which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the
sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for
Regional Trial Courts.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1998, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent.

HELD:
RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed
by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-
year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that
the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for
the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of
accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the action for specific
performance, irrespective of the amount of the rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable exclusively by the RTC.
 8.

[G.R. NO. 171916, DECEMBER 4, 2009]

CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS,

REPRESENTED BY ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioner

Versus

LOURDES S. PASCUAL, respondent

PONENTE: DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for

issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before RTC,
Malolos, Bulacan against respondent Dr. Lourdes Pascual. On August 14,
2002, the process server went again to the house of respondent Dr.
Lourdes Pascual and left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the
age of reason but refused to sign the same.

For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading,

petitioner, on September 17, 2002, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default, to which the petitioner filed an Opposition/Comment to Plaintiff's
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default dated October 1, 2002, claiming
that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the
complaint. The RTC, in its Order dated October 30, 2002, declared
respondent in default and allowed petitioner to file his evidence ex-parte.
ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a proper and valid substituted service of

summons, the resolution of which, will determine whether jurisdiction was
indeed acquired by the trial court over the person of the petitioner.

SUPREME COURT´S RULING:

The jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested
with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the process
server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation
of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a
valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.
When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction
or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court
which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”

The said doctrine, however, is applicable only when the judgment

or decision is valid. In the present case, as earlier pronounced, and as ruled
by the CA, the judgment in question is void, the RTC not having acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. It is a well-entrenched
principle that a void judgment can never become final.

Thus, the Decision of the RTC, not having

attained its finality due to its being void, the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, filed by the respondent with the CA, was proper..
 9.
G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,

vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO,
ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO,
LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a Complaint to expropriate a property of
the respondents. In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated, Concluding
that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. In a
Resolution, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the
due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the
resolution of July 14, 1999." 7 In a subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated
the Petition.

ISSUE:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation
where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

HELD:
Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the
right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An
expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court
is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety
of the expropriation. In addition, The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of
the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not
even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience
or welfare may demand." The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case.
 10.

G.R. No. 195619 September 5, 2012

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE CHANDUMAL, Respondent.

Ponente: BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The instant case stemmed from a contract to sell a parcel of land,

between BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) and respondent Julie Chandumal
(Chandumal). On February 12, 1993, BF Homes sold to PDB all its rights,
participations and interests over the contract. Chandumal paid her monthly
amortizations from December 1990 until May 1994 when she began to
default in her payments.

On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of notarial

rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDB against Chandumal,
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-99-0137.

Consequently, summons was issued and served by deputy sheriff

Roberto T. Galing (Sheriff Galing). According to his return, Sheriff Galing
attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19
and 22, 1999 but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on
said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons on
August 5, 1999 by serving the same through Chandumal’s mother who
acknowledged receipt thereof.
ISSUE:

1. Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons and thus the
court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

DECISION:

No valid substituted service of summons

In applying the foregoing requisites in the instant case, the CA

correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to
substituted service of summons. According to the CA, the Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion
of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in
attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating
that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Indeed, the sheriff’s return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to
cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no
indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific
whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where she can be
reached or whether he even tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted
by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his
failure to comply with the requisites renders such service ineffective. The
petition is denied.
 11.

G.R. No. 150908 January 21, 2005

LAGRIMAS PACAÑA-GONZALES, as one of the heirs of Luciano Pacaña, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL CARBONELL PHUA, respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Amarillo registered owners of subject lot 7746 located in Cebu, it was conveyed to
Manuel Carbonell Phua and Amarillo’s title was cancelled. More than a decade later heirs of Pacaña
claim the lot and filed a complaint for Nullity of Title and Annulment of Deed of Sale. Summons together
with the complaint was served to the spouses Amarillo but not to the Phua who was unknown at his
given address at Salinas Compound Lahug, Cebu City. Service of summons to Phua by postal service was
served but the same failed, then summons by publication was resorted. It was publish once a week for
(3) three consecutive weeks.

No answer recievd by Phua within reglementary period. The RTC declared him in default and the
heirs of Pacaña were allowed to present their evidence exparte. Decision was served against the
defendant by publication and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new transfer certificate of title
to Pacaña.

Phua filed for annulment of judgment in Court Of Appeals, because when the case was filed by
the Pacaña he did not receive any summons because he was outside the country. CA granted the
petition and the RTC’c decision were declared null and void, for lack of jurisdiction over the person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC acquire jurisdiction.

HELD:
Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction for not diligently following required necessary
requisites. Hence the issuance of new certificate is null and void.
 12.

