III. INTRO TO PHIL.

COURTS AND CASES

1. IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act.
As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.

Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within
the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

2. Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary

2. Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary
December 2, 1991

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass
actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assembly. Secretary of Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply. After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively
charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The
case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for
certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied
due process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to Cariño to appear and
enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the
matter.
Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission has the
jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not grievances
justify their mass action or strike.

Issue: Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and hear the issue?

Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power. The most that may
be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It does not however
grant it the power to resolve issues. The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the matters involved. These are
matters within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission and lastly, the Supreme Court.
The petition is granted and respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case on the merits."
3. 124 Phil. 168

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for the Office of Vice-
President of the Philippines in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. By Resolution No. 2,
approved on December 17, 1965, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session assembled as the board
charged with the duty to canvass the votes then cast for President and Vice President of the Philippines,
proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes, or a plurality of
26,724 votes over his closest opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes
had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent filed with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as Vice President of
the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest
number of votes for said office.

On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court the present original action, for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act
No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional", and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity."

Petitioner's contention is predicated upon the ground, that Congress may not, by law, authorize an election
contest for President and Vice President, the Constitution being silent thereon; that such contest tends to
nullify the constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim the candidates elected for President and Vice
President; that the recount of votes by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as an incident of an election
contest, is inconsistent with the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the election returns for the
President and the Vice President; that no amendment to the Constitution providing for an election protest
involving the office of President and Vice President has been adopted, despite the constitutional
amendment governing election contests for Members of Congress; that the tenure of the President and the
Vice President is fixed by the Constitution and cannot be abridged by an Act of Congress, like Republic Act
No. 1793; that said Act has the effect of amending the Constitution, in that it permits the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to review the congressional proclamation of the president-elect and the vice president-
elect; that the constitutional convention had rejected the original plan to include in the Constitution a
provision authorizing election contests affecting the president-elect and the vice president-elect before an
electoral commission; that the people understood the Constitution to authorize election contests only for
Members of Congress, not for President and Vice President, and, in interpreting the Constitution, the
people's intent is paramount; that it is illegal for Justices of the Supreme Court to sit as Members of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, since the decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme Court on
questions of law; that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court; and that
Congress cannot by legislation appoint in effect the members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law".[1]
This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but "the" judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said
power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
"judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the Senate and those
of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.[2]

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.[3] The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and
demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this
reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts", subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.[4]

Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for president or vice-president, who
believed that he was the candidate who obtained the largest number of votes for either office, despite the
proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the President-elect or vice president-elect, had no legal
right to demand by election protest a recount of the votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right
thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on this matter were not justiciable.[5]

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:

"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal * * * which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-
elect of the Philippines."

has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the
President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved in
the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he[6] is the one elected president or vice-
president, as the case may be[7] and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said
office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court", said legislation has conferred upon such Court
an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.[8]

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme
Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the
fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance,[9] those of
courts of land registration,[10] those of probate courts,[11] and those courts of juvenile and domestic
relations.[12] It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital
exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.[13]
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the
functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise
of its jurisdiction over ordinary cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the
same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic
relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal
court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which
are primarily within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although
it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different
from those of the others.

Indeed, the Supreme Court,[14] the Court of Appeals[15] and courts of first instance,[16] are vested with
original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts
and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of
Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of
first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of
juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance,
hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court, although the
functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption by
Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. [17]

Moreover, the power to be the "judge * * * of * * * contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications"
of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such under the very principle of separation of powers invoked
by petitioner herein it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution
provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic law ordains that "the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of
the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide such
contests relating to Members of Congress which by nature is judicial[18] from the operation of the general
grant of judicial power[19] to "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as maybe established by law."

Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No. 1793, the aforementioned provision of
the Constitution, establishing said Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only, proves the exact
opposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion[20] to determine by law
whether or not the election of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if
Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest.
It is, even, debatable whether such jurisdiction may be conferred, by statute, to a board, commission or
tribunal composed partly of Members of Congress and Members of the Supreme Court, because of its
possible inconsistency with the constitutional grant of the judicial power to "the Supreme Court and * * *
such inferior courts as may be established by law," for said board, commission or tribunal would be neither
"the Supreme Court",[21] nor, certainly, "such inferior courts as may be established by law."
It follows, therefore, not only that Republic Act No. 1793 is not inconsistent with the Constitution or with the
principle of separation of powers underlying the same, but, also, that it is in harmony with the
aforementioned grant of "the judicial power" to said courts. Indeed, when Claro M. Recto, Chairman of the
Constitutional Convention, proposed that the original move therein to include in the fundamental law a
provision creating an Electoral Commission[22] to hear election contests against the President-elect and
the Vice-President-elect, be given up, he expressed the view that the elimination of said provision would
have the effect of leaving in the hands of the legislative department the power to decide what entity or body
would "look into the protests for the position of President and Vice-President."[23] Twenty-two (22) years
later, or on May 3, 1957, then Senator Recto reiterated this view, when, in the course of the debates on the
Bill which later became Republic Act No. 1793, he stated:

