REGISTRABILITY

FIRST DIVISION
established rights of the [respondent] over its registered and internationally well-known mark.
G.R. No. 186088, March 22, 2017

WILTON DY AND/OR PHILITES ELECTRONIC & LIGHTING PRODUCTS, Petitioner, v.KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS
ELECTRONICS, N.V., Respondent.

DECISION The registration of the trademark PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE in the name of the [petitioner] will
(e) violate the proprietary rights and interests, business reputation and goodwill of the [respondent]
SERENO, C.J.: over its trademark, considering that the distinctiveness of the trademark PHILIPS will be diluted.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Wilton Dy and/or Philites Electronic & Lighting
Products ("PHILITES") assails the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
103350. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision4 of the IPP Office of the Director
General (IPP-DG), which affirmed the Decision5 of the Intellectual Property Philippines Bureau of Legal
Affairs (IPP-BLA) upholding petitioner's trademark application. The registration of the applied for mark will not only prejudice the Opposer, but will also cause
(f) [petitioner] to unfairly profit commercially from the goodwill, fame and notoriety of Opposer's
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS trademark and reputation.

On 12 April 2000, petitioner PHILITES filed a trademark application (Application Serial Number
4-2000-002937) covering its fluorescent bulb, incandescent light, starter and ballast. After publication,
respondent Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. ("PHILIPS") filed a Verified Notice of Opposition on 17
March 2006, alleging the following: [Petitioner's] registration and use of the applied for mark in connection with goods under Class 11
will weaken the unique and distinctive significance of mark PHILIPS and will tarnish, degrade or
(g)
dilute the distinctive quality of Opposer's trademark and will result in the gradual attenuation or
The approval of Application Serial No. 4-2000-002937 is contrary to the following provisions of whittling away of the value of Opposer's trademark, in violation of Opposer's proprietary rights.6
(a) Republic Act No. [RA] 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code): Sections
123.1(d), (i) and (iii), 123.1(e), 147, and 168.

(see image)

On 8 August 2006, petitioner filed a Verified Answer, stating that its PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE
trademark and respondent's PHILIPS have vast dissimilarities in terms of spelling, sound and meaning.7
The approval of Application Serial No. 4-2000-002937 will cause grave and irreparable damage and
(b)
injury to oppose. At the conclusion of the hearing, on 9 November 2006, IPP-BLA Director Estrellita Beltran-Abelardo
rendered a Decision8 denying the Opposition filed by respondent PHILIPS. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The use and registration of the applied for mark by [petitioner] will mislead the public as to the
(c)
origin, nature, quality, and characteristic of the goods on which it is affixed;
WHEREFORE, premises considered the OPPOSITION filed by Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, Application Serial no. 4-2000-002937 filed by Respondent-Applicant, Wilton
Dy and/or Philites Electronic & Lighting Products on 12 April 2000 for the mark "PHILITES & LETTER P
DEVICE" used on fluorescent bulb, incandescent light, starter, ballast under class 11, is as it is,
hereby GRANTED.

Let the filewrapper of "PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE," subject matter of this case together with this
Decision be forwarded to the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) for appropriate action.
(d) [Petitioner's] application for registration is tantamount to fraud as it seeks to register and obtain
legal protection for an identical or confusingly similar mark that clearly infringes upon the SO ORDERED.
REGISTRABILITY
In upholding petitioner's trademark application, the IPP-BLA stated that assuming respondent's mark was
well-known in the Philippines, there should have been prior determination of whether or not the mark
under application for registration was "identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constitutes a
translation of such well-known mark in order that the owner of the well-known mark can prevent its
registration."9From the evidence presented, the IPP-BLA concluded that the PHILIPS and PHILITES marks
were so unlike, both visually and aurally. It held that no confusion was likely to occur, despite their
contemporaneous use, based on the following observations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Philips shield mark has four stars in different sizes located at the north east and south west portions
inside a circle within the shield. There are three wavy lines dissecting the middle of the circle. None of
these appear in the respondent's mark.
