G.R. No.
186560 November 17, 2010 Nonetheless, we believe that the peculiarities of your case is a matter that may be jointly
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. FERNANDO P. DE
LEON, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks the nullification of the
Decision1 dated October 28, 2008 and the Resolution2 dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811.
Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which
provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. The application was
approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously received
his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension. 3
Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under
R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the
same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits
provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the payment of respondent’s monthly pension.4
Respondent wrote GSIS several letters but he received no response until November 9, 2007,
when respondent received the following letter from GSIS:
Dear Atty. De Leon:
This is in response to your request for resumption of pension benefit.
It appears that you retired under Republic Act No. 910 in 1992 from your position as Chief State
Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. From 1992 to 2001, you were receiving pension benefits
under the said law. Beginning the year 2002, the Department of Budget and Management
through then Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin already refused to release the funds for your pension
benefit on the ground that Chief State Prosecutors are not covered by R.A. 910. This conclusion
was later on affirmed by Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. in a letter dated 6 June 2006.
In view of these, you now seek to secure benefits under Republic Act No. 660 or any other
applicable GSIS law.
We regret, however, that we cannot accede to your request because you have chosen to retire
and in fact have already retired under a different law, Republic Act No. 910, more than fifteen (15)
years ago. There is nothing in the GSIS law which sanctions double retirement unless the retiree
is first re-employed and qualifies once again to retire under GSIS law. In fact, Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8291 provides for exclusivity of benefits which means that a retiree may choose
only one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion of all others.
addressed or threshed out by your agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of
Budget and Management.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
CECIL L. FELEO
Senior Vice President Social Insurance Group5
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be
compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from
2001. He also asked that GSIS and the DBM be ordered to pay him damages. 6
In the assailed October 28, 2008 Decision, the CA resolved to grant the petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The GSIS is hereby ordered to pay without delay
petitioner Atty. Fernando de Leon, his monthly adjusted pension in accordance with other
applicable law not under RA 910. It is also ordered to pay the back pensions which should also
be adjusted to conform to the applicable law from the time his pension was withheld.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA found that GSIS allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following precedents
which allowed non-judges to retire under the said law. The CA said that it was not respondent’s
fault that he was allowed to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 910; and that, even if his
retirement under that law was erroneous, respondent was, nonetheless, entitled to a monthly
pension under the GSIS Act. The CA held that this was not a case of double retirement, but
merely a continuation of the payment of respondent’s pension benefit to which he was clearly
entitled. Since the error in the award of retirement benefits under R.A. 910 was not attributable to
respondent, it was incumbent upon GSIS to continue defraying his pension in accordance with
the appropriate law which might apply to him. It was unjust for GSIS to entirely stop the payment
of respondent’s monthly pension without providing any alternative sustenance to him. 8
The CA further held that, under R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 8291, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1146, respondent is entitled to a monthly pension for life. He cannot be penalized for the error
committed by GSIS itself. Thus, although respondent may not be qualified to receive the
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, he is still entitled to a monthly pension under R.A. No.
660, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A. No. 8291.9
Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution
denying its motion for reconsideration.
GSIS admits that respondent received monthly pensions from August 1997 until December 2001.
Thereafter, the DBM refused to remit the funds for respondent’s pension on the ground that he
was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910 and should have retired under another law, without
however specifying which law it was.10 It appears that the DBM discontinued the payment of
respondent’s pension on the basis of the memorandum of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
that Chief Prosecutors of the DOJ are not entitled to the retirement package under R.A. No. 910.
Because of the discontinuance of his pension, respondent sought to convert his retirement under
R.A. No. 910 to one under another law administered by GSIS.11 However, this conversion was
not allowed because, as GSIS avers, R.A. No. 8291 provides that conversion of one’s retirement
mode on whatever ground and for whatever reason is not allowed beyond one year from the date
of retirement.
GSIS assails the CA’s Decision for not specifying under which law respondent’s retirement
benefits should be paid, thus making it legally impossible for GSIS to comply with the
directive.12 It then raises several arguments that challenge the validity of the appellate court’s
decision.
GSIS argues, first, that the CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite the absence of any
specific and clear right on the part of respondent, since he could not even specify the benefits to
which he is entitled and the law under which he is making the claim. 13
Second, GSIS alleges that it had refunded respondent’s premium payments because he opted to
retire under R.A. No. 910, which it does not administer. Thus, GSIS posits that the nexus
between itself and respondent had been severed and, therefore, the latter cannot claim benefits
from GSIS anymore.14
Third, GSIS contends that the CA erred in concluding that respondent would not be unjustly
enriched by the continuation of his monthly pension because he had already benefited from
having erroneously retired under R.A. No. 910. GSIS points out that it had refunded respondent’s
premium contributions. When the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel concluded that respondent
was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910, it was implicit recognition that respondent was
actually not entitled to the ₱1.2 million lump sum payment he received, which he never
refunded.15
Fourth, GSIS points out that the CA erred in concluding that respondent was not seeking
conversion from one retirement mode to another. It reiterates that R.A. No. 8291 expressly
prohibits conversion beyond one year from retirement. To compel GSIS to release respondent’s
retirement benefits despite the fact that he is disqualified to receive retirement benefits violates
R.A. No. 8291, and would subject its officials to possible charges under R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Fifth, GSIS contends that respondent is not entitled to the retirement benefits under R.A. No.
8291 because, when he retired in 1992, the law had not yet been enacted. The retirement laws
administered by GSIS at that time were R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 1616, and P.D. No. 1146.
Lastly, GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it
compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to law.
Respondent traverses these allegations, and insists that he has a clear legal right to receive
retirement benefits under either R.A. No. 660 or P.D. No. 1146. 16 He claims that he has met all
the conditions for entitlement to the benefits under either of the two laws. 17 Respondent contends
that the return of his contributions does not bar him from pursuing his claims because GSIS can
require him to refund the premium contributions, or even deduct the amount returned to him from
the retirement benefits he will receive. 18 He also argues that resumption of his monthly pension
will not constitute unjust enrichment because he is entitled to the same as a matter of right for the
rest of his natural life.19
Respondent accepts that, contrary to the pronouncement of the CA, he is not covered by R.A.
No. 8291. He, therefore, asks this Court to modify the CA Decision, such that instead of Section
13 of R.A. No. 8291, it should be Section 12 of P.D. No. 1146 or Section 11 of R.A. No. 660 to be
used as the basis of his right to receive, and the adjustment of, his monthly pension.
Furthermore, respondent argues that allowing him to retire under another law does not constitute
"conversion" as contemplated in the GSIS law. He avers that his application for retirement under
R.A. No. 910 was duly approved by GSIS, endorsed by the DOJ, and implemented by the DBM
for almost a decade. Thus, he should not be made to suffer any adverse consequences owing to
the change in the interpretation of the provisions of R.A. No. 910. Moreover, he could not have
applied for conversion of his chosen retirement mode to one under a different law within one year
from approval of his retirement application, because of his firm belief that his retirement under
R.A. No. 910 was proper – a belief amply supported by its approval by GSIS, the favorable
endorsement of the DOJ, and its implementation by the DBM. 20
The petition is without merit.
