Civil Law Review - Property
429
Atty. Melissa Romana P. Suarez
Cases on Ownership
Art. 429
Camarines Norte v. Quezon
GR 80796; Oct 11, 2001
En Banc: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J
Facts:
On Nov 8, 1989, SC rendered a
Decision which resolved a boundary
dispute between the Provinces of
Camarines Norte and Quezon. The
Decision declared that the subject area
belongs to Camarines Norte.
On May 28, 1991, the DENR installed a
monument marker along the boundary
line determined in the survey.
But, on Oct 14, 1991, Quezon Gov.
Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Lim caused
the bulldozing and removal of the
boundary marker.
Gov. Rodriguez and Mayor Lim
asserted that their action was a
“reasonable use of force” justified under
Art. 429 of the Civil Code to protect the
territorial integrity of Quezon from a
threatened physical invasion.
Issue:
Did the Quezon Governor and Mayor
correctly invoke Art. 429?
Held:
No. They perceived the installation of
the monument marker as an attack on the
territorial integrity of Quezon Province
despite the DENR technical working
group’s findings that the disputed area
belongs to Camarines Norte.
They could not avail of Art. 429
because Quezon province is not the owner
nor lawful possessor of the disputed area.
Art.
MWSS v. Act Theater
GR 147076; Jun 17, 2004
2nd Division: Callejo, J
Facts:
On Sep 22, 1988, 4 employees of Act
Theater were apprehended by members of
the QC police for allegedly tampering a
water meter in violation of PD 401, as
amended by BP 876.
On account of the incident, Act
Theater’s water service connection was
cut off.
MWSS insists that in cutting off Act
Theater’s water service connection, MWSS
merely exercised its proprietary right
under Art. 429.
Issue:
Did MWSS correctly invoke Art. 429?
Held:
No.
Concededly, MWSS, as the owner of
the utility providing water supply to
certain consumers including Act Theater,
had the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
However, the exercise of rights is not
without limitations. Having the right
should not be confused with the manner
by which such right is to be exercised.
While it is true that MWSS had sent a
notice of investigation to Act prior to the
disconnection of Act’s water services, this
was done only a few hours before the
actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the
notice and in order to ascertain the matter,
Act sent its assistant manager to the
MWSS office but he was treated badly on
the flimsy excuse that he had no authority
to represent Act.
Therefore, MWSS’s act was arbitrary,
injurious and prejudicial to Act Theater.
Art. 429
UCPB v. Basco
GR 142688; Aug 31, 2004
2nd Division: Callejo, J
Facts:
Ruben Basco was employed by UCPB
for 17 years. He also maintained a
checking account with UCPB.
On June 1995, Basco’s employment
was terminated by UCPB. However, Basco
still frequented UCPB Makati to solicit
insurance policies from EE’s thereat. He
also frequently entered restricted areas
and discussed the complaint he filed
against UCPB with said EE’s.
On Nov 1995, Luis Ongsiapco, UCPB
VP, issued a Memo as follows: “Please be
advised that Ruben Basco was terminated
for a cause by the Bank on 19 June
1992. He filed charges against the bank
and the case is still on-going. In view of this,
he should not be allowed access to all bank
premises.”
UCPB aver that it has the right to
prohibit Basco from access to all bank
premises under Art. 429
Basco, avers that Art. 429 does not
give to UCPB the absolute right to exclude
him, a depositor, from having access to the
bank premises, absent any clear and
convincing evidence that his presence
posed an imminent threat.
Issue:
W/N UCPB properly used Art. 429
when it banned Basco from all bank
premises.
Held:
No. On its face, the Memo barred
Basco, a SH of UCPB and one of its
depositors, from gaining access to all
bank premises under all
circumstances.
The Memo is all-embracing and
admits of no exceptions whatsoever.
UCPB may prohibit non-employees
from entering the working area of the
ATM section. However, the Memo, as
worded, violates the right of Basco as a SH
or a depositor of UCPB for being
capricious and arbitrary.
It behooved UCPB to revise such
Memo to conform to their intentions when
it was issued.
Issue:
Did UCPB properly use Art. 429 when
Basco was prevented from going into the
ATM area?
Held:
Yes. Basco entered the restricted
working areas, where non-EE’s were
prohibited entry; from there, Basco could
go up to the upper floors of the bank
through the elevator or the stairway.
SG’s had no other recourse but
prevent Basco from going to and entering
such working area.
SG’s need not have waited for Basco to
actually commence entering the working
area before stopping him.
Art. 429
Villafuerte v. CA
GR 134239; May 26, 2005
2nd Division: Chico-Nazario, J
Facts:
Villafuerte operated a gasoline station.
The lot was owned by De Mesa.
When the lease contract expired, de
Mesa refused to renew. He sent V a notice
to vacate but V continued to operate the
gasoline station despite demand.
In the early morning of Feb 1, 1990, de
Mesa, with the aid of several persons and
without the knowledge of V, caused the
closure of V’s gasoline station by
constructing fences around it.
Invoking his status as owner of the
withheld premises, de Mesa admitted
having caused the fencing of V’s gasoline
station but reasoned out that he did so
because of V’s refusal to vacate despite
demands.
Issue:
W/N de Mesa had the right to fence off
the lot pursuant to Art. 429?
Held:
No. Art. 536 which states:
“In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He
who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a
thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver
the thing.
He who believes himself entitled to
deprive another of the possession of a
thing, so long as the possessor refuses
delivery, must request the assistance of
the proper authority.”
His arbitrary conduct of fencing the lot
brazenly violates the law and circumvents
the proper procedure which should be
obtained before the court.
When de Mesa personally took it upon
himself to evict V, which act was in clear
contravention of the law, he became liable
“for all the necessary and natural
consequences of his illegal act.”
Art. 429
Diamond Farms v. DFWMPC
GR 192999; Jul 18, 2012
1st Division: Villarama, J
Facts:
Diamond Farms is engaged in
commercial farming of bananas.
On Feb 14, 1995, its 958-ha land was
placed under CARP coverage.
Diamond, however, maintained
management and control of 277 has,
including a portion measuring 109 has.
On Nov 23, 1999, Diamond’s TCT over
the 109-ha land were cancelled.
On Aug 5, 2000, DAR identified 278
CARP beneficiaries of the 109-ha land,
who are members of Diamond Farm
Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(DFWMPC).
On Oct 26, 2000, DAR issued CLOAs in
favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries.
On July 2, 2002, Diamond filed a
complaint for unlawful occupation against
DFWMPC.
DFWMPC alleged Diamond tried to
allow alleged beneficiaries to occupy
portions of the 74-ha land, but DFWMPC
guarded it to protect their own rights, so
the intruders were able to occupy only the
pumping structure. Thereafter, Diamond
stopped farm operation on the 74-ha land
and refused their request to resume farm
operation.
Issue:
W/N DFWMPC are guilty of unlawful
occupation.
Held:
No. DFWMPC are agrarian reform
beneficiaries who have been identified as
such, and in whose favor CLOAs have been
issued.
DFWMPC insist that they guarded the
74-ha land to protect their rights as farm
workers and CARP beneficiaries.
They were compelled to do so when
Diamond attempted to install other
workers thereon, after it conspired with
67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy the 35-ha
land.
They were fairly successful since the
intruders were able to occupy the
pumping structure.
Installing workers on a CARP-covered
land when the DAR has already identified
the CARP beneficiaries serves no other
purpose than to create an impermissible
roadblock to installing the legitimate
beneficiaries on the land.
 Hence, the action taken by DFWMPC
to guard the land as reasonable and
necessary to protect their legitimate
possession and prevent precisely what
Diamond attempted to do.
Such course was justified under Art.
429.
Being legitimate possessors of the
land and having exercised lawful means to
protect their possession, DFWMPC were
not guilty of unlawful occupation.
Art. 430 – Right of the Owner
Custodio v. CA
GR 116100; Feb 9, 1996
2nd Division: Regalado, J p:
Facts:
Mabasa owns a lot situated at Interior
P. Burgos St. Said lot is surrounded by
other lots owned by Mabasa’s neighbors.
Taking P. Burgos St. as the point of
reference, going to Mabasa’s property, the
row of houses is as follows:
P. Burgos St.
Custodio p Xxx
Santos a Santos
Mabasa t Zzz
h land which it subdivided the land into 39
As an access to P. Burgos St. from
Mabasa's lot, the path is 1m wide and is
20m distant from Mabasa's lot to P. Burgos
St. Such path is passing in between the
row of houses.
However, Santos constructed an
adobe fence along their lot which is also
along the passageway.
Later Santos extended said fence in
such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed.
Issue:
Did Santos have the right to block the
passageway with a fence?
Held:
Yes. It is within the right of Santos as
owners, to enclose and fence their
property.
Art. 430 provides that "(e)very owner
may enclose or fence his land or tenements
by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon."
At the time of the construction of the
fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of Mabasa, either by law
or by contract.
Hence, Santos had an absolute right
over their property and their act of fencing
and enclosing the same was an act which
they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right.
Art. 430
Aneco Realty v. Landex
GR 165952; Jul 28, 2008
3rd Division: Reyes, J
Facts:
FHDI is the original owner of a tract of
lots. It later sold 22 lots to Aneco and the
remaining 17 lots to Landex.
Landex started the construction of a
concrete wall on its lots. To restrain
construction of the wall, Aneco filed a
complaint for injunction with the
RTC. Aneco later sought to demolish the
newly-built wall.
Issue:
W/N Aneco may enjoin Landex from
constructing a concrete wall on its own
property.
Held:
No. What is involved here is an undue
interference on the property rights of a
landowner to build a concrete wall on his
own property.
It is a simple case of a neighbor,
Aneco, seeking to restrain a landowner,
Landex, from fencing his own land.
Art. 430 gives every owner the right to
enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any
other means.
The right to fence flows from the right
of ownership. As owner of the land,
Landex may fence his property subject
only to the limitations and restrictions
provided by law.
Art. 430
Heirs of Limense v. De Ramos
GR 152319; Oct 28, 2009
3rd Division: Peralta, J
Facts:
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered
owner of Lot 12 covered by OCT 7036.
Dalmacio subdivided his property into
5 lots: Lot 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E.
Under a Deed of Donation executed in
1932 the lots were adjudicated to
Dalmacio's daughters:
1. Lot 12-C to Catalina Natividad; Isabel
Limense; and Salud Ramos, in equal
parts [1/3 each];
2. Lot 12-D to Salud Ramos
In 1932, Ramos constructed their
house on Lot 12-D, adjacent to Lot 12-C.
In 1969, TCT 96886 was issued in the
name of Joaquin Limense covering Lot 12-
C.
In 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a
building permit for the construction of a
hollow block fence on the boundary line
between his Lot 12-C and Lot 12-D
[occupied by Ramos]. But the fence could
not be constructed because a substantial
portion of Ramos’ house in Lot 12-D
encroached upon portions of Lot 12-C.
On Mar 1983, Limense instituted a
Complaint against Ramos before the RTC
for removal of obstruction and damages.
Ramos countered that she was a 1/3
co-owner of Lot 12-C and therefore had
the right to build her house there.
Issue:
Does Limense have the right to build a
hollow block fence around Lot 12-C?
Held:
Yes. Lot 12-C is now registered
exclusively in the name of Limense.
Limense, as the registered owner of
Lot 12-C, may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.
However, although Limense has the
right to enclose or fence his property, he
must respect servitudes constituted
thereon.
Art. 434
Heirs of Julao v. Spouses De Jesus
GR 176020; Sep 29, 2014
2nd Division: Del Castillo, J.:
Facts:
On Mar 2, 1999, heirs of Telesforo
Julao, filed before the RTC, a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession of Real Property,
against spouses De Jesus.
Telesoforo’s Heirs alleged that:
1. They are the true and lawful owners of
a 641-sqm lot covered by OCT P-2446;
2. Said lot originated from TSA V-2132
3. De Jesus’ house encroached on 70 sqm
of the said lot;
De Jesus alleged that:
1. They are the true and lawful owners
and possessors of the said lot which
originated from V-6667;
2. They acquired said lot from Solito
Julao;
3. TSA V-6667 and TSA V-2132 pertain to
the same property.