[Respondent] declares that the word Philips is the surname of the brothers who founded the Philips
company engaged in manufacturing and selling lighting products. [Petitioner] on the other hand has
testified that the word Philites is coined from the word 'Philippines' and 'lights,' hence 'Philites.' This
Bureau finds that there is no dictionary meaning to the [petitioner's] mark. It is a coined and arbitrary
word capable of appropriation as a trademark. x x x
Moreover, by mere pronouncing the two marks, the phonetic sounds produced when each mark is uttered
are not the same. The last syllable of respondent's mark is uttered in a long vowel sound, while the last
vowel of the opposer's mark is not.
x x x. This Bureau believes that opposer has no monopoly over the color or diameter or shape of a light
bulb or packaging shape unless registrations were secured to protect the same. The images of the
packages are reproduced below for reference.
(see image)
xxxx
x x x. For one, respondent adopts a yellow to light yellow dominant color while the oppose uses an
orange yellow hue. The mark "Philites" is printed in yellow with light blue background as compared to the
"Philips" mark typed in white against a black background.
It is fundamental in trademark jurisprudence that color alone, unless displayed in an arbitrary design
does not function as a trademark.
Secondly, there appears to be other advertising slogans that appear in respondent's package such as the
words, "new", "prolong lite life", "E-coat finished" and "with additional 35% more than ordinary". These
phrases are absent in opposer's package. These phrases can be considered in the nature of descriptive
terms that can be appropriated by anyone.10
Upon appeal, the IPP-DG rendered a Decision11 on 16 April 2008, affirming the ruling of the IPP-BLA as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, that instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
Decision No. 2006-125 of the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs dated 09 November 2006, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Let a copy of this Decision as well as the trademark application and records be furnished and returned to
the Director of Bureau of Legal Affairs for appropriate action. Further, let also the Directors of the
Bureau of Trademarks, the Administrative, Financial and Human Resources Development Services Bureau,
and the library of the Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer Bureau be furnished a copy
of this Decision for information, guidance and records purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the IPP-DG noted that "[t]he dominant feature of the [respondent's] trademark is 'PHILIPS'
while that of the [petitioner's] trademark is 'PHILITES.' While the first syllables of the marks are identical
- 'PHI' - the second syllables are not. The differences in the last syllable accounted for the variance of the
trademarks visually and aurally."12 Moreover, there were "glaring differences and dissimilarities in the
design and general appearance of the Philips shield emblem mark and the letter 'P' of Philites
mark."13Thus, "even if the [petitioner's] products bearing the trademark PHILIPS are placed side by side
with other brands, the purchaser would not be confused to pick up the [petitioner's] product if this is his
choice or preference, unless the resemblance in the appearance of the trademarks is so glaring which [it]
is not in this case."14
As regards the issue of petitioner submitting a trademark drawing different from that used in the
packaging, the IPP-DG noted that this case involved an opposition to the registration of a mark, while
labels and packaging were technically not a part thereof.15 At best, respondent supposedly had the
remedy of filing a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition.16
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision17 on 7 October 2008. The dispositive
portion herein reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review .is GRANTED. The Decision dated 16 April
2008 of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office in Appeal No. 14-06-28; IPC No.
14-2006-00034 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for trademark registration (Application Serial
Number 4-2000-002937) of respondent Wilton Dy and/or Philites Electronic & Lighting Products
is DISMISSED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the CA reasoned that the "drawing of the trademark submitted by [petitioner] has a different
appearance from that of [petitioner's] actual wrapper or packaging that contain the light bulbs, which
We find confusingly similar with that of [respondent's] registered trademark and packaging."18 Moreover,
it found to be "self-serving [petitioner's] asseveration that the mark 'PHILITES' is a coined or arbitrary
mark from the words 'Philippines' and 'lights.' Of all the marks that [petitioner] could possibly think of for
his light bulbs, it is odd that [petitioner] chose a mark with the letters 'PHILI,' which are the same
prevalent or dominant five letters found in [respondent's] trademark 'PHILIPS' for the same products,
light bulbs."19 Hence, the appellate court concluded that petitioner had intended to ride on the
long-established reputation and goodwill of respondent's trademark.20
On 25 October 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in a
REGISTRABILITY
Resolution21issued by the CA on 18 December 2008.