Initially, we resolve the procedural issue.
GSIS contends that respondent’s petition for mandamus filed before the CA was procedurally
improper because respondent could not show a clear legal right to the relief sought.
The Court disagrees with petitioner. The CA itself acknowledged that it would not indulge in
technicalities to resolve the case, but focus instead on the substantive issues rather than on
procedural questions.21 Furthermore, courts have the discretion to relax the rules of procedure in
order to protect substantive rights and prevent manifest injustice to a party.
The Court has allowed numerous meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than to promote substantial justice must always be avoided. 22
Besides, as will be discussed hereunder, contrary to petitioner’s posture, respondent has a clear
legal right to the relief prayed for. Thus, the CA acted correctly when it gave due course to
respondent’s petition for mandamus.
This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years,
was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but
found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation
that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of
social legislation.
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of
the beneficiaries.23 Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the
retiree24 because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even
comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced.25 Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor
of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. 26
In this case, as adverted to above, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal
right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits.
In stopping the payment of respondent’s monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of
the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel’s opinion that
respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because
respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS
erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even
under any other extant retirement law. This is flawed logic.
Respondent’s disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not
mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing
retirement law.
The CA, however, incorrectly held that respondent was covered by R.A. No. 8291. R.A. No. 8291
became a law after respondent retired from government service. Hence, petitioner and even
respondent agree that it does not apply to respondent, because the law took effect after
respondent’s retirement.
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to
the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth
Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146.
In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146,
since this law provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time
of his retirement in 1992.27
Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the following
requisites:
Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:
(1) has at least fifteen years of service;
(2) is at least sixty years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not
dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12
of the same law, to wit:
Section 12. Old-Age Pension.
(a) A member entitled to old-age pension shall receive the basic monthly pension for life but in no
case for a period less than five years: Provided, That, the member shall have the option to
convert the basic monthly pensions for the first five years into a lump sum as defined in this Act:
Provided, further, That, in case the pensioner dies before the expiration of the five-year period,
his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the balance of the amount still due to him. In default
of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall be paid to his legal heirs.
To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly
claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should
simply apply the proper retirement law to respondent’s claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910. In
this way, GSIS would be faithful to its mandate to administer retirement laws in the spirit in which
they have been enacted, i.e., to provide retirees the wherewithal to live a life of relative comfort
and security after years of service to the government. Respondent will not receive --- and GSIS is
under no obligation to give him --- more than what is due him under the proper retirement law.
It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 1146 specifically mandates that a retiree is entitled to
monthly pension for life. As this Court previously held:
Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government
pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms
of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the
government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage
and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government
employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a
pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms
of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. 28
It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910,
following jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioner’s
interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer
the government’s retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what
they were doing.
Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced
by the same.1avvphi1 His right to receive monthly pension from the government cannot be
jeopardized by a new interpretation of the law.
GSIS’ argument that respondent has already been enormously benefited under R.A. No. 910
misses the point.
Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the employer,
and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden
of having to worry about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature of
"retained wages" of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the
government service; and to permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only
for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by
illness or accident.29
Surely, giving respondent what is due him under the law is not unjust enrichment.
As to GSIS’ contention that what respondent seeks is conversion of his retirement mode, which is
prohibited under R.A. No. 8291, the Court agrees with the CA that this is not a case of conversion
within the contemplation of the law. The conversion under the law is one that is voluntary, a
choice to be made by the retiree. Here, respondent had no choice but to look for another law
under which to claim his pension benefits because the DBM had decided not to release the funds
needed to continue payment of his monthly pension.
Respondent himself admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the payment of his pension, he
would not have sought any other law under which to receive his benefits. The necessity to
"convert" was not a voluntary choice of respondent but a circumstance forced upon him by the
government itself.
Finally, GSIS would like this Court to believe that because it has returned respondent’s premium
contributions, it is now legally impossible for it to comply with the CA’s directive.
Given the fact that respondent is ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, the refund by GSIS of
respondent’s premium payments was erroneous. Hence, GSIS can demand the return of the
erroneous payment or it may opt to deduct the amount earlier received by respondent from the
benefits which he will receive in the future. Considering its expertise on the matter, GSIS can
device a scheme that will facilitate either the reimbursement or the deduction in the most cost-
efficient and beneficial manner.
The foregoing disquisition draws even greater force from subsequent developments. While this
case was pending, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10071, 30 the Prosecution Service Act
of 2010. On April 8, 2010, it lapsed into law without the signature of the President,31 pursuant to
Article VI, Section 27(1) of the Constitution. 32
Section 24 of R.A. No. 10071 provides:
Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted
to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act.
By virtue of this express provision, respondent is covered by R.A. No. 10071. In addition, he is
now entitled to avail of the benefits provided by Section 23, that "all pension benefits of retired
prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service shall be automatically increased whenever there
is an increase in the salary and allowance of the same position from which he retired."
Respondent, as former Chief State Prosecutor, albeit the position has been renamed "Prosecutor
General,"33should enjoy the same retirement benefits as the Presiding Justice of the CA,
pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 10071, to wit:
Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor
General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary
grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those
of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President. 34
Furthermore, respondent should also benefit from the application of Section 16 of the law, which
states:
Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors, and other Prosecution
Officers. – x x x.
Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or
any upgrading of the grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to
herein to whom said emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors.
Lastly, and most importantly, by explicit fiat of R.A. No. 10071, members of the National
Prosecution Service have been granted the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, to wit:
Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended, and all other benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall
likewise be given to the prosecutors covered by this Act.
Hence, from the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 10071, respondent should be entitled to receive
retirement benefits granted under R.A. No. 910.
Consequently, GSIS should compute respondent’s retirement benefits from the time the same
were withheld until April 7, 2010 in accordance with P.D. No. 1146; and his retirement benefits
from April 8, 2010 onwards in accordance with R.A. No. 910.
A final note. The Court is dismayed at the cavalier manner in which GSIS handled respondent’s
claims, keeping respondent in the dark as to the real status of his retirement benefits for so long.
That the agency tasked with administering the benefits of retired government employees could so
unreasonably treat one of its beneficiaries, one who faithfully served our people for over 40 years,
is appalling. It is well to remind GSIS of its mandate to promote the efficiency and welfare of the
employees of our government, and to perform its tasks not only with competence and proficiency
but with genuine compassion and concern.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 28, 2008 and the
Resolution dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811 are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED
to (1) pay respondent’s retirement benefits in accordance with P.D. No. 1146, subject to
deductions, if any, computed from the time the same were withheld until April 7, 2010; and (2)
pay respondent’s retirement benefits in accordance with R.A. No. 910, computed from April 8,
2010 onwards.
In order that respondent may not be further deprived of his monthly pension benefits, this
Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154798 October 20, 2005
CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., and/or A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, Petitioners,
vs.
