1. LWV Construction Corporation vs. Marcelo B.

Dupo award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such
payment as severance pay.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers
hired Dupo in Saudi Arabia for its principal, MMG. Dupo signed his
first overseas employment contract, renewable after 1 year. It was 2. Raytheon International, Inc. vs. Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr
renewed 5 times. The sixth and last contract stated that Dupo’s
employment starts upon reporting to work and ends when he leaves PRINCIPLE: Forum non conveniens – a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
the work site. Dupo informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
needs to extend his vacation because his son was hospitalized; he available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.
also sought promotion. In reply, MMG informed respondent that his
services are still needed and that his decision regarding his
FACTS:
employment must be made within 7 days. Dupo resigned.
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation in Connecticut,
hired Rouzie as its representative in the Philippines who secured a
Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least 5
service contract with the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.
to the so-called long service award which is known to others as
longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of
Years later, Rouzie filed a suit against BMSI and RUST for alleged
service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to 1 month
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
pay for every year of service.
contract. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Dupo stated he is entitled for a long service award.
5 years later, Rouzie sued BMSI and RUST for damages before the
Petitioner said that the benefit was offered to Dupo before he went
RTC, this time including Raytheon International Inc. He reiterated
on vacation to which Dupo replied he did not grab the offer for he
the allegations in the labor case.
intended to return after his vacation.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure
Petitioner added that under Article of the Saudi Labor Law, the
to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens.
action to enforce payment of the service award must be filed within
1 year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period.
ISSUE: Whether or not forum non conveniens was applicable.
Petitioner concluded that the one-year prescriptive period had
lapsed because respondent filed his complaint on December 11,
RULING:
2000 or one year and seven months after his sixth contract ended.
No. Raytheon theorized that the foreign elements of the dispute
necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
LA – ordered petitioner to pay longevity pay
conveniens – he is mistaken.
NLRC – affirmed.
CA – affirmed. Service award is the same as longevity pay, and that
There are 3 phases involved in a judicial resolution of conflicts of
the severance pay received by Dupo cannot be equated with service
laws: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
award.
judgments. In this case, jurisdiction is the issue.
ISSUE:
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter – case was properly
1. Whether Dupo was entitled to a service award or longevity
filed in the RTC because the action was for damages arising from an
pay.
alleged breach of contract.
2. Whether or not the service award has prescribed based on
the Bahrain Law on prescription of action.
Jurisdiction over the parties – the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the
RULING:
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
1. No. Dupo’s service award under Saudi Labor Law has
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary
already been paid. The Court ruled that the service award
appearance in court.
is the same as longevity pay based on the computation.
Dupo’s employment contract expressly stated that his
Just because the contract stipulated that it shall be governed by the
employment ended upon his departure from work. Each
laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine
year he departed from work and successively new
courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
contracts were executed before he reported for work
from hearing the civil action.
anew. His service was not cumulative.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
2. No. Art. 291 of the LC finds application not the Bahrain
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
Law. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of
as procedural or substantive, depending on the
the case is fair to both parties.
characterization given such a law. Thus, Dupo’s complaint
was filed well within the 3-year prescriptive period under
Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has
already been mooted by the finding that Dupo’s service
 3. Sameer v. Bajaro, etc
FACTS:
Sameer agency deployed Bajaro, Morilla, and Sumigcay to Taiwan to
work as operators for Mabuchi Motors. However, after working for
only a period of 11 months and before the expiration of the two-
year period, respondents' employment contracts were terminated
and they were repatriated to the Philippines. This prompted the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner company.
Petitioners claimed that respondents were validly retrenched due to
severe business losses suffered by their foreign principal.
LA – respondents were illegally dismissed
- according to Section 10 of RA 8042. The liability of the
principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency
for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and
several. Thus, Sameer and Lamzon (the General Manager)
are jointly and severally liable to respondents
NLRC – reversed
- NLRC absolved petitioner Lamson of any personal liability for
lack of evidence showing that she acted in bad faith,
following the oft-repeated principle that corporate officers
cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations
of a corporation arising from employment-related claims.
CA – reinstated the decision of the LA
When Sameer elevated the matter to the SC, it raised the
application of private international law and the labor standards in
China. Since these were not raised before the NLRC and CA, it cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Yes, as Sameer failed to establish valid retrenchment, respondents
were clearly dismissed without just, valid or authorized cause.
Consequently, petitioner Lamzon is jointly and severally liable with
petitioner company.
SC modified the monetary award. In the Serrano case, the Court En
Banc declared the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" found in Section 10 of R.A. 8042,
as unconstitutional.
4. Wildvalley Shipping v. CA and Phil. President Lines
FACTS:
Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc.,
arrived in Venezuela, to load iron ore. An official pilot of Venezuela,
was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. When the
vessel experience vibrations, the pilot assured that the vibration was
harmless. The vessel would eventually touch the ground under
shallow water obstructing the ingress and egress of other vessels. As
a result, Wildvalley’s own vessel was unable to sail out.
Wildvalley sued Phil. Pres Lines and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
insurer of Phil. Roxas) for damages. The complaint against Pioneer
Insurance was dismissed.
RTC favored Wildvalley. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether Venezuelan law is applicable.
RULING:
No. Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must
be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Foreign law is considered
to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the
existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
event or transaction in issue. The best evidence rule requires that it
be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy: and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to
justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a
document in a foreign country.
In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country,
or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.