During the trial, Julao Heirs disputed
the validity of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights executed by Solito. They presented
evidence to show that Telesforo submitted
2 applications:
1. TSA V-2132 – resulted in the issuance
of OCT P-2446 in favor of the heirs of
Telesforo
2. TSA V-6667 was dropped from the
records.
De Jesus presented 2 letters from the
DENR:
1. A letter dated April 27, 1999 issued by
CENRO, stating that “it can be
concluded that TSA V-2132 and TSA V-
6667 referred to one and the same
application covering the same lot;
2. A letter dated Sep 30, 1998 from the
DENR stating that “the land applied for,
TSA V-2132 was renumbered as TSA V-
6667 as per 2nd Indorsement dated Nov
20, 1957 x x x.”
Issue:
W/N the complaint will prosper.
Held:
No. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified.
Art. 434 states that “[i]n an action to
recover, the property must be identified,
and the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.”
The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound
to clearly identify the land sought to be
recovered, in accordance with the title on
which he anchors his right of ownership.
The failure of the plaintiff to establish
the identity of the property claimed is fatal
to his case.
Here, the Heirs failed to identify the
lot they seek to recover as they failed to
describe the location, the area, as well as
the boundaries thereof.
In fact, no survey plan was presented
by the Heirs to prove that De Jesus actually
encroached upon the 70-sqm portion of
the Heirs’ lot.
Failing to prove their allegation, the
Heirs are not entitled to the relief prayed
for in their Complaint.
Art. 434
Baltazar Ibot v. Heirs of Tayco
GR 202950; Apr 06, 2015
3rd Division: Reyes, J.:
Facts:
The heirs of Francisco Tayco presently
occupy Lot 299.
Ibot is the registered owner of Lot 299
in whose name OCT P-62053 was issued
on Oct 23, 1997.
On Sep 23, 1999, Taycos a complaint
for reconveyance of real property was
filed against Ibot grounded on their claim
as owners of Lot 299 because of their
actual, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession thereof since 1964
through their PII, Francisco.
Taycos alleged that:
1. In 1960, Francisco Tayco purchased
Lot 299 from Amelita Ibot for P1,200
which was set forth in a Deed of Sale
2. Francisco commenced his Sales
Application of Lot 299 with the
Bureau of Lands but it was
discontinued due to his sickness;
3. Francisco lost the documents
necessary for his sales application
including the Deed of Sale;
4. They were in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession
since 1964 and introduced
improvements thereon;
5. Fraud attended the issuance of Ibot's
OCT in 1998.
Issue:
W/N the complaint will prosper.
Facts:
No. Taycos failed to dispense their
burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that they are entitled to the
reconveyance of Lot 299.
Under Art. 434, in order to
successfully maintain an action to recover
the ownership of a real property, the
person who claims a better right to it must
prove 2 things:
1. First, the identity of the land claimed;
and
2. Second, his title thereto.
As to the first requisite, there is no
doubt that the land sought to be
reconveyed is Lot 299.
As to the second requisite on title of
ownership, the claims of the parties are in
conflict.
Here, the registration of Lot 299 was
not preceded by a prior sale to the Taycos'
PII. Taycos failed to substantiate their
claim that the same land was sold to the
late Francisco because the documents they
presented in evidence did not prove the
alleged sale.
It can, therefore, be stated that the OCT
issued in the name of Ibot over Lot 299
cannot be assailed by the Taycos
considering that their claim of ownership
has not been duly proved.
Art. 437 - Ownership
NPC v. Ibrahim, et al
GR 168732, June 29, 2007
1st Division: Azcuna, J.:
Facts:
In 1978, NPC, through alleged stealth
and without landowner Ibrahim’s
knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of
Ibrahim’s land and constructed therein
underground tunnels. The existence of the
tunnels was only discovered sometime in
July 1992.
NPC maintains that:
1. The sub-terrain portion where the
underground tunnels were constructed
does not belong to Ibrahim
2. Ibrahim were still able to use their
land even with the existence of the
tunnels
3. The underground tunnels 115m below
Ibrahim’s property could not have
caused damage or prejudice to
Ibrahim.
Issue:
Who owns the sub-terrain area
occupied by NPC?
Held:
Ibrahim. Art. 437 states that: “The
owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it xxx …”
Thus, the ownership of land extends
to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it.
Presumably, landowners’ right
extends to such height or depth where it
is possible for them to obtain some
benefit or enjoyment, and it is
extinguished beyond such limit as there
would be no more interest protected by
law.
Ibrahim could have dug motorized
deep wells but were prevented from doing
so by the authorities because of the
construction and existence of the tunnels
underneath the surface of their property.
Ibrahim, therefore, still had a legal
interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar
as they could have excavated the same for
the construction of the deep well. The fact
that they could not was proof that the
tunnels interfered with Ibrahim’s
enjoyment of their property and deprived
them of its full use and enjoyment.
Art. 442. Civil Fruits
Bachrach Motors v. Talisay-Silay
GR 35223; Sep 17, 1931
En Banc: Romualdez, J p:
Facts:
Talisay-Silay Milling [TSM] was
indebted to the PNB. To secure the
payment of its debt, TSM induced its
planter, Ledesma, to mortgage his land to
PNB.
In order to compensate Ledesma for
the risk under that mortgage, TSM
undertook to credit Ledesma with a sum
equal to 2% of the debt secured.
Issue:
W/N the bonus given to Ledesma is
civil fruits.
Held:
NO. The bonus, is not a civil fruit of the
mortgaged property.
Art. 422 considers 3 things as civil
fruits:
1. Rents of buildings;
2. Proceeds from leases of lands; and,
3. Income from perpetual or life
annuities, or other similar sources
of revenue.
As the bonus is not the rent of a
building or of land, the only meaning of
"civil fruits" left to be examined is that of
"income."
Assuming that in the broad juridical
sense of the word "income" it might be
said that the bonus in question is "income"
under Art. 422, it is obvious to inquire
whether it is derived from the land
mortgaged by Ledesma to PNB for the
benefit of TSM; for if it is not obtained
from that land but from something else, it
is not civil fruits of that land.
Art. 443 – Duty to Return
Tacas v. Tobon
GR 30240; Aug 23, 1929
1st Division: Villamor, J p:
Facts:
Tacas filed an action to recover 3 lots
from Tobon. Tacas alleged that Tobon
harvested the fruits of the land since 1912.
RTC declared Tacas to be the absolute
owner of the lots, and ordered Tobon to
deliver said lots to Tacas, together with
the fruits collected each year since 1912
until the complete termination of this case,
and in default thereof, to pay to Tacas the
equivalent of the crops harvested by
Tobon from 1912 to 1927.
Issue:
Is Tobon required to return the
gathered fruits or the equivalent sum to
Tacas?
Held:
Yes, but only from the time Tobon
received the judicial summons.
Evidence being lacking to show that
when Tobon entered upon the possession
of the lots, he was aware of any flaw in his
title or mode of acquiring it, he is deemed
a possessor in good faith, and in
accordance with Art. 544, the fruits of said
lands were his, until he was summoned
upon the complaint, or until he filed his
answer thereto.
Therefore, Tobon is only bound to
return to Tacas the fruits received from
April, 1918 to 1927, with the right to
deduct the expenses of planting and
harvesting, which shall be determined by
the trial court, after hearing both parties.
Art. 445
Rex Daclison v. Eduardo Baytion
GR 219811, April 06, 2016
2nd Division: Mendoza, J.:
Facts:
Baytion filed an action for ejectment
against Daclison.
Daclison insists that:
1. The property in dispute is outside of
the land owned by Baytion
2. It is the filled-up portion between the
riprap constructed by the government
and the property of Baytion
Baytion posits that although the
disputed portion is outside the description
of his property covered by TCT 221507, it
forms an integral part of thereof because it
is an accretion, construction, or
improvement on the property and, under
the law, any accretion or anything built
thereon belongs to him.
Issue:
W/N Baytion has a right over the
disputed property.
Held:
No. The disputed property was the
filled-up portion between the riprap
constructed by the government and the lot
of Baytion.
Baytion's contention that he owns that
portion by reason of accretion is
misplaced.
Under Art. 457, the following
requisites must concur in order for an
accretion to be considered, namely:
1. The deposit be gradual and
imperceptible;
2. It be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and,
3. The land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Here, the contested portion cannot be
considered an accretion.
First, the land came about not by
reason of a gradual and imperceptible
deposit. The deposits were artificial and
man-made and not the exclusive result of
the current from the creek adjacent to his
property. Alluvion must be the exclusive
work of nature and not a result of human
intervention.
Second, the disputed lot cannot also be
considered an improvement or accession.
Art. 445 provides: Whatever is built,
planted or sown on the land of another
and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the
land..xx.
Art. 445 uses the adverb "thereon"
which is defined as "on the thing that has
been mentioned."
In other words, the supposed
improvement must be made, constructed
or introduced within or on the property
and not outside so as to qualify as an
improvement contemplated by law.
Otherwise, it would just be very
convenient for land owners to expand or
widen their properties in the guise of
improvements.
Art. 445
Provincial Assessor v. Filipinas Palm Oil
GR 183416; Oct 05, 2016
2nd Division: Leonen, J.:
Facts:
Filipinas Palm Oil operates a palm oil
plantation with a total land area of 7,000
hectares in Agusan del Sur. The land is
owned by National Development Company
(NDC).
Harvested fruits from oil palm trees
are converted into oil through FPO's
milling plant in the middle of the
plantation area.
Within the plantation, there are 3
plantation roads constructed by FPO.
After the CARL was passed, NDC lands
were transferred to CARP beneficiaries
who formed themselves as the NGPI-NGEI
Cooperatives.
Filipinas entered into a lease contract
agreement with NGPI-NGEI.

Issue:
W/N the roads that FPO constructed
within the leased area should be assessed
with real property taxes.
Held:
No. The roads that FPO constructed
became permanent improvements on the
land owned by the NGPI-NGEI by right of
accession under Art. 440 and Art. 445
Despite the land being leased by FPO
when the roads were constructed, the
ownership of the improvement still
belongs to NGPI-NGEI.
As provided under Art. 440 and 445,
whatever is incorporated in the land,
either naturally or artificially, belongs to
the NGPI-NGEI as the landowner.
Therefore, NGPI-NGEI, as owner of the
roads that permanently became part of the
land being leased by FPO, shall be liable
for real property taxes, if any.
However, by express provision of the
Local Government Code, NGPI-NGEI is
exempted from payment of real property
tax.
Art. 448 – Builder in Good Faith
Pleasantville v. CA
GR 79688; Feb 1, 1996
3rd Division: Panganiban, J p:
Facts:
Jardinico bought Lot 9 from PDV.
Later, Jardinico discovered that
improvements had been introduced on Lot
9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken
possession thereof.
It appears that Kee bought Lot 8 from
CTT, the exclusive real estate agent of PDV.
CTT through its employee, Octaviano,
accompanied Kee's wife, Donabelle, to
inspect Lot 8.
Unfortunately, the lot pointed by
Octaviano was Lot 9. So, Kee proceeded to
construct his residence on Lot 9.
After discovering that Lot 9 was
occupied by Kee, Jardinico wrote Kee,
demanding that Kee remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9.
Issues:
Was Kee a builder in good faith?
Held:
Yes.
Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw
in his title.
And as good faith is presumed, PDV
has the burden of proving bad faith on the
part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on
Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what
he bought from PDV. He was not aware
that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8.
Thus, Kee is a builder in good faith.
Art. 448
Ismael Macasaet v. Vicente Macasaet
GR 154391-92; Sep 30, 2004
3rd Division: Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
Vicente and Rosario Macasaet own 2
lots. Ismael is their son, married to
Teresita.
On Dec 10, 1997, the parents filed
with the MTC an ejectment suit against the
children IsmTer.
Parents alleged that:
1. By way of a verbal lease agreement,
IsmTer occupied the lots in March
1992 and used them as their residence
and construction business;
2. Despite repeated demands, IsmTer
failed to pay the agreed rental of
P500/week.
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art. 448 covers only cases in
which the BPS believe themselves to be
owners of the land or, at least, to have a
claim of title thereto.
It does not apply when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary.
Good faith is identified by the belief
that the land is owned; or that - - by some
title - - one has the right to build, plant, or
sow thereon.
However, in some special cases, SC has
used Art. 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond this limited definition.