G.R. No. 159482. August 30, 2005

NICASIO P. RODRIGUEZ JR., ANTONIO P. EREÑETA, JUANITO A. MAGNO, VICTOR C. PINEDA, BITUIN V.
SALCEDO, CESAR R. SAN DIEGO, VICTOR V. TANTOCO and AMADOR C. DE LA MERCED, petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO L. AGUILAR SR., respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc.
(PPSBI) at Liwasang Bonifacio, Manila; private respondent Antonio L. Aguilar was employed as
Vice President of its Finance and Administrative Group from February 14, 2000 to January 31,
2001, and thereafter as Compliance Officer until September 26, 2001 when his services were
terminated.

On October 25, 2001, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 49, City of Manila alleging that he was illegally dismissed by the petitioners
in an oppressive way; that the cause of his dismissal was his principled act of exposing
anomalies in the bank; that considering the seriousness of the violations of internal control and
bank policies, there is a need to prohibit petitioners from performing their functions as members
of the Board in their own personal capacity. He prayed for the award of damages, the issuance of
a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from dismissing him or in the alternative,
to immediately reinstate him, and the prohibition of the petitioners from performing their
personal and official acts in the bank.

The judge dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction that the case lies within the Labor
Arbiter of National Labor Relation Commission. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
an exparte to withdraw motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. Reinstatement be deleted.

ISSUES:
Was the court has jurisdiction to decide the case

HELD:
National Labor Relation Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide regarding any labor
disputes, while the RTC has the jurisdiction and the effective means and also the adequate tool
for arriving at a just accurate assessment of damages.
 13.

G.R. No. 154886. July 28, 2005]

LUDWIG H. ADAZA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO R.
CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICE, respondents.

FACTS:
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte
awarded to Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School (MNHS) a contract
for the construction of a school building at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50. Upon the
completion of the project, PTA failed to receive the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.

PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, DPWH Cashier, that the check
for P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza).
Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging receipt of the check bears his name and signature
which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adaza‘s signature was affixed on the voucher. During that
time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon examination of DBP Check issued to payee,
Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal portion of it, his forged signature and
another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of Adaza.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan found
Adaza guilty of the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest. Hence, the filing of
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza which was not in
relation to his position as municipal mayor

HELD:
In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the
accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The
information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official
duties and the commission of the offense. . . .

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the
office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its
acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.
 14.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004]

