MEMORANDUM OF LAW

ABOLISHMENT OF ALL FORMS PEONAGE AND SLAVERY

EXCEPT MILITARY CONSCIPTION

SECTION I
Military conscription and service ruled not slavery
Exhibit “A”

Arver v. United States 245 U.S. 366 (1918)

United States Supreme Court
245 U.S. 366
Arver v. United States
Argued: Dec. 13, 14, 1917. --- Decided: Jan 7, 1918

We are here concerned with some of the provisions of the Act of May 18, 1917 (Public No. 12, 65th
Congress, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76), entitled 'An act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the
military establishment of the United States.' The law, as its opening sentence declares, was intended to
supply temporarily the increased military force which was required by the existing emergency, the war
then and now flagrant. The clauses we must pass upon and those which will throw light on their
significance are briefly summarized.
The act proposed to raise a national army, first, by increasing the regular force to its maximum strength
and there maintaining it; second, by incorporating into such army the members of the National Guard and
National Guard Reserve already in the service of the United States (Act of Congress of June 5, 1916, c.
134, 39 Stat. 211) and maintaining their organizations to their full strength; third, by giving the President
power in his discretion to organize by volunteer enlistment four divisions of infantry; fourth, by
subjecting all male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty to duty in the national army for the
period of the existing emergency after the proclamation of the President announcing the necessity for
their service; and fifth, by providing for selecting from the body so called, on the further proclamation of
the President, 500,000 enlisted men, and a second body of the same number should the President in his
discretion deem it necessary. To carry out its purposes the act made it the duty of those liable to the call to
present themselves for registration on the proclamation of the President so as to subject themselves to the
terms of the act and provided full federal means for carrying out the selective draft. It gave the President
in his discretion power to create local boards to consider claims for exemption for physical disability or
otherwise made by those called. The act exempted from subjection to the draft designated United States
and state officials as well as those already in the military or naval service of the United States, regular or
duly ordained ministers of religion and theological students under the conditions provided for, and while
relieving from military service in the strict sense the members of religious sects as enumerated whose
tenets excluded the moral right to engage in war, nevertheless subjected such persons to the performance
of service of a noncombatant character to be defined by the President.

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The proclamation of the President calling the persons designated within the ages described in the statute
was made and the plaintiffs in error who were in the class and under the statute were obliged to present
themselves for registration and subject themselves to the law failed to do so and were prosecuted under
the statute for the penalties for which it provided. They all defended by denying that there had been
conferred by the Constitution upon Congress the power to compel military service by a selective draft and
if such power had been given by the Constitution to Congress, the terms of the particular act for various
reasons caused it to be beyond the power and repugnant to the Constitution. The cases are here for review
because of the constitutional questions thus raised, convictions having resulted from instructions of the
courts that the legal defences were without merit and that the statute was constitutional.
The possession of authority to enact the statute must be found in the clauses of the Constitution giving
Congress power 'to declare war; * * * to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years; * * * to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.' Article 1, § 8. And of course the powers conferred by these provisions like all
other powers given carry with them as provided by the Constitution the authority 'to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.' Article 1, § 8.
As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the
objection that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for further
notice. It is said, however, that since under the Constitution as originally framed state citizenship was
primary and United States citizenship but derivative and dependent thereon, therefore the power conferred
upon Congress to raise armies was only coterminous with United States citizenship and could not be
exerted so as to cause that citizenship to lose its dependent character and dominate state citizenship. But
the proposition simply denies to Congress the power to raise armies which the Constitution gives. That
power by the very terms of the Constitution, being delegated, is supreme. Article 6. In truth the contention
simply assails the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in conferring authority on Congress and in
not retaining it as it was under the Confederation in the several states. Further it is said, the right to
provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to
exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a
governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the
citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. It is argued, however, that although this
is abstractly true, it is not concretely so because as compelled military service is repugnant to a free
government and in conflict with all the great guarantees of the Constitution as to individual liberty, it
must be assumed that the authority to raise armies was intended to be limited to the right to call an army
into existence counting alone upon the willingness of the citizen to do his duty in time of public need, that
is, in time of war. But the premise of this proposition is so devoid of foundation that it leaves not even a
shadow of ground upon which to base the conclusion. Let us see if this is not at once demonstrable. It
may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the
reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right to compel it.
Vattel, Law of Nations, book III, cc. 1 and 2. To do more than state the proposition is absolutely
unnecessary in view of the practical illustration afforded by the almost universal legislation to that effect
now in force. [1] In England it is certain that before the Norman Conquest the duty of the great militant
body of the citizens was recognized and enforceable. Blackstone, book I, c. 13. It is unnecessary to follow
the long controversy between Crown and Parliament as to the branch of the government in which the
power resided, since there never was any doubt that it somewhere resided. So also it is wholly
unnecessary to explore the situation for the purpose of fixing the sources whence in England it came to be
understood that the citizen or the force organized from the militia as such could not without their consent
be compelled to render service in a foreign country, since there is no room to contend that such principle
ever rested upon any challenge of the right of Parliament to impose compulsory duty upon the citizen to
perform military duty wherever the public exigency exacted whether at home or abroad. This is
exemplified by the present English Service Act. [2]

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In the Colonies before the separation from England there cannot be the slightest doubt that the right to
enforce military service was unquestioned and that practical effect was given to the power in many cases.
Indeed the brief of the government contains a list of Colonial Acts manifesting the power and its
enforcement in more than two hundred cases. And this exact situation existed also after the separation.
Under the Articles of Confederation it is true Congress had no such power, as its authority was absolutely
limited to making calls upon the states for the military forces needed to create and maintain the army,
each state being bound for its quota as called. But it is indisputable that the states in response to the calls
made upon them met the situation when they deemed it necessary by directing enforced military service
on the part of the citizens. In fact the duty of the citizen to render military service and the power to
compel him against his consent to do so was expressly sanctioned by the Constitutions of at least nine of
the states, an illustration being afforded by the following provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776:
'That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property,
and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of that protection, and yield his
personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.' Article 8 (Thorpe, American Charters,
Constitutions and Organic Laws, vol. 5, pp. 3081, 3083). [3]
While it is true that the states were sometimes slow in exerting the power in order to fill their quotas-a
condition shown by resolutions of Congress calling upon them to comply by exerting their compulsory
power to draft and by earnest requests by Washington to Congress that a demand be made upon the states
to resort to drafts to fill their quotas [4]-that fact serves to demonstrate instead of to challenge the existence
of the authority. A default in exercising a duty may not be resorted to as a reason for denying its
existence.
When the Constitution came to be formed it may not be disputed that one of the recognized necessities for
its adoption was the want of power in Congress to raise an army and the dependence upon the states for
their quotas. In supplying the power it was manifestly intended to give it all and leave none to the states,
since besides the delegation to Congress of authority to raise armies the Constitution prohibited the states,
without the consent of Congress, form keeping troops in time of peace or engaging in war. Article 1, § 10.
To argue that as the state authority over the militia prior to the Constitution embraced every citizen, the
right of Congress to raise an army should not be considered as granting authority to compel the citizen's
service in the army, is but to express in a different form the denial of the right to call any citizen to the
army. Nor is this met by saying that it does not exclude the right of Congress to organize an army by
voluntary enlistments, that is, by the consent of the citizens, for if the proposition be true, the right of the
citizen to give consent would be controlled by the same prohibition which would deprive Congress of the
right to compel unless it can be said that although Congress had not the right to call because of state
authority, the citizen had a right to obey the call and set aside state authority if he pleased to do so. And a
like conclusion demonstrates the want of foundation for the contention that although it be within the
power to call the citizen into the army without his consent, the army into which he enters after the call is
to be limited in some respects to services for which the militia it is assumed may only be used, since this
admits the appropriateness of the call to military service in the army and the power to make it and yet
destroys the purpose for which the call is authorized-the raising of armies to be under the control of the
United States.
The fallacy of the argument results from confounding the constitutional provisions concerning the militia
with that conferring upon Congress the power to raise armies. It treats them as one while they are
different. This is the militia clause:
'The Congress shall have power: * * * To provide for calling for h the militia to execute the laws of the
nation, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,

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reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.' Article 1, § 8.
The line which separates it from the army power is not only inherently plainly marked by the text of the
two clauses, but will stand out in bolder relief by considering the condition before the Constitution was
adopted and the remedy which it provided for the military situation with which it dealt. The right on the
one hand of Congress under the Confederation to call on the states for forces and the duty on the other of
the states to furnish when called, embraced the complete power of government over the subject. When the
two were combined and were delegated to Congress all governmental power on that subject was
conferred, a result manifested not only by the grant made but by the limitation expressly put upon the
states on the subject. The army sphere therefore embraces such complete authority. But the duty of
exerting the power thus conferred in all its plenitude was not made at once obligatory but was wisely left
to depend upon the discretion of Congress as to the arising of the exigencies which would call it in part or
in whole into play. There was left therefore under the sway of the states undelegated the control of the
militia to the extent that such control was not taken away by the exercise by Congress of its power to raise
armies. This did not diminish the military power or curb the full potentiality of the right to exert it but left
an area of authority requiring to be provided for (the militia area) unless and until by the exertion of the
military power of Congress that area had been circumscribed or totally disappeared. This, therefore, is
what was dealt with by the militia provision. It diminished the occasion for the exertion by Congress of its
military power beyond the strict necessities for its exercise by giving the power to Congress to direct the
organization and training of the militia (evidently to prepare such militia in the event of the exercise of the
army power) although leaving the carrying out of such command to the states. It further conduced to the
same result by delegating to Congress the right to call on occasions which were specified for the militia
force, thus again obviating the necessity for exercising the army power to the extent of being ready for
every conceivable contingency. This purpose is made manifest by the provision preserving the
organization of the militia so far as formed when called for such special purposes although subjecting the
militia when so called to the paramount authority of the United States. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 408,
20 L. Ed. 597. But because under the express regulations the power was given to call for specified
purposes without exerting the army power, it cannot follow that the latter power when exerted was not
complete to the extent of its exertion and dominant. Because the power of Congress to raise armies was
not required to be exerted to its full limit but only as in the discretion of Congress it was deemed the
public interest required, furnishes no ground for supposing that the complete power was lost by its partial
exertion. Because, moreover, the power granted to Congress to raise armies in its potentiality was
susceptible of narrowing the area over which the militia clause operated, affords no ground for
confounding the two areas which were distinct and separate to the end of confusing both the powers and
thus weakening or destroying both.
And upon this understanding of the two powers the legislative and executive authority has been exerted
from the beginning. From the act of the first session of Congress carrying over the army of the
government under the Confederation to the United States under the Constitution (Act of September 29,
1789, c. 25, 1 Stat. 95) down to 1812 the authority to raise armies was regularly exerted as a distinct and
substantive power, the force being raised and recruited by enlistment. Except for one act formulating a
plan by which the entire body of citizens (the militia) subject to military duty was to be organized in
every state (Act of May 8, 1792, c. 33, 1 Stat. 271) which was never carried into effect, Congress
confined itself to providing for the organization of a specified number distributed among the states
according to their quota to be trained as directed by Congress and to be called by the President as need
might require. [5] When the War of 1812 came the result of these two forces composed the army to be
relied upon by Congress to carry on the war. Either because it proved to be weak in numbers or because
of insubordination developed among the forces called and manifested by their refusal to cross the border,
[6]
the government determined that the exercise of the power to organize an army by compulsory draft was
necessary and Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of War (Mr. Madison being President), in a letter to Congress