Del Campo v. Abesia – Art. 448 was
applied to one whose house – despite
having been built at the time he was still
co-owner – overlapped with the land of
another.
Art. 448 was also applied to cases
wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the
owner. SC ruled that the law deemed the
builder to be in good faith.
Sarmiento v. Agana – the builders
were found to be in good faith despite
their reliance on the consent of another,
whom they had mistakenly believed to be
the owner of the land.
Javier v. Javier – SC deemed the son
to be in good faith for building the
improvement (the house) with the
knowledge and consent of his father, to
whom belonged the land upon which it
was built. Thus, Art. 448 was applied.
Art. 448 applies here. The facts show
that Parents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by IsmTer.
In fact, because IsmTer occupied the
lots upon their invitation, parents
certainly knew and approved of the
construction of the improvements
introduced thereon. Thus, IsmTer may be
deemed to have been in good faith when
they built the structures on those lots.
Consequently, Parents have the right
to appropriate, as their own, the building
and other improvements on the lot, but
only after:
1. Refunding the expenses of IsmTer, or
2. Paying the increase in value acquired
by the properties by reason thereof.
They also have the option to oblige
IsmTer to pay the price of the land, unless
its value is considerably more than that of
the structures, in which case, IsmTer shall
pay reasonable rent.
Art. 448
Parilla v. Pilar
GR 167680; Nov 30, 2006
3rd Division: Carpio-Morales, J
Facts:
Parilla [dealer of Pilipinas Shell],
possessed a lot leased to Shell by Prospero
Pilar under a 10-year Lease Agreement
entered into in 1990.
When the lease contract between Shell
and Pilar expired in 2000, Parilla
remained in possession of the lot on which
he built improvements consisting of a
billiard hall, restaurant, and sari-sari store.
Pilar filed a complaint for ejectment
with MTC against Parilla.
MTC ruled in favor of Pilar and
ordered Parilla to vacate and to pay Pilar
P50T as compensation for the use of the
lot. But MTC also ordered Pilar to
reimburse Parilla P2M for improvements
introduced on lot.
Issue:
Is Parilla entitled to reimbursement?
Held:
No. There was a lease contract
between Shell and Pilar.
Parilla, being a dealer of Shell, was
allowed to occupy the property. Parilla is
considered an agent of Shell. The
provisions on lease are therefore
applicable.
 Art. 448 covers only cases in which
the BPS believe themselves to be owners
of the land or, at least, have a claim of title
thereto, but not when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary. A tenant
cannot be said to be a BGF as he has no
pretension to be owner.
Art. 448/546, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a
PGF, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. It does
not apply where one’s only interest is that
of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the
power of the tenant to “improve” his
landlord out of his property.
Art. 448
Republic v. Judge Ballocanag
GR 163794; Nov 28, 2008
3rd Division: Nachura, J
Facts:
In 1970, Reyes bought an 18 ha. lot
from Castillo, covered by OCT P-2388.
Immediately, Reyes introduced
improvements and planted fruit trees,
including 1000 mangoes, 100 Mandarin
citrus, and 100 guyabanos. He had the title
transferred in his name and was issued
TCT 45232.
Unfortunately, it turned out that about
16 ha of the lot is timberland and,
therefore, cannot be subject to any
disposition, and is not registrable.
Thus, in 1987 SolGen filed a complaint
for “Cancellation of Title and Reversion” in
behalf of the RP. RTC ruled in favor of the
RP and cancelled the title of Reyes and
ordered him to vacate.
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Reyes was a PGF. Reyes was of
the belief that he was the owner of the
subject land; in fact, a TCT was issued in
his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit
trees thereon, and invested money from
1970. He received notice of the RP’s claim
only when the reversion case was filed in
1987.
However, to allow Reyes to remove
the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown,
even if he is legally entitled to do so, would
be risking substantial damage to the
land. It would violate the implicit mandate
of Art. 547.
In this light, the options that Reyes
may exercise under Art. 448 and 546 have
been restricted. It is no longer feasible to
permit him to remove the trees he
planted.
The only equitable alternative would
be to order the RP to pay Reyes the value
of the improvements he introduced on the
property.
Art. 448
Sulo sa Nayon v. Nayong Pilipino
GR 170923; Jan 20, 2009
First Division: Puno, CJ
Facts:
Nayong Pilipino Foundation leased a
portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex, to
Sulo sa Nayon for the construction and
operation of a hotel building, to be known
as the Philippine Village Hotel.
PVH defaulted in the payment of their
monthly rental. NPF repeatedly demanded
PVH to pay the arrears and vacate the
premises. So, NPF filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MTC.
PVH insist is that because of the
improvements made on the lot, which are
of substantial value, that they have
introduced on the leased premises with
the permission of NPF, they should be
considered builders in good faith who
have the right to retain possession of the
property until reimbursement by NPF.
Issue:
W/N the rules on accession, as found
in Art. 448 and 546 apply.
Held:
No. Art. 448 is manifestly intended to
apply only to a case where one builds,
plants, or sows on land in which he
believes himself to have a claim of title,
and not to lands where the only interest of
the BPS is that of a holder, such as a
tenant.
PVH, as lessees, recognize that the
NPF is the owner of the land.
Introduction of valuable
improvements on the leased premises
does not give the PVH the right of
retention and reimbursement which
rightfully belongs to a BGF. Otherwise,
such a situation would allow the lessee to
easily “improve” the lessor out of its
property.
A lessee is neither a builder in good
faith nor in bad faith that would call for
the application of Art. 448 and 546. His
rights are governed by Art. 1678.
Art. 448
Narvaez v. Alciso
GR 165907; July 27, 2009
1st Division: Carpio, J
Facts:
Alciso was the registered owner of a
lot. Alciso entered into a Deed of Absolute
Sale with right to repurchase, selling the
lot to Bate for P50,000. TCT T-16066 was
issued in the name of Bate.
On 14 Aug 1981, Bate sold the lot to
spouses Narvaez for P80,000. TCT T-
16528 was issued in the name of Narvaez.
In 1982, Narvaez built a commercial
building on the lot amounting to P300,000.
Alciso informed Narvaez that she
wanted to repurchase the lot and exercise
her options under Art. 448.
Issue:
Is Art. 448 applicable?
Held:
NO. Art. 448 is not applicable in cases
involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase — it is inapplicable when the
owner of the land is the BPS.
Where the true owner himself is the
builder of the works on his own land, the
issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely
irrelevant.
Art. 448 is inapplicable because
Narvaez built the commercial building on
the land that they own. Besides, to compel
them to buy the land, which they own,
would be absurd.
The terms of the 14 Aug 1981 Deed of
Sale of Realty show that Bate and the
Narvaez entered into a sale with right of
repurchase, where Bate transferred his
right of repurchase to Alciso.
So, in a sale with right of repurchase,
the applicable provisions are Art. 1606
and 1616, not Art. 448.
Under Art. 1616, Alciso may exercise
her right of redemption by payinge
Narvaez:
1. the price of the sale,
2. the expenses of the contract,
3. legitimate payments made by reason of
the sale, and
4. the necessary and useful expenses
made on the thing sold.
Here, the cost of the building
constitutes a useful expense. Useful
expenses include improvements which
augment the value of the land.
Art. 448
Tuatis v. Spouses Escol
GR 175399; Oct 27, 2009
3rd Division: Chico-Nazario, J

Facts:
In 1989, Tuatis purchased a 300 sqm
lot from Visminda for P10T on
installments.
Tuatis took possession of the lot and
constructed a house thereon.
In 1996, Tuatis requested Visminda to
sign a absolute deed of sale, but Visminda
refused, contending that the purchase
price had not yet been fully paid, except
for P3,000 downpayment and P1,000
installment, Tuatis made no other
payment.
So, Tuatis filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance against Visminda.
RTC ruled in Visminda 's favor. Tuatis
filed a Motion to Exercise Right under Art.
448.
Issue:
Does Art. 448 apply?
Held:
Yes. Tuatis breached the conditions
stipulated in the Deed of Sale by
Installment between her and Visminda.
Visminda knew about said breach but still
allowed T to build her house. Since both
Tuatis and Visminda were guilty of bad
faith, their rights are governed by Art. 448.
Issue:
Who has the right of choice?
Held:
Visminda, as landowner, has the right
of choice. There is no basis for Tuatis'
demand that, since the value of house is
considerably higher than the lot, she may
choose between buying the lot from
Visminda and selling the house to V for
P502,073.
The rule that the choice under Art. 448
belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession. But,
the landowner cannot refuse to exercise
either option and compel instead the
builder to remove the house from the land.
It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.
Art. 448
Heirs of Limense v. De Ramos
GR 152319; Oct 28, 2009
3rd Division: Peralta, J
Facts:
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered
owner of Lot 12 which he subdivided into
5 lots: Lot 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E.
In 1932, Dalmacio donated:
3. Lot 12-C to Catalina Natividad; Isabel
Limense; and Salud Ramos, in equal
parts [1/3 each];
4. Lot 12-D to Salud Ramos
In 1932, Ramos constructed her house
on Lot 12-D, adjacent to Lot 12-C.
In 1969, TCT 96886 was issued in the
name of Limense covering Lot 12-C.
In 1981, Limense tried to build a fence
on the boundary line between Lot 12-C
and Lot 12-D, which was being occupied
by Ramos. The fence, however, could not
be constructed because a substantial
portion of Ramos’ house in Lot 12-D
encroached upon portions of Limense's
property in Lot 12-C.
Limense demanded the removal of the
encroached area; however, Ramos ignored
both oral and written demands.
Limense instituted a Complaint against
Ramos before the RTC for removal of
obstruction and damages.
Ramos countered that she was a 1/3
co-owner of Lot 12-C and therefore had
the right to build her house there.
Issue:
Did Ramos build part of her house on
Lot 12-C in good faith?
Held:
Yes. Ramos' PII constructed their
house on Lot 12-D, adjacent to Lot 12-C, in
1932. Ramos' PII owned the 1/3 portion of
Lot 12-C at the time it was donated to
them by Dalmacio in 1932.
The “encroached area” are all within
the 1/3 share alloted to them by Dalmacio
and, hence, there was absence of a
showing that Ramos acted in bad faith
when she built portions of the house on
Lot 12-C.
Issue:
Does Art. 448 apply?
Held:
Yes. Art. 448 cannot apply where a co-
owner builds, plants or sows on the land
owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon the land that
exclusively belongs to another but of
which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is
not a 3rd person under the circumstances,
and the situation is governed by the rules
of co-ownership.
However, when the co-ownership is
terminated by a partition, and it appears
that the house of an erstwhile co-owner
has encroached upon a portion pertaining
to another co-owner, but the
encroachment was in good faith, then Art.
448 should apply to determine the
respective rights of the parties.
In this case, the co-ownership was
terminated due to the transfer of the title
of the whole Lot 12-C in favor of Limense.
Art. 448 applies.
Art. 448
Fuentes v. Roca
GR 178902; Apr 21, 2010
En Banc: Abad, J
Facts:
Tarciano sold a lot to Fuentes.
However, later it was discovered that the
signature of his estranged wife on the
Deed of Sale was forged. The sale was
declared null and void.
However, Fuentes, who was in
possession of the lot for some time, had
introduced some improvements on the lot.
Issue:
Is Fuentes entitled to reimbursement
for improvements introduced on the lot?
Held:
Yes. Since the sale to Fuentes was
void, the land remained the property of
spouses Tarciano despite that sale.
But, Fuentes appear to have acted in
good faith in entering the land and
building improvements on it. They had no
way of knowing that Rosario did not give
her consent.
He is deemed a possessor in good
faith, said Art. 526, who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As PGF, Fuentes was under no
obligation to pay for their stay on the lot
prior to its legal interruption.
What is more, they are entitled under
Art. 448 to indemnity for the
improvements they introduced with a
right of retention until the reimbursement
is made.
Roca shall have the option, pursuant
to Art. 546 indemnifying Fuentes for the
costs of the improvements or paying the
increase in value which the property may
have acquired by reason of such
improvements.
Art. 448, 449, 452, 453
Spouses Aquino v. Spouses Aguilar
GR 182754; Jun 29, 2015
1st Division: Sereno, C.J.:

Facts:
Spouses Teresa and Crispin Aquino
are the owners of a house and lot. Since
1981, this lot has been occupied by
Teresa’s sister, Josefina Aguilar and her
husband, Eusebio.