1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 2LT. RYAN H. QUISAI, TSG.
ELMER D. COLON, CAPT. JULIUS W. ESPORO, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. GIL P.
LOZADA, SGT. RAYMUND DUMAGO and PFC. REGIE A. ALAGABAN, petitioners, vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
B.GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the AFP, and
OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 162341. October 25, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF CPT. RUPERTO L.
REASO, LTSG. NORBERTO E. SANTIAGO, 1LT. DANNY C. CANAVERAL, 1LT. JULIUS
R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 1LT. JEFFREY GAUGUIRAN, LTJG.
CEFERINO CHECA, LTJG. MARCO ANGELO J. ANCHETA, LTJG. ELMER TORRIADO,
LTJG. RONALD A. GALICIA, 2LT. LAUREFEL P. DABALES, 2LT. MARY JAMES A.
TAYABAN, 2LT. JASON P. PANALIGAN, 2LT. RYAN QUISAI, 2LT. NESTOR JASON
CAMBA, 2LT. ARCHIBALD RANEL, 2LT. RESINO S. ORTEZA, 2LT. NOEL F.
TOMENGLAY, 2LT. LEOPOLDO APELLANES, JR., 2LT. JONATHAN D. COSTALES,
2LT. OSWALD IAN DIRA, 2LT. SAMSUDIN T. LINTONGAN, 2LT. ALQUIN CANSON,
2LT. JUNIBERT S. TUBO, 2LT. EDWIN DUETAO, 2LT. MARK P. DAMASO, 2LT.
JIOVANNI PALLIAN, 2LT. EDGARDO AGUILAR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER, 2LT.
LARRY S. CENDANA, 2LT. AVELINO SAHLI, 2LT. LEXINGTON ALONZO, 2LT.
FILMORE RULL, ENS. VICTOR ODULLO, ENS. IAN LUIS BADECAO, ENS. RONALD E.
DISO, ENS. ARJOHN ELUMBA, ENS. BRIAN BABANG, ENS. ANTONIO BOSCH, ENS.
TED CEREZO, ENS. HAROLD DAVE PRE, ENS. JEFFREY BANGSA, ENS. JONAH
ARUGAY, ENS. JONATHAN J. ADLAWAN, ENS. EMERSON ROSALES, ENS. ELMER
CRUZ, ENS. REX P. CALLANO, ENS. JUVENAL AZURIN, ENS. LYLE ROSOS, ENS.
CESAR CARMEL TAMBA, CPO. LEONIDO FERNIN, EM3 RONNIE GUMIA, PO3
ROULEX MAGISA, TSG. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD, SSG. NORBERTO MARTINEZ, SSG.
BERTING CABANA, SSG. JOERY ROJO, PO2 EDWARD ABUAC, SSG. LEO GAPAYAO,
SSG. ROMAR ARQUERO, SSG. RALLON BEBASA, SSG. LORENZO GLORIOSO, SSG.
NOEL AGGALUT, SSG. PHILIP VITALES, SSG. FRANCISCO BOSI, JR., SSG.
BONIFACIO BARRION, SSG. RUBEN SORIANO, SSG. RONALD REYES, SSG.
WILFREDO LEAL, SSG. GUILLERMO LAVITORES, SGT. ALFREDO ALEGADO, JR.,
SGT. GREGORIO SANDAGON, SGT. JIGGER PACULBA SGT. JOJO ABANDO, SGT.
JUANITO JILBURY, SGT. ERIC CASTINO, SGT. ANTONIO CARABATA,
SGT.REYNANTE DANTE ESCATRON, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. JERAN TABUJARA,
SGT. RESTITUTO DEBORJA, SGT. NILO ENASO, SGT. JULIUS WESFIRO, SGT.
ROLDAN ANDO, SGT. LORENZO CARRANZA, SGT. DANTE SANTOS, SGT. WALTER
MANALANSAN, SGT. JUDE ARQUISOLA, SGT. HERMAN LINDE, SGT. ALEXANDER
SICAT, SGT. FLORANTE ROSETTE, SGT. ROMELO SY, SGT. JOEY MEMBREVE, SGT.
 ADONIS PRADO, PO3 JESSMAR LANDONG, PO3 ROBERTO TRIPULCA, PO3 SONNY
MADARANG, PO3 RHOMMEL LORETE, PO3 CARISTOFEIL TIKTIK, PO3 RENATO
BUSTILLO, PO3 JERRY ASUNCION, PO3 LUDIVICO CLEMENTE, CPL. REY RUBIOS,
CPL. EMMANUEL TIRADOR, CPL. OLIVER COMBAUCER, CPL. JOEL ABAYA, CPL.
RANDEL CENO, CPL. RONALD RETUTA, CPL. JULIUS TANALLON, CPL. FILOMENO
RAMIREZ, CPL. JIGGER ALAMEDA, CPL. RAYMUND DUMAGAO, CPL. EDGAR
VELASCO, CPL. RAMONCITO TAMPON, SN1 ALLAN DULAP, SN1 JERRY
REGALARIO, SN1 JOEL MASENAS, SN1 JONATHAN PEREZ, S1HM ROMUALDO
GANANCIAL, SN1 ROEL GADON, F1EM GARY PAYOS, SN1 ZANDRIX GACU, SN1
ROMMEL ANONUEVO, SN1 WILLIAM ABLITER, SN1 GERMINIO FERNANDEZ, SN1
ARNEL CAPUNO, SN1 CLEOFAS PAMIENTA, S1HM TIMOTEO ABARRACOSO, S1CD
GERARDO DEDICATORIA, SN1 LEONOR FORTE, JR., CPL. JEOBAL GONZALES, CPL.
ALADIN GOMEZ, CPL. HARDY GLAGARA, CPL. CESAR A. PADILLA, CPL. JERSON
ALABATA, CPL. OLIVER GERIO, CPL. TEDDY ANTONIO, CPL. DENNIS LOPEZ, CPL.
RUEL MOLINA, CPL. ALVIN CELESTINO, CPL. BENJAMIN RAMBOYONG, JR., CPL.
GERRY CALINGACION, CPL. ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, CPL. JONATHAN
DAGOHOY, CPL. CLECARTE DAHAN, CPL. RAYMOND PASTRETA, CPL. LORENZO
BIAO, CPL. ALEX PENA, CPL. ROGUN OLIVIDO, CPL. MONCHITO LUSTERIO, CPL.
GEORGE GANADOS, CPL. MICHAEL BALISTA, PVT. 1ST CLASS MAXINIAR
BALANAY, PVT. 1ST CLASS BONIFACIO CAOALO, PVT. 1ST CLASS REGGIE
ALAGABAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ANGELO MARQUEZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS JOHN GAIHAN,
PVT. 1ST CLASS MARCIAL CAISA, PVT. 1ST CLASS CARLOS FILLIOS, PVT. 1ST
CLASS PATROCENIO PATENO, PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLLY BERNAL, PVT. 1ST CLASS
NOVIDA RUIZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS MELCHOR ALOOS, PVT. 1ST CLASS JOEL MALALAY,
PVT. 1ST CLASS JULIETO BANAS, JR., PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLAND BANAAG, PVT. 1ST
CLASS NIXON MAGALLIS, PVT. 1ST CLASS RICHARD LARCE, PVT. 1ST CLASS SINDY
BONOTAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ARNOLD PULPULAAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ABRAHAM
APOSTOL, PFC. CHARLES AGNER, S2RM JULIUS CEAZAR ALFUENTE, PFC. EDILON
ANDALEON, PFC. RONALDO BAYOS, PFC. MARCIAL BAYSA, S2EM ABRAHAM
BILLONES, CPL. ABNER BIRAL, PFC. JEFFREY BOLALIN, SN2 JEFFREY BONCACAS,
1LT PATRICIO BUMIDANG, JR., S2BM JOSEPH BUSCATO, CPT. EINSTEIN CALAOA,
JR., PFC. EDWIN CANETE, SN2 EZRA JERRY CARUMBA, S2PH GLENN CARUMBA,
SGT. ARIMATEO B. CEDENO, SN2 ALEX CHAN, PO3 COCARI GONZALES, FN2 ALEX
DEL CALLE, PFC. HANZEL DELA TORRE, SN2 SONNY DELA VEGA, PFC. JOSE
DEMONTEVERDE, 1LT. JOSE ENRICO M. DINGLE, PFC. ALADINO DOGOMEO, ENS.
DENNIS DONGA, PFC. RUEL ESPINILLA, PFC. RODRIGO FERNANDEZ, SN2 JULIUS
GARCIA, SGT. ALLAN INOCENCIO, TSQ. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD, PFC. JERSON
LABILLES, CPL. DANILO LAGRIMAS, SN2 ALLAN LEONOR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER
LO, S2BM JERIC LORENA, S2DP ANGELITO LOYLOY, PFC. LUIS NOVIDA, SN2
EMMANUEL LUMACANG, CPL. RIZAL MANIMTIM, PFC. GALIB MOHAMMAD, SSG.
GIL MONTOJO, PFC. BENJAMIN NANGGAN, PFC. ARNOLD NIALLA, SN2 FERNANDO
PACARDO, SGT. JOVITO PACLEB, PFC. CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, LTJG. JENNIFER PILI,
PFC. CARLOS PILLOS, PFC. JOCIL REGULACION, S2DC GARY REYES, S2EM
VALENTIN SAMAR, LT/SG. NORBERTO SANTIAGO, JR., FN2 FRANCISCO SEVILLA,
JR., SN2 MIKE SOLAR, SN2 ROMMEL SOLIS, PFC. JOJIT SORIANO, CPT. EDMAR B.
SORIOSO, SSG. JUAN TUQUIB, SN2 JOEL TYBACO, S1BM RONALDO URBANO, S2HM
 EDGAR VASQUEZ, SGT. IGNACIO VIGAR, ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
petitioner, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, BRIG. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as AFP Judge Advocate General,
and ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR STEAD AND UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY,
respondents.

