VOL.

154, OCTOBER 9, 1987

Banogon vs. Zerna No. L-35469. October 9,1987.*

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners, vs. MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO,
FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).

Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Laches; Petitioners are guilty of laches for having delayed not only for 31 days but for 31 years in asserting
their claim of fraud.—A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in
asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

Same; Same; Remedial Law; Judgment; Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and once a judgment has become final the
winning party should not, through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict —This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and
lawyers alike: " 'Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them.'' There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this
Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory,
especially so, where, as shown in this case, the dear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Degree of public distrust from lawyers arise from the way they misinterpret the law; The Court must express its disapproval
of the adroit and intentional misreading by lawyers designed precisely to circumvent or violate it—One reason why there is a degree of public distrust
for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they
frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to
say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its
disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Responsibility of lawyers as officers of the court; Admonition to lawyers not to commence litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts but merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.—As officers of the court, lawyers have a
responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload
of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case,
such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or
their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Br. III. Vamenta, Jr. J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CRUZ, .J;

It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion
to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on
March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was
filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then
came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty
one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in
favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one
was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their name pursuant
thereto.4

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been
appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the
cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not
see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for
review.5

While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land subject
thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year
after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued?"6

Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land
has not yet been registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?

Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran,7 where it was held:
"x x x. It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of
such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed 'within one year after entry of the decree.' Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at
first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that
such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners
must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be
no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud We therefore hold that
a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year
from the entry of the final decree of registration." (Italics supplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of
fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and
logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

" 'Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.'

"There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted
or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this
case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable."9

"This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display
ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim
of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so
again."10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out
that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition.11 Moreover, it was for the
petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties
asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning
effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the
sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only
honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts
and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of
the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—Delay of 99 days before filing petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is guilty of laches. (Claridad vs. Santos, 120 SCRA 148.)

Action to redeem property sold or have the sale declared void barred by long inaction. (Vda. de Zalueta vs. Octaviano, 121 SCRA 314.)

Laches cannot be asserted by mere possessor without claim to title legal or equitable; (Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Lim, 123 SCRA 46.)

[No. 37386. September 19, 1933]

ANDRES JAYME, plaintiff and appellee, vs. BUALAN ET AL., defendants and appellants.

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT ; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 29 APPLIED; COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEYS.—When the
relationship of attorney and client is evidenced by a written contract for services, it should ordinarily control the amount of the recovery by the lawyer
if found by the courts not to be unconscionable or unreasonable. This is so when an attorney is one party to a contract stipulating the amount of the
compensation he is to receive, and a client of ordinary intelligence and business acumen is the other party agreeing to this amount; under such
circumstances, the courts should give effect to the contract, and if the attorney has performed the task assigned to him, should determine his
compensation on the basis of the contract. But the situation is not the same when on one side there is an attorney with professional knowledge of his
rights and of the technicalities of the law, and on the other side an ignorant non-Christian of whose rights the law takes tender care.

2. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be
considered are generally: (1) The importance of the subject matter of the controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer.

3. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the legal profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-making trade. (Code of Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12.)

4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PRESENT CASE.—Bagobos employed an attorney to recover possession of their land from two previous attorneys of the
Bagobos, and to accomplish the same the attorney drafted and filed a complaint and brought the suit to an amicable conclusion, thus securing the
return of property worth approximately P100,000 to the Bagobos, it being further shown that the attorney has exercised the duties of his profession
since 1908. The attorney having received P7,020 from the Bagobos, it is held that the latter should not be condemned to pay anything more.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Natividad, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Cornelio Reta and Romualdo C. Quimpo for appellants.
Jayme & Jayme for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This case furnishes eloquent proof of how clients, in this instance ignorant Bagobos, can be passed on from lawyer to lawyer in a seemingly endless
treadmill of litigation without ever reaching finality and a vindication of legal rights. The particular judgment appealed from by the Bagobos purported
to award their former attorney P15,000 for professional services.

