STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE

OF THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES

PRODUCTION MEANS
E41.50.530.N
FMECA METHOD
April 2011 P : 1/14
ICS : 03.120.01 ; 21.020

Importante Note : This document has been translated from the French. In the event of any dispute, only the
French version is referred to as the reference text and is binding on the parties.

Preface
The present document was drawn up using information describe in:
 The international standard IEC 60812 or European standard EN 60812

________________________________________
Purpose and applicability

This document defines the Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis mode, or FMECA, and how its
applied on production means and means indirectly liked to a production system.
These provisions apply to production means meant for the PSA Peugeot Citroën or RENAULT groups.
The production means FMECA may be repeated during operation so that the risk of disruptions caused by the
operational environment and aging phenomena may be estimated.
Note: For product and process FMECAs, refer to the documents in use in the groups PSA Peugeot Citroën or
RENAULT

________________________________________
Descriptors

Fiabilité, maintenabilité, disponibilité, fmd, sureté de fonctionnement, amdec, amde, defaillance, fmeca, failure,
availability, reliability, capability to maintain

________________________________________
Modifications
Compared to the previous publishing:
Update of the quoted documents.
Precision for certain definitions. § modified are tracked down by a line in the margin.
Integration of the guide GE41-950N.

DRAWN UP CANCELLED VALIDATION

RENAULTPSA Peugeot Citroën
PSA Peugeot Citroën
E41.50.530.N of June 1994
Commission 41F
GE41-950N of June 1995
J. GOUTIERE M. HARVIER
Prohibited reproduction
April 2011 2 E41.50.530.N

Contents
Page

1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................2

2 Basic principle ........................................................................................................................3

3 Method.....................................................................................................................................4
3.1 Initialization................................................................................................................................................. 4
3.2 Constitution of the Work Group .................................................................................................................. 4
3.3 FMEA, failure Modes Effects Analysis ....................................................................................................... 5
3.4 Criticality ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
3.5 Actions Corrective actions.......................................................................................................................... 7
3.6 Monitoring................................................................................................................................................... 8
3.7 Verification.................................................................................................................................................. 8
4 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................8

5 FMECA booklet .......................................................................................................................8

6 List of reference documents ..................................................................................................8

Appendix 1: Notation tables G, F, D....................................................................................................9

Appendix 2 : FMECA standard table .................................................................................................11

Appendix 3 : FMECA booklet.............................................................................................................12

1 Introduction
FMECA is a forward-looking reliability analysis method which allows potential faults to be registered
whose consequences affect the correct operation of the production means or the company equipment
studied, then to estimate the risks due to the appearance of these faults, so that corrective actions
may be taken during design, realization or operation (production, maintenance) of the means
FMECA is an inductive method used on all systems which risk not meeting reliability, maintainability,
manufactured product quality and security targets.
Several different types of FMECA may be identified which are performed during successive phases of the
development of the automobile product. The principal types are:

PRODUCT FMECA
Which is the analysis of the design of the automobile product

PROCESS FMECA
Which is the analysis of productions processes

PRODUCTIONS MEANS FMECA

Which is the analysis of design production of production means
April 2011 3 E41.50.530.N

2 Basic principle
FMECA is a technique to ease the critical examination of design in order to evaluate and guarantee
Dependability of Operation (Safety, reliability, Maintainability and Availability).

FMECA should analyze the design of the means in preparation for operation, so that this means is
reliable and maintainable under its operational environment. To fulfil this goal, the operator of the means
require:
 an intrinsically reliable and maintainable installation,
 specially adapted spare parts and tools,
 Processes or aids to minimize the Intervention Time (diagnostic + repair or replacement +
return to service),
 trained staff,
 An adapted preventive maintenance, so that faults may be avoided if possible

For company equipment, FMECA should be performed on all new sub-assemblies, especially those
which are specific or complex. For a sub-assembly which is know to be reliable (standard, catalogue
type, etc.), FMECA is performed on its interactions with other sub-assemblies, the manufactured product
or the environment, taking operating conditions into account.
It concerns all activities leading to the development and use of any company equipment. This means that
all abilities required for this analysis need to be pooled; therefore a work group should be created
bringing together the designers of the means, Methods, Manufacture and Maintenance.

FMECA is a stage of reliability, availability and security studies for a system. It requires two
complementary analyses: FMECA, Failure Mode, Effects and Analysis, and the analysis of their
Criticality.

FMEA shows up the potential failures of the means and the consequences which may affect felt by the
different users of the means.

