Keziah G.

Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

Raul H. Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160689
March 26, 2014

FACTS: Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable
search in his residential premises.

VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño
was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service contract they had entered into on
March 2, 1982.

At around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989, the Violation of Contracts (VOC)
Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a
routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes,
jumpers, wiring connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been
turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric
meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said
meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office
and no one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and
received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and
number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.
Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed the
condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with
notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet
that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.

But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what
the VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding
premises was effected without his permission and over the objections of his maids. They
threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned
it upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter.
They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a
visitor to sign two documents, making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards,
he found that some of his personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team
when they searched the house.

ISSUE: Is the constitutional guaranty against searches and seizures also intended against acts of
private individuals?

HELD: NO. The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

Lim vs. Felix

194 SCRA 292/G.R. Nos. 94054-57
February 19, 1991

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport
road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by
a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived
the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the
incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of
the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused. In
the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of
Php 200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.

Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that: “all of the
accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder but for a case
of murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting
gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante.”

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on
the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where
all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make
his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the
court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. Edano

G.R. No. 188133
July 7, 2014

FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement
Group, together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue
to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias "Nato."

At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. 5 The
informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the
informant waved at PO3 Corbe. 6 When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter
went out of the vehicle and ran away.

PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant's right hand, while
PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant's waist. The other members of the police
arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the
police station for investigation. P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer examined the
seized items and found them positive for the presence of shabu.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA added that strict compliance with Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as long as the integrity of the seized item had
been ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed
their official duties. Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of illegal possession of shabu.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether or not the seized
items were admissible?

(2) Whether or not the corpus delicti of the crime charged was adequately proven?

RULING:

(1) NO. The shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
known as arrest in flagrante delicto.

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.

In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with
each other when he approached them; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he
approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter
admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been
consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal
knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he
approached it.

(2) NO. The prosecution failed to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
We stress that “the existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the
crimes.”

Thus, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

In the present case, the various lapses — enumerated and discussed below — committed by
the police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu, namely:

(1) We find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark
the drugs seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves.

Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. Consistency with the “chain of
custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the marking should be
done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant's participation in the marking
procedure should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly
baffles us.

(2) The police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the place of
confiscation or at the police station. These omissions were admitted by the prosecution during
pre-trial.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

To be sure, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., “non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]”

This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling
and safekeeping of the seized items.

Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No.
9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is
gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No.
9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the
prosecution presented in evidence.

This doubt cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

280 SCRA 400

FACTS: Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along
the front of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that drug addicts were roaming around
in the area, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced themselves as
policemen. Said man avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was
holding in his hand, the man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found
what he suspected to be crushed MJ leaves. The man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and
turned out to be Manalili. The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was sent to NBI Foresic
Chemistry Section and was confirmed as MJ.

Manalili’s version of the story was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when three
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them of the suspected possession of MJ, the
policemen bodily searched both Manalili and the driver and upon finding nothing illegal on their
persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili along to the police station. Manalili while on the
way to the station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and when he was again
searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants where they found nothing illegal. Said
neighbor then asked the policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had not found anything
illegal but Manalili was put on a cell and was brought to a fiscal later that day and was told not to
say anything despite his saying that the policemen had not found MJ on his person. Said tricycle
driver and neighbor testified on court as to how the two searches yielded nothing illegal on
Manalili’s person.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
(2) Whether or not actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
(3) Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalili’s guilt.

HELD:
(1) YES. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons.

Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:

a. Search incidental to a lawful rrest

b. Search of moving vehicles
c. Seizure in plain view
d. Customs search
e. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential
requirement. Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

A “stop-and-frisk” operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable
cause was established with Manalili’s suspicious behaviour.

(2) YES. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures require the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had
knowledge; and (3) he/she had actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case however, it is
deemed that Manalili has waived such right for failure to raise its violation before the trial
court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the
first time on appeal.

(3) YES. Manalili’s contention that the charge was trumped up to extort money and testimonies
of the arresting officers were inconsistent, it held that the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is accorded great weight and
respect as it had opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it.

The elements of illegal possession of MJ are:

(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;

(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The substance found on
Manalili’s wallet was identified as MJ which was prohibited and knowingly without authority.
Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that he
knew he was holding MJ and it was prohibited by law.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People of the Philippines vs. Nazareno Villareal

G.R. No. 201363
March 18, 2013

FACTS: In the morning of December 25, 2006, Police officer Renato de Leon was driving his
motorcycle. From a distance of 8 to 10 meters he saw the appellant Villareal, holding a plastic
sachet of shabu. When Villareal saw him, he immediately ran away. When de Leon caught
Villareal, he was brought to the police station where he was arrested and the alleged shabu was
turned over to be marked as evidence. The substance was tested and was proven to be a 0.03
gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The appellant was charged with
the violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
During the trial de Leon claimed that the appellant had previous criminal charges for the same
offense and that he arrested the appellant because when he saw that the appellant was holding a
powdery white substance, it immediately gave him suspicion as to the matter thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest based on the police officers personal
knowledge of the criminal record of the appellant.