Hence, this petition.
Respondent filed its Comment22 on 23 June 2009, and petitioner filed its Reply23 on 10 November 2009.
THE ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:
Whether or not respondent's mark is a registered and well-known mark in the Philippines; and
Whether or not the mark applied for by petitioner is identical or confusingly similar with that of
respondent.
OUR RULING
The Petition is bereft of merit.
A trademark is "any distinctive word, name, symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or any combination thereof,
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and distinguish them from
those manufactured, sold, or dealt by others."24 It is "intellectual property deserving protection by
law,"25 and "susceptible to registration if it is crafted fancifully or arbitrarily and is capable of
identifying and distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer or seller from those of another."26
Section 122 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC) provides that rights to a mark shall
be acquired through registration validly done in accordance with the provisions of this law.27 Corollary
to that rule, Section 123 provides which marks cannot be registered.
Respondent opposes petitioner's application on the ground that PHILITES' registration will mislead the
public over an identical or confusingly similar mark of PHILIPS, which is registered and internationally
well-known mark. Specifically, respondent invokes the following provisions of Section
123:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 123. Registrability. - 123.1. A mark cannot be registered if it:
xxx
(d) Is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing
or priority date, in respect of:
(i) The same goods or services, or
(ii) Closely related goods or services, or
(iii) If it nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion;
(e) Is identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constitutes a translation of a mark which is considered
by the competent authority of the Philippines to be well-known internationally and in the Philippines,
whether or not it is registered here, as being already the mark of a person other than the applicant for
registration, and used for identical or similar goods or services: Provided, That in determining whether a
mark is well-known, account shall be taken of the knowledge of the relevant sector of the public, rather
than of the public at large, including knowledge in the Philippines which has been obtained as a result of
the promotion of the mark.28
Respondent's mark is a registered and well-known mark in the Philippines.
There is no question that respondent's mark PHILIPS is already a registered and well-known mark in the
Philippines.
As we have said in Fredco Manufacturing Corporation v. Harvard University,29 "[i]ndeed, Section 123.1(e)
of R.A. No. 8293 now categorically states that 'a mark which is considered by the competent authority of
the Philippines to be well-known internationally and in the Philippines, whether or not it is registered
here,' cannot be registered by another in the Philippines."30
Rule 100(a) of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks, Service Marks, Tradenames and Marked or
Stamped Containers defines "competent authority" in the following manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(c) "Competent authority" for purposes of determining whether a mark is well-known, means the Court,
the Director General, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, or any administrative agency or office
vested with quasi-judicial or judicial jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate any action to enforce the rights
to a mark.
We thus affirm the following findings of the CA, inasmuch as the trademark of PHILIPS is a registered and
well-known mark, as held in the Supreme Court Decision in Philips Export B. V., v. CA:31
Petitioner (PHILIPS) is the registered owner in the Philippines of the "PHILIPS" and "PHILIPS SHIELD
EMBLEM" trademarks, as shown by Certificates of Registration Nos. 42271 and 42270. The Philippine
trademark registrations of petitioner's "PHILIPS" and "PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM" are also evidenced by
Certificates of Registration Nos. R-1651, R-29134, R-1674, and R-28981. The said registered trademarks
"PHILIPS" and "PHILIPS SHIELD EMBLEM" cover classes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, and 16. The assailed Decision
itself states that "(T)he Appellant's trademark is already registered and in use in the Philippines". It also
appears that worldwide, petitioner has thousands of trademark registrations x x x in various countries. As
found by the High Court in Philips Export B. V. vs Court of Appeals, PHILIPS is a trademark or trade name
which was registered as far back as 1922, and has acquired the status of a well-known mark in the
Philippines and internationally as well.32
Petitioner seeks to register a mark nearly resembling that of respondent, which may likely to deceive or
cause confusion among consumers.