FMEA therefore determines:

 he failure mode which is the manner in which the failure is observed, and corresponds to a
total or partial loss of the functions assured by the means
 the potential cause of the failure, which is the initial event likely to have lead to the failure
mode.
 the Effect the failure mode has on the correct operation of the production means or on the
end-user of the means;
A failure is when an entity is no longer able to perform a required function (Experimental AFNOR
Standard X 60-500). The failure is observed using the mode and is the result of an initial cause. It is
therefore characterized by the Cause-Mode couple.
The Criticality Analysis allows the Frequency, Gravity and non-detection of each failure to be
estimated.
It shows up critical points so that they may be reduced by modifying plans or specifications, or, if this is
not possible or insufficient, by installing means of detection or monitoring, and programming
maintenance operations.
April 2011 4 E41.50.530.N

3 Method
A recapitulative plate of the method is given under pdf format and is joined to this standard.

3.1 Initialization
FMEACA is requested either in the statement of work defining the system ordered from the supplier or by
a specific contract for any new development or plant equipment.
It should be planned for in planning and project resources, and brought into use from the first stages of
development of the means and continued during the study phase when components are defined, and
before detailed plans are finalized.
Any person requesting a FMECA on precise equipment and who has the right to implement corrective
operations fixes a schedule and study limits (level of precision, possibilities for questioning, etc.) which
must be defined in a FMECA synthesis file.
The following support required to study a system, should be brought together and prepared:
 a concrete representation defining it (statement of work, plans, component parts list,
manufacturing procedures and means of control).
 its functional breakdown, which included:
 a breakdown of the system into sub-system down to be desired breakdown level (elementary
component or module on which may be performed a standard exchange),
 a description of the functions performed by each component of the different sub-systems,
 dependency (or cause -effect) links which exist between these functions

3.2 Constitution of the Work Group

A multi_disciplinary Work group should be set up composed of people responsible for the subject
involved, who may provide the information necessary for analysis using their technical knowledge or
experience of similar means which are already operational.
The word group must include:
 the investor from the Methods service (in charge of the statement of work, technical aspects,
costs, quality, and schedules),
 the designer of the means studied (supplier in charge of the means),
 a user of the means in production,
 a maintenance worker in charge of maintaining the means when operational,
FMECA research is controlled by a pilot (the requester or the investor), assisted by an organizer, who
should have experience with methodologies and the personality required to assure organization, the
progress and regulation of the Production Means FMECA study.
The group should also include, depending on the agenda:
 a specialist or expert in a punctually treated subject,
 Quality, Reliability, Safety, Test, Purchasing, Automatism, etc. departments.
April 2011 5 E41.50.530.N

3.3 FMEA, failure Modes Effects Analysis

For each element of the device or system, the following elements should be determined and listed in the
FMECA table (See appendix 2 and Word file which is joined to this standard):

Failures Modes
A failure mode is used by e device so that it may stop functioning abnormally.
It is relative to component functions. For each component identified in the functional breakdown, the
following must be checked for each function associated to it (there may be several):
 the total loss of the function,
 the occurrence of degraded states of the function (performance inferior to a specified level),
 the function is not performed as soon as it is called,
 premature operation when the function has not been requested.
The mode is ho one of these four dysfunctions is corrected for each component.
Example:
A bearing (component) assures the rotational guiding (function) of a shaft in relation to a fixed
assembly.
A failure mode may be:
 either the total loss of the function: loss of rotational guiding due to a fault in the bearing, or
blockage, etc.
 or a degradation of the function : incorrect rotational guiding due to lose gripping, or an
incorrect set, etc.

Failure causes
The events likely to have lead to the failure mode must be located and described.
The cause of a failure is the initial event (often an anomaly) which may lead to a failure, via the
intermediary of relative mode. There may be several causes for a single failure mode. In the same way a
single cause provoke the appearance of several failure modes on several components.
Examples: Incorrect dimensions, nut-lock missing, lubricant missing, damaged joint, connector not
ratched, vibrations, temperature, …

Effects of a failure
For each failure mode, the effects of the failure on the system which concern the user of the production
means must be described. The consequences may lead to:
 the halt of the production of the means,
 an incorrect quality of the manufactured product,
 insufficient safety of goods and workers.
Examples: halt after fault, total breakdown, reject-repair, equipment tolerance surpassed, equipment
damage, accidents, ..