"* * * Mr. President, as far as I can remember, the intention of the constitutional convention was to leave
this matter to ordinary legislation."

Such was, also, the impression of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, another prominent Member of the Convention, who
says[24] that

"Election protests for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency were left to be judged in a manner and by a
body decided by the National Assembly." (Italics ours.)

No less than one of the main counsel for petitioner herein, himself another delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, evidently shared this view as late as September 30, 1965, for the introduction to his 1965
edition of "the Revised Election Code" states that "he will always be remembered for * * * his famous bill
creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal * * *." Indeed as a member of the Senate, on January 3, 1950,
he introduced Senate Bill No. 1 Seeking to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal "to try, hear and decide
protests contesting the election of the President and the Vice-President of the Philippines", which shall be
composed of three justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, and four Senators and four
Members of the House of Representatives.

Then, again, the records of the Convention show that, in voting eventually to eliminate, from the draft of the
Constitution, the provision establishing a Presidential Electoral Commission, the delegates were influenced
by the fact that there was no similar provision in the Federal Constitution of the United States. Having
followed the pattern thereof, it must be assumed, therefore, in the absence of any indicium to the
contrary,[25] that the Convention had adhered, also, to the interpretation given to this feature of said Federal
Constitution, as may be deduced from the fact that, by an Act of Congress of the United States, approved
on January 29, 1877, an Electoral Commission was created to hear and decide certain issues concerning
the election of the President of said nation held in 1876. It is, also, worthy of notice that, pursuant to said
Act, nothing therein "shall be held to impair or affect any right now existing under the Constitution and laws
to question, by proceedings in the judicial courts of the United States, the right or title of the person who
shall be declared elected, or who shall claim to be President or Vice-President of the United States, if any
such right exists"[26]. Thus, the absence of a provision in said Federal Constitution governing protests
against the election of the President and the Vice-President had been construed to be without prejudice to
the right of the defeated candidate to file a protest before the courts of justice of the United States, if the
laws thereof permitted it. In other words, the Federal Congress was deemed clothed with authority to
determine, by ordinary legislation, whether or not protests against the election of said officers may properly
be entertained by the judicial department.

Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-
President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely
acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty[27] to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of
canvassers[28]. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine
whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect
the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and,
incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted,
and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

It is, likewise, patent that the aforementioned authority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to determine
whether or not the protestant has a better right than the President and/or the Vice-President declared
elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election
protest shows that the person really elected president or vice-president is the protestant, not the person
declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence,
he can claim no abridgement thereof.

It is similarly obvious that, in imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing1 the
functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793,
encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither
the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer[29].

In view of a resolution of this Court dated July 8, 1966 upholding the validity of Republic Act No. 1793, upon
the ground that it merely vests additional jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, petitioner has filed a motion
dated July 13, 1966, praying this Court "to clarify whether or not" this "election contest should as a
consequence * * * be docketed with, and the records thereof transferred, to this Supreme Court, and all
pleadings, papers and processes relative thereto should thence forth be filed with it". The motion is,
evidently, based upon the premise that the Supreme Court is different and distinct from the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, which is erroneous, as well as contrary to the ruling made in said resolution.

Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for denied accordingly. The
aforesaid motion is, moreover, denied. With costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro,
JJ., concur.

Writs denied.

4. FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William
B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment
complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not
have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to
act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the
complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment
complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD

1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:

(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or
set going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to
ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the
filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the
procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment
complaint.

2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.

5. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City,
respectively.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The question presented for resolution in the administrative matter at bar is whether, during the period of the
ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. A corollary question
is whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public
service.

Resolution of the issues is needful; it will preclude a recurrence of any conflict in the matter of nominations
and appointments to the Judiciary — as that here involved — between the Chief Executive, on the one
hand, and on the other, the Supreme Court and the Juducial and Bar Council over which the Court exercises
general supervision and wields specific powers including the assignment to it of other functions and duties
in addition to its principal one of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, and the determination of its
Members emoluments.1
I. The Relevant Facts

The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts and is for
that reason hereunder reproduced in full.

Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively. The appointments were received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998. The
referral was made in view of the serious constitutional issue concerning said appointments arising from the
pertinent antecedents.

The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998. The meeting
had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio Chairman, to discuss the question raised by
some sectors about the "constitutionality of ** appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in light of
the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
reading as follows:

Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his,
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the
provision just quoted could seemingly be justified by another provision of the same Constitution Section 4
(1) of Article VIII which states:

Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
** **. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Also pertinent although not specifically discussed is Section 9 of the same Article VIII which provides that
for the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments — from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Council for every vacancy — within ninety days from the submission of the list.
The view was then expressed by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council,
who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the
Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that on the basis of the commission's records,
the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without any extended
discussion or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis
was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's
nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

On April 6, 1998 the Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been
duly signed on March 11, 1998 by His Excellency the President. In view of the fact that all the appointments
had been sign on March 11, 1998 — the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on
appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution — who impliedly but no less clearly
indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary
were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the
vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, specially
considering that the Court had scheduled sessions in Baquio City in April, 1998, that the legislature's
representatives to the JBC were occupied with the forthcoming elections, and that a member of the Council
was going on a trip out of the country.

On May 4, 1998, the Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to the JBC, requesting
transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy "no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998" in view
of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy ** within ninety (90) days from February
13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred.

On May 5, 1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice for "guidance"
respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting immediately to fill
up the vacancy in the Court in line with the President's letter of May 4. The Chief Justice advised Secretary
Bello to await the reply that he was drafting to the President's communication, a copy of which he would
give the Secreatary the following day.

On May 6, 1998 the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President. He began by stating that no sessions had
been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections for the reason that apparently the President's
Office did not share the view posited by the JBC that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution had no
application to JBC-recommendend appointments — the appointments to the Court of Appeals having been
all uniformly dated March 11, 1998, before the commencement of the prohibition in said provision — thus
giving rise to the "need to undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the-desire to avoid any
constitutional isssue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy" and the further fact that "certain
senior members of the Court of Appeals ** (had) asked the Council to reopen the question of their exclusion
on account of age from such (final) list." He closed with the assurance that the JBC expected to deliberate
on the nominations "forthwith upon the completion of the coming elections." The letter was delivered to
Malacañang at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 6, 1998 and a copy given to the Office of Justice
Secretary Bello shortly before that hour.
It would appear, however, that the Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already
taken action without awaiting the Chief Justice's promised response to the President's letter of May 4, 1998.
On that day, May 6, 1998, they met at some undisclosed place, deliberated, and came to an agreement on
a resolution which they caused to be reduced to writing and thereafter signed. In that two-page Resolution
they drew attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15,
Article VII) as well as to the President's letter of May 4 in which he "emphatically requested that the required
list of final nominees be submitted to him;" and pointing out that the "Council would be remiss in its duties"
should it fail to submit said nominations, closed with an appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council
for the purpose "on May 7, 1998, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon." This Resolution they transmitted to the
Chief Justice together with their letter, also dated May 6, in which they emphasized that "we are pressed
for time" again drawing attention to Section 4 (1). Article VIII of the Constitution (and again omitting any
reference to Section 15, Article VII). They ended their letter with the following intriguing paragraph:

Should the Chief Justice be not disposed to call for the meeting aforesaid, the undersigned members
constituting the majority will be constrained to convene the Council for the purpose of complying with its
Constitutional mandate:

It seems evident, as just intimated, that the resolution and the covering letter were deliberated on, prepared
and signed hours before delivery of the Chief Justice's letter to the President and the Justice Secretary.

Since the Members of the Council appeared determined to hold a meeting regardless of the Chief Justice's
wishes, the latter convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998. Present
at the meeting were the Chief Justice, Secretary Bello, ex officio member and the regular members of the
Council: Justice Regino Hermosisima. Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison, Judge Cesar C. Peralejo. Also present,
on invitation of the Chief Justice, were Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N.
Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V. Panganiban, Antonio M.
Martinez, Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Fidel P. Purisima. The Chief Justice reviewed the events leading
to the session, and after discussion, the body agreed to give the President time to answer the Chief Justice's
letter of May 6, 1998.