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recommended several plans of legislation on that subject. It suffices to say that by each of them it was
proposed that the United States deal directly with the body of citizens subject to military duty and call a
designated number out of the population between the ages of 18 and 45 for service in the army. The
power which it was recommended be exerted was clearly an unmixed federal power dealing with the
subject from the sphere of the authority given to Congress to raise armies and not from the sphere of the
right to deal with the militia as such, whether organized or unorganized. A bill was introduced giving
effect to the plan. Opposition developed, but we need nor stop to consider it because it substantially rested
upon the incompatibility of compulsory military service with free government, a subject which from what
we have said has been disposed of. Peace came before the bill was enacted.
Down to the Mexican War the legislation exactly portrayed the same condition of mind which we have
previously stated. In that war, however, no draft was suggested, because the army created by the United
States immediately resulting from the exercise by Congress of its power to raise armies, that organized
under its direction from the militia and the volunteer commands which were furnished, proved adequate
to carry the war to a successful conclusion.
So the course of legislation from that date to 1861 affords no ground for any other than the same
conception of legislative power which we have already stated. In that year when the mutterings of the
dread conflict which was to come began to be heard and the proclamation of the President calling a force
into existence was issued it was addressed to the body organized out of the militia and trained by the
states in accordance with the previous acts of Congress. Proclamation of April 15, 1861, 12 Stat. 1258.
That force being inadequate to meet the situation, an act was passed authorizing the acceptance of
500,000 volunteers by the President to be by him organized into a national army. Act of July 22, 1861, c.
9, 12 Stat. 268. This was soon followed by another act increasing the force of the militia to be organized
by the states for the purpose of being drawn upon when trained under the direction of Congress (Act of
July 29, 1861, c. 25, 12 Stat. 281), the two acts when considered together presenting in the clearest
possible form the distinction between the power of Congress to raise armies and its authority under the
militia clause. But it soon became manifest that more men were required. As a result the Act of March 3,
1863 (c. 75, 12 Stat. 731), was adopted entitled 'An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces
and for other purposes.' By that act which was clearly intended to directly exert upon all the citizens of t e
United States the national power which it had been proposed to exert in 1814 on the recommendation of
the then Secretary of War, Mr. Monroe, every male citizen of the United States between the ages of 20
and 45 was made subject by the direct action of Congress to be called by compulsory draft to service in a
national army at such time and in such numbers as the President in his discretion might find necessary. In
that act, as in the one of 1814, and in this one, the means by which the act was to be enforced were
directly federal and the force to be raised as a result of the draft was therefore typically national as distinct
from the call into active service of the militia as such. And under the power thus exerted four separate
calls for draft were made by the President and enforced, that of July, 1863, of February and March, 1864,
of July and December, 1864, producing a force of about a quarter of a million men. [7] It is undoubted that
the men thus raised by draft were treated as subject to direct national authority and were used either in
filling the gaps occasioned by the vicissitudes of war in the ranks of the existing national forces or for the
purpose of organizing such new units as were deemed to be required. It would be childish to deny the
value of the added strength which was thus afforded. Indeed in the official report of the Provost Marshal
General, just previously referred to in the margin, reviewing the whole subject it was stated that it was the
efficient aid resulting from the forces created by the draft at a very critical moment of the civil strife
which obviated a disaster which seemed impending and carried that struggle to a complete and successful
conclusion.
Brevity prevents doing more than to call attention to the fact that the organized body of militia within the
states as trained by the states under the direction of Congress became known as the National Guard. Act
of January 21, 1903, c. 196, 32 Stat. 775; National Defense Act of June 5, 1916, c. 134, 39 Stat. 211. And
to make further preparation from among the great body of the citizens, an additional number to be

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determined by the President was directed to be organized and trained by the states as the National Guard
Reserve. National Defense Act, supra.
Thus sanctioned as is the act before us by the text of the Constitution, and by its significance as read in
the light of the fundamental principles with which the subject is concerned, by the power recognized and
carried into effect in many civilized countries, by the authority and practice of the colonies before the
Revolution, of the states under the Confederation and of the government since the formation of the
Constitution, the want of merit in the contentions that the act in the particulars which we have been
previously called upon to consider was beyond the constitutional power of Congress, is manifest.
Cogency, however, if possible, is added to the demonstration by pointing out that in the only case to
which we have been referred where the constitutionality of the act of 1863 was contemporaneously
challenged on grounds akin to, if not absolutely identical with, those here urged, the validity of the act
was maintained for reasons not different from those which control our judgment. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa.
238. And as further evidence that the conclusion we reach is but the inevitable consequence of the
provisions of the Constitution as effect follows cause, we briefly recur to events in another environment.
The seceding states wrote into the Constitution which was adopted to regulate the government which they
sought to establish, in identical words the provisions of the Constitution of the United States which we
here have under consideration. And when the right to enforce under that instrument a selective draft law
which was enacted not differing in principle from the one here in question was challenged, its validity
was upheld evidently after great consideration by the courts of Virginia, of Georgia, of Texas, of
Alabama, of Mississippi and of North Carolina, the opinions in some of the cases copiously and critically
reviewing the whole grounds which we have stated. Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Grat. (Va.) 470; Jeffers v.
Fair, 33 Ga. 347; Daly and Fitzgerald v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38, 54; Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 27; Parker v.
Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136; Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 386; Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429; In re Emerson, 39
Ala. 437; In re Pille, 39 Ala. 459; Simmons v. Miller, 40 Miss. 19; Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N. C. 333, 408.
In reviewing the subject we have hitherto considered it as it has been argued from the point of view of the
Constitution as it stood prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But to avoid all
misapprehension we briefly direct attention to that amendment for the purpose of pointing out, as has
been frequently done in the past, [8] how completely it broadened the national scope of the government
under the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant instead
of being subordinate and derivative, and therefore operating as it does upon all the powers conferred by
the Constitution leaves no possible support for the contentions made if their want of merit was otherwise
not so clearly made manifest.
It remains only to consider contentions which, while not disputing power, challenge the act because of the
repugnancy to the Constitution supposed to result from some of its provisions. First, we are of opinion
that the contention that the act is void as a delegation of federal power to state officials because of some
of its administrative features is too wanting in merit to require further notice. Second, we think that the
contention that the statute is void because vesting administrative officers with legislative discretion has
been so completely adversely settled as to require reference only to some of the decided cases. Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct.
349, 48 L. Ed. 525; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 L. Ed. 1408; First
National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734, 61 L. Ed. 1233. A like conclusion also
adversely disposes of a similar claim concerning the conferring of judicial power. Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470, 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525; West v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80, 27 Sup. Ct. 423, 51
L. Ed. 718; Ocean Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 338-340, 29 Sup. Ct. 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013;
Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218. And we pass without anything but
statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we at
the outset referred because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.

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Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of
the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of
the nation as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people can be said to be
the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we
are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.
Affirmed.
Notes[edit]
^1 In the argument of the government it is stated: 'The Statesman's Yearbook for 1917 cites the following
governments as enforcing military service: Argentine Republic, p. 656; Austria-Hungary, p. 667;
Belgium, p. 712; Brazil, p. 738; Bulgaria, p. 747; Bolivia, p. 728; Columbia, p. 790; Chili, p. 754; China,
p. 770; Denmark, p. 811; Ecuador, p. 820; France, p. 841; Greece, p. 1001; Germany, p. 914; Guatemala,
p. 1009; Honduras, p. 1018; Italy, p. 1036; Japan, p. 1064; Mexico, p. 1090; Montenegro, p. 1098;
Netherlands, p. 1191; Nicaragua, p. 1142 Norway, p. 1152; Peru, p. 1191; Portugal, p. 1201; Roumania,
p. 1220; Russia, p. 1240; Serbia, p. 1281; Siam, p. 1288; Spain, p. 1300; Switzerland, p. 1337; Salvador,
p. 1270; Turkey, p. 1353.' See also the recent Canadian conscription act, entitled, 'Military Service Act' of
August 27, 1917, expressly providing for service abroad (printed in the Congressional Record of
September 20, 1917, 55th Cong. Rec., p. 7959); the Conscription Law of the Orange Free State, Law No.
10, 1899; Military Service and Commando Law, sections 10 and 28; Laws of Orange River Colony, 1901,
p. 855; of the South African Republic, 'De Locale Wetten en Volks-raadsbesluiten der Zuid Afr.
Republick,' 1898, Law No. 20, pp. 230, 233, article 6, 28; Constitution, German Empire, April 16, 1871,
Art. 57, 59; Dodd, 1 Modern Constitutions, p. 344; Gesetz, betreffend Aenderungen der Wehrpflicht, vom
11 Feb. 1888, No. 1767, Reichs-Gesetzblatt, p. 11, amended by law of July 22, 1913, No. 4264, RGBl., p.
593; Loi sur de recrutement de l'armee of 15 July, 1889 (Duvergier, vol. 89, p. 440), modified by act of
21 March, 1905 (Duvergier, vol. 105, p. 133).
^2 Military Service Act, January 27, 1916, 5 and 6 George V, c. 104, p. 367, amended by the Military
Service Act of May 25, 1916, 2d session 6 and 7 George V, c. 15, p. 33.
^3 See also Constitution of Vermont, 1777, c. 1, art. 9 (Thorpe, vol. 6, pp. 3737, 3740); New York, 1777,
art. 40 (Id. vol. 5, p. 2637); Massachusetts Bill of Rights, 1780, art. 10 (Id. vol. 3, p. 1891); New
Hampshire, 1784, pt. 1, Bill of Rights, art, 12 (Id. vol. 4, p. 2455); Delaware, 1776, art. 9 (Id. vol. 1, pp.
563, 564); Maryland, 1776, art. 33 (Id. vol. 3, pp. 1686, 1696); Virginia, 1776, Militia (Id. vol. 7, p.
3817); Georgia, 1777, arts. 33, 35 (Id. vol. 2, pp. 777, 782).
^4 Journals of Congress, Ford's Ed., Library of Congress, vol. 7, pp. 262, 263; vol. 10, pp. 199, 200; vol.
13, p. 299. 7 Sparks, Writings of Washington, pp. 162, 167, 442, 444.
^5 Act of May 9, 1794, c. 27, 1 Stat. 367; Act of February 28, 1795, c. 36, 1 Stat. 424; Act of June 24,
1797, c. 4, 1 Stat. 522; Act of March 3, 1803, c. 32, 2 Stat. 241; Act of April 18, 1806, c. 32, 2 Stat. 383;
Act of March 30, 1808, c. 39, 2 Stat. 478; Act of April 10, 1812, c. 55, 2 Stat. 705.
^6 Upton, Military Policy of the United States, p. 99 et seq.
^7 Historical Report, Enrollment Branch, Provost Marshal General's Bureau, March 17, 1866.
^8 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 72-74, 94, 95, 112, 113, 21 L. Ed. 394; United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L. Ed. 588; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 140, 12 Sup. Ct. 375, 36 L.
Ed. 103; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 37 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869.

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 SECTION II
Slavery and peonage definition and criminal laws, military service is excluded
Exhibit “B”

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SECTION

1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation

Exhibit “C”
USLegal,
Peonage is a condition in which debtors are bound in servitude to their creditors until their debts are
discharged. It is a status of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.
The basal fact is indebtedness. [Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905)].
The following is an example of a federal statute defining the term:
According to 42 USCS § 1994, 'peonage' is defined as "a condition of enforced servitude by which the
servitor is compelled to labor against his will in liquidation of some debt or obligation, either real or
pretended." The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or States of the United States.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States or. any place subject to their jurisdiction”

42 U.S. Code § 1994. Peonage abolished

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever
prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders,
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or
enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce,
directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation
of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.
(R.S. § 1990.)

