Review

Reviewed Work(s): A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger by Michael
Friedman
Review by: Gottfried Gabriel
Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jul., 2003), pp. 125-128
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20013214
Accessed: 11-08-2019 20:34 UTC

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 BOOK REVIEWS

Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Hei?

degger, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, IL, 2000, 192 pp. ISBN
0-8126-9424-4, $49.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-8126-9425-2, $24.95 (paper).

For several years, a historical reconsideration of the origins of analytic

philosophy that seeks to revise its "forgetfulness of the continent", has
been in progress. After Frege had found his fixed place in neo-Kantianism,
Carnap's relationship with this tradition, which dominated German philo?
sophy at the turn of the century, has been largely investigated. Friedman
goes much further in his book, where he traces the origins of the continuing
split between analytic and continental philosophy. By detailed analysis of
the philosophical texts and historical documents, he convincingly demon?
strates how this split took place in the beginning of the 1930's, as a
consequence of a difference in departing from neo-Kantianism. The "In?
ternational University Course" in Davos, Switzerland (17 March-6 April
1929) has long been considered the historical turning point, showing
clearly the replacement of the older generation by the younger genera?
tion within German-speaking philosophy. A highlight of the conference
was the discussion about Kantian philosophy between Cassirer, who was
the leading representative of neo-Kantianism at the time, and Heidegger.
It has hardly been noticed, until now, that Carnap attended the confer?
ence also and, as Friedman demonstrates with unpublished materials of
Carnap, not only had talks with Heidegger, but was very impressed with
him. The split did not occur until Carnap's article "The Elimination of
Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" (1931), in which he
uses sentences from Heidegger's inaugural lecture "What is Metaphysics?"
(Freiburg 1929) as examples of metaphysical pseudo-sentences.
At the core of Friedman's study is the relation between Cassirer,
Heidegger, and Carnap as three central figures of philosophy in the 20th
century, with Carnap and Heidegger being, so to speak, brothers who, in
very different ways, reject the intellectual heritage of their neo-Kantian
fathers. Heidegger breaks with this heritage completely, while Carnap may
be regarded as its radical pursuer in putting Kant's practical philosophy
aside and completely reducing his theoretical philosophy to its logical
methodological component. Epistemology, the prime discipline of neo

?jk Erkenntnis 59: 125-128, 2003.

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 126 BOOK REVIEWS

Kantianism, is transformed into logic and philosophy of science, and the

differences in natural science and Geisteswissenschaften are to be tran?
scended in a (physicalistic) unified science. The reader is surprised to learn
that Carnap (according to his notes) found Heidegger to be in agreement
with him on such a program (p. 7). Soon, it becomes clear why. Heideg?
ger leaves such questions to science. His own subject matter, however, is
philosophy, in which he denies "the centrality of logic" (p. 12). Herein
lies the actual opposition between Carnap and Heidegger and not, as one
might think, in their assessment of metaphysics. As Friedman shows, it is
not so much their attitude towards metaphysics itself, but their views as
to what remains for philosophy to do following the end of metaphysics,
which constitutes the opposition between Carnap and Heidegger.
Friedman succeeds admirably, not only in tracing the different paths of
the "heretical" sons, but also in elucidating their conflict with each other
from within. Moreover, Friedman is able to explain this conflict from the
historical, cultural and political circumstances that the authors were in at
the time and, thus, marks it as exemplary. In doing so, Friedman thoroughly
discusses the differences between the Marburg School and the Southwest
School of neo-Kantianism (Chap. 4) and demonstrates how Carnap and
Heidegger pursue different paths from the same starting point: the context
of neo-Kantianism and its problem area, i.e., the mediation of the fac?
ulties of understanding and the faculties of sensibility, a context in which
Friedman shows both authors' early works to be located.
The conflict between Carnap and Heidegger is still exemplary today
because, in retrospect, it proves to be the origin of the "parting of the
ways" of analytic and continental philosophy. Friedman brings out not
only the philosophical opposition between Carnap and Heidegger (p. 18),
but the political opposition, as well. That opposition, of course, cannot
be regarded exemplary in the same way. Clearly, the parting of both tra?
ditions that took place then was intensified because most representatives
of analytic philosophy in the German-speaking countries, especially the
members of the Vienna circle, fled from Nazism to the Anglo-Saxon world
while Heidegger remained on the continent. However, this fact can only
explain why it took so long for analytic philosophy to establish itself again
on the continent, but not the split itself. Continental philosophers, espe?
cially those of the "left wing", also left Germany. Among them were even
students of Heidegger, as Friedman remarks (p. 157, note 217). Also, after
World War II, not all chairs of philosophy were occupied by students of
Heidegger (or Husserl), but by critics of Heidegger, as well, e.g., Theodor
W. Adorno and Ernst Bloch. Their rejection of analytic philosophy was, in

