Lecture 4 - Judiciary
CASE TITLE PERTINENT FACTS
1. Re: Letter of The case concerns the various submissions of the 37
the UP Faculty respondent law professors in response to the October 19, 2010
Entitled Resolution, directing them to show cause why they should not
“Restoring be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
Integrity: A specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Statement by
the Faculty of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary was promulgated on April 28,
the University 2010. Counsel for the ​Malaya Lolas (Atty. Harry Roque and
of the Atty. Bagares) filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
Philippines where they posited the charge of plagiarism. The works
College of Law allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were: (1) Evan J.
on the Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of
Allegations of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga
Plagiarism and Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
Misrepresentat article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
ion in the Crime." The charge of plagiarism also made it onto news
Supreme articles and was the subject of Atty. Roque’s column in the
Court” Manila Standard Today, where the authors confirmed that their
works were plagiarized.
AM
10-10-4-SC 37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law published a statement on the allegations of
March 8, 2011 plagiarism and misrepresentation. Essentially, the faculty of the
UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the
face of allegations of plagiarism in his work. It was the opinion
of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law
that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of
the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and
professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing
implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya
case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme
Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have
been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;
ISSUE RULING (CONSTI PROVISION-RELATED)
Did the Show NO. The legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that
Cause order deny freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
respondents their lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court
freedom of submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of
expression or academic freedom.
academic freedom
as professors? A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
NO. neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court
nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
[Court also ruled motivated the said Resolution—it was the manner of the criticism and the
that YES, the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
respondents counsels in the Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, have
violated the Code expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
of Professional case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave
Responsibility. rise to said Resolution.
Anyway, ang ilang
penalty kay The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced
admonishment against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the
rapud] Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute—there are other societal values that press
for recognition, and one such societal value that presses for recognition
in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the orderly
administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on
judicial decisions and institutions pose.
It is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court
to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious
conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party
in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. Lawyers when they teach
law are considered engaged in the practice of law—their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the
Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in
keeping with their duty to “participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice” under Canon 4 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to
give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct
that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of
the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without
prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the
manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence
of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
[Who signed? Marvic Leonen, Theodore Te, Florin Hilbay,
Antonio La Viña, Froilan Bacungan, Pacifico Agabin, Merlin
Magallona, Salvador Carlota, Carmelo Sison, Jay Batongbacal,
Patricia Salvador-Daway, Evelyn Battad, Dante Gatmaytan,
Gwen de Vera, Solomon Lumba, Rommel Casis, Jose Geraldo
Alampay, Jose Laureta, Arthur Autea, Dina Lucenario, Rosa
Maria Bautista, Owen Lynch, Mark Bocobo, Antonio Santos,
Dan Calica, Vicente Mendoza, Tristan Catindig, Rodolfo
Quimbo, Sandra Coronel, Gmeleen Tomboc, Rosario Gallo,
Nicholas Ty, Concepcion Jardeleza, Evalyn Ursua, Raul
Vasquez, Carina Laforteza, Susan Villanueva]
[I also included the dissenting opinions of Carpio and Sereno
kay quotable]
2. Tan v. Tan filed a complaint-affidavit against Matsuura, Atty. Tanjutco,
Matsuura, and Atty. Cua for the crime of falsification. They allegedly stole
company’s properties and his personal belongings which were
G.R. No. kept “under lock and key”. Among those stolen was his pre-
179003, signed DEED OF TRUST, whose date and number of shares,
January 9, and the item witness were all in BLANK. As a result, Criminal
2013 Case for Qualified Theft was also filed against them, pending
before the RTC - Makati. The entries for the number of shares,
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations.
With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence,
since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.
CARPIO, Dissenting: The majority’s action impermissibly expands the
Court’s administrative powers and, more importantly, abridges
constitutionally protected speech on public conduct guaranteed to all,
including members of the bar. Under the scheme of our constitutional
values, this species of speech—prime political speech critical of conduct
of public officials and institution, delivered in public forum—enjoys the
highest protection, rooted on the deeply-held notion that “the interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs.”
On the supposed unpleasant tone of the statement, critical speech, by its
nature, is caustic and biting, and it is for this same reason that it enjoys
special constitutional protection; It is important to remember that the
social function of lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also to permit
challenges to the status quo. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty
represents, is the judiciary’s partner in a perpetual intellectual
conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions.
SERENO, Dissenting: It is unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its
core of independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-page
commentary from academia—by issuing the Show Cause Order, and
affirming it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in the precarious
position of shackling free speech and expression.
The academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary—it is to
help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take,
by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and by identifying
gaps in law and jurisprudence; In a certain sense, because the law
faculty can discharge a most meaningful role in keeping the judiciary
honest, there must be recognition given to the special role of the law
faculty in upholding judicial independence. The legal academe is the
preserver of the noble standards of legal reasoning and legal
scholarship—it must itself demonstrate strength and independence and
not be punished when doing so.
WON the CA Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
erred in taking investigations.
cognizance of the Tan argues that the institution of a criminal action in court depends upon
two petitions filed the sound discretion of the prosecutor. The Court remains mindful of the
before it, established principle that the determination of probable cause is
assuming the role essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor
of a reviewing and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled is the rule that
authority of the courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
 the witnesses, and the date of the instrument were then
inserted. It was notarized by Atty. Cua.
Matsuura vehemently denied Tan’s charges, saying that the
filing of the complaint was merely a scheme resorted to by Tan
following their dispute in business and after he had obtained a
favorable resolution in a complaint for estafa against Tan.
Cua denied having any business or interest whatsoever with
the law offices of Tanjutco and claimed to have conducted her
duty in utmost good faith.
The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed for lack of probable
cause the complaint against Matsuura and Tanjutco. The Sec.
of Justice affirmed the OCP and ruled that no evidence was
presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the
witnesses’ signatures appearing on the subject deed were
merely inserted therein by the respondents. Tan’s bare
averments were insufficient to show the actual participation of
the respondents in the alleged falsification.
Upon appeal of Tan, it was reversed by then SOJ, finding the
presence of probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco,
but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information.
He ruled that Cua had exercised due diligence as a notary
public.
Upon appeal, CA then reversed the findings of the SOJ and
affirmed the OCP resolution finding no probable cause. Tan
filed a petition for review before the SC.
3. Pichay v. On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
Deputy issuedExecutive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC
Executive and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Secretary Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative
G.R. No. andAdjudicatory Division (IAD).
196425
July 24, 2012 On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V.
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for
grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of theLocal Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of
the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of
Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy
Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Secretary of investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave
Justice. [NO] abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
covers the courts’ power to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its
functions.
Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to
the prosecutors’ findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their
power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the
prosecutors’ findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so
doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that
are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes,
and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the
exercise of the courts’ review power ensures that, on the one hand,
probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent
are spared from baseless prosecution.
Not related to the consti topic but the Court found that there is no
probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua. A
finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require
that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.
And while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner,
there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material
damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the
burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and
holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Whether E.O. 13 No. EO is constitutional.
is unconstitutional
for abrogating While the term “adjudicatory” appears part of its appellation, the
unto an IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to
administrative the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
office a recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IADODESLA shall
quasi-judicial “perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC.”
function?
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to “investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in
the government” and to “submit its report and recommendations to the
President.” The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body
to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and
adjudicate cases.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.

On April 14, 2011, Pichay received an Order signed by
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and
his co-respondents to submit their respective written
explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
Manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I,
is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pichay avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with
judicial power which is reserved to the Judicial Department
and, by way of exception through an express grant by the
legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that the
name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that
the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
4. This case arose from the issuance of two Tax Credit
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the
act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following
actions undertaken for such purpose: (1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other departments or agencies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative
authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new,
additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to
the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA,
which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The
reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a
third division—the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division—through
which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked
to discharge under E.O. 13.
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the
President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the
absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged
in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the
power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President
has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look
into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee
occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
Whether or not the The Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s
G.R. Nos. Certificates in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. which were investigated Sandiganbayan Resolutions, and ORDERS the discharge of accused Homero A.
185729-32 and found fraudulent by the Presidential Task Force 156, gravely abused its Mercado from the criminal information to be used as a state
June 26, 2013 created by then President Joseph E. Estrada. discretion in witness.
refusing to
PEOPLE OF Homero Mercado, the President of JAM Liner, showed The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function.
recognize the
THE willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate that Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as
immunity from
PHILIPPINES, allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop. in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused
criminal
He applied with the DOJ for immunity as state witness under its as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors
vs. prosecution that
witness protection program, which was granted. Still, since the whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several
the Ombudsman
THE investigation of the case fell within the authority of the accused before the courts. The latter do not as a rule have a vision of the
granted
HONORABLE Ombudsman, the latter charged him and the other respondents true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial is over.
respondent
SANDIGANBA before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the
Mercado and, as a
YAN prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation, result, in declining
(FOURTH used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements
citing the DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably, the to discharge him
DIVISION), of Section 17, Rule 119.
Ombudsman executed an Immunity Agreement with Mercado. from the
ANTONIO P.
information as a The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado was part of
BELICENA, But the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the
state witness. prosecutorial discretion in the determination of who should be used as a
ULDARICO P. Ombudsman’s motion to drop Mercado from the information.
state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses.
ANDUTAN, That court held that the pieces of evidence adduced during the
Unless made in clear violation of the Rules, this determination should be
JR., RAUL C. hearing of the Ombudsman’s motion failed to establish the
given great weight by our courts. As this Court held in People v. Court of
DE VERA, conditions required under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Appeals:
ROSANNA P. Court for the discharge of an accused as a state witness. The
DIALA AND Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration but the court The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those
JOSEPH A. denied it, hence, this petition of the People of the Philippines. conditions. Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the
CABOTAJE, suggestions and the considerations presented by the prosecuting officer.
[Mercado’s co-accused opposed the grant of immunity]
"A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which
may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in
the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little
need for the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested,
as to the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative
evidence; as to which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one; and the like,
the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer. x x x."

5 ​THE CITY Petitioner City of Manila assessed taxes for the taxable period Whether or not the On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No.
OF MANILA​ v. from January to December 2002 against private respondents CTA has 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the
HON. SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances jurisdiction over a CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a
CARIDAD H. special civil action collegiate court with special jurisdiction​. While it is clearly stated that the
GRECIA–CUE Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., for ​certiorari CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
RDO, Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines
February 4, Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition
2014 to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant
to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the ​Revised Revenue Code of
Manila (RRCM)​, said assessment covered the local business
taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of
the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was
a precondition for the issuance of their business permits,
private respondents were constrained to pay assessment under
protest.
Private respondents then filed with RTC-Pasay City the
complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of
Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax,
Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction” before public respondent’s ​sala​. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents
alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the ​RRCM were violative of the
limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city’s Ordinance No. 8011
which amended pertinent portions of the ​RRCM had already
been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.
RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. ​Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for ​certiorari with the
CA assailing Orders of the RTC.
CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for ​certiorari holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that
since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint
for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows
that a petition for ​certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that
the instant petition should be denied for being moot and
academic. In any case , the Court finds it necessary to resolve
the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its
assailing an resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved
interlocutory order by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,there is
issued by the RTC no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA
in a local tax case. 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
[YES] certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax
cases filed before it.
Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of
certiorari,​ prohibition and ​mandamus​. With respect to the Court of
Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the
appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power
to issue, among others, a writ of ​certiorari​,whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a
writ of ​certiorari,​ in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided
under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and ​to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government​.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of ​certiorari in these
cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a
writ of ​certiorari.​ In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to
transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
 significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is
a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
6 ERDITO The petitioner is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare
QUARTO, Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE),
petitioner, vs. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area,
THE Manila. On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon
HONORABLE Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged
OMBUDSMAN anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase
SIMEON of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.The
MARCELO. committee designated the DPWH Internal Audit Service (IAS)
as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual
investigation.
DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001,
several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of
hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and
paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in
government losses of approximately P143 million for this
ten-month period alone.
Thus, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit and a
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit charging several
high-ranking DPWH officials and employees—including the
petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who
purportedly benefited from the anomalous transactions—with
Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA
No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations charging a
number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa
through falsification of official/commercial documents and
violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman granted the respondents’ request for immunity in
exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the
prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman’s grant of
immunity in the respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan,
however, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsman’s
actions before this Court.
The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of
WON the The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman can Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
grant immunity. powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental system and
structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and
insulated from outside pressure and improper influence. Consistent with
this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of
non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to
witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” Ocampo
IV v. Ombudsman best explains the reason behind this policy:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court
of the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Like all other officials under
our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to
the Constitution. The parameters of our review, however, are narrow. In
the first place, what we review are executive acts of a constitutionally
independent Ombudsman. Since the determination of the requirements
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in
nature, the Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of the
Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the
defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence
presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony
he needs to enable him to prove his case. It should not be forgotten, too,
that the grant of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the
extinction of the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have
incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This point is no less
important as the grant directly affects the individual and enforces his right
against self-incrimination. These dynamics should constantly remind us
that we must tread softly, but not any less critically, in our review of the
Ombudsman’s grant of immunity.
 the respondents as state witnesses, they must be included first
in the informations filed with the court. There ]after, the
Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they
can be utilized as state witnesses under the conditions laid
down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court since the
court has the “sole province” to determine whether these
conditions exist.
Our room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of
the exercise of discretion is shown. Necessarily, this limitation similarly
reflects on the petitioner who comes to us on the allegation of grave
abuse of discretion; the petitioner himself is bound to clearly and
convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in granting immunity in order to fully establish his case.

