Marcos VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1) According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property

without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives
Facts:
them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non- may only be impaired by a court order.
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed,
Issue:
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,

considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning
to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos
and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.

events:
Decision:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese Ratio:
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
5. Communist insurgency movements Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant
7. devastated economy because of
by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain
1. accumulated foreign debt powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments,
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant

reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to
outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions
the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest

discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the

president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exice.
Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged.
The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover
of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of “Marcos loyalists” and
the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation
to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatism and
blind loyalty of their followers in the country.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die.
President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from retyrning to the Philippines.
RULING:
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right
to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered,
as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof
[Art. 12 (4).]
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that,
having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the
officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and
the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
[Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism,
the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention
only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers
to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion
that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead
to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge
of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did
not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SANLAKAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY by Martin
TINGA; FEBRUARY 3, 2004
FACTS:
 Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) staged a mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere apartments
in Makati City on July 27, 2003
 The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
demanded for the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
 In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress
the rebellion
 The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003
 After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their barracks, the President lifted
the state of rebellion five days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No.
435
 Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice Society
(SJS), in relation to Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:
o The declaration of a state of rebellion is not required to call out the armed
forces
o Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists no factual basis for the
imposition of a state of rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended
on the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of rebellion ensued for five days
until August 1, 2003)
o The report circumvents the report requirement, which requires the
President to make a report 48 hours after the proclamation of martial law
 Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the
President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers
o Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the
Constitution, such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to
Congress, and that the declaration made by the President thus results to
the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power
 Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the presidential issuances constitute an
unwarranted exercise of martial law power, which is baseless under the
Constitution
o Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the President may pave
way for the unconstitutional imposition of warrantless arrests
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out the armed
forces
4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the imposition of a state of rebellion
5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers
6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to exercising martial law powers
HELD/RULING:
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the Supreme Court recognizes
jurisdiction over cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review
 The petitions are deemed moot and academic, because the state of rebellion
has been lifted already on August 1, 2003
 The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this case is capable of repetition;
in the said case, an angry mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has
compelled the President to call upon the AFP and PNP to suppress the
rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1
 In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess the validity of the
President’s declaration
2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal standing to sue; Petitioners
Suplico et al. and Pimentel (Members of Congress) have standing to sue
 Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered “people’s organizations”
that represents the interest of the people, the Supreme Court is still observant
of the rule that only real parties in interest or those who would suffer a direct
injury from the controversy, are the ones who may invoke the judicial power
 Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear the validity of their legal
standing, since their contention involving the alleged usurpation of the
President of their constitutional power speaks of their incurrence of direct
damage
3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to
declare a state of rebellion
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution: …whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, in her capacity as
Commander-in-Chief, the following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
 In order for the President to exercise the latter two powers, these two
conditions must exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required for ensuring public safety
 The aforementioned conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling
out power
 The Constitution of the United States of America (USA) serves as the
foundation of the overall concept of the President’s power as Chief Executive
and Commander-In-Chief
  Residual executive powers of the President, as suggested by Justice Cortes,
rests upon the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized nature of the
Philippines government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein residual executive
power is practiced by the President by barring the return of former
President Marcos due to perceived threats of destabilization against
the government and other forms of socio-political disturbances
4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion
 Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court may review, in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or the extension thereof, ad must promulgate its decision
thereon within three days from its filing.
 No proof was shown by the petitioners that the President has acted without
factual basis
5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief
 There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers
as both Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the declaration of martial law
 No indication that military tribunals have taken over jurisdiction over civil courts
 No indication of curtailment of civil and political rights
 No indication of President’s encroachment of other branches of government
 No indication of attempt, at all, that President attempted to exercise martial
law
Petitions DISMISSED.
Rubrico vs. Arroyo
February 18, 2010
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine
Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her
detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean
Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were
also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued,
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of
an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or
her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents
for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that
body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that
followed.