Detection
Supposing that the failure cause (and/or mode) has appeared, a list is drawn up of everything planned to
stop this failure cause or mode from effecting the user of the means, in order words to avoid effects from
accruing. This list relative to the actions taken to ease or avoid a halt in production, to assure the quality
of parts produced, or to deal with safety problems for staff and equipment.
FMEA is therefore based on the following chain of events: when a potential cause has appeared, it leads
to a system failure mode, which then leads to an effect for the operator, if there is no means of detecting
the mode or cause.
Examples: Checking grips are closed, preventative maintenance, visual procedures, PLC captor,
overtravel sensor, dimensions calculations, testes,…
April 2011 6 E41.50.530.N

3.4 Criticality
When FMEA has finished (globally or for a component), a risk evaluation analysis is performed on all
previously identified failures.
Potential risks are evaluated using the Criticality calculation, after estimation of gravity, Frequency and
non-detection indices.
Criticality allows:
 the size of the risk created by each failure cause to be evaluated,
 Then to organize into a hierarchy the failures. This hierarchical organization serves for prioritize
the actions and for leading, so, actions on those who are equal or superior to the reserved
threshold.
The Criticality Index is calculated for each failure cause by calculating the product of the tree indices:
C = F. G . D

F, G, D are this defined below. These indications can be also written F ', G ', and D ' (and C ') when they
are estimated after corrective actions

Frequency index: F
F represents the probability that the cause of the failure will appear and that it will lead to the potential
failure mode considered. It is therefore necessary to simultaneously consider the probability that the
cause will appear and the probability that this will lead to the failure into account. The value of F therefore
corresponds to the combination of booth of these probabilities. The range of values varies between 1 and
4 (cf. Appendix 1).

Gravity index: G
Ranges of values, which vary between 1 and 5 (cf. Appendix 1), are based on the effects caused by the
failure, in the following terms:
 the Intervention time (IT) which corresponds to the Actual Time for Corrective maintenance
(diagnostic + repair or replacement + return to service),
 the quality of manufactured pieces,
 the safety of staff or equipment.
The index only sanctions the most serious effect produced by the failure mode, even several effects
have been identified.
The value G = 5 is automatically set:
 when the effect may imply safety problems for staff, in dysfunctioning or intervention,
 or, when the effect can lead a nonconformity in the downstream operations and, possibly, a
dysfunction for the final customer, if this nonconformity is not discovered in the process.
G do not change except in case of new conception.

Non-detection index: D
D is the probability that the failure cause or mode supposed to have appeared will provoke the most
serious effect, without the failure having been previously detected. The range of values varies between 1
and 4 (cf. Appendix 1).

Creating a hierarchy of Risks

Using criticality indices, it is possible to create a hierarchy of failures and list those whose criticality level
is above a constant contractually set threshold, in the statement of work for example. The level of
criticality varies according to reliability goals or techniques used
The following cases may be given as an example:
 12, when reliability goals are severe,
 16, most often used for mechanical instruments,
 24, for electrical or electronic components, where the non-Detection index is almost always 4.
April 2011 7 E41.50.530.N

Corrective operations are undertaken for all failure causes where C has reached this threshold.
Whenever the value of G or F is 4 a corrective design action must be taken, even if criticality is below
fixed threshold.
When the value of G = 5 the following is mandatory:
 a corrective design action, if possible, to lower gravity to less than or equal to 4
(G ≤ 4),
 or, if it is impossible to get rid of the effect with this value (the value of G remains 5), a
corrective action so that the values of frequency F and non-detection D are both set to 1.
(F = 1 and G = 5 and D = 1)
In summary, a critical point corresponds either to a point whose failure criticality is above or equal to a
given threshold, or a point whose failure gravity or frequency is equal to or above 4:

(C ≥ threshold) or (G ≥ 4) or (F = 4)
Any critical point must be subject to corrective actions to try ant eliminate it. If a critical points persists, it
must be justified as far as possible by the designer and be subject to special measures for the user.

3.5 Actions Corrective actions

After riks of critical failures have been shown up, Corrective Actions are defined and applied. These
should diminish the criticality of failures.
C may be reduced by:
 acting on the means, from design to implementation, through a Supplier operation in the
following areas:
 respecting conformity of the characteristics of the product produced by the means,
 respecting staff working and safety conditions,
 reliability,
 intrinsic maintainability,
 acting on logistics, by a Client operation in the following areas:
 maintenance policies,
 training operating staff,
 organization (spare parts, etc. )
In all cases, a corrective design action is preferable to a corrective logistical action
For the same reason, a corrective design action improve reliability should be considered
before a corrective maintainability action.
Criticality may be reduced by reducing one or more indices:
 the frequency value, F, may be lowered improving the reliability of the incriminated component,
or conditions of use, or by a systematic preventative maintenance action,.. This action action
should be taken in priority.
 The non-detection value, D, may be improved by changing design validation (Calculations,
tests, etc.), monitoring aids by preventive maintenance, etc.
 The gravity value, G, may be improved by improving maintainability or the aptitude to diagnose
and repair faster. This may also lead to design modifications (and affect product quality, risk
confinement, etc.)