In 1921, Bagobo Bualan and companions secured Attorneys Juan A. Sarenas and Domingo Braganza to represent them in a case against one
Ciriaco Lizada for the possession of land. The action was successfully maintained in the Court of First Instance and in the Supreme Court.1
Nevertheless the attorneys appear to have taken over control of the land presumably to protect their attorney's fees. In view of this situation Bagobo
Bualan and others engaged the services of Attorney Andres Jayme to institute another action to recover possession of their land and confirmed this
in writing. Issues were joined, but an amicable settlement was entered into by Attorney Jayme and Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, whereby the
Bagobos were to be given the land, they to pay to Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza the sum of P6,000, and this agreement was judicially confirmed.
In this connection it should be stated that the amount of P6,000 was apparently received from Japanese tenants to cancel the indebtedness of
Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, but for reasons known to the attorney for the Bagobos, the major part of this money went into his pocket instead,
thus necessitating the execution of a mortgage in order to cancel this claim. As a matter of fact, Attorney Jayme received P1,270 as proved by the
receipt Exhibit 3 and P5,750 as proved by the receipt Exhibit 4, or a total of P7,020. About the same time, Bagobo Bualan signed by a mark a
promissory note in the amount of P15,000 in favor of Attorney Jayme. As related to the foregoing facts, it is the contention of the appellants that the
services of the attorney are only worth P1,270 which he had received, and that he should be ordered to return to them the sum of P5,750 which he
secured as a loan and not in payment of his fees.

The relationship of attorney and client is here evidenced by a written contract for services which, in accordance with section 29 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, should ordinarily control the amount of the recovery by the lawyer if found by the courts not to be unconscionable or unreasonable. With
an attorney as one party to a contract stipulating the amount of the compensation he is to receive, and a client of ordinary intelligence and business
acumen as the other party agreeing to this amount, the courts should give effect to the contract and if the attorney has performed the task assigned
to him, should determine his compensation on the basis of the contract. But the situation is not the same when on one side there is an attorney with
professional knowledge of his rights and of the technicalities of the law and on the other side an ignorant non-Christian of whose rights the law takes
tender care. In this instance, to do justice to Attorney Jayme, it should be explained that he does not rely entirely on the contract between him and
the Bagobos, but is considerate enough to ask for the valuation of his services on the basis of quantum meruit.

The elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer are generally: (1) The importance of the
subject matter of the controversy,
(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 29; Code of Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12; Delgado vs. De la Rama [1922],
43 Phil, 419.)

Speaking to these elements, there is evident a wide difference of opinion as to the value of the property involved in the case which Attorney Jayme
handled, the attorney claiming that it is worth P200,000 and this being the finding of the trial judge, and the appellants claiming that the land is worth
something like P30,000. All facts considered, probably a happy medium, or approximately P100,000, would be a fair approximation of the total value
of the land and its improvements. As to the services rendered by Attorney Jayme, they consisted in drafting and filing a complaint and bringing the
suit to an amicable conclusion and in drafting and acknowledging a mortgage, although this latter document may have been unnecessary. Finally,
except that it was alleged in the complaint and not denied that Attorney Jayme has exercised the duties of his profession since 1908, and is an
attorney with sufficient business to be known to the courts, we have no other data like expert testimony to go on. All elements considered, and it
being admitted that the attorney has already received P7,020, although the proper application of P5,750 is challenged by appellants, we think that
Attorney Jayme has been sufficiently compensated by the receipt of these P7,020, and that the Bagobos should not be made to pay anything more.
Before concluding, may we be permitted to express the hope that present counsel for the Bagobos, Messrs. Reta and Quimpo, will not follow in the
devious path of their predecessors, necessitating further litigation to settle their fees, and that as counselled in the Code of Legal Ethics, "in fixing
fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere moneymaking trade."
In consonance with the foregoing pronouncements, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the plaintiff will take nothing on his complaint
and the defendants will take nothing on their counterclaim, neither party to recover costs from the other. So ordered. Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull,
and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed. Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422, No. 37386 September 19, 1933

[G.R. No. 120348. December 3, 1948.]

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for Respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers’ Association) as amici
curiæ.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTHORITY OF SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW;
SUPREME COURT CONDUCTS BAR EXAMINATIONS. — Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to
promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under
which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve
for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have
passed the examinations.