DEO P. NATIVIDAD, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Resolutions1 dated July 2, 2002 and August 15, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71293 which denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time
to file a petition for certiorari and their motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner A/S Stein Line Bergen, through its local manning agent, petitioner Crystal Shipping,
Inc., employed respondent Deo P. Natividad as Chief Mate of M/V Steinfighter for a period of ten
months.2 Within the contract period, respondent complained of coughing and hoarseness and
was brought to shore for examination. He was diagnosed with "swelling neck and lymphatic
glands right side in neck", declared unfit for duty, and advised to see an ear-nose-throat
specialist.3 He was repatriated to Manila on August 18, 1998.
Shortly after his arrival, respondent was referred to ClinicoMed Inc., the company-designated
clinic, for check-up and later thoroughly examined at the Manila Doctors Hospital. He was
diagnosed with "papillary carcinoma, metastatic to lymphoid tissue consistent with thyroid
primary" and "reactive hyperplasis, lymph node". On September 11, 1998, he underwent a total
thyroidectomy with radial neck dissection. After the operation, respondent developed chest
complications and pleural effusion, and had to undergo a thoracenthesis operation. On the basis
of all these, his attending physician diagnosed him permanently disabled with a grade 9
impediment, with grade 1 as the most serious.4
A second opinion by Marine Medical Services and Metropolitan Hospital attending physician, Dr.
Robert D. Lim, likewise concurred that respondent was disabled with a grade 9
impediment.5 Under the care of Dr. Lim, respondent underwent various treatments, one of which
was the radioactive iodine therapy at the Philippine General Hospital. While his treatment with Dr.
Lim was ongoing, respondent sought the opinion of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, who opined that he was
totally and permanently disabled for labor with a grade 1 impediment. 6 On February 22, 1999,
respondent underwent a whole body scan which revealed no trace of radio iodine on his body to
indicate metastasis or residual thyroid tissue. The attending physician, Dr. Wilson D. Lim,
confirmed the earlier assessments of disability with a grade 9 impediment.7
All expenses incurred in respondent’s examination and treatments were shouldered by the
petitioners. Respondent was also paid the allowable illness allowances, commensurate to a
grade 9 impediment.
On June 25, 1999, petitioners offered US$13,060 as disability benefits which respondent
rejected. Respondent claimed that he deserves to be paid US$60,000 for a grade 1 impediment.
Failing to reach an agreement, respondent filed, with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB), a
complaint for disability benefits, illness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled for respondent and ordered petitioners to pay respondent US$60,000 as
disability benefits, ₱100,000 as moral damages, and ten percent of the total monetary award as
attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) initially reversed the ruling of the
RAB on the ground that findings of the company-designated doctors were binding, as stipulated
in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Employment
Contract.8 However, upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, citing jurisprudence that
findings of company-designated doctors are self-serving, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the RAB
with respect only to the award of disability benefits.
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for extension of time to file their petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 2002, the appellate court denied the motion on the ground that
pressure of work is not a compelling reason for the grant of an extension.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner’s motion for extension is DENIED and the instant case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9
Prior to the receipt of the appellate court’s denial, petitioners filed the petition. It was noted
without action in view of the July 2, 2002 Resolution. 10 Subsequently, petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the resolution, but it was denied.11
Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing error to the Court of Appeals,
I. … WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THEIR
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, FAILING TO GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS THEREIN;
II. … WHEN IT MERELY NOTED PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65 WITHOUT PERUSING THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN AND THE ARGUMENTS IN
SUPPORT THEREOF WHICH, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IS CLEARLY INIQUITOUS
AND UNJUST.12
Here, we are asked to resolve the procedural issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it
denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a petition; and the substantive issue of the
proper disability benefits that respondent is entitled to.
Anent the procedural issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erroneously applied the
ruling in Velasco v. Ortiz,13 because the factual circumstances therein were different from the
present case. In Velasco, the parties sought for the admission of their appeal that was filed
beyond the reglementary period. In the present case, however, petitioners filed their motion for
extension of time within the reglementary period. They maintain that they have a valid and
compelling reason in asking the appellate court for extension. Moreover, petitioners posit that
technical rules of procedure should give way to substantive justice.
On the other hand, respondent argues that there should be more than a mere claim of "extreme
pressure of work" to justify an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. He calls attention to
the fact that petitioners never moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which is a
prerequisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Likewise, respondent counters petitioners’ plea
for liberality by indicating their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision.
Jurisprudence abounds on the subject that a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the
filing of a special civil action for certiorari. 14 A literal interpretation of this prerequisite would
require a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which granted a previous motion for
reconsideration and reversed a prior decision. After all, the second decision is considered as
entirely new.
We cannot fault the appellate court for faithfully complying with the rules of procedure which it
has been mandated to observe.15 Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is
enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.16
Indeed, on several occasions, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford
the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases. This is in line with the time-
honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue
their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as
basis of decisions.17
The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to make sure that administrative
remedies have been exhausted before a case is appealed to a higher court. It allows the
adjudicator a second opportunity to review the case, to grapple with the issues therein, and to
decide anew a question previously raised. 18 It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any
previous error committed in its forum.19
With the first motion for reconsideration which the NLRC granted, there is no need for the parties
to file another motion for reconsideration before bringing up the matter to the Court of Appeals.
The NLRC was already given the opportunity to pass upon and correct its mistakes. Moreover, it
would be absurd to ask the NLRC to keep on reversing itself.
Considering that property rights of both parties are involved here, we will give due course to the
instant petition. Remanding the case to the court a quo will only frustrate speedy justice and, in
any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this
Court. 20 Thus, we shall bring the present controversy to rest by deciding on the appropriate
disability benefits that respondent is entitled to.
On the substantive issue, petitioners assert that the NLRC erred when it said that findings of
company-designated doctors are self-serving. They point out that there were three doctors who
came up with the same findings. They argue that these findings were more credible than the
findings of respondent’s doctor. In addition, petitioners claim that the award of a grade 1
impediment/disability benefit was wrong considering that respondent subsequently gained
employment as chief mate of another vessel.
In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 55, Series of 1996,21 which provides the schedule of disability or impediment for
injuries suffered and illness contracted. The particular illness of the respondent is not within those
enumerated. But, the same provision supplies us with the guideline that any item in the schedule
classified under grade 1 constitutes total and permanent disability.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. 22 As gleaned from the
records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least,
or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was
permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind
of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. 23 It does not mean absolute
helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. 24
Although the company-designated doctors and respondent’s physician differ in their assessments
of the degree of respondent’s disability, both found that respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to
respondent’s need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would not be available if
he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that respondent’s disability was total.
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again
as a chief mate in March 2001.25 Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a
result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of
no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that
the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary
work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. 26 An award of a total
and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help
the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and
August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71293, as well as the Resolution
dated April 9, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-
2000 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154093 July 8, 2003
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs.LEO L. CADIZ, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means
disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature,
that he was trained for, or any work which a person of similar mentality and attainment could do.1
Assailed in this petition for review is the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63521, which set aside the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission and granted
respondent’s claim for permanent total disability compensation benefits.