HELD: NO. There was no valid warrantless arrest.

A lawful warrantless arrest exists when either of the following circumstances are present:

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that he person to be arrested has committed it, and

(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is service final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Based on the distance and the amount of the powdery substance it is insufficient to conclude,
even with clear vision that such substance constitutes as shabu. The act of the appellant of
examining the substance is not tantamount to arouse suspicion of a commission or possible
commission of a crime even if he has previous criminal history on the same offense.

Personal knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal record, but personal
knowledge as to the actual commission of the crime. The act of running away from authority
also does not automatically imply guilt on the accused. There are various reasons to run away
from authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the possible reasons.

Because there is an absence of overt act there is no justification for the appellant’s warrantless
arrest. Hence, it cannot be presented as evidence in court as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. Abe Valdes

G.R. No. 129296
September 25, 2000

FACTS: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung,
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut.

Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. At approximately 5:00 o'clock
A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The
police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two
rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.

PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed
2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.
Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.
Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon
microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a
positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of
which confirmed her initial impressions.

The accused, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by trial court of cultivating marijuana
plants punishable under section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.

The accused-appellant contended there was unlawful search and that the court erred in
declaring the marijuana plants, as evidence despite that was the product of an illegal
search; erred in convicting the accused of violation of section 9 (Dangerous Drugs Act),
Republic Act No. 6425 despite of the inadmissibility of the evidence; and gravely erred in
imposing the supreme penalty of death upon the accused despite failure of the court to
prove that the land where the Indian Hemp were cultivated was a public land on the
assumption that the accused planted.

ISSUES:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in this case lawful?
(2) Was the used evidence (seizure of marijuana plants) in the case against Valdez admissible?
(3) Has the prosecution proved that Valdez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
(1) NO. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause.

(2) NO. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show
that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the
marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet
tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers
when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police
officers. We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain
view" doctrine.

For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants
before appellant was arrested without a warrant.

Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises.
Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.

Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of
SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they
could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in
"plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.

We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.

(3) NO. In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police
officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who
planted them.

It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants
was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at
the time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore,
admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during
custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel.

The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right:

(1) to remain silent;

(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and

(3) to be informed of such rights.

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a

particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.

The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name
as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being
grown.

While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police
chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator.

Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility.

For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements:

(1) it must be voluntary;

(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;

(3) it must be express; and

(4) it must be in writing.

The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal
admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of
counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only
inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is
also hearsay.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People of the Philippines vs. Edison Sucro

G.R. No. 93239
March 18, 1991

FACTS: March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro,
because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. Pat. Fulgencio was
positioned under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado which was near a chapel. Pat. Fulgencio
saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. Later the same thing happened but Sucro in this case handed it
out to a group of persons. Fulgencio informed Seraspi of this and the latter told him to continue
monitoring.

In the evening of the same day Fulgencio informed Seraspi that a third buyer identified as
Ronnie Macabante was transacting with Sucro and it was at this point that Seraspi intercepted
Macabante and Sucro. Macabante, upon seeing the police, threw something to the ground and it
was later discovered to be a tea bag of marijuana. When he was confronted, Macabante admitted
that he bought the same from Sucro. Sucro was likewise arrested and the police recovered 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante.

The accused questioned the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant for the arrest.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
(2) Whether or not the evidence resulting from arrest is admissible

HELD:
(1)YES. The arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful. According to Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the instances of a lawful arrest without a warrant
is when in the presence of a police officer or a private person, the person to be arrested:

(a) has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

In the given set of facts, Fulgencio saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and
return to them and exchange some things. As such the act of selling of the drugs was done in the
presence of the said officer. As for the second instance of a valid warantless arrest, the fact that
Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when
confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates
that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge.

Given that the arrest complied with the requisites provided by the Rules of Court for the
instances of a valid arrest without a warrant, the arrest in the given case is therefore valid.

(2) YES. The evidence resulting from the arrest is admissible. The requisite that for a search
to be valid there must be a corresponding warrant is not absolute. Among the exceptions granted
by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. Given that the arrest in this case is valid considering its compliance with the
requirements of a warrantless arrest, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are therefore
admissible in evidence.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. Chua Ho San

308 SCRA 432/ G.R. No. 128222
June 17, 1999

FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim
Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID) began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from Almoite requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat.

CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both
hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this
time, Almoite, CID and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms,
became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing
the approaching officers. Badua, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his
right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive.
Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand.

CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he
termed “sign language;” he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the
man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several
transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances which was later found out
to be Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend.
Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling
the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

HELD: NO. The Court finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a

contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or
proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the
area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he
can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an
arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People v. Tangliben
G.R. No. L-63630
April 6, 1990

FACTS: On March 2, 1982, a surveillance mission was conducted by Patrolmen Quevedo and
Punzalan with Barangay Tanod Sacdalan at the Victory Liner Terminal in Pampanga based on a
tip given by an informant. They saw the appellant carrying a red bag and acting suspiciously.
They asked him to open the travelling bag but he refused. When the opened the same they found
marijuana leaves, the appellant claims that he was supposed to deliver them to Olongapo City.
Upon arrest, the alleged marijuana leaves were tested. They were indeed found to be marijuana.

He was charged and found guilty of illegal possession of illegal drugs.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.

HELD: YES, there was a valid warrantless arrest because during his arrest he was in
flagrante delicto. He was in the act of possessing marijuana. This case, therefore, falls under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that a warrantless arrest
may be valid “when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”

Furthermore, the search was not made purely on the basis of him looking suspicious; it was also
because of the tip given by an informant that built their surveillance mission out of urgency of
handling on the spot information. Hence, there was no time for them to request for a warrant of
arrest. Hence, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. Leila Johnson

G.R. No. 138881
December 18, 2000

FACTS: Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession
more than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in
the airport. The security personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when
asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security
personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets
of shabu were seized from her.

Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that
her constitutional rights were infringed when such search was conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search was made.

HELD: YES. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

Section. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph
(a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to
custodial investigation is far from being accurate.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are.

There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials
or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. Malmstedt

198 SCRA 401
June 19, 1991

FACTS: On May 11, 1989, the appellant, Malmstedt, a Swedish National, rode a bus stop in
order to catch a trip to Baguio City. On the same day, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command, Captain Alen Vasco ordered to set up a checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province. This was established to prevent the alleged delivery of marijuana in
the area and also to catch a Caucasian coming from Sagada, who based on information received
by Vasco that morning that an alleged Caucasian was the one carrying the drugs.

When the bus arrived at the checkpoint, the NARCOM officers inspected the same and made
notice of the appellant. An officer asked the appellant to furnish them his identification papers,
but the appellant failed to do so. Because the appellant had a buldge near his waist, the officer
also asked that he show what the bulge could be. When they saw that such was a pouch, the
officer the noticed that he had four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packaging tape.
When they were unwrapped, they all contain hashish or marijuana. The appellant was asked to
alight the bus, as he was doing this he grabbed two travelling bags. Each contained teddy bears.
When they brought the accused to their headquarters they found that even the teddy bears were
filled with hashish. Samples from his items were taken to verify if such was marijuana and this
was proven to be true. Because of this a case was filed against the appellant, the appellant
attested that the search was an illegal search and that the illegal items were merely planted by the
officers to arrest him. The court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure is made pursuant to a lawful
warrantless arrest.

HELD: YES. The arrest constitutes a lawful warrantless arrest. Pursuant to Rule 113, Section
5, arrests are deemed lawful when:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

NARCOM received information regarding the transportation of prohibited drugs the same day
that the items were about to be transported. There was not enough time on the part of NARCOM
to obtain a search warrant. When the accused was search he was in the act of transporting illegal
drugs, such is an offense actually being committed. The search emanates from the information
provided by the informant coupled with the failure of the appellant to present his passport when
asked to do so. He was caught in flagrante delicto, thus when he was search such was
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The items therefore, may be admissible in court.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

Valmonte vs. De Villa

178 SCRA 211/ G.R. No. 83988
September 29, 1989

FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development
of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

HELD: NO. Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift
to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

People vs. De Gracia

233 SCRA 211

FACTS: Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
staged coup d’état in December 1989 against the Government. Efren Soria of Intelligence
Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989, which surveillance
actually started November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied by the elements
of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.

Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance
car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the
area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver.
Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in
the crossfire.

Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office
and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
different calibers, and molotov.

Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door. No search warrant was secured
by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

HELD: YES. There was a valid search and seizure in this case. Where the military
operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being committed, and had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same
constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches. It is admitted that
the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.

Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance
team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for
them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office
is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could
not be justifiably or even colorably explained.

In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was
under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for
that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al.

G.R. No. 157870
November 3, 2008

FACTS: These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3)
officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

Section. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result
as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be
dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

ISSUE:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

HELD: The Court granted the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as unconstitutional.

It also partially granted the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165 constitutional, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) unconstitutional.

The Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f)
and (g) of RA 9165.

(1) YES. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator is unconstitutional.
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

NO. Congress cannot enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken
the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,

effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.

The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as
getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the
drug-testing requirement.

(2) NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are not unconstitutional; YES,
paragraphs (f) thereof is unconstitutional.

As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools citing the U.S. cases of
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the
following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to
their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to
the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations
and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employees—and students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,”
the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged
law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect
as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law
specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know”
basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA
9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should
pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day
Keziah G. Huelar
Political Law Review
Constitutional Law II

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the
drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.