Consti

2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW
CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 6

JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay
in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice.
From time to time, however, the Court has recognized exceptions to the strict application of such
rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would
defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. These exceptions, as enumerated in the case of
Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), are as follows: x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. x x x. Castells vs. Saudi Arabian
Airlines, 704 SCRA 206, G.R. No. 188514 August 28, 2013
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will
to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or
complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the
correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge
whose authority they acknowledge. Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to
obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. Abadilla, Jr. vs. Obrero, 777 SCRA 457, G.R. No.
210855 December 9, 2015
To merit liberality, the one seeking such treatment must show reasonable cause justifying
its non-compliance with the Rules, and must establish that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice.
It is well to stress that “procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may
be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party, x x x. Justice has to be administered according
to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.” Resort to the liberal
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application of procedural rules remains the exception rather than the rule; it cannot be made
without any valid reasons underpinning the said course of action. x x x Procedural rules must, at
all times, be followed, save for instances when a litigant must be rescued from an injustice far
graver than the degree of his carelessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. The
limited exception does not obtain in this case. William Go Que Construction vs. Court of
Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 191699 April 19, 2016; see also Dy vs. Yu, 762 SCRA 357,
G.R. No. 202632 July 8, 2015
Hierarchy of Courts
It should be observed that while strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been the
long standing policy of the courts, it is not without exception as the Court possesses full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it.
A direct resort to the Court is allowed when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as in this
case. United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna, 845 SCRA 213,
G.R. No. 216788 November 20, 2017
Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-interference
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city,
having the same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their
respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
In Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 414 (2015), the Court had the opportunity to thoroughly explain
the said doctrine in this manner: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:
no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration
of justice. x x x To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate
the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against
this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher

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court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power
that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this
Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65. x x x It is not a viable
legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff,
not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ
itself, not merely the executing sheriff. x x x As already mentioned above, the appropriate action
is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts,
and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body. Del Rosario vs. Ocampo-
Ferrer, 794 SCRA 116, G.R. No. 215348 June 20, 2016; see also First Gas Power Corporatin
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 169461 September 2, 2013
JURISDICTION
Jurisprudence has consistently held that jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority
of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.
In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits,
it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.” Perforce, it
is important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter presented before it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction
shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects. Bilag vs. Ay-Ay, 824 SCRA 78, G.R.
No. 189950 April 24, 2017
It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation.
The fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall
be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the
same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental
that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties. Hence, following
the rule that the law is deemed written into every contract, the said stipulation should not be
construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue. Moreover,
“[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time they enter into the contract
and at the time it is to become operative.” Thus, without any clear showing in the contract that the
parties intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation should be considered as a stipulation on
venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic principles of procedural law. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sedano, 837 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 222711
August 23, 2017
Case law holds that jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined from the nature of action
pleaded as appearing from the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief

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sought. Once the nature of the action is determined, it remains the same even on appeal until a
decision rendered thereon becomes final and executory. Ignacio vs. Office of the City
Treasurer of Quezon City, 839 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 221620 September 11, 2017
When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss
the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any
binding legal effects.
RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein
respondents) seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil
Case No. 5881-R must be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo’s
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without authority and necessarily
obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. In this light, the Court finds no further need to
discuss the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case. Bilag vs. Ay-Ay, 824 SCRA 78,
G.R. No. 189950 April 24, 2017
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over
such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in
force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.
Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the
complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, 685 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 192994 November 12, 2012
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service
of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.
It was ruled that as a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to
declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Reicon Realty Builders Corporation
vs. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., 750 SCRA 37, G.R. No. 204796 February
4, 2015

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In ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant may be made when said party specifically objects to the service of
summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant,
however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of the complainant’s
initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the court’s
jurisdiction over his person.
It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the
propriety of the trial court’s service of summons — same as the CA’s service of its resolution
indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition — which remains material to the matter of the
court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the defendant’s/respondents’ person.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an
exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in
an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.” Reicon Realty Builders Corporation vs.
Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., 750 SCRA 37, G.R. No. 204796 February 4,
2015
Family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,”
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law. Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352,
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution

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vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3
SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
issue.” Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 8799, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A was transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), being courts of general
jurisdiction.
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular
case’s subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court’s exercise of
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders
issued from time to time by the Court. In Lozada v. Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371 (2014), it was
recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has
nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect
on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A was transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general jurisdiction. Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly
S.J. Land, Inc.), 774 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 202664 November 10, 2015
The erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only
a matter of procedure — that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and,
thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa
City had already acquired.
In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed;
instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing
as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only
designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256. Note that the procedure
would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special
commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same
as a commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.
If the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then
it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch
within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-
docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if

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the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case
among those special branches. Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.), 774
SCRA 242, G.R. No. 202664 November 10, 2015
Cases decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which involve issues relating to the power
of the local government to impose real property taxes are considered as local tax cases,
which fall under the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Based on the above cited provision of law, it is apparent that the CTA’s appellate jurisdiction over
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs becomes operative only when the RTC has ruled on
a local tax case. Thus, before the case can be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the
RTC must be in the nature of a tax case, or one which primarily involves a tax issue. In National
Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas, 741 SCRA 505 (2014): Indeed, the CTA,
sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings and resolutions of
the RTC over local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is evident from a perusal
of the Local Government Code (LGC) which includes the matter of Real Property Taxation under
one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the power to impose real property tax is in line with the
power vested in the local governments to create their own revenue sources, within the limitations
set forth by law. As such, the collection of real property taxes is conferred with the local treasurer
rather than the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Thus, cases decided by the RTC which involve issues
relating to the power of the local government to impose real property taxes are considered as
local tax cases, which fall under the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. To note, these issues may,
inter alia, involve the legality or validity of the real property tax assessment; protests of
assessments; disputed assessments, surcharges, or penalties; legality or validity of a tax
ordinance; claims for tax refund/credit; claims for tax exemption; actions to collect the tax due;
and even prescription of assessments. Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City,
839 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 221620 September 11, 2017
It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the
fees are paid within a reasonable period.
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are
paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent
rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development
Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), should be applied in this case cannot be sustained in
the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay
the correct amount of filing fees. Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, G.R. Nos.
175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013

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VENUE
The venue for personal actions shall — as a general rule — lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As
an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions
in a certain exclusive venue.
In Briones v. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240 (2015), the Court explained: Written stipulations
as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive
stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this
purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of
the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Ley Construction
and Development Corporation vs. Sedano, 837 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 222711 August 23, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) has held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided, that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent;
(b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing
of the suit.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present and
that the questioned stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue
stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to the courts of Pasay City. It states: 21. Should any
of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable
for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others. x x x The above provision clearly shows
the parties’ intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from a violation of the terms
and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase
“exclusive of all others” and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such
cases may be filed.
It is undisputed that petitioner’s action was one for collection of sum of money in an amount that
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Since the lease contract already provided that all
actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that
petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC’s exclusive original
jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its complaint
before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the
Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without
prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court. Ley Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Sedano, 837 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 222711 August 23, 2017

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CAUSE OF ACTION
Elements of a Cause of Action
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014
It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in

the complaint.
In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the
allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same
should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11,
2013
The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein.
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party
may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.
As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is

not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Real Parties-in-Interest
The rule on real parties-in-interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an action, the
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved.
One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
In Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, 481 SCRA 348 (2006), the Court expounded on the purpose of this
rule, to wit: Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions
by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled
to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid multiplicity of suits; and 4) discourage
litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to public policy. Ang vs. Pacunio, 762 SCRA
411, G.R. No. 208928 July 8, 2015
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be

had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence
to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs.
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., 682 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 193753 September 26, 2012; see
also Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Sabado, 838 SCRA 425, G.R. No. 224204 August 30, 2017
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015

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Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action
Even on the assumption that DMI was, indeed, an indispensable party, the RTC committed
reversible error in dismissing the complaint. Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed
to be indispensable, considering that parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc., 682 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 193753 September 26, 2012, see also
Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015; Laus vs. Optimum
Security Services, Inc., 783 SCRA 257, G.R. No. 208343 February 3, 2016; Philippine
Veterans Bank vs. Sabado, 838 SCRA 425, G.R. No. 224204 August 30, 2017
All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties;
as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action
for partition of real estate.—A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and
an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87,
G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015
The absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential
— as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before
the court renders judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. People vs. Go, 736 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 201644
September 24, 2014
Taxpayer’s Suits
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A

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person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public
funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing
so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by
the alleged act. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861, G.R. No. 191667
April 17, 2013; see also Remulla vs. Maliksi, 706 SCRA 35, G.R. No. 171633 September 18,
2013
Substitution of Parties
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during
the pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not
extinguished by his death. As early as in Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), the Court has
settled that if the claim in an action affects property and property rights, then the action survives
the death of a party-litigant, viz.: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the
wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Ngo, 789 SCRA 308, G.R. No. 214934 April 12, 2016
PLEADINGS
So as to avert any future confusion, the Supreme Court (SC) requires henceforth, that all
initiatory pleadings state the action’s nature both in its caption and the body.
According to jurisprudence, “it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading
may be legally characterized.” However, so as to avert any future confusion, the Court requires
henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the action’s nature both in its caption and the body,
which parameters are defined in the dispositive portion of this Decision. Gonzales vs. GJH Land,
Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.), 774 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 202664 November 10, 2015
A general denial does not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.”
A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of the
Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above quoted rule. The mere
statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations
of the Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes,”
does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not

