CASE # 7

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES

- PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FIRST DIVISION (G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013)
SERENO, CJ.

FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No.
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads:
"P.S.– This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Thus,
on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
COSLAP. MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions. The Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition, Both NMSMI
and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time the
Proclamation was published.

RULING:

No. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation
No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation
No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect
of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers
to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera.

Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of
any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence
of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is
not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable
intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. This Court cannot rule that a
word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,
we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it.
To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae
exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating."
The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

CASE # 15
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE
DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO
DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco vs. TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA,
Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja
EN BANC (G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972)
REYES, J.B.L., J.

FACTS:

(Overview) This case is a compilation of three cases: (1) Appeal by Tasiana Vda. de Borja from
approval of compromise agreement by CFI Rizal; (2) Appeal by Jose de Borja from the
disapproval of compromise agreement by CFI Nueva Ecija; and (3) appeal by Jose de Borja from
the decision of CFI Rizal that the main object of the compromise agreement is a separate and
exclusive property of Francsico de Borja and not a conjugal asset.

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition
for the probate of her will in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The will was probated on 2 April
1941.

In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose
de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco.
Francisco de Borja has a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she
was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits.

In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963, by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage,
namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,"
and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja

The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1)
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de
Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force
and effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.

RULING:

Valid. The doctrine in the case of Guevara vs. Guevara, wherein the Court's majority held the
view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution
of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public
policy, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of
the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement
specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the estate
of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or
by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.

CASE # 22
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ vs. AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ
EN BANC (G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933)
HULL, J.

FACTS:

Plaintiff (Barretto) and defendant (Gonzales) are citizens of the Philippine Islands and residents
of the City of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived
together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily
separated and since that time have not lived together as man and wife.

Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued for
several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be
increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name.

Shortly after the agreement, Gonzales went to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927.

On that same date he married another Filipino citizen as well & eventually they had 3 children.

When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the
support of Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.

Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barretto brought an
action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts
of Nevada & invoked Sec 9 of Act 2710.
- Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of
what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates
had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to
pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in
educating the 3 minor sons.

CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the defendant Barretto. Hence, this appeal by
Gonzales.

ISSUE:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized
in said jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the
courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

RULING:

No. The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila is reversed and defendant
absolved from the demands made against him in this action.

The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710,
and in various court decisions (such as Goitia v. Campos Rueda, Cousins Hix v. Fluemer, etc)

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to
this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly
indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to
secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our
law.

At all times their matrimonial domicile has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence
acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a
bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the
bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.

While the decisions of this court in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually
been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud
or collusion, the Court has not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code.

Article 9 reads:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws
or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for
which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.
Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts
in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
CASE # 29
ROLANDO LANDICHO vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
EN BANC (G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968)
FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the
information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has
not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."

On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise
presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to
petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation
allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.

On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint against the
third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said
third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of
the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

RULING:

Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second
wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and
the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases
are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his
consent to the second marriage is not in issue.

"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

CASE # 36
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR. vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, et al.
EN BANC (G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990)
PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging
that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had
died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

RULING:

The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and
sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child
and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

CASE # 43
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO vs. GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG
EN BANC (G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928)
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:

Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a
loan from Genoveva Muerong and German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan
as the sole heir of his estate.

In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their land
as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were
threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalan’s first cedula
to acknowledge the document.

ISSUE:

Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RULING:

The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine
laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case because the plaintiff
did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.

Important Statutes:
Civil Code, Article 38.
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.
Civil code, Art. 1327.
The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Civil code, Art. 1390.
The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.