The undisputed facts are as follows: respondent Leo L. Cadiz was appointed as a Provincial
Guard of Negros Oriental on July 1, 1968. On March 16, 1974, he entered the police service and
was promoted to several ranks until he became a Police Major. In 1991, he was absorbed by the
Philippine National Police (PNP), with a rank of Police Chief Inspector. On July 17, 1992,
respondent’s rank was adjusted to Police Chief Superintendent, the position he held until his
retirement on March 19, 1999 at the age of 55.3
The medical records of respondent revealed that on October 11, 1996, he suffered a heart attack
and was hospitalized at the San Carlos Planters Hospital, San Carlos City. He was transferred to
the Siliman University Medical Center where he was diagnosed to be suffering from "AF with CHF
Class 1-E T/A Sec. to Cardio embolic Sec. to AF, Chronic CAD,"4 a heart ailment. Thereafter,
respondent was also admitted at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital for chest pain,
palpitation and abnormal beats – "HP..., AF, CHF Class I; Hypercholesterolemia."5Consequently,
he applied for early retirement due to "an ailment causing [paralysis of the] left hand and [slurred]
speech…rendering him unfit to discharge further his duties and responsibilities as a police
officer."6 Dr. Silahis Rosario, a cardiologist and attending physician of respondent, testified before
the National Police Commission that the latter’s ailment is unstable angina and chronic atriol
fibrillation, which means a chronic irregularity of the heart causing a congestive heart
failure.7 After its own examination of respondent, the Medical and Dental Service, PNP, declared
him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE".8 Hence, on March 19, 1999, he was retired from service
and granted permanent total disability benefits. 9
Subsequently, respondent filed a disability claim with the GSIS, attaching to his application his
service record and PNP General Order No. 641, stating that respondent retired from the PNP due
to a permanent total disability.10 On November 25, 1999, Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical
Officer of GSIS, Dumaguete City, approved the claim and granted respondent permanent total
disability benefits starting March 19, 1999, and temporary total disability benefits from October
12, 1996 to November 22, 1996. 11
The Medical Service Group of GSIS, Pasay City, however, directed Dr. Estrada to revise her
recommendation, thus – "[k]indly revise your medical recommendation based on our criteria for
granting of disability. Based on your physical examination (8/23/99) done the degree of claimant’s
disability, does not satisfy the criteria for PTD. We are returning these claim for re-evaluation
under PD 626."12
On January 29, 2000, Dr. Estrada modified her recommendation by retaining respondent’s
temporary total disability benefits from October 12, 1996 to November 22, 1996, but downgrading
the permanent total disability benefits to compensation equivalent to 8 months permanent partial
disability benefits from March 19, 1999.13 Respondent moved for reconsideration of the
evaluation but the same was denied.
On appeal by respondent, the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the
findings of the GSIS. Hence, respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals which, on June
21, 2002, rendered a decision setting aside the decision of the ECC and granting respondent’s
claim for permanent total disability. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged decisions of the
ECC and the GSIS are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and another [one is] entered
declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability. Respondent ECC
is accordingly ordered to award the petitioner the full benefits corresponding to his
permanent total disability. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.14
On September 3, 2002, GSIS, as the agency charged with the management and administration of
the trust fund of the ECC, filed the instant petition.
Is respondent entitled to permanent total disability benefits?
We rule in the affirmative. In denying respondent’s claim for permanent total disability benefits,
the ECC held:
Based on the ECC Schedule of Compensation, appellant was already awarded the
maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his disability. Moreover, the primary
criterion set for permanent total disability in this case was not met, that is: permanent
paralysis of two limbs; complete loss of sight of both eyes; brain injury resulting in
incurable imbecility; and loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrist.
Since appellant was already awarded the maximum benefits prevailing at the time of his
compulsory retirement, he is no longer entitled to additional benefits under PD 626, as
amended.15
Clearly, the ECC did not state its reason for declaring that the benefits awarded by the GSIS to
respondent are those that are commensurate to the degree of his disability. The fact that the
latter did not lose the use of any part of his body does not justify the denial of his claim for
permanent total disability. In Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,16 it was
held that while permanent total disability invariably results in an employee’s loss of work or
inability to perform his usual work, permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses
the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his
former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent
total disability is the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the
disability he incurred. If by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable
to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage
of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed
manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee
undoubtedly suffers from a permanent total disability regardless of whether or not he loses the
use of any part of his body. Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute
helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or
work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or any work which a person of similar mentality
and attainment could do.17
In the case at bar, respondent’s entitlement to permanent total disability was established by his
medical records and by the investigation of the very agency he worked for, the PNP, which found
him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE".18Even the initial findings of Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada,
Medical Officer of the GSIS, Dumaguete City evinced that respondent is really qualified for
permanent total disability benefits. Most of all, the decision of the PNP to retire him at the age of
55 for being unfit for police service is a clear indication that his heart ailment rendered him
incapable of effectively and competently performing his job as a Police Chief Superintendent
without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to his life.19 In a number
of cases, 20 it was ruled that the early retirement of an employee due to a work-related ailment, as
in the case at bar, proves that he was really disabled totally to further perform his assigned task,
and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render inutile
and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution.
The case of Tria v. Employees Compensation Commission,21 where we denied a claim for
conversion of disability benefits, is not applicable to the instant case. The claim therein, which
was filed 4 years after the employee’s retirement, refers to a claim for conversion of a previously
granted disability benefit from permanent partial to permanent total on the ground of an alleged
recurring illness. The case at bar, however, neither concerns a recurring illness previously
compensated, nor a claim for additional/conversion of disability benefits, but involves a review of
the ECC decision which classified respondent’s early-retirement-causing disability as permanent
partial instead of permanent total. As to the decisions 22 of the Court of Appeals cited by petitioner
as authorities, it must be stressed that judicial decisions which form part of our legal system are
only the decisions of the Supreme Court. While rulings of the Court of Appeals may serve as
precedents for lower courts, they only apply to points of law not covered by any Supreme Court
decision.23 This is not, however, the case here, considering that the legal issue presented is
already laid to rest by settled jurisprudence. Significantly, one of the Court of Appeals’ cases cited
by petitioner – Ijares v. Employees Compensation Commission (CA-G.R. SP No. 26910, April 13,
1992) was reversed by this Court on August 26, 1999, in G.R. No. 105854. There, we held that
the early retirement of an employee at the age of 60 by reason of a work-related illness justifies
the award of permanent total disability benefits.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 63521, declaring respondent Leo L. Cadiz to be suffering from a permanent total disability
and ordering the Employees’ Compensation Commission to award him the full benefits
corresponding to his disability, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96844 January 23, 1992
REMUS A. DIOPENES, petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
(Development Bank of the Philippines) and the EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION (ECC), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Two years after his retirement, Remus A. Diopenes filed an application for the conversion of his
compensation benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The
application was rejected by the Government Service Insurance System, which held that it had no
more jurisdiction over the matter because the applicant was no longer in the service. 1 On appeal,
this decision was affirmed by the Employees' Compensation Commission on the ground that the
alleged permanent total disability was not service-connected. 2 Dissatisfied, the petitioner has
come to this Court for relief.