Despite respondent's diversification to numerous and varied industries,33 the records show that both
parties are engaged in the same line of business: selling identical or similar goods such as fluorescent
bulbs, incandescent lights, starters and ballasts.
In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed two tests: the
REGISTRABILITY
dominancy test, and the holistic or totality test.34
On one hand, the dominancy test focuses on "the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the
competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing
public. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be
registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are the aural and visual impressions
created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like prices, quality, sales
outlets, and market segments."35
On the other hand, the holistic or totality test necessitates a "consideration of the entirety of the marks
as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but also on the other
features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is
confusingly similar to the other."36
Applying the dominancy test to this case requires us to look only at the mark submitted by petitioner in
its application, while we give importance to the aural and visual impressions the mark is likely to create
in the minds of the buyers. We agree with the findings of the CA that the mark "PHILITES" bears an
uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity with respondent's mark "PHILIPS," to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Applying the dominancy test in the instant case, it shows the uncanny resemblance or confusing
similarity between the trademark applied for by respondent with that of petitioner's registered
trademark. An examination of the trademarks shows that their dominant or prevalent feature is the
five-letter "PHILI", "PHILIPS" for petitioner, and "PHILITES" for respondent. The marks are confusingly
similar with each other such that an ordinary purchaser can conclude an association or relation between
the marks. The consuming public does not have the luxury of time to ruminate the phonetic sounds of the
trademarks, to find out which one has a short or long vowel sound. At bottom, the letters "PHILI" visually
catch the attention of the consuming public and the use of respondent's trademark will likely deceive or
cause confusion. Most importantly, both trademarks are used in the sale of the same goods, which are
light bulbs.37
The confusing similarity becomes even more prominent when we examine the entirety of the marks used
by petitioner and respondent, including the way the products are packaged. In using the holistic test, we
find that there is a confusing similarity between the registered marks PHILIPS and PHILITES, and note
that the mark petitioner seeks to register-is vastly different from that which it actually uses in the
packaging of its products. We quote with approval the findings of the CA as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Applying the holistic test, entails a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products,
including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. A comparison between
petitioner's registered trademark "PHILIPS" as used in the wrapper or packaging of its light bulbs and that
of respondent's applied for trademark "PHILITES" as depicted in the container or actual
wrapper/packaging of the latter's light bulbs will readily show that there is a strong similitude and
likeness between the two trademarks that will likely cause deception or confusion to the purchasing
public. The fact that the parties' wrapper or packaging reflects negligible differences considering the use
of a slightly different font and hue of the yellow is of no moment because taken in their entirety,
respondent's trademark "PHILITES" will likely cause confusion or deception to the ordinary purchaser with
a modicum of intelligence.38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The 7
October 2008 Decision and 18 December 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
103350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
GUILLEUMO BAXTER v. ZOSIMO ZUAZUA ET AL. +
5 Phil. 160
MAPA, J.:
Guillermo Baxter, the plaintiff in this case, after complying with the necessary formalities, secured from
the Government of the Philippine Islands, on the 30th day of August, 1894, the right to use the
trade-mark described as "Agua de Kananga,"as well as the labels annexed thereto, a facsimile of which
was attached to the complaint filed in this case.