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specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.” Neither does it become so by the
simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations
contested are “self-serving” or are intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.” Go Tong Electrical
Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 760 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 187487 June
29, 2015
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states that the complaint need only allege the
ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a
motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is
consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only
allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is
essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it
follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014
Complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an

ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action.
With respect to the first incident, it bears to stress that Arlene’s and the Heirs of Edgardo’s
complaint-in-intervention in the dismissed reformation case had been effectively discharged since
the principal complaint therein had already been terminated with finality. Clearly, their complaint-
in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an ancillary to and a
supplement of the principal action. In other words, the complaint-in-intervention essentially latches
on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint leads to its
concomitant dismissal. Applying these principles to this case therefore lead to the conclusion that
the dismissal of the main complaint in the reformation case necessarily resulted in the dismissal
of Arlene’s and the Heirs of Edgardo’s complaint-in-intervention lodged in the same case. B. Sta.
Rita & Co., Inc. vs. Gueco, 704 SCRA 320, G.R. No. 193078 August 28, 2013
Waiver of Defenses
Settled is the rule that defenses which are not raised in the answer are deemed waived, and
counterclaims not set up in the answer shall be barred. The Court cannot subscribe to
Dominador’s claim for payment of compensation as administrator of the business affairs of
Evangeline based on the principle of quantum meruit, which was not raised as an affirmative

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defense or counterclaim in his answer to the complaint. Apique vs. Fahnenstich, 765 SCRA
399, G.R. No. 205705 August 5, 2015
Except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an
answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof. Edron Construction
Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, 826 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 220211
June 5, 2017
If a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and
decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his
client.
In the present case, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the 60--day reglementary period
for the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from January 12, 2011, the
date Atty. Borromeo, Sarmiento’s then counsel of record, had the notice of the December 30,
2010 Resolution, and not February 10, 2011, the date when Sarmiento was personally notified
thereof. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule. Pagdanganan, Jr. vs. Sarmiento, 735
SCRA 584, G.R. No. 206555 September 17, 2014
Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made,
any court record sent to him binds the client, despite an internal arrangement between
them.
The Court cannot give credence to Sarmiento’s contention that Atty. Borromeo had been
discharged as counsel even before Sarmiento received the December 30, 2010 Resolution,
considering that Atty. Borromeo never filed a formal withdrawal of appearance prior thereto,
conformably with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe the proper legal
formalities, Atty. Borromeo remained as Sarmiento’s counsel on record. Fundamental is the rule
that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent to him binds
the client, despite an internal arrangement between them terminating their professional
relationship, as in this case. Pagdanganan, Jr. vs. Sarmiento, 735 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 206555
September 17, 2014
Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that non-compliance with the verification requirement or
a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. It is settled that
the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement.
In Fernandez v. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548 (2014), the Court pronounced that non-compliance with
the verification requirement or a defect therein “does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that

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the ends of justice may be served thereby.” “Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.” Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification
requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the
truth of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427 given the lack of
competent evidence of any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private
respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and
belief is shrouded in doubt. For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with
the certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court explained that
“noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons.’”
Here, the CA did not mention — nor does there exist — any perceivable special circumstance or
compelling reason which justifies the rules’ relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the
private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in
another forum. William Go Que Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, G.R. No.
191699 April 19, 2016; see also Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 200191
August 20, 2014
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required
for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is

required to pay docket fees. x x x In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and
not compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees.
However, it must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per se,
should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that
while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its
dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
Verily, respondents’ reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their
good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the government.
Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. Instead, the
docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents’
favor. In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, 487 SCRA 339
(2006), citing Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that in instances where a
litigant’s nonpayment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any intention of
defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the
amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on the
amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case. Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of
Rolando Ogsos, Sr., 805 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 221062 October 5, 2016

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Amendment of Pleadings
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so
long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the
pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party
can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. Tatlonghari vs. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan
Rural Bank, Inc., 799 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 219783 August 3, 2016
As long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with
intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an
amended pleading.
Jurisprudence states that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest
of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the
multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Tatlonghari vs. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank,
Inc., 799 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 219783 August 3, 2016
FORUM SHOPPING
Nature of Forum Shopping
Forum shopping exists “when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.” What is truly important to
consider in determining whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same
or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.
Kapisanang Pagkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Potrero, Inc. vs. Barreno, 698 SCRA 79, G.R.
No. 175900 June 10, 2013; see also Grace Park International Corporation vs. Eastwest
Banking Corporation, 798 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 210606 July 27, 2016; Ignacio vs. Office of
the City Treasurer of Quezon City, 839 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 221620 September 11, 2017;
Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sumitomo Corporation, 704 SCRA
332, G.R. No. 196723 August 28, 2013
Elements of Forum Shopping
In Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, 716 SCRA 175 (2014), the Court held that “[t]he test to
determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present,
or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such

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parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.” Grace Park International
Corporation vs. Eastwest Banking Corporation, 798 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 210606 July 27,
2016; see also Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City, 839 SCRA 304, G.R.
No. 221620 September 11, 2017; Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs.
Sumitomo Corporation, 704 SCRA 332, G.R. No. 196723 August 28, 2013
Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke
the coverage of this principle.
Anent the first requisite of forum shopping, “[t]here is identity of parties where the parties in both
actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest
is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a community
of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was
not impleaded in the first case.” Grace Park International Corporation vs. Eastwest Banking
Corporation, 798 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 210606 July 27, 2016
Forum shopping can be committed in three (3) ways.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances
of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. It can be committed in three
(3) ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting
of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
Galang vs. Peakhold Finance Corporation, 853 SCRA 245, G.R. No. 233922 January 24,
2018
Requirements of a Certification Against Forum Shopping
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not

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theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.” “Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided. William Go Que Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, G.R.
No. 191699 April 19, 2016; see also Grace Park International Corporation vs. Eastwest
Banking Corporation, 798 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 210606 July 27, 2016
Requirements on or Submission of a Defective Verification and Certification Against

Forum Shopping
The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to non-compliance with the
requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike

in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special
circumstances or compelling reasons.”
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign,
he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf. Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 200191 August 20, 2014

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Case law states that “verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely
speculative.” On the other hand, “the certification against forum shopping is required
based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora.”
The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially
called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private
respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission
of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the
proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition. William Go Que Construction vs. Court
of Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 191699 April 19, 2016
Where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense — the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the
certification against forum shopping may be relaxed.
Following paragraph 5 of the guidelines as aforestated, there was also substantial compliance
with the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only
Lourdes signed the same. It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances x x
x the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping
may be relaxed. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the petition on this score. Fernandez
vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 200191 August 20, 2014
MOTIONS
A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma.
It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed without
the requisite notice of hearing. We have held time and again that the failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the
motion defective. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma. None of
the acceptable exceptions obtain in this case. Layug vs. Commission on Elections, 667 SCRA
135, G.R. No. 192984 February 28, 2012
Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper;
thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for
the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion
before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process. Festin vs. Zubiri,
827 SCRA 181, A.C. No. 11600 June 19, 2017

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“Manifestation” and “Motion,” Distinguished
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise
indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather
than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than
by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other
party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Festin vs. Zubiri, 827
SCRA 181, A.C. No. 11600 June 19, 2017
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section
1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, 524 SCRA 153 (2007),
citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC), 440 SCRA 498
(2004): The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a
valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity
of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it
can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented
by the defendants. (Emphasis supplied) Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should
stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and
not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause
of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule. Unicapital, Inc.
vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013
Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of
action refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading.
It bears pointing out that while the RTC dismissed the case impliedly by reason of respondents’
repeated failure to appear in court and prosecute their case, it also inaccurately expressed the
view that such dismissal may properly be taken as its favorable action on petioner’s standing
motion to dismiss. The Court takes note, however, that the cited motion to dismiss was not
premised on the respondents’ failure to prosecute their case but on the alleged failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action.
Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action
refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the
existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the
plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said right. If these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed. In this case,

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the Court finds that the subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of petitioner
in procuring her title to the subject property to the prejudice of respondents who claim to have
acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper. Yap-
Co vs. Uy, 750 SCRA 504, G.R. No. 209295 February 11, 2015
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided
on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in
a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, 685 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 192994 November 12, 2012
In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint.
In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed “within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint” and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is
improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by
a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states
no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded
is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent
for filing the claim has not been complied with. Aldersgate College, Inc. vs. Gauuan, 685 SCRA
646, G.R. No. 192951 November 14, 2012
A judicious review of the records reveals that respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim dated
January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners’ non-execution of the sworn
statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such
matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer, or
on May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a

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cause of action. However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it
can no longer be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before
the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
More importantly, such matter/defense raised in the motion does not fall within the exceptions laid
down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from
raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order dated
August 11, 2010 denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said
issue/defense in its Decision dated December 28, 2010 and Order dated September 16, 2011.
Edron Construction Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, 826 SCRA
47, G.R. No. 220211 June 5, 2017
Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate

Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading.
As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is undeniably a prohibited
pleading. Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the dismissal of the case based on the
mere issuance of a board resolution by the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of
petitioner corporation recommending its dismissal, especially considering the various issues
raised by the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have entertained, let
alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss. Aldersgate College, Inc. vs. Gauuan, 685
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss
a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading,
while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for
lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Zuñiga-Santos vs.
Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over
such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve
any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be

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enforced. Sahar International Trading, Inc. vs. Warner Lambert Co., LLC, 725 SCRA 460,
G.R. No. 194872 June 9, 2014; see also Philippine Savings Bank (PSBANK) vs. Senate
Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35, G.R. No. 200238 November 20, 2012
Litis Pendentia
In reference to the foregoing, litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit”
and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a
ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two (2) actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one (1) of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Grace Park
International Corporation vs. Eastwest Banking Corporation, 798 SCRA 644, G.R. No.
210606 July 27, 2016; see also Dy vs. Yu, 762 SCRA 357, G.R. No. 202632 July 8, 2015
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis
pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis
pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the
same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy
that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once,
in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the
rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis
for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a
cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata,
as the case may be). Marilag vs. Martinez, 763 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 201892 July 22, 2015
It must be borne in mind that a remand and a dismissal are distinct procedural concepts
and hence should not be confused with one another, else the Rules be subverted.
On the one hand, a remand means an order “to send back”; or the “sending of the case back to
the same court out where it came for the purpose of having some action on it there”; and, on the
other hand, a dismissal refers to an order or judgment finally disposing of an action, suit, motion,
etc. which may either be with prejudice or without. The dismissal is deemed “with prejudice” when
the adjudication is based on the merits and bars the right to bring an action on the same claim or
cause and “without prejudice” when the case can be refiled despite its having been previously
dismissed. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Court of Appeals, 708 SCRA 523, G.R.
No. 189801 October 23, 2013

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PRE-TRIAL
It is mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the
paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that a pretrial is a procedural device intended to clarify and
limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise
and maneuvering. More significantly, a pretrial has been institutionalized as the answer to the
clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation
in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pretrial in civil cases in
order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.
Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132, G.R. No. 215820 March 20, 2017
INTERVENTION
Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.
Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent

jurisdiction. In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M
for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the
correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be
improper since the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation — on
jurisdictional grounds at that — means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to
intervene. Pulgar vs. Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, 734 SCRA 527,
G.R. No. 157583 September 10, 2014
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Since the last day fell on a Saturday, parties were completely justified in filing their motion
for reconsideration on the next working day.
The CA failed to take into consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In these situations,
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 1. How to compute time.—In
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by
any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins
to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as
thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday,
petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the
next working day: Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it
filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion on the merits. In such an instance, court
procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.

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However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be
had — as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand
in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of
justice. In view of the foregoing — as well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution of
the substantive issues on the merits — the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive
issues of this case. Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr., 805 SCRA 438, G.R. No.
221062 October 5, 2016
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
Case law states that consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of
proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible
major abbreviation of trial.
In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on Bautista’s death. As
such, it should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case No. 1117-09, considering that the
two cases involve the same property and, as correctly opined by the court a quo, any adjudication
in either case would necessarily affect the other. In this relation, case law states that consolidation
of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the
resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable
end to be achieved, within the context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full
and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and
is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their cases before the courts. Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.
Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Ngo, 789 SCRA 308, G.R. No. 214934 April 12, 2016
In order to determine whether consolidation is proper, the test is to check whether the
cases involve the resolution of common questions of law, related facts, or the same
parties. Consolidation of cases is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the
latter’s action in consolidation will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of
discretion tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, which is absent in this case.
Consolidation is proper whenever the subject matter involved and the relief demanded in the
different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate
the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together. However, it must be stressed that an
essential requisite of consolidation is that the several actions which should be pending before the
court, arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence. As succinctly stated in the rules, consolidation is
allowed when there are similar actions which are pending before the court — for there is nothing
to consolidate when a matter has already been resolved and the very purpose of consolidation,
to avoid conflicting decisions and multiplicity of suits, rendered futile. Puncia vs. Toyota
Shaw/Pasig, Inc., 795 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 214399 June 28, 2016

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Consolidation of cases is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which
involve a common question of law or fact before the court.
It is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to
be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which are
intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered and in effect, prevent confusion, unnecessary costs, and delay. It is an
action sought to avoid multiplicity of suits; guard against oppression and abuse; clear congested
dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial court in order to attain justice with the least expense
and vexation to the parties-litigants. Puncia vs. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., 795 SCRA 32, G.R.
No. 214399 June 28, 2016
It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order
to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly,
thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases.
In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single
suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which provides: SEC. 1.
Consolidation.—When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA
511, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013
JUDGMENTS
A judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence
may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.
It is well-settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by
the Highest Court of the land. This principle, commonly known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to
judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily,
it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be
easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied.
National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 658, G.R. No. 173802 April 7,
2014; see also Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217, G.R.

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No. 194247 June 19, 2013; Vicente vs. Acil Corporation, 763 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 196461 July
15, 2015; Office of the Ombudsman vs. Borja, 774 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 201830 November
10, 2015; Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18, 2012;
Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay, Leyte vs. Exploration Permit Application
(EXTA-000005-VIII) of Philippine National Oil Company, 704 SCRA 446, G.R. No. 162226
September 2, 2013
Exceptions to the Rule on Immutability of Final Judgments
The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that had already
attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law. As the
only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void
judgments, none of which are obtaining in this case, and considering further that there lies no
compelling reason to relax the rules of procedure, the CA erred when it took cognizance of
respondents’ certiorari petition and rendered judgment thereon.” Abadilla, Jr. vs. Obrero, 777
SCRA 457, G.R. No. 210855 December 9, 2015
Relaxation of the Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgment; Other Exceptions
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is
not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to
serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property;
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f)
that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Bigler vs. People, 785 SCRA 479,
G.R. No. 210972 March 2, 2016; see also People vs. Layag, 806 SCRA 190, G.R. No. 214875
October 17, 2016
Principle of Stare Decisis
Dictated by the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents, the Court therefore enforces its ruling in G.R. No. 137533, as duly applied in the
succeeding cases, i.e., G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608; and G.R. No.
188302, as the controlling and binding doctrine in the resolution of these consolidated petitions.
In view of the nullity of the trust agreement, Banco Filipino has no cause of action against Tala
Realty, thereby validating the dismissal of the former’s reconveyance complaints filed before the

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courts a quo. For these reasons, the Court denies the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158866 and 187551
given that they both seek the reversal of the CA’s Decision granting defendants’ motions to
dismiss. On the contrary, the Court grants the petition in G.R. No. 181933 since it properly seeks
to reverse the CA’s denial of Nancy’s motions to dismiss the reconveyance cases. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Tala Realty Services Corporation, 705 SCRA 208, G.R. No.
158866 September 9, 2013
Judgment on the Merits
Simply stated, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter,
such as the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab’s January 24, 2006 Decision which had resolved the
substantive issue in Civil Case No. 821 as above explained. Contrary to respondents’ stance,
said Decision was not premised on a mere technical ground, particularly, on improper venue. This
is evinced by the qualifier “granting arguendo” which opens the discussion thereof, to show that
the first ejectment complaint would, according to the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab, have been
dismissed on improper venue notwithstanding the undated lease contract’s simulated character.
De Leon vs. Dela Llana, 750 SCRA 531, G.R. No. 212277 February 11, 2015
Res Judicata
Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes
parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It
means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.” Res judicata has two (2) concepts. The first is “bar by prior
judgment” in which the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. The
second is “conclusiveness of judgment” in which any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Puerto Azul Land, Inc. vs. Pacific
Wide Realty and Development Corporation, 735 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 184000 September 17,
2014; see also De Leon vs. Dela Llana, 750 SCRA 531, G.R. No. 212277 February 11, 2015
For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action. Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City, 839 SCRA 304,
G.R. No. 221620 September 11, 2017; see also Marilag vs. Martinez, 763 SCRA 533, G.R.
No. 201892 July 22, 2015

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“Bar by prior judgment” vs. “Conclusiveness of judgment”
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred.
There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Puerto Azul Land, Inc. vs. Pacific
Wide Realty and Development Corporation, 735 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 184000 September 17,
2014
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess
of what is being sought by a party to a case.
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
what is being sought by a party to a case. The rationale for the rule was explained in Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 545 SCRA 422 (2008), viz.: Due process considerations justify
this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect
to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
For the same reason, this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be
available to petitioners. Verily, both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen
and arbitrary judgments. The very essence of due process is “the sporting idea of fair play” which
forbids the grant of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be
heard. The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present
during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any
pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief. Bucal vs. Bucal, 759 SCRA
262, G.R. No. 206957 June 17, 2015
The Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the subject
premises, as well as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials
salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set
aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal
may be taken from the order denying the motion.”
At the onset, it should be pointed out that Civil Case No. 01-1352 — the case from which the
present petition originates — comes before the Court at its execution stage. Notably, the
Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well
as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is,
by nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying
the motion.” With no such motion having been filed, the RTC is bound to issue a writ of execution