Diopenes joined the government service in 1959 as a clerk and eventually rose to Branch
Attorney of the Development Bank of the Philippines in Catarman, Northern Samar. On April 5,
1978, he suffered a stroke and was found to have sustained a cardio-vascular accident (CVA)
with light hemiparesis. He was hospitalized from May 8 to June 15, 1978, and went on sick leave
of absence from February 28 to March 1, 1979.
As a result of the CVA, the GSIS granted the petitioner compensation for temporary total
disability for 240 days from May 1 to December 26, 1978, 3 and permanent partial disability for 19
months beginning January 1, 1986, until July 1, 1987. 4
On December 28, 1985, the petitioner retired.
When on November 23, 1986, he requested the change in his compensation benefits, he was
required by the GSIS to undergo not only one but three medical examinations.
The first examination was conducted by Dr. Victor L. Cortez, Chief of the Gov. Valeriano M.
Gatuslao Memorial Hospital, who diagnosed the petitioner's ailment as "post CVA with residual
left hemiplegia," referring to the earlier stroke in 1978. The medical report described as total and
permanent the patient's "left hemiparesis (which) has persisted since then up to the present." 5
The second examination was conducted by Dr. Felix Jardenico, GSIS medical officer for its
branches in Iloilo and Bacolod, who found that the left side of the petitioner's body had been
paralyzed since 1978 and recommended that "the claim of Atty. Remus A. Diopenes, former
Branch Attorney, DBP, Catarman Branch, Northern Samar, be given preferential and favorable
consideration and the action thereat be done soonest." 6
The third examination was conducted by Dr. Lucila Lazaro, resident physician of the Corazon
Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, who reported that the petitioner started his illness as early
as "April 1978 as high blood pressure with left hemiplegia which persisted up to the present" and
said that the degree of disability was "total and permanent." 7
Despite these reports, the GSIS denied the petitioner's request, holding that since the hemiplegia
was contracted after his retirement, he was not entitled to the benefits claimed. Echoing this
finding, the ECC stressed that the petitioner's "hemiplegia occured two years after he retired from
the service" and thus could not be considered service-connected under the Employees'
Compensation Law.
There is no evidence that the hemiplegia occurred two years after the petitioner's retirement, as
concluded by the respondents. On the contrary, the three doctors who examined the petitioner
were one in the finding that the disability began in 1978 and continued even after the petitioner's
retirement in 1985. Significantly, one of these doctors was the medical officer of the GSIS itself in
Bacolod and Iloilo.
All of these doctors actually examined the petitioner. By contrast, the conclusion of the GSIS
medical staff in Manila was based on an arm-chair evaluation by doctors who had not personally
examined the petitioner.
Even if the Petitioner did suffer a second attack after his retirement, as the respondents contend,
this supervening event would not defeat his claim. The reason is that the second stroke was only
the consequence of the first stroke which he suffered in 1978, when he was still in the service.
There is no question that that first stroke was service-connected as categorically admitted in the
Employees Report made by the GSIS thus:
 Immediately prior to his CVA attack on April 8, 1978, employee was
supervising court cases of DBP, he being on special detail at Catarman DBP,
Northern Samar, from his regular position as Assistant Branch Attorney, DBP
Dumaguete Branch. He was in his office preparing pleadings to be filed in
court in order to meet the deadline set by the Rules of Court in the numerous
court collection cases of the DBP Catarman, which prior to and during the
attack of his CVA, employee was working overtime to beat the prescriptive
period of filing same in court; the tension thereof triggered his CVA on April 8,
1978. 8
The following ruling in Mondejar v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 is applicable to the
case at bar:
It is also noteworthy as stated in the referee's decision that because of his
illnesses brought about by his work and his first attack in 1972, petitioner's
condition had worsened to such an extent that he was constrained to retire at
age 60 on August 13, 1974, soon after which he suffered in January, 1973 his
second and near-fatal attack which "reduced him to a complete wreck" — in
the commission's own language. This second attack was but the consequence
of the illnesses which he suffered in the course of his employment. It is patent,
therefore, that contrary to the commission's speculation, these illnesses were
the "precipitating factors that triggered the stroke" which were "attributable to
his employment" and consequently petitioner's claim to compensation under
the Act must be upheld, in accordance with the law and settled jurisprudence.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the GSIS had earlier granted the petitioner temporary total
disability benefits for 240 days and permanent partial disability for nineteen months, thus in effect
acknowledging that he was suffering from permanent total disability. Under Section 192 of the
Labor Code, "(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty
days" shall be deemed "total and permanent."
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner's request should not have been denied by
the respondents. Their posture cannot be sustained against the uncontroverted medical evidence
that the petitioner's incipient permanent and total disability was incurred during his incumbency in
the government service and merely continued and aggravated after his retirement.
The GSIS and the ECC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that
will only deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled
employees. Nevertheless, we should caution against a too-strict interpretation of the rules lest it
result in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished if
not completely impaired as a consequence of their service in the government. A humanitarian
impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a
liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled public servants like the
herein petitioner. Compassion for them is not a dole but a right.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decisions of the Government Service
Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are SET ASIDE and petitioner
Remus A. Diopenes is declared to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits under Article
192 of the Labor Code and shall be compensated accordingly. It is so ordered.
A.M. No. P-95-1167 December 21, 1998
CARMELITA L. LLEDO, complainant, vs .ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Court personnel, from the judge to the lowest clerk, are invested with the sacred duty to maintain
the good name and standing of the institution they serve. A court employee abdicates that duty
when he abandons his family and openly cohabits with his mistress. He aggravates his culpability
by falsely representing his paramour to be his lawful wife.