5. Pioneer Concrete, Pioneer Phils, and Klepzig v. Todaro
FACTS:
Todaro filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioners. Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is
principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete
aggregates business. PCPI is the company established by PIL to
undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates
and quarrying operations in the Philippines. PIL contacted Todaro
and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with
their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant in the
Philippines.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the
former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant
for 3 months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of
PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to
invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in
the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking
to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners move to dismiss the
complaint on the bases of forum non conveniens.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine was correctly applied.
RULING:
No. The doctrine should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
include said doctrine as a ground.
6. Socorro v. Wilsem
FACTS:
Socorro married Wilsem in Holland and had a son. They would
eventually file for divorce in Holland and Socorro and her son went
back to the Philippines. Socorro alleged that Wilsem made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son but he never did. Not long
after, Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried and has been
living in Cebu.
Because of the foregoing, Socorro filed against Wilsem for violation
of VAWC for his unjust refusal to support his minor child. RTC-Cebu
issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law.
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
RULING:
1. No. Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the
parent’s obligation to support his child, only applies to
Filipino citizens. However, in international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of
the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents
to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
But assuming arguendo that the English law (of non-
compliance of a parent’s obligation to support his child)
were properly pleaded and proved, said foreign law would
be great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support.
2. Yes. Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or
denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children. Considering that
respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle
in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case.
The SC did not agree with Wilsem that the action has
prescribed because the act of denying support to a child
under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly
not prescribed.
7. Medina v. Koike
FACTS:
Doreen (Filipino) and Michiyuki (Japanese) married in the Philippines
who thereafter obtained divorce in Japan. Doreen filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce in Quezon City to which the
RTC denied ruling that the divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Section 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. In other words, she fell short of proving the existence
of the law on divorce in Japan.
“The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too
that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions
found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was
insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness
nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of
the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and
divorce.”
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in denying the petition.
RULING:
The issue raised was a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a
Rule 45 petition for review and it referred it to the CA.
Principle: Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
like any other fact.
8. Lavadia Soledad v. Juan Luces Luna
FACTS:
Atty. Luna initially married Eugenia but thereafter agreed to live
apart and dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership. They
obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic. On the dame date,
Atty. Luna married Soledad whom he returned with to the
Philippines.
When Atty. Luna died his share of a condominium unit including the
law books were taken by his son of the first marriage. This prompted
Soledad to file a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna alleging
that the properties were acquired during her marriage with him and
that she was a co-owner of the same.
RTC – ruled that Atty. Luna acquired the properties through his sole
industry and that Soledad had no right as owner or under any
concept
CA – Eugenia was the legitimate wide of Atty. Luna until his death
because the divorce was not recognized in our jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the divorce was valid under our jurisdiction
2. Whether the separation and property settlement was
valid.
3. Whether Soledad became a co-owner to Atty. Luna’s
properties
RULING:
1. No. Atty. Luna and Eugenia were both Filipinos and their
marriage was solemnized in the Philippines. The law in
force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule to the effect that
Philippine laws were binding upon Filipino citizens
although living abroad. The non-recognition of absolute
divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the
 Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are
residing abroad.
2. No. Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947 so the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. The
mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required. The approval of the
Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic was not sufficient. The approval took place only
as an incident of the action for divorce. With the divorce
not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law
for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public
law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally
valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently,
the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia
subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. No. The marriage was void for being bigamous, thus the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In such a situation,
whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof
to confirm such fact. Thus, her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor.
9. Lhuiller v. British Airways
FACTS:
Lhuiller took a flight with British Airways from London, UK, to Italy.
She alleged that one of the flight attendant’s refused to assist her
while another made her appear ignorant to other passengers by
singling her out to lecture on place safety. This prompted Lhuiller to
file a complaint for damages against British Airways. Respondent, by
way of special appearance through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person
of the respondent, alleging that jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is
deemed to be an "international carriage" within the
contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may
bring the action for damages before –
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled (London)
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of
business (London)
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which
the contract has been made; (Italy, Lhuiller bought her
ticket through Jeepney Travel in Rome) or
4. the court of the place of destination (Italy)
With this, only the courts of London, UK or Rome, Italy have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages.
2. No. In Naval Drug Corporation v. CA, the court held that
special appearance to question a court’s jurisdiction is not
voluntary appearance.
In Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure it provides
–
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing
the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court
cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the said trial court.