2. STATUTES; WORDS AND PHRASES; "INTEREST OF THE STATE" EXPLAINED AND CONSTRUED. — We do not propose to define or fix the
limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" cannot be confined and limited to the
"security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not uncommon
terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provides that the President may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i. e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase
or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so,
there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it
extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state."
Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE OF ADMISSION OF LAWYERS; BAR EXAMINATIONS, HOW GIVEN AND
CONDUCTED. — Under constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the
admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and
it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar Examiners who prepare the
questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law.

6. SUPREME COURT; MAINTENANCE OF HIGH STANDARD OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have
always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this
end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show
proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner.

7. ID.; LEGAL PROFESSION AS THE MOST POPULAR IN THIS JURISDICTION; CONDUCT OF BAR EXAMINATIONS IMBUED WITH GENERAL
INTEREST AND NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. — It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this
country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this
fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial
fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions.
Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.

8. ID.; BAR EXAMINATIONS ANOMALY AS WITHIN THE MEANING OF "INTEREST OF THE STATE." — The present case falls and may be
included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law
schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of
Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the highest
Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

9. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, SUPREME COURT AS; DUTY AND NECESSITY TO ADOPT MEASURES TO PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF
LEGAL PROFESSION. — In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent
power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to
 preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of
charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star
Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the
headline in large letters — "CLAIM ’LEAK’ IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want
Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the
news item in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star
Reporter this morning.

"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal
School.

"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.

"The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had
seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city.

"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to
find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
examinations.

"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian,
official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the
possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools."cralaw virtua1aw library

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been
designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner
with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of
showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has
been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to
be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law,
the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions
directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in
good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but
that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of
the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of
public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and
conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the
alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.

In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was
designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of
Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report
thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some
bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of
Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof,
particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was
conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, the
new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court.

"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the
persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic
spirit, and for his cooperation, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to
authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that
he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be
regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result."cralaw virtua1aw library

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it
was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and
of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in
particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who
were appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examination papers; and last but not
least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations.
It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination
questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who
furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation
because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he
could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do
this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his
request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano.
The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the
revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of
the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably
argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled
to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or
reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw
library

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as
questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means
and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only when national security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the
defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which
the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact, the vote of the Justices is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate where it originated, we examined the
record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that
the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute
and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest."cralaw virtua1aw library

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment
by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that
said clause would kill the purpose of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the
clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may
be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception
embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of
the public or the interest of the state requires that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a
newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a
newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was
put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of section
1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too
elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public
safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of
the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that
the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as
amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest," when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the
Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the state" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco
Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest," Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest
of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two
phrases "public interest" and "interest of the state," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected
the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco
was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not
propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be
confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public
safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in
Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same
Constitution provides that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the
public safety requires it.

The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes against National Security and
the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the
phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People’s Court, promulgated on September 25,
1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase
or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so,
there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it
extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as
broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for
instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the state" even
under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nation, not only a
branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal
functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or
of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government,
their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar Examinations.
Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing
grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the
Philippines, practising law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a
number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this
noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law
by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that
perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared
to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as
compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme
Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government,
draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of
necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the
examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later
admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have
reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public
would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend
himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of
sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar
Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly,
the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparation, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice
law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might
be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students
and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in
them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of
questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.

The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic
spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two
or more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not
themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly,
and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as
a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still
enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to
fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of
the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Commitee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the
highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine
Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general,
specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or
misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S.
41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to
the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo’s news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, his informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were
denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due
investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place
to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and
furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the
curtain of press immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and
used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and
answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said
examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no
one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions,
although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not
disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo’s informants who claim to have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each
candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of the
eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred
candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hands of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until
the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had
actually been committed, - evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally
obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or
warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn
hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from
the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and
delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to
conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants
and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges
contained in the news item, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated
by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations
clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing
with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and
correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of
its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility
and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the
investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his
information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court’s
endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to
punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties
who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private
institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or
all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were
unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the
other hand, if too many obtain a passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate
measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of
the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examination day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees
have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction
of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of
his information which formed the basis of his news item or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly
stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted
and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.) Ordinarily, in such
cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that cases like the present are not
common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other
cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a
crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it
hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this
Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent
is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this Court.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It would protect him only if we could agree with his
theory that the words "interest of the state" used in the law should be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the
whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the Senate journal, or in the
grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they
embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the state.