Aguilar stayed on the property with
the consent and approval of Aquino, who
were then residing in the United States.
While Aguilar was in possession of the
lot, the house previously constructed
thereon was demolished, and a 3-storey
building built in its place.
Aguilar improved on and occupied
half of the 3/F of this new building for the
next 20 years without payment of rental.
Issue:
W/N Aguilar is a builder in good faith.
Held:
No. The term “builder in good faith” as
used in reference to Art. 448, refers to one
who, not being the owner of the land,
builds on that land believing himself to be
its owner and unaware of the land, builds
on that land, believing himself to be its
owner and unaware of the defect in his
title or mode of acquisition.
Aguilar cannot be considered as
builders in good faith on account of their
admission that the lot belonged to Aquino.
By law, one is considered in good faith
if he is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
At the onset, Aguilar were aware of a
flaw in their title and a limit to their right
to possess the property.
Issue:
W/N Art. 1678 is applicable.
Held:
No. Art. 1678 applies only to lessees
who build useful improvements on the
leased property. It does not apply to those
who possess property by mere tolerance
of the owners, without a contractual right.
There is absolutely no evidence of any
lease contract between the parties. In fact,
Aguilar themselves never alleged that they
were lessees of the lot or the building.
Issue:
W/N Aguilar is entitled to
reimbursement.
Held:
No. Aquino had already warned
Aguilar not to build a structure on the
property as early as 1983.
Hence, Aquino, as landowners, have
the right to appropriate what has been
built on the lot, without any obligation to
pay indemnity therefor; and Aguilar have
no right to a refund of any improvement
built therein, under to Art. 449 and 450.
Issue:
W/N Art. 453 applies.
Held:
No. Aguilar’s contention that pursuant
to Art. 453, they should be considered
builders in good faith, since their act of
introducing improvements to the 3-storey
building was with knowledge and without
opposition on the part of Aquino, cannot
be sustained.
Aguilar was already forewarned as
early as 1983 not to introduce any
improvements thereon.
Issue:
What can Aguilar recover?
Held:
As a builder in bad faith, Aguilar may
recover the necessary expenses incurred
for the preservation of the property but
without the right of retention, pursuant to
Art. 452.
Art. 448, 453
Bliss v, Diaz
GR 213233; Aug 05, 2015
3rd Division: Velasco Jr., J.:
Facts:
BDC is the registered owner of Lot 27
covered by TCT 331582.
On Oct 19, 1984, BDC entered into a
Deed of Sale over said lot in favor of
Melgazo.
On May 7, 1991, Nacua sent a letter to
BDC, saying that Melgazo transferred to
him the rights over the lot. He expressed
willingness to pay the outstanding
obligations of Melgazo to BDC.
Before the property was fully paid,
there was a series of transfer of rights:
Nacua GarciaReyesTapay Diaz.
Diaz paid BDC amortizations
amounting to P406T and BDC issued a
permit to occupy the property in favor of
Diaz. Diaz introduced improvements on
the property, amounting to P700T.
On April 14, 1992, BDC executed a
Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz.
On April 15, 1994, however, BDC
informed Diaz that Arreza was claiming
that the heirs of Melgazo sold to him the
rights over the property.
To resolve the conflicting claims of
Arreza and Diaz, BDC filed a complaint for
Interpleader against them.
RTC ruled that the signatures of
Melgazo transferring their rights to Nacua
were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that
Arreza had a better right over the lot.
Later, it was established that both BDC
and Diaz were in bad faith.
Issue:
W/N BDC is liable to Diaz for the value
of the improvements that Diaz introduced
to the property.
Held:
Yes, Art. 453 commands that the
rights of one and the other shall be the
same as though both had acted in good
faith.
Under Art. 448, the landowner is given
the option, either to appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of
the proper amount of indemnity or to sell
the land to the possessor in good faith.
Art. 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred.
In this case, however, the option of
selling the land to the builder in good faith
is no longer viable.
Hence, there is only one thing left for
[BDC] to do: indemnify Diaz for the
improvements introduced on the land.
Art. 448
DepEd v. Casibang
GR 192268; Jan 27, 2016
3rd Division: Peralta, J.:
Facts:
Lot 115 covered by OCT 0-627 was
registered under the name of Juan Cepeda.
In 1965, upon the request of Mayor
Caronan, Cepeda allowed the construction
and operation of a school on the western
portion of his lot.
The school is now known as Solana
North Central School, operating under the
control and supervision of the DepEd.
Despite Cepeda's death in 1983, Heirs
of Cepeda continued to tolerate the use
and possession of the property by the
school.
Sometime in 2000 Cepeda Heirs
entered and occupied a portion of the
property.
Issue:
W/N the Cepeda heirs have the right
of ejectment.

Held:
Yes. As registered owners of the lot,
Cepeda Heirs have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property.
Those who occupy the land of another
at the owner's tolerance, without any
contract between them, are necessarily
bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon
demand.
Tolentino states that acts merely
tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another
person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or
benefits which one's property can give to
another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them
out of friendship or courtesy." x x x. and,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is
continued for a long time, no right will be
acquired by prescription." x x
x39chanrobleslaw
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 is applicable.
Held:
Yes.
To be deemed a builder in good faith,
it is essential that a person asserts title to
the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be
a possessor in the concept of owner, and
that he be unaware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
However, there are cases where Art.
was applied beyond the recognized and
limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases
wherein the builder has constructed
improvements on the land of another with
the consent of the owner.
SC held that the structures were built
in good faith in those cases that the
owners knew and approved of the
construction of improvements on the
property.
DepEd is considered a builder in good
faith, since Cepeda permitted the
construction of building and
improvements to conduct classes on his
property.
Hence, Art. 448 may be applied in the
case at bar. Art. 448, in relation to Art. 546,
provides for the rights of Cepeda Heirs as
landowners as against the DepEd, a
builder in good faith.
Art. 448
Christian Spiritists v. Atty. Mangallay
AC 10483; Mar 18, 2016
First Division: Bersamin, J.:
Facts:
Atty. Mangallay is the registered
owner of a lot covered by TCT 45241.
Atty. M filed an action for ejectment
against CSP-PLC which constructed its
church building on his land.
MTC decided the case in favour of Atty.
M. But MTC also declared that CSP-PLC
was a builder in good faith, without
prejudice to Atty. Mangallay exercising his
option to appropriate the building in
accordance with Art 448.
MTC judgment became final and
executory.
However, the parties decided put an
end to their dispute. CSP-PLC withdrew
their notice of appeal and undertook to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn
over the premises to Atty. M by Aug 31,
2013 in exchange for financial assistance
of the P300T.
Atty. M paid the amount in the MTC on
Mar 20, 2013, and it was received by CSP-
PLC on the same day.
But CSP-PLC reneged on their part of
the agreement without returning the
P300T to Atty. M.
Hence, Atty. Mangallay obtained a writ
of execution from the MTC.
 Sheriffs implemented the writ of
execution and demolition by demolishing
the church building of CSP-PLC.
Issue:
W/N the demolition or removal was
proper.
Held:
Yes.
The MTC judgment expressly directed
Atty. M "to exercise his option pursuant to
the provisions of Art. 448 within 30 days
from the finality of this judgment insofar as
the improvements introduced by CSP-PLC
on the subject property."
Art. 448 granted to Atty. M as the
owner of the premises, "the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing
or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Art. 546 and 548."
Hence, Atty. M’s exercised the right of
appropriation in light of the fact that the
P300T earlier delivered as financial
assistance was most likely meant to
indemnify the supposed builders in good
faith.
Art. 449-451 – Builder in Bad Faith
Agueda de Vera v. CA
GR 97761; Apr 14, 1999
3rd Division: Purisima, J p:
Facts:
Ramos is the registered owner of a
parcel of land.
In 1981, Ramos wrote de Vera:
1. Reminding them that their house is on
his titled property, and
2. Asking them, whether they were going
to buy the portion occupied by them or
to lease the same on a yearly or
monthly basis.
But the letter of Ramos was ignored
by de Vera.
In 1983, Ramos filed a Complaint
against de Vera for recovery of property
against de Vera.
Issue:
W/N de Vera is a possessor and
builders in bad faith.
Held:
Yes.
Prior to the construction in 1983 of de
Vera, a demand letter dated Apr 27, 1981
was sent by Ramos to them, informing
them that the land they were possessing
and occupying is within his property.
Ramos gave de Vera the option to
either pay him the value of the property or
lease the same on a yearly or monthly
basis. However, the contending parties
failed to reach a compromise agreement.
The facts and circumstances are
"outward acts and proven conduct"
indicating bad faith of de Vera as
possessor and builder.
Under Art. 449 & 450, the landowner
has 3 alternative rights, either to:
1. Appropriate what has been built
without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor; or
2. Demand the builder to remove what
he had built; or
3. Compel the builder to pay the value of
the land.
Here, Ramos availed of the 2nd
alternative, which option is legally feasible
under the attendant facts and
circumstances.
Art. 448
Espinoza v. Mayandoc
GR 211170; Jul 03, 2017
2nd Division: Peralta, J
Facts:
Lot X located was originally owned by
Eusebio Espinoza.
 On July 9, 1977, a fictitious deed of sale
was executed by Cayabyab over Lot X in
favor of Mayandoc.
In 1997, Espinoza filed an action for
annulment of document against
Mayandoc.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
Espinoza and ordered Mayandoc to
reconvey Lot X.
Mayandoc filed a complaint for
reimbursement for useful expenses,
pursuant to Art. 448 and 546, alleging that
the house was built on Lot X in good faith
in 1995 and was finished in 1996.
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Mayandoc is a builder in good
faith.
Art. 448 applies when the builder
believes that he is the owner of the land or
that by some title he has the right to build
thereon, or has a claim of title thereto.
Art. 448 comes in to protect the
builder of their improvement without
causing injustice to the lot owner.
Art. 448 provided a just resolution of
the resulting "forced-ownership" by giving
the lot owners the option to acquire the
house after payment of the proper
indemnity or to oblige the builder to pay
for the lot.
The rule that the choice under Art.
448 belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless,
is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse
to exercise either option and compel
instead the owner of the building to
remove it from the land.
The raison d'etre for this provision has
been enunciated thus: Where the builder,
planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of
the land.
Therefore that there is a need to
remand the case to the RTC for further
proceedings, specifically, in assessing the
current fair market value of Lot X and
other matters that are appropriate in the
application of Art. 448, in relation to Art.
546 and 548.
Art. 453 – Bad Faith
Pada-Kilario v. CA
GR 134329; Jan 19, 2000
2nd Division: De Leon, JR., J p:
Facts:
Jacinto Pada had 6 children. He died
intestate. His estate included Lot 5581
with an area of 1,301.92 sqm.
During the lifetime of Jacinto, his half-
brother, Feliciano, obtained permission
from Jacinto to build a house on the
northern portion of Lot 5581.
FelicianoPastorVerona
Verona Kilario, one of Pastor's
children, has been living in said house
since 1960.
In May 1951, the heirs of Jacinto
entered into an EJ partition of his estate.
At the execution of the EJ partition,
Lot 5581 was allocated to Ananias and
Marciano [co-owners].
June 1978, Ananias Paderes
Nov 1993, Marciano Silverio Pada.
So, Silverio demanded that Verona
Kilario vacate Lot 5581.
Issue:
W/N Verona is a builder in bad faith.
Held:
Yes. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them.
Verily, persons whose occupation of a
realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners
are not possessors in good faith.
As such, Verona cannot be said to be
entitled to the value of the improvements
that they built on the said lot
Art. 449. Builder in Bad Faith
Geminiano v. CA
GR 120303; July 24, 1996
3rd Division: Davide, JR., J p:
Facts:
A lot [314 sqm] was originally owned
by Paulina Geminiano.
On 15 Nov 1978, Paulina executed a
contract of lease over a 126 sqm portion of
the lot, in favor of Mary Nicolas for
P40/month for 7 years.
So, Mary introduced improvements
and registered the house in her name.
After the expiration of the lease contract in
Nov 1985, however, Paulina refused to
accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot was the
subject of a suit, which resulted in its
acquisition in 1972 by Maria LeeLily
SalcedoDionisio.