These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be

“absolute necessity” for the testimony of the proposed witness
and that he/she should not appear to be the “most guilty.” The
petitioner claims that the respondents failed to comply with
these conditions as the Ombudsman’s “evidence,” which
became the basis of the informations subsequently filed, shows
that the respondents’ testimony is not absolutely necessary; in
fact, the manner of the respondents’ participation proves that
they are the “most guilty” in the premises.

The Ombudsman counters that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman

Act of 1989) expressly grants him the power to grant immunity
from prosecution to witnesses. Given this power, the
Ombudsman asserts that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, which presupposes that the witness is originally included
in the information, is inapplicable to the present case since the
decision on whom to prosecute is an executive, not a judicial,
prerogative.

The Ombudsman invokes this Court’s policy of

non-interference in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his discretion
in matters involving his investigatory and prosecutorial
powers.26 The petitioner’s claim that the respondents are the
“most guilty” is a matter of defense which the petitioner may
raise not in this proceeding, but in the trial proper.

7In re Save This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Whether petitioner This court resolves to deny the petition.
the Supreme Development Fund1 and replacing it with the „Judiciary Support Rolly Mijares has
Court 746
scra 352
Fund. Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support sufficiently shown The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress grounds for this Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must
shall determine how the funds will be used court to grant the comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this
petition and issue
court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a a writ of
writ of ​mandamus ​in order to compel this court to exercise its mandamus​. (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the judicial power;
perceived hostility of Congress. He is concerned about the (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
Development Assistance Fund11 case on November 19, 2013
and Disbursement Acceleration Program12 case on July 1,
2014. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of
Congress and the President after the promulgation of these
cases show a threat to judicial independence.
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very ​lis mota ​of the case.23
PetitionerÊs failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the
outright dismissal of this petition.
I. ​No actual case or controversy
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial
review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there
must be „an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.‰
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a
justiciable controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation
of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.
PetitionerÊs allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the
proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court,
however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution.
This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not
a law.
Similar to ​Montesclaros,​ petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress
from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This
court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of
Congress and is „not subject to judicial restraint[.]‰35 A proposed bill
produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that
Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or
issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36 The petition,
therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for
this courtÊs determination.
II. Petitioner has no legal standing
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the
requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that

8 Macalintal v. Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner
PET, 635 Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal of our Decision in G.R. No. 191618
SCRA 783 dated November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring
the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged
unconstitutional creation of the PET:
[1] He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a
concerned citizen.
[2] He is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the
PET simply by virtue of his appearance as counsel of former
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent tribunal.
[3] Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for
the creation of the PET.
[4] The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the
constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).
Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which
cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being
lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that
if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot
create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the
PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
may only affect the judiciary.
Whether or not YES.
PET is
constitutional Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.”
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
“dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and
Enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to
include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes
characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power. At the barangay and municipal levels, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts,
respectively.
At the higher levels—city, provincial, and regional, as well as
congressional and senatorial—exclusive and original jurisdiction is
lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and
Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking,
courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of
theConstitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET
decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial
review—via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party—if there is a
showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct
line between the PET and the Supreme Court.The PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the
PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department.

9. Vivas vs. The corporate life of Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) WON The power No. The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over
Monetary expired on May 2005. Notwithstanding, Alfeo Vivas and his delegated in favor banks without need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the
Board of the principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in of the Bangko law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination of whether any
Bangko January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new Sentral ng or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and receivership of the
Sentral ng management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI Pilipinas to place erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has been
Pilipinas and the results highlighted the dismal operation of the rural rural banks under invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under
bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to receiverships is receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s
G.R. No. revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. unconstitutional continuance in business would probably result in the loss to depositors or
191424. for being a creditors.
August 7, On December 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) diminution or
2013 issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of invasion of the In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon.
RBFI for another 50 years. It also approved the change of its powers of the Antonio-Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of “close now, hear
corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, Supreme Court, in later,” stating that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the
Alfeo Vivas, as well as the increase in the number of the members of its violation of public interest. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is
on his behalf BOD, from 5 to 11. Section 2, Article summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final
and on behalf VIII of the and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a
of the Pursuant to Section 28 of The New Central Bank Act, the Philippine petition for certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank
shareholders Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP Constitution. representing a majority of the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is
of Eurocredit conducted a general examination on ECBI. On April 2008, the designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors,
Community examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP creditors and stockholders, the bank itself and the general public.
Bank, vs. The arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the
Monetary bank. Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution Preliminarily, Vivas’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of
Board of the No. 1255 placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) R.A. No. 7653 constitutes collateral attack on the said provision of law.
Bangko framework because of the serious findings and supervisory Nothing is more settled than the rule that the constitutionality of a statute
Sentral ng concerns noted during the general examination. cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must be
Pilipinas and pleaded directly and not collaterally. A collateral attack on a presumably
the Philippine On March 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing valid law is not permissible. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct
Deposit ECBI under receivership in accordance with the proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands. Be that as it may,
Insurance recommendation of the ISD II based on the latter’s findings that there is no violation of the nondelegation of legislative power. The
Corporation the ECBI (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due rationale for the constitutional proscription is that “legislative discretion as
in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
 business without involving probable losses to its depositors and
creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order
of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are
considered unsafe and unsound banking practices and other
acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the
Board of Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore
the bank’s financial health and viability despite considerable
time given to address the bank’s financial problems, and that
the bank had been accorded due process.
Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for
prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its
banking business and for placing it under receivership. Vivas
assails the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653
claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP the unbridled
power to close and place under receivership a hapless rural
bank instead of aiding its financial needs. He is of the view that
such power goes way beyond its constitutional limitation and
has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in its own “kingdom of
banks.”
10 In re Save This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary
the Supreme Development Fund1 and replacing it with the „Judiciary Support
Court, supra. Fund. Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support
Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress
shall determine how the funds will be used
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its
judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress. He is concerned about the
threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority
Development Assistance Fund11 case on November 19, 2013
and Disbursement Acceleration Program12 case on July 1,
2014. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of
Congress and the President after the promulgation of these
cases show a threat to judicial independence.
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. “
In this case, under the completeness and sufficient standard tests, there
was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A.
No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the
legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor and
supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant,
to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place
them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the
reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to
it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was
given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be
implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest of
the public, the banking industry and the economy.
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
The petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the
party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a
petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any
special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this
Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court
only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly
factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating
team.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
WON Courts can It cannot.
exercise its
powers to
“REVOKE/ABRO This court resolves to deny the petition.
GATE and
EXPUNGE The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts
whatever have power to declare what law is given a set of facts, but it does not
irreconcilable have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of the
contravention of purse. “Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget
existing laws of the judiciary should not go below the appropriation for the previous
affecting the year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget
judicial is.”
independence and
fiscal autonomy. Despite being the third coequal branch of the government, the judiciary
enjoys less than 1%50 of the total budget for the national government.
Specifically, it was a mere 0.82% in 2014,51 0.85% in 2013,52 0.83% in
2012,53 and 0.83% in 2011.54 Maintenance and Other Operating
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
“REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable
contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare
of the people.”
Expenses or MOOE “pays for sundry matters such as utility payments,
paper, gasoline and others.”55 The MOOE granted to the lower courts in
2014 was P1,220,905,000.00.56 While this might seem like a large
amount, the amount significantly dwindles when divided among all lower
courts in the country.
In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of
Representatives was P3,386,439,000.0058 or about P282.2 million per
month for the maintenance and operation of the House of
Representatives compound in Batasan Hills. Even if this amount was
divided equally among the 234 legislative districts, a representative’s
office space would still have a monthly MOOE It was only in 2013 that
the budget allocated to the judiciary included an item for the construction,
rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice in the capital outlay. The
amount allocated was P1 million.59 In 2014, there was no item for the
construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice.60 This
allocation would have been used to help fund the repair of existing halls
of justice and the construction of new halls of justice in the entire country,
including those courts destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda and the 2013
earthquake. The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only
come from the national government. The Constitution grants fiscal
autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence.
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The
Judiciary Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the
judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis. The
financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.64
These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of
lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their personnel.
The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the generosity
of local government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.65
If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of
justice is with the Department of Justice.66 As a result, our fiscal
autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels
of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating
expenses, and the reliance on local government units and the
Department of Justice.
For this reason, we appreciate petitioner’s concern for the judiciary. It is
often only through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to
the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the
remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not
a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a
proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in
Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who
may have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed
investments in the Rule of Law.
11 REPUBLIC This petition for certiorari assails the January 14, 2005 and
VS GARCIA March 2, 2005 resolutions of the Fourth Division of the
JULY 12, 2007 Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0193 which was a petition for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties, with a verified
urgent ex-parte application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife and children in the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 2004. In praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Republic
maintained that, as a sovereign political entity, it was exempt
from filing the required attachment bond.
On October 29, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of the Garcias upon the filing by the
Republic of a P1 million attachment bond. On November 2,
2004, the Republic posted the required attachment bond to
avoid any delay in the issuance of the writ as well as to
promptly protect and secure its claim.
Did the The Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon
Sandiganbayan itself a power that it did not by law possess. All courts must take their
commit grave bearings from the decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not
abuse of been superseded or reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and
discretion when it continues to form an important part of our legal system. Surprisingly, the
rejected the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino “need(ed) to be carefully
Republic’s claim reexamined in the light of the changes that the rule on attachment ha(d)
of exemption from undergone through the years.”
the filing of an
attachment bond? The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may
Yes. modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan
included, which renders a decision in violation of this constitutional
precept exceeds its jurisdiction. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan could not
have validly “reexamined, much less reversed, Tolentino. By doing
something it could not validly do, the Sandiganbayan acted ultra vires
and committed grave abuse of discretion. The fact was, the revisions of
the Rules of Court on attachment, particularly those pertaining to the
filing of an attachment bond, did not quash Tolentino.

On December 7, 2004, the Republic filed a motion for partial

reconsideration of the October 29, 2004 resolution claiming that
it was exempt from filing an attachment bond and praying for
the release thereof.

In a resolution dated January 14, 2005, the Sandiganbayan

ruled that there was nothing in the Rules of Court that
exempted the Republic from filing an attachment bond. It
reexamined Tolentino v. Carlos which was invoked by the
Republic to justify its claimed exemption. That case was
decided under the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted more
than a century ago.