On May 7, 1998, the Chief Justice received a letter from his Excellency the President in reply to his letter
of May 6 (which the President said had been "received early this morning"). The President expressed the
view that "the election-ban provision (Article VII, Sec. 15) ** applies only to executive appointments or
appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT."' He also observed that further proof of his theory "is the fact that appointments to the
judiciary have special, specific provisions applicable to them" (citing Article VIII, Sec, 4 (1) and Article VIII,
Section 9. In view thereof, he "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) ** (his) request for the Judicial and Bar
Council to transmit ** the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."

The Chief Justice replied to the letter the following day, May 8, 1998. Since the Chief Justice's letter explains
the issue quite, plainly, it is here quoted in full.
Thank you for your letter of May 7, 1998, responding to my own communication of May 6, 1998 which, I
would like to say reflects the collective sentiments of my colleagues in the Supreme Court. Knowing how
busy you are, I will deal straightaway with the points set out in your letter.

The dating of the latest appointments to the Court of Appeals was adverted to merely to explain how we in
the Court and the JBC came to have the impression that you did not share the view expressed in the JBC
minutes of March 9, 1998 that there is no election ban with regard to the JBC appointments. Be this as it
may, the Court feels that there is a serious question concerning the matter in light of the seemingly
inconsistent provision of the Constitution. The first of these is Section 15, Article VII, which reads:

Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The second is Section 4 (1) of Article VIII which states:

Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
** ** Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

As you can see, Your Excellency, Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President: he
"shall not make appointments" within the period mentioned, and since there is no specification of which
appointments are proscribed, the same may be considered as applying to all appointments of any kind and
nature. This is the general rule then, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions" as to
which "temporary appointments may be made within the interdicted period "when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." As the exception makes reference only to
"executive" positions, it would seem that "judicial" positions are covered by the general rule.

On the other hand, Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, requires that any vacancy in the Supreme Court "shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." Unlike Section 15 Article VII, the duty of filling the
vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President; hence, it may be inferred that it is a duty shared by
the Judicial and Bar Council and the President.

Now, in view of the general prohibition in the first-quoted provision, how is the requirement of filling in the
Court within ninety days to be construed? One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Section
4 (1), Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally,
when there are no presidential elections — which after all, occur only every six years — Section 4 (1),
Article VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now)
there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall
not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority
on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission, is "(i)n order not to tie the
hands of the incoming President through midnight appointments." Another interpretation is that put forth in
the Minutes of the JBC meeting of March 9, 1998.

I must emphasize that the validity of any appointment to the Supreme Court at this time hinges on the
correct interpretation of the foregoing sections of the Constitution. On account of the importance of the
question, I consulted the Court about it but, as I stated in my letter of May 6, 1998, "it declined to take any
position, since obviously there had not been enough time to delivarate on the same ** (although it) did
agree that further study wass necessary **.

Since the question has actually come up, and its importance cannot be gainsaid, and it is the Court that is
empowered under the Constitution to make an authoritative interpretation of its (provisions) or of those of
any other law. I believe that the Court may now perhaps consider the issue ripe for determination and come
to grips with it, to avoid any possible polemics concerning the matter. However the Court resolves the issue,
no serious prejudice will be done. Should the Court rule that the President is indeed prohibited to make
appointments in a presidential election year, then any appointment Attempted within the proscribed period
would be void anyway. If the Court should adjudge that the ban has no application to appointments to the
Supreme Court, the JBC may submit nominations and the President may make the appointment forthwith
upon such adjudgment.

The matter is a delicate one, quite obviously, and must thus be dealt with with utmost circumspection, to
avoid any question regarding the validity of an appointment to the Court at this time, or any accusation of
"midnight" appointments or rash hasty action on the part of the JBC or the President

In view thereof, and upon the advice and consent of the Members of the Court, I am requesting the regular
Members of the Judicial Bar Council to defer action on the matter until further device by the Court. I
earnestly make the same request of you, Your Excellency. I assure you, however that as befits a matter in
which the Chief Executive has evinced much interest, my colleagues and I will give it preferential and
expeditious attention and consideration. To this end, I intend to convene the Court by next week, at the
latest.

On May 8, 1998, again on the insistence of the regular Members of the JBC, another meeting was held at
which were present the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice and the three regular, Members above
mentioned, as well as Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato
S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V. Panganiban, Antonio M.
Martinez, Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Fidel P. Purisima. The meeting closed with a resolution that "the
constitutional provisions ** (in question) be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action,
together with the request that the Supreme Court consider that the ninety-day period stated in Section 4
(1), Article VIII be suspended or interrupted in view of the peculiar circumstances. **.
On May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from Malacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges of the
Regional Trial Court mentioned above. This places on the Chief Justice the obligation of acting thereon:
i.e., transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and assume the
duties of their office. The trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, for these appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII of the Charter. This circumstance, and the referral of the constitutional
question to the Court in virtue of the Resolution of May 8, 1998, supra operate to raise a justiciable issue
before the Court, an issue of sufficient importance to warrant consideration and adjudication on the merits.

