JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV.

ABDUSAKUR TAN

G.R. No. 187298 03 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

FACTS:

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean
Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when
they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee
(Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened
under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search
and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and
thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President?

RULING:
No.
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic.
This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who
is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
VII thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the
nation’s supreme military leader.
The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and
talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy.
The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution
does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to
military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary Islamic
405 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
Freedom of Exercise of Religion
FACTS:
Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) prayed for the declaration of
nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibited the respondents Office of the
Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
Petitioner, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino
people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic
organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic
Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The World Assembly of Muslim
Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Thus,
among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal
food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Hence, they are
accredited to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
On the other hand, Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. By then, OMA Warns NGOs Issuing
Illegal 'Halal' Certification. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped
securing certifications from it.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not EO violates the non-establishment clause and the freedom of exercise of religion
provision?
RULING:
Yes. EO 46 violates Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) “to ensure the integration
of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions.” OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns
of the Muslim community as a “national cultural community” and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make
sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment
clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution.
Parreño vs. Commission on Audit
523 SCRA 390, G.R. No. 162224 June 7, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. He
retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Availed and received
payment of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. Thereafter, petitioner receives
monthly pension.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the
AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree
No. 16384 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650.5 Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA (respondent) for the continuance of his monthly pension.
However, petitioner request is denied for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. He was
advised to file his claim with the proper court of original jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 27 of PD 1638 discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed
their nationality
RULING:
NO. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes
him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. A retiree who had lost his Filipino
citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled
by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises, which the state may
require of not only its private citizens, but also citizens who have retired from military service.
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995

FACTS:

This suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)].

The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.

Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995.

Respondent Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because it is the same as the
old contract of lease and violative of PSCO’s charter. ELA is violative of the law regarding public bidding
and has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to the government.

Two objections were filed against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by
petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted
to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution,
by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner regarding constitutional polices and principles are self-
executing?

RULING:

These provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but
only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity,
Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution,
the PCSO may be given this authority.

Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and
thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports
to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation
and development.
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017

FACTS:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into
a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious
activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of Church
and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the
benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding
of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the
rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are
affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution or system of religion.

RULING:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and State.
The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if further
provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation
of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman
Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing
the right to the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon
City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the government
recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the
reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution provides that
“No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any
priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance
of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of public property for
religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which
is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice
has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein
is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
Imbong vs Ochoa

April 8, 2014

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

RULINGS:

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources
also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval
of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the
IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
SAGUISAG V. EXEC SECRETARY OCHOA

G.R. No. 212426 July 26, 2016

FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in
Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA
must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article·
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate
their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the
Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT
because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows
the establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities.

RULING:

Petition DISMISSED.

The President is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to enter the
Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate.

To this Court, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it
applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government, whereby military
bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be “allowed” or would “gain entry” Philippine
territory. Note that the provision “shall not be allowed” is a negative injunction. This wording signifies that
the President is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to enter the
Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the constitutionally restricted authority
pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR) EMPLOYEES UNION v. Commission
on Audit

G.R. No. 169815, Aug. 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134

FACTS:

The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Employees Union requested for a Food Basket Allowance
(FBA), with justifying the request on the high cost of living, and also relying on the Employees Suggestions
and Incentive Awards System, which: “includes the granting of incentives that will help employees
overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and dedication to public
service.”

On post-audit, however, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) disallowed
the grant of the FBA ruling that it had no legal basis and violated the General Appropriations Act of 1999.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance, arguing that the grant
would enhance the welfare and productivity of the employees. COA-LAO denied the motion. The petitioner
appealed to the COA-LAO but denied the decision, and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disallowance is unconstitutional as it contravened the fundamental principle of the State
enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication
Office dated April 8, 2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are AFFIRMED.

Reason: Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16, all agencies are prohibited from granting “[…] any other
form of incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President.” In this case, no Administrative Order has been issued, therefore the claim has no merit. Further,
State principles and policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987 Constitution are the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation.
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 699 SCRA 352

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also
unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would
not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims
of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially
necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier
judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. DAN PADAO
G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143
November 16, 2011

FACTS:

These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such as
G.R. No. 180849 and G.R. No. 187143 were petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) seeks the reversal
of the decisions.