Exhibit “D”
U.S. Supreme Court
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905)

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Clyatt v. United States
No. 235
Argued December 13-14, 1904
Decided March 13, 1905
197 U.S. 207
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the
master. The service is enforced unless the debt be paid, and however created, it is involuntary servitude
within the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. While the ordinary
relation of individuals to individual are subject to the control of the states and not to that of the general
government, the Thirteenth Amendment grants to Congress power to enforce the prohibition
Page 197 U. S. 208
against involuntary servitude, including peonage, and to punish persons holding another in peonage, and
§§ 1990, 5526, Rev.Stat. are valid legislation under such power and operate directly on every person
violating their provisions, whether in state or territory and whether there be or not any municipal
ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. Conviction cannot be had under an indictment charging
defendants with returning certain persons to a condition of peonage unless there is proof that the persons
so returned had actually been in such condition prior to the alleged act of returning them thereto.
Where the bill of exceptions, after referring to the empaneling of the jury, contains recitals that the
plaintiff produced witnesses, followed in each case by the testimony of the witness at the close of all of
which there were farther recitals that the parties rested, these statements are sufficient, even in the absence
of a technical affirmative recital to that effect, to show that the bill of exceptions contains all the
testimony, and defendant is not to be deprived of a full consideration of the question of his guilt by such
omission, and even in the absence of a motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant, this Court may
examine the question where it is plain that error has been committed.
No matter how severe may be the condemnation due to the conduct of a party charged with crime, it is the
duty of the court to see that all the elements of the crime are proved or that testimony is offered which
justifies a jury in finding those elements.
Sections 1990 and 5526, Rev.Stat., read:
"SEC. 1990. The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other territory or state of the
United States, and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New
Mexico, or of any other territory or state, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or
by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt
or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void."
"SEC. 5526. Every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any
manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage shall be punished by a fine of
not less than one thousand nor

Page 9 of 44
Page 197 U. S. 209
more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less than one year nor more than five years, or
by both."
On November 21, 1901, the grand jury returned into the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Florida an indictment in two counts, the first of which is as follows:
"The grand jurors of the United States of America impaneled and sworn within and for the district
aforesaid, on their oaths present, that one Samuel M. Clyatt, heretofore, to-wit: on the eleventh day of
February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one, in the County of Levy, State of
Florida, within the district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did then and there
unlawfully and knowingly return one Will Gordon and one Mose Ridley to a condition of peonage by
forcibly and against the will of them, the said Will Gordon and the said Mose Ridley, returning them, the
said Will Gordon and Mose Ridley, to work to and for Samuel M. Clyatt, D. T. Clyatt, and H. H. Tift,
copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Clyatt & Tift, to be held by them, the said
Clyatt & Tift, to work out a debt claimed to be due to them, the said Clyatt & Tift, by the said Will
Gordon and Mose Ridley; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the United States."
The second count differs only in charging that defendant caused and aided in returning Gordon and
Ridley. A trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, and thereupon the defendant was sentenced to confinement
at hard labor for four years. The case was taken on appropriate writ to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which certified to this Court three questions. Subsequently the entire record was brought here on
a writ of certiorari, and the case was heard on its merits.
Page 197 U. S. 215
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The constitutionality and scope of §§ 1990 and 5526 present the first questions for our consideration.
They prohibit peonage. What is peonage? It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. As said by
Judge Benedict, delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M.190, 194: "One fact existed
universally: all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their
master's service." Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified
as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the
character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his
creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage, however created, is
compulsory service -- involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the
payment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and
the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case, the
debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject, like any other
contractor, to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no
law or force compels
Page 197 U. S. 216
performance or a continuance of the service. We need not stop to consider any possible limits or
exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, or the obligations
of a child to its parents, or of an apprentice to his master, or the power of the legislature to make unlawful,
and punish criminally, an abandonment by an employee of his post of labor in any extreme cases. That
which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt. Is this
legislation within the power of Congress? It may be conceded, as a general proposition, that the ordinary

Page 10 of 44
relations of individual to individual are subject to the control of the states, and are not entrusted to the
general government; but the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted as an outcome of the Civil War, reads:
"SEC. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction."
"SEC. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
This amendment denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is
created. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are largely upon the acts of the
states, but the Thirteenth Amendment names no party or authority, but simply forbids slavery and
involuntary servitude and grants to Congress power to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legislation.
The differences between the Thirteenth and subsequent amendments have been so fully considered by this
Court that it is enough to refer to the decisions. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 109 U. S. 20-23,
Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of the Court, uses this language:
"This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary
legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided
force and effect, it abolished slavery, and
Page 197 U. S. 217
established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases
and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter
or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character, for the amendment is not a mere
prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or
involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States. . . ."
"We must not forget that the province and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are
different; the former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited the states from abridging the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, from depriving them of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments
are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under
one it may not have power to do under the other. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, it has only to do with
slavery and its incidents. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has power to counteract and render
nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws. Under the Thirteenth
Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery
and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether
sanctioned by state legislation or not; under the Fourteenth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily
be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against state
regulations or proceedings. "
Page 197 U. S. 218
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 163 U. S. 542, MR. JUSTICE BROWN, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said;
"That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary
servitude -- a state of bondage, the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor
and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his

Page 11 of 44
own person, property, and services. This amendment was said in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and
that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or
involuntary servitude, and that the use of the word 'servitude' was intended to prohibit the use of all forms
of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name."
Other authorities to the same effect might be cited. It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in
involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. In the exercise of that power, Congress has
enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of
involuntary servitude. This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national
domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends. We
entertain no doubt of the validity of this legislation or its applicability to the case of any person holding
and wherever the sovereignty of the United whether there be a municipal ordinance or state law
sanctioning such holding. It operates directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence
may be.
Section 5526 punishes "every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or
returned." Three distinct acts are here mentioned -- holding, arresting, returning.
Page 197 U. S. 219
The disjunctive "or" indicates the separation between them, and shows that either one may be the subject
of indictment and punishment. A party may hold another in a state of peonage without ever having
arrested him for that purpose. He may come by inheritance into the possession of an estate in which the
peon is held, and he simply continues the condition which was existing before he came into possession.
He may also arrest an individual for the purpose of placing him in a condition of peonage, and this
whether he be the one to whom the involuntary service is to be rendered or simply employed for the
purpose of making the arrest. Or he may, after one has fled from a state of peonage, return him to it, and
this whether he himself claims the service or is acting simply as an agent of another to enforce the return.
The indictment charges that the defendant did
"unlawfully and knowingly return one Will Gordon and one Mose Ridley to a condition of peonage by
forcibly, and against the will of them, the said Will Gordon and the said Mose Ridley, returning them, the
said Will Gordon and the said Mose Ridley, to work to and for Samuel M. Clyatt."
Now a "return" implies the prior existence of some state or condition. Webster defines it "to turn back; to
go or come again to the same place or condition." In the Standard dictionary, it is defined "to cause to
take again a former position; put, carry, or send back, as to a former place or holder." A technical
meaning in the law is thus given in Black's Law Dictionary: "The act of a sheriff, constable, or other
ministerial officer, in delivering back to the court a writ, notice, or other paper."
It was essential, therefore, under the charge in this case, to show that Gordon and Ridley had been in a
condition of peonage to which, by the act of the defendant, they were returned. We are not at liberty to
transform this indictment into one charging that the defendant held them in a condition or state of
peonage, or that he arrested them with a view of placing them in such condition or state. The pleader has
seen
Page 197 U. S. 220
fit to charge a return to a condition of peonage. The defendant had a right to rely upon that as the charge,
and to either offer testimony to show that Gordon and Ridley had never been in a condition of peonage or
to rest upon the government's omission of proof of that fact.

Page 12 of 44
We must therefore examine the testimony, and the first question that arises is whether the record
sufficiently shows that it contains all the testimony. The bill of exceptions, after reciting the impaneling of
the jury, proceeds in these words:
"And thereupon the plaintiff, to maintain the issues upon its part, produced and offered as a witness,
James R. Dean, who, being first duly sworn, did testify as follows."
That recital is followed by what purports to be the testimony of the witness. Then follows in succession
the testimony of several witnesses, each being preceded by a statement in a form similar to this: "The
plaintiff then introduced and offered as a witness, H. S. Sutton, who, being first duly sworn, did testify as
follows." At the close of the testimony of the last witness named is this statement:
"Whereupon the plaintiff rests its case."
"Defendant rests -- introduces no testimony."
"And the said judge, after charging the jury on the law in the case, submitted the said issues and the
evidence so given on the trial, to the jury, and the jury aforesaid then and there gave their verdict for the
plaintiff."
It is true there is no affirmative statement in the bill of exceptions that it contains all the testimony, but
such omission is not fatal. This question was presented in Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins,
173 U. S. 255, a civil case, brought to this Court on certiorari to the circuit court of appeals, which court
had held that the bill of exceptions did not purport to contain all the evidence adduced at the trial, and for
that reason did not consider the question whether error was committed in instructing the jury to find for
the defendant. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, delivering the unanimous opinion
Page 197 U. S. 221
of the Court, disposed of that question in these words (p. 173 U. S. 261):
"We are of opinion that the bill of exceptions should be taken as containing all the evidence. It appears
that, as soon as the jury was sworn to try the issues in the cause, 'the complainants, to sustain the issues on
their part, offered the following oral and documentary evidence.' Then follow many pages of testimony on
the part of the plaintiffs, when this entry appears: 'Whereupon complainants rested.' Immediately after
comes this entry: 'Thereupon the defendants, to sustain the issues herein joined on their part, produced the
following evidence.' Then follow many pages of evidence given on behalf of the defendant, and the
evidence of a witness recalled by the defendant, concluding with this entry: 'Whereupon the further
proceedings herein were continued until the 20th day of May, 1896, at 10 o'clock A.M.' Immediately
following this entry: 'Wednesday, May 20th at 10 o'clock, the further trial of this cause was continued as
follows.' The transcript next shows some discussion by counsel as to the exclusion of particular evidence,
after which is this entry:"
"Thereupon counsel for defendant made a formal motion under the evidence on both sides that the court
instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant."
"Although the bill of exceptions does not state in words that it contains all the evidence, the above entries
sufficiently show that it does contain all the evidence."
The present case is completely covered by that decision. If, in a civil case, such recitals in the bill of
exceptions are sufficient to show that it contains all the testimony, a fortiori should this be the rule in a
criminal the question of his guilt by an omission from not be deprived of a full consideration of the
question of his guilty by an omission from the bill of the technical recital that it contains all the evidence.

Page 13 of 44
While no motion or request was made that the jury be instructed to find for defendant, and although such
a motion is the proper method of presenting the question whether there is evidence to sustain the verdict,
yet Wiborg v. United States,
Page 197 U. S. 222
163 U. S. 632, 163 U. S. 658, justifies us in examining the question in case a plain error has been
committed in a matter so vital to the defendant.
The testimony discloses that the defendant, with another party, went to Florida, and caused the arrest of
Gordon and Ridley on warrants issued by a magistrate in Georgia for larceny, but there can be little doubt
that these criminal proceedings were only an excuse for securing the custody of Gordon and Ridley and
taking them back to Georgia to work out a debt. At any rate, there was abundant testimony from which
the jury could find that to have been the fact. While this is true, there is not a scintilla of testimony to
show that Gordon and Ridley were ever theretofore in a condition of peonage. That they were in debt, and
that they had left Georgia and gone to Florida without paying that debt does not show that they had been
held in a condition of peonage, or were ever at work, willingly or unwillingly, for their creditor. We have
examined the testimony with great care to see if there was anything which would justify a finding of the
fact, and can find nothing. No matter how severe may be the condemnation which is due to the conduct of
a party charged with a criminal offense, it is the imperative duty of a court to see that all the elements of
his crime are proved, or at least that testimony is offered which justifies a jury in finding those elements.
Only in the exact administration of the law will justice in the long run be done and the confidence of the
public in such administration be maintained.
We are constrained, therefore, to order a reversal of the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA concurs in the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN:
I concur with my brethren in holding that the statutes in question relating to peonage are valid under the
Constitution of the United States. I agree also that the record sufficiently shows that it contains all the
evidence introduced at the trial.
Page 197 U. S. 223
But I cannot agree in holding that the trial court erred in not taking the case from the jury. Without going
into the details of the evidence, I care only to say that, in my opinion, there was evidence tending to make
a case within the statute. The opinion of the court concedes that there was abundant testimony to show
that the accused, with another, went from Georgia to Florida to arrest the two negroes, Gordon and
Ridley, and take them, against their will, back to Georgia to work out a debt. And they were taken to
Georgia by force. It is conceded that peonage is based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.
The accused admitted to one of the witnesses that the negroes owed him. In any view, there was no
motion or request to direct a verdict for the defendant. The accused made no objection to the submission
of the case to the jury, and it is going very far to hold in a case like this, disclosing barbarities of the worst
kind against these negroes, that he trial court erred in sending the case to the jury.

Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905)

Clyatt v. United States
No. 235
Argued December 13-14, 1904

Page 14 of 44
Decided March 13, 1905
197 U.S. 207
Syllabus
Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the
master. The service is enforced unless the debt be paid, and however created, it is involuntary servitude
within the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. While the ordinary
relation of individuals to individual are subject to the control of the states and not to that of the general
government, the Thirteenth Amendment grants to Congress power to enforce the prohibition
Page 197 U. S. 208
against involuntary servitude, including peonage, and to punish persons holding another in peonage, and
§§ 1990, 5526, Rev.Stat. are valid legislation under such power and operate directly on every person
violating their provisions, whether in state or territory and whether there be or not any municipal
ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. Conviction cannot be had under an indictment charging
defendants with returning certain persons to a condition of peonage unless there is proof that the persons
so returned had actually been in such condition prior to the alleged act of returning them thereto.
Where the bill of exceptions, after referring to the empaneling of the jury, contains recitals that the
plaintiff produced witnesses, followed in each case by the testimony of the witness at the close of all of
which there were farther recitals that the parties rested, these statements are sufficient, even in the absence
of a technical affirmative recital to that effect, to show that the bill of exceptions contains all the
testimony, and defendant is not to be deprived of a full consideration of the question of his guilt by such
omission, and even in the absence of a motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant, this Court may
examine the question where it is plain that error has been committed.
No matter how severe may be the condemnation due to the conduct of a party charged with crime, it is the
duty of the court to see that all the elements of the crime are proved or that testimony is offered which
justifies a jury in finding those elements.
Sections 1990 and 5526, Rev.Stat., read:
"SEC. 1990. The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other territory or state of the
United States, and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New
Mexico, or of any other territory or state, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or
by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt
or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void."
"SEC. 5526. Every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any
manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage shall be punished by a fine of
not less than one thousand nor
Page 197 U. S. 209
more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less than one year nor more than five years, or
by both."
On November 21, 1901, the grand jury returned into the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Florida an indictment in two counts, the first of which is as follows:

Page 15 of 44
"The grand jurors of the United States of America impaneled and sworn within and for the district
aforesaid, on their oaths present, that one Samuel M. Clyatt, heretofore, to-wit: on the eleventh day of
February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one, in the County of Levy, State of
Florida, within the district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did then and there
unlawfully and knowingly return one Will Gordon and one Mose Ridley to a condition of peonage by
forcibly and against the will of them, the said Will Gordon and the said Mose Ridley, returning them, the
said Will Gordon and Mose Ridley, to work to and for Samuel M. Clyatt, D. T. Clyatt, and H. H. Tift,
copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Clyatt & Tift, to be held by them, the said
Clyatt & Tift, to work out a debt claimed to be due to them, the said Clyatt & Tift, by the said Will
Gordon and Mose Ridley; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the United States."
The second count differs only in charging that defendant caused and aided in returning Gordon and
Ridley. A trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, and thereupon the defendant was sentenced to confinement
at hard labor for four years. The case was taken on appropriate writ to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which certified to this Court three questions. Subsequently the entire record was brought here on
a writ of certiorari, and the case was heard on its merits.
Page 197 U. S. 215

Exhibit “E”
Peonage
Notwithstanding its early acknowledgment in the Slaughter-House Cases that peonage was
comprehended within the slavery and involuntary servitude proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment,24
the Court has had frequent occasion to determine whether state legislation or the conduct of individuals
has contributed to re-establishment of that prohibited status. Defined as a condition of enforced servitude
by which the servitor is compelled to labor against his will in liquidation of some debt or obligation,
either real or pretended, peonage was found to have been unconstitutionally sanctioned by an Alabama
statute, directed at defaulting sharecroppers, which imposed a criminal liability and subjected to
imprisonment farm workers or tenants who abandoned their employment, breached their contracts, and
exercised their legal right to enter into employment of a similar nature with another person. The clear
purpose of such a statute was declared to be the coercion of payment, by means of criminal proceedings,
of a purely civil liability arising from breach of contract.25
Several years later, in Bailey v. Alabama,26 the Court voided another Alabama statute that made the
refusal without just cause to perform the labor called for in a written contract of employment, or to refund
the money or pay for the property advanced thereunder, prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud, and
punishable as a criminal offense, and that was enforced subject to a local rule of evidence that prevented
the accused, for the purpose of rebutting the statutory presumption, from testifying as to his
“uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention.” Because a state “may not compel one man to labor for
another in payment of a debt by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the
debt,” the Court refused to permit it “to accomplish the same result [indirectly] by creating a statutory
presumption which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction.”27
In 1914, in United States v. Reynolds,28 a third Alabama enactment was condemned as conducive to
peonage through the permission it accorded to persons, fined upon conviction for a misdemeanor, to
confess judgment with a surety in the amount of the fine and costs, and then to agree with said surety, in
consideration of the latter’s payment of the confessed judgment, to reimburse him by working for him
upon terms approved by the court, which, the Court pointed out, might prove more onerous than if the

Page 16 of 44
convict had been sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the first place. Fulfillment of such a contract
with the surety was viewed as being virtually coerced by the constant fear it induced of rearrest, a new
prosecution, and a new fine for breach of contract, which new penalty the convicted person might
undertake to liquidate in a similar manner attended by similar consequences.
Bailey v. Alabama was followed in Taylor v. Georgia29 and Pollock v. Williams,30 in which statutes of
Georgia and Florida, not materially different from the one voided in Bailey, were held unconstitutional.
Although the Georgia statute prohibited the defendant from testifying under oath, it did not prevent him
from entering an unsworn denial both of the contract and of the receipt of any cash advancement
thereunder, a factor that, the Court emphasized, was no more controlling than the customary rule of
evidence in Bailey. In the Florida case, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty and
accordingly obviated the necessity of applying the prima facie presumption provision, the Court reached
an identical result, chiefly on the ground that the presumption provision, despite its nonapplication, “had a
coercive effect in producing the plea of guilty.”
Pursuant to its section 2 enforcement powers, Congress enacted a statute by which it abolished peonage
and prohibited anyone from holding, arresting, or returning, or causing or aiding in the arresting or
returning, of a person to peonage.31
The Court looked to the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment in interpreting two enforcement statutes,
one prohibiting conspiracy to interfere with exercise or enjoyment of constitutional rights,32 the other
prohibiting the holding of a person in a condition of involuntary servitude.33 For purposes of prosecution
under these authorities, the Court held, “the term ‘involuntary servitude’ necessarily means a condition of
servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint
or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”34
Footnotes
24 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
25 Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
26 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Lurton, dissented on the ground that a state
was not forbidden by this Amendment from punishing a breach of contract as a crime. “Compulsory work
for no private master in a jail is not peonage.” Id. at 247.
27 219 U.S. at 244.
28 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
29 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
30 322 U.S. 4 (1944). Justice Reed, with Chief Justice Stone concurring, contended in a dissenting
opinion that a state is not prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment from “punishing the fraudulent
procurement of an advance in wages.” Id. at 27.
31 Ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546, now in 42 U.S.C. § 1994 and 18 U.S.C. § 1581. Upheld in Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); see also United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944). See also 18 U.S.C. §
1584, which is a merger of 3 Stat. 452 (1818), and 18 Stat. 251 (1874), dealing with involuntary
servitude. Cf. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 481–83 (2d Cir. 1964). [Back to text]
32 18 U.S.C. § 241.
33 18 U.S.C. § 1584.
34 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). Compulsion of servitude through “psychological
coercion,” the Court ruled, is not prohibited by these statutes.

Page 17 of 44
 Exhibit “F”
Peonage and debt slavery Circular No. 3591
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Circular_No._3591
Circular No. 3591 was a directive from Attorney General Francis Biddle to all United States attorneys
concerning the procedure for handling cases relating to involuntary servitude, slavery and peonage.
Following the formal abolition of slavery in the United States at the end of the Civil War, freed slaves in
the American South often found themselves subject to conditions of forced labor that approximated
slavery. [1] Author Douglas A. Blackmon has called this period, which lasted until the end of World War
II, "the Age of Neoslavery." [2] "Peonage," the working out of a debt, was the term most frequently used
for this form of bondage. A federal statute, 18 United States Code 444, enacted in 1867 to criminalize the
practice, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1905; [3] and in 1911, the Court struck down an Alabama
law that compelled contract workers to continue in service to their employers.[4] Nevertheless, peonage
and other forms of forced labor persisted. "Convict leasing" permitted private employers to pay state and
local governments for the labor of persons convicted of crimes; [5] and a practice known as "confessing
judgment" forced African Americans to admit to minor offenses, often based on spurious accusations, and
bind themselves to white employers who agreed to pay their fines and costs. [6] Because traditional
reliance on the peonage law resulted in few convictions and only minor penalties in cases where
convictions were obtained, Attorney General Biddle opted to refocus the efforts of the Department of
Justice on the broader issue of slavery, directing the department's prosecutors to attack the practice by
name and use a wider array of criminal statutes to convict both slave-holding employers and the local
officials who abetted them. [7] He announced the new policy in Circular No. 3591.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.
December 12, 1941
CIRCULAR NO. 3591
TO ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS:
RE: Involuntary Servitude, Slavery, and Peonage
A summary of the Department files on alleged peonage violations discloses numerous instances of
"prosecution declined" by United States Attorneys, the chief reason stated as being the absence of the
element of debt. It is apparent that these determinations were reached after considering the facts at hand
only in accordance with the case law under Section 444, Title 18, U.S. Code, which holds that debt is the
"basal element of peonage." It is further disclosed that only in a negligible number of instances was
consideration given these complaints in light of:
(a) Section 443, Title 18, U.S. Code, which punishes for causing persons to be held in involuntary
servitude, regardless of the existence of a debt.
(b) Section 51, Title 18, U.S. Code, which punishes for conspiracy to deprive citizens of rights secured to
them by the Constitution, particularly the right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude.