RTC—Warsaw Convention applies

Lhuiller filed a petition for certiorari. She contends that the treaty
11. Asiavest Limited v. CA and Heras
does not apply because her action was on the tortious conduct of
FACTS:
the flight attendants, not on the contract of carriage. She thus
Asiavest filed a complaint against Heras ordering him to pay the
maintained that the fact that said acts occurred aboard a plane is
amounts awarded by a Hong Kong court judgment. It plaintiff
merely incidental. Since her cause of action was not predicated on
presented only documentary evidence to show rendition, existence,
the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to
and authentication of such judgment by the proper officials
pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.
concerned.
Piggybacking on the issue of jurisdiction, she also submits that the
An expert in Hong Kong laws testified that there was no record that
special appearance of counsel was deemed to be a voluntary
a writ of summons was served on the person of Heras in Hong Kong,
submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
or that any such attempt at service was made but there was no legal
requirement to do so.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Warsaw Convention applies
RTC –the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given
2. Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal
the respondent by virtue of the special appearance.
presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
CA—a foreign judgment does not have any extraterritorial
RULING:
application. For it to be given effect, the foreign tribunal should have
1. Yes. Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioner’s
acquired jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. If such
complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw
tribunal has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void.
Convention. In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of
departure was UK while her place of destination was Italy.
ISSUES:
Both the UK and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
 1. Whether service of summons should have been personally
served on Heras in Hong Kong and whether the foreign
judgment should be given effect
RULING:
Yes, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action
against him was in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service
in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the
Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the
Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in
the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
13. EDI v. NLRC and Eleazar Gran
FACTS:
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and
placement of OFWs. ESI is another recruitment agency which
collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and
deployment of Gran to Saudi Arabia. After working as “Computer
Specialist” for OAB for 5 months, he was terminated on the
following grounds:
a. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the
recruitment agency primarily on your salary and contract
duration
b. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements
c. Insubordination or disobedience
LA - there was neither underpayment nor illegal dismissal
NLRC – reversed
CA – Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB did not
abide by the twin notice requirement thus not afforded due process.
EDI had the burden of proving Gran's incompetence but no evidence
was presented to show how and why Gran was considered to be
incompetent. The court held that since the law requires the
recruitment agencies to subject OFWs to trade tests before
deployment, Gran must have been competent and qualified;
otherwise, he would not have been hired and deployed abroad.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Gran’s termination was for justifiable by reason
of incompetence and insubordination and disobedience
2. Whether he was afforded due process
RULING:
1. No. In the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor
laws and regulations shall govern the relationship between
Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules on the requisites of
due process relating to termination of employment shall
apply. Aside from termination letters, no other evidence
was presented to show how and why Gran was considered
incompetent, insubordinate, or disobedient. EDI had
clearly failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran
was validly dismissed.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the
following twin elements must concur:
a) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and
b) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge
EDI failed to show that the order of the company which was
violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of
Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI
should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job
description, or any other document that would show that the "Daily
Activity Reports" were required for submission by the employees,
more particularly by a Computer Specialist.
2. No. Under the twin notice requirement, the employees
must be given 2 notices before their employment could be
terminated:
(1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault,
and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees
that their employment is being terminated.
In between the first and second notice, the employees should be
given a hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or
by counsel of their choice. While it furnished Gran the written notice
informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written
notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed by the
Labor Code. Consequently, he was denied the opportunity to
respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing
or conference with Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in
support of his defenses. Clearly, there was no intention to provide
Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his
employment arbitrarily terminated on the same day, through the
same letter, and for unjustified grounds.
14. Nedlloyd and East Asiatic v. Glow Enterprises
FACTS:
Nedlloyd is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of carrying
goods by sea, whose vessels regularly call at the port of Manila. It is
doing business in the Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-
petitioner East Asiatic. Glow Laks Enterprises likewise a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong.
respondent loaded on board a vessel at the Port of Manila a total
343 cartons of garments, complete and in good order for pre-
carriage to the Port of Hong Kong. The goods arrived in good
condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to another vessel for
final carriage to Panama. Both vessesl were owned by Nedlloyd
represented in the Philippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods
were agreed to be released to consignee, Pierre Kasem.
Upon arrival at Panam, petitioners purportedly notified Kasem and
its custody was turned over to the NPA. However, unauthorized
persons managed to forge the covering bulls of lading and on the
basis of falsified documents, the ports released the goods.
Nedlloyd filed against petitioners for the alleged misdelivery of the
goods.
In disclaiming liability, petitioners asserted that their extraordinary
responsibility ceased when the goods were turned over to the NPA.
RTC – Panama law was proved by the petitioners and pursuant to
such statute, carrier of goods had to discharge their loads into the
custody of the port authorities, relieving them of liability
CA –reversed; foreign law was not proven thus under the CC, the
discharge of goods to the port authorities does not relieve them