12. ​In Re: On July 22, 2008, the Court's Third Division, granted the Whether the YES. ​RULE 2 THE OPERATING STRUCTURES OF THE COURT
Letters of Atty. petition for review on ​certiorari filed by FASAP finding PAL general rule SEC. 7.​Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
Estelito P. guilty of illegal dismissal. The Decision was penned by ​Justice under decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
Mendoza re: Consuelo Ynares-Santiago who was joined by the other four A.M. No. subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division.​ — ​Motions for
G.R. No. Members of the ​Third Division​: Austria-Martinez, 99-8-09-SC reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed
178083 — Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and De Castro. (which was then resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in
Flight PAL subsequently filed its motion for reconsideration still in effect) the case​ shall be acted upon by the ​ponente ​and the other Members
Attendants (MR) of the July 22, 2008 Decision; this was handled should have of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
and Stewards by Third Division: Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, applied so that resolution.
Association of Nachura, Peralta, Bersamin the case should
the Philippines The Special Third Division ​denied the MR with finality on have been RULE 8 INHIBITION AND SUBSTITUTION OF MEMBERS
(FASAP) v. October 2, 2009. The Court further declared that "[n]o further transferred to OF THE COURT
PAL pleadings will be entertained." The other Members of the the remaining SEC. 3.​Effects of inhibition. — The consequences of an inhibition of a
Special Third Division unanimously concurred with the denial of Members of the Member of the Court shall be governed by these rules:
the motion. Division that (a)Whenever a ​Member-in-Charge ​of a case in a Division inhibits
November 3, 2009, PAL asked for leave of court to file
(a) an MR of the October 2, 2009 Resolution, and (b)
a 2nd MR of the July 22, 2008 Decision.
In view of the retirement of the ponente,​ Justice
Ynares-Santiago, the Court's Raffle Committee had to
resolve the question of who would be the new ponente
of the case.
Under ​A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC ​(Rules on Who Shall Resolve
Motions for Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the Divisions
of the Court, effective April 1, 2000), ​if the ponente has
retired, he/she shall be replaced by another Justice who
shall be chosen by raffle from among the ​remaining
Members​ of the Division.
However, on November 11, 2009, the case was
raffled, not to a Member of the Third Division that
issued the July 22, 2008 Decision or to a Member of
the Special Third Division that rendered the October 2,
2009 Resolution, but to ​Justice Presbitero Velasco,
Jr​. who was then a Member of the newly-constituted
regular Third Division.
In raffling the case to Justice Velasco, the Raffle Committee
considered the above-quoted rule inapplicable because of the
express excepting qualification provided under A.M. No.
99-8-09-SC that states: [t]hese rules shall ​not apply to
motions for reconsideration of decisions or resolutions
already denied with finality​.
Stated otherwise, when the original ponente of a case retires,
motions filed after the case has been denied with finality may
be resolved by any Member of the Court to whom the case
shall be raffled, not necessarily by a Member of the same
Division that decided or resolved the case.
On January 20, 2010 (or ​while A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC was
still in effect​), the new regular Third Division, through
Justice Velasco, granted PAL's Motion for Leave to File and
Admit Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 2
October 2009 and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration of
Decision dated 22 July 2008​. This grant, which opened both
the Decision and the Resolution penned by Justice
Ynares-Santiago for review, effectively opened the whole
case for review on the merits.
The members of the Third Division: Carpio, Velasco,
Nachura, Peralta , Bersamin,
at the time leave of court was granted (which was effectively
an acceptance for review of PAL's 2nd MR), the prohibition
against entertaining a 2nd MR under Section 2, Rule 52 (in
relation with Section 4, Rule 56) of the Rules of Court
applied. This prohibition, however, had been subject to
various existing Court decisions that entertained 2nd MRs ​in
the higher interest of justice​. This liberalized policy was
ruled on the himself for a just and valid reason, ​the case shall be returned to the
merits of the Raffle Committee for re-raffling among the Members of the other
case. two (2) Divisions of the Court.
A comparison of these two provisions shows the semantic sources of the
seeming conflict: Section 7, Rule 2 refers to a situation where the
ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified,
or has inhibited himself from acting on the case; while Section 3, Rule 8
generally refers to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge who does not
need to be the writer of the decision or resolution under review.
Under Section 7, Rule 2, the case should have been re-raffled and
assigned to anyone of Justices Nachura (who did not retire until June 13,
2011), Peralta, or Bersamin, either (1) after the acceptance of the 2nd
MR (because the original rulings were no longer final); or (2) after Justice
Velasco's inhibition because the same condition existed, ​i.e.,​ the need
for a review by the same Justices who rendered the decision or
resolution. As previously mentioned, Justice Nachura participated in both
the original Decision and the subsequent Resolution, and all three
Justices were the remaining Members who voted on the October 2, 2009
Resolution. On the other hand, if Section 3, Rule 8 were to be solely
applied after Justice Velasco's inhibition, the Clerk of Court would be
correct in her assessment and the raffle to Justice Brion, as a Member
outside of Justice Velasco's Division, was correct.
Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC should be read as the general rule
applicable to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge. This general rule
should, however, yield where the inhibition occurs at the late stage of the
case when a decision or signed resolution is assailed through an MR. At
that point, when the situation calls for the review of the merits of the
decision or the signed resolution made by a ponente (or writer of the
assailed ruling), Section 3, Rule 8 no longer applies and must yield to
Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC which contemplates a situation when the
ponente is no longer available, and calls for the referral of the case for
raffle among the remaining Members of the Division who acted on the
decision or on the signed resolution. This latter provision should rightly
apply as it gives those who intimately know the facts and merits of the
case, through their previous participation and deliberations, the chance
to take a look at the decision or resolution produced with their
participation.
NOTE. ​The propriety of and grounds for the recall of the September
7, 2011 Resolution
The October 4, 2011 Resolution was issued to determine the
propriety of the September 7, 2011 Resolution given the facts that
came to light after the ruling Division's examination of the records.
To point out the obvious, ​the recall was not a ruling on the merits
and did not constitute the reversal of the substantive issues already
decided upon by the Court in the FASAP case in its previously
issued Decision (of July 22, 2008) and Resolution (of October 2,
 not formalized by the Court until the effectivity of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court ​(IRSC)​ on May 4, 2010.
In other words, with the re-opening of the case for review on
the merits, the application of the excepting qualification under
A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC that the Raffle Committee cited lost its
efficacy, as the rulings of the Court were no longer final for
having been opened for further review.
Velasco, after acting on the FASAP case for almost one
whole year, inhibited himself from participation "due to a
close relationship to a party," despite his previous action on
the case. The case was then referred to the Raffle
Committee pursuant to Administrative Circular (AC) No.
84-2007, as stated in the Division Raffle Sheet.
On September 7, 2011, the Court — through its Second
Division as then constituted — resolved to deny with finality
PAL's 2nd MR through an unsigned resolution. The second
Division was composed of: Brion, Peralta, Perez, Bersamin,
Mendoza.
Then there came Atty. Estelito Mendoza's 4 letters submitted
to the SC.
On September 26, 2011, the Clerk of Court issued the
Vidal-Anama Memorandum to the Members of the Second
Division in relation to the inquiries contained in the first and
second letters of Atty. Mendoza dated September 13 and 20,
2011.
13. BENITO E. The surviving spouse of Rosario Lorenzo, a GSIS member who
LORENZO, served as Elementary Teacher I at DepEd from 1984 to 2001.
petitioner, vs. Benito Lorenzo, filed for benefit claim. Rosario was admitted at
GOVERNMEN the Medical City Hospital due to Hematoma on he Tongue, Left
T SERVICE Inner lip and right Cheek and associated gingival bleeding.
INSURANCE Prior to said admission, it appears that Rosario was previously
SYSTEM diagnosed by the same hospital for Chronis Myelogenous
(GSIS) and Leukemia and was confined because of pneumonia which was
DEPARTMEN a result of immune-compromise secondary to leukemia.
T OF There was no document on record indicating any past medical,
EDUCATION family and personal or social history of Rosario. December
(DepEd), 2001, Rosario died. Benito claimed for Employees
respondents. Compensation death benefits from GSIS. It was denied on the
ground the GSIS found out the Rosario’s ailments and cause of
death is a NON-OCCUPATIONAL DISEAS contemplated under
PD No. 626, as amended.
Unconvinced, Benito elevated his claim to the ECC review and
consideration. ECC denied the claim and affirmed the prior
decision. Benito filed a petition for review before the CA.
2009)​. In short, the October 4, 2011 Resolution was not meant and was
never intended to favor either party, but to simply remove any doubt
about the validity of the ruling Division's action on the case. The case, in
the ruling Division's view, could be brought to the Court ​en banc since it
is one of "sufficient importance"; at the very least, it involves the
interpretation of conflicting provisions of the IRSC with potential
jurisdictional implications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby confirm that the Court
en banc​ has assumed jurisdiction over the resolution of the merits of the
motions for reconsideration of PAL, addressing our July 22, 2008
Decision and October 2, 2009 Resolution; and that the September 7,
2011 ruling of the Second Division has been effectively recalled. This
case should now be raffled either to Justice Lucas P. Bersamin or Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta (the remaining Members of the Special Third
Division that originally ruled on the merits of the case) as
Member-in-Charge in resolving the merits of these motions.
The PAL’s Motion to Vacate dated October 3, 2011, but received by this
Court after a recall had been made, has thereby been rendered moot
and academic. The FASAP’s Motion for Reconsideration of October 17,
2011 is hereby denied; the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution
was made by the Court on its own before the ruling's finality pursuant to
the Court's power of control over its orders and resolutions.
WON the ailment Sickness, as defined under Article 167 (l) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of
of the late Rosario the Labor Code of the Philippines refers to any illness definitely accepted
Lorenzo is as an occupational disease listed by the Employees’ Compensation
compensable Commission, or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that
under the present the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
law on employees’ in cases of death, Section 1(b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing P.D.
compensation. No. 626, as amended, requires that for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must show: (1) that it
NO is the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the conditions set
WHEREFORE, therein satisfied; or (2) that the risk of contracting the disease is
the petition is increased by the working conditions.
hereby DENIED. In Sante vs ECC: claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a
The 24 February reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment
2009 Decision and of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had
11 June 2009 aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum
Resolution of the of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man x x
Court of Appeals x to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only
in CA -G.R. SP on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and
No. 104853 are substantial, and not merely apparent, for the duty to prove
CA ruled that under the present law, leukemia, while listed as
an occupational disease, is compensable only among operating
room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. Being a
schoolteacher who is not exposed to anesthetics, may not be
compensable, unless, petitioner could prove that his wife’s risk
of contracting the disease was increased by the latter’s working
conditions, which the petitioner failed to do. CA also stated that
Benito has not presented any medical information on the cause
of his wife’s illness, which could help in determining the causal
connection between Rosario’s ailment and her alleged
exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and paint — hardly
considered as radiation exposure which may cause chronic
myeloid leukemia.
Hence this petition for review.
AFFIRMED. SO work-causation or work aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x
ORDERED. not merely apparent.”
It is well to stress that the principles of “presumption of compensability”
and “aggravation” found in the old Workmen’s Compensation Act is
expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme. As
illustrated in the said Raro case, the new principle being applied is a
system based on social security principle; thus, the introduction of “proof
of increased risk.” As further declared therein: The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s
compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for
work-connected death or disability.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF J. BRION:
View that as a general rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are
conclusive and binding on the parties when supported by substantial
evidence, and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. View that there
are two classifications of “sickness” under Article 167(l), Chapter I, Title
II, Book IV of the Labor Code. The first classification is any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees’
Compensation Commission. The second classification is any illness
caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions. View that unlike the old law,
the employee does not have to litigate his right to compensation under
the present Labor Code. The employee or his family simply files a claim
with the Employees’ Compensation Commission which determines
whether compensation may be paid. The lopsided situation between the
employer and the employee is now absent since the former no longer
opposes the latter’s claim for compensation. Thus, presumptions of
compensability and aggravation cease to have importance and are no
longer applicable in claims for compensation. View that in our new Labor
Code, the degree of proof required in claims for compensation is merely
substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Congruent with the required degree of proof is the consideration that it is
the trust fund that suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not
entitled under the law. The reason is that the trust fund’s integrity would
be endangered if we inadvertently or recklessly include diseases not
covered by law.
View that the liberal interpretation of employees’ compensation does not
dispense with the requirement that the employee or his family should
present substantial proof that his risk of contracting an illness was
increased by his working conditions. View that the presumptions of
compensability and aggravation no longer apply in the present Labor
Code. We thus unequivocably abandoned the presumptions of
compensability and aggravation in cases where the claimant cannot
prove the work-connection of the illness because its cause is unknown.
View that no less than the Constitution itself, under the social justice
policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals

14. Republic v. From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty
Sereno of the UP-College of Law. October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a
Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO)
certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any
permission to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine SALN
were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly
sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by
Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In
sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice.
In 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and
the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for
those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011”
for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or
considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to
JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from
the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her
SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government
records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,”
and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should
be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was
deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno
was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty.
Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to
make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination
of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the
chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno.
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG,
of disabled public servants.
Whether the Court YES. A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials
can assume and SC has jurisdiction.
jurisdiction and
give due course to The SC has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the
the instant petition extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the
for quo warranto. SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual
controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred
in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government
including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through
the Senate.
Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is
not forum shopping and is allowed. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to
hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the
public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her
removal from office. There can be no forum shopping because the
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the impeachment
case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against Sereno.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed
or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. The
language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a
quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision uses the
permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed
as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held
that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are
other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable
officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it
the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the
public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
 requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic,
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil
action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the
SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened.
Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of Representatives.
OSG CONTENTION:
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy
because what is being sought is to question the validity of her
appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of
committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust while in office. OSG maintains that the phrase “may
be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed
through modes other than impeachment.
SERENO CONTENTION:
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be
ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of
the Constitution. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category
of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment
and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued
operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word
“may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty
imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office.
Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has
no jurisdiction. Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the
SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG,
the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would
be rendered inutile.
15. Liban v. This in as MR by Gordon and PNRC assailing the decision
Gordon, 639 rendered on July 15 2009, declaring unconstitutional R.A 95,
SCRA 709 the Charter of PNRC.
In the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009, the
Court held that respondent Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. Again, the
difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be
emphasized. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts
or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else,
which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules. While a certain leeway must be given to
the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an
unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements.
Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy
or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory. The filing of the SALN
is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that
failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal
from the public service but also in criminal liability. RA 6713 even
provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
WON the court After a thorough study of the arguments, we have reconsidered our
went beyond its pronouncements in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard to the
jurisdiction in nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
deciding the PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended. The issue of constitutionality
constitutionality of of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
RA 95. [YES] issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis
 Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC
Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the SEC if it
wants to be a private corporation.
It is Gordon’s contention as the issue of constitutionality of RA
95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the
case in deciding such issue and cites Laurel v. Garcia, wherein
the Court said that it will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record if the case
can be disposed of on some other ground.
PNRC prays that the Court sustain the constitutionality of its
Charter on the following grounds:deprived intervenor PNRC of
its constitutional right to due process, intervenor PNRC was
never a party to the instant controversy, the constitutionality of
RA95, as amended was never an issue in this case. PNRC’s
structure is sui generis; it is a class of its own. While it is
performing humanitarian functions as an auxiliary to
government, it is a neutral entity separate and independent of
government control, yet it does not qualify as strictly private in
character.
16. Serrano Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
mota of the case.
In Alvarez v PICOP: This Court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established
rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95,
as amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead,
the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court
could have based its judgment.
PNRC was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled,
as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years
of existence in this country. Its existence as a chartered corporation
remained unchallenged on ground of unconstitutionality notwithstanding
that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22, 1947 during the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, which provided for a proscription against the
creation of private corporations by special law
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No.
95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in
March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and
its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon’s
Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and movant-intervenor
PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A.
No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross,
was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been
passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis ̧
being neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains
valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the
Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.”
1. Whether the 5th 1. No. The enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution
vs. Gallant and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Maritime Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Services (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.
G.R. No. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
167614 March constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for
24, 2009 the position. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay
on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998.
5th paragraph o fSection 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to
wit: Sec. 10. Money Claims. - xxx In case of termination
of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims. The LA rendered a Decision declaring the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary
benefits.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC modified the LA Decision and
corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary
awarded to petitioner because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide
for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have
been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating
the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable
salary rate.
For Antonio Serrano, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the
contributions of OFWs to national development, but
exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting
their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum
salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment
contract “or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner claims that
the last clause violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal
protection and denies them due process.
paragraph of of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Section 10, RA Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject
8042 violate the clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
non-impairment of the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed
contract clause of to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
the Constitution?
2. Yes. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
2. Does the due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
subject clause of the law.
violate Section 1,
Article III of the Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the
Constitution, and labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection
Section 18, Article of their rights and welfare.
II and Section 3,
Article XIII on To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
Labor as constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
protected sector? monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,”
the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
On Judicial review:
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of
the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when
these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that
the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest
opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of
the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same
on some other ground.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that
the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest
 opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a
competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings
before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if
not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. Records
disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was
first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for
Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, and reiterated in his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Nonetheless, the issue is deemed
seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the
competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor
tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function – its function in the
present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the
legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such
questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;
thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042,
and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other
hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare
unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.
Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was
undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take
up the issue in its decision.

17. An original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality Whether or not the Petition is dismissed.
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development mandatory
G.R. No. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) requisites for the
164987 does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory
9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of exercise of judicial
acts of Congress. In ​Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,​ 272 SCRA 18
2004). review are met in
(2003), the Court held that:
April 24, 2012 this case; and
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the
LAWYERS this petition: Whether or not the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and
AGAINST implementation of
For fund requirements of priority development programs and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
MONOPOLY PDAF by the
projects, as indicated hereunder – ₱ 8,327,000,000.00 effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption
AND Members of
should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the
POVERTY Xxxxx Congress is
burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and
(LAMP), unconstitutional
Special Provision unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
and illegal.
vs.
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be
THE appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In
SECRETARY projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted In allowing the case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
OF BUDGET programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be direct allocation the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on
AND released directly to the implementing agency or Local and release of x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
MANAGEMEN Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the PDAF funds to the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”
T, et al. allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense Members of This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, Congress based clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution,
 That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized
allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and
other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the
National Food Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump
sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of
projects. In its memorandum, LAMP insists that "[t]he silence in
the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of
Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the
Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the
‘pork barrel’ system." In other words, "[t]he omission of the
PDAF provision to specify sums as ‘allocations’ to individual
Members of Congress is a ‘casus omissus’ signifying an
omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is
forbidden to supply."
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of
separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
18 ​GOV. LUIS : ​This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
RAYMUND F. the 1997 Revised Rules of Court filed by former Governor Luis
VILLAFUERT Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. (Villafuerte) and the Province of
E, JR., and Camarines Sur (petitioners), seeking to annul and set aside the
the following issuances of the late Honorable Jesse M. Robredo
PROVINCE (respondent), in his capacity as then Secretary of the
OF Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), to
CAMARINES wit:
SUR,
(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83,
vs. pertaining to the full disclosure of local budget and
finances, and bids and public offerings;
HON. JESSE
M. ROBREDO (b) MC No. 2010-138, pertaining to the use of the 20%
G.R. No. component of the annual internal revenue allotment
on their own list of and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
proposed projects, may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,
did the that the challenged act must be struck down.
implementation of
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the
the PDAF
Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s enforcement based
provision under
on the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to
the GAA of 2004
the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on executive
violate the
power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF.
Constitution or the
Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof
laws?
was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds
to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds
by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the
petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims.
Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
enforcement. In a case like this, the Court’s hands are tied in deference
to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits
unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the
power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings
where justice and truth lie. Again, newspaper or electronic reports
showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the
Court, "not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence."
Whether the It is well-settled that the Court’s exercise of the power of judicial review
present petition is requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) there must be an
ripe for judicial actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
review. [YES] the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The Court disagrees.
In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,​25 the Court
195390 shares; and
December 10,
2014 (c) MC No. 2011-08, pertaining to the strict adherence
to Section 90 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act of 2011.
The petitioners seek the nullification of the foregoing issuances
on the ground of unconstitutionality and for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The foregoing circular also states that non-compliance will be
meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.
At the outset, the respondent is questioning the propriety of the
exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review over the instant
case. He argues that the ​petition is premature since there is yet
any actual controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. He
points out the lack of allegation in the petition that the assailed
issuances had been fully implemented and that the petitioners
had already exhausted administrative remedies under Section
25 of the Revised Administrative Code before filing the same in
court.
19 The On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
Diocese of within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Bacolod vs. Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six
Commission feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
on Elections walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
G.R. No. contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
205728. Jan Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
uary 21, 2015. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
characterized an actual case or controversy, viz:
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication
that the assailed issuances of the respondent are already in the full
course of implementation. The audit memorandum specifically mentioned
of Villafuerte’s alleged non-compliance with MCNo. 2010-83 regarding
the posting requirements stated in the circular and reiterated the
sanctions that may be imposed for the omission. The fact that Villafuerte
is being required to comment on the contents of AOM No. 2011-009
signifies that the process of investigation for his alleged violation has
already begun. Ultimately, the investigation is expected to end in a
resolution on whether a violation has indeed been committed, together
with the appropriate sanctions that come with it. Clearly, Villafuerte’s
apprehension is real and well-founded as he stands to be sanctioned for
non-compliance with the issuances.
The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be
overemphasized. At the time of filing of the instant petition, the
respondent had already implemented the assailed memorandum
circulars. In fact, on May 26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10, 2011 ​from the Office
of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on
the observation of the audit team.
Whether or not the Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the
petitioners notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of
violated the the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers,
principle of reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
exhaustion of
administrative Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule
remedies as the 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of
case was not discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action,
brought first there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and
before the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
COMELEC En
Banc or any if its Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by
divisions. respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this court from taking
jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve election protests
WON petitioners or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning
violated the candidate.
hierarchy of
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither courts. In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for expression.
the 2013 elections, but not

2. Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit

with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the
dismissal of their petition. Observation of the hierarchy of courts is
compulsory.

On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court’s

discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if
warranted by “compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of
the issues raised.

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created
by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented
before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. The Court of Appeals is
primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This
nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial
court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most
special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should
act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless
there are factual questions to determine.

The SC, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground
or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a
court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it
truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and
act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent
should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of
courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.68 This

court has “full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it
for exceptionally compelling reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of
the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of
certiorariand prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both
legislative and executive branches of the government.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental

importance.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In

cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the
lower courts on this matter.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This
case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections
have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate
urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as
an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ.

COMELEC is a constitutional body.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them
from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are “dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.”
20 League of Golden Falcon filed with the DENR MGB R- III an Application
Provinces v for FTAA in Bulacan but was denied for failure to secure area
DENR 696 clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands
scra 190
Management Sector of the DENR. Reconsiderations and
Appeals were denied.
While Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D.
Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato
Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective
Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same
area
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP)
covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden
Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.
Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board PMRB, endorsed to the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela
Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had
apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato
Sembrano).
August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the
corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo
D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S.
Valdez
AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of
the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits
August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a
Decision​14 in favor of AMTC. the Small-Scale Mining Permits
granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On
the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed
its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was
already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC’s
Whether petitioner To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this
League of petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local Government
Provinces of the Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level;17 adopt
Philippines has measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials
legal standing to and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such
assail the other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of
constitutionality of the provinces.
the subject laws.
Locus standi is defined as „a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question. The fundamental question is „whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.‰ In case of a citizens’s suit, the „interest of the person
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way.
In the case of ​Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC​, 289 SCRA 337
(1998), we said that a citizen who raises a constitutional question may
only do so if s/he could show:
(1) that s/he had personally suffered some ​actual or threatened injury​;
(2) that the actual or threatened injury was a result of an allegedly illegal
conduct of the government;
(3) that the injury is traceable to the challenged action; and
(4) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
YES (concurring opinion ni Sereno)
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated
under Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code. It claims that it is composed of 81 local governments, including the
province of Bulacan. It further claims that the instant case is a collective
action of all provinces·in that, a favorable ruling will not only benefit the
province of Bulacan, but also all the other provinces and local
governments.
The ponencia upheld petitionerÊs legal standing to file this petition
because the latter is tasked, under Section 504 of the Local Government
Code, to promote local autonomy at the provincial level, adopt measures
Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the
DENR Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining
Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076
and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to
Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never
proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining
Program.
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments
incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that it is
composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province
of Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province
alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the
League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province,
but all provinces and all local governments.
for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and
employees, and exercise such other powers and perform such duties
and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the
provinces.
In this jurisdiction, we have acknowledged the standing of associations to
sue on behalf of their members. In ​Executive Secretary v. Court of
Appeals​,8 we held that:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an
association with that of its members. An association has standing to file
suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the
concerns of its constituents.
Thus, based on jurisprudence, the League has legal
standing to question the constitutionality of the subject
laws, not only in behalf of the province of Bulacan, but
also its other members.
Apart from jurisprudence, the League is also vested with
statutory standing. The League of ProvincesÊ primary
purpose is clear from the provisions of the Local
Government Code, ​viz.:​
SEC. 502. ​Purpose of Organization​.·There shall be an organization of all
provinces to be known as the League of Provinces for ​the primary
purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government
administration, and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto.
Provinces do not have a common or general interest on matters related
to mining that the League of Provinces can represent. Each province has
a particular interest to protect and claims to pursue that are separate and
distinct from the others. Therefore, each is unique as to its reasons for
raising issues to the Court. The League of Provinces cannot represent all
provinces on mining-related issues. The perceived wrong suffered by the
Province of Bulacan when the Central Office allegedly exercised control
does not necessarily constitute a wrong suffered by the other provinces.