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to carry out the said judgment to its full force and effect. In Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Vda. de Hernandez, 67 SCRA 256 (1975), the duty of courts dealing with final and
executory judgments was explained as follows: [T]he court cannot refuse to issue a writ of
execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general
rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new
issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which
makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has never been
submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without
authority. The Plaza, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 756 SCRA 350, G.R. No. 209537 April 20, 2015
A party’s violation of a compromise agreement may give rise to a new cause of action,
which may be pursued in a separate action as it is not barred by res judicata.
In Genova v. De Castro, 407 SCRA 165 (2003), the Court stated that a party’s violation of a
compromise agreement may give rise to a new cause of action, which may be pursued in a
separate action as it is not barred by res judicata. [P]etitioner’s violation of the terms of the
compromise judgment gave rise to a new cause of action on the part of respondent, i.e., the right
to enforce the terms thereof. When she failed to obtain this by mere motion filed with the trial
court, she was constrained to institute the proper suit for ejectment. The filing of a separate case
based on a cause of action that arises from the application or violation of a compromise
agreement is not barred by res judicata in the first action. Noticeably, Plaza’s Motion for
Restitution is not one of the remedies that can be availed against ALI’s purported violation of the
Compromise Agreement. On the contrary, the same is a new cause of action arising therefrom.
The Plaza, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 756 SCRA 350, G.R. No. 209537 April 20, 2015
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide
a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days; The 90-day period is mandatory.
The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise directs judges to administer
justice without delay and dispose of the courts’ business promptly within the period prescribed by
law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to
prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period
is mandatory.
In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, 620 SCRA 298 (2010), the Court stressed the importance of deciding
cases within the periods prescribed by law and, at the same time, reiterated that a judge’s failure
to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the
7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloan-Compostela, Liloan, Cebu, 789 SCRA 138, A.M. No.
12-8-59-MCTC April 12, 2016

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JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. The rule is stated in Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules which reads as follows: Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings.—Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x. In this
relation, jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with
the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting
in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it is a form
of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of
evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted. Government Service Insurance System
vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., 710 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 165585 November
20, 2013
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the
court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to
any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In Viajar v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 (1979), the Court explained: Relief by summary judgment is
intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts
and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a
summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. x x x [R]elief by summary
judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the
court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s right to a
plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Soller vs. Heirs of Jeremias
Ulayao, 677 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 175552 July 18, 2012
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law.
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that

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the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral
award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms cover not only
aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the
doctrine of necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) vs. United Planners Consultants, Inc. (UPCI), 751 SCRA 389,
G.R. No. 212081 February 23, 2015
Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and
not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court.
It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. x x x Due process dictates
that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.
Atilano II vs. Asaali, 680 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 174982 September 10, 2012
A writ of possession is defined as a “writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to

recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment.”
It may be issued under the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section
17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as “The Land Registration Act”; (b) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to
the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales. Proceeding
therefrom, the issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in order to execute judgments
ordering the delivery of specific properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court. Sia vs. Arcenas, 746 SCRA 272, G.R. Nos. 209672-74 January 14, 2015;
see also Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18, 2012
Money judgments are enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the
judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon
to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the
levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court.
Section 16, Rule 39 thereof specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action”
to vindicate their claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, “a
person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties
is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim” Gagoomal vs.
Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18, 2012

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A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property
is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
“Lis pendens,” which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which
a court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and
until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep
the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated; and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. x x x The filing of a notice
of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power
of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by
successive alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the
litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Gonzales vs.
Marmaine Realty Corporation, 781 SCRA 63, G.R. No. 214241 January 13, 2016
Relative thereto, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following actions and their concomitant
proceedings: “(a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action to quiet title thereto;
(c) an action to remove clouds thereon; (d) an action for partition; and (e) any other proceedings
of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon.” Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18,
2012
The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object
sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to
property be incidentally affected.
It is essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action or
suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between
conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring
its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case
in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. In
such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio. Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663
SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18, 2012
Should the sheriff levy upon the assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has
not even the remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his authority.
It bears to stress that the court issuing the writ of execution may enforce its authority only over
properties or rights of the judgment debtor, and the sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to
execution property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor. Should the sheriff levy upon the
assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has not even the remotest interest, then he
is acting beyond the limits of his authority. A judgment can only be executed or issued against a
party to the action, not against one who has not yet had his day in court. Gagoomal vs. Villacorta,
663 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 192813 January 18, 2012

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It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially

conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed.
As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the
execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.
Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or reconveyance, the issuance of writs of
possession and demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil action for mandamus,
as in this case. Sia vs. Arcenas, 746 SCRA 272, G.R. Nos. 209672-74 January 14, 2015
Execution Pending Appeal
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed. In order to grant the same pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules, the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal;
and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. GSIS vs. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc., 710 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 165585 November 20, 2013
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court states that no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution; Exceptions.
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an order
of execution. However, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 (1985), the Court
stated that there are certain instances when an appeal from an order of execution should be
allowed, to wit: It is also a settled rule that an order of execution of judgment is not appealable.
However, where such order of execution in the opinion of the defeated party varies the terms of
the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, or when the terms of the judgment
are not clear and there is room for interpretation and the interpretation given by the trial court as
contained in its order of execution is wrong in the opinion of the defeated party, the latter should
be allowed to appeal from said order so that the Appellate Tribunal may pass upon the legality
and correctness of the said order. (Underscoring supplied) Recently, the Court En Banc, in
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Aumentado, Jr., 625 SCRA 241
(2010), reiterated that there are exceptions to the general rule that an order of execution is not
appealable, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment. Dela Cruz, Sr. vs.
Fankhauser, 677 SCRA 744, G.R. No. 196990 July 30, 2012
APPEALS
Question of Law vs. Question of Fact
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a “question

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of fact” when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The
test for determining whether the supposed error was one of “law” or “fact” is not the appellation
given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or
not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the
question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
BCDA vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217, G.R. No. 194247 June 19, 2013
Two Modes of Appealing a Judgment or Final Order of the Regional Trial Court in the
Exercise of its Original Jurisdiction
Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment
or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction: (a) If the issues raised involve
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is an ordinary appeal to
the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (b) If the issues
raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. BCDA vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217,
G.R. No. 194247 June 19, 2013
It has been consistently held that appellate courts are precluded from entertaining matters
neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time
only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.
It bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its opposition to
respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration from the
RTC’s Order dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts are
precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but
ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these
issues may be classified as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of
the evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the same. Consequently, only
the first and third issues were left for its determination. BCDA vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217, G.R.
No. 194247 June 19, 2013; see also Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Bajaro,
686 SCRA 39, G.R. No. 170029 November 21, 2012
As a general rule, a party who has not appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other
than the one granted in the appealed decision.
However, jurisprudence admits an exception to the said rule, such as when strict adherence
thereto shall result in the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties concerned. In Global
Resource for Outsourced Workers (GROW), Inc. v. Velasco, 678 SCRA 751 (2012): Indeed, a

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party who has failed to appeal from a judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no
longer obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was already granted
under said judgment. However, when strict adherence to such technical rule will impair a
substantive right, such as that of an illegally dismissed employee to monetary compensation as
provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to pave the way for a full
and just adjudication of the case. Century Properties, Inc. vs. Babiano, 795 SCRA 671, G.R.
No. 220978 July 5, 2016
It is a fundamental rule that the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on
appeal even if none of the parties raised the same.
It is a fundamental rule that the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal
even if none of the parties raised the same. The reason for the rule is that a court without
jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. Cast against this light, the Court finds that the CA
improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the
reason that the OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one which could be
classified as an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA’s jurisdiction over the
case. The jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken against a judgment, final order,
resolution or award of a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions” is
explicitly stated in Section 1 of the said Rule. Narra Nickel Mining and Development
Corporation vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation, 777 SCRA 258, G.R. No. 202877
December 9, 2015
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime.
It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the
proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A
void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Tan vs. Cinco, 793 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 213054
June 15, 2016
Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an
appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise
affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored.
It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable, absent any of the exceptions recognized
by case law. This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by a trial court are
accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of
the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not
be ignored. Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed
by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court, as in this case. Bigler vs. People, 785 SCRA 479, G.R.
No. 210972 March 2, 2016; see also Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), vs. Centeno, 693
SCRA 110, G.R. No. 200667 March 11, 2013

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An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order
It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done
by the lower court. A final order is appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule
enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) declaring that “[a]n appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.” Abadilla, Jr. vs. Obrero, 777 SCRA
457, G.R. No. 210855 December 9, 2015
Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried
and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal, not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness.
Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when
their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such
novel theory, issue or argument (a) is subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially
admitted, which do not obtain in this case. Borromeo vs. Mina, 697 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 193747
June 5, 2013
The mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction, since the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appellant only; it is not
“deemed perfected,” for purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction, “before the
expiration of the period to appeal of the other parties.”
Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, “[i]n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties.” In fact, under Section 13 of the same Rules, the trial
court, prior to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, may, motu propio or on
motion, order the dismissal of the appeal on the grounds specified therein. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s position, the RTC has yet to lose its jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice
of Appeal as respondents’ period to appeal had not yet expired by then. United Interior
Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna, 845 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 216788
November 20, 2017
A board resolution authorizing the representative to initiate the appeal is not required for
the purpose of filing a notice of appeal. This is because a notice of appeal is not a pleading,
initiatory or otherwise, that, when required by the law or the rules, must contain, among
others, a verification and certification against forum shopping to be signed by the party or
his/her representative, and, in the case of a representative, proof of his/her authority to file