On the 23d day of July, 1901, the said Guillermo Baxter associated himself with certain merchants of the
city of Manila for the purpose of organizing a limited partnership for a period of five years, under the
firm name and style of "Baxter & Company," the object of which said partnership was the manufacture of
toilet water and perfumery. Guillermo Baxter contributed to the partnership, of which he was elected
manager and administrator, the business which is now the basis of that carried on by the said partnership;
also his title to certain trade-marks, among them the one described as "Agua de Kananga." For this reason
the proprietor of the said trade-mark was joined as a party plaintiff with the partnership of Baxter & Co.,
the firm directly interested in the use and exploitation of the,said trade-mark. This trade-mark is
actually used by the plaintiffs to designate the ownership and origin of a certain toilet water
manufactured and sold by them under the said name of "Agua de Kananga"
The plaintiffs brought this action for unfair competition under section 7 of Act No. 666 of the Philippine
Commission. It is alleged that the defendant Zosimo Zuazua, for the purpose of imitating and
fraudulently simulating the " Agua de Kananga" manufactured by plaintiffs, placed on tke market for sale
a certain toilet water under the name and denomination of "Kananga Superior" and "Kanangue" and
disposed of the same in bottles with labels similar to those used by the plaintiffs for their own goods. It
was further alleged that the other defendants were engaged in retailing to the public the product
manufactured by the defendant Zuazua. Certain facsimiles of the labels used by the said Zuazua were
also attached to the complaint.
REGISTRABILITY
Zuazua admitted that he had manufactured certain toilet water under the denomination of "Kananga
Superior" and "Kanangue," and that he had also sold the same in bottles labeled as alleged in the
complaint. As to the bottles, it was stipulated, page 19 of the bill of exceptions, that "those used by the
defendant Zuazua, as well as those used by the plaintiffs, were universally used by all persons engaged in
the manufacture of toilet water, and that the fact that they were used by the defendant did not, of itself,
constitute a violation of the rights of the plaintiffs nor a fraud or deceit upon the public."
The trial court entered judgment enjoining the defendants from the further manufacture of toilet water
under the trade-mark of "Kananga Superior" and "Kanangue" and the selling of the same in bottles of the
size and form of those introduced in evidence at the trial, labeled as aforesaid, and for costs. The said
judgment was based upon the ground that the labels, words, and bottles in question, taken together,
were an imitation of those used by the plaintiffs, and tended to deceive the public by making it appear
that the toilet water manufactured and sold by the defendants was the same toilet water manufactured
by the plaintiffs, and that the use of the said labels, words, and bottles was therefore illegal, and
constituted a violation of plaintiff's rights.
The trial court found also, as a conclusion of law, that the grant by the Government of the Philippine
Islands did not give the plaintiffs an exclusive right to the use of the word "Kananga," but to the phrase
" Agua de Kananga" that "Kananga" was the name of a well-known tree of the Philippine Islands, and held
that, although the plaintiffs had a right to the exclusive use of the phrase "Agua de Kanang" it did not
follow that they had an exclusive right to the use of any of the words contained in the said phrase.
The plaintiffs, as well as the defendant Zosimo Zuazua, excepted to the judgment of the trial court,
upon different grounds. The defendant moved for a new trial in the Court of First Instance, upon the
ground that the judgment was contrary to the weight of evidence.
The main reliance of the defendant is that the labels used on his goods differed from those used by the
plaintiffs as to the drawing, color, and general appearance of the design, and he denies emphatically
that he had any intention to deceive the public thereby, alleging that the people clearly distinguished
the goods of the plaintiffs from those of the defendants, the former being known from the picture on the
bottle as the "Payo Brand" and the latter as the "Senorita Brand."
The alleged similarity or resemblance between the labels is a question of fact which can be decided by a
mere inspection of the same. After a careful comparison of the labels used by the defendant with those
used by the plaintiffs, we have unanimously arrived at the conclusion that there is no identity nor even
any similarity whatsoever between them, either in detail or as a whole. The difference between the two
is so apparent that it can be readily noticed. We do not believe that the public could have been deceived
by the appearance of the labels to the extent of taking the goods of the plaintiffs for those manufactured
and sold by the defendant. We make no finding as to the bottles because they were not forwarded to this
court for inspection, and, moreover, because it was stipulated by the parties that the said bottles were
universally used by all manufacturers of toilet water, and that their particular use by defendant was not,
therefore, an act of fraud or deceit practiced by him upon the plaintiffs or the public generally.