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 BOOK REVIEWS 127

some ways, more emphatic than that of Heidegger, who only protested the
notion to identify philosophy with logic and philosophy of science.
To gain a complete picture of the opposition, more research will have to
ensue, for which Friedman cleared the path and set the standard. His work,
which, on the basis of a systematic appreciation of the problem and in best
hermeneutic practice, develops a historical understanding, is evidence that
continental wit and analytic acumen can be fruitfully combined. On such
a basis, the hope for a re-unification of both traditions does not seem to be
unjustified. Friedman himself sees that chance, primarily in thinking back
to the philosophical virtues of a comprehensive, rational Kantianism, as
Cassirer theoretically and personally represented it (p. 159, final remark).
In view of the present differences between the analytic method and con?
tinental deconstruction, which particularly refers to Nietzsche, bridging
the gap will be difficult. In this regard, it is worth noticing that, of all
philosophers, it is Nietzsche who, by name, is spared in Carnap's criticism
of metaphysics.
Starting with Nietzsche life-philosophy developed in competition to
neo-Kantianism at the beginning of the 20th century. It not only had a
great impact on Heidegger (explicitly), but also on Carnap (implicitly).
Both Heidegger's and Carnap's thinking is a product of an inter-breeding
between neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy, with opposite conclusions
for the method of philosophy. This fact has not been appreciated suf?
ficiently until now. Friedman, at least, mentions it (pp. 150ff). I permit
myself some supplementary remarks.
The final section of Carnap's "The Elimination of Metaphysics", en?
titled "Metaphysics as Expression of an Attitude Towards Life (Lebensge
fuhl)", provides important clues here. The expression "Lebensgefahr is a
central term for W. Dilthey. Presumably, Carnap adopted the term, not di?
rectly from Dilthey, but from his student Herman Nohl, whom Carnap had
heard in Jena. (The influence of Dilthey on Carnap was first pointed out by
A. Naess: Four Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
Sartre, Chicago and London 1968, 41-48.) It is revealing that, apart from
Bauch and Frege, Nohl is the only one of his teachers in Jena that Carnap
mentions by name in his Intellectual Autobiography.
Carnap in no way fails to recognize that something important can be
addressed in metaphysics. He disputes, however, that it can be represen?
ted in the form of meaningful statements. Apart from this, Carnap admits
that language still has functions other than making statements. Alongside
a cognitive function, it assumes an emotive one. This serves to give ex?
pression of the attitude towards life (Ausdruck des Lebensgef?hls). It is in
precisely this function that Carnap sees metaphysics, which however, at

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 128 BOOK REVIEWS

tempts to clothe something in the form of statements that cannot be said. A

legitimate need underlies metaphysics. However, the adequate expression
of the attitude towards life is not metaphysics, but art. As the historical
source for his surrogate thesis ("Metaphysicians are musicians without
musical ability") Carnap adduces Nietzsche, as that metaphysician, "who
perhaps had artistic talent to the highest degree" and was, hence, able to
give expression to the Lebensgef?hl in the form of poetry (in Zarathustra).
At this point, again, a surprising contiguity shows up between the positions
of Carnap and Heidegger.
If we consider the historical stock of forms of philosophy, we find the
complete spectrum between the poles of science and poetry. The ques?
tion is always: Toward which does one orientate oneself? Carnap orients
himself methodically towards science, that is, towards the justification of
statements. With him, philosophy is absorbed by the logic of science; it
no longer has contents of its own. These contents are passed on to poetry,
where they find the form appropriate to them. With Carnap, Frege's Be?
griffsschrift lies on the desk, so to speak, and Nietzsche's Zarathustra on
the bedside table. The result is a problematic dichotomy of cognition and
feeling. Apart from this dichotomous accentuation, Heidegger seems to
proceed from the same finding of a conflict between the form and content
of metaphysics. But, since it is the contents that matter to him, he departs
from the scientific form and consistently approaches (as Nietzsche did) the
form of poetry. Carnap and Heidegger, as well as the philosophical tradi?
tions founded by the two, have a common point of departure, but proceed
from there in opposite directions, and thus, arrive at diametrically contrary
forms of philosophy. Having to choose one of the two forms is, according
to Friedman, the present "fundamental philosophical dilemma" (p. 156).
Closing the gap between analytic and continental philosophy will require
a meta-philosophical discussion to determine the relation between science,
philosophy and poetry. Hopefully, it will lead to the realization that logical
and poetical philosophy, in view of different subjects, are complementary
forms of understanding, and ought to be recognized as such.

University of Jena GOTTFRIED GABRIEL

Germany

Manuscript submitted 15 July 2002

Final version received 5 August 2002

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