21. .Land This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming
Bank of the the RTC in declaring the nullity of the loan agreements entered
Philippines v. into by Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union.
Cacayuran,
Agoo’s (Sangguniang Bayan) SB passed a certain resolution to
696 SCRA implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public
861 Plaza. To finance the plan, SB passed a resolution authorizing
then Maor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank, incidental
to it, mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also
authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly
income in favor of Land Bank to secure the payment. 10 Kiosks
were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a
commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too, with a loan
from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan.
The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the
municipality embodied in a manifesto launched through a
signature campaign by the residents and Cacayuran. Invoking
his right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against the
officials and Land bank assailing the validity of the loans on the
ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property of public
dominion and therefore beyond the commerce of man.
RTC Ruling: declared the nullity of the subject loans, saying
that the loans were passed in a highly irregular manner, as
such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed notice of appeal.
Ruling of CA: affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling,
excluding the Vice Mayor from any personal liability arising
from the subject loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident
and taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves public
interest. The plaza cannot be a valid collateral to a loans for it
is of public dominion.
Land Bank filed this instant petition.
To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this
petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level;17 adopt
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials
and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of
the provinces.
Whether or not YES
Cacayuran has
locus standi It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.
A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation
are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so,
a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner
is directly affected by the alleged act.
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant
case. First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which Land Bank
insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds
derived from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality
assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans.
Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local
government unit’s just share in the national Taxes, is in the nature of
public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that
although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization
should only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public
officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be
effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it is observed that the
proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public
funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private
sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when
they are under official custody.
Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly
affected by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza which was funded by the
proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas are

22. Remulla On May 1957, Marietta O’Hara de Villa (de Villa), in her
vs. Maliksi personal capacity and as administratrix of the estate of her late
husband Guillermo, ceded, through a deed of donation ​(1957
G.R. No. deed of donation), 134,957 sq. m. (donated portion) of their
171633. 396,622 sq. m. property (subject property) in favor of the
September 18, Province of Cavite, on which now stands various government
2013 offices and facilities.
On December 1981 and February 1982, ​the Province of Cavite
filed an expropriation case seeking to expropriate, for the
amount of P215,050.00, the remaining 261,665 sq. m. of the
subject property which the former intends to develop as the
Provincial Capitol Site. Accordingly, the Province of Cavite
made a preliminary deposit of the amount of P21,505.00 and,
the RTC issued a Confirmatory Writ of Immediate Possession
in its favor, by virtue of which the Province of Cavite took
possession of the entire property.
De Villa opposed the expropriation proceedings, claiming that
there are still areas within the donated portion which the
Province of Cavite failed to develop. She also alleged that the
fair market value of the subject property should be pegged at
the amount of P11,272,500.00, or at P45.00 per sq. m. ​On
June 1989, while the expropriation case was still pending, de
Villa sold, for the amount of P2,000,000.00, the 261,665 sq. m.
portion of the subject property to Goldenrod, Inc. (Goldenrod),
a joint venture company owned by Sonya G. Mathay (Mathay)
and Eleuterio M.
Pascual, Jr. (Pascual). Subsequently, Mathay and Pascual
intervened in the expropriation case.
properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion.
As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the
rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in
ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial
purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need
not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections
thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are
involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
Government. Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this
case, Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.
WON the CA No.
properly denied
Remulla’s petition Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities:
for annulment of first​, in his personal capacity as a taxpayer; and, ​second,​ in his official
judgment due to capacity as then presiding officer of the ​Sangguniang ​Panlalawigan ​of
his lack of legal the Province of Cavite.
standing.
With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. ​In this case, public funds of
the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise
judgment. As such, Remulla — being a resident-taxpayer of the Province
of Cavite — has the legal standing to file the petition for annulment of
judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on
said ground. Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds
have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla from assailing
the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood, the
concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which
may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant. As
observed in ​Mamba v. ​Lara​, ​the Court did not hesitate to give standing to
taxpayers in cases ​where serious legal issues were raised or where
public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved.
Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need not be a party to
the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment of
the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud. ​Indeed, for as long as taxes
are involved, the people have a right to question contracts entered into
by the government,as in this case. Anent the second, Remulla equally
lodged the petition for annulment of judgment in his official capacity as
Later on, a Compromise Agreement ​(subject compromise) was
entered into by and between Maliksi and then Trece Martires
City Mayor Melencio De Sagun, Jr., both assisted by
respondent Cavite Provincial Legal Officer Atty. Renato A.
Ignacio (Ignacio), and, on the other hand, Mathay and Pascual,
in their capacity as owners of Goldenrod. On February 28,
2004, Goldenrod sold its landholdings to Mathay and Pascual
for the amount of P400,000.00.
then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the ​Sangguniang
Panlalawigan o ​ f the Province of Cavite. As such, he represents the
interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in
interest since it stands to be either benefited or injured ​by the execution
of the compromise judgment.

The subject compromise was approved by the RTC in its

Decision and Amended Decision ​(compromise judgment), both
of which were ratified by the ​Sangguniang ​Panlalawigan o​ f the
Province of Cavite and the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod o ​ f Trece
Martires City.

Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then

Vice-Governor and, hence, Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan o ​ f the Province of Cavite, ​filed a
petition for annulment of judgment arguing that the subject
compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the government
because: (​a)​ the agreed price for the subject property was
excessive as compared to its value at the time of taking in
1981;(​b​) the government stands to lose prime lots; ​and (​c​) it
nullifies/amends the 1957 deed of donation. Moreover, Maliksi
entered into the subject compromise without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan o ​ f the Province of Cavite and sans
any certification on the availability of funds as required by law.
Remulla claimed that extrinsic fraud tainted the expropriation
proceedings considering that there was collusion between the
parties and that respondent Ignacio deliberately withheld
crucial information regarding the property valuation and certain
incidents prior to the expropriation case when he presented the
subject compromise for ratification before the ​Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.​

CA rendered dismissed Remulla’s petition for annulment of

judgment based on the following grounds: (​a)​ there was yet no
disbursement of public funds at the time of its filing; thus, it
cannot be considered as a taxpayer’s suit; and (​b​) Remulla was
not a real party in interest to question the propriety of the
subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto.
23. Narra
Nickel Mining Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont
v. Redmont, Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation
722 SCRA organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in
382
mining and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan.
After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to
undertake exploration and mining activities where already
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the
capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and
controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a
considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force
behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered
by applications since it knows that it can only participate in
mining activities through corporations which are deemed
Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’
capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise
disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs,
which are reserved only for Filipino citizens. the POA issued a
Resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs.
WHEREFORE, the Panel of Arbitrators finds the Respondents,
McArthur Mining Inc., Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc.,
and Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. as,
DISQUALIFIED for being considered as Foreign Corporations.
Their Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) are
hereby x x x DECLARED NULL AND VOID.6
With respect to the applications of respondents McArthur,
Tesoro and Narra for Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of their MPSA applications to
FTAA, the matter for its rejection or approval is left for
determination by the Secretary of the DENR and the President
of the Republic of the Philippines.
After a careful review of the records, the CA found that there
was doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when it realized
that petitioners had a common major investor, MBMI, a
WON the ​Court of No. T​he POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining
Appeals erred areas which definitely involve the petitions filed by Redmont against
when it did not petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro. It is clear that POA has
dismiss the case exclusive and original jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving
for lack of rights to mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which
jurisdiction an adverse claim, protest or opposition is filed by another interested
considering that applicantn the case at bar, the dispute arose or originated from MPSA
the Panel of applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas
Arbitrators has no subject of their respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3
jurisdiction to separate petitions for the denial of said applications, then a controversy
determine the has developed between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve
nationality of said disputes.
Narra, Tesoro and
McArthur. Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Euro-med Laboratories v. Province of
Batangas elucidates: ​The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if
a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort
to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as we enunciated in Celestial, the POA unquestionably has
jurisdiction to resolve disputes over MPSA applications subject of
Redmont’s petitions. However, said jurisdiction does not include either
the approval or rejection of the MPSA applications, which is vested only
upon the Secretary of the DENR. Thus, the finding of the POA, with
respect to the rejection of petitioners’ MPSA applications being that they
are foreign corporation, is valid. Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, in
his Dissent, asserts that it is the regular courts, not the POA, that has
jurisdiction over the MPSA applications of petitioners.
This postulation is incorrect. It is basic that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action.54 Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or “The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980” reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 1. In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of POA is unequivocal from Sec. 77 of
RA 7942: Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.— x x x Within thirty (30)
days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the
panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following: (c) Disputes involving rights to mining areas (d) Disputes
involving mineral agreements or permits It is clear that POA has
 corporation composed of 100% Canadians. Pursuant to the first
sentence of paragraph 7 of Department of Justice (DOJ)
Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules
which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and
other laws pertaining to the exploitation of natural resources,
the CA used the "grandfather rule" to determine the nationality
of petitioners.
24 FILM Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of
DEVELOPME its power to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of the
NT COUNCIL Local Government Cod (LGC), anchored on the constitutional
VS COLON policy on local autonomy, passed City Ordinance No. LXIX
HERITAGE otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of
JUNE 16, the City of Cebu (tax ordinance).” Central to the case at bar are
2015 Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require
proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement,
to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of
the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City
Treasurer of Cebu City.
Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed
RA 9167, creating the Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development
Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board.
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax treatment of
certain graded films as follows:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films.—Films which have
obtained an “A” or “B” grading from the Council pursuant to
Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following
privileges:
exclusive and original jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving
rights to mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which
an adverse claim, protest or opposition is filed by another interested
applicant. In the case at bar, the dispute arose or originated from MPSA
applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas
subject of their respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3
separate petitions for the denial of said applications, then a controversy
has developed between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve
said disputes. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions
while what petitioners filed with the DENR Regional Office or any
concerned DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA has
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA
applications under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Euro-med
Laboratories v. Province of Batangas55 elucidates:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge
of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the
matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. Whatever may be the
decision of the POA will eventually reach the court system via a resort to
the CA and to this Court as a last recourse.
whether or not the It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress,
RTC (Branches 5 broad as they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of
and 14) gravely the Constitution. Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
erred in declaring power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going
Secs. 13 and 14 beyond the parameters wrought by the organic law. In the case at bar,
of RA 9167 invalid through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the
for being income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not
unconstitutional. and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially,
NO. despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly
overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative
of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local autonomy, as echoed in
Sec. 130(d) of the LGC.
Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced. The exception to this is when the parts of a
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, in which
case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. Here, the constitutionality
of the rest of the provisions of RA 9167 was never put in question. Too,
nowhere in the assailed judgment of the RTC was it explicated why the
entire law was being declared as unconstitutional. It is a basic tenet that
courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case, which the RTC, Branch 5

a. Amusement tax reward.—A grade “A” or “B” film shall
entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement
tax imposed and collected on the graded films by cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized and
independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to
Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 x x x
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance.—All
revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may
otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan
Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities
in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act No.
7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be
deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees
of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from
the termination of the exhibition to the Council which shall
reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of
the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
The city filed before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for
declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. In said petition, Cebu City sought the declaration of
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
Similarly, Colon Heritage filed before the RTC, Branch 5,
seeking to declare Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.
Both trial courts rendered Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional.
25. SAMEER Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a
OVERSEAS recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it
PLACEMENT published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
AGENCY, application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
INC.,
Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a
vs.
oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary of
JOY C.
NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency
CABILES,
required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she
.
signed the employment contract.
G.R. No.
170139 Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal)
August 5, on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment
2014 contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
· Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14,
1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she
did when it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional. This being the case, and
in view of the elementary rule that every statute is presumed valid, the
declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entirety of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional, is improper.
It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. Applying this
principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the return of all the
amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers of graded films, by
all of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions, if
not billions. In fact, just for Cebu City, the aggregate deficiency claimed
by FDCP is ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT
PESOS AND FIFTY-FOUR CENTAVOS (P159,377,988.54). Again, this
amount represents the unpaid amounts to FDCP by eight cinema
operators or proprietors in only one covered city. An exception to the
above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It
applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Whether Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just
respondent is cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to
illegaly dismissed. accord her due process of law.
YES
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and
quality standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules to
ensure that the employees comply with these standards. Failure to
(Pure labor case)
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty
of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law
acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not
"authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer."
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and
negligent in her dutiesmay, therefore, constitute a just cause for
termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the
 should immediately report to their office to get her salary employer. "The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate
and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." Failure to show
repatriation." that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was illegal.
Subsequently, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the
withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for
23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She
identified Wacoal as SOPA’s foreign principal.