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the action, i.e., power of attorney or secretary’s certificate with copy of the board
resolution.
Besides, if only to put to rest any doubts anent respondents’ objection against Calilung’s authority
to represent petitioner in the case, the latter in fact submitted, with its motion for reconsideration,
a copy of Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 2013 to this effect. Thus, when the RTC in this case
expunged petitioner’s Notice of Appeal for lack of authority from petitioner’s Board of Directors to
initiate the appeal, it not only effectively expanded the procedural requirements for initiating an
appeal; more than anything, it effectively deprived petitioner of further recourse to the higher
courts by asking for the submission of documents which neither the law nor the Rules and
jurisprudence require. United Interior Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna, 845
The Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment
of docket and other lawful fees.
For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the
petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; (b) he must
have filed his petition for review within the reglementary period; (c) he must have paid the
necessary docket fees; and (d) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.
In this regard, the Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the
appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the
payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition
for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear
and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees.
Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Bautista vs. Doniego, Jr., 797 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 218665 July 20, 2016
Under the Rules, it is the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period that would justify the court in dismissing the appeal.
It should be pointed out that petitioner’s failure to present proof of payment of the appeal fees, as
ruled by the RTC in the December 12, 2014 Order, is not fatal to petitioner’s appeal especially
considering its earlier finding that petitioner “has paid the appeal fee within the reglementary
period.” Under the Rules, it is the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period that would justify the court in dismissing the appeal. United Interior
Manggahan Homeowners Association vs. De Luna, 845 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 216788
November 20, 2017; see also Atilano II vs. Asaali, 680 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 174982
September 10, 2012

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The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.
It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since
one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter
is precisely that there should be no appeal. Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, 692 SCRA 339,
G.R. No. 200727 March 4, 2013
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the Court of Appeals (CA)
taken from a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within fifteen (15) days, counted from
notice of the judgment appealed from or from the denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The original 15-day period to appeal is extendible for an additional 15
days upon the filing of a proper motion and the payment of docket fees within the
reglementary period of appeal.
As a general rule, appeals are perfected when it is filed within the period prescribed under the
Rules of Court. x x x Failure to successfully comply with the aforementioned procedure, especially
in filing the appeal within the prescribed period, renders the petition for review dismissible.
Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order and prevent needless delays for the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The Court has long declared that the right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege, subject to the court’s discretion by virtue of which no party
can assume that its motion for extension would be granted. Being discretionary in nature, it
behooves upon the appellants to follow up on their motions and ascertain its status, as the failure
to strictly comply with the provisions on reglementary periods renders the remedy of appeal
unavailable. Further, as a purely statutory right, the appellant must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down by the Rules of Court. However, where strong considerations of substantial
justice are present, the stringent application of technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction as in cases where petitioners showed no intent to delay the final disposition of
the case. Cayago, Jr. vs. Cantara, 776 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 203918 December 2, 2015
Withdrawal of Appeals; When the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of
appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of
the court.
A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of provisions
governing the procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence, pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall suppletorily apply: Sec. 3. Applicability
of the Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court in the Philippines shall apply suppletorily to these
Rules. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court — an adjunct rule to the appellate procedure in the CA under
Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which are equally adopted in the RRCTA — states

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that when the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing
of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court. CIR vs. Nippon Express
(Phils.) Corporation, 771 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 212920 September 16, 2015
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a
measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.
As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final
judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over
the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected. Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro, 700
SCRA 547, G.R. No. 185734 July 3, 2013
The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
x x x Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is

taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party. x x x Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit
itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The consequence
is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an
incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of
the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of
the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action. Northern
Islands Co., Inc. vs. Garcia, 753 SCRA 603, G.R. No. 203240 March 18, 2015
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
It is a standing rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is merely provisional in nature and
is integrally linked to the subsistence of the proceedings in the main case.
Stated differently, the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as part
or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. Thus, since the CA already remanded the

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case to the Ombudsman for the purpose of resolving Gabuya’s pending motion for
reconsideration, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it, absent any countervailing
justification therefor, must be dissolved. In this relation, it is observed that the CA’s issuance of
the aforesaid writ was essentially hinged on the 2008 Samaniego ruling which, however, did not
contain any pronouncement on the legal status of the writ issued in that case. The Court only
remarked that the injunctive writ issued in Samaniego was a “mere superfluity” and, in fact,
ordered the same to be “lifted” since the appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision already had the
effect of staying its execution. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Court of Appeals, 708
SCRA 523, G.R. No. 189801 October 23, 2013
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior

to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts.
Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of the
court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that
will hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. In a sense, it
is a regulatory process meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the
parties. Espiritu vs. Sazon, 785 SCRA 454, G.R. No. 204965 March 2, 2016
It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2)
requisites
These are: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said
right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. Province of
Cagayan vs. Lara, 702 SCRA 183, G.R. No. 188500 July 24, 2013
A writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right
must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an
actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a
proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the
same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary injunction
is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.

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Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control
of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed, as in
this case. As earlier intimated, preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy. Therefore, it should
not create new relations between the parties, but must only maintain the status quo until the merits
of the case is fully heard. Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the WPI involved herein. Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued by the RTC
no longer serves any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject properties
since the Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired. Time and again, the Court
has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer
for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented by
injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. An
injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. Laus vs. Optimum
Security Services, Inc., 783 SCRA 257, G.R. No. 208343 February 3, 2016
The rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is
discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination.
In the present case, the CA found that the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence presented
during the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. At this point, it bears to
stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete
evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in his complaint. As such, the evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to
give the trial court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on
the merits of the case. Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation
of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be
disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo must be preserved until the merits
of the case can be heard fully. Espiritu vs. Sazon, 785 SCRA 454, G.R. No. 204965 March 2,
2016; see also Cayabyab vs. Dimson, 830 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 223862 July 10, 2017
Injunctive reliefs are not granted for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to
which is in dispute, out of the possession of one person and putting it into the hands of
another before the right of ownership is determined.
The reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the
evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo
so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. Espiritu vs. Sazon, 785
SCRA 454, G.R. No. 204965 March 2, 2016

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

DECLARATORY RELIEF
Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of
the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening
seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding. Republic vs. Roque, 706 SCRA 273, G.R. No. 204603
September 24, 2013
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS
A certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore
not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business
address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had
since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the
said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above cited, which merely entails service of the petition
upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel. The underlying rationale behind this rule is that
a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and therefore not
considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory
pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel.
Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any
party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not
apply. Reicon Realty Builders Corporation vs. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management,
Inc., 750 SCRA 37, G.R. No. 204796 February 4, 2015
In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done
acting on a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews
only questions of law. Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may

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generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as “when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible”; or “when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.” Finding a confluence
of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court would not apply, and the Court retains
the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom. St. Martin
Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corporation, 847 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 217426
December 4, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) stresses that “to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.”
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross
as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all
in contemplation of law. In this relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings,
or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degree of
gravity, as above-described, must be met. Republic vs. Roque, 706 SCRA 273, G.R. No. 204603
September 24, 2013; see Briones vs. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240, G.R. No. 204444
January 14, 2015
In petitions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or
resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the
voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009
indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC
to file a comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by
filing its comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired
jurisdiction over both parties to the instant case. Province of Leyte vs. Energy Development
Corporation, 760 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 203124 June 22, 2015
Motion for Reconsideration; The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the

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order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Bucal vs. Bucal, 759 SCRA
262, G.R. No. 206957 June 17, 2015; see also Jolo’s Kiddie Carts vs. Caballa, 847 SCRA
357, G.R. No. 230682 November 29, 2017; Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Santos-Falceso, 833
SCRA 460, G.R. No. 227695 July 31, 2017
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision
for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the previous
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for
compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the
Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion,
viz: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus,
there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. CBSUA vs. Province of
Camarines Sur, 764 SCRA 394, G.R. No. 210861 July 29, 2015; see also Castells vs. Saudi
Arabian Airlines, 704 SCRA 206, G.R. No. 188514 August 28, 2013
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish certain requisites
While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal of the same
reveals that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of injunction be
issued to permanently stop “[r]espondents, or any other person acting under their orders or
authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of [p]etitioner’s properties.”

