Request of Judge Tito G.

Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation
of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I. The Facts:

In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge Tito G. Gustilo requested that, considering his retirement
is “barely one month from November 2004,” the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under the Republic Act No.
9227 included in the computation of his retirement benefits. In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that “in the past, Judges who retire
in October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay, invoking the “liberal policy” of the Court in granting benefits to the
underpaid Trial Court Judges.”

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to judges took effect in November 11,
2003. The special allowances shall be equivalent to 100% of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades to be
implemented uniformly in 4 years in such sums or amounts equivalent to 25% of the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof.
Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source
specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise reiterated that for purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special allowance
actually received and that which accrued at the time of retirement shall be included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in favor of retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the special allowance in the computation of his retirement
benefits because Sec 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading, shows that only the allowances “actually
received” and the tranche or tranches “already received and implemented,” upon date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of
the retirement benefits. As such, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application of the law.

Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals Case No. 165 G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976)
Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63

FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila
Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to
lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner
sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).

ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of
Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a
gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar,
the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila.
Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of
legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

G. R. No. L-41001 September 30, 1976

MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, and TARLAC DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

No. L-41012 September 30, 1976

TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF ELKS, INC., respondents.
CASTRO, C.J.: têñ.£îhqwâ£

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTS

These two cases are petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated June 30, 1975 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
51590-R entitled "Tarlac Development Corporation vs. City of Manila, and Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks, Inc.," affirming the trial court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the property subject of the decision a quo is
a "public park or plaza."

On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of
Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be
the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel
site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not
exceed ninety-nine years."

Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize
the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.

The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area,
and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The title described the registered
land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta Extension, situato en el distrito de la Ermita x x x." The registration
was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of said law (Land Registration Act) as may be
subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones impuestas en la Ley No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de
venta, celebrados y otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No. 761,
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, fechados respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909." 1

On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07 square meters of the
reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) on the
basis of which TCT No. 2195 2 was issued to the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta Extension,
Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back of this title vas annotated document 4608/T-1635, which in part reads as
follows: "que la citada Ciusdad de Manila tendra derecho a su opcion, de recomparar la expresada propiedad para fines
publicos solamete in cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 le Julio le 1911, precio de la misma propiedad,
mas el valor que entonces tengan las mejoras."

For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761,
PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No. 2196 3 was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.

Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued
TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court oder to "Manila Lodge No. 761,
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."

In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the
City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.

On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the
Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the
same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments.5 At the time of the sale,, there was no annotation of any
subsisting lien on the title to the property. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE TERRENO,
que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."

In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to
repurchase; the court, after haering, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarind the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. From
this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial
court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.

As a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, containing three causes of
action and praying -

a) On the first cause of action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have purchased the parcel of land now in question with
the buildings and improvements thereon from the defendant BPOE for value and in good faith, and accordingly ordering the
cancellation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of the Plaintiff;

b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant City of Manila to pay the plaintiff TDC damages in the sum of note
less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);

c) On the third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to recover from the defendant BPOE the amounts
mentioned in par. XVI of the complaint in accordance with Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in the remote event that the final
judgment in this case should be that the parcel of land now in question is a public park; and
d) For costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 6

Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971, admitted all the facts alleged in the first cause of action
except the allegation that TDC purchased said property "for value and in good faith," but denied for lack of knowledge or
information the allegations in the second and third causes of action. As, special and affirmative defense, the City of Manila
claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it had actual notice of the City's right to repurchase which was
annotated at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and that, assuming arguendo that TDC had no notice of the right to
repurchase, it was, nevertheless, under obligation to investigate inasmuch as its title recites that the property is a part of the
Luneta extension. 7

The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971, admitted having sold the land together with the
improvements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in good faith, but denied for lack of knowledge as to their
veracity the allegations under the second cause of action. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paid the quarterly
installments until October l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the subsequent
installments. It also asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without having misrepresented or concealed tacts
relative to the title on the property. As counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to recover the balance of the
purchase price plus interest and costs. 8

On June 15, 1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its refusal to make further payments was fully
justified.9

After due trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public park or
plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City
of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in g faith and for
value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila
whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter. 'The dispositive part of the decision reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel of land formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos 2195 and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the
name of Tarlac Development Corporation is a public' park or plaza, and, consequently, instant complaint is
dimissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

In view of the reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation to recover from defendant BPOE
the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI of the complaint in accordance with Article 1555 of the Civil Code,
the Court makes no pronouncement on this point. 10