26. Petitioners are members of Kalipunan ng Damayang 1. WON the 1. YES. Hierarchy of Courts; The petitioners appear to have forgotten
KALIPUNAN Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Hoemowners’ petition should be that the Supreme Court (SC) is a court of last resort, not a court of first
NG Association as well as the individual petitioners were/are dismissed for instance; The concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, Court of
DAMAYANG occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of serious procedural Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) to issue writs of
MAHIHIRAP, San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs). defects (Whether certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
INC., These LGU sent the petitioners notices of eviction and the petitioners injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice
represented demolition notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to violated the of forum. The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts
by its Vice Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the principle of by coming directly to the Court with their petition for prohibition and
President, implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the hierarchy of courts mandamus. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners
CARLITO areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. and Whether the have unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better
BADION, Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and petitioners devoted to matters within our exclusive jurisdiction. Worse, the
CORAZON demolitions without any court order when: (1) persons or correctly availed petitioners only contributed to the overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
DE JESUS entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, themselves of a We also wish to emphasize that the trial court is better equipped to
HOMEOWNE garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other petition for resolve cases of this nature since this Court is not a trier of facts and
RS public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and prohibition and does not normally undertake an examination of the contending parties’
ASSOCIATIO playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where mandamus). evidence.
N, represented government infrastructure projects with available funding are The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies
by its about to be implemented. YES against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person’s exercise of
President, Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus 2. WON Section judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. We issue a writ of
ARNOLD before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior 28(a) and (b) of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondent’s
REPIQUE, and Local Government, respondents to first secure an eviction RA 7279 are usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.
FERNANDO and/or demolition order from the court prior to their violative of A petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal,
SEVILLA as implementation of Sec 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279. Sections 1 and 6, corporation, board, officer, or person who unlawfully neglects the
President of Petitioners justify their direct recourse before SC by generally Article 3 of the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
Samahang averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy 1987 Constitution. office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another from the use
Pamata sa in the ordinary course of law. They also posit that the and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. Thus, a
Kapatirang respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing NO writ of mandamus will only issue to compel an officer to perform a
Kristiyano, Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently ministerial duty. It will not control a public officer’s exercise of discretion
ESTRELIETA unconstitutional. They likewise insist that they stand to be WHEREFORE, as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
BAGASBAS, directly injured by the respondents’ threats of evictions and premises reference to any manner in which he is required to act precisely because
JOCY LOPEZ, demolitions. In the alternative, they contend that the considered, we it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the court.
ELVIRA transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this hereby DISMISS Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails
VIDOL, and case clothes them with legal standing. the petition for its the constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition
DELIA The petitioners argue that Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 serious procedural must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that
FRAYRES, offend their constitutional right to due process because they defects. No costs. would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly
petitioners, vs. warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They SO ORDERED. entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the
JESSIE point out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1)
ROBREDO, in expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode unless the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
his capacity as there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28(a) and (b) of RA rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the existence of personal
Secretary, 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional
Department of recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
Interior and Rights and Section 2(a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
Local complain that the respondents had previously conducted necessary to the decision of the case.
Government, evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action”; it is rooted in the
Hon. GUIA Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the
GOMEZ, in presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our
her capacity coequal branches of the government. To justify the nullification of a law,
as MAYOR there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
OF THE CITY not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
OF SAN 2. NO. We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to
JUAN, Hon. compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of
HERBERT Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article
BAUTISTA, in 3 of the 1987 Constitution. In Magkalas v. NHA, 565 SCRA 379 (2008),
his capacity as this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions
the MAYOR without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of Section 2
OF QUEZON of Presidential Decree No. 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily
CITY, Hon. eject all informal settlers’ colonies on government resettlement projects
JOHN REY as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit
TIANGCO, in owned or administered by the NHA. In that case, we held that Caridad
his capacity as Magkalas’ illegal possession of the property should not hinder the NHA’s
MAYOR OF development of Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project.
NAVOTAS
CITY, and the We further stated that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried
GENERAL out even without a judicial order in the following instances: (1) when the
MANAGER of property involved is an expropriated property x x x pursuant to Section 1
the of P.D. No. 1315; (2) when there are squatters on government
NATIONAL resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or
HOUSING dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of
AUTHORITY, P.D. No. 1472; (3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such
respondents. as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; (4) when
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.

Paragraph 2, Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279 prescribes the

procedure to ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a
just and humane manner

27. IN THE Sec. 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws was amended in 1989 Whether YES. The Constitution has empowered the SC to promulgate rules
MATTER OF to read: “The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a IBP-Southern concerning the integrated bar. Pursuant thereto, the Court wields a
THE President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Luzon’s motion for continuing power of supervision over the IBP and its affairs like the
BREWING Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, intervention can elections of its officers. The current controversy has been precipitated by
CONTROVER as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors be allowed and the petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, praying that the
SIES IN THE shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective admitted election of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be opened to all and that it be
ELECTIONS regions…The Executive Vice President shall automatically considered as qualified to field a candidate for the said position.
OF THE become President for the next succeeding term…”
INTEGRA
TED BAR OF The 9 regions are: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern
THE Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western
PHILIPPINES. Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao.
A.M. No. In Velez v. de Vera (1999), the SC had occasion to rule that the
09-5-2-SC rotation system applied only to the EVP. The court ruled that
the election of EVP de Vera completed the first rotational cycle.
De Vera was removed for misappropriating clients’ funds and
general inimical acts, and Salazar was affirmed as EVP. He
April 11, 2013 eventually succeeded to the position of IBP President, and his
term was the start of the second rotational cycle.
In 2009, the national and regional elections were again tainted
with numerous controversies, which was resolved by the SC in
a Resolution ordering, among others, that a special election be
held to elect the EVP for the 2009-2011 term.
In 2011, the IBP-Board of Governors, acting on the letter of
then Gov. Fortunato of IBP-Western Visayas requested that the
Court provide guidance on how it would proceed with the
application of the rotational rule in the regional elections for
governor of IBP-Western Visayas. On December 4, 2012, the
Court issued a resolution addressing the issues with respect to
the election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas.
In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by exclusion, the
Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all
chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have
their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those
chapters that had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a
rotational cycle would be completed, all chapters of a region,
except the chapter which won in the immediately preceding
elections, could once again have the equal opportunity to vie
for the position of governor of their region. The chapter that
won in the immediately preceding election, under the rotational
cycle just completed, could only vie for the position of governor
after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.
The current controversy stems from a Motion for Intervention
by IBP-Southern Luzon seeking a declaration that the post of
EVP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and
that it be qualified to nominate a candidate for the position of
EVP for the 2011-2013 term. This was opposed by
IBP-Western Visayas, who insist that they are the only region
that could vie for EVP for that term.
28. Civil This administrative case arose from a letter dated June 23,
Service 2006 by Director Cabanag of the CSC Region VII calling the
Commission v. attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to the
In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is allowing
the matter to be raised as an issue because it has not yet been squarely
settled. Moreover, it is not only an exercise of its constitutional and
statutory mandated duty, but also of its symbolic function of providing
guiding principles, precepts and doctrines for the purpose of steering the
members of the bench and the bar to the proper path.
It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar
matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In
fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment.
Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not
come into play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened
administrative cases and modified its decisions that had long attained
finality in the interest of justice.
At any rate, granting that technical rules are strictly applied in
administrative matters, the Court can exercise its power and prerogative
to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and
when justice requires it. "The power to suspend or even disregard rules
of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself had already declared final.”
[As for the rotational cycles, the court ruled that the best option is to open
the election to all regions. Stating thus:
How then do we treat the turns of those who had already served in the
second rotational cycle? Shall we treat them as anomalies? As aberrant
developments, as Justice Brion puts it?
A remedy is to reconcile the conflicting decisions and resolutions with
nothing in mind but the best interest of the IBP. It appears from the
pleadings, however, that the differences are irresoluble.
To avoid the endless conflicts, confusions and controversies which have
been irritably plaguing the IBP, the solution is to start another rotational
round, a new cycle, open to all regions. At any rate, all regions, after the
election of Libarios, would be considered as already having its turn in the
presidency. This is not to detract from the fact that under Section 47, as
amended, and from the pertinent rulings, the position of EVP-IBP is the
one being actually rotated, but as stated in the December 14, 2010
Resolution,71 it will enable the IBP "to start on a clean and correct slate,
free from the politicking and the under handed tactics that have
characterized the IBP elections for so long."]
Whether the CSC The Supreme Court has always maintained that it is only the one that
had jurisdiction to can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance
remove her from with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may
Pita continued employment of Merle Ramoneda- Pita
(Ramoneda-Pita) as Clerk III of the MTCC Danao.
696 SCRA
151 He informed OCA that Ramoneda-Pita was found guilty of
A.M. No. dishonesty and dismissed from the service. As accessory
P-08-2531. penalties, she was perpetually barred from joining government
April 11, 2013. service and her civil service eligibility was revoked. However,
Ramoneda-Pita did not declare her ineligibility when she stated
in her Personnel Data Sheet (PDS) dated June 14, 2005 that
she had never been involved in any administrative case and
that she was civil service eligible. The dishonesty was from the
allegation that came out that Merle Ramoneda was not the one
who took the civil service exam and there was a difference in
the pictures in the seat plan and her actual picture in the
personal data sheet that she submitted to apply for work.
Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service
examinations in her stead. She averred that she took the civil
service examinations on 1986 and1987 and that there were
dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS because
these were not taken on the same year and might have
deteriorated in quality over the years. However, investigation
showed that it was indeed a different person and not her who
took the exam. She was penalized with dismissal from the
service with all its accessory penalties is imposed. She is also
perpetually barred from entering the government service and
from taking any civil service examination in the future. Her Civil
Service Sub-Professional Eligibility is likewise revoked.
She wrote to then President GMA appealing for clemency
stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with a
solemn commitment to do good for the rest of her life. The
Office of the President referred the matter to Director Cabanag
of the CSC Regional Office No. VII for investigation.
While the appeal for clemency was pending, the CSC
discovered that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in
her PDS, particularly the PDS dated June 14, 2005 submitted
to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any
administrative case and that she was civil service eligible.
Thus, CSC recommended to the president that her appeal for
clemency be denied.
In reply to the OCA, Ramoneda- Pita asserted that she never
concealed that she had been previously found guilty of
dishonesty. She claimed that her immediate supervisor, Judge
Patalinghug, was furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No.
010263. She admitted having filed request for executive
clemency with the Office of the President. In connection to this,
she said that the CSC directed her to submit some documents
the service. [YES] intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded
the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due process. She was able
to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It
may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of
Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in
both instances.
A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC and a
perusal of its investigation reports in the present case, convince us that
Ramoneda-Pita was not the one who took the CS Sub-Prof Exam in
1987. Specimen signatures in the various PDS she had submitted over
the years to the Court do not resemble the signature which appeared in
the seat plan of the CSC. Moreover, no substantive evidence was
presented by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her defense that she was not
able to develop a settled signature. Nor did she substantiate her claim
that the difference between the pictures in the PSP and the PDS is due
to the aging process.
This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should hold the
highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of this esteemed
institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of
dishonesty perpetrated by its employees.
In this case, Ramoneda-Pita’s length of service in the judiciary is
inconsequential. The CSC’s discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of
her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil
service eligible in her PDS when she had been already found guilty of an
administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and
even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita has
not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court
employee. As the Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the
ranks of undesirables.
WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUILTY of
dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leave credits, if any,
and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned
and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
her records with this Court.
 needed for its processing. She explained that she made the
entries in her June 14, 2005 PDS because she wanted to be
consistent in her statements in her previous PDS and,
considering her low education, she just copied the data entries
contained in her earlier PDS. She said that it was never her
intention to falsify the PDS and she did not understand the
legal implications. She prayed for the Court’s understanding
and cited her good record during her years of service.
In its Memorandum dated February 19, 2009, the OCA
recommended Ramoneda-Pita’s dismissal from the service. It
found that Ramoneda-Pita fully participated in the proceedings
before the CSC never once questioning its jurisdiction.
29. Re In the middle of 2013, the “pork barrel scam” controversy
Allegations spawned massive protest actions all over the country. Some
against government officials and other individuals were mentioned by
Sandiganbaya "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
n Justice mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an
Gregory Ong ex-military officer. Among the said personalities who allegedly
transacted with Mrs. Napoles was the incumbent
A.M. No. Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.
SB-14-21-J
September 23, The Kevlar Case: ​Based on the testimonies of Benhur Luy,
2014 Marina Sula and Aries Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
Respondent Ong acted as contact of Napoles in connection
with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman; Ong, being
Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal; Ong received an undetermined
amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of
her acquittal; Ong visited Napoles in her office where she
handed to him eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest
for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was
photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles. Ong thus
stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption
or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with
Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally,
respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter
to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at
her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with
or attended any social event hosted by her.
In the Report of the Investigating Justice, Respondent Justice
Whether or not Yes. The Court ADOPTED the findings, conclusions and
Justice Gregory recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
Ong is guilty of
gross misconduct, Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
dishonesty and action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
impropriety, thus character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined
violating the New as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
Code of the conduct as is not to be excused.
Judicial Conduct.
The Court agree with Investigating Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that
respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes GROSS MISCONDUCT notwithstanding the absence of
direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said
judgment.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in
connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received. A judge who extorts money from
a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and the Court has condemned such act in the strongest
possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one
charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering
justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
The evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not
witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to
Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the
respondent, the Court found credible evidence of his association with
Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's
Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of
all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and
WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and
categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous,
clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth. In fact,
their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were
consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or
falter. It was found that the two whistleblowers are credible
witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction,
reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses and therefore
found unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula
were lying.
Ong's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct
relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain
dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders
him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of
the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore,
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he
received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of
the same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that
their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of
going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed
himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two
occasions was GROSSLY IMPROPER and violated Section 1, Canon 4
(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on
June 1, 2004.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the
mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct states that "Propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge."
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when
improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are
under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter
public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with
Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel"
controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials.
Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft
cases. The Court cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion,
consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters
even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu
proprio, is guilty of DISHONESTY, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT,

30. The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the
MCTC Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
G.R. No.
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. A year later, he
211833
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in three (3)
April 07, 2015 RTC branches.
FERDINAND JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination
R. informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of
VILLANUEVA, candidates for the said stations. On the same date, he sought
PRESIDING reconsideration of his non-inclusion.
JUDGE,
He was informed by the JBC Executive Officer that his protest
MCTC,
and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC ​en banc​.
COMPOSTEL
However, its decision not to include his name in the list of
A-NEW
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of
BATAAN,
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
COMPOSTEL
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
A VALLEY
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner
PROVINCE,
has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded
Petitioner, v.
from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this
JUDICIAL
Court.
AND BAR
COUNCIL, Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly
Respondent. came to this Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of
the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
Whether or not the Petition is dismissed.
policy of JBC
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to
requiring five
recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the
years of service
JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by
as judges of
the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened
first-level courts
with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it
before they can
determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While
qualify as
the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
applicant to
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
second-level
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
courts is
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
constitutional.
incidental to the JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process
that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’ qualifications. In
carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long-held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine
who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but
not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to
establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses
the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the
five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is
necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to
the JBC.
Equal Protection
In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in
accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a
member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity
and independence. "To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every
member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees
submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from
the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified."

Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing

recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the
competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to
determine proven competence which may be measured by experience,
among other factors.

At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only
factor that determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be
appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification are neither
automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The
applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated
based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the
questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.

Due Process

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not
be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive
branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of
the Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as

judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to
second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect.

While there are several exceptions to the requirement of publication, the

assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed
policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the
JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to
lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to
serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a
natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.
31 The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected
FRANCISCO departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012,
I. CHAVEZ, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Petitioner, Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the
filing of this case. The issue has constantly been nagging legal
vs. minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional
challenge.
JUDICIAL
AND BAR Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to
COUNCIL, the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan activities, the
SEN. members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
FRANCIS create a separate, competent and independent body to
JOSEPH G. recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
ESCUDERO body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
and REP. appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
NIEL C. (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are provided under
TUPAS, Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution​ (see provision).
JR.,​Responde
nts. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the
creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the
G.R. No. JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. ​Perhaps in order
202242 to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive
July 17, 2012 body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would
send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words,
Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
Contention of respondents
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents
defended their position as members of the JBC in their
Comment ​and according to them, the crux of the controversy is
the phrase "a representative of Congress." ​Reverting to the
basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution ​to
determine the meaning of the term "Congress." It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Does the first Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
paragraph of supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
Section 8, Article officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
VIII of the 1987 Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
Constitution allow a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
more than one (1) representative of the private sector.
member of
Congress to sit in From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
the JBC? Is the discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first
practice of having paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the
two (2) supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
representatives regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar,
from each house a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
of Congress with from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
one (1) vote each controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC
sanctioned by the composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary
Constitution? [NO of Justice and "a representative of Congress."
TO BOTH]
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that
the word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made
on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred
to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed
to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as
pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant
of the JBC in his memorandum, ​"from the enumeration of the
membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members
pertained to a single individual only."
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of
the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a ​practical purpose​, ​that is, to provide a solution should there
be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of
the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in
"Congress," such that the absence of either divests the term of
its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In
simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the
Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from
Congress," it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
the event a tie is reached.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress,
the word "Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
should be read as including both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the
time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a
unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a
bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to
amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.​45 ​On this score, the
Court cites the insightful analysis of another member of the Court and
JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that
the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in
the Council a representation for the major elements of the community."
xxx The ​ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government while the regular members
are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. ​The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each
ex-officio member as ​representing one co-equal branch of
government​. ​xxx​Thus, the JBC was designed to have ​seven voting
members with the three ​ex-officio members having equal say in the
choice of judicial nominees.
xxx xxx xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of
Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative
powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII
of the Constitution. ​Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial
branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal
branch of in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other
hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the
Senate and House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct
bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme.
While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness
of the two houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such
dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other
two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three
governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding
aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the
Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one
branch and ​should not have any more quantitative influence as the
 other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed
upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion.

32 This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the (1] whether the MR Denied.
FRANCISCO Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the first paragraph of
I. CHAVEZ, respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Section 8, Article Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
petitioner, vs. Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 VIII of the 1987 representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its
JUDICIAL by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez . Constitution primary function―to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive
AND BAR allows more than power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
COUNCIL Grounds relied upon by Respondents: one (1) member of assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
G.R. No. 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the Congress to sit in
202242. JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; the JBC; and There is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate
April 16, 2013. when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress 2] if the practice of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at
would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the having two (2) a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the representatives representatives from the major branches of government―the Chief
Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide from each House Justice as ex-officio Chairman representing the Judicial Department), the
a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct. of Congress with Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
one (1) vote each representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
is sanctioned by Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the
the Constitution. Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in
the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major
branch of government.

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in

the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution.Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches
of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in
the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and
the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in
furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the
latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be
made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.

In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the
entireCongress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is
not an absurdity. From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can
this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized
33. Jardaleza The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory the correct
v Sereno GR retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (​Associate application of
213181 Justice Abad​) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on Section 2, Rule 10
March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC JBC-009 and its
announced the opening for application or recommendation for effects, if any, on
the said vacated position. the substantive
rights of
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo applicants.
Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating
petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (​Jardeleza​), incumbent Solicitor WHETHER OR
General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance NOT THE
of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of ISSUES RAISED
candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On AGAINST
May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC. JARDELEZA
BEFIT
Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of QUESTIONS OR
Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora CHALLENGES
Santiago Lagman (​Justice Lagman​), who informed him that ON INTEGRITY
during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice AS
and JBC ​ex officio ​Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno CONTEMPLATED
(​Chief Justice Sereno​), manifested that she would be invoking UNDER SECTION
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was 2, RULE 10 OF
then directed to „make himself available‰ before the JBC on JBC-009.
June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the
objections to his integrity.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, ​sans J​ ardeleza,
incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (​Associate
Justice Carpio)​ appeared as a resource person to shed light on
a classified legal memorandum (​legal memorandum)​ that would
clarify the objection to JardelezaÊs integrity as posed by Chief
Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
questioned JardelezaÊs ability to discharge the duties of his
office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his
handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the CourtÊs ​ante-​
rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal
points:
1. There was a misapplication of the unanimity rule under Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the
government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider
trading fall within the contemplation of a question on integrity and would
have warranted the
application of the unanimity rule, he was not afforded due process in its
application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for
judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend
nominees to the President. The ​sui generis c​ haracter of JBC
proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due
process under JBC- 010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due pro cess when, contrary to
the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his
integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should
have been included in the short list submitted to the President for the
vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not
from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, ​per se​, but
from the ​violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic
tenets of due process. B ​ y no means does the Court intend to strike down
the „unanimity rule‰ as it reflects the JBCÊs policy and, therefore,
wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing
treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza
has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the
fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.
1. Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases
where an applicant’s integrity is challenged.
(​Secretary De Lima​) informed him that Associate Justice
Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential
information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his
integrity as dubious.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if
he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised
against him. He answered that he would defend himself
provided that due process would be observed.
Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying
JardelezaÊs request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC
continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the short list. Thereafter, the JBC
released the subject short list of four (4) nominees which
included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan with
five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes.
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later
published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
stating that the CourtÊs Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te,
revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it
to the JBC short list, but one (1) nominee could not be included
because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC
rules.
Jardeleza ​prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the
list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice ​vice
Associate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief
Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
JBC’s contention:​ As a general rule, an applicant is included
in the short list when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at
least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an
applicantÊs integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is
required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the said
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the
categorical constitutional declaration that [a] member of the
judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. To ensure the fulfillment of these
standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been
tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others,
making certain that the nominees submitted to the President
are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way,
the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified.
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized
evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, „integrity is
closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to ​sound moral and ethical
standards​. That is why proof of an applicantÊs reputation may
be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable
government officials and nongovernmental organizations and
clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation,
and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback
from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked.
As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such
that, „integrity is the quality of personÊs character.24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: ​Does Rule 2,
Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the „unanimity rule,
contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant?
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant
is challenged.·In every case where the integrity of an applicant
provision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC
members to be included in the short list. In the process, Chief
Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even
then, he needed the votes of the five (5) remaining members.
He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result, he was not
included in the short list. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who
got four (4) affirmative votes, was included in the short list
because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, them
ajority rule was considered applicable.
who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or
challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the
Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his
nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the
rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put,
when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for
his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes
„unanimous instead of the „majority vote required in the
preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the
term „integrity as an essential qualification for appointment,
and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to
surpass, that is, ​the unanimous vote of all the members of the
JBC​, the Court is of the safe conclusion that „integrity as used
in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. ​Hence, Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an
applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that
the „unanimity rule only comes into operation when the
moral character of a person is put in issue.​ It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an
applicantÊs moral uprightness.
2. Examining the questions of integrity made against
Jardeleza
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or
original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC- 009 was
grounded on Jardeleza’s „inability to discharge the duties of
his office as shown in a legal memorandum related to
Jardeleza’s manner of representing the government in a
legal dispute.​ The records bear that the „unanimity rule was
initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC
meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her
position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required to
be a member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the Chief
Justice shared with the other JBC members the details of
Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the governmentÊs
position in a case and how this could have been detrimental to
the national interest.

Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing

questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity? Does
his adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a
case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the unanimity rule apply in cases
where the main point of contention is the professional
judgment ​sans ​charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior?

The Court answers these questions in the negative.

While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of

Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out of a mere
variance of legal opinion but by an „act of disloyalty‰
committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact
remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the
„disagreement in legal strategy as expressed by a group of
international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that
case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said
reason, criticism was hurled against his „integrity. The
invocation of the „unanimity rule on integrity traces its roots to
the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. ​No
connection was established linking his choice of a legal
strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the
country’s interests or to betray the Constitution.

The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding
international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO
case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts in the
determination of JardelezaÊs professional background, while
commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a
connection between the act complained of and his integrity as
a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably
within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC- 009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of
the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What
this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its
invocation.

Issue on insider trading and extra-marital affair:

Do these issues fall within the purview of „questions on

integrity under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court
nods in assent.
The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital
affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the
Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships
which have never gone physical or intimate could still be
subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is
married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than
friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been
confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community and
an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare

On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults

 the integrity of our vital securities market.

These two issues can be properly categorized as „questions

on integrity under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC- 009. They fall
within the ambit of „questions on integrity. Hence, the
„unanimity rule may come into operation as the subject
provision is worded.

3. Due process

In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partyÊs right to

due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule may well be applied to the current
situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill
of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of
government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is
available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject
short list as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against.
Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed
to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on
the original ground against JardelezaÊs integrity. At the risk of being
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBCÊs discretion in the selection of
nominees, but its application of the „unanimity rule‰ must be applied in
conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by
Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the
only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the
JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of
Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the short list
submitted to the President.