First Case:

Respondent Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch. He was later designated as a
credit investigator in an acting capacity on and then appointed regular Credit Investigator III, and was
ultimately promoted to the position of Loan and Credit Officer IV.

Sometime in 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans." A certain Sih Wat Kai
complained to the Provincial Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) of Zamboanga del Norte that
anomalous loans were being granted by its officers.

The questionable loans were reportedly being extended to select bank clients, among them Joseph Liong,
Danilo Dangcalan, Jacinto Salac, Catherine Opulentisima, and Virgie Pango. The exposé triggered the
conduct of separate investigations by the COA and PNB's Internal Audit Department (IAD) from January to
August 1995. Both investigations confirmed that the collateral provided in numerous loan accommodations
were grossly over-appraised. The credit standing of the loan applicants was also fabricated, allowing them
to obtain larger loan portfolios from PNB. These borrowers eventually defaulted on the payment of their
loans, causing PNB to suffer millions in losses.

The case against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a deceptively positive status of
the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of loan applicants Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma
and eleven (11) others. It was later found that either said borrowers' businesses were inadequate to meet
their loan obligations, or that the projects they sought to be financed did not exist.

Petitioner found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the
bank. Then, Respondent Padao instituted a complaint against PNB for Illegal Dismissal. However, the ELA
found Padao's dismissal valid.

Padao appealed to the NLRC. NLRC declared Padao's dismissal to be illegal. He was thereby ordered
reinstated to his previous position without loss of seniority rights and PNB was ordered to pay him full
backwages and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

PNB's Motion for Reconsideration and was denied by NLRC.

Aggrieved, PNB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was dismissed in a Decision. PNB moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution

Second Case
G.R.No.187143

During the pendency of G.R. No. 180849 before the Court, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment certifying
that Resolution had become final and executory.

Respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the NLRC Resolution dated and this was granted by the ELA.

Petitioner PNB and AVP Matienzo sought reconsideration of the ELA's Order.
Later, series of petition were filed by PNB however the CA dismissed the petition and motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of dismissal,
which it deemed appropriate given the circumstances?

2. Whether or not Padao was guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties?

RULING:

1. YES.

Padao over-appraised the collateral of spouses Gardito and Alma Ajero, and that of spouses Ihaba and
Rolly Pango. Padao’s repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted
to gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to perform
what he was employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage
to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of dismissal, which it
deemed appropriate given the circumstances.

In the 1987 Constitution, provisions on social justice and the protection of labor underscore the importance
and economic significance of labor. Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor as a "primary social economic
force," and as such, the State is bound to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
Moreover, workers are "entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage

The Labor Code declares as policy that the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

While it is an employer's basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of self-
protection against acts inimical to its interest,[37] the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as
the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an employee.

Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of an
employee except for a just or authorized cause.

2. YES. Padao was guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties

Padao is not entitled to financial assistance. The rule regarding separation pay as a measure of social
justice is that it shall be paid only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful
breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral
character.
MANDANAS VS. OCHOA

G.R. No. 199802 July 03, 2018

FACTS:
President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization”
to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through
the LGC.

The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release
thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
1987 Philippine Constitution.

RULING:
Yes.

The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
“withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs
and must be struck down.

According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of
an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself;
supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the
discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The
LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution
mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic,
the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without
need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules &
regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions
would violate this constitutional mandate.

The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal
revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal
year. The exception does not apply in this case.
PAMATONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004

FACTS:

When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency, the
Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a
case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared
Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not
nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”

Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing
Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution
in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates”
and supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and
international campaigns, and his government platform.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the
grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

RULING:

NO.

The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-self executing. As such,
the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially
enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting
ideals/standards through the policies presented.

Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to limitations provided
by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not
violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest
of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process
becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position,
is allowed to run.
MARIO JOSE E. SERENO v. COMMITTEE ON TRADE

GR No. 175210 Feb 01, 2016

FACTS:

The Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend
to President Golria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products. Letters to request for a copy of the minutes of the meeting
were made by the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers in the Philippines (APMP) to understand
the basis for CTRM’s recommendation that allegedly caused tremendous losses to the petrochemical
industry. CTRM’s continued refusal to deliver the requested documents prompted the APMP to bring the
petition for mandamus in the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the
minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern and the State’s policy of full public disclosure?

RULING:

NO. The people’s right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
the constitutional guarantee to information “does not open every door to any and all information.” It is limited
to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the
State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.