This principle is applied by the Court in resolving the present Administrative Complaint for
immorality, abandonment and conduct unbecoming a public official. Filed on February 4, 1994 by
Mrs. Carmelita Lledo against her husband, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, said Complaint presented the facts as follows:
That sometime last year (1993) I received some information that he is keeping
a paramour, which information I verified, as a result of which, I personally
came to know that my husband is living with another woman named Katrina
Narvaez with whom he has children[. A] certified true copy of the Birth
Certificate of his son named Ryan Narvaez Lledo, is hereto attached marked
as "Annex B";
That the other children's birth certificates named Don and Kathleen are still for
release by the National Statistics Office;
That when I was able to secure a copy of the Birth Certificate of Ryan, I
immediately went to see the specified address at 240 Rd. 1 Pag-asa, Quezon
City, only to be informed by Ms. Songco, their landlady that they transferred to
another apartment in Burol I Sta. Cruz Village, Balagtas Bulacan because they
had a serious altercation which resulted in the filing of three (3) cases namely:
IS No. 92-15883 Oral Defamation and Grave Threats, IS No 92-16957. Grave
Threats, Malicious Mischiefs and Physical Injuries and IS No. 92-15650 for
Slight Physical Injuries, xerox copies of which are hereto attached and marked
as Annex "C", "D" and "E" respectively;
That on November 12, 1992, Atty. Cesar Lledo executed an affidavit
subscribed and sworn to on [the] same date by the Assistant City Prosecutor,
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo, Fiscal['s] Office, Quezon City, attesting to the truth that
Katrina is his wife and that they are tenants or lessees of one of the rooms of
the house of Ms. Dolores Songco, xerox copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "G";
That they lived as husband and wife at 240 Rd. I, Pag-asa as evidenced by a
contract entered into by his paramour K.N. Lledo, xerox copy of which is
attached and marked as Annex "F" and that Katrina and Atty. Lledo are known
in the community as husband and wife;
 That upon knowledge of my husband's infidelity which caused irreparable
psychological and emotional damage to the children and gross humiliation I
suffered as the lawful wife, I immediately wrote a formal letter (xerox copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "H") to Judge Pedro Santiago, Executive
Judge of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, copy furnished Atty. Lledo's
immediate superior. Judge Romeo Zamora, Regional Trial Court Branch 94,
requesting . . . a dialogue which never transpire[d] because my husband
refused to see me;
That Atty. Lledo with his paramour Katrina has been transferring their
residence from 240 Rd. I Pagasa, Quezon City, to Burol I Sta. Cruz Village,
Balagtas Bulacan and at present at Santol Burol 5, Balagtas Bulacan,
maintaining their illicit relationship up to the present;
That such actuations of Atty. Lledo [constitute] disgraceful and immoral
conduct violative of the provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 (PD 807)
and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); and,
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truthfulness of the foregoing
statements and as basis for my complaint against my husband for immorality,
abandonment and for conduct unbecoming . . . a public
official.1
In his Comment, respondent denied all the material allegations of the complainant and stated:
That since the birth of all their children, respondent has not been remiss in his
obligation to provide for their support as he is still paying the matriculation fees
of their youngest daughter who is taking up [the] Degree of Bachelor of
Psychology in an amount of not less than P9,000.00 per semester, more or
less. Additionally, he (respondent) caused the employment of his two (2) sons,
both married namely Eric — employed at the sala of Judge Lucas Bersamin,
and Cesar, Jr. — employed at the National Power Corporation.
Additionally, the amount obtained on the maturity of his GSIS Policy was all
utilized for the payment of all the debts incurred due to advances made to pay
the needs of his children especially for payment of tuition fees and other
miscellaneous needs of the children.
The filing of the case was triggered on the unfounded ground or claim that the
petitioner [would] not [get] her alleged one-half share of the respondent's
pension. The said ground is untrue and bias[ed]. The truth of the matter is
respondent will be paying the amortized house and lot and will give the
complainant her one-half share of the pension. 2
On August 28, 1996, the Court referred the Complaint and the Comment to then Executive Judge
Pedro T. Santiago, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Finding that the Report of Judge Santiago was not responsive, in fact totally irrelevant, to the
issue in the case, the Court on September 30, 1997 asked the new executive judge, Hon. Estrella
Trias-Estrada, to reinvestigate the matter.
After a thorough reinvestigation, wherein both the complainant and the respondent were
accorded the opportunity to present their respective causes and to cross-examine each other's
witness, Judge Trias-Estrada submitted her Report, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
From the evidence on record, the undersigned has reason to believe the claim
of complainant Carmelita Lledo that respondent ha[s] indeed abandoned her
and their children sometime in 1987 without giving adequate support to their
four legitimate children and [that] he had established a second family with one
Katrina Narvaez and their own set of children. In the affidavit-complaint dated
November 12, 1992 which respondent Cesar Lledo filed before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office executed under oath (Exhibit "J"), respondent Lledo
gave the name [of] Katrina as his wife and [of] . . . Don as his child. The
complaint-affidavit was filed in connection with a serious altercation he had
with one Dolores Songco, the landlady/administrator of the house at No. 240,
Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City where he and Katrina lived together as
husband and wife with their children. The cases filed by him were oral
defamation through malicious mischief and slight physical injuries. These
cases, however, were dismissed by Judge Tolentino of the MTC. The affidavit-
complaint of respondent is in effect an admission that he considered Katrina
Narvaez as his wife and Don as his child. Complainant was also able to
secure a birth certificate of one Ryan Narvaez Lledo whose father's name is
Czar Diaz Lledo with address at No. 240, Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City.
Although the name of the purported father appears to be different, Czar Diaz
Lledo, it is obvious that it is a typographical error or perhaps, it was
intentionally misspelled that way because it was Katrina Narvaez who
furnished that dat[um] in said certificate of live birth. But despite the erroneous
spelling, said certificate of live birth became the key to the discovery of the
address of the respondent after he left their conjugal dwelling.
The complainant was able to get information through Dolores Songco, the
landlady of respondent and Katrina Narvaez Lledo who gave a full account of
the relationship of respondent and Katrina who[m] she personally observed to
have conducted themselves as husband and wife; that Don was four years old
when he was brought to said residence as their son and where the two other
children Ryan and Kat[h]leen were conceived and born Dolores Songco
categorically stated that respondent and Katrina lived in the house where she
is the administrator together with her from June, 1988 up to November 7,
1992.
Respondent Lledo did not make any [categorical] denial of the charges. His
answers were only that he did not know said Katrina, that he did not also
[know] Ryan, but the only reason that he left the conjugal dwelling [was] that
his wife was a complete nagger and was not performing her duties as a
responsible wife and mother, that it was he who performed the household
chores and often he would bring to his office one of his children to take care
of. He also denied that he was not giving financial support but it was his wife
 who never spent any single cent. He admitted that the signature appearing in
the affidavit-complaint marked as Exhibit "J" which was the basis of the
criminal charges against Dolores-Songco is his signature.
Between the oral and documentary evidence of the complainant and the oral
denials and admissions made by the respondent, the inevitable conclusion is
that the charges against respondent Lledo are true. The abandonment of
complainant and their children apparently came about when respondent Lledo
was already at the JDRC and had started to have drinking buddies and later
on a sweetheart. And in 1987 he already completely left the conjugal dwelling
to establish a second family and for the purpose, he and Katrina with their son
Don, established their residence in a room in the house at No. 240, Road I,
Pag-asa, Quezon City which was being administered by one Dolores Songco
for and in behalf of her brother who is living in the United States. Such second
family stayed in said residence for four (4) years, lived as a complete family
without the benefit of marriage and therefore was living in an immoral status
which is a ground for dismissal of a government official or employee.
Considering that respondent is holding a high government position which
requires him to be of good moral character and fit to perform his functions as
Branch Clerk of Court, his actuations [are] not a good example to his
subordinates.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service be meted [out to]
respondent Atty. Cesar V. Lledo.
In its September 2, 1998 Memorandum addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the findings of Judge Estrada and recommended that
Atty. Cesar Lledo be dismissed from the service for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of Judge Estrada and the OCA that respondent
should be sanctioned.
The Court has emphasized time and again that "the conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff and
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility." 3 In a
similar case, the Court has further held that "a court personnel, being a public servant,
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his
official duties but also in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve
the court's good name and standing." 4 The Court has also admonished court personnel
that their conduct "should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest
of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone
in the court to maintain it good name and standing as a temple of justice." 5
In the present case, sufficient proof, both oral and documentary, was presented to show
that Respondent Lledo abandoned his conjugal dwelling without providing support for his
legitimate children and subsequently cohabited with Katrina Narvaez with whom he had
three children. It is beyond dispute that respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and his elementary obligation to provide for his
legitimate children. Worse, he executed several Sworn Statements that he was lawfully
wedded to his mistress.