34 Villanueva Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed on September Whether or not the The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present
v. JBC, 755 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial writ of certiorari Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
SCRA 182 Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley and prohibition correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court.
On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter dated December 18,
2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of
candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the
petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking
reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered
applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did
not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was
informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly
noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include
his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's
long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and
since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year,
he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to
take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already
prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates
the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates
the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights
for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also
asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program
mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.8557
should not be merely directory and should be fully
implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and
by Congress, since he has already complied with the
requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
cannot issue to jurisdiction.
prevent the JBC
from performing In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
its principal tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In
function under the the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted
Constitution to in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
recommend performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
appointees to the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the
Judiciary because petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
the JBC is not a JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether
tribunal exercising the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
judicial or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
quasi-judicial
function Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by
virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence
provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the
authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to
inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own
rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in
assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary
writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance
of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an
applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by
mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by
the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of
the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties' rights or duties thereunder."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that
the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although
he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court
reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution

35. Aguinaldo This is a motion for reconsideration on the SC decision
vs. Aquino III declaring the clustering of nominees made by the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) unconstitutional, and the appointments of
G.R. No. respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick Musngi and
224302. Geraldine Faith Econg, together with the four other
February 21, newly-appointed Associate Justices of the ​Sandiganbayan​, as
2017 valid.
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom,
and maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to cluster the
nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan A ​ ssociate Justice into six separate short lists.
to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate
RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the present petition.
WON the Yes. The independence and discretion of the JBC has its limits. It cannot
clustering made impair the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his
by the JBC statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly appointed
impaired the Sandiganbayan ​Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the
President’s power strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
to appoint espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President’s
members of the appointing power. The Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the
Judiciary President’s appointing power in the following ways: The President’s
option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in
each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one
cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in
the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nominees applied for
and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant
Associate Justice positions in the ​Sandiganbayan,​ but the JBC failed to
explain why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the
position assigned to one specific cluster only.
Correspondingly, the nominees’ chance for appointment was restricted to
the consideration of the one cluster in which they were included, even
though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies.
Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
established the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan ​Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1,
paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606), rules (Rule II, Section 1[b]
of the Revised Internal Rules of the ​Sandiganbayan)​ , and jurisprudence
(​Re: Seniority Among the Four Most ​Recent Appointments to the Position
of Associate Justices of ​the Court of Appeals)​ ,18 vest exclusively upon
the President.
The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely

36. Flores v. SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
Montemayor, without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
G.R. No. the law on which it is based.
170146, June
8, 2011 No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
Facts:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision
dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the October 19, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision
dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent
administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and
2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two
expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A.
No. 6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations
of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including
the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on
respondent, with all accessory penalties.
The motion is anchored on the following grounds:
1. Respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal
Investigations equivalently resulting in violation of his
constitutional right against "double jeopardy".
2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of two (2)
successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to
favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be
included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her
appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with
many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal,
objective, and rational basis for determining which nominee shall be
included in a cluster. Simply saying that it is the result of the deliberation
and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory.
The JBC cannot even question the “cross-reaching” or nonobservance
by President Aquino of such clustering.
WON NO. The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and
respondent’s recommendation of the PAGC, adopted the same with a brief statement
constitutional right preceding the dispositive portion:
to due process
was violated. After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the
recommendation of PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual
findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001
and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of the
relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was,
to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted
to let the opportunity pass by.
The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition
adopting fully the findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the
investigating authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a court but
an administrative body determining the liability of respondent who was
administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority over
presidential appointees.
In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, this Court ruled that the rights of parties
in an administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the
decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as
the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. Thus:
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative
proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to
decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled
"Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with
respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error
 government agencies involving the same facts and issues
affecting the rights of the Respondent.
3. Respondent’s constitutional right to due process was
violated.
4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh
and severe on the alleged offense committed/omitted.
On the first ground, the Court finds it bereft of merit.
Respondent asserts that since the PAGC charge involving
non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the
subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for
unexplained wealth, the former can no longer be pursued
without violating the rule on double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a
valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. We
have held that none of these requisites applies where the
Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the
same criminal offense against the respondent public officer.
The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does
not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not
being part of the trial.
With respect to the second ground, respondent underscores
the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and
administrative complaints against him, including the charge
subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is
argued that the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional
body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC which is not a
constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP. Under said
law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government, such as
herein respondent.
37DEUTSCHE In accordance with Section 28(A)(5)4 of the NIRC of 1997,
BANK VS CIR petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent the amount of
AUG 28, 2013 PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent
(15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular
banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank
to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or
administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements under
Section 14, Article VIII.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as
long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal
rights of parties in administrative proceedings, among these rights are
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;" and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the
parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no requirement in
Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative
decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that
sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the
decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of
HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The
brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing
concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed
Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the
parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in
order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari
under Rule 65.1avvphi1
Whether the At the outset, this Court’s minute resolution on Mirant is not a binding
Mirant is a binding precedent. The Court has clarified this matter in Philippine Health Care
precedent. NO. Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue as follows:
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division on an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate. On the same date,
petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs
Division(ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the
preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
The CTA Second Division Ruling
The CTA Second Division found that petitioner indeed paid the
total amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 representing the 15%
BPRT on its RBU profits amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for
2002 and prior taxable years. However, the claim of petitioner
for a refund was denied on the ground that the application for a
tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by
the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch
profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the
preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany
Tax Treaty provision. The court a quo held that petitioner
violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III
paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No.
1-2000.
Further, the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant (Philippines)
Operations Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Asia-Pacific
Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Mirant) where the CTA En Banc ruled that before the benefits
of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign corporation
wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the
provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to
the corporation.
The CTA En Banc Ruling
The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division’s
Decision and Resolution. Citing Mirant, the CTA En Banc held
that a ruling from the ITAD of the BIR must be secured prior to
the availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax treaty.
Applying the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, the
CTA En Banc took into consideration that this Court had denied
the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed by Mirant for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment.
The CTA En Banc ruled that once a case has been decided in
one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner.
the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we
dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being
questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final.
When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to
comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged
decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are
deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning
the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or
another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is
involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v.
Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel
involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed
of by the Court thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003
sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the
previous case „ha(d) no bearing on the latter case because the two
cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the
taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a
minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under
the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the
facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions.
A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the
justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief
Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published
in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article
VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down
doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a
decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the
Chief Justice.
Even if we had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that
Decision cannot bind this Court in cases of a similar nature. There are
differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods, and treaties involved; more
importantly, the disposition of that case was made only through a minute
resolution.
 Petitioner posits that, contrary to the ruling of the CTA, Mirant is
not a binding judicial precedent to deny a claim for refund
solely on the basis of non-compliance with RMO No. 1-2000.

38. Agoy vs. The Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s petition for review Whether or not the One. The notices of the minute resolutions sent to Agoy, bearing the
Araneta through a minute resolution that reads: copies of the signatures of Assistant Clerk of Court and Deputy Division Clerk of Court,
Center, Inc. —The Court resolves to GRANT petitioner’s motion for minute resolutions both printed on pink paper and duly received by counsel for petitioner as
extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for that Agoy received evidenced by the registry return cards, are authentic and original copies
March 21, review on certiorari.” are authentic; of the resolutions.
2012. - The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Decision dated 19 October 2010 and Whether or not it Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of
The Resolution dated 29 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA), was proper for the the Court. While they are the results of the deliberations by the Justices
adjudication of Manila, for failure to show that the CA committed reversible Court to deny his of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants
a case by error when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy. petition through a whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by
minute minute resolution. quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court.1 Neither the Clerk
resolution is Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of Court nor his assistants take part in the deliberations of the case. They
an exercise of of the above minute resolution that he received through merely transmit the Court’s action in the form prescribed by its Internal
judicial counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same Rules.
discretion and and to have his case resolved on its merits via a regular
constitutes resolution or decihsion signed by the Justices who took part in “Sec. 14. No Two. While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision
sound and the deliberation. In a related development, someone claiming to decision shall be clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the
valid judicial be Agoy’s attorney-in-fact requested an investigation of the rendered by any Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for
practice. issuance of the resolution of June 15, 2011. On September 21, court without review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.
2011 the Court denied Agoy’s motion to rescind the subject expressing therein
minute resolution and confirmed the authenticity of the copy of clearly and With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined
the June 15, 2011 resolution. It also treated his motion to distinctly the facts the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed
rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the same and the law on resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution.4 Among those
with finality. which it is based. instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies
No petition for a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis
Upon receipt of the Court’s September 21, 2011 resolution, review or motion the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision,
Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case for reconsideration resolution, or order of the court below.”5 The minute resolutions in this
resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in of a decision of case complied with this requirement.
relation to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy the court shall be
reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his petition by a refused due The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the
minute resolution. course or denied actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits.6 They
without stating the are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court.7
legal basis When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the
therefor.” CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain
its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the
findings and conclusions of the CA. It would be an exercise in
redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution
denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached.

39. OFFICE The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit WON Judge Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The Constitution, Code of Judicial
OF THE of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Alaminos City, Bustamante Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must
COURT Pangasinan, then presided by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante should be fined decide cases within 90 days from submission. Decision making, among
ADMINISTRA (Bustamante). Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 20k. other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of
TOR, 2010. the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim
complainant, Because Judge Bus, char, is retiring soon, a judicial audit of the
vs. JUDGE MTCC was conducted on Sept 21, 2010 by a team from the
BORROMEO Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Deputy Court
R. Administrator Raul Villanueva (hmm chos) informed Judge Bus
BUSTAMANT of the initial audit findings that there were 35 cases for decision
E, (21 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) and
MUNICIPAL 23 cases with pending incidents for resolution (19 of which
TRIAL were already beyond the reglementary period) in Judge Bus’
COURT IN court. DCA Villanueva gave Judge Bus the followunf directives:
CITIES, 1. Explain in writing, 2. Decide and submit copies of the
ALAMINOS decisions within 3 days after your compulsory retirement, and
CITY, 3. Resolve and submit copies of the resolutions
PANGASINAN Judge Bus submitted a letter explaining that he has decided all
, respondent. the cases Civil, LRC and Criminal Cases except 2 Civ cases,
because of lack of TSN taken when he was not yet the
Presiding Judge. He explained why he was not able to decide
on the cases within the reglementary period, it was because of
the volume of work in this court.
In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to
the OCA copies of the decisions and resolutions he referred to
in his letter. OCA submitted to the court its memo, reporting viz:
1. Judge Bus has decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in
his court, 2. Judge Bus had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases
with pending incidents in his court, all of which were resolved
beyond their respective reglementary periods. Unconvinced by
Judge Bus’ explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding
cases and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended
that: fine for 20,000 for gross inefficiency.
In a Resolution dated February 8, 2012, the case was
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Judge Bus wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating
that although he already retired from the service on November
6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement benefits (except
for his accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of
the instant administrative matter against him. Consequently,
Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative matter be
resolved soonest so he could already receive his retirement
benefits or that his retirement benefits be released but a certain
amount commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose
be withheld.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
OCA.
40. Marcelo v. Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in a civil case for unlawful
Pichay detainer before the MTC. By virtue of a Joint Decision on Sep.
5, 2005, the defendants (Sps. Magopoy) were ordered to
AM vacate and surrender possession of the property.
MTJ-13-1838
In 2006, a writ of execution was issued and Sps. Marcelo
March 12, obtained possession. However, Sps. Magopoy successfully
YES of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the
judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
WHEREFORE, constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their
the Court finds cases. The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence
retired Judge consistently. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
Borromeo R. brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Bustamante, A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
former Presiding requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation.
Judge of the Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall
Municipal Trial behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. The Court usually
Court in Cities, allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the
Alaminos City, heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the
Pangasinan, 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can,
GUILTY of undue for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally
delay in rendering granted. But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of
decisions and these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period,
orders, and without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante
imposes upon him is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.
a FINE of Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in
P20,000.00, to be deciding cases and/or resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge
deducted from his is responsible, not only for the dispensation of justice but also for
retirement managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court
benefits. SO services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
ORDERED. discharge of his official functions, he should know the cases submitted to
him for decision or resolution, especially those pending for more than 90
days.
Under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the
respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not more
than P20,000.00.
Whether Judge YES. The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the
Pichay should be time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their
held adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date
administratively they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. Section 15, Article
liable for undue VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this
delay rule, viz.:
2014 reentered the property and regained possession. Sps. Marcelo
moved to cite Sps. Magopoy in contempt for
disobedience/resistance to lawful court process.
In 2009, while finding the act of reentry by Sps. Magopoy as a
clear defiance of a lawful writ (a form of indirect contempt
punishable under Rule 71), the MTC did not cite them in
contempt but ordered them to surrender the property to Sps.
Marcelo within 10 days.
Sps. Marcelo filed an ex parte constancia in view of the
continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to surrender the property. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Sps. Magopoy, which
was opposed by Sps. Marcelo. During the hearing, Sps.
Magopoy were directed to file their Reply. In compliance, Sps.
Magopoy filed their Supplemental Motion and Reply. Sps.
Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents for resolution.
October 1, 2009 – Instead of resolving the case, Judge Pichay
directed Sps. Marcelo to file their comment, after which the
court will resolve the pending incidents. Judge Pichay set the
motion for hearing on three dates in 2010. Disconcerted with
Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Sps. Marcelo filed an
administrative complaint against him, charging him with
inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending incidents.
Judge Pichay attributed the delay to the new arguments raised
in the supplemental motion.
OCA recommended that Judge Pichay be held administratively
liable for undue delay. They found that he entertained dilatory
machinations that resulted in the delay of the implementation of
the writ of execution issued as early as 2006.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
In previously decided cases, the Court held that non-compliance with the
periods prescribed under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
constitutes gross inefficiency, and, perforce, warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge.
While trial court judges are often burdened with heavy case loads which,
in turn, preclude the expeditious resolution of disputes, they are given the
option to, for good reasons, ask for an extension of the period within
which to resolve a particular case or any pending incident therein.
As correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay failed to
resolve the subject motions, namely the motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion, within the three (3) month-period prescribed
therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo’s period to file their
comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/or rejoinder to the
reply lapsed on October 18, 2009, at which time, the pending incidents
were, as stated in the Order dated October 1, 2009, already deemed
submitted for resolution. This is concordant with Section 15(2), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that “[a] case or matter shall be
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself.”
To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention on June 7,
2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the
subject motions were already due for resolution. Thus, without having
duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Pichay was bound
to resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the three (3)
month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however, failed to
do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him
remains in order.