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(c) Section 52, Title 18, U.S. Code, which punishes persons vested with official authority who aid or
cause others to suffer deprivation of rights secured to them by the Constitution, particularly the right to be
free from slavery and compulsory servitude.
(d) Section 88, Title 18, U.S. Code, the general conspiracy statute, which may be employed in
combination with Section 443 or Section 52.
It is the purpose of these instructions to direct the attention of the United States Attorneys to the
possibilities of successful prosecutions stemming from alleged peonage complaints which have heretofore
been considered inadequate to invoke federal jurisdiction. It is requested that the spelling out of peonage
under Section 444 be deferred in favor of building the cases around the issue of involuntary servitude and
slavery under Sections 443, 51[,] and 52, disregarding entirely the element of debt. If, however, it is
found that a claimed debt is the basis of the intimidation to compel one to the service of another, a
separate count under Section 444 should be included in the indictment. Evidence of such debt, of course,
may likewise be employed as an additional circumstance to prove intimidation under the counts based on
Sections 443, 51, and 52. In any event the Government should henceforth emphasize and depend upon the
issue of in- voluntary servitude and slavery in lieu of peonage (debt plus involuntary service) in
prosecuting this type of case.
The United States Attorneys are instructed, therefore, to consider such complaints in accordance with the
following statutes and authorize prosecutions where any one or more of the following conditions exist,
regardless of the existence of debt real or claimed:
(a) Section 443, Title 18, U.S. Code
carrying or enticing of any person from one place to another in order that he may be held in slavery or
involuntary servitude; causing another by force, fraud or intimidation to enter and remain in another's
employment; causing one to be held by threats, as well as by force, and whether such threats are of
prosecution, arrest or imprison- ment or by threats of bodily harm; holding another by threats of
prosecution, even under a valid law; the validity of the law not justifying its use for the criminal purpose
of causing compulsory service by intimidation; where one does not stay in his employment of his own
free will but only in accordance with the will of his master or employer, in-voluntary service exists. [sic] -
- "service" does not necessarily mean labor, i.e., a man may be in that state if he is held to be made to
work but escapes before he has begun such work; by falsely accusing another of crime and carrying him
before a magistrate in order that he may be convicted and put to hard labor in consequence of which such
person is convicted and put to hard labor, the false accuser at the time having the purpose or design to hire
such person or to enable some other person to hire him.
(b) Section 51, Title 18, U.S. Code
If two or more persons conspire or combine to do any of the acts outlined above, they are guilty of a
conspiracy to deprive the person, if he is a citizen of the United States, of the free exercise or enjoyment
of the right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution of the United States to be free from involun-
tary servitude, and are indictable accordingly.
(c) Section 52, Title 18, U.S. Code
This section is applicable to public officers, judges, sheriffs, local constabulary, etc., who act under color
and in the name of their authority in perpetrating any of the acts listed above in viola-tion of a person's
rights [sic] to be free from involuntary servitude and slavery as secured to him by the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. For a discussion of the applicability of this Section to colorably official
action, see Circular No. 3356, Supp.1. [8] In the matter of control by one over the person of another, the
circumstances under which each person is placed must be determined, i.e., the subservience of the
will of one to the other. Open force, threats or intimidation need not be used to cause a person to go

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involuntarily from one place to another to work and to remain at such work; nor does evidence of kind
treatment show an absence of involuntary servitude.
In the United States one cannot sell himself as a peon or slave -- the law is fixed and established to protect
the weak-minded, the poor, the miserable. Men will sometimes sell themselves for a meal of victuals or
contract with another who acts as surety on his [sic] bond to work out the amount of the bond upon his
[sic] release from jail. Any such contract is positively null and void and the procuring and causing of such
contract to be made violates these statutes.
It is not necessary that the defendants be themselves charged with holding a person in a condition of
compulsory servitude, a showing of aiding in holding or returning one to that condition is sufficient.
Procedure
1. The United States Attorneys should contact local law enforcement officials by letter, circular,
conference, or any other means found effective for seeking state wide [sic] cooperation
and advise them that the practices outlined above will be prosecuted by the Federal Government.
2. In those states where legislatures have enacted criminal statutes to enforce labor contracts, United
States Attorneys from the various districts therein should promptly notify the local magistrates, sheriffs,
and other law enforcement officers, that such laws are re-pugnant to the provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United Statesand that action to enforce such statutes may subject
the local officials to federal prosecution.
3. In the interest of consistency and uniformity in the method of investigation, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has been requested to direct all original complaints in this field to the Civil Rights Section
of the Criminal Division of the Department for clearance and instruction before embarking upon a formal
investigation. No investigation or prosecution of these cases should be commenced through the offices of
the various United States Attorneys without Departmental sanction. Because of the importance of unified
and consistent prosecu-tion policy in these cases, it is further requested that no indictments under these
statutes be sought without obtaining authority from the Department.
4. To assure emphasis on the issue of involuntary servitude and slavery in considering these cases on the
one hand and to minimize the necessity of relying upon the element of debt to fix jurisdiction on the
other, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been requested to change the title on its reports from
"Peonage" to read "Involuntary Servitude and Slavery."
Henceforth, Peonage will be considered as secondary to involuntary servitude and slavery investigations.
FRANCIS BIDDLE
Attorney General [9]
Notes
1. See generally, Levine, Bruce C. (2013). The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil War
and the Social Revolution that Transformed the South. New York: Random House.
p. 295-299. ISBN 9781400067039.
2. Blackmon, Douglas A. (2008). Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black
Americans from the Civil War to World War II. New York: Anchor Books. p. 402.
ISBN 9780385722704.
3. Goluboff, Risa L.Goluboff, Risa L. (2009). "The Thirteenth Amendment in Historical
Perspective". University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (University of
Pennsylvania Law School) 11 (5): 1451–1473 at 1453. Retrieved May 13, 2013. The

Page 20 of 44
 statute is now part of 18 USC Chapter 77 - PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS.
4. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
5. Blackmon, pp. 54-56.
6. Blackmon, pp. 66-68.
7. Goluboff at 1457.
8. "Circular No. 3356, Supp. No. 1, Re: Federal Criminal Jurisdiction over Violations of
Civil Liberties." Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge (Criminal Division) to All
United States Attorneys, May 21, 1940.
9. "Circular No. 3591, Re: Involuntary Servitude, Slavery, and Peonage." Francis Biddle to
All United States Attorneys, Dec. 12, 1941, File 50-821, Record Group 60, Department
of Justice, National Archives.

Exhibit “G”
The Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 was an Act passed by Congress on March 2, 1867, that abolished
peonage in the New Mexico Territory and elsewhere in the United States. Designed to help enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment, the act declares that holding any person to service or labor under the peonage
system is unlawful and forever prohibited. It defines peonage as the "voluntary or involuntary service or
labor of any persons . . . in liquidation of any debt or obligation." Violations were punishable by fines and
imprisonment.
AN ACT United States Statutes at Large, 39th Cong., Sess. II., Chp. 187, p. 546
To abolish and forever prohibit the System of Peonage in the Territory of New Mexico and other Parts of
the United States. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the holding of any person to service or labor under the system
known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same is hereby abolished and forever
prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the United States; and all
acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New Mexico, or of any other
Territory or State of the United States, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by
virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt
or obligation, or otherwise, be, and the same are hereby, declared null and void; and any person or
persons who shall hold, arrest, or return, or cause to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aid in
the arrest or return of any person or persons to a condition of peonage, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by fine not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
less than one nor more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all persons in the military or civil service in
the Territory of New Mexico to aid in the enforcement of the foregoing section of this act; and any person
or persons who shall obstruct or attempt to obstruct, or in any way interfere with, or prevent the
enforcement of this act, shall be liable to the pains and penalties hereby provided; and any officer or other
person in the military service of the United States who shall so offend, directly or indirectly, shall, on
conviction before a court-martial, be dishonorably dismissed the service of the United States, and shall
thereafter be ineligible to reappointment to any office of trust, honor, or profit under the government.

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Approved, March 2, 1867.

Exhibit “H”
Department of Justice
https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary-servitude-forced-labor-and-sex-trafficking-statutes-enforced
A number of provisions in the U.S. Code target trafficking in persons, also known as involuntary
servitude/slavery or forced labor. These provisions are contained in Chapter 77 of Title 18 and are
sometimes referred to generally as Chapter 77 offenses. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)
of 2000 supplemented existing laws, primarily 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (Involuntary Servitude), and also
provided new tools to combat trafficking. Key statutes are excerpted below.
Peonage
Summary: Section 1581 of Title 18 makes it unlawful to hold a person in "debt servitude," or peonage,
which is closely related to involuntary servitude. Section 1581 prohibits using force, the threat of force, or
the threat of legal coercion to compel a person to work against his/her will. In addition, the victim's
involuntary servitude must be tied to the payment of a debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1581
(a) Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any person with the intent of
placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of
years or life, or both.
(b) Whoever obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement
of this section, shall be liable to the penalties prescribed in subsection (a).
Involuntary Servitude
Summary: Section 1584 of Title 18 makes it unlawful to hold a person in a condition of slavery, that is, a
condition of compulsory service or labor against his/her will. A Section 1584 conviction requires that the
victim be held against his/her will by actual force, threats of force, or threats of legal coercion. Section
1584 also prohibits compelling a person to work against his/her will by creating a "climate of fear"
through the use of force, the threat of force, or the threat of legal coercion [i.e., If you don't work, I'll call
the immigration officials which is sufficient to compel service against a person's will.
18 U.S.C. § 1584
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary
servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of
this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or
the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

Forced Labor

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Summary: Section 1589 of Title 18, which was passed as part of the TVPA, makes it unlawful to provide
or obtain the labor or services of a person through one of three prohibited means. Congress enacted §
1589 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988),
which interpreted § 1584 to require the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion. Section 1589
broadens the definition of the kinds of coercion that might result in forced labor.
18 U.S.C. § 1589
Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person--
(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person;
(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did
not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical
restraint; or
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the
violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual
abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

Trafficking with Respect to Peonage, Slavery, Involuntary Servitude, or Forced Labor

Summary: Section 1590 makes it unlawful to recruit, harbor, transport, or broker persons for labor or
services under conditions which violate any of the offenses contained in Chapter 77 of Title 18.
18 U.S.C. § 1590
Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor
or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an
attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an
attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or
both.

Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion

Summary: Section 1591 criminalizes sex trafficking, which is defined as causing a person to engage in a
commercial sex act under certain statutorily enumerated conditions. A commercial sex act means any sex
act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person. The specific conditions
are the use of force, fraud, or coercion, or conduct involving persons under the age of 18. The punishment
for conduct that either involves a victim who is under the age of 14 or involves force, fraud, or coercion is
any term of years or life. The punishment for conduct that involves a victim between the ages of 14 and
18 is 40 years.
18 U.S.C. § 1591
Whoever knowingly--

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(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a
person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has
engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing that force, fraud, or coercion described
in subsection (c)(2) will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person
has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).

Unlawful Conduct with Respect to Documents in Furtherance of Trafficking, Peonage, Slavery,

Involuntary Servitude, or Forced Labor
Summary: Section 1592 makes it illegal to seize documents in order to force others to work. By
expanding its coverage to false documents as well as official documents, § 1592 recognizes that victims
are often immobilized by the withholding of whatever documents they possess, even if the documents are
forged or fraudulent. Section 1592 expands the scope of federal trafficking statutes to reach those who
prey on the vulnerabilities of immigrant victims by controlling their papers.
18 U.S.C. § 1592
(a) Whoever knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported
passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification
document, of another person--
(1) in the course of a violation of section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1591, or 1594(a);
(2) with intent to violate section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591; or
(3) to prevent or restrict or to attempt to prevent or restrict, without lawful authority, the person's liberty
to move or travel, in order to maintain the labor or services of that person, when the person is or has been
a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to the conduct of a person who is or has been a victim of a severe form
of trafficking in persons, as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, if
that conduct is caused by, or incident to, that trafficking.

Additional provisions of the TVPA provide for mandatory restitution (18 U.S.C. § 1593) and forfeiture
(18 U.S.C. § 1594(b)), criminalize attempt (18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)), and give victims an avenue for civil
lawsuits (18 U.S.C. § 1595).

Exhibit “I”
Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926
Entry into force: 9 March 1927, in accordance with article 12
The Convention was amended by the Protocol done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York,
on 7 December 1953; the amended Convention entered into force on 7 July 1955, the date on which the
amendments, set forth in the annex to the Protocol of 7 December 1953, entered into force in accordance
with article III of the Protocol.