From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, avers that the trial court committed the
following errors, namely:

1. In holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial property of the City of Manila; and

2. In holding that the Tarlac Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right against the defendant BPOE. 11

The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the other hand, asserts that the trial court erred:

(1) In finding that the property in question is or was a public park and in consequently nullifying the sale thereof by the City of
Manila to BPOE;

(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, and Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112, to the
case at bar; and

(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to ,recover damages from the defendant City of Manila. 12

Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second assignment of error raised by BPOE, maintained that it can recover and
enforce its rigth against BPOE in the event that the land in question is declared a public park or part thereof.13

In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals concur ed in the findings and conclusions of the lower
court upon the ground that they are supported by he evidence and are in accordance with law, and accordingly affirmed the
lower court's judgment.

Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari.

G.R. No. L-41001

The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41001, that the
Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the very enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the subject property was,
and still is, patrimonial property of the City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or disposed of like any other private
property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it simply made a general
affirmance of the court a quo's findings and conclusions without bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed
by the BPOE in its assigned errrors. 14

G.R. No. L-41012

The Tarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41012, relies on the
following grounds for the allowance of its petition:

1. that the Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, of the Philippine
Commission; and

2. that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not make
its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court. 15

ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS

FIRST ISSUE

Upon the first issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360,
as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza.

Arguments of Petitioners

In G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be some logic in the conclusion" of the
Court of Appeals that "neither Act No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to supply the City of Manila the authority to
sell the subject property which is located at the south end not the north — of the reclaimed area." 16 It argues, however, that
when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the City of Manila to undertake the construction of the Luneta extension by
reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and declared that the reclaimed land shall be the "property of the City of Manila," the
State expressly granted the ownership thereof to the City of Manila which. consequently. could enter into transactions
involving it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No. 1909, there could he no doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City
was its patrimonial property;" that the south end of the reclaimed area could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC a
street, park or promenade can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the Spanish Civil Code only when it has
already been so constructed or laid out, and the subject land, at the time it was sold to the Elk's Club, was neither actually
constructed as a street, park or promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;" that even assuming that the subject
property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was subsequently converted into patrimonial property pursuant
to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had never been used, red or utilized since it was reclaimed in 1905 for purpose
other than this of an ordinary real estate for sale or lease; that the subject property had never been intended for public use, is
further shown by the fact that it was neither included as a part of the Luneta Park under Plan No. 30 of the National Planning
Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park (now Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December
19, 1955 of President Ramon Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated October 4, 1967 of President Ferdinand E.
Marcos;" 19 that, such being the case, there is no reason why the subject property should -not be considered as having been
converted into patrimonial property, pursuant to the ruling in Municipality vs. Roa 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of Manila
has considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it under the operation of the Land Registration Act but also by
disposing of it; 20 and that to consider now the subject property as a public plaza or park would not only impair the obligations
of the parties to the contract of sale (rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property without due process of
law.21

G.R. No. L-410112

In L-41012, the petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the interpretation of Act No. 1360, as amended by. Act No.
1657 of the Philippine Commission, 22 and avers that inasmuch as Section 6 of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act 1657,
provided that the reclamation of the Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila which was
authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended in the construction of Luneta Extension," the reclaimed area became "public
land" belonging to the City of Manila that spent for the reclamation, conformably to the holding in Cabangis,23 and
consequently, said land was subject to sale and other disposition; that the Insular Government itself considered the reclaimed
Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to disposition as evidenced by the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360 declared that
"the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for
according to Article 344 of the Civil Code, the character of property for public use can only attach to roads and squares that
have already been constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions did not obtain regarding the subject land, that
Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized the City of Manila to lease the northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel purposes; that Act
No. 1657 furthermore authorized the City of Manila to sell the same; 24 that the express statutory authority to lease or sell the
northern part of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean that the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the
purpose of the statute was not merely to confer authority to sell the northern portion but rather to limit the city's power of
disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent disposition of the northern portion for any purpose other than for a hotel site that the
northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be considered as extension of the Luneta for they lie beyond the
sides of the original Luneta when extended in the direction of the sea, and that is the reason why the law authorized the sale
of the northern portion for hotel purposes, and, for the same reason, it is implied that the southern portion could likewise be
disposed of.26

TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in
construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J"
and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do not include the subject
property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which is the plan of the subject property covered by TCT No. 67488 of
BPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is not a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified
copy of Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U" which is Proclamation
Order No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not include the subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4)
Exhibit "W", which is the location plan of the Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms
that the subject property is not a public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 in the name of the United
States of America covering the land now occupied by the America covering the land now occupied by the American
Embassy, the boundaries of which were delineated by the Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is bounded on the
northwest by properties of the Army and Navy Club (Block No. 321) and the Elks Club (Block No. 321), and this circumstance
shows that even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject property as private property of the Elks Club. 27

TDC furthermore contends that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale of the subject property
that it executed on July 13, 1911 to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1) the City's petition for
the reannotation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when the property was bought by
the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park as testified to by both Pedro Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the
surveyor, Manuel Añoneuvo, according to whom the subject property was from all appearances private property as it was
enclosed by fences; (3) the property in question was cadastrally surveyed and registered as property of the Elks Club,
according to Manuel Anonuevo; (4) the property was never used as a public park, for, since the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165
on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO. 761, the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16,
1909 the City of Manila had already executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761; and (5)
the City of Manila has not presented any evidence to show that the subject property has ever been proclaimed or used as a
public park. 28

TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply to the subject land, for Com. Act No. 141 took effect
on December 1, 1936 and at that time the subject land was no longer part of the part of the public domain. 29

TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be disregarded, for the mere mention in the certificate of
title that the lot it purchased was "part of the Luneta extension" was not a sufficient warning that tile title to the City of Manila
was invalid; and that although the trial court, in its decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found the TDC -to has been an
innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded the petitioner's rights as such purchaser that relied on Torrens certificate
of title. 30

The Court, continues the petitioner TDC erred in not holding that the latter is entitled to recover from the City of Manila
damages in the amount of P100,000 caused by the City's petition for- reannotation of its right to repurchase.

DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUE

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered
from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a
particular provision thereof, should be considered.32 It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.

Act No. 1360 which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as amended by Act No. 1657 enacted on
May 18, 1907, authorized the "construction of such rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the
making of an extension to the Luneta" (Sec. 1 [a]), and the placing of the material dredged from the harbor of Manila "inside
the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta extension above referred to" (Sec. 1 [a]). It likewise provided that the plan of
Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for the extension and improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila" be
adopted; that "the reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the land included in said projected Luneta extension... is hereby
authorized and the land thereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City of Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of Manila is
hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension authorized by this Act at the
worth end of said tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same with
the approval of the Governor General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years; that "should the Municipal Board ...
deem it advisable it is hereby authorized to advertise for sale to sell said tract of land ... ;" "that said tract shall be used for
hotel purposes as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the
grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and
transferred, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to maintain
on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred to the grantee shall
revert to the City of Manila, and said City of Manila shall thereupon become entitled to immediate possession of said tract of
land" (Sec. 5); that the construction of the rock and timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the funds of the City
of Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said proposed Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost to the City of Manila,
with material dredged from Manila Bay at the expense of the Insular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is
hereby authorized to borrow from the Insular Government ... the sum of three hundred thousand pesos, to be expended in the
construction of Luneta extension provided for by paragraph (a) of section one hereof" (Sec.7).

The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same having
been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee.33 One
compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of,
public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be
narrowly restricted in favor of the public.34 This reason for strict interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant, for,
although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be
necessary for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular
Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute
should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation.
The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of Manila. Property, however, is either
of public ownership or of private ownership. 35 What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is it of public
ownership (dominion) or of private ownership?

We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.

Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its
ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. Thus Article
348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations
than those established by law." 36 The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No.
1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed
area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. Thus the statute provides that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized
to set aside a tract ... at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same ... should the municipal board ... deem it
advisable, it is hereby authorized ...to sell said tract of land ... " (Sec. 5). If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the
City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside
... lease ... or sell ... given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute s to render the term
"authorize," which is repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no
part thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous. 37 To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. 38 Act No. 1360
furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section," Hence
without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion;
much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila,
not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial
property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should the
grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.

TDC however, contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in Act No. 1360 to lease or sell was really to limit the
City's power of disposition. To sustain such contention is to beg the question. If the purpose of the law was to limit the City's
power of disposition then it is necessarily assumed that the City had already the power to dispose, for if such power did not
exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gave the City the power to dispose for it was hereby authorized
by lease of sale. Hence, the City of Manila had no power to dispose of the reclaimed land had such power not been granted
by Act No. 1360, and the purpose of the authorization was to empower the city to sell or lease the northern part and not, as
TDC claims, to limit only the power to dispose. Moreover, it is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it
had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with
respect thereto.39 If by another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do
if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a superfluity for Act No. 1360 to authorize the City
to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do so, nor
have we come across any. What we do know is that if the reclaimed land were patrimonial property, there would be no need
of giving special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said authorization was given because the reclaimed land was not
intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and without the express authorization to dispose of the northern
portion, the City could not dispose of even that part.

Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." 40 If the reclaimed area is an extension of
the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to
extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. 41 It is not disputed that the old
Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila.42 Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.

TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is outside
of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the term "extension," for an
"extension," it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction — in length, breadth, or circumstance." 43

Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to
Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open
to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of
Spain.

When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use, according
to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis.44 The predecessor of the claimants in this case was the owner of a big
tract of land including the lots in question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due to the action of the waters of Manila
Bay. In 1901 the lots in question became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides. It remained in such a state until
1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of the Vitas estuary and dumped the Sand and - silt from estuary on the
low lands completely Submerged in water thereby gradually forming the lots in question. Tomas Cabangis took possession
thereof as soon as they were reclaimed hence, the claimants, his successors in interest, claimed that the lots belonged to
them. The trial court found for the claimants and the Government appealed. This Court held that when the lots became a part
of the shore. As they remained in that condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government, they belonged to the
public domain. for public use .4' Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose a part of the bay, did not lose its character of
being for public use after it was reclaimed.

Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel sites.
The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion.
Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject
property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the case at bar inasmuch
as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed against the
City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is author
ized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly
authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation.

Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the promenades, and public works of general
service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised
in said article.

The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that the character of property for public use may
be so attached to a plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the subject property
was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be property for
public use. It should be noted, however, that properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same
principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain.46 In order to be property of public domain an
intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. 47 The, petitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in his
comments", on Article 344, that: ñé+ .£ªw ph!1

Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos correspondent sin duda aiguna aldominio publico municipal ), porque se
hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y estan destinadas al uso de todos Laurent presenta tratando de
las plazas, una question relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de dominio publico los lugares vacios libres,
que se encuenttan en los Municipios rurales ... Laurent opina contra Pioudhon que toda vez que estan al
servicio de todos pesos lugares, deben considerable publicos y de dominion publico. Realmente, pala decidir
el punto, bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los citados lugares, y si este destino entraña
un uso comun de todos, no hay duda que son de dominio publico municipal si no patrimoniales.

It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered property
for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been shown that the intention of the
lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a
grant for public use as a plaza.

We have demonstrated ad satietatem that the Luneta extension as intended to be property of the City of Manila for public
use. But, could not said property-later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But
this Court has already said, in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, 49 the executive and possibly the legislation department that
has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property, is no longer required for public use, and until such
declaration i made the property must continue to form paint of the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such
explicit or unequivocal declaration It should be noted, furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are undoubted v not.
primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified
in Article 4 of the Law of Waters .50

Having disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the main issue, we now pass to the items of circumstantial
evidence which TDC claims may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent in the enactment of Act No. 1360, as
amended. It is noteworthy that all these items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time from the date of
the enactment of Act No.1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not
farfetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, to
wit: the City's having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT No. 1909 on January 20,1911; the sale made by the City of the
subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It cannot gainsaid that if the
subsequent acts constituting the circumstantial evidence have been base on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent
invalid acts and Torrens titles S they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in enacting Act No. 1360
and its amendatory act.

TDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the subject property is not a park.

Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and vicinity showing proposed development" dated May 14, 1949, were prepared by the
National Urban Planning Commission of the Office of the President. It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for
development of the Luneta should show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public park, for it was made
38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been issued to Elks. It is to be assumed that the Office of
the President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE. That the subject property was not included as a part of the Luneta
only indicated that the National Urban Planning Commission that made the plan knew that the subject property was occupied
by Elks and that Elks had a Torrens title thereto. But this in no way proves that the subject property was originally intended to
be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or that the sale to Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.

Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for Tarlac Development Company." It was made on
November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz, private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for TDC. 51 This plan
cannot be expected to show that the subject property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was made to show the lot that
"was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have also assumed the existence of a valid title to the land in favor of Elks.

Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations No. 234 issued on November 15, 1955 and No. 273 issued on
October 4, 1967, respectively. The purpose of the said Proclamations was to reserve certain parcels of land situated in the
District of Ermita, City of Manila, for park site purposes. Assuming that the subject property is not within the boundaries of the
reservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the subject property was not originally intended to be for public use or
that it has ceased to be such. Conversely, had the subject property been included in the reservation, it would mean, if it really
were private property, that the rights of the owners thereof would be extinguished, for the reservations was "subject to private
rights, if any there be." That the subject property was not included in the reservation only indicates that the President knew of
the existence of the Torrens titles mentioned above. The failure of the Proclamations to include the subject property in the
reservation for park site could not change the character of the subject property as originally for public use and to form part of
the Luneta Park. What has been said here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also refer to the area and
location of the reservation for the Luneta Park.

Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935, covering the lot where now stands the American
Embassy [Chancery]. It states that the property is "bounded ... on the Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club (Block
No.321) and Elks Club (Block No. 321)." Inasmuch as the said bounderies delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act No.
4269, the petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized and conceded the existence of the Elks Club property as a
primate property (the property in question) and not as a public park or plaza. This argument is non sequitur plain and simple
Said Original Certificate of Title cannot be considered as an incontrovertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth and in
fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it validate a
title that is null and void.

TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale it executed on July 13,'1911
conconveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE. This contention cannot be seriously defended in the
light of the doctrine repeatedly enunciated by this Court that the Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the
pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its
against Republic policy, and the sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract
prohibited by law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of
sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the
City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 52

The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent
for lack of subject matter. 53 It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express
ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the
contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the
obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract at all.

The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first
vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its suceessors, including the TDC which are not protected the
doctrine of bona fide ii purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC does not apply where there is a total absence of
title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none exists. 55

The so-called sale of the subject property having been executed, the restoration or restitution of what has been given is
order 56

SECOND ISSUE

The second ground alleged in support of the instant petitions for review on certiorari is that the Court of Appeals has departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision. TDC in L-
41012, argues that the respondent Court did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court and made a
general affirmance, contrary to the requirements of the Constitution; that the respondent Court made glaring and patent
mistakes in recounting even the copied findings, palpably showing lack of deliberate consideration of the matters involved, as,
for example, when said court said that Act No. 1657 authorized the City of Manila to set aside a portion of the reclaimed land
"formed by the Luneta Extension of- to lease or sell the same for park purposes;" and that respondent Court. further more, did
not resolve or dispose of any of the assigned errors contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act..57

The Manila Lodge No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the reasons warranting review, that the Court of Appeals
departed from the accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedings by simply making a general affirmance of the court a
quo findings without bothering to resolve several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned errors. 58

COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUE

We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law. To follows
that when such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence, no
useful purpose will be served in further discussing the second issue.

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL. GR NO.125183, September 29, 1997

Facts:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposescertain parcels of land located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. After
resettling hundreds of squatter families occupying the land covered by the proclamation, the Municipality of San Juan
started to develop its government center. On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987,
former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 by excluding from its
operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government center sites purposes but actually occupied for residential
purposes. On June 1, 1998, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of the herein private respondents,
filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against the
Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing
or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded
to them by Proclamation No 164. The regional trial court dismissed the petition and the appeal before the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed. This decision became final. Disregarding the ruling of the court, private respondent
hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to
respondent DENR in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164. To prevent DENR from
issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de
Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, hence, the present recourse.

Issues:
Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid
legislation?

Held:
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Not withstanding the fact that the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue of res judicata, there, exists a more basic reason for
setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to the fundamental and gross error in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 164. Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due exercise of
legislative power vested upon him. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an
equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called
bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary
government. On March 24, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution.
When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely in
Congress. The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative
power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared void. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
set aside. Public respondent DENR is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing Proclamation No. 164

Municipality of San Juan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125183
September 29, 1997

MELO, J.:

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE:

This case is about the legality of then President Aquino's proclamation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for the Municipal
Government Center Cite, purposes certain parcels of land for the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila

The said land was occupied by informal settlers, thus leading the Municipality of San Juan to buy land in Taytay to
resettle them. After they were resettled San Juan began constructing its government center by constructing the INP
building which serves a venue for different government offices.

On October 6, 1987, after congress has already convened, then President Aquino issued proclamation No. 164,
amending proclamation No. 1716. Proclamation No. 165 orders that the parcels of land not used for government center
sites be excluded in its operation.

The Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, inc. were residents on the plot of land which was allotted for the
Municipality of San Juan. They were being removed by the Municipality of San Juan due to projects that were to be done.