Dionisio executed a Deed of Quitclaim
over said lot in favor of Federico, Paulina’s
son. So, the lot was registered in
Federico’s name. Federico sent a letter
addressed to Mary demanding that she
vacate.
Upon failure of Mary to heed the
demand, Federico filed with MTC a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Mary claims she is builder in good
faith, hence, Art. 448 should apply.
Issue:
Does Art. 448 apply?
Held:
No. Mary, as lessee who had
undisturbed possession for the entire term
under the lease, is estopped to deny her
landlord's title.
Being a mere lessee, Mary knew that
her occupation of the premises would
continue only for the life of the lease.
Plainly, she cannot be considered as a
possessor nor builder in good faith.
Art. 448 applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner
thereof.
Art. 448 does not apply where one's
only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract; otherwise, it would always
be in the power of the tenant to "improve"
his landlord out of his property.
There is no need to apply by analogy
the provisions of Art. 448. The rights of
Mary as lessee are governed by Art. 1678
which allows reimbursement to the extent
of ½ of the value of the useful
improvements.
Art. 449. Builder in Bad Faith
Congregation RVM v. CA
GR 126363; June 26, 1998
2nd Division: Martinez, J p:
Facts:
On Dec 1964, Gervacio sold to the
Congregation of RVM, Lot 5-A and 5-C.
In Oct 1989, Protasio purchased Lot 5-
B from Gervacio.
When Protasio had Lot 5-B surveyed
he discovered that 664 sqm of their 858
sqm property was fenced and occupied by
RVM. He also found out that a building and
gymnasium were constructed inside Lot 5-
B.
Issue:
Can RVM legally possess/occupy part
of Lot 5-B?

Held:
No. RVM has no right whatsoever to
possess and construct permanent
structures on Lot 5-B owned by Protasio.
RVM admitted that it introduced
improvements on Lot 5-B without the
consent and knowledge of Protasio. It is
thus a builder in bad faith.
Art. 452 – Both Builders in Bad Faith
Alviola v. CA
GR 117642; April 24, 1998
2nd Division: Martinez, J p:
Facts:
In 1950, Tinagan was the owner of 2
lots. In 1960, Alviola occupied portions
thereof. Alviola built a copra dryer and put
up a store where they engaged in the
business of buying and selling copra.
In 1988, Tinagan filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against Alviola.
RTC ruled in favor of Tinagan and
ordered Alviola to vacate and surrender
possession to Tinagan and remove the
store and dryer on the premises without
injury and prejudice to Tinagan.
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Alviola have been on the lot since
1961. However, their stay thereon was
merely by tolerance on the part of
Tinagan. Alviola were permitted by
Tinagan to build a copra dryer on the land.
There was bad faith on the part of
Alviola when they constructed the copra
dryer and store on the lot since they were
fully aware that the land belonged to
Tinagan.
There was also bad faith on the part of
Tinagans, having knowledge of the
construction of the copra dryer and store.
Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Art.
448 should be applied.
Issue:
W/N Art. 448 should apply.
Held:
No. The copra dryer and the store, as
determined by the RTC, are transferable in
nature. Thus, it would not fall within the
coverage of Art. 448.
Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly
explains: "To fall within the provision of
Art. 448, the construction must be of
permanent character, attached to the soil
with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a
transitory character or is transferable,
there is no accession, and the builder must
remove the construction. The proper
remedy of the landowner is an action to
eject the builder from the land."
Tinagan's action for recovery of
possession was the suitable solution to
eject Alviola from the premises.
Art. 449
NHA v. Baello
GR 200858; Aug 07, 2013
2nd Division: Carpio, J.:
Facts:
Sometime in the mid-70s, a truckload
of fully-armed military personnel entered
Baello lot covered by OCT 55839 and, at
gunpoint, forcibly ejected the family’s
caretaker.
The soldiers demolished a 2-storey
house and destroyed all fishpond
improvements on the lot.
From this period up till the end of the
Marcos misrule, no decree, no court order,
no ordinance was shown or made known
to Baello to justify the invasion, assault,
and occupation of their property.
Prudence dictated silence. From
government news reports, Baello gathered
that their land was seized to complement
the erstwhile First Lady’s Dagat-Dagatan
project.
Baello’s property thus came under the
control and possession of NHA.
The NHA went on to award portions of
the subject property to dubious
beneficiaries who quickly fenced their
designated lots and/or erected permanent
structures therein.
During all this time, no formal
communication from the NHA was
received by Baello. NHA acted as if the
registered owners or their heirs did not
exist at all.
The celebrated departure of the
conjugal dictators in Feb 1986 kindled
hopes that justice may at least come to the
Baellos.
Issue:
W/N NHA is a builder in bad faith.
Held:
Yes. NHA’s unlawful taking of Baello’s
properties is irretrievably characterized
by BAD FAITH, patent ARBITRARINESS
and grave abuse of discretion.
Having established that the NHA acted
in bad faith, Art. 449 applies in this case.
It states: Art. 449. He who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right of indemnity.
Thus, under Art. 449, the NHA is not
entitled to be reimbursed of the expenses
incurred in the development of Baello’s
property.
Art. 449
Padilla v. Malicsi
GR 201354; Sep 21, 2016
2nd Division: Leonen, J.:
Facts:
Padilla is the registered owner of a lot
covered by TCT T-45565.
In 1998, Padilla discovered that
Malicsi, et al. constructed houses on the
lot.
On Aug 2007, Padilla filed a complaint
for recovery of possession against Malicsi.
Malicsi claimed that:
1. They did so only after receiving De
Mossessgeld's permission.
2. De Mossessgeld agreed that she would
sell them the areas occupied by their
houses.
3. They constructed houses on the lot in
the belief that they would eventually
own the areas they were occupying.
4. They first found out about Padilla's
claim of ownership in 2002.
On Sep 2008, a commission was
created to determine the actual valuation
of lot and improvements.
The Commission found that "the
prevailing valuation of similar lots in the
vicinity had an average valuation of
P5000/sqm."
On Jan 2009, Padilla, exercising their
option to sell the land under Art. 448 for
P5,000/sqm, filed a Motion and
Manifestation with Offer to Sell. Malicsi
did not accept the offer to sell.
Later, RTC ruled that Malicsi are
builders in bad faith.
Issue:
W/N Malicsi are builders in bad faith.
Held:
Yes. A builder in good faith is a builder
who was not aware of a defect or flaw in
his title when he introduced
improvements on a lot that turns out to be
owned by another.
nMalicsi claim to be builders in good
faith because they believed that the lot
was owned by De Mossessgeld.
If Malicsi had checked with the ROD,
they would have easily discovered that it
was titled to Padilla as early as 1963 under
TCT T-8303.
 Hence Malicsi "cannot claim good faith
when they constructed their houses
thereon in 1980 and 1983.
As builders in bad faith, Malicsi have
no right to recover their expenses over the
improvements they have introduced to
Padilla' lot under Art. 449
Under Art. 452, a BBF is entitled to
recoup the necessary expenses incurred
for the preservation of the land. But,
Malicsi did not present evidence to show
that they made improvements for
preservation of the land.
Hence, Padilla became the owners of
the improvements, including the houses
constructed by Malicsi, if they chose to
appropriate the accessions.
However, they could instead choose
the demolition of the improvements at
Malicsi's expense or compel Malicsi to pay
the price of the land under Art. 450.
Whether Padilla choose to
appropriate the improvements, compel
their demolition, or compel Malicsi to pay
the price of the land, they are entitled to
damages under Art. 451.
Considering that Padilla pray for the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision
ordering Malicsi to vacate the lot and
surrender its possession to them, Padilla
are deemed to have chosen to appropriate
the improvements built on their lot
without any obligation to pay indemnity to
Malicsi.
Art. 457. Accretion
Vda. De Nazareno v. CA
GR 98045; June 26, 1996
2nd Division: Romero, J p:
Facts:
The subject of this controversy is a
parcel of land. Said land was formed as a
result of sawdust dumped into the dried-
up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of
the Cagayan River.
Nazareno caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan with a
view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him.
Nazareno claims that the subject land
is private land being an accretion to his
titled property, applying Art. 457
Issue:
Does Nazareno own the subject land
by accretion?
Held:
No, the land in controversy is public
land.
Art. 457, requires the concurrence of
these requisites:
1. The deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible;
2. It be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and
3. The land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks or rivers
These are called the rules on alluvion
which if present in a case, give to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of
waters.
However, Nazareno admits that the
accretion was formed by the dumping of
boulders, soil and other filling materials
on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the accumulation of such boulders, soil
and other filling materials was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action of
the waters or the current of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River.
Therefore, the accretion was man-
made or artificial.
Art. 457. Natural Accretion
Art. 461. Change in Course of Rivers
Bagaipo v. CA
GR 116290; Dec 8, 2000
2nd Division: Quisumbing, J p:
Facts:
Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot
415, in Ma-a, Davao City.
Lozano is the owner of a lot across
Bagaipo's lot facing the Davao River..
On May 1989, Bagaipo filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession
against Lozano for the recovery of a land
area measuring 37,901 sqm which
Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao
River traversed her property.
Bagaipo contended that as a result of a
change in course of the said river, her
property became divided into 3 lots,
namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
Lozano insisted that:
1. The land claimed by Bagaipo is actually
an accretion to their titled property.
2. Davao River did not change its course
and that the reduction in Bagaipo's
domain was caused by gradual erosion
due to the current of the Davao River.
3. It is also because of the river's natural
action that silt slowly deposited and
added to his land over a long period of
time.
RTC conducted an ocular inspection. It
concluded that the applicable law is Art.
457 and not Art. 461. The reduction in the
land area of Bagaipo was caused by
erosion and not by a change in course of
Davao River.
Issue:
Is the RTC correct?
Held:
Yes. The decrease in land area was
brought about by erosion and not a change
in the river's course.
This conclusion was reached after RTC
judge observed during ocular inspection
that the banks located on Bagaipo's land
are sharp, craggy and very much higher
than the land on the other side of the river.
Additionally, the riverbank on
Lozano's side is lower and gently sloping.
The lower land therefore naturally
received the alluvial soil carried by the
river current.
The decrease in Bagaipo's land area
and the corresponding expansion of
Lozano's property were the combined
effect of erosion and accretion
respectively.
Hence, Art. 461 is inapplicable.
Bagaipo cannot claim ownership over the
old abandoned riverbed because the same
is inexistent. The riverbed's former
location cannot even be pinpointed with
particularity since the movement of the
Davao River took place gradually over an
unspecified period of time, up to the
present.
The requisites under Art. 457 were
sufficiently proven in favor of Lozano.
In the absence of evidence that the
change in the course of the river was
sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and was caused by
alluvium and erosion.
Art. 457. Accretion
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
GR 68166; February 12, 1997
Hermosisima, J p:
Facts:
Pascual applied for registration of a
14-hectare lot which he claims was
formed by alluvium.
The land sought to be registered was
formed at the northern tip of Pascual’s
land. His registered lot is bounded on the:
1. East by the Talisay River,
2. West by the Bulacan River, and
3. North by the Manila Bay.
The Talisay River and the Bulacan
River flow down towards the Manila Bay
and act as boundaries of Pascual’s land on
the east and on the west.
Anchoring his claim of ownership on
Art. 457, Pascual argues that 14-hectare
land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
which run their course on the eastern and
western boundaries, respectively, of
Pascual’s own tract of land.
Issue:
May the land sought to be registered
be deemed an accretion in the sense that it
naturally accrues in favor of the riparian
owner?
Held:
No. The title of Pacual’s lot reveals its
northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay.
Pascual’s land adjoins Manila Bay and not
any of the two rivers.
If the accretion were to be attributed
to the action of either river, the alluvium
should have been deposited on either or
both of the eastern and western
boundaries of Pascual’s lot, not on the
northern portion thereof which is adjacent
to the Manila Bay.
As such, the applicable law is not Art.
457 but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.
The trees planted by Pascual in 1948
became a sort of strainer of the sea water
and at the same time a kind of block to the
strained sediments from being carried
back to the sea by the very waves that
brought them to the former shore at the
end of the dike, which must have caused
the shoreline to recede and dry up
eventually raising the former shore
leading to the formation of the land in
question.