Accordingly, the Court Resolved to (1) CONSIDER the case at bar an administrative matter and cause it to
be appropriately docketed: (2) to DIRECT the Clerk of Court to immediately serve copies of this Resolution
on (a) the Office of the President, (b) the Office of the Solicitor General. (c) Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela, and
(d) Hon. Placido B. Vallarta (at their addresses recorded in the Judicial and Bar Council); and (3) to
REQUIRE the Office of the President, the Office of the Solicitor General, Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela, and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta to file their comments on this Resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

The Court further Resolved that (1) pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the Court
on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and
Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees
shall refrain from taking their oath of office; and that (2) exercising its power of supervision over the Judicial
and Bar Council, said Council and its ex officio and regular Members herein mentioned be INSTRUCTED,
as they are herby INSTRUCTED, to defer all action on the matter of nominations to fill up the lone vacancy
in the Supreme Court or any other vacancy until further orders.

SO ORDERED.

6. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JBC, GR No. 191002, 2010-03-17

Facts:

In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal
luminaries - one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two
months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until... the end of her term of office as
President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to
executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the
appointment of a Chief Justice... during the election ban - has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to
whom to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.[8]
He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial... function that is not conferred upon it
by the Constitution," which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has
not empowered it to "finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme
Court under the
Constitution." As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the
submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a "final and definitive resolution of the
constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the... tension in the legal community that would go
a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system."

Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that
Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent
circumstances warrant the appointment, because... that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the
absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption
or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that even without the successor of Chief Justice

Puno being appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to sit and adjudge en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is not
necessary; that petitioner De Castro's fears are unfounded and... baseless, being based on a mere
possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief
Justice whose appointment is unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a
crisis in the judicial... system and will worsen an already vulnerable political situation.

Intervenors Tan, Ubano, WTLOP, Bello et al., IBP Dacao del Sur, Corvera, and Boiser regard De Castro's
argument that a permanent Chief Justice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political
situation in the country when the election-related... questions reach the Court as false, because there is an
existing law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; that the law is
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or...
any other law; that a temporary or an acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that
the designation of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by practical
necessity; that the practice was intended to be enshrined in... the 1987 Constitution, but the Commissioners
decided not to write it in the Constitution on account of the settled practice; that the practice was followed
under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
Associate Justice

Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief
Justice; that said filling up of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used
by analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the

Commission on Elections, per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court
has shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly observed and has become a part of its tradition.

Issues:
Can current president appoint new CJ even if law tells us that the deadline for appointments should be two
months before elections?

May the incumbent President... appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his... term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety?

What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides
that any... vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the
matter of the appointment of his successor?

May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or
being considered to succeed Chief

Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC?... whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.[86]
It is proper when the act against... which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.[87]

Ruling:

The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in...
particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of one's personal
interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to
appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent

Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great
number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included
in a short list to be submitted to the President for... consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice
Puno as the next Chief Justice.

In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that
the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17,
2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential... appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

The Court agrees with the submission.

Although Valenzuela[67] came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Thereby, the confirmation... made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly...
mentioned, should prevail.

However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the
result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine
in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner

Eulogio Lerum, "a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
occurrence," which even Valenzuela conceded.[69] The exchanges during deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show... that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme
Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President, viz:

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced[71] - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the
President the imperative duty to... make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.

Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and... careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can
be made by the outgoing President.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary
further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department
from the Executive and Legislative Departments.

Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders
vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next

Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also
become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does
not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence,... precisely because her term will end by June
30, 2010.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.[86]
It is proper when the act against... which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.[87]

For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will... thereby effectively and
illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.

The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following
manner:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of a legal authority,... without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not... ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
or judgment.

7. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA

LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College
of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases,
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of
UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from
the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by
Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs
were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for
those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or
out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private
practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her
SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most
of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be
taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief
Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear
the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC
then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces
of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’
and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only
in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule
66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto
to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the
validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v.
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office”
in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes
other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG
claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus
occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The
State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified.
Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and
corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political
question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no
right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice
or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2
of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was
chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment
suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of
government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty
imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode
is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis
of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision
for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention
that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result
to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections
6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over
all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG,
the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.Furthermore, Sereno
argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be
filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a
public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided
by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to
the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern
of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the
post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only
required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity,
probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.

Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.

Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.

Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
powers

Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;

Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.

If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations

If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.

Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC

If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;

In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that
may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and
their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s
and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if
the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is
not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of
the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over
title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private
quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without
fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were
present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc,
given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There
must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of
the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the
proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining
the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and
discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except
to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall
likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body,
the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting
in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial
review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried
on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented
before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This
constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of
the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity
of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a
political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office
may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public
office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by
a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo
warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct
as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more)
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the
controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds
the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand,
impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s
title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes
that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether
or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to
cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction
for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that
he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet
to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is
no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is
merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly
elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members
of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription
does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even
the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments
or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election
of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise
be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or
she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto
conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause
for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would
be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire
membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be
unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment
or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement
thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being
a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which
may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position,
arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals
asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of
the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto
and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any
case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may
be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto,
neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not
be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to
the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public
office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for
questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up
to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on
Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority
of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from
the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the
Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for
the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s
supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place
the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
[yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained
by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral
and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence
of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the
Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply”
with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the
dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials
and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that
failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in
criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is
not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion
in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as
accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all
constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their
office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every
office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity
does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the
law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason.
The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter
of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the
statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno]
for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude
that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO
and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence.
Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the
burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive
any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary
capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet
in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said
clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist
nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite
proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be
deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her
SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent
appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications.
Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of
her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO
cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first
five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with
the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity.
The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose
SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate
Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for
nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the
rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law.
It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance.
Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN
requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no
longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government
service only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her government records are more
than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the
JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her
employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC
betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was
no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the
service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for
the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years
2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a
TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme
Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute
cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship
benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges
and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza,
by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie
the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that
her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief
Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further,
the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity
to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for
example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that
she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated
in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible,
in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position
follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading
the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he
Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident
from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-
negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and
her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo
warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
[yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council
is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.

8. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

FACTS:

The case was an original action filed by Jose Angara for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the former.

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, et.al., were candidates for the position of National Assembly member for
1st district of Tayabas Province.

On October 7, 1935, Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Angara as the winner. Angara then took
his oath of office. National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 (Confirming the election of members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had been filed)

Subsequently, Respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of Angara. Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: “The
commission will not consider any protest that is not submitted on or before this day (Dec. 9)”
Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to dismiss the protest” on the ground that it must
uphold Resolution No. 8 of National Assembly. Ynsua countered that there is no constitutional prohibition
barring the filing of protest.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the “Motion to dismiss the Protest” filed by
Angara.

ISSUES:

1. WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission as well as the subject matter of
the controversy (Resolution of National Assembly or Resolution of EC) – YES.

2. WoN the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when: (1)it assumed
cognizance of the protest

despite the previous confirmation by the National Assembly; (2) it adopted its resolution in Dec. 9 – NO.

3. WoN Resolution No. 8 can “nullify” filing of protest or toll the time of filing protest effectively rendering
the resolution of the Electoral Commission moot – NO.

RATIO:

1. On judicial review

“In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.”

Sec. 4 of Art VI provides EC the sole power of deciding such matters. Also, from the transcript of the
Framers’ discussion, it is clearly the intention of the Framers to give EC “sole” jurisdiction over election
protests.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of powers within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere but it does not follow that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other.

Constitution institutes the system of checks and balances. Moderating power of the court is granted by clear
implication from section 2 article VIII of the Constitution.

The judiciary does not intend to assert superiority over other departments or deliberately nullify of invalidate
acts of the legislature. It merely asserts the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims for authority under the Constitution and establish rights for the parties.

“Power of judicial review is limited only to actual cases and controversies…and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.”

2. On the legality of the Electoral Commission’s acts

National Assembly has no jurisdiction over election protests so it follows that they don’t have the authority
to prescribe the time or prevent the filing of protest. Separation within same branch of government.

Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative. It acted within its
jurisdiction. The EC’s resolution will stand. National Assembly’s Resolution No. 8 should neither prevent
the filing of protest within the time prescribed in EC’s resolution nor “toll the time” in filing protests.

9. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not
within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.

Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case
was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.

Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.

Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot
do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
 A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed
limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance
that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat
of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
 Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains
the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

10. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA, GR Nos. 217126-27, 2015-11-10

Facts:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et... al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the

Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]

On even date,[58] Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari[59] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO
and/or

WPI to enjoin its implementation.

a) Phases I and

II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010

Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus... rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for TRO

The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing
Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be
issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter
thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction... and

(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and
improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected
to contempt proceedings.

Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power
to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the

Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he
asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.

Binay, Jr. maintains that... the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order
given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in

2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous
term.
Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an... impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and
imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is
an impeachable officer... should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.

the CA issued a Resolution... which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive... suspension
order.

In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v.
Santos.

the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ
against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770... in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated
it from judicial intervention,"[157] particularly, "from injunctive... reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts,"[158] claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure
would."

Issues:

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based
on the condonation doctrine

Ruling:

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and
her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court[119]) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman.

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against
issuances of the Ombudsman

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy... against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a
Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of
law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself
allows, or an amendment thereto is made;

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or
dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;[168] hence, its budget cannot be...
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions;
and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."[169]
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which
are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to... all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion
that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or... pressure.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief
to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the... usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not
cover the Supreme Court.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the
questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the... preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which
it had already... acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will
be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from
the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.

Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American
authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes
and constitutional provisions, and also,... in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of
whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established
weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of
Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the... right to remove him from office due to a
misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least
seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.[250] The Ombudsman aptly
cites several... rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to
demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making.
"[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."[267] Therefore, the ultimate
analysis is on whether or not the condonation... doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in
numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of

Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application.[268] In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when
circumstances exist to preclude reversal... of standing precedent.[269] As the Ombudsman correctly points
out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives.[270] In the words of a recent US Supreme Court
Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."[271]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal
landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution,
which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the

Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including,
of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious
re-examination.

What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential
doctrine, was - and still remains - the... above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of
US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability
to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's... re-election cuts qff
the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook,
line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against
existing legal norms. As in the US, the... propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the
legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current
laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of...
condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;[284] thus,
the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.[285] Likewise, the
Constitution is a... framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account
the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government.

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of
public office being a public trust. The provision in the
1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that
"[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil... service."[287] Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the
matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting... the
Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that
time.

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987
Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State
shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service... and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption."[288] Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of
a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a... constitutional
principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has
been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times:

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that
an elective local official's... administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election
is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no... constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from... administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos[293] to apply to administrative offenses:

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered... obsolete by - the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual,
and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia,... Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal... system of the Philippines

Principles:
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis
the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by
the Constitution itself; additionally, they all... enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that
the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core... functions"[163];

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional... offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express
mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which... the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";[164] and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In
the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a
constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission,... instead of one created by law, on the premise that the
effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past

Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."[165]

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department:

Republic Act No. 9282 March 30 2004

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS
RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING
ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO.
1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Court; Justices; Qualifications; Salary; Tenure. - There is hereby created a Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) which shall be of the same level as the Court of Appeals, possessing all the inherent powers
of a Court of Justice, and shall consist of a Presiding Justice and five (5) Associate Justices. The incumbent
Presiding Judge and Associate Judges shall continue in office and bear the new titles of Presiding Justice
and Associate Justices. The Presiding Justice and the most Senior Associate Justice shall serve as
chairmen of the two (2) Divisions. The additional three (3) Justices and succeeding members of the Court
shall be appointed by the President upon nomination by the Judicial and Bar Council. The Presiding Justice
shall be so designated in his appointment, and the Associate Justices shall have precedence according to
the date of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two (2) or more of them shall bear
the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. They shall
have the same qualifications, rank, category, salary, emoluments and other privileges, be subject to the
same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirements and other benefits as those provided
for under existing laws for the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.

"Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are
increased, such increases in salaries shall be deemed correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the CTA.

"The Presiding Justice and Associate Justices shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the
age of seventy (70), or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, unless sooner removed
for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for members of the judiciary of equivalent
rank."

Section 2. Section 2 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. - The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2)
Divisions, each Division consisting of three (3) Justices.

"Four (4) Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc and two (2) Justices for sessions of a
Division: Provided, That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to any vacancy,
disqualification, inhibition, disability, or any other lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any
Justice of other Divisions of the Court to sit temporarily therein.
"The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en banc or two (2) members of a Division, as the
case may be, shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution."