Once corrective action have bee identified, the decision-maker validates the application for the
implementation of corrective actions proposed by the group, after considering time schedules (dates, or
contractual stages) and investment, operating, and maintenance costs
.
April 2011 8 E41.50.530.N

3.6 Monitoring
Monitoring is a primordial aspect for the success of this analytical tool. A list of critical points to be
considered and the planned corrective actions is drawn up. For all decided measures, leaders are
designated and a plan of actions is established to carry out the envisaged modifications.
Each noted corrective action is analyzed and evaluated in turn as previously (potential failure modes,
causes, effects, criticality).
Corrective actions must be performed until all criticality indices, C, are below the established threshold
and all gravity indices equal to 5 are associated to frequency and detection indices which are equal to 1.
Cost and time constraints may lead to a few criticality points equal to the set threshold remaining (for
limits).
For a global view of the degree of confidence that can be given to the studies system, a function may be
traced by setting the different criticality values on the X-axis and the number of corresponding causes on
the Y-axis (criticality histogram). This representation also eases the monitoring of future improvements.

3.7 Verification
A systematic check of corrective actions is performed by the pilot during studies and after delivery of the
installation, to assure that they have been correctly put into place and are effective.
FMECA should be included with the production means or company equipment file sent to Maintenance
and methods.

4 Conclusion
FMECA is a forward-looking analysis method for the Safety of Operation (Availability, reliability,
maintainability and Safety). Its efficiency depend on :
 a well organized work group (precise meeting agenda, planned work between meetings,
professional meeting management, etc.)
 the fact that device is analyzed and corrected at the same time instead of waiting for this device
to be in service and then discovering its failures, which would lead to an unsatisfactory quality
of manufactured parts,
 the collection of practical experience in different fields and from databases (qualitative
and quantitative),
 the fact that participants are responsible for the evaluation of the plan of action and for actions
to improve the business, the use of a simple and objective methodology, implanted by the
organizer,
 the use of a simple and objective method, implemented by the leader,
 the existence of criticality indices allowing a hierarchy of failures to be created.
However, it should be noted that for quality and reliability problems which appear during operation,
FMECA ma be used effectively to trigger curative and preventative actions for failures which are actually
observed. This is no longer a forward-looking FMECA but an operational FMECA.

5 FMECA booklet
The synthesis of this method, in the form of a booklet, is available in Appendix 3 of this standard.

6 List of reference documents

For the documents that are not dated, the last version in force is applied.
Quoted documents
CEI 60812 : Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA)
EN 60812 : Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for failure mode and effects
analysis (FMES))
X 60-500 : Terminology relating to reliability, maintainability and availability
April 2011 9 E41.50.530.N

Appendix 1: Notation tables G, F, D

Gravity table G
Value relative to the effect of each failure, expressed in terms of Maintainability, Quality of the
parts produced (conformity), and safety.

SELECTION CRITERIA
Value GRAVITY G
(TI = Intervention Time *, Quality, and Security
Minor failure, no notable equipment degradation,
1 Minor
for example, TI ≤ 3 min
Medium failure requiring a short intervention,
2 Medium
for example, 3 min < TI ≤ 20 min
Major failure, requiring a lengthy intervention,
for example, 20 min < TI ≤ 60 min
3 Major
or
Product does not conform, noticed and corrected by the user of the means
Serious failure, for example, TI > 60 min,
or
4 Catastrophic Product does not conform, noticed by a test client (internal to the company),
or
Major equipment damage (equipment safety).
Accident which may imply safety problems for personnel, during
dysfunctionning or intervention,
Safety or
5
/ Quality
nonconformity in the downstream operations and, possibly, a dysfunction
for the final customer, if this nonconformity is not discovered in the
process.
* TI = Intervention Time or Actual Time for Corrective Maintenance
(= Diagnostic + Repair + Return to initial condition)
April 2011 10 E41.50.530.N