Section 7 of Act No. 666 provides in part as follows:
"And in order that the action shall lie under this section, actual intent to deceive the
public and defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of the person
sought to be made liable, but such intent may be inferred from similarity in the
appearance of the goods as packed or offered for sale to those of the complaining
party."
The plaintiffs have not proved, or attempted to prove, the fraudulent intent attributed to the defendant
Zuazua by any means other that the alleged similarity between the labels used by him and those used by
the defendant to designate his own goods. There being no such similarity between the labels, we find no
reason for even inferring that the defendant had any such intention, and therefore the action brought by
the plaintiffs in this case can not be maintained under the law. The judgment appealed from should be
reversed in so far as it holds that such an action lies in this case.
We agree, however, with the trial court, that the ownership of the trade-mark "Agua de Kananga" did not
give the plaintiffs a right to the exclusive use of the word "Kananga."
The defendant alleged in his answer that the word "Kananga" could not be used as a trade-mark because
it was the name of a flower. It is stated in the judgment of the court below that the word "Kananga"
represents the name of a well-known tree in the Philippines. This finding has not been disputed by the
plaintiffs, who simply allege that the spelling of the said word indicates that it is foreign to the Spanish
language. This, by the way, would not prove, even though it were true, that the said word was not in fact
the name of a flower of the Philippine Islands, as set out in the judgment. It is apparent, therefore, that
the said word could not be used exclusively as a trade-mark, any more than could the words "sugar,"
"tobacco," or "coffee." The law is clear and conclusive upon the subject. "A designation or part of a
designation," says section 2 of Act No. 666, "which relates only to the name, quality, or description of the
merchandise * * * can not be the subject of a trade-mark." This provision is in conformity with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of article 5 of the royal decree of the 26th of October, 1888, under which
Guillermo Baxter secured the registration of his trade-mark. The said royal decree provided that the
denominations generally used in commerce for the purpose of designating a class of goods could not be
the subject of labels or trade-marks.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants did not prove, or even attempt to prove, that the goods
manufactured by them had anything to do with the "Kananga" flower. If the goods in question had really
nothing to do with the said flower, then it was not lawful for the plaintiffs to sell them to the public
under the name of "Agua de Kananga," because the people might be deceived as to the nature of the
goods, taking for "Kananga" an article which, as a matter of fact, had nothing to do with the said flower.
Both plaintiffs and defendant would be exactly in the same position as one who should sell goods as
"coffee" or "tobacco" which were neither one nor the other. Such being the case the plaintiffs could not
have maintained this action for unfair competition, because under section 9 of said Act No. 666 such
action would not lie "when the trade-mark or designation of its origin, ownership, or manufacture has
been used by the claimant for the purpose of deceiving the public as to the nature of the goods in which
he deals, his business, profession, or occupation." The law can not and does not permit that trade-marks
shall contain indications capable of deceiving the public as to the nature of the goods. This would be
exactly the. case if under the trade-mark of "Agua de Kananga" the plaintiffs should sell goods that had in
fact nothing to do, as they say, with the "Kananga" flower. However the contention of the plaintiffs may
be considered, the proof is nevertheless insufficient to show that the word "Kananga" the name of a
flower, can be appropriated, as the subject of a trade-mark, under the law.
The defendant prays that judgment be entered against the plaintiffs for damages incurred by reason of
the preliminary injunction, still in force, issued by the trial court on the 18th day of June, 1903. In his
answer the defendant estimates these damages at 800 pesos per month. He did not, however, introduce
REGISTRABILITY

evidence in support of his allegation, and no order can be made by the court upon this matter. The
foregoing disposes of the other questions raised by the parties in their briefs in this court.

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another judgment entered in favor of the
defendant and appellant Zosimo Zuazua, dissolving the preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the
court below on the 18th of June, 1903. The finding of the court that the plaintiffs have no right to the
exclusive use of the word "Kananga," is sustained. Each party shall pay its own costs. After the expiration
of ten days from the date hereof let judgment be entered accordingly and the case remanded to the trial
court. So ordered.