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More significantly, respondents (with the exception of Casanova as will be herein discussed) are
not asked to be prevented from exercising any judicial or ministerial function on account of any
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an action for
prohibition.
Case law dictates that “[f]or a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.” Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova, 789 SCRA 209, G.R. No.
202618 April 12, 2016
Mandamus, as defined
“Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the

act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 (2013), the Court explained that the
peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity,
and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one
who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled. Being an extraordinary
remedy, mandamus is available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. City of Davao vs. Olanolan,
822 SCRA 481, G.R. No. 181149 April 17, 2017; see also Martinez vs. Martin, 743 SCRA 719,
G.R. No. 203022 December 3, 2014
Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined

by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of discretion
one way or the other.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent. Layug vs. COMELEC, 667 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 192984 February 28, 2012

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It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty
and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Petitioner could not have been
compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by respondent in view of the attending
circumstances. It is well-settled that “[m]andamus only lies to enforce the performance of a
ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as
thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under
certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not
controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.” City of Davao vs. Olanolan, 822 SCRA
481, G.R. No. 181149 April 17, 2017
QUO WARRANTO
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.
The Court observes that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova’s title as President and
Chief Executive Officer, which is a public office by nature is improper to resolve in this petition.
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings;
and it cannot be assailed collaterally. Also, it has already been settled that prohibition does not
lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
In fact, petitioner impliedly recognized the impropriety of raising this issue herein by stating that
“until the final resolution regarding the purported authority of [respondent Casanova], he should
be prohibited from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from issuing notices of demolition.” Thus,
at all events, the foregoing characterization of this action as one for injunction, and the consequent
conclusion that it was properly filed before the Court remain. That being said, the Court now
proceeds to the main issue in this case. Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs.
Casanova, 789 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 202618 April 12, 2016
EXPROPRIATION
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation is vested in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), hence, it cannot be unduly
restricted in the exercise of its judicial function.
It is doctrinal that the concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment. It
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation
cannot be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos, 782 SCRA 441, G.R.
No. 213863, G.R. No. 214021 January 27, 2016

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In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just

compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State.
Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred
to the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment. To
clarify, unlike the six percent (6%) annual incremental interest allowed under DAR AO No. 13,
Series of 1994, DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve
percent (12%) annual interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a
penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment. Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos, 782 SCRA 441, G.R. No. 213863, G.R. No. 214021
January 27, 2016
Case law dictates that there is “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.
Notably, the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect expropriation, did not affect the
character of the City’s taking of the subject property in 1986 as the CA, in its January 20, 2012
Decision, suggests. x x x Therefore, notwithstanding the lack of proper authorization, the legal
character of the City’s action as one of “taking” did not change. In this relation, the CA noted that
the City enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on April 12, 1994 and filed its expropriation
complaint on November 7, 1996. However, as it previously admitted, it already commenced with
the taking of the subject property as early as 1986. Accordingly, interest must run from such time.
Sy vs. Local Government of Quezon City, 697 SCRA 621, G.R. No. 202690 June 5, 2013
FORECLOSURE
The stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.
Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the
agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As a
consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively. In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within
the province where the property to be sold is situated, viz.: SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made
legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within
said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in
said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is
situated. Heirs of the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang and Salud Adaza-Maglasang vs.
Manila Banking Corporation, 706 SCRA 235, G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013

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It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes

the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made within one (1) year from the
registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem.
As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article
428 of the New Civil Code, not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi. “Possession being
an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other attendant rights of
ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand
possession as a matter of right. This is why Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession to the new owner
upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7 reads: In any sale made under the provisions of this Act,
the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property
or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period,
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months,
to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage
or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs of
Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz, 836 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 197797 August 9, 2017
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the

mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the
land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act (RA) No. 720, as amended, otherwise
known as the Rural Banks Act, or within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate
of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135.
If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within
five (5) years from the expiration of the aforementioned redemption period pursuant to Section
119 of the Public Land Act, which states: SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
The Court has, however, ruled that redemptions from lending or credit institutions, like TCLC, are
governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law
of 2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper redemption price
when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or credit institution.
In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all the expenses
of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with
Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000. Considering further that Sps. Guevarra failed to
redeem the subject property within the one-year reglementary period, they are liable to reimburse
TCLC for the corresponding Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) and Capital Gains Tax (CGT) it paid
pursuant to Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Regulations No. 4-99, which requires the
payment of DST on extrajudicial foreclosure sales of capital assets initiated by banks, finance and
insurance companies, as well as CGT in cases of non-redemption. CGT and DST are expenses
incident to TCLC’s custody of the subject property, hence, likewise due, under the above provision
of law. Guevarra vs. The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc., 751 SCRA 144, G.R. No.
204672 February 18, 2015

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Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court — which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages as per Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3135 — provides that upon the
expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
In China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), it was held that for the
court’s ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession to cease, it is not enough that the property be
held by a third party, but rather the said possessor must have a claim thereto adverse to the
debtor/mortgagor: Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a
judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said
adverse possession.
Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the
possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the
issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property
ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte.
For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party,
but also held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. Specifically, the Court held that
to be considered in adverse possession, the third-party possessor must have done so in his own
right and not merely as a successor or transferee of the debtor or mortgagor:
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates
a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-
owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the
property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs
of Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz, 836 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 197797 August 9, 2017
Where a third party has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession or in a motion to
quash the same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse
to that of the debtor or mortgagor the procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to
determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored
principle of due process.
Notably, when this opposition is made, the proceeding for the issuance of a writ of possession
loses its nature of being an ex parte, and instead, turns adversarial, so as to give: On the one
hand, the third-party claimant the opportunity to present evidence of his title showing his
independent right over the subject property adverse to the judgment obligor/mortgagor; and on
the other hand, the mortgagee the opportunity to rebut said evidence in order to sustain the
issuance of the writ and gain possession of the subject property pursuant to his consolidated title.
Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs of Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz, 836 SCRA 292, G.R. No.
197797 August 9, 2017

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PARTITION
A partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to
the segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in
their names upon compliance with the requirements of law.
Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when
Julian sold different portions thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds
of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the
buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same in their names,
and paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents who never disputed
the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there is, in this case. Geñorga
vs. Heirs of Julian Meliton, 828 SCRA 673, G.R. No. 224515 July 3, 2017
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of
a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 662 SCRA 14 (2011), “[t]he invariable rule is that
what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case,
are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must
necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential,
however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice
that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words,
the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement
is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Javier vs. Lumontad, 744 SCRA 1, G.R.
No. 203760 December 3, 2014; see also Philippine Tourism Authority vs. Sabandal-
Herzenstiel, 701 SCRA 517, G.R. No. 196741 July 17, 2013
Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by
express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70,

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of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose
of settling the issue of possession. It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership. Javier vs. Lumontad,
744 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful
detainer case is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties.
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category
of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance
without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will
vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must be filed “within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession” and must allege that: (a) the
defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property became illegal
or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the
defendant’s right of possession; (c) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. Piedad vs. Gurieza, 727 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 207525 June 18, 2014
It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property in dispute.
The main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession
de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading. The principal issue must be possession de
facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. In forcible entry, the
plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived
thereof by the defendant. Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, 834 SCRA 597, G.R. No. 224549 August
7, 2017

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Jurisprudence states that the law does not require a person to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession thereof.
In this case, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot.
Records disclose that respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same
from Abid in September 1995. She even paid the lot’s realty taxes, as well as requested for a
survey authority thereon. In fact, she submitted old photographs showing herself on the subject
lot, the identity of which petitioners did not contend. Notably, jurisprudence states that the law
does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be
said that he is in possession thereof. In Bunyi v. Factor, 591 SCRA 350 (2009), the Court held
that “visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession.
The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the
subject property.” In contrast, petitioners themselves claim that they began occupying the subject
lot only in August 2005, after Alvarez executed the corresponding Deed of Sale in their favor.
Hence, in light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that respondent had prior de facto possession.
Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, 834 SCRA 597, G.R. No. 224549 August 7, 2017
Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in cases for forcible entry
shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises.
With regard to the rent due respondent, the CA correctly held that since petitioners disturbed
respondent’s possession of the subject lot, rent is due respondent from the time petitioners
intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in
cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. However, in Badillo v. Tayag, 400
SCRA 494 (2003), the Court clarified that reasonable amount of rent in suits for forcible entry
must be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence. Here, since the RTC
indeed failed to cite any document showing the assessment of the subject lot, any increase in the
realty taxes, and the prevailing rental rate in the area, the CA correctly remanded this aspect to
the RTC for proper determination. Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, 834 SCRA 597, G.R. No. 224549
August 7, 2017
CONTEMPT
Contempt of court, as defined
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in
some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an
act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be
punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden

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or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
Time and again, the Court has stressed that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised
on the preservative, not on the vindictive principle, and only when necessary in the interest of
justice. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds no contumacious disobedience on the
part of respondents, particularly with respect to the TRO in G.R. No. 193585. Rivulet Agro-
Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, 688 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 197507 January 14, 2013
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject
last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists
of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Lopez vs. Lopez,
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of
their estate.
Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the
Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily.
Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule
in dealing with secured claims against the estate: SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.—A
creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share
in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and
if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his
mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall
prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by

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paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall
adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. Heirs of
the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang and Salud Adaza-Maglasang vs. Manila Banking
Corporation, 706 SCRA 235, G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN CIVIL REGISTRY
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
An adversary proceeding is defined as one “having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished

from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.” Almojuela vs. Republic, 801
SCRA 399, G.R. No. 211724 August 24, 2016
A petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby. The failure to strictly comply with the requirements
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court renders the entire proceedings null and void.
A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Almojuela vs. Republic, 801 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 211724 August 24, 2016
WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in
response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings.
It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent
punishment of the perpetrators.
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768 (2008), the Court has previously held that the writ of
amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to
life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue
on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Ladaga vs. Mapagu,