Page 24 of 44
Whereas the signatories of the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 declared that they were
equally animated by the firm intention of putting an end to the traffic in African slaves,
Whereas the signatories of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919, to revise the General Act
of Berlin of 1885 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 1890, affirmed their intention of
securing the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea,
Taking into consideration the report of the Temporary Slavery Commission appointed by the Council of
the League of Nations on June 12th, 1924,
Desiring to complete and extend the work accomplished under the Brussels Act and to find a means of
giving practical effect throughout the world to such intentions as were expressed in regard to slave trade
and slavery by the signatories of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and recognising that it is
necessary to conclude to that end more detailed arrangements than are contained in that Convention,
Considering , moreover, that it is necessary to prevent forced labour from developing into conditions
analogous to slavery,
Have decided to conclude a Convention and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [ names
omitted ]
... have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following definitions are agreed upon:
(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right
of ownership are exercised.
(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent
to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or
exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.
Article 2
The High Contracting Parties undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under its sovereignty,
jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, so far as they have not already taken the necessary steps:
( a ) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;
( b ) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its
forms.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to adopt all appropriate measures with a view to preventing and
suppressing the embarkation, disembarkation and transport of slaves in their territorial waters and upon
all vessels flying their respective flags.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to negotiate as soon as possible a general Convention with regard
to the slave trade which will give them rights and impose upon them duties of the same nature as those
provided for in the Convention of June 17th, 1925, relative to the International Trade in Arms (Articles
12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Section II of Annex II), with the necessary adaptations,
it being understood that this general Convention will not place the ships (even of small tonnage) of any
High Contracting Parties in a position different from that of the other High Contracting Parties.

Page 25 of 44
It is also understood that, before or after the coming into force of this general Convention, the High
Contracting Parties are entirely free to conclude between themselves, without, however, derogating from
the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph, such special agreements as, by reason of their
peculiar situation, might appear to be suitable in order to bring about as soon as possible the complete
disappearance of the slave trade.
Article 4
The High Contracting Parties shall give to one another every assistance with the object of securing the
abolition of slavery and the slave trade.
Article 5
The High Contracting Parties recognise that recourse to compulsory or forced labour may have grave
consequences and undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction,
protection, suzerainty or tutelage, to take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour
from developing into conditions analogous to slavery.
It is agreed that:
(1) Subject to the transitional provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below, compulsory or forced labour
may only be exacted for public purposes.
(2) In territories in which compulsory or forced labour for other than public purposes still survives, the
High Contracting Parties shall endeavour progressively and as soon as possible to put an end to the
practice. So long as such forced or compulsory labour exists, this labour shall invariably be of an
exceptional character, shall always receive adequate remuneration, and shall not involve the removal of
the labourers from their usual place of residence.
(3) In all cases, the responsibility for any recourse to compulsory or forced labour shall rest with the
competent central authorities of the territory concerned.
Article 6
Those of the High Contracting Parties whose laws do not at present make adquate provision for the
punishment of infractions of laws and regulations enacted with a view to giving effect to the purposes of
the present Convention undertake to adopt the necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be
imposed in respect of such infractions.
Article 7
The High Contracting Parties undertake to communicate to each other and to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations any laws and regulations which they may enact with a view to the application of the
provisions of the present Convention.
Article 8
The High Contracting Parties agree that disputes arising between them relating to the interpretation or
application of this Convention shall, if they cannot be settled by direct negotiation, be referred for
decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In case either or both of the States Parties to such
a dispute should not be Parties to the Protocol of December 16th, 1920, relating to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the dispute shall be referred, at the choice of the Parties and in accordance with the
constitutional procedure of each State, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to a court
of arbitration constituted in accordance with the Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, or to some other court of arbitration.
Article 9

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At the time of signature or of ratification or of accession, any High Contracting Party may declare that its
acceptance of the present Convention does not bind some or all of the territories placed under its
sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage in respect of all or any provisions of the
Convention; it may subsequently accede separately on behalf of any one of them or in respect of any
provision to which any one of them is not a Party.
Article 10
In the event of a High Contracting Party wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation
shall be notified in writing to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who will at once
communicate a certified true copy of the notification to all the other High Contracting Parties, informing
them of the date on which it was received.
The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying State, and one year after the notification
has reached the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
Denunciation may also be made separately in respect of any territory placed under its sovereignty,
jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage.
Article 11
The present Convention, which will bear this day's date and of which the French and English texts are
both authentic, will remain open for signature by the States Members of the League of Nations until April
1st, 1927.
The Secretary-General of the League of Nations will subsequently bring the present Convention to the
notice of States which have not signed it, including States which are not Members of the League of
Nations, and invite them to accede thereto.
A State desiring to accede to the Convention shall notify its intention in writing to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations and transmit to him the instrument of accession, which shall be deposited in the
archives of the League.
The Secretary-General shall immediately transmit to all the other High Contracting Parties a certified true
copy of the notification and of the instrument of accession, informing them of the date on which he
received them.
Article 12
The present Convention will be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the office
of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General will inform all the High
Contracting Parties of such deposit.
The Convention will come into operation for each State on the date of the deposit of its ratification or of
its accession.
In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries signed the present Convention.
Done at Geneva the twenty-fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six, in one
copy, which will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. A certified copy shall be
forwarded to each signatory State.

Exhibit “J”
The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,

Page 27 of 44
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having
met in its Fourteenth Session on 10 June 1930, and
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to forced or compulsory labour, which
is included in the first item on the agenda of the Session, and
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention,
adopts this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty the following
Convention, which may be cited as the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, for ratification by the Members
of the International Labour Organisation in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation:
Article 1
1. Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to
suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.
2. With a view to this complete suppression, recourse to forced or compulsory labour may be had, during
the transitional period, for public purposes only and as an exceptional measure, subject to the conditions
and guarantees hereinafter provided.
3. At the expiration of a period of five years after the coming into force of this Convention, and when the
Governing Body of the International Labour Office prepares the report provided for in Article 31 below,
the said Governing Body shall consider the possibility of the suppression of forced or compulsory labour
in all its forms without a further transitional period and the desirability of placing this question on the
agenda of the Conference.
Article 2
1. For the purposes of this Convention the term forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person
has not offered himself voluntarily.
2. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Convention, the term forced or compulsory labour shall not
include--
(a) any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for work of a purely military
character;
(b) any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizens of a fully self-
governing country;
(c) any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law,
provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public
authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals,
companies or associations;
(d) any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event of war or of a calamity
or threatened calamity, such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases,
invasion by animal, insect or vegetable pests, and in general any circumstance that would endanger the
existence or the well-being of the whole or part of the population;
(e) minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by the members of the community in the
direct interest of the said community, can therefore be considered as normal civic obligations incumbent
upon the members of the community, provided that the members of the community or their direct
representatives shall have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such services.

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Article 3
For the purposes of this Convention the term competent authority shall mean either an authority of the
metropolitan country or the highest central authority in the territory concerned.
Article 4
1. The competent authority shall not impose or permit the imposition of forced or compulsory labour for
the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations.
2. Where such forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals, companies or
associations exists at the date on which a Member's ratification of this Convention is registered by the
Director-General of the International Labour Office, the Member shall completely suppress such forced or
compulsory labour from the date on which this Convention comes into force for that Member.
Article 5
1. No concession granted to private individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of
forced or compulsory labour for the production or the collection of products which such private
individuals, companies or associations utilise or in which they trade.
2. Where concessions exist containing provisions involving such forced or compulsory labour, such
provisions shall be rescinded as soon as possible, in order to comply with Article 1 of this Convention.
Article 6
Officials of the administration, even when they have the duty of encouraging the populations under their
charge to engage in some form of labour, shall not put constraint upon the said populations or upon any
individual members thereof to work for private individuals, companies or associations.
Article 7
1. Chiefs who do not exercise administrative functions shall not have recourse to forced or compulsory
labour.
2. Chiefs who exercise administrative functions may, with the express permission of the competent
authority, have recourse to forced or compulsory labour, subject to the provisions of Article 10 of this
Convention.
3. Chiefs who are duly recognised and who do not receive adequate remuneration in other forms may
have the enjoyment of personal services, subject to due regulation and provided that all necessary
measures are taken to prevent abuses.
Article 8
1. The responsibility for every decision to have recourse to forced or compulsory labour shall rest with the
highest civil authority in the territory concerned.
2. Nevertheless, that authority may delegate powers to the highest local authorities to exact forced or
compulsory labour which does not involve the removal of the workers from their place of habitual
residence. That authority may also delegate, for such periods and subject to such conditions as may be
laid down in the regulations provided for in Article 23 of this Convention, powers to the highest local
authorities to exact forced or compulsory labour which involves the removal of the workers from their
place of habitual residence for the purpose of facilitating the movement of officials of the administration,
when on duty, and for the transport of Government stores.
Article 9

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Except as otherwise provided for in Article 10 of this Convention, any authority competent to exact
forced or compulsory labour shall, before deciding to have recourse to such labour, satisfy itself--
(a) that the work to be done or the service to be rendered is of important direct interest for the community
called upon to do work or render the service;
(b) that the work or service is of present or imminent necessity;
(c) that it has been impossible to obtain voluntary labour for carrying out the work or rendering the
service by the offer of rates of wages and conditions of labour not less favourable than those prevailing in
the area concerned for similar work or service; and
(d) that the work or service will not lay too heavy a burden upon the present population, having regard to
the labour available and its capacity to undertake the work.
Article 10
1. Forced or compulsory labour exacted as a tax and forced or compulsory labour to which recourse is had
for the execution of public works by chiefs who exercise administrative functions shall be progressively
abolished.
2. Meanwhile, where forced or compulsory labour is exacted as a tax, and where recourse is had to forced
or compulsory labour for the execution of public works by chiefs who exercise administrative functions,
the authority concerned shall first satisfy itself--
(a) that the work to be done or the service to be rendered is of important direct interest for the community
called upon to do the work or render the service;
(b) that the work or the service is of present or imminent necessity;
(c) that the work or service will not lay too heavy a burden upon the present population, having regard to
the labour available and its capacity to undertake the work;
(d) that the work or service will not entail the removal of the workers from their place of habitual
residence;
(e) that the execution of the work or the rendering of the service will be directed in accordance with the
exigencies of religion, social life and agriculture.
Article 11
1. Only adult able-bodied males who are of an apparent age of not less than 18 and not more than 45 years
may be called upon for forced or compulsory labour. Except in respect of the kinds of labour provided for
in Article 10 of this Convention, the following limitations and conditions shall apply:
(a) whenever possible prior determination by a medical officer appointed by the administration that the
persons concerned are not suffering from any infectious or contagious disease and that they are physically
fit for the work required and for the conditions under which it is to be carried out;
(b) exemption of school teachers and pupils and officials of the administration in general;
(c) the maintenance in each community of the number of adult able-bodied men indispensable for family
and social life;
(d) respect for conjugal and family ties.
2. For the purposes of subparagraph (c) of the preceding paragraph, the regulations provided for in Article
23 of this Convention shall fix the proportion of the resident adult able-bodied males who may be taken at

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any one time for forced or compulsory labour, provided always that this proportion shall in no case
exceed 25 per cent. In fixing this proportion the competent authority shall take account of the density of
the population, of its social and physical development, of the seasons, and of the work which must be
done by the persons concerned on their own behalf in their locality, and, generally, shall have regard to
the economic and social necessities of the normal life of the community concerned.
Article 12
1. The maximum period for which any person may be taken for forced or compulsory labour of all kinds
in any one period of twelve months shall not exceed sixty days, including the time spent in going to and
from the place of work.
2. Every person from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall be furnished with a certificate
indicating the periods of such labour which he has completed.
Article 13
1. The normal working hours of any person from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall be
the same as those prevailing in the case of voluntary labour, and the hours worked in excess of the normal
working hours shall be remunerated at the rates prevailing in the case of overtime for voluntary labour.
2. A weekly day of rest shall be granted to all persons from whom forced or compulsory labour of any
kind is exacted and this day shall coincide as far as possible with the day fixed by tradition or custom in
the territories or regions concerned.
Article 14
1. With the exception of the forced or compulsory labour provided for in Article 10 of this Convention,
forced or compulsory labour of all kinds shall be remunerated in cash at rates not less than those
prevailing for similar kinds of work either in the district in which the labour is employed or in the district
from which the labour is recruited, whichever may be the higher.
2. In the case of labour to which recourse is had by chiefs in the exercise of their administrative functions,
payment of wages in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be introduced as
soon as possible.
3. The wages shall be paid to each worker individually and not to his tribal chief or to any other authority.
4. For the purpose of payment of wages the days spent in travelling to and from the place of work shall be
counted as working days.
5. Nothing in this Article shall prevent ordinary rations being given as a part of wages, such rations to be
at least equivalent in value to the money payment they are taken to represent, but deductions from wages
shall not be made either for the payment of taxes or for special food, clothing or accommodation supplied
to a worker for the purpose of maintaining him in a fit condition to carry on his work under the special
conditions of any employment, or for the supply of tools.
Article 15
1. Any laws or regulations relating to workmen's compensation for accidents or sickness arising out of the
employment of the worker and any laws or regulations providing compensation for the dependants of
deceased or incapacitated workers which are or shall be in force in the territory concerned shall be equally
applicable to persons from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted and to voluntary workers.
2. In any case it shall be an obligation on any authority employing any worker on forced or compulsory
labour to ensure the subsistence of any such worker who, by accident or sickness arising out of his
employment, is rendered wholly or partially incapable of providing for himself, and to take measures to