Frequency table F
Probability that the cause occurs and causes the failure mode.
FREQUENCY
Value SELECTION CRITERIA
F
Pratically non- Failures are practically non-existent on similar operational installations, a
1
existent maximum of 1 fault during an average lifespan.
Failure appears rarely on similar already operational equipment, for
example: 1 fault per year

2 Rare or
new technology component for which all conditions have in theory been
reunited to avoid, but there has been no experience on similar
equipment.
Failure appears occasionally on similar already operational equipment,
3 Occasional
for example: 1 fault every three months
Failure appears frequently on a know component or similar already
operational equipment, for example: 1 fault per month,

4 Frequent or
new technology component for which all conditions have not been
reunited to avoid a failure, but there has been no experience on similar
equipment

Non-Detection table D

Probability that the cause will not be detected or that the mode will affect the user of the
means.
NON-DETECTION
Value SELECTION CRITERIA
D
Measures taken assure total detection of the initial cause or the failure
1 Total Detection mode, which allows the most serious effect provoked by the failure during
production to be avoided.
The failure mode or cause may be located, but there is still a risk that
2 Operable detection
they are not noticed.
The failure mode or cause are difficult to locate, or detection elements
3 Low detection
are difficult to use.
4 No detection The failure is impossible to detect before the effect occurs
April 2011 11 E41.50.530.N

Appendix 2 : FMECA standard table

Correctives actions: Supplier : FQ : Quality of manufactured product FF : Reliability FM : Maintainability FS : Safety
Client : CM : Arrangement of maintenance CF : Operator training CO : logistical Organisation
According to CNOMO standard
E41.50.530.N of 04/2011 FMECA production means Page

Supplier : Author :
System : department : Nominal indices Corrective actions Final indices
Sub-System : Date ref :
Effects
(failure,
COMPONENT/ FAILURES Res.
FONCTIONS CAUSES incorrect DETECTION TI F G D C Actions TI F G D C
Reference MODES /Schedule
quality and
security)
April 2011 12 E41.50.530.N

Appendix 3 : FMECA booklet


Etape 3 : Criticality
Frequency F
Probability that the cause of the
failure will appear and that it will
lead the mode.
Frequency table F
Practically non-existent
event: F = 1
Failures are practically non-
existent on similar operational
installations, a maximum of 1
fault during an average lifespan
Rare : F = 2
Failure appears rarely on
similar already operational
equipment,
for example: 1 fault per year
or
new technology component for
which all conditions have in
theory been reunited to avoid,
but there has been no
experience on similar
equipment.
Occasionnal : F = 3
Failure appears occasionally on
similar already operational
equipment, for example: 1 fault
every three months
Frequent : F = 4
Failure appears frequently on a
know component or similar
already operational equipment,
for example: 1 fault per month,
C=F.G.D
Gravity G
Value relative to the effect of
each failure, expressed in terms
of:
- Maintainability,
- Quality of the parts produced
(conformity)
- Safety
Gravity table G
Minor G = 1
Minor failure, no notable
equipment degradation,
for example, TI ≤ 3 min.
Medium G = 2
Medium failure requiring a short
intervention, for example,
3 min < TI ≤ 20 min.
Major G = 3
Major failure, requiring a lengthy
intervention, for example,
20 min < TI ≤ 60 min
or
Product does not conform,
noticed and corrected by the user
of the means
Catastrophic G = 4
Serious failure, for example,
TI > 60 min
or
Product does not conform,
noticed by a test client (internal to
the company),
or
Major equipment damage
(equipment safety).
Safety / Quality G = 5
Accident which may imply safety
problems for personnel, during
dysfunctionning or intervention
or
nonconformity in the downstream
Etape 4 : Corrective
actions
Non-detection D They reduce the number of Prefer
Probability that the cause will not
be detected or that the mode will
critical points by actions of : - A corrective action of
conception in a corrective
FMECA
• Supplier action in exploitation.
affect the user
FQ : Quality of manufactured - An action improving the
Means of
The D index sanctions the
ineffectiveness of the detection of product, reliability in an action production
the cause or the mode FF : Intrinsic reliability of improving the maintenability.
component,
Non-detection table D FM : Maintainability (Accessibility,
Total Detection D = 1 mouting, dismantling, help to
Measures taken assure total the diagnosis),
detection of the initial cause FS : Equipment and personnel
Safety
or the failure mode, which safety If G = 5 then corrective actions
allows the most serious to obtain
effect provoked by the failure • Clients G≤4
during production to be
avoided.
CM : Arrangement of
maintenance,
If impossible to have G ≤ 4,
then corrective actions to
Failure
ailure
CF : Operator training
obtain F = 1 and D = 1
Operable detection
D=2
The failure mode or cause
(procedures in the post,
technical documentation, Mode
specific training …)
may be located, but there is
still a risk that they are not
noticed.
CO : Logistical organisation, part
or sub-assemblies spare,
specific tool .
Etape 5 : Monitoring -
verification Effects and,
Low detection D = 3
The failure mode or cause
The decision-maker validates
the corrective actions proposed
by the group, after considering
Criticality
are difficult to locate, or
time and investment
detection elements are
difficult to use. The pilot:
- draws up the list of the
Analysis mode
No detection D = 4 reserved corrective actions,
The failure is impossible to Management of the risks - Indicates the responsible and
detect before the effect fixes the delays,
occurs Points critiques
Critical points - assures of the
implementation and the
Acceptance
Acceptation oui
yes efficiency of the actions,
ofrisque ??
the risk - establishes the final file
non
no
Critical points • functional
Actions correctives
Correctives actions
breakdown,

