Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must
267 SCRA 498 (1998)
FACTS:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by Manila
Prince Hotel before the Supreme Court against GSIS. The controversy arose
when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid
security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
RULING:
Yes. It is a self-executing provision.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a
petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,
through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise
the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently
the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and
of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon,
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared
as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin
petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The
petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin
filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments,
such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative
to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of
the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of
people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a
revision or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise
it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot
be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s
initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would
affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of
elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be
done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above
Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.
Lambino v. Commission on Elections 505 SCRA 160, October 25, 2006
Carpio, J
Facts:
Petitioners with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25
August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum
(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures
of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and
by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying
due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC
invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative?
Held:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus,
there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply
with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent
by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically
impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do
so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after
the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
Tolentino vs. Comelec
G.R. No. L-34150
October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 702, 729)
BARREDO, J.:
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent
Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment
"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the
people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by
declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far
as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of
the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in
obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines by Resolutions No. 2 and 4 on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively.
On November 10, 1970, the delegates were elected. The Convention has its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Three months later, the Constitutional
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1. Constitutional Convention
OR No. 1 lowered the voting age to 18 years old and made women qualified
to vote.
President Diosdado Macapagal sent letter to Comelec calling upon it to
implement the resolution. A day later, Comelec resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Constitutional
Convention then passed a series of resolutions to continue with the
plebiscite. Plebiscite was scheduled on November 8, 1971, which is the
same day for the elections of other government officials.
Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the plebscite,
arguing that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force
and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-
incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's
acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the
plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that
the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
The COMELEC posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay
down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the
Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the
Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose
amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such
amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion.
Issue: Whether or not there is any limitation or condition in Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the
Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that
all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that
the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for
ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section
1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the
respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them
for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the
people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its
harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its
entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits
and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And
so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the
existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or
any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its
acceptability.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted.

Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution
No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with
the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.