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ensure the maintenance of any persons actually dependent upon such a worker in the event of his
incapacity or decease arising out of his employment.
Article 16
1. Except in cases of special necessity, persons from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall
not be transferred to districts where the food and climate differ so considerably from those to which they
have been accustomed as to endanger their health.
2. In no case shall the transfer of such workers be permitted unless all measures relating to hygiene and
accommodation which are necessary to adapt such workers to the conditions and to safeguard their health
can be strictly applied.
3. When such transfer cannot be avoided, measures of gradual habituation to the new conditions of diet
and of climate shall be adopted on competent medical advice.
4. In cases where such workers are required to perform regular work to which they are not accustomed,
measures shall be taken to ensure their habituation to it, especially as regards progressive training, the
hours of work and the provision of rest intervals, and any increase or amelioration of diet which may be
necessary.
Article 17
Before permitting recourse to forced or compulsory labour for works of construction or maintenance
which entail the workers remaining at the workplaces for considerable periods, the competent authority
shall satisfy itself--
(1) that all necessary measures are taken to safeguard the health of the workers and to guarantee the
necessary medical care, and, in particular, (a) that the workers are medically examined before
commencing the work and at fixed intervals during the period of service, (b) that there is an adequate
medical staff, provided with the dispensaries, infirmaries, hospitals and equipment necessary to meet all
requirements, and (c) that the sanitary conditions of the workplaces, the supply of drinking water, food,
fuel, and cooking utensils, and, where necessary, of housing and clothing, are satisfactory;
(2) that definite arrangements are made to ensure the subsistence of the families of the workers, in
particular by facilitating the remittance, by a safe method, of part of the wages to the family, at the request
or with the consent of the workers;
(3) that the journeys of the workers to and from the workplaces are made at the expense and under the
responsibility of the administration, which shall facilitate such journeys by making the fullest use of all
available means of transport;
(4) that, in case of illness or accident causing incapacity to work of a certain duration, the worker is
repatriated at the expense of the administration;
(5) that any worker who may wish to remain as a voluntary worker at the end of his period of forced or
compulsory labour is permitted to do so without, for a period of two years, losing his right to repatriation
free of expense to himself.
Article 18
1. Forced or compulsory labour for the transport of persons or goods, such as the labour of porters or
boatmen, shall be abolished within the shortest possible period. Meanwhile the competent authority shall
promulgate regulations determining, inter alia, (a) that such labour shall only be employed for the purpose
of facilitating the movement of officials of the administration, when on duty, or for the transport of
Government stores, or, in cases of very urgent necessity, the transport of persons other than officials, (b)

Page 32 of 44
that the workers so employed shall be medically certified to be physically fit, where medical examination
is possible, and that where such medical examination is not practicable the person employing such
workers shall be held responsible for ensuring that they are physically fit and not suffering from any
infectious or contagious disease, (c) the maximum load which these workers may carry, (d) the maximum
distance from their homes to which they may be taken, (e) the maximum number of days per month or
other period for which they may be taken, including the days spent in returning to their homes, and (f) the
persons entitled to demand this form of forced or compulsory labour and the extent to which they are
entitled to demand it.
2. In fixing the maxima referred to under (c), (d) and (e) in the foregoing paragraph, the competent
authority shall have regard to all relevant factors, including the physical development of the population
from which the workers are recruited, the nature of the country through which they must travel and the
climatic conditions.
3. The competent authority shall further provide that the normal daily journey of such workers shall not
exceed a distance corresponding to an average working day of eight hours, it being understood that
account shall be taken not only of the weight to be carried and the distance to be covered, but also of the
nature of the road, the season and all other relevant factors, and that, where hours of journey in excess of
the normal daily journey are exacted, they shall be remunerated at rates higher than the normal rates.
Article 19
1. The competent authority shall only authorise recourse to compulsory cultivation as a method of
precaution against famine or a deficiency of food supplies and always under the condition that the food or
produce shall remain the property of the individuals or the community producing it.
2. Nothing in this Article shall be construed as abrogating the obligation on members of a community,
where production is organised on a communal basis by virtue of law or custom and where the produce or
any profit accruing from the sale thereof remain the property of the community, to perform the work
demanded by the community by virtue of law or custom.
Article 20
Collective punishment laws under which a community may be punished for crimes committed by any of
its members shall not contain provisions for forced or compulsory labour by the community as one of the
methods of punishment.
Article 21
Forced or compulsory labour shall not be used for work underground in mines.
Article 22
The annual reports that Members which ratify this Convention agree to make to the International Labour
Office, pursuant to the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour
Organisation, on the measures they have taken to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, shall
contain as full information as possible, in respect of each territory concerned, regarding the extent to
which recourse has been had to forced or compulsory labour in that territory, the purposes for which it has
been employed, the sickness and death rates, hours of work, methods of payment of wages and rates of
wages, and any other relevant information.
Article 23
1. To give effect to the provisions of this Convention the competent authority shall issue complete and
precise regulations governing the use of forced or compulsory labour.

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2. These regulations shall contain, inter alia, rules permitting any person from whom forced or
compulsory labour is exacted to forward all complaints relative to the conditions of labour to the
authorities and ensuring that such complaints will be examined and taken into consideration.
Article 24
Adequate measures shall in all cases be taken to ensure that the regulations governing the employment of
forced or compulsory labour are strictly applied, either by extending the duties of any existing labour
inspectorate which has been established for the inspection of voluntary labour to cover the inspection of
forced or compulsory labour or in some other appropriate manner. Measures shall also be taken to ensure
that the regulations are brought to the knowledge of persons from whom such labour is exacted.
Article 25
The illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be punishable as a penal offence, and it shall be
an obligation on any Member ratifying this Convention to ensure that the penalties imposed by law are
really adequate and are strictly enforced.
Article 26
1. Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to
apply it to the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty, tutelage or
authority, so far as it has the right to accept obligations affecting matters of internal jurisdiction; provided
that, if such Member may desire to take advantage of the provisions of article 35 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation, it shall append to its ratification a declaration stating--
(1) the territories to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Convention without modification;
(2) the territories to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Convention with modifications,
together with details of the said modifications;
(3) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision.
2. The aforesaid declaration shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification and shall have the
force of ratification. It shall be open to any Member, by a subsequent declaration, to cancel in whole or in
part the reservations made, in pursuance of the provisions of subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, in
the original declaration.
Article 27
The formal ratifications of this Convention under the conditions set forth in the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation shall be communicated to the Director-General of the International
Labour Office for registration.
Article 28
1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members whose ratifications have been registered
with the International Labour Office.
2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members of the
International Labour Organisation have been registered with the Director-General.
3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the date on
which the ratification has been registered.
Article 29

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As soon as the ratifications of two Members of the International Labour Organisation have been
registered with the International Labour Office, the Director-General of the International Labour Office
shall so notify all the Members of the International Labour Organisation. He shall likewise notify them of
the registration of ratifications which may be communicated subsequently by other Members of the
Organisation.
Article 30
1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from
the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Director-General
of the International Labour Office for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year
after the date on which it is registered with the International Labour Office.
2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the year following the
expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of
denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of five years and, thereafter,
may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of five years under the terms provided for
in this Article.
Article 31
At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall
present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and shall examine the
desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.
Article 32
1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, the
ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall ipso jure involve denunciation of this
Convention without any requirement of delay, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 30 above, if and
when the new revising Convention shall have come into force.
2. As from the date of the coming into force of the new revising Convention, the present Convention shall
cease to be open to ratification by the Members.
3. Nevertheless, this Convention shall remain in force in its actual form and content for those Members
which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising convention.
Article 33
The French and English texts of this Convention shall both be authentic.

Exhibit “K”
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force April 30, 1957.
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that freedom is the birthright of every human being, Mindful that the peoples of the United
Nations reaffirmed in the Charter their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person,
Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the
United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, states that no one

Page 35 of 44
shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their
forms,
Recognizing that, since the conclusion of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September
1926, which was designed to secure the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade, further progress has
been made towards this end,
Having regard to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and to subsequent action by the International
Labour Organisation in regard to forced or compulsory labour,
Being aware, however, that slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery have
not yet been eliminated in all parts of the world,
Having decided, therefore, that the Convention of 1926, which remains operative, should now be
augmented by the conclusion of a supplementary convention designed to intensify national as well as
international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar
to slavery,
Have agreed as follows:
SECTION I. - INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY
Article 1
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary legislative and other
measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of
the following institutions and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the
definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September
1926:
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal
services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound
to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such
other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration
in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for
value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by
either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a
view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.
Article 2
With a view to bringing to an end the institutions and practices mentioned in article I (c) of this
Convention, the States Parties undertake to prescribe, where appropriate, suitable minimum ages of

Page 36 of 44
marriage, to encourage the use of facilities whereby the consent of both parties to a marriage may be
freely expressed in the presence of a competent civil or religious authority, and to encourage the
registration of marriages.
SECTION II. - THE SLAVE TRADE
Article 3
1. The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of
transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to
this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties.
2.
(a) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their
flags from conveying slaves and to punish persons guilty of such acts or of using national flags for that
purpose.
(b) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their ports, airfields and coasts are
not used for the conveyance of slaves.
3. The States Parties to this Convention shall exchange information in order to ensure the practical
co^ordination of the measures taken by them in combating the slave trade and shall inform each other of
every case of the slave trade, and of every attempt to commit this criminal offence, which comes to their
notice.
Article 4
Any slave who takes refuge on board any vessel of a State Party to this Convention shall ipso facto be
free.
SECTION III. - SLAVERY AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY
Article 5
In a country where the abolition or abandonment of slavery, or of the institutions or practices mentioned
in article I of this Convention, is not yet complete, the act of mutilating, branding or otherwise marking a
slave or a person of servile status in order to indicate his status, or as a punishment, or for any other
reason, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to
this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.
Article 6
1 . The act of enslaving another person or of inducing another person to give himself or a person
dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party
to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States
Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.
2. Subject to the provisions of the introductory paragraph of article I of this Convention, the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the present article shall also apply to the act of inducing another person to place himself or
a person dependent upon him into the servile status resulting from any of the institutions or practices
mentioned in article 1, to any attempt to perform such acts, to being accessory thereto, and to being a
party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts.
SECTION IV. - DEFINITIONS
Article 7

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For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) "Slavery" means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926, the status or condition of a person
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, and "slave" means a
person in such condition or status;
(b) "A person of servile status" means a person in the condition or status resulting from any of the
institutions or practices mentioned in article I of this Convention;
(c) "Slave trade" means and includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person
with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or
exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.
SECTION V. - CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES PARTIES AND COMMUNICATION OF
INFORMATION
Article 8
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to co-operate with each other and with the United
Nations to give effect to the foregoing provisions.
2. The Parties undertake to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations copies of any
laws, regulations and administrative measures enacted or put into effect to implement the provisions of
this Convention.
3. The Secretary-General shall communicate the information received under paragraph 2 of this article to
the other Parties and to the Economic and Social Council as part of the documentation for any discussion
which the Council might undertake with a view to making further recommendations for the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade or the institutions and practices which are the subject of this Convention.
SECTION VI. - FINAL CLAUSES
Article 9
No reservations may be made to this Convention.
Article 10
Any dispute between States Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which is
not settled by negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one
of the parties to the dispute, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.
Article 11
1. This Convention shall be open until I July 1957 for signature by any State Member of the United
Nations or of a specialized agency. It shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States, and the
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
inform each signatory and acceding State.
2. After I July 1957 this Convention shall be open for accession by any State Member of the United
Nations or of a specialized agency, or by any other State to which an invitation to accede has been
addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of a
formal instrument with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform each signatory and
acceding State.
Article 12