The combined and interactive effect of
the planting of trees, the withdrawal of the
waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting
in the drying up of its former foreshore,
and the regular torrential action of the
waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of
the disputed land on the northern
boundary of Pascual’s own tract of land.
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking,
distinct from littoral owners, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore
of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
Art. 457 – Natural Accretion
Art. 461 – Change in Course of Rivers
Agustin v. IAC
GR 66075-76; July 5, 1990
1st Division: Griño-Aquino, J p:
Facts:
The Cagayan River separates the
towns of Solana on the west and
Tuguegarao on the east.
Lands EAST of the River:
1. 1919 – lands east of the river were
covered by the Tuguegarao
Cadastre
2. 1927 – OCT 5472 was issued to
Agustin
Lands WEST of the River
1. 1950, all lands west of the river were
included in the Solana Cadastre.
2. Owners were Binayug
As the years went by, the Cagayan
River moved gradually eastward,
depositing silt on the western bank. The
shifting of the river and the siltation
continued until 1968.
Through these years, the Cagayan
River eroded Agustin's Lot, depositing the
alluvium as accretion on the land
possessed by Binayug on the western
bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the
Cagayan River changed its course,
returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the
process, cut across the lands of Binayug
whose lands were transferred on the
eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river.
To cultivate those lots they had to cross
the river.
In April 1969, while Binayug were
planting corn on their lots located on the
eastern side of the Cagayan River, Agustin
claimed the same lands as his own and
drove away Binayug from the premises.
Binayug filed complaints to recover
their lots and their accretions.
Issue:
What was the effect of the accretion
that gradually took place?
Held:
Binayug are benefited.
Accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present:
1. The deposit be gradual and
imperceptible;
2. It resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and
3. The land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the bank of a river
All these requisites of accretion are
present in this case for:
Cagayan River moved year by year
from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years.
Within this period, the alluvium
deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of
Binayug.
Still the addition in every year is
imperceptible in nature. One could not
discern it but can be measured after the
lapse of a certain time.
The lot of Binayug grew from its
original area of 18 hectares, by an
additional 50 hectares through alluvium as
the Cagayan River gradually moved east.
These accretions belong to riparian
owners upon whose lands the alluvial
deposits were made.
The reason for this principle is
because, if lands bordering on streams are
exposed to floods and other damage due to
the destructive force of the waters, and if
by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or
dangers as may prejudice the owners
thereof should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion.
Issue:
What was the effect in the sudden
change in the course of the river?
Held:
Binayug’s ownership of the accretion
to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of
the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed and separated
or transferred said accretions to the other
side (or eastern bank) of the river. Art. 459
and 463 apply to this situation.
Here, the sudden change of course of
the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the
lands of Binayug to be "separated from the
estate by the current." Binayug have
retained the ownership of the portion that
was transferred by avulsion to the other
side of the river.
Art. 457
New Regent v. Tanjuatco
GR 168800; April 16, 2009
2nd Division:
Facts:
New Regent (NR) filed a Complaint for
Rescission against Tanjuatco.
NR alleged that in 1994, it authorized
Vicente Cuevas, its President, to apply on
its behalf, for the acquisition of 2 lots by
virtue of its right of accretion.
Cuevas purportedly applied for the
lots in his name with the Bureau of Lands.
Pending approval of the application with
the BOL, Cuevas assigned his right to
Tanjuatco.
The Director approved the transfer of
rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. TCT T-
369406 and T-369407 were then issued in
the name of Tanjuatco.
NR anchors its claim over the lots on
the right of accretion.
Issue:
W/N NR owned the lots purportedly
formed by accretion.
Held:
No. Accretion as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 requires the
concurrence of the following requisites:
1. that the deposition of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible;
2. that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and
3. that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian
owner in order to enjoy the benefits of
accretion.
One who claims the right of accretion
must show by preponderant evidence that
he has met all the conditions of the law.
NR has notably failed in this regard as
it did not offer any evidence to prove that
it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands
from OCT 245 registered in the name of
the RP. Said lots formed part of the Dried
San Juan River Bed, which under Art.
502(1) of the Civil Code rightly pertains to
the public dominion.
The Certification issued by Forester III
Leviste confirms that said lots were
verified to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Project 11-B of Calamba,
Laguna per BFD LC Map 3004, certified
and declared as such on Sep 28, 1981.
Clearly, the Republic had every right to
transfer ownership thereof to Tanjuatco.
Art. 457
Office of City Mayor v. Ebio
GR 178411; June 23, 2010
3rd Division: Villarama, J
Facts:
Road Lot 8 [RL8] [291 sqm], owned by
GHI was donated by GHI to the City of
Parañaque in 1966.
Because RL8 was adjoining the Cut-
cut creek, a 408 sqm lot was formed by
accretion through the years.
Vitalez possessed the accreted lot
since 1930.
In 1987, Vitalez transferred his rights
in the accreted lot to Ebio.
In 1999, Ebio discovered that the City
was planning to construct an access road
along Cut-cut Creek. The proposed road
will traverse the lot occupied by Ebio. Ebio
immediately registered opposition
thereto.
In 2005, the City ordered Ebio to
vacate the area within the next 30 days, or
be physically evicted.
City argues that since the creek, being
a tributary of the river, it is classified as
part of the public domain, and any land
that may have formed along its banks
through time should also be considered as
part of the public domain.
Issue:
W/N Ebio can be evicted from the lot.
Held:
No. The lot was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek.
Therefore, the law that governs ownership
over the accreted portion is Art. 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect in relation to Art. 457.
Art. 84 reads: “Accretions deposited
gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong
to the owners of such lands.”
Therefore, alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by
law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a
property of public dominion, the land
which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.
Since, for more than 30 years, neither
GHI nor the City sought to register the
accreted portion, Ebio is deemed to have
acquired ownership over the accreted lot
through prescription.
Ebio can assert such right despite the
fact that they have yet to register their title
over the said lot. It must be remembered
that the purpose of land registration is not
the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land.
Registration was never intended as a
means of acquiring ownership. A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not
confer, ownership.
Art. 457
Heirs of Narvasa v. Imbornal
GR 182908; Aug 06, 2014
2nd Division: Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
Basilia Imbornal had 4 children:
1. Alejandra  Francisco Narvasa
2. Balbina  Petra
3. Catalina married to Ciriaco
4. Pablo  Victoriano Imbornal
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a
lot with an area of 4,144 sqm (Sabangan
property), which she conveyed to her 3
daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina
sometime in 1920.
Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco, applied
for and was granted a homestead patent
over a 31,367-sqm riparian land
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga
River.
Ciriano was eventually awarded
Homestead Patent and on Dec 5, 1933,
OCT 1462 was issued in his name.
On May 10, 1973, OCT 1462 was
cancelled, and TCT 101495was issued in
the name of Ciriaco’s heirs.
Ciriaco and his heirs had since
occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while Victoriano occupied the
southern portion.
Motherland
Ciriaco
Victoriano
Cayanga River
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion,
approximately 59,772 sqm in area,
adjoined the southern portion of the
Motherland.
On Aug 15, 1952, OCT P-318 was
issued in the name of Victoriano covering
the First Accretion.
In 1971, the Second Accretion, with an
area of 32,307 sqm, abutted the First
Accretion on its southern portion.
On Nov 10, 1978, OCT 21481 was
issued in the names of all Pablo’s heirs
covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the Motherland,
Francisco, Petra, et al., as the children of
Alejandra and Balbina, filed on Feb 27,
1984 a Complaint for reconveyance,
partition, and damages against Victoriano
[son of Pablo].
 Francisco, et al. alleged that through
deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, Victoriano, with
respect to the First Accretion, and Pablo’s
heirs collectively, with regard to the
Second Accretion, had illegally registered
the said accretions in their names, despite
the fact that they were not the riparian
owners.
Issue:
W/N Francisco, et al, have proprietary
rights over the 1st and 2nd accretion.
Held:
No. Francisco, et al. are not the riparian
owners of the Motherland to which the
First Accretion had attached, hence, they
cannot assert ownership over the First
Accretion.
As the Second Accretion had merely
attached to the First Accretion, they also
have no right over the Second Accretion.
Neither were they able to show that
they acquired these properties through
prescription as it was not established that
they were in possession of any of them.
Therefore, whether through accretion
or, independently, through prescription,
the discernible conclusion is that
Francisco et al.’s claim of title over the
First and Second Accretions had not been
substantiated, and, as a result, said
properties cannot be reconveyed in their
favor.
Art. 457
Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo
GR 214587, Feb 26, 2018
2nd Division: Peralta, J.:
Facts:
Lot 2076, total area of 101,897 sqm:
1. OCT 24435 – registered in the name of
Ana Peralta
2. Jan 13, 1975 – registered as TCT T-
5547 in the name Jose Peralta upon
demise of Ana
3. Jose divided it into Lots 2076-A and
2076-B
4. Jose sold Lot 2076-B.
5. Nov 17, 1975 - Lot 2076-A was
registered as TCT 6166 in Jose's name.
Meanwhile, allegedly through
accretion, land was added to Lot 2076.
Accreted area:
1. 1945 – First occupied by and declared
for taxation purposes (TD 6466) in the
name of Ignacio [Peralta’s tenant]
2. March 14, 1955 - Ignacio executed a
Quitclaim in Jose Peralta's favor.
3. When Jose died, Lot 2076-A, and the
supposed area of accretion, was
transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta.
4. Sep 1, 1983 – TCT T-13140 was issued
for Lot 2076-A in the name of Juanito
5. The area of accretion was and
registered under TD’s in the names of
siblings Juanito, Javier, Julius Peralta,
and Josephine delos Reyes.
Issue:
W/N Peralta are the owners of the
accreted area.
Held:
No. Peralta did not register the subject
increment under their names.
An accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the
lot that receives such accretion is covered
by a Torrens Title.
Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code;
imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Act does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and, thereafter, protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties. But to obtain this protection, the
land must be placed under the operation
of the registration laws, wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided.
Moreover, even the character of the
land subject of the accretion is highly
questionable.
Accretion is the process whereby the
soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.
The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks
of rivers.
Here, Ignacio characterized the land in
question as swampy and its increase in
size as the effect of the change of the
shoreline of the Visayan Sea, and not
through the gradual deposits of soil
coming from the river or the sea.
In addition, the DENR has remained
firm and consistent in classifying the area
as land of the public domain for being part
of either the Visayan Sea of the Sooc
Riverbed and is reached by tide water.
Hence, the questionable character of
the land, which could most probably be
part of the public domain, indeed bars Jose
from validly transferring the increment to
any of his successors.
Art. 472 - Mixture
Santos v. Bernabe
GR 31163; November 6, 1929
En Banc: Villa-Real, J p:
Facts:
There were deposited in Jose
Bernabe's warehouse by:
1. Urbano Santos – 778 cavans of palay
2. Pablo Tiongson – 1,026 cavans of
palay
On March 20, 1928, Tiongson filed a
complaint against Bernabe, to recover the
1,026 cavans of palay deposited in
Bernabe's warehouse.
The application of Tiongson for a writ
of attachment was granted, and Sheriff
attached the 924 cavans of palay found in
Bernabe’s warehouse.
It does not appear that the sacks of
palay of Santos and those of Tiongson,
deposited in Bernabe's warehouse, bore
any marks or signs, nor were they
separated one from the other.
Issue:
W/N Tiongson owns the 924 cavans of
palay.
Held:
No. The 778 cavans of palay belonging
to Santos, having been mixed with the
1,026 cavans of palay belonging to
Tiongson in Bernabe's warehouse; the
sheriff having found only 924 cavans of
palay in said warehouse at the time of the
attachment thereof; and there being no
means of separating from said 924 cavans
of palay belonging to Santos and those
belonging to Pablo, Art. 472 for cases of
this nature, is applicable.
We take the proportion of the 924
cavans of palay which were attached and
sold, thereby giving:
1. Santos, who deposited 778 cavans
owns 398.49 cavans
2. Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans,
owns 525.51 cavans
Art. 476. Quieting of Title
Heirs of Olviga v. CA
GR 104813; Oct 21, 1993
1st Division: Griño-Aquino, J
Facts:
Lot 13, was, in 1950, still forest land
when Eutiquio, then only 12 years old, and
his father cleared and cultivated it.
1. In 1954 – they introduced
improvements such as, coconut trees,
 jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and
bananas.