Clearly, the respondent in this case has failed to comply with the strict standard required
of court employees. His conduct betrays an unscrupulous streak that has, in turn,
tarnished the image of the judiciary.
We impose on respondent the penalty of dismissal, in line with numerous similar cases.
In Sicat v. Alcantara, 6 the Court dismissed a clerk of court and judge for maintaining an
illicit amorous relationship with each other. In Castillo v. Calanog 7 and in Dy Teban
Hardware & Auto Supply v. Tapucar 8, respondent judges were also dismissed from the
service for moral obtuseness in maintaining mistresses and for immoral advances against
the complainants. These cases demonstrate, as we do once again, that "exacting
standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the
highest Court of the land in regard to those in the service of the judiciary . . . ." 9 "In fact,
moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary." 10 Because
respondent clerk of court has failed to perform his imperative duty to maintain the
prestige and integrity of the judiciary, he has forfeited his privilege to partake in the
administration of justice.
Moreover, the conduct for which he is here penalized affects not only his qualifications as
a court employee, but also as a member of the bar. For this reason, the Court hereby
refers the case to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 11
WHEREFORE, Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City, is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave
credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. This case is
REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141707 May 7, 2002
CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, petitioner, vs.PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT
CORP., respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The pivotal issue raised in the petition in this case is whether, for the purpose of computing an
employee’s retirement pay, prior service rendered in a government agency can be tacked in and
added to the creditable service later acquired in a government-owned and controlled corporation
without original charter.
On 23 January 1963, Petitioner Cayo F. Gamogamo was first employed with the Department of
Health (DOH) as Dental Aide. On 22 February 1967, he was promoted to the position of Dentist
1. He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen years until he resigned on 2 November 1977. 1
On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation. 2 Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (hereafter Respondent) acquired and took over the shipping business of
LUSTEVECO, and on 1 August 1979, petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by
the Respondent.3 Thus, he continued to work as company dentist. In a letter dated 1 August
1979, Respondent assumed without interruption petitioner’s service credits with
LUSTEVECO,4 but it did not make reference to nor assumed petitioner’s service credits with the
DOH.
On 10 June 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued a memorandum 5 approving the
privatization of PNOC subsidiaries, including Respondent, pursuant to the provisions of Section
III(B) of the Guidelines and Regulations to implement Executive Order No. 37. 6 Accordingly,
Respondent implemented a Manpower Reduction Program to govern employees whose
respective positions have been classified as redundant as a result of Respondent’s decrease in
operations and the downsizing of the organization due to lay-up and sale of its vessels pursuant
to its direction towards privatization.7 Under this program, retrenched employees shall receive a
two-month pay for every year of service.
Sometime in 1995, petitioner requested to be included in the next retrenchment schedule.
However, his request was turned down for the following reasons: 8
1. As a company dentist he was holding a permanent position;
2. He was already due for mandatory retirement in April 1995 under his retirement plan
(first day of the month following his 60th birthday which was on 7 March 1995).
Eventually, petitioner retired after serving the Respondent and LUSTEVECO for 17 years and 4
months upon reaching his 60th birthday, on 1 April 1995. He received a retirement pay of
P512,524.15,9 which is equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits.
On 30 August 1995, Admiral Carlito Y. Cunanan, Repondent’s president, died of Dengue Fever
and was forthwith replaced by Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente who assumed office in December 1995.
The new president implemented significant cost-saving measures. In 1996, after petitioner’s
retirement, the cases of Dr. Rogelio T. Buena (company doctor) and Mrs. Luz C. Reyes
(telephone operator), who were holding permanent/non-redundant positions but were willing to be
retrenched under the program were brought to the attention of the new president who ordered
that a study on the cost-effect of the retrenchment of these employees be conducted. After a
thorough study, Respondent’s Board of Directors recommended the approval of the
retrenchment. These two employees were retrenched and paid a 2-month separation pay for
every year of service under Respondent’s Manpower Reduction Program. 10
In view of the action taken by Respondent in the retrenchment of Dr. Buena and Mrs. Reyes,
petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full
payment of his retirement benefits. Petitioner argued that his service with the DOH should have
been included in the computation of his years of service. Hence, with an accumulated service of
32 years he should have been paid a two-month pay for every year of service per the retirement
plan and thus should have received at least P1,833,920.00.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner’s complaint.11 On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its decision12 of 28 November 1997, the NLRC ruled:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 30, 1997 is hereby SET
ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered to wit:
(1) the government service of the complainant with the Department of Health
numbering fourteen (14) years is hereby considered creditable service for
purposes of computing his retirement benefits;
(2) crediting his fourteen (14) years service with the Department of Health,
together with his nearly eighteen (18) years of service with the respondent,
complainant therefore has almost thirty-two (32) years service upon which his
retirement benefits would be computed or based on;
(3) complainant is entitled to the full payment of his retirement benefits
pursuant to the respondent’s Retirement Law or the retrenchment program
(Manpower Reduction Program). In any case, he is entitled to two (2) months
retirement/separation pay for every year of service.
(4) all other claims are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. 13
Unsatisfied with the reversal, Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51152. In its decision14 of 8 November
1999, the Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC judgment and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for
GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division) dated November 28, 1997 and May 15, 1998,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED, without prejudice to private
respondent Cayo F. Gamo-gamo’s recovery of whatever benefits he may have been
entitled to receive by reason of his fourteen (14) years of service with the Department of
Health.
No pronouncement as to costs.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, 15 petitioner filed with
us the petition in the case at bar. Petitioner contends that: (1) his years of service with the DOH
must be considered as creditable service for the purpose of computing his retirement pay; and (2)
he was discriminated against in the application of the Manpower Reduction Program.16
Petitioner maintains that his government service with the DOH should be recognized and tacked
in to his length of service with Respondent because LUSTEVECO, which was later bought by
Respondent, and Respondent itself, were government-owned and controlled corporations and
were, therefore, under the Civil Service Law. Prior to the separation of Respondent from the Civil
Service by virtue of the 1987 Constitution, petitioner’s length of service was considered
continuous. The effectivity of the 1987 Constitution did not interrupt his continuity of service. He
claims that he is supported by the opinion of 18 May 1993 of the Civil Service Commission in the
case of Petron Corporation, where the Commission allegedly opined:
… that all government services rendered by employees of the Petron prior to 1987
Constitution are considered creditable services for purposes of computation of
retirement benefits. This must necessarily be so considering that in the event that
Petron would consider only those services of an employee with Petron when it was
excluded from the civil service coverage (that is after the 1987 Constitution), it would
render nugatory his government agencies prior to his transfer to Petron. Hence, Petron
or any other PNOC subsidiary has to include in its retirement scheme or in its Collective
Bargaining Agreement a provision of the inclusion of the other government services of
its employees rendered outside Petron, otherwise, it would be prejudicial to the interest
of the retireable employee concerned.