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1. This Convention shall apply to all non-self-governing trust, colonial and other non-metropolitan
territories for the international relations of which any State Party is responsible; the Party concerned shall,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, at the time of signature, ratification or accession
declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to which the Convention shall apply ipso facto as a
result of such signature, ratification or accession.
2. In any case in which the previous consent of a non-metropolitan territory is required by the
constitutional laws or practices of the Party or of the non-metropolitan territory, the Party concerned shall
endeavour to secure the needed consent of the non-metropolitan territory within the period of twelve
months from the date of signature of the Convention by the metropolitan State, and when such consent
has been obtained the Party shall notify the Secretary-General. This Convention shall apply to the
territory or territories named in such notification from the date of its receipt by the Secretary General.
3. After the expiry of the twelve-month period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the States Parties
concerned shall inform the Secretary General of the results of the consultations with those non-
metropolitan territories for whose international relations they are responsible and whose consent to the
application of this Convention may have been withheld.
Article 13
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the date on which two States have become Parties thereto.
2. It shall thereafter enter into force with respect to each State and territory on the date of deposit of the
instrument of ratification or accession of that State or notification of application to that territory.
Article 14
1. The application of this Convention shall be divided into successive periods of three years, of which the
first shall begin on the date of entry into force of the Convention in accordance with paragraph I of article
13.
2. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by a notice addressed by that State to the Secretary-
General not less than six months before the expiration of the current three-year period. The Secretary-
General shall notify all other Parties of each such notice and the date of the receipt thereof.
3. Denunciations shall take effect at the expiration of the current three year period. 4. In cases where, in
accordance with the provisions of article 12, this Convention has become applicable to a non-
metropolitan territory of a Party, that Party may at any time thereafter, with the consent of the territory
concerned, give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations denouncing this Convention
separately in respect of that territory. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of the
receipt of such notice by the Secretary-General, who shall notify all other Parties of such notice and the
date of the receipt thereof.
Article 15
This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic,
shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall prepare a
certified copy thereof for communication to States Parties to this Convention, as well as to all other States
Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Convention on the date appearing opposite their respective signatures.
DONE at the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva, this seventh day of September one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.

Page 39 of 44
 Exhibit “L”
International Slavery Conventions
LIST OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTIONS
Timeline of legislation against contemporary slavery
1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention
Obliged governments "to prevent and suppress the slave trade", and also recognised a need "to prevent
forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery".
1930 International Labour Organization (ILO) Forced Labour Convention
Defined forced labour as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any
penalty" which has not been offered voluntarily.
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 4)
States: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all
their forms."
1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others
Seeks to prevent commercial sexual exploitation through prostitution.
1950 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of
Europe) (Article 4)
States: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude", and "No one shall be required to perform forced or
compulsory labour". It excludes "work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention".
1953 UN Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926
Hands over the duties contained in the 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention to the United Nations.
1956 UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery
Defines and legislates against a number of practices and institutions that are considered similar to slavery,
most notably bonded labour, serfdom, forced marriage, and the transfer of children for the purposes of
exploitation.
1957 ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour
Obliges governments to suppress "any form of forced or compulsory labour".
1969 Organization of American States (OAS) American Convention on Human Rights (Article 6:
Freedom from Slavery)
States: "No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their
forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women", and "No one shall be required to perform forced or
compulsory labour". Like the 1950 European Convention, it also excludes work in situations of detention.
1981 African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity, OAU) African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Article 5)

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States: "All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited."
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 34 and 35)
Protects children from all forms of sexual exploitation, including exploitation in prostitution and
pornography, and prohibits the abduction, sale and trafficking of children.
1998 Rome Statute of the International Court
Established the International Criminal Court in the Hague, which has jurisdiction with respect to
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of enslavement.
1999 ILO Convention (182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour
Addresses the difficulty in distinguishing between excessive and exploitative forms of child labour and
identifies the "worst forms", such as slavery, debt bondage, forced labour, recruitment for armed forces,
prostitution and drug trafficking.
2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and
Children (part of the 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
Commits states to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, to protect and assist victims of trafficking
and to promote co-operation among states in order to meet those objectives.
2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
Aims at preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, while guaranteeing gender equality. Also
aims at protecting and assisting victims and witnesses, to ensure effective investigation and prosecution,
while promoting international cooperation against human trafficking.

Exhibit “M”

Rule 94. Slavery and Slave Trade

Rule 94. Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms are prohibited.
Summary
State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both
international and non-international armed conflicts.
International and non-international armed conflicts
The prohibition of slavery was specified as early as the Lieber Code.[1] Although not actually spelled out
in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, nor in Additional Protocol I, it is clear that enslaving persons in
an international armed conflict is prohibited. The various rules in the Geneva Conventions relating to the
labour of prisoners of war and civilians, concerning their release and return, as well as the prohibition in
the Hague Regulations of the forced allegiance of persons in occupied territory, presuppose the
prohibition of slavery.[2]
The prohibition of “slavery and the slave trade in all their forms” has been recognized in Additional
Protocol II as a fundamental guarantee for civilians and persons hors de combat.[3]

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“Enslavement” was considered a crime against humanity in the Charters of the International Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.[4] “Enslavement” is also listed as a crime against humanity under the
Statutes of the International Criminal Court and of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.[5]
The military manuals and the legislation of many States prohibit slavery and the slave trade, or
“enslavement”, which is often, but not always, referred to as a crime against humanity.[6] In the
Krnojelac case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the defendant was
accused, inter alia, of “enslavement as a crime against humanity” and of “slavery as a violation of the
laws or customs of war” but was acquitted on these counts for lack of evidence.[7]
Slavery and the slave trade are equally prohibited in international human rights law. The first universal
treaty outlawing slavery and the slave trade was the Slavery Convention in 1926.[8] This was
supplemented in 1956 by the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery, outlawing debt bondage, serfdom and inheritance or
transfer of women or children.[9] The prohibition of slavery, servitude and the slave trade is a non-
derogable right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the regional human
rights conventions.[10] A series of recent treaties criminalize trafficking in persons, such as the Protocol
on the Trafficking in Persons adopted in 2000.[11] Slavery and the slave trade are also prohibited in other
international instruments.[12]
Definition of slavery and slave trade
The Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”. It defines slave trade as including:
all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all
acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by
sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of
trade or transport in slaves.[13]
These definitions have served as the basis for the definition of “enslavement” in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children”.[14]
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices similar to Slavery defines serfdom as “the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom
or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some
determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his
status”.[15] In the Pohl case in 1947, the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that “involuntary
servitude, even if tempered by humane treatment, is still slavery”.[16]
Sexual slavery
Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, sexual slavery is a war crime in both international
and non-international armed conflicts.[17] The elements of crimes for this offence were deliberately
drafted to avoid too narrow an interpretation of “sexual slavery”, defining it as the exercise of “any or all
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing,
selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of
liberty” combined with the causing of such person or persons “to engage in one or more acts of a sexual
nature”. In relation to the first element of this war crime, the Elements of Crimes specifies that “it is
understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or
otherwise reducing a person to servile status” as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the

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Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery and that “it is also
understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women
and children”.[18]
In a report submitted in 1998 to the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on
the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Wartime stated that
“sexual slavery is slavery and its prohibition is a jus cogens norm”.[19] In the ongoing debate
surrounding the so-called “comfort women” during the Second World War, both the Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Wartime and the
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences have stated that they
consider the practice of “comfort women” to be a case of sexual slavery. Japan, on the other hand,
maintains that the definition of slavery does not apply to the treatment of the women in question.[20]
[1] Lieber Code, Article 23 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 1782), Article 42 (ibid., § 1783) and Article 58
(ibid., § 1784).
[2] Third Geneva Convention, Articles 49–68 (ibid., § 1760–1762) and Articles 109–119 (cited in Vol. II,
Ch. 37, §§ 606–607); Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 40 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 1763), Articles
51–52 (ibid., § 1764), Articles 95–96 (ibid., § 1765) and Articles 132–135 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 37, §§
608–610); Hague Regulations, Article 45.
[3] Additional Protocol II, Article 4(2)(f) (adopted by consensus) (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 1772).
[4] IMT Charter (Nuremberg), Article 6 (ibid., § 1759); IMT Charter (Tokyo), Article 5(c) (ibid., § 1787).
[5] ICTY Statute, Article 5(c) (ibid., § 1793); ICTR Statute, Article 3(c) (ibid., § 1794); ICC Statute,
Article 7(1)(c) (ibid., § 1777).
[6] See, e.g., the military manuals of Canada (ibid., § 1800), France (ibid., § 1802), Israel (ibid., § 1803),
Netherlands (ibid., § 1804), New Zealand (ibid., § 1805), Senegal (ibid., § 1807) and United States (ibid.,
§ 1813) and the legislation of Armenia (ibid., § 1815), Australia (ibid., § 1818), Belgium (ibid., § 1823),
Canada (ibid., § 1826), China (ibid., § 1827), Congo (ibid., § 1829), Croatia (ibid., § 1831), France (ibid.,
§ 1833), Ireland (ibid., § 1834), Kenya (ibid., § 1837), Mali (ibid., § 1841), Netherlands (ibid., § 1842),
New Zealand (ibid., § 1844), Niger (ibid., § 1846), Norway (ibid., § 1847), Philippines (ibid., § 1849),
United Kingdom (ibid., § 1853) and United States (ibid., §§ 1854–1855); see also the draft legislation of
Burundi (ibid., § 1825) and Trinidad and Tobago (ibid., § 1851).
[7] ICTY, Krnojelac case, Judgment (ibid., § 1895).
[8] Slavery Convention, Article 2 (ibid., § 1756).
[9] Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions similar to
Slavery, Article 1 (ibid., § 1767).
[10] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 8 (slavery, slave-trade and servitude)
(ibid., § 1770); European Convention on Human Rights, Article 4(1) (slavery and servitude) (ibid., §
1766); American Convention on Human Rights, Article 6(1) (slavery, involuntary servitude and slave
trade) (ibid., § 1771); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 5 (slavery and slave trade)
(ibid., § 1774).
[11] Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, Articles 1, 3 and 5 (ibid., § 1781).
[12] See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 4 (ibid., § 1788); Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam, Article 11(a) (ibid., § 1791); EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 5 (ibid.,
§ 1798).

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[13] Slavery Convention, Article 1 (ibid., § 1756).
[14] ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(c) (ibid., § 1777).
[15] Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions similar to
Slavery, Article 1(b). For an application of this definition, see European Commission of Human Rights,
Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium (ibid., § 1898).
[16] United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Pohl case (ibid., § 1867).
[17] ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (e)(vi) (ibid., § 1778).
[18] Elements of Crimes for the ICC, Definition of sexual slavery (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii),
including Footnote 53, and Article 8(2)(e)(vi), including Footnote 65).
[19] UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape,
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Wartime, Final report (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, § 1885).
[20] UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and
Consequences, Report (ibid., § 1883); UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Wartime, Final report
(ibid., § 1885).

References:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_Free_Womb
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_wombs
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partus_sequitur_ventrem
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels_Conference_Act_of_1890
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926_Slavery_Convention
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SlaveryConvention.aspx
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-3&chapter=18&lang=en

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