2. In 1956 – when the area was released
for disposition, the Bureau of Lands
surveyed the same in the name of
Eutiquio.
3. In 1960 - Eutiquio filed a homestead
application over Lot 13.
4. In 1961 – without his application
having been acted upon, Eutiquio
transferred his rights in said lot to
Cornelio Glor.
5. However, neither the homestead
application of Eutiquio nor the
proposed transfer of his rights to Glor
was acted upon by the Director of
Lands for reasons not disclosed.
6. In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a
registered title for Lot 13 in a cadastral
proceeding, in fraud of the rights of
Eutiquio and his transferee, Glor, who
was the real and actual occupant of Lot
13.
Olviga claimed both Lots 12 and 13,
which are adjoining lots, in the same
cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted
to mention the fact that other persons
were in possession of, and claiming
adverse interest in, Lot 13 and that the
land had been surveyed for Eutiquio.
As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were
declared as uncontested in the name of
Jose Olviga and were registered in his
name in 1967. Olviga later transferred Lot
13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila and
daughter, Lolita.
Jaime and Lolita have never been in
possession. Glor was the one found to be
in possession of the property.
Glor filed a case for reconveyance of
Lot 13 against Olviga.
Issue:
What kind of an action is it?
Held:
It is an action to quiet title.
Issue:
Has the action prescribed?
Issue:
No. One who is in actual possession of
a piece of land claiming to be owner
thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being that his
undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Here, Glor and his PII were in actual
possession of the property since 1950.
Their undisturbed possession gave them
the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to determine the nature of
the adverse claim of Olviga, who in 1988
disturbed their possession.
Art. 476. Quieting of Title
Metrobank v. Alejo
GR 141970; Sep 10, 2001
3rd Division: Panganiban, J p:
Facts:
Spouses Acampado obtained loans
from Metrobank in the amounts of P5M
and P2M.
As security, Acampado executed in
favor of Metrobank a REM over a lot
registered in their names covered by TCT
V-41319.
On June 1996, Sy filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of TCT V-41319
against Acampado with the RTC.
Despite being the registered
mortgagee of the lot covered by TCT V-
41319, Metrobank was not made a party
to the Sy complaint nor was it notified of
its existence.
 Later, Acampado defaulted in the
payment of their loan. Metrobank initiated
EJ foreclosure proceedings over the lot.
The sheriff conducted an auction sale
of the lot, and Metrobank submitted the
highest and winning bid.
A Certificate of Sale was issued in its
favor. This sale was entered in the
Registry of Deeds.
When the redemption period lapsed,
Metrobank executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership to enable the
ROD to issue a new TCT in its name.
However, ROD informed Metrobank of
the existence of the RTC Decision in CC
4930-V-96, annulling TCT V-41319.
Metrobank filed with CA a Petition for
Annulment of the RTC Decision.
CA ruled that Metrobank ought to
have filed, instead an action for quieting of
title.
Issue:
W/N a petition to quiet title the correct
remedy for Metrobank.
Held:
No.
Sy filed this case for declaration of
nullity of TCT V-41319, which was decided
without first giving Metrobank an
opportunity to be heard.
Metrobank focused on the judgment in
CC 4930-V-96 which adversely affected it,
and which it therefore sought to annul.
Filing an action for quieting of title
will not remedy what it perceived as a
disregard of due process; it is therefore
not an appropriate remedy.
Equally important, an action for
quieting of title is filed only when there is
a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein.
As defined, a "cloud on title is a
semblance of title which appears in some
legal form but which is in fact unfounded."
In this case, the RTC judgment cannot
be considered as a cloud on Metrobank's
title or interest over the lot covered by
TCT V-41319, which does not even have a
semblance of being a title.
It would not be proper to consider the
RTC judgment as a cloud that would
warrant the filing of an action for quieting
of title, because to do so would require the
court hearing the action to modify or
interfere with the judgment or order of
another co-equal court.
Clearly, an action for quieting of title is
not an appropriate remedy in this case.
Art. 476 - Quieting of Title
Secuya v. Vda. De Selma
GR 136021; Feb 22, 2000
3rd Division: Panganiban, J p:
Facts according to Secuya
1. Lot 5679 [12,750 sqm] was originally
sold to Maxima Caballero.
2. Maxima entered into that agreement
with Paciencia Sabellona, whereby
Maxima bound herself and parted
with 1/3 of Lot 5679 in favor of
Paciencia.
3. Pacencia sold 3,000 sqm thereof to
Secuya on Oct 1953, by means of a
private document which was lost.
4. Secuya took physical possession of the
lot;
5. In 1975, Selma bought a portion of Lot
5679 consisting of 9,302 sqm.
6. The 3,000-sqm occupied by Secuya, is
embraced and included within the
boundary of the acquisition by Selma;
7. Selma lodged a complaint against
Secuya as Selma was asserting
ownership over the lot which Secuya
had long been in possession . . . in
concept of owner.
8. Secuya filed a case for quieting of title
against Selma. He alleges that the
claim of Selma is a cloud on their title.
Selma's version of the facts’
 She is the registered owner of Lot
5679-C-120 consisting of 9,302 sqm as
evidenced by T-35678, having bought the
same in Feb 1975 from Cesaria Caballero
as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale
and has been in possession of the same
since then.
Cesaria was the widow of Silvestre
Aro, registered owner of Lot 5679 with an
area of 12,750 sqm as shown by TCT 4752.
Upon Silvestre's demise, his heirs
executed an EJP and Deed of Absolute
Sale" wherein ½ plus 1/5 of Lot 5679 was
adjudicated to his widow, Cesaria, from
whom Selma derives title.
Issue:
Does Secuya have the requisite title
that would enable him to avail of the
remedy of quieting of title?
Held:
No. In an action to quiet title, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a legal or
subject real property. Likewise, he must
show that the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud
on his title is in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Secuya insists that Paciencia sold the
disputed lot to Secuya on Oct 1953, and
that the sale was embodied in a private
document. However, such which would
have been the best evidence of the
transaction, was never presented in court,
allegedly because it had been lost. While a
sale of land in a private deed is binding
between the parties, it cannot be
considered binding on 3rd persons, if not
embodied in a public instrument and
registered.
While Secuya could not present the
purported deed evidencing the transaction
between Paciencia and Dalmacio, Selma in
contrast has the necessary documents to
support her claim to the disputed
property.
Art. 476. Quieting of Title
Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo
GR 167848; Apr 27, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts:
San Pablo spouses are the registered
owners of a lot.
On Dec 1994, Santos obtained a loan
from Direct Funders in the amount of
P1,064,000.40.
As a security for the loan obligation,
San Pablo executed a SPA in favor of
Santos, authorizing Santos to mortgage to
DF the lot registered under San Pablo.
In the Deed of REM, San Pablo spouses
signed as co-mortgagors of Santos. It was,
however, clear between the parties that
the loan obligation was for the sole benefit
of Santos and San Pablo merely signed the
deed to accommodate him.
Upon learning that Santos’ debt with
DF had been fully settled, San Pablo
demanded from Santos to turn over to
them the TCT but Santos failed to do so
despite repeated demands.
Such refusal prompted San Pablo to
inquire as to the status of the TCT with the
ROD and to their surprise, they discovered
that the lot was again used by Santos as
collateral for another loan he secured from
the Bank of Commerce.
As shown in the annotation stamped
at the back of the title, San Pablo
purportedly authorized Santos to
mortgage the lot to the BOC, as evidenced
by the SPA allegedly signed by San Pablo
on Mar 1995. It was further shown from
the annotation that San Pablo signed a
Deed of REM over the lot in favor of BOC,
which they never did.
San Pablo, filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title.
Issue:
 W/N the action for quieting of title
will proper.
Held:
Yes. The primary object of San Pablo
in filing the same was to effectively free
the title of their property from any
unauthorized lien imposed upon it.
An action for quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property.
The mortgage of the lot to BOC,
annotated on Pablo’s TCT, constitutes a
cloud on their title to the lot, which may, at
first, appear valid and effective, but is
allegedly invalid or voidable for having
been made without their knowledge and
authority as registered owners.
Art. 476. Quieting of Title
Bituin v. Caoleng
GR 157567; Aug 10, 2007
1st Division: Azcuna, J.:
Facts:
Lot 3661 was originally owned by
siblings Juan and Epifania Romero.
The Caolengs are the heirs of Juan
while the Bituins are the heirs of Epifania.
On Oct 1989, Bituin filed a Complaint
for “Quieting of Title before the RTC
against Caoleng.
Bituin alleged that due to stealth and
high-handed machination, Teofilo Caoleng
succeeded in securing a title for Lot 3661
by fraudulently stating that it was owned
only by his late father, Agustin Caoleng.
Bituin aver that:
1. They are entitled to the ½ share of Lot
3661 as the only surviving heirs of
Juan Romero.
2. The other ½ belongs to Caoleng as
heirs of Epifania.
3. Bituin have been in the actual,
physical, material, and continuous
possession of a great part of Lot 3661
since time immemorial.
Issue:
W/N the action for quieting of title
prescribed.
Held:
No. If the person claiming to be the
owner of the property is in actual
possession thereof, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet
title to the property, does not prescribe.
Caoleng did not controvert Bituin’s
allegations that they are in possession of a
large portion of Lot 3661.
If Caoleng were truly the owners of
Lot 3661, why did they allow Bituin to stay
there for such a long period of time?
All this time that Bituin introduced
improvements on the land in controversy,
Caoleng did not oppose or complain about
the improvements.
Art. 476 - Quieting of Title
Efren Tandog v. Renato Macapagal
GR 144208; Sep 11, 2007
1st Division: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts:
Tandog, et al claim that they and their
PII have been in actual, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of a
147,991 sqm lot since time immemorial.
Tandog trace their rights to Policarpio,
who died in 1945. Tandog claim that they
have continued possessing and cultivating
the land.
When Tandog decided to apply for the
judicial registration of the lot, they found
that portions thereof have been occupied
by Calderon.
Tandog filed with the RTC a complaint
for quieting of title.
Calderon denied Tandog’s
allegations. She alleged that:
1. She and her husband bought their
property in 1958
2. Since then, has been in possession of
the same.
3. She planted trees and crops thereon
4. She paid the realty taxes.
5. She does not know Tandog who are all
strangers in the place.
Tandog contend that the allegations of
Calderon that they purchased the lot are
judicial admissions which they (Tandog)
consider as cloud upon their interest in
the disputed property.
Issue:
W/N the action for quieting of title
will prosper.
Held:
No. As a general rule, a cloud which
may be removed by suit to quiet title is not
created by mere verbal or parol assertion
of ownership of or an interest in property.
This rule is subject to qualification,
where there is a written or factual basis
for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of
right based on acquisitive prescription or
adverse possession has been held to
constitute a removable cloud on title.
While Tandog alleged that Calderon’s
claim of adverse possession is a cloud on
Tandog’s interest in the land, however,
such allegation has not been proved.
It is important that Tandog must first
establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. Tandog failed
to do so. Parenthetically, they did not
present any evidence to prove that
Casimiro Policarpio “existed” and that he
is their PII.
Art. 476
Green Acres v. Cabral
GR 175542 & 183205; June 05, 2013
1st Division: Villarama, J
Facts:
Victoria Cabral was the original owner
of a lot covered by TCT T-73737.
1. Mar 23, 1993 – The lot was placed
under PD 27, and Emancipation
Patents were issued to Moraga.
2. Aug 29, 1994 – Cabral filed a complaint
before PARAD seeking cancellation of
Emancipation Patents
3. Dec 15, 1995 – PARAD dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
4. Cabral appealed to the DARAB.
5. MoragaFilconGreen Acres
6. Jan 17, 2001 – DARAB rendered
judgment in favor of Cabral.
7. On Apr 19, 2001 – Green Acres filed a
Complaint for Quieting of Title against
Cabral, Moraga, Filcon.
Green Acres sought to quiet its title
and alleged that it is a purchaser in good
faith and for value, claiming that:
1. It had no notice or knowledge of any
adverse claim, lien, or encumbrance on
the properties.
2. It was not a party to the DARAB
proceedings
3. The DARAB decision casts a cloud on
its titles.
Issue:
W/N the DARAB Decision in
favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud
on Green Acres’ title over the lot.