Petitioner asserts that with the tacking in of his 14 years of service with the DOH to his 17 years
and 4 months service with LUSTEVECO and Respondent, he had 31 years and 4 months
creditable service as basis for the computation of his retirement benefits. Thus, pursuant to
Respondent’s Manpower Reduction Program, he should have been paid two months pay for
every year of his 31 years of service.
Petitioner likewise asserts that the principle of tacking is anchored on Republic Act No. 7699. 17
Petitioner concludes that there was discrimination when his application for coverage under the
Manpower Reduction Program was disapproved. His application was denied because he was
holding a permanent position and that he was due for retirement. However, Respondent granted
the application of Dr. Rogelio Buena, who was likewise holding a permanent position and was
also about to retire. Petitioner was only given one-month pay for every year of service under the
regular retirement plan while Dr. Buena was given a 2-month pay for every year of service under
the Manpower Reduction Program.
In its Comment to the petition, Respondent maintains that although it is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, it has no original charter. Hence, it is not within the coverage of the Civil
Service Law. It cites the decision in PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo,18 wherein we held that only
corporations created by special charters are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law.
Those without original charters are covered by the Labor Code. Respondent also asserts that
R.A. No. 7699 is not applicable. Under this law an employee who has worked in both the private
and public sectors and has been covered by both the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS), shall have his creditable services or contributions
in both Systems credited to his service or contribution record in each of the Systems, which shall
be summed up for purposes of old age, disability, survivorship and other benefits in case the
covered member does not qualify for such benefits in either or both Systems without
the totalization.
Respondent further contends that petitioner was not discriminated upon when his application
under the Manpower Reduction Program was denied. At the time of his retirement in 1995,
redundancy was the main consideration for qualification for the Manpower Reduction Program.
Petitioner was not qualified. However in 1996, in order to solve the company’s business
reversals, the new president, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, found it necessary to implement cost-saving
strategies, among which was the retrenchment of willing employees. Thus, the applications for
retrenchment of Dr. Buena and Mrs. Reyes were approved. Respondent had the prerogative to
amend its policies to meet the contingencies of the business for self-preservation.
We rule in the negative the issue of whether petitioner’s service with the DOH should be included
in the computation of his retirement benefits.
Respondent’s Retirement scheme19 pertinently provides:
ARTICLE IV
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
SEC 4.1. Normal Retirement Date/Eligibility. -- The normal retirement date of an
employee shall be the first day of the month next following the employee’s sixtieth (60 th)
birthday. To be eligible for the retirement benefit described under Sec. 4.2, the
employee must have rendered at least ten (10) years of continuous service with the
Company. In case the retiring employee has rendered less than ten (10) years of
service with the Company, he shall be entitled to one (1) month’s final monthly basic
salary (12/12) for every year of service.
SEC. 4.2. Normal Retirement Benefit. -- The retirement benefit shall be payable in lump
sum upon retirement which shall be determined on the basis of the retiree’s final
monthly basic salary (14/12) as follows:
(a) One (1) month’s pay for every year of service for those who have
completed at least twenty (20) years of continuous service with the Company.
(b) One and one-half (1 1/2) months’ pay for every year of service for those
who have completed twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) continuous years of service
with the Company.
(c) Two (2) months’ pay for every year of service for those who have
completed at least thirty-one (31) years of service with the Company.
It is clear therefrom that the creditable service referred to in the Retirement Plan is the retiree’s
continuous years of service with Respondent.
Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby
the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the former.20
Since the retirement pay solely comes from Respondent’s funds, it is but natural that Respondent
shall disregard petitioner’s length of service in another company for the computation of his
retirement benefits.
Petitioner was absorbed by Respondent from LUSTEVECO on 1 August 1979. Ordinarily, his
creditable service shall be reckoned from such date. However, since Respondent took over the
shipping business of LUSTEVECO and agreed to assume without interruption all the service
credits of petitioner with LUSTEVECO,21 petitioner’s creditable service must start from 9
November 1977 when he started working with LUSTEVECO22 until his day of retirement on 1
April 1995. Thus, petitioner’s creditable service is 17.3333 years.
We cannot uphold petitioner’s contention that his fourteen years of service with the DOH should
be considered because his last two employers were government-owned and controlled
corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the
1987 Constitution states --
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned and
controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are not under the Civil Service
Law. In Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission,23 we ruled:
xxx "Thus under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a
government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are [sic]
the manner of its creation, such that government corporations created by special
charter(s) are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the General
Corporation Law are not within its coverage."
Consequently, Respondent was not bound by the opinion of the Civil Service Commission of 18
May 1993.
Petitioner’s contention that the principle of tacking of creditable service is mandated by Republic
Act No. 7699 is baseless. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7699 reads:
SEC 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, a covered worker who transfer(s) employment from one sector to
another or is employed in both sectors, shall have his creditable services or
contributions in both systems credited to his service or contribution record in each of the
Systems and shall be totalized for purposes of old-age, disability, survivorship, and
other benefits in case the covered employee does not qualify for such benefits in either
or both Systems without totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping periods of
membership shall be credited only once for purposes of totalization (underscoring,
ours).
Obviously, totalization of service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for
benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here, petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted
by the Government Security Insurance System (GSIS), if such right has not yet been exercised.
The pertinent provisions of law are:
SEC. 12 Old Age Pension. -- (a) xxx
(b) A member who has rendered at least three years but less than fifteen years of
service at the time of separation shall, upon reaching sixty years of age or upon
separation after age sixty, receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of
his average monthly compensation for every year of service with an employer
(Presidential Decree No, 1146, as amended, otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977).
SEC. 4. All contributions paid by such member personally, and those that were paid by
his employers to both Systems shall be considered in the processing of benefits which
he can claim from either or both Systems: Provided, however, That the amount of
benefits to be paid by one System shall be in proportion to the number of contributions
actually remitted to that System (Republic Act No. 7699).
In any case, petitioner’s fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated
because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the aforequoted Section 12, as may be
determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the GSIS, he
cannot avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
It may also be pointed out that upon his receipt of the amount of P512,524.15 from Respondent
as retirement benefit pursuant to its retirement scheme, petitioner signed and delivered to
Respondent a Release and Undertaking wherein he waives all actions, causes of actions, debts,
dues, monies and accounts in connection with his employment with Respondent. 24 This quitclaim
releases Respondent from any other obligation in favor of petitioner. While quitclaims executed
by employees are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of the employees’ legal rights, there are legitimate waivers that
represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborers’ claims which should be respected
by the courts as the law between the parties. 25 Settled is the rule that not all quitclaims are per
se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; and (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face.26 We discern nothing from the record that would suggest that
petitioner was coerced, intimidated or deceived into signing the Release and Undertaking.
Neither are we convinced that the consideration for the quitclaim is unconscionable because it is
actually the full amount of the retirement benefit provided for in the company’s retirement plan.
In light of the foregoing, we need not discuss any further the issue of whether petitioner was
discriminated by Respondent in the implementation of the Manpower Reduction Program. In any
event, that issue is factual and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, indeed, he was
discriminated upon.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error on the part of the Respondent Court of Appeals having been
shown, the petition in this case is DENIED and the appealed decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51152
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.