ARTICLES 37-39 – Civil Personality ARTICLE 50-51 – Effects of Residency and Domiciliary

CASE: Mercado v. Espiritu CASE: Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

SC: Contracts made by minors who pretend to be of legal age when the fact that
they are not, are considered valid, without excuse of the fulfillment of the contract
obligations.
CASE: Bambalan v. Maramba
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of
execution. The Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not
applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the
defendant knew him as a minor.
ARTICLES 40-42
CASE: Geluz v. CA
An individual does not lose his domicile even if she has maintained different
residences for different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention
of abandoning her domicile of origin.
- A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
- Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
- A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium

If a physician operates on a pregnant woman and succeeds in aborting the foetus,

the parents would normally be entitled only to moral damages and to exemplary
damages, if warranted, but NOT to actual damages. The provision which grants
P3,000 for the death of a person does NOT cover the case of an unborn foetus,
since this is not endowed with personality. And even moral damages cannot be
recovered by the husband of the woman (who had voluntarily sought the abortion)
from physician if said husband took no steps to investigate the causes of the
abortion.

CASE: Quimiguing v. Icao

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors.

CASE: De Jesus v. Syquia

A conceived child can be acknowledged even before it is born.
ARTICLE 26 – Marriage with Foreign Spouses
CASE: Republic v. Orbecido
The intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thus, taking into
consideration the legislative intent, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, were Filipino citizens but, later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
CASE: Republic v. Iyoy
For the second paragraph of Article 26 to apply, a spouse who obtained the
divorce must not be a Filipino at the time of the divorce. If the obtaining-spouse is
still a Filipino at the time of the divorce, then the divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines. The root cause in psychological incapacity must still be determined
even if there is no requirement that a personal examination of the respondent be
made prior to a declaration of nullity of marriage. Office of the Solicitor General
has personality to appeal a decision in a declaration-of-nullity of marriage case.
CASE: Republic v. Iyoy
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the
Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized
Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity
of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign
decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without
judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.
CASE: Garcia v. Recio
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.
ARTICLE 36 – Psychological Incapacity
CASE: Santos v. CA
PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support.
The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
CASE: Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY has no exact definition but is restricted to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage. It involves a senseless, protracted, and constant refusal to comply with
the essential marital obligations by one or both of the spouses although he, she, or
they are physically capable of performing such obligations.
CASE: Republic v. Molina
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities”
doesn’t constitute psychological incapacity.
It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities as
married persons, it is essential that they must be shown incapable of doing so due
to some psychological illness.
The court laid down the ff guidelines in interpretation and application of art 36 of
family code:
1. Burden of proof belongs to petitioner
2. Root cause of psy incap must be
 - Clinically identified
- Alleged in the complaint
- Proven by experts
- Clearly explained in the decision
3. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at time of the celebration –
illness must be attached at such moment or prior to
4. Incapacity must be incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party
6. Essential marital obligations are those embraced by Arts. 68-71 and 220
221 225 of the fam code
7. Interpretations given by the Nat. Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Phil should be given great respect by our courts
8. Court must order the fiscal aand SG to appear as counsel for the state and
SG must issue a certif. stating reason for agreement or opposition.
CASE: Salita v. Magtolis
CASE: Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
Mere abandonment is not constitutive of psychological incapacity. There must be
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. “In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.”
CASE: Antonio v. Reyes
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. They indicate a failure on the
part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth.
Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable
to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
CASE: Pesca v. Pesca
the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given
legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for
annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both
judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the
guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.
CASE: Marcos v. Marcos
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
CASE: Marcos v. Marcos
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity,
hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the
same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
A finding of psychological incapacity on the part of one spouse negates any award
of moral and exemplary damages against him/her. Award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that is was done deliberately and with malice by a party who
had known of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same.