Held:
Yes.
For an action to quiet title to prosper,
2 requisites must concur: (1) P has a legal
or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
There is no dispute as to the first
requisite since Green Acres has legal title
over the lot.
There is also a cloud on Green Acres’
title.
The DARAB decision is:
An instrument – a document which
gives formal expression to a legal act or
agreement, for the purpose of creating,
securing, modifying or terminating a right.
A record – a written account of some
act, court proceeding, transaction or
instrument drawn up under authority of
law, by a proper officer, and designed to
remain as a memorial or permanent
evidence of the matters to which it relates.
A “claim” – a cause of action or a
demand for money or property.
Here Cabral is asserting her right over the
lots.
A “proceeding” – a regular progress in
form of law including all possible steps in
an action.
Also, the DARAB decision:
Is valid and effective. It is a final
decision that has not been reversed,
vacated or nullified.
May be prejudicial to Green Acres’
titles since it orders the cancellation of the
titles of Moraga and Filcon all from which
Green Acres derived its titles.
However, the DARAB decision
ineffective and unenforceable against
Green Acres because Green Acres was not
properly impleaded in the DARAB
proceedings nor was there any notice of lis
pendens annotated on the title of Filcon so
as to serve notice to Green Acres that the
subject properties were under litigation.
As such, Green Acres is an innocent
purchaser for value.
Hence, the titles registered in the
name of Green Acres are
declared VALID and any cloud over such
titles which may have been created by the
Decision dated Jan 17, 2001 of the DARAB
is hereby REMOVED.
Art. 476
Extremadura v. Extremadura
GR 211065; June 15, 2016
1 Division: Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
st
Facts:
Jose Extremadura filed an action for
quieting of title against his brother,
Manuel. Jose alleged that:
1. He purchased 3 lots from his aunt,
Corazon, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated Dec 18, 1984.
2. Since he resided in Manila, he placed
one lot [3,4945 sqm], in Manuel's care,
in exchange for which, Manuel
religiously delivered the produce of
said land from 1984 until 1995.
3. Unfortunately, Manuel now refuses to
deliver the produce of the land or
vacate the same despite his repeated
demands
Manuel averred that the deed of
absolute sale presented by Jose is not the
legal or beneficial title contemplated by
Art. 476.
Issue:
W/N Jose has equitable title.
Held:
Yes. In order for an action for quieting
of title to prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject matter of the action. Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while
equitable title means beneficial
ownership.
Jose satisfactorily established his
equitable title over the lot entitling him –
and his SII - to the removal of the cloud or
doubt thereon, particularly, the claim of
respondents that they are the owners
thereof.
Equitable title has been defined as "a
title derived through a valid contract or
relation, and based on recognized equitable
principles”.
In order that a plaintiff may draw to
himself an equitable title, he must show
that the one from whom he derives his
right had himself a right to transfer.
In this case, Jose's title to the lot was
derived through a contract of sale, as
evidenced by a notarized document
denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale
dated Dec 18, 1984, whereby the previous
owner, Corazon, transferred the lot to Jose
for P6T for which Jose duly paid27 the
required capital gains tax.
That Corazon had the right to transfer
the land by virtue of her ownership
thereof was clearly established during the
trial.
Art. 476
Heirs of Castillejos v. La Tondeña
GR 190158; July 20, 2016
3rd Division: Reyes, J.:
Facts:
On Sep 16, 1997, La Tondeña [LTI]
filed a Complaint4 for Quieting of Title,
against Liberato Castillejos.
In its complaint, LTI averred that:
1. It is the absolute owner of 2 lots,
covered by TD’s issued by the
Provincial Assessor of La Union in
1994, 1985, 1980, 1974, 1959, and
1953.
2. On May 29, 1991, Liberato, through
stealth, misrepresentation and
deliberate fraud, maliciously executed
an affidavit of ownership over the
subject lots and presented the same to
the Provincial Assessor of La Union
who, in turn, issued in his name TD’s
on May 31, 1991.
3. By itself and through its PII, it has been
in continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of the subject lots
through time immemorial.
Issue:
W/N the action will prosper.
Held:
No. An action to quiet title to property
or to remove a cloud thereon is a remedy
or form of proceeding originating in equity
jurisprudence.
The plaintiff in such an action seeks
for adjudication that any adverse claim of
title or interest in the property in question
is invalid, so that the plaintiff and those
claiming under him or her may forever be
free from any danger of the hostile claim."
For the action to prosper, 2 requisites
must concur, viz:
1. P must have a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the
action; and
2. The deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a
cloud P’s title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
In this case, no clear and concrete
evidence is extant from the records that
the properties covered by Liberato's TD
26682 and 26683 are the same parcels of
land described in LTI's TDs.
The boundaries, nature and
classification of the land claimed by the
parties appear to be different.
LTI failed to illustrate, prove or even
allege which portion of the land covered
by its TD was allegedly encroached upon
by Liberato's TD 26682 and 26683. It did
not submit a technical description or
survey report to identify the exact
locations of the property it claims vis-avis
the one claimed by Liberato.
 Considering that the claim of
overlapping has not been clearly
established, SC deems it appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC for the
conduct of a verification/relocation survey
under the direction and supervision of the
Land Management Bureau of the DENR.
In the event that LTI's claim of
encroachment is found to be correct, the
corresponding adjustment in the metes
and bounds of Liberato's property should
be reflected in TD 26682 and 26683,
which will then have to be partially, if not
totally voided, and the corresponding
amendment as to the precise area and
technical description be made.
Art. 476
Ocampo v. Ocampo
GR 227894; July 05, 2017
3rd Division: Velasco
Facts:
Jose and Ricardo Ocampo are
brothers.
On June 29, 1991, Ricardo filed an
action for partition and annulment of TCT
102822 against Jose.
Ricardo alleged that:
1. He and Jose are co owners of Lot X left
by their parents, originally registered
under TCT 36869.
2. Jose and his wife, Andrea, conspired in
falsifying his signature on a notarized
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Waiver
dated Sep 1970, and effecting the
transfer of Lot X in the name of Jose
under TCT 102822, which was issued
on Nov 24, 1970.
3. Based on a finding by the NBI that
Ricardo's signature was forged, an
Information was filed against Jose.
4. Ricardo requested for partition of Lot
X, but Jose refused to do so and
secretly mortgaged Lot X for P200,000.
Jose, in his Answer insists that the
action to annul TCT 102822 had
prescribed since it was filed only on June
29, 1992, or 21 years and 7 months from
the issuance of the title.
Issue:
W/N the action has prescribed.
Held:
No. Given the falsity of the ESW, Jose
obtained the registration through fraud.
This wrongful registration gives occasion
to the creation of an implied or
constructive trust under Art. 1456.
An action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust generally prescribes in 10
years. However, if the plaintiff remains in
possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title of
possession does not run against him. In
such case, his action is deemed in the
nature of a quieting of title, an action that
is imprescriptible.
Quieting of title is a remedy for the
removal of any cloud, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property.
A cloud on a title exists when:
1. there is an instrument (deed, or
contract) or record or claim or
encumbrance or proceeding;
2. which is apparently valid or effective;
3. but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable
or extinguished (or terminated) or
barred by extinctive prescription; and
4. and may be prejudicial to the title.
Since it was already established that
Ricardo's signature on the ESW, which
was the basis of Jose's title over the
property, was forged, then it is only
necessary for the cloud [TCT in the name
of Jose] on Ricardo's title to be removed.
Imprescriptibility is accorded to cases
for quieting of title since the plaintiff has
the right to wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is questioned before
initiating an action to vindicate his right.

Art. 476
Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo
GR 214587, Feb 26, 2018
2nd Division: Peralta, J.:
Facts:
Lot 2076, total area of 101,897 sqm:
1. OCT 24435 – registered in the name of
Ana Peralta
2. Jan 13, 1975 – registered as TCT T-
5547 in the name Jose Peralta upon
demise of Ana
3. Jose divided it into Lots 2076-A and
2076-B
4. Jose sold Lot 2076-B.
5. Nov 17, 1975 - Lot 2076-A was
registered as TCT 6166 in Jose's name.
Meanwhile, allegedly through
accretion, land was added to Lot 2076.
Accreted area:
6. 1945 – First occupied by and declared
for taxation purposes (TD 6466) in the
name of Ignacio [Peralta’s tenant]
7. March 14, 1955 - Ignacio executed a
Quitclaim in Jose Peralta's favor.
8. When Jose died, Lot 2076-A, and the
supposed area of accretion, was
transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta.
9. Sep 1, 1983 – TCT T-13140 was issued
for Lot 2076-A in the name of Juanito
10. The area of accretion was and
registered under TD’s in the names of
Peralta siblings.
In 1996, the municipality built a
retaining wall on the property.
On Jan 26, 1998, Peraltas filed a
Complaint for quieting of title over the
portions of accretion declared in their
names for taxation purposes.
Issue:
W/N the action to quiet title will
prosper.
Held:
No. In order that an action for quieting
of title may prosper, the plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in, the property which is the subject
matter of the action.
While legal title denotes registered
ownership, equitable title means
beneficial ownership.
In the absence of such legal or
equitable title, or interest, there is no
cloud to be prevented or removed.
Here, Peraltas are not even registered
owners of the area adjacent to the
increment claimed, much less of the
subject lots.
Only Juanito became the registered
owner of Lot 2076-A, the lot next to the
supposed accretion.
Assuming that Peralta are Juanito's
SII, they still did not register the subject
increment under their names.
If at all, whatever rights Peraltas
derived from their PII respecting the
accreted area came only from the
quitclaim executed by Ignacio in Jose's
favor in 1955.
BUT, there is no concrete evidence
showing any right of title on Ignacio's part
for him to be able to legally and validly
cede the property to Jose.
Equitable title is defined as a title
derived through a valid contract or
relation, and based on recognized
equitable principles, or the right in the
party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal
title transferred to him.
In order that a plaintiff may draw to
himself an equitable title, he must show
that the one from whom he derives his
right had himself a right to transfer.
Hence, Peraltas, the plaintiffs have
neither legal nor equitable title over the
contested property.
Art. 476
DDDI v. SSS
GR 231053, April 04, 2018
3rd Division: Velasco
Facts:
In 1976, SSS filed a case against DDII
for collection of unremitted SSS premium
contributions of DDII's employees.
On Mar 11, 1977, DDII offered Lot X to
offset DDII's liabilities at P3,500,000. SSS
did not accept.
On May 27, 1982, Atty. Cabarroguis,
representing DDDI, told SSS that he has
"the authority to offer Lot X in the amount
of P2M."
The offer for dacion was accepted by
SSS at the appraised value of P2M. In July
1982, SSS took possession of Lot X.
Despite repeated written and verbal
demands made by SSS for DDII to deliver
the titles of Lot X, DDII failed to comply.
On Oct 8, 2002, DDII filed a complaint
for Quieting of Title against SSS.
DDII asserted that:
1. It is the owner of Lot X
2. Desiderio Dalisay, during his lifetime
and as president of DDII, offered Lot X
appraised at P3.5M to SSS for
offsetting.
3. SSS accepted such but only in the
amount of P2M
4. Negotiations were not fruitful as they
failed to agree on the terms and
conditions set forth by SSS.
5. Atty. Cabarroguis' alleged acceptance
of the proposals of SSS was not
covered by any BR.
6. There was no dation in payment to
speak of, contrary to the claim of SSS.
Issue:
W/N the action to quiet title will
prosper.
Held:
No. For an action to quiet title to
prosper, 2 requisites must concur, namely:
1. Plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and
2. The PRICE claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Here, the dacion en pago was
perfected, thereby vesting unto SSS a
legitimate title and interest over Lot X.
SSS has validly and in good faith
acquired title to Lot X, making the action
to quiet title filed by DDII improper.
In order that an action for quieting of
title may prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered
ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. In the absence of
such legal or equitable title, or interest,
there is no cloud to be prevented or
removed.
Here, DDII having divested itself of
any claim over Lot X in favor of SSS by
means of sale via dacion en pago, DDII has
lost its title over the property which would
give it legal personality to file said action.
Hence:
1. DDII no longer has any legal or
equitable title to speak of over Lot X.
2. SSS' claim which allegedly casts a cloud
on DDII's title is valid and operative –
not invalid or inoperative