Section 3. Section 3 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Clerk of Court; Division Clerks of Court; Appointment; Qualification; Compensation. - The CTA
shall have a Clerk of Court and three (3) Division Clerks of Court who shall be appointed by the Supreme
Court. No person shall be appointed Clerk of Court or Division Clerk of Court unless he is duly authorized
to practice law in the Philippines. The Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court shall exercise the same
powers and perform the same duties in regard to all matters within the Court's jurisdiction, as are exercised
and performed by the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, in so far as the
same may be applicable or analogous; and in the exercise of those powers and the performance of those
duties they shall be under the direction of the Court. The Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of Court
shall have the same rank, privileges, salary, emoluments, retirement and other benefits as those provided
for the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, respectively.'

Section 4. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Other Subordinate Employees. - The Supreme Court shall appoint all officials and employees of
the CTA, in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Supreme Court shall fix their salaries and prescribe
their duties."

Section 5. Section 5 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 5. Disqualifications. - No Justice or other officer or employee of the CTA shall intervene, directly or
indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the
functions of the Court. Justices of the Court shall be disqualified from sitting in any case on the same
grounds provided under Rule one hundred thirty-seven of the Rules of Court for the disqualification of
judicial officers. No person who has once served in the Court in a permanent capacity, either as Presiding
Justice or as Associate Justice thereof, shall be qualified to practice as counsel before the Court for a period
of one (1) year from his retirement or resignation."

Section 6. Section 6 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. Place of Office. - The CTA shall have its principal office in Metro Manila and shall hold hearings
at such time and place as it may, by order in writing, designate."
Section 7. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

"a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

"1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds
of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

"2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where
the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;

"3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

"4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Customs;

"5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals;

"6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of
the Tariff and Customs Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or
article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs
Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision
to impose or not to impose said duties.

"b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
the principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts
and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for
taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filling of such civil action separately from the criminal action
will be recognized.

"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

"c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

"1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes,
fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes
and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall
be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
"2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

"a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection
cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

"b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction."

Section 8. Section 10 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 10. Power to Administer Oaths; Issue Subpoena; Punish for Contempt. - The Court shall have the
power to administer oaths, receive evidence, summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as applied in judicial proceedings of a similar nature.
The Court shall, in accordance with Rule seventy-one of the Rules of Court, have the power to punish for
contempt for the same causes, under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."

Section 9. Section 11 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. - Any party adversely affected by a decision,
ruling or inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary
of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts may file an appeal with the CTA within thirty (30) days
after the receipt of such decision or ruling or after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as
referred to in Section 7(a)(2) herein.

"Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
decision or ruling or in the case of inaction as herein provided, from the expiration of the period fixed by law
to act thereon. A Division of the CTA shall hear the appeal: Provided, however, That with respect to
decisions or rulings of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure
analogous to that provided for under rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA, which shall
hear the case en banc.
"All other cases involving rulings, orders or decisions filed with the CTA as provided for in Section 7 shall
be raffled to its Divisions. A party adversely affected by a ruling, order or decision of a Division of the CTA
may file a motion for reconsideration of new trial before the same Division of the CTA within fifteens (15)
days from notice thereof: Provide, however, That in criminal cases, the general rule applicable in regular
Courts on matters of prosecution and appeal shall likewise apply.

"No appeal taken to the CTA from the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the
Commissioner of Customs or the Regional Trial Court, provincial, city or municipal treasurer or the
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry and Secretary of Agriculture, as the case may
be shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction
of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the Court the
collection by the aforementioned government agencies may jeopardize the interest of the Government
and/or the taxpayer the Court any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the
taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount
with the Court.

"In criminal and collection cases covered respectively by Section 7(b) and (c) of this Act, the Government
may directly file the said cases with the CTA covering amounts within its exclusive and original jurisdiction."

Section 10. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 13. Decision, Maximum Period for Termination of Cases. - Cases brought before the Court shall be
decided in accordance with Section 15, paragraph (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the 1987
Constitution. Decisions of the Court shall be in writing, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based, and signed by the Justices concurring therein. The Court shall provide for the
publication of its decision in the Official Gazette in such form and manner as may best be adopted for public
information and use.

"The Justices of the Court shall each certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers
presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls under which their salaries are paid, that all
proceedings, petitions and motions which have been submitted to the Court for determination or decision
for a period required by the law or the Constitution, as the case may be, have been determined or decided
by the Court on or before the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary
shall be paid without such certificate."

Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:

"SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving matter arising under
the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be
maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA
and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

"A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new
trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc."

"SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure."
Section 13. Distraint of Personal Property and/or Levy on Real Property. - Upon the issuance of any ruling,
order or decision by the CTA favorable to the national government, the CTA shall issue an order authorizing
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, through the Commissioner to seize