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Only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the
case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners’ rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not
merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced
establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying
that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings has also been met.
Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, G.R. No. 189691 November 13, 2012
The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial evidence
as standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address situations of
enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is akin to
administrative proceedings.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows: SEC. 17. Burden of
Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.―The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence. x x x SEC. 18. Judgment.―The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would
warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322,
G.R. No. 189691 November 13, 2012
An amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence the involvement of

government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to
order the conduct of further investigation where it appears that the government did not
observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duty to investigate the
complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance.
The Court directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest efforts of police
investigators were effectively putting petitioner’s right to security in danger with the delay in
identifying and apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court found it necessary to
explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue with extraordinary diligence the
investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a known activist because not only did the
police investigators conduct an incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed their
ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the
authorities. In both of these cases, the incidents of abduction and torture were undisputed and
they provided the evidentiary support for the finding that the right to security was violated and the
necessity for further investigation into such violation. Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, G.R.
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Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not dismiss,
the case should it determine that it could not proceed for a valid cause.
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases.—The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall
archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of
petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived
cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party,
order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with
prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the
petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court
Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of
January of every year.
Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such
as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous causes
that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings
which, however, do not obtain in these cases. Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a
procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate
action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an
inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon
can be taken. Balao vs. Ermita, 794 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 186050, G.R. No. 186059 June 21,
2016
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,

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and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must
be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of
habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738
SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security
are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly
renders a habeas data petition dismissible.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded
in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest
and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive
versions of possible transgressions. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8,
2014
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
GENERAL MATTERS
Where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null
and void.
It is clear that the RTC-Valenzuela had no authority to take cognizance of the instant case as the
crime was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the RTC-Valenzuela’s ruling
convicting Casanas of the crime charged, as well as the CA’s ruling upholding the same, is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that “where there is want of jurisdiction over a
subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither
binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It
is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows
that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata,” as
in this case.
Time and again, it has been held that “the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage
of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may
dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion

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to dismiss. So that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even
after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and
not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.”
Casanas vs. People, 848 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 223833 December 11, 2017
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction.
This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 [of the RPC], as
amended [by Republic Act No. 4363], specifically provides for the possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.” Generally speaking, “the venue of libel
cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. Piccio, 789 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 203370, G.R. No. 215106 April 11, 2016
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. As such, when it becomes
apparent that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In Navaja v. De Castro, 759 SCRA 487 (2015), the
Court held: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.
The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Casanas vs. People, 848 SCRA 324, G.R. No.
223833 December 11, 2017
The court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other.
It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,

which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory,

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while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation
of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred — in particular, the
place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. Yalong vs. People, 704 SCRA
195, G.R. No. 187174 August 28, 2013
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea.
In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the
same. Dabalos vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City (Pampanga), 688 SCRA
64, G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing
of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.—If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He
shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he
was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of
the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and
shall immediately inform the parties of such action. No complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. The filing of
an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a

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jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express
consent. Quisay vs. People, 781 SCRA 98, G.R. No. 216920 January 13, 2016
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal
information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the
evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon
the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the
judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial. De Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of
Appeals, 699 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013; see also Young vs. People, 783
SCRA 286, G.R. No. 213910 February 3, 2016
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof.
To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the
suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable
likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements,
without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense. Garcia, Jr. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 741 SCRA 172, G.R. No. 197567 November 19, 2014
The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to establish

whether there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the
accused committed the crime. Taking into account the quantum of evidence needed to support a
finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of

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discretion when it dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Presidential Commission
on Good Government vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 785 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 193176
February 24, 2016
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the
Department of Justice on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose
of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that
the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive
function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the
judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Alberto
vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 104, G.R. No. 182130 June 19, 2013
In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where
the determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility.
The abuse of discretion to be qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross as to constitute an

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation
of law. In this regard, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Alberto vs. Court of Appeals,
699 SCRA 104, G.R. No. 182130 June 19, 2013
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence.
That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the properties in order to
support its stance that the loans were under collateralized is of no moment. Included in the records
of this case is the Executive Summary of the TWG, citing as evidence numerous documents from
PNB showing, on its face, that the loans granted to HMOI by PNB were undercollateralized.
Hence, the lack of independent valuation alone is not sufficient to dismiss the case for
insufficiency of evidence to establish mere probable cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party’s
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during the trial proper. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 785 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 193176 February 24, 2016

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All petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable

by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs), except in the National Capital Region (NCR), shall be filed
with the Regional State Prosecutor (RSP) concerned who shall resolve such petitions with
finality.
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the
“2000 NPS Rule on Appeal,” which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution
Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the
SOJ. However, this procedure was immediately amended by the DOJ’s Department Circular No.
70-A dated July 10, 2000, entitled “Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to
Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases.” The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the
Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the entire National
Prosecution Service and in the interest of justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State
Prosecutors in appealed cases. Cariaga vs. Sapigao, 436, G.R. No. 223844 June 28, 2017
ARREST
A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and
supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant
of arrest.
It bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and
supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that “no warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”
While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of
issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. De Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614,
G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013
Once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task
of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds
probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in
case he doubts the existence of probable cause.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that
the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record

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plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should
not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however,
the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. De
Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013
A judge’s discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in
court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly
inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived gap in the
evidence leads to a “neither this nor that” conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is
preferable over a doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge’s discretion to dismiss a case
immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to
establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its
existence is simply doubtful. It cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court
the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction
of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. De
Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013
Elements that must concur for warrantless arrest
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it. People vs. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to
satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest.
“Personal knowledge” of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is
required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal
citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power
of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous

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criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. It was
therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on “personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record,” as this is
unquestionably not what “personal knowledge” under the law contemplates, which must be strictly
construed. People vs. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
Probable cause to justify warrantless arrest has been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if
they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are
not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. x x x Specifically with respect
to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which
clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case. People vs. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 201363
March 18, 2013
MOTION TO QUASH
A dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect
of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
The Court explained the parameters of this rule: As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal
or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by
the prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case by the
trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of due process
resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is true that double jeopardy will attach
in case the prosecution appeals a [D]ecision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and
therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void
indictment. In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for
the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on
the ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that where
after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and
the court reset the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said
order was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered. Bonsurbe, Jr. vs. Yerro,
750 SCRA 490, G.R. No. 205952 February 11, 2015

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The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court; Requisites
of provisional dismissal.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two
(2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Under the aforecited
provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur: (a) The prosecution
with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin
perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (c) The
court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (d) The
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Bonsurbe, Jr. vs. Yerro, 750 SCRA 490, G.R. No. 205952 February 11, 2015
TRIAL
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should
be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.
The pertinent provision reads thus: [RULE 119] SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the accused.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused. Go vs.
People, 677 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

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JUDGMENT
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on
the civil aspect of the case.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.” Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr.
vs. Manzano, 827 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 192391 June 19, 2017
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.” Daluraya vs. Olivia, 744 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 210148 December 8,
2014
APPEAL
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects,
including those not raised by the parties.
While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an
appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including
those not raised by the parties. Considering that under Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure as abovequoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit
the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but
for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory, Benabaye’s discharge for
the crime of estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the estafa charge
against Tupag is similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against
him as may be warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him. Benabaye vs. People, 752
SCRA 26, G.R. No. 203466 February 25, 2015; see also Wacoy vs. People, 760 SCRA 259,
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015; People vs. Arguta, 756 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 213216 April 20,
2015; Bulauitan vs. People, 803 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 218891 September 19, 2016; Sindac
vs. People, 802 SCRA 270, G.R. No. 220732 September 6, 2016; People vs. Racho, 841
SCRA 449, G.R. No. 227505 October 2, 2017; Ramos vs. People, 845 SCRA 324, G.R. No.
226454 November 20, 2017

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Section 3(e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules) especially
provides that except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court (SC) shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
At the outset, the Court notes that Antone made a procedural lapse in elevating the case before
the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 3(e),
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules) especially provides that “[e]xcept
as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In this regard, Section 13, Rule 124 of
the Rules states: Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—(a) Whenever
the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render
judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate
its entire record to the Supreme Court for review. (b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser
penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the
accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme
Court. (c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. Antone vs.
People, 845 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 225146 November 20, 2017
With the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004],
providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of
cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper
course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of
an intermediate review.
At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view
of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. People
vs. De Los Reyes, 684 SCRA 216, G.R. Nos. 130714 & 139634 October 16, 2012
Jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People.
The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the
criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For
this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties-in-interest in the criminal case
and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in
this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the
People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the

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offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari
even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil
aspect of the case. People vs. Piccio, 732 SCRA 254, G.R. No. 193681 August 6, 2014
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule,
outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order
to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.
Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination. Belmonte vs. People, 828 SCRA 463, G.R. No. 224143 June 28, 2017
Non-compliance with the requirements of the chain of custody rule will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.
It is important to note that while the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the
aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as
well as jurisprudence nevertheless provides that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule
will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a)
there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must
be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous chain of custody
which preserved the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated from the
accused, notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ at the
time of the arrest and the taking of inventory. The absence of media representatives at the time
Ominga prepared the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination
when she testified that when contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still
far from the area and would not be able to arrive on time. As regards the absence of the DOJ
representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has
been the practice in their office for him to go to the PDEA office to sign the inventories instead of
going to the site of the crime. While this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones it, the
Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily,
under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II