from liability because the extraordinary responsibility remains.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Panama law was duly proven in accordance
with the Rules of Evidence
 2. Whether petitioners were relieved of extraordinary
responsibility.
RULING:
1. No. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court. For a copy of a foreign public document to
be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
a) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of
the records or by his deputy; and
b) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and
with the seal of his office.
The Panamanian laws petitioners relied on, particularly Law 42 and
its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly proven in accordance
with Rules of Evidence.
It is explicitly required by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a copy of the statute must be accompanied by a
certificate of the officer who has legal custody of the records and a
certificate made by the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consular or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not
merely a technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith
and credit to the genuineness of the document in a foreign country.
Certainly, the deposition of Mr. Enrique Cajigas, a maritime law
practitioner in the Republic of Panama, before the Philippine
Consulate in Panama, is not the certificate contemplated by law.
2. No. Since, the foreign law was not duly proven, Philippine laws
governed and under the NCC, the loss or the misdelivery of the
goods gave rise to the presumption that the common carrier is at
fault or negligent. To overcome the presumption of negligence, the
common carrier must establish by adequate proof that it exercised
extraordinary diligence over the goods. Petitioners failed to prove
that they did so.
Crescent Petroleum v. M/V Maheshwari, Portserv, Transmar
FACTS:
17. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Jack Robert
Sherman
Facts:
Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Singapore branch an overdraft
facility in the maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00
(which amount was subsequently increased to Singapore dollar
375,000.00). As a security for the repayment bythe COMPANY of the
sum advanced, Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj, herein
private respondents, and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom
were directors of said COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee in favor of petitioner BANK whereby they agreed
to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the
COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft
facility. The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: "This
guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby
agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction overall
disputes arising under this guarantee . . ." The COMPANY failed to
pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment from
the private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the
Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents
still failed to pay, petitioner BANK filed a civil case for a collection of
a sum of money against Sherman and Reloj before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In turn, the private respondents filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint and over the persons of the defendants,
but, it was denied. Subsequently, the court granted the petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.
Held:
Yes. The parties did not stipulate that only the courts of
Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither
did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as
the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things
within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. This authority,
which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive
within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent
to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before
them. While it is true that “the transaction took place in Singaporean
setting” and that law not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International
Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction
must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The defense of
private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim,
much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them
any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand,
there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to
harass private respondents.
18. PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al
FACTS:
Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners
Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment
Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent
1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed
Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc.
executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to
petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas,
U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as
initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by
means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488,
Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc.,
PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and
delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession
belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire
amount covered by the note became due and demandable.
Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC,
AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance
and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of
the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners
filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC
Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in
their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States
District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed
fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its
true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the
grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2)
forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and
BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues
raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case
justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which
does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing
a case based on this principle requires a factual determination,
hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
“vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances” require the court’s desistance.

The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary
requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before
the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in
private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted
that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in
applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc.,
and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of

the U.S. court?

HELD:
CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati. NO, While this Court
has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under
the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim
of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39,
§50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is

conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private
respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary.
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished
copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence
presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the