Justifications
or operations and, possibly, a
A decreasedeof:: F, • Assembly drawing,
dysfunction for the final customer C ≥ threshold * Diminution F, G G or
ouDD
New indices
Nouveaux F’ G’
indices or ou
’F, G’ D’ D’ • Analysis sheet and
new technology component for TI = Intervention Time or Actual Or evaluation sheet,
which all conditions have not Time for Corrective Maintenance
G≥4 Decrease
Diminutionofde
thelacriticality
criticit
é • Decisions,
been reunited to avoid a failure,
(= Diagnostic + Repair + Return to Or nouvel
new indice
indiceCC ’ • Actions monitoring,
but there has been no initial condition) • Result, …
experience on similar F=4 Reduction
Réduction of du
thenombre
number
de
of points
critical critiques
points According to
equipment CNOMO standard E41.50.530.N of
* constant contractually set
April 2011
threshold
(12, 16 or 24 ….)
G do not change except in
case of new conception.
 On what to perform the FMECA in the project
Work group Stage 1 : initialization FMECA (continued)
FMECA progress

All production means ?

FMECA is a forward- All factory equipment ? Technical Causes : initial event which
specifications may lead to the
looking analysis method (CdC)
which allows: failure mode
FMECA
- to be registered faults, clauses
- to estimate the risks,
- to engage corrective TENDER FMECA is managed by Limits of the study Mode : Total loss of
- All new sub-assemblies Choice of the supplier
actions during design, the pilot (Requester, function or
realization, operation - For the known to be degraded function
STUDIES FMECA investor) assisted by a
reliable sub-assemblies Assembly drawings
(standard, catalogue organizer
type …), FMECA is
Functional and equipment
performed on their The work group must breakdown Effects :
interactions with other include - Halt of the production
sub-assemblies, the Detailed plans Monitoring
- Investor - incorrect quality of the
manufactured product détaillés of corrective Stable manufactured product
actions of - Designerr groupe !
or the environment, - Safety
the supplier - User
taking operating - Maintenance worker
conditions into account
Detection :
REALIZATION Monitoring
of corrective
Assure the S.d.F actions of
the
Action taken to avoid that
of production means Depending on the agenda : the effects occur
Customer
- Specialists (detection on the cause
And the manufactured "News ? " - Departments of Quality,
product quality Robot grippers or on the mode)
Reliability, Safety, Test,
Check of the
modifications Purchassing, Automatism, Grip of part
Put in
refer. of Control
parts
STARTING and the plan …
TESTS of Suction cups Tightenings Pilots Gully Profile

Not known sub- maintenance

templates Pneumatic Electric

assemblies or significant Pipework Coupling

evolution of:
- technology, Procedure stages
- materials, Stage 2 : FMEA
- rate, IMPLEMENTATION
Components Functions Failure Causes Effects Detections
- operating conditions, 1 : Initialization / Reference modes
- modification of 2 : failure Modes Effects Suction cups Grips of No grip Insufficient Halt Pressure
S.d.F : Dependability of
operation manufactured product Analysis (FMEA) parts pressure machine sensor
Flexible Halt Preventative
(Reliability, - environment, 3 : Criticality break machine Inspection
Maintainability, -… 4 : Corrective actions Retention Loss of Leak of - Incorrect Detector of
RETURN OF of parts in parts suction cup quality presence
Availability, EXPERIENCE
5 : Monitoring -
the - Halt part
Safety) Verifications absence of machine
air