Despite the fact that the court decided that they were to remove themselves from the said location, the
homeowners association hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans in the land in question, and
also submitting the same to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their
application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, inc. (CJHAI) filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of the Capital Judicial Region for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against Municipal Mayor and
Engineer of San Jan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine. The RTC dismissed the petition since the land was used for
government purposes, hence the conditions Proclamation No. 164 is absent.

CJHAI filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) which was then dismissed, it became final and executory.

The Municipality of San Juan then filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court to prevent the DENR to award
parcels of land to the CJHAI, which the RTC sustained.

The CA then reversed its decision, hence the petiton.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 164 is constitutional.

RULING:

Petition is GRANTED, decision of the CA is SET ASIDE.

The petitioners' contention of RES JUDICATA is of merit due to the fact that the prior decision of the CA was
already final and executory. The basic elements of res judicata was undeniably accomplished where in the requirements
are the ff:

(a) the former judgement must be final

(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over he subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgement on merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action

In addition to this which is of more importance is that Proclamation No. 164 was issued by then President Aquino where the congress was already
reinstated. There is an obvious breach of separation of powers between the executive and legislative, hence it is unconstitutional. It is also a fact
that during the period which Marcos implemented Proclamation No. 1716 he had the capacity to legislate which renders his proclamation a valid
act of legislation.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is here y SET ASIDE. Public respondent Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED form enforcing Proclamation No. 164.

SO ORDERED.

BIRAOGO VS PTC MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS “BAROK” C.
BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x G.R.
No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption commiĴed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, seĴle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates
separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
BIRAOGO VS PTC | case digests https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2013/03/28/biraogo-vs-ptc/ 1 of 4 06/12/2015 15:31 (d)
E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and seĴled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1
does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the laĴer’s jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1. The petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has
not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury aĴributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private
suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Difficulty of determining locus standi
arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. The
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds BIRAOGO VS PTC | case digests
https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2013/03/28/biraogo-vs-ptc/ 2 of 4 06/12/2015 15:31 reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the
petition covers maĴers of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the aĴention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers
of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc commiĴees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into maĴers which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would
be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding. 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other
past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. BIRAOGO VS
PTC | case digests https://vbdiaz.wordpress.com/2013/03/28/biraogo-vs-ptc/ 3 of 4 06/12/2015 15:31 The Constitution is
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July
30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong,
and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during
the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief

HELD:With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes
that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over contingent funds.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent
duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s
power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in
the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. 51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used
the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated,
no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law."58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is
to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable
cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial
duties.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class
such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.67

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the
Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction
between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the
selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption." 69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that
the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." 78

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."82

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as
to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to
avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if
the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point.
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources. "The law does not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).91

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century’s worth of graft cases. However, the fact
remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be
struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 92

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact
that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or
report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

To transform his campaign slogan, ”Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap,” the President, Benigno Simeon Aquino
III, at the dawn of his administration, signed on July 30, 2010 an Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
The Philippine Truth Commission composed of a Chairman and four (4) members shall act as independent collegial
body, and shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Commission’s primary task is to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. The Commission is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties.
Not long after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, two petitions were filed with the Supreme Court. The first
case, G.R. No. 192395, is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo, in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Birago assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Article VI, Section 1, of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislative to create
a public office and to appropriate funds thereof. The second case, G.R. No.193036, is a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition filed by petitioners-legislators, Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong,
and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House of Representatives, questioning the legality of the
creation of the Truth Commission since the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not
with the executive branch of government.
The Office of the Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. The OSG argued that the petitioners-legislators have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the Commission. Not claiming to be the subject of the
commission’s investigation, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the essential requisites for judicial review are present in order for the court to validly exercise its
power of judicial review.

HELD:
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with the
Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
However, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of Judicial Review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. The court confirmed
that the petitioner-legislators had the requisite standing to challenge Executive Order No. 1 as they are allowed to question
the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. Evidently, the petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly
justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of
their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995 the
51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the
amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the
former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security,
but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.

One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted
the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC
to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over
foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how
much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the
same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to
foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning
bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir
trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section
6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However,
it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs.
14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has
residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general
welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art.
II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can
do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times
of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request
of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are
factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the
people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

TITLE: MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
CAPTION: FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.
PONENTE: CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exice.
Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the
takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of “Marcos loyalists” and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from
Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from retyrning to the Philippines.
RULING:
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution,
aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.
Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian
officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the

conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and
lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.