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts within which the ideas of security or safety occupy a
place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words,
to a minimum that, if given effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be violative of the
Constitution.

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to
the point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation
was pushed up to the place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one is authorized to push that line of limitation still
farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how
much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to
inject in the statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative intent. There is no alternative
for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more respective mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a
court demand obedience for their effectiveness. Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of
judicial orders is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it means sowing the seeds of
anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a thing to obtain.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive department or without a legislative department. As a
matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does
not suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the Congressional session
when legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the
way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society without some effective system of administration of justice,
functioning without long interruptions.

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and this Supreme Court will never take lightly any
disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without
fear or favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty imposed upon
Respondent.

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil.,
741. The provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a
sum not exceeding P1,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there are mitigating circumstances that attenuate
respondent’s responsibility, — youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, — we should not
impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-278 1 , the very one which, as can be
gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53.

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple
process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the
discretion of the guilty one. His future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His
past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be undone. These are verities
no one can eloign.
We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

PARAS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full
in the decision of the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of public service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants,
thereby enabling this Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to "institute an immediate probe into the matter, to
find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at least have tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The
point I want to underscore is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in substantiating their truth. And if I am
constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the
revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 — which this Court is bound to enforce — providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of
any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing
in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the phrase "interest of the state," as used in the
Act, refers exclusively to matters affecting the security or safety of the state.

In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto provided for absolute immunity. The committee on
revision of laws, however, inserted an amendment by adding the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public
interest." Senator Sotto’s attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the remarks of the Chairman of the committee presently to be
mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to change the words "public interest" into "interest of the state," a proposal that was readily accepted. Hence, the
use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.

Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state," as intended by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to
recall that the original intention of the author of the bill was to provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly
defeated by any subsequent exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the deliberations of the lawmakers. For
instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing Senator Sotto’s advocacy of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause
"unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a
newspaperman who publishes an information regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in which case Senator Cuenco believed that "el
interes publico y el interes mismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the change of "public
interest" to "interest of the state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as to the essential difference between the two phrases, explained
that "La diferencia esta en que puede haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y
no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase ’public interest’ es muy elastica. En cambio, si se pone ’interest of the state,’ claramente se entenderia que
mediando el interes del Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, it should be noted that the Act
in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for
refusing to reveal the source of the information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the respondent, the
security or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was intended to be limited to cases portrayed by the examples
(theft of plans of forts and fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely affect the security or safety of the state.

It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security," or whether "public interest" and
"interest of the state" were interchangeably used in the discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the
lawmakers definitely knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey. Conjectures cannot prevail over the clear
legislative intent.

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the main purpose of the law. This would further make
the law more consonant with the spirit of the constitutional provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Article III, section 1, paragraph 5), and that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of the press (Article III, section 1, paragraph 8).

It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his information does not absolutely prevent this Court from
verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story
in question, to admit the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of evidence or of the refusal of those who know to come
out and testify.

In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.

Resurreccion vs. Sayson

Adm. Case No. 1037. December 14, 1998.*

VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Estafa; Moral Turpitude; Words and Phrases; Lawyer Convicted of Estafa Disbarred; Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals.—The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo’s findings and conclusion, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be disbarred. Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on September 20, 1973. Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and upheld by this Court. In
In re Vinzon, the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa and held that “moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals.”
Same; Same; Same; The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar; Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.—True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. However, in the
present case, the Court notes that even if respondent’s culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has
served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case
was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a
failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his
conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar.