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of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Rebotazo, 698 SCRA 452
(2013), the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, noncompliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized
or confiscated inadmissible. Belmonte vs. People, 828 SCRA 463, G.R. No. 224143 June 28,
2017; see also People vs. Goco, 806 SCRA 240, G.R. No. 219584 October 17, 2016
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat
the very purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should
not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not
of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669
(1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state
criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions,
are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen
or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence,
unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective
of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection
orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from
greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator
and to ensure their financial support.” The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence
is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable

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ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. Garcia vs. Drilon,
699 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY
Evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as
long as it satisfies the most basic test of reason―i.e., relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment of amparo cases,
the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties that beset amparo petitioners, arising
as they normally would from the fact that the State itself, through its own agents, is involved in
the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing that it is supposedly tasked by law to
investigate.
Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court laid down a new standard of
relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of
proof showing the State’s direct or indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a
fair and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality” and “to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.” Put simply, evidence is not
to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies “the
most basic test of reason―i.e. relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all other pieces of adduced evidence.” Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, G.R. No.
189691 November 13, 2012
ADMISSIONS
It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course
of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further
evidence to prove them.
Having admitted that she obtained loans from respondent without showing that the same had
already been paid or otherwise extinguished, petitioner cannot now aver otherwise. x x x They
are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they have been made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither of which was
shown to exist in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her admission of liability and the
only material question remaining is the extent of such liability. Odiamar vs. Valencia, 795 SCRA
18, G.R. No. 213582 June 28, 2016; see also Uy vs. Del Castillo, 831 SCRA 589, G.R. No.
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OBJECT EVIDENCE
It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of

the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving
with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.
The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly
militates against a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt persists on the
identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should come as a
matter of course. People vs. Sorin, 754 SCRA 594, G.R. No. 212635 March 25, 2015
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
While the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that
generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of
the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as “[w]hen the
original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror.”
In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence
or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 821
SCRA 41, G.R. No. 198799 March 20, 2017
Photocopies are considered secondary evidence which can be rendered inadmissible

absent any proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Notably, the genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could not be competently established
without a copy of the original. x x x Here, not only did the prosecution fail to present the original
copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise did not provide ample proof that the same was lost,
destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of Lamsen. Since mere photocopies of the
subject deed were used to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas,
no valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles’ declaration
inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen. Lamsen vs.
People, 846 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 227069 November 22, 2017
It has been settled that an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value. In addition, case law states that since a medical certificate
involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot

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be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications.
The Certification does not fall within the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court — and hence, must be considered as private. x x x It is precluded because
the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine
the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be
presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its
contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the medical certificate
renders its contents suspect and of no probative value,” as in this case. St. Martin Polyclinic,
Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corporation, 847 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 217426 December 4, 2017
Under Section 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in
the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they state.
Neither will the non-presentation in court of Police Senior Inspector Ebuen, the forensic chemist
who conducted the laboratory examination on the confiscated substance, operate to acquit
appellant.
The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. It has
the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses. Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the chemical
analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys
the presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts they state. People vs. Laba, 689 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 199938 January 28,
2013
The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it
may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its genuineness and due execution.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its genuineness and due
execution.
Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary
public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves
of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be
part of illegal transactions. Leones Vda. de Miller vs. Miranda, 774 SCRA 205, A.C. No. 8507
November 10, 2015

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TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore, does not mandatorily bind the court, the
expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which it can form its own
opinion.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, the authenticity of a signature is a matter that is not so highly
technical as to preclude a judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon the question
of whether the signature on a document is forged or not. The opinion of a handwriting expert,
therefore, does not mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s function being to place before the
court data upon which it can form its own opinion. Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs.
Alibin, 733 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 196129 August 13, 2014
It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer
oaths), they are still classified as hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is accorded the
opportunity to cross-examine them.
Nelson was not presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not subjected to any in-court
examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they
are still classified as hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them.
With the prosecution’s failure to present Nelson to affirm his statement that Castro caused the
return of Volume 266, the prosecution’s evidence on the matter should be treated as hearsay and,
thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims. Consequently, there exists
no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castro’s guilt. Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84,
G.R. No. 188694 February 12, 2014
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence
of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), 642 SCRA 210 (2011),
the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims
of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual
on Lending Operations. Delos Santos vs. Commission on Audit, 703 SCRA 501, G.R. No.
198457 August 13, 2013

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Case law states that the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
Bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certificate should be accorded
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of respondent Local Housing
Board of Taguig City. Case law states that “[t]he presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness,” as in this case.
Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova, 789 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 202618
April 12, 2016
Under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing
himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of the same Rule, it is
equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence
to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions.
Also, respondent’s possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses
her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that
evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the
evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent’s favor. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA
43, G.R. No. 208113 December 2, 2015
The burden rests on the debtor to prove payment rather than on the creditor to prove non-
payment.
On the matter of interest, while petitioner assailed the unilateral imposition of interest at rates
above the stipulated 18% p.a., he failed to submit a summary of the pertinent dates when
excessive interests were imposed and the purported over-payments that should be refunded.
Having failed to prove his affirmative defense, the Court finds no reason to disturb the amount
awarded to Chinabank. Settled is the rule that in civil cases, the party who asserts the affirmative
of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Thus, the
burden rests on the debtor to prove payment rather than on the creditor to prove nonpayment.
Crisologo vs. People, 686 SCRA 782, G.R. No. 199481 December 3, 2012

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Case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document
without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
That respondent was made to believe that her contract will just be renewed every time it expires
was not supported by substantial evidence. It bears stressing that self-serving and
unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to
establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla. Moreover,
Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court carries a legal presumption that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one
does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Also,
Section 3(p) of the same Rule equally presumes that private transactions have been fair and
regular. It therefore behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a
document before he signs the same. To add, since the employment contracts were duly
acknowledged before a notary public, it is deemed prima facie evidence of the facts expressed
therein and such notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity that may be
contradicted only by clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence, which
respondent failed to show in this case. OKS DesignTech vs. Caccam, 765 SCRA 433, G.R. No.
211263 August 5, 2015; see also Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs.
Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete Development & Construction, Inc., 838 SCRA 500, G.R. No.
225402 September 4, 2017
The rule is that he who alleges mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his
allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that
private transactions have been fair and regular.
Time and again, the Court has stressed that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence
because mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid
consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear, and convincing evidence, not merely
by preponderance of evidence. x x x Where mistake or error is alleged by parties who claim to
have not had the benefit of a good education, as in this case, they must establish that their
personal circumstances prevented them from giving their free, voluntary, and spontaneous
consent to a contract. Sierra vs. Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc., 734 SCRA 694, G.R.
No. 197857 September 10, 2014
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial
judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grueling examination.
Aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative evidence to support his
claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI’s presentment of
the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado’s unsubstantiated

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testimony is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon. In fact, the RTC did not
lend any credence to Amado’s testimony in resolving this case. x x x Absent any showing that the
trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment,”
as in this case. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 821 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 198799
March 20, 2017; see also People vs. Ladra, 831 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 221443 July 17, 2017
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of a witness
on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), these are generally binding and conclusive upon
the Supreme Court (SC).
While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, the Court found no substantial reason to
overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s
credibility. Orsos vs. People, 845 SCRA 150, G.R. No. 214673 November 20, 2017
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.” Evangelista vs. Andolong III, 809 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 221770
November 16, 2016; see also Ogawa vs. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, G.R. No. 193089 July 9,
2012
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them
by a preponderance of evidence. Also, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle equally holds true,
even if the defendant was not given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default
order. Evangelista vs. Andolong III, 809 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 221770 November 16, 2016
The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent
with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the
accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are

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derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it
is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the
others, as the guilty person. Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84, G.R. No. 188694 February 12,
2014
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole
record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability.
All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked constitute an unbroken
chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion
of the others, indeed the culprits. As such, their conviction, tested under the threshold of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability. Such moral certainty is, however, lacking in this
case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented. Atienza vs. People, 716
SCRA 84, G.R. No. 188694 February 12, 2014
The employer bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the
aforesaid just cause ― or any other valid cause for that matter―forms the basis of the
employee’s dismissal from work.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.—The Court
notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard
of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation
vs. Estrella, 700 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 197789 July 8, 2013; see also Reyes vs. Nieva, 802
SCRA 196, A.C. No. 8560 September 6, 2016; Jinon vs. Jiz, 692 SCRA 348, A.C. No. 9615
March 5, 2013

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2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW

CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 6

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Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-interference

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It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation.

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Elements of a Cause of Action

It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in

As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be

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Complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as it is merely an

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Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is

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Nature of Forum Shopping

Elements of Forum Shopping

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Forum shopping can be committed in three (3) ways.

Requirements of a Certification Against Forum Shopping

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Requirements on or Submission of a Defective Verification and Certification Against

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

4) As to certification against forum shopping, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike

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A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma.

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“Manifestation” and “Motion,” Distinguished

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Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate

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Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.

Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent

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Exceptions to the Rule on Immutability of Final Judgments

Relaxation of the Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgment; Other Exceptions

Principle of Stare Decisis

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Judgment on the Merits

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“Bar by prior judgment” vs. “Conclusiveness of judgment”

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JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

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A writ of possession is defined as a “writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to