FACTS

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men,
mostly from the elite units of the AFP the Philippine Armys Scout Rangers and the Philippine
Navys Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in
Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments
(Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted
at the Oakwood roof deck..

Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-
CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those grievances were:
the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the
State, the bombings in Davao City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus,
Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain more military assistance from the United States
government, and the micro-management in the AFP by then Department of National Defense
(DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of
command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration.

Petitioners , filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the
Judge Advocate General in filing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War Sections 67,
96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court acquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the
mutiny. Petitioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their participation in
the mutiny was not service connected. The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus were
then filed with the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order
in the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parties to observe the status quo
prevailing before the filing of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military courts of jurisdiction.

HELD:
RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims,
or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense,
as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected
crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.
The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are considered “service-connected crimes or
offenses” under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War. Section 1 of RA
7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In view of the clear mandate of RA
7055, the Regional Trial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with
violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as “service-
connected offenses or crimes” under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts
have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to
rule that violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’etat and, as
such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found
no probable cause for coup d’etat against Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case against
them. The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et al. There is, as
yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the
Articles of War in furtherance of coup d’etat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were
not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, the RTC (Branch 148)
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and
does not exist.
 15.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU
SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.
UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014

FACTS:

September 23,2011 Shang KoVingson Yu (Shang Ko) run away from their home as alleged by her mother
ShirlyVingdon (Shirly). November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of
information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent JovyCabcaban (Cabcaban), a police officer in that
station.Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban. Pura an NBI agent told Shirly that Shang Ko was staying with a
private organization called Calvary Kids.

This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed
officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing
as reason several threats against her life in that city.

December 18, 2012,the CA denies the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko.
According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a
person or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of such
person.3 The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not habeas corpus may be availed by the petitioner?

Whether or not the case was properly file with CA?

HELD:

No

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful
custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State
has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives
unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.

No.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that
such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city.
WHEREFORE, thedecision of Court of Appeals was set and the case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City
for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime the minor Shang KoVingson remain in the
custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.

Further the Court ORDERS petitioner ShirlyVingsonShirlyVingsonDemaisip to pay the balance of the docket and
other legal fees within 10 days from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.