Same; Same; Same; Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally.—Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PER CURIAM:

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, “of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,”1 it is imperative that they live by the law.
Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.

In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurreccion charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting “malpractice, deceit and
gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.” The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence
case, in which Complainant Resurreccion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto,
Sr. The complainant alleged that, pursuant to the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the respondent who,
however, never gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case.
The complainant then demanded the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment.

The records show that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) conducted several hearings on the matter, during which the complainant was
represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such hearings. He eventually appeared
through his new counsel, Atty. Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4,
1973 Order,2 deemed the investigation of the case terminated. But upon the motion of the respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set aside its
earlier Order and once again set the case for a hearing of the former’s evidence. Since then, however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to
submit its report and recommendation on the case.

In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of the case3 and tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the investigation,
of which both the complainant and the respondent were duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the pursuit of the matter,
but Respondent Sayson could not be found.4 In his Report, Commissioner Manalo presented the following facts:

“Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was accused of having converted and appropriated [for] his own personal benefit the amount of
P2,500.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the complainant to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of a case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.

xxx xxx xxx

“Complainant alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which occurred at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City
which involved a boy [named] the name of Armando Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By reason of the said incident, complainant was
accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence before the City Fiscal’s Office at Quezon City. In the preliminary investigation, the father of the victim
Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., was represented by respondent. Complainant was however, represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8 August 1970 and respondent received from the complainant the amount of P2,500.00. Respondent
allegedly assured complainant that the sum [would] be delivered to his client Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in writing having
received the amount of P2,500.00.

“Contrary however, to the assurances of the respondent, he had not delivered the said amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for
which reason complainant was compelled to pay anew the heirs of the victim the amount of P2,500.00. Demands were made for the respondent to
return the said amount of P2,500.00 but the latter failed. By reason thereof, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against the respondent before
the City Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Ciriaco C. Sayson.’

“In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant Victoriano P. Resurreccion appeared assisted by his counsel. There was however, no appearance
for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The investigator declared his failure to appear as a waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. was
presented as witness. He testified that he [was] the father of Armando Basto, Jr. who was ran over by a motor vehicle then driven by the respondent.
By reason of such death a case was filed in court and he was represented by Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A settlement
arrangement was arrived at and complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00 to the respondent for the latter to turn over the same to his client.
Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, however, failed to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00 to his client for which reason the case was not immediately
dismissed. To effect dismissal of the case, complainant was forced to pay anew the sum of P2,500.00.

“Complainant was next presented as witness and he testified that on 30 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted in the
death of one Armando Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence[,] and to effect settlement of that case he
agreed to pay the amount of P2,500.00.

“On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his counsel conferred with [the] respondent in the latter’s office at May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila
and in a conference, a settlement was arrived at whereby complainant [would] pay the amount of P2,500.00. This was done and payment was
delivered to the respondent who acknowledged having received the said amount.

“Subsequently, complainant learned that the said amount of P2,500.00 was not delivered by respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father of the
victim for which reason he was compelled to pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs of the victim.

“Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said amount of P2,500.00 from the respondent. Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times, Atty.
Ciriaco C. Sayson still failed to return the money. Thus, complainant filed a complaint for estafa which was elevated in Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 49358.

“A Decision finding the respondent guilty of [the] crime of estafa was promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City.”5

Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and recommendation in this wise:

“Complainant was able to establish by more than convincing evidence that the misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent. This fact
[is] eloquently proven by Exhibits “A” to “E,” all of which were not controverted by the respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

“In view of the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that the above-entitled case be endorsed by the Honorable Board of
Governors to the Supreme Court with the recommendation that the complain[ant be] disbarred and his name be stricken off x x x the roll of attorneys.

xxx xxx x x x”6

On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28, 1998, is worded as follows:

“RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202

Adm. Case No. 1037
Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs.
Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A” and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson is DISBARRED and x x x his name x x x
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been found guilty of Estafa promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City and [which] complainant was
able to establish by more convincing evidences that misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent, all of which were not controverted by
the respondent.”7

The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo’s findings and conclusion, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C.
Sayson must be disbarred.

Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on September 20, 1973. Such
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals9 and upheld by this Court.10

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant.” (CA Decision, pp. 9-10).

In In re Vinzon,11 the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa and held that “moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals.”

In a more recent case,12 the Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa
through falsification of public documents, because she was “totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession.” In adopting the recommendation,
we held that “good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.”

True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar.13 Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.14 However, in the present case, the Court notes that even if respondent’s culpability for
estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed
any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office
of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges
brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar.

Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.

Respondent disbarred.

_____________

14 For example, in Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554, March 11, 1996, the respondent, who was accused of estafa by his client, was suspended
for one year from the practice of law. Likewise, in Igual v. Javier (254 SCRA 416, March 7, 1996), suspended from the practice of law for one year
was the respondent, who was accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated complainant’s money in the amount of P7,000, allegedly
paid as acceptance fee for a matter on which respondent never performed any work.

Notes.—A lawyer convicted of falsification of a public document may be disbarred. (Paras vs. Vailoces, 1 SCRA 954 [1961])

Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in another action, like an action for reconveyance
and damages. (Esquivias vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 803 [1997])

Lawyer disbarred for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon
11 thereof. (Busiños vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997])

A lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an attorney, when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting
to him all her money, and later refused to return the same despite demand. (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998])

——o0o——

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Conflict of Interest; The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of public policy, good
taste and, more importantly, upon necessity; In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s
case, including its weak and strong points, which knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.—Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional responsibility provides: Rule 15.03—A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double—dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice. It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationships; Respondent lawyer must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of an investment company, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship.—Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time,
was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot
shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form
of “friendly accommodations,” precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the
parties—documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney as the contract may be express or implied.—
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever
forged between her and complainant. This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of
basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said: The absence of a written contract will not preclude
the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of
an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought
and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Tests; The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client,” as
well as where the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection, and another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.—
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat (405 SCRA 220 [2003]), we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and
prosecuted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers
of an IBP Chapter even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.—Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client
had ever complained of respondent’s unethical behavior. This remark indubitably displays respondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in
the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and
prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter even if no
private individual files any administrative complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Withdrawal of Membership; An administrative case against a lawyer may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by
her act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so—to terminate one’s membership in the Bar
voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to
evade liability.—Respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and
other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness Protection Program. Convenient as it may be for
respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against
her. The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to
complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the
Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The conduct of a lawyer
may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to
allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove
that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez, 594 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case stems from an administrative complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant
violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of
interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of
Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation
(Precedent).3

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of
Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (₱30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization
where complainant and his wife were also active members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and
even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him
and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by
respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a
telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means. 6 Hence, the
retainer agreement remained unsigned.7

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent 8 asking for the return and immediate settlement of the
funds invested by respondent’s clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she
had to send it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that
there was nothing to worry about.9

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant.
On these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to resolve complainant’s problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from
any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in
Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.12

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed
and gave her an initial amount of ₱900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself.13 Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave
respondent ₱1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts were all part of Precedent’s collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the
company’s properties.15

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short
messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was
arrested and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitel’s failed investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants
and a hold departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him
of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in
order to clear complainant’s name.16 In two separate e-mail messages,17 respondent again asked money from complainant, ₱200,000 of which was
handed by complainant’s wife while respondent was confined in Saint Luke’s Hospital after giving birth,18 and another ₱700,000 allegedly to be given
to the NBI.19

Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle all complainant’s legal problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in
the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories
stored in complainant’s house and inside a warehouse.20 He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu
Trooper.21

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another
lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the
same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were
provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio
really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones, every employees and
directors[’] quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted,
every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.

I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no
problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who
will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the
SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his
connections. Val’s friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the
state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have
allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to
Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to
work with.

As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to
make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please
trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will
stand by you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on
your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy22

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of his departure from the United States,
respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.23

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them that she has already accumulated ₱12,500,000.00
as attorney’s fees and was willing to give ₱2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that
without his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted respondent’s offer but respondent,
later on, changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest the ₱2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant
declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed.
Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.24

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure
order issued against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases. 25

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainant’s call or would
abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for several months.26 In one instance, when complainant asked
respondent for an update on the collection of Benefon’s obligation to Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent
arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would read Benefon’s letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking
for a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter. 27 Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated
December 20, 2004.28 When complainant found respondent’s explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the
accounting.29 Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be
constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.30 Respondent replied,31 explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by
complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure
quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability.32 Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint33 against respondent
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed
between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she
personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization.35lavvph!1

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients
had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted for.36
Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with
Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.38 Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the administrative case must also
be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBP’s Commission
on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful
authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-client relationship
was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that
respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a
full accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors issued a Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste43 and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.44 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.46

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly
accommodations,"47 precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing
parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.48

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever
forged between her and complainant.49 This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of
basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism
is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.50 (Emphasis supplied.)1awphi1

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services
of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand
as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict
of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 52

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and
properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her
clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself
admitted to complainant that without the latter’s help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she
was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.53 Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,54 but also toyed with decency and good taste.

Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of respondent’s unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably
displays respondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for
disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or
by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter56 even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other
gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness Protection Program.57 Convenient as it may be for
respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against
her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to
complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the
Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 58 The conduct of a lawyer
may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to
allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove
that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[A.C. NO. 7902 : September 30, 2008]

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, v. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and
deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to
perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a report of the status of the cases
entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for return of the money paid to him.

On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national, through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer
Agreement1 with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the amount of PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him, all pending in Antipolo City; including a
dismissed complaint which was appealed before the Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that fees would cover acceptance and
attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other legal incidental expenses, and appearance fees. 2

The cases filed by the complainant included a complaint for Estafa, Grave Threats, Coercion, Unjust Vexation and Oral Defamation 3 pending before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Antipolo and a civil case for Mandamus, Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages 4
which is on trial at Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. On the other hand, the cases filed against the complainant included a criminal
case for Other Light Threats at Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, 5 and violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 20046 before the Family Court of Antipolo City. A complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms
was also filed against Torben Overgaard which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Antipolo City. This was appealed to the Department of
Justice by way of Petition for Review.7

Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the respondent USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer,8 as full
payment for the services to be rendered under the Agreement. The respondent then assured the complainant that he would take good care of the
cases he was handling for the complainant.9

On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant, through his business partner John Bradley,
demanded from the respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect to the cases entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts
to contact the respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him; his phone calls were not answered and his electronic
mails were ignored.10

The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that the respondent was handling for him. Upon his own inquiry, he was
dismayed to find out that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases for Other Light Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act.11 The respondent also did not inform him that he was entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to
answer the complaint for Other Light Threats. The complainant had no knowledge that there had already been arraignments for the criminal cases
against him, and that there were already warrants of arrest12 issued for his failure to attend the arraignments. He was constrained to engage the
services of another lawyer in order to file a Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other Light Threats, 13 and an Omnibus Motion to
Revive the Case and Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.14

The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Not only did
the respondent fail to enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed against the complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of appearance in the
civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment on the complaint for Illegal
Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under review at the Department of Justice.15

Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the complainant wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the
documents which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for
the complainant.16 However, complainant was unable to get any word from the respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch
with him.
Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.17 Despite the order to
submit an Answer to the complaint against him,18 the respondent failed to comply. A Mandatory Conference was set on September 21, 2007,19 but
the respondent failed to attend despite being duly notified.20 This prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to issue an Order declaring the
respondent in default for failure to submit an Answer and failure to attend the Mandatory Conference. 21 The investigation proceeded ex parte.

The complainant submitted his position paper on October 5, 2007,22 with a prayer that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, and to
be ordered to return the amount of PhP900,000.00. A Clarificatory Hearing was scheduled on December 11, 2007, 23 and again, it was only the
complainant who was in attendance; the respondent failed to attend the hearing despite notice. The case was then submitted for resolution based on
the pleadings submitted by the complainant and the hearings conducted.24

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for
investigation, report and recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6, 2008, approved
the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from
receipt of the notice.

We agree. We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party
without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his client's cause,
he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. He not only failed to properly handle the cases which were
entrusted to his care, he refused to do a single thing in connection with these cases. He did not file any pleading to defend his client; he did not even
enter his appearance in these cases. Moreover, he disregarded the complainant's letters and electronic mails and rejected the complainant's phone
calls. All the complainant was asking for was a report of the status of the cases but the respondent could not be reached no matter what the
complainant did to get in touch with him. After receipt of the full amount of fees under the Retainer Agreement, he simply disappeared, leaving the
client defenseless and plainly prejudiced in the cases against him. Warrants of arrest were even issued against the complainant due to the
respondent's gross and inexcusable negligence in failing to ascertain the status of the case and to inform his client of the arraignment. It was not a
mere failure on the respondent's part to inform the complainant of matters concerning the cases, it was an unmistakable evasion of duty. To hide
from the complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable; and to commit all these acts and omissions after
receiving the full amount of legal fees and after assuring the client of his commitment and responsibility violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals.25 It is an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.26 Representing to the complainant that he would take care of the cases filed against him,27 assuring the
complainant that his property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded,28 and then collecting the full amount of legal fees of PhP900,000.00,
only to desert the complainant after receipt of the fees, were manifestly deceitful and dishonest.

The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and
truthful when dealing with his client. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.29
However, instead of devoting himself to the client's cause, the respondent avoided the complainant, forgot about the cases he was handling for him
and ostensibly abandoned him. The client reposed his trust in his lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not betray him or abscond from his
responsibilities. By assuring the complainant that he would take care of the cases included in the Retainer Agreement, and even accepting fees, the
respondent defrauded the complainant when he did not do a single thing he was expected to do.

A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.30 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.31 Respondent should indeed be held liable, for he was not just incompetent, he was practically useless;
he was not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather than being of help to the complainant, he prejudiced the client. Respondent's inaction with
respect to the matters entrusted to his care is obvious; and his failure to file an answer to the complaint for disbarment against him and to attend the
hearings in connection therewith, without any explanation or request for resetting, despite proper notice from the IBP, is clear evidence of negligence
on his part.

The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is required to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.32 The respondent did the opposite. Despite the complainant's efforts to consult him
and notwithstanding numerous attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of the cases, the respondent was able to avoid the
complainant and never bothered to reply.

After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering that the respondent had been remiss in his duties, the complainant
demanded the return of the documents he had turned over to the respondent. He also demanded the return of the money he had paid for the legal
services that were not rendered and expenses of litigation which were not incurred. However, the respondent rejected the complainant's demands.

Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or
received for and from the client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the respondent via telegraphic bank transfer. This was considered as complete
payment for the PhP900,000.00 that was stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to be rendered. However, since the respondent did not
carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor did he appear in court or make any payment in connection with litigation, or give any
explanation as to how such a large sum of money was spent and allocated, he must immediately return the money he received from the client upon
demand. However, he refused to return the money he received from the complainant despite written demands, and was not even able to give a
single report regarding the status of the cases.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not used for failure to file the case, must immediately be returned to the
client on demand.33

In Sencio v. Calvadores,34 the respondent lawyer Sencio was engaged to file a case, which he failed to do. His client demanded that he return the
money which was paid to him but he refused. Sencio similarly failed to answer the complaint and disregarded the orders and notices of the IBP on
many occasions.35 The respondent lawyer was ordered to return the money that he received from the complainant with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount.36

The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character.37 The Bar must maintain a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing.38 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large,39 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension
and disbarment.40

The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his
duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent, betray not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For
the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.41 Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the
privilege to practice law. We must protect the administration of justice by requiring those who exercise this function to be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the IBP is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions
of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar.
We could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary principles of professional ethics and failing
to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good faith, the respondent has proven himself unworthy of membership in this noble profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He
is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual
payment, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%)
interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision until the payment
thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.

Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, CJ., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,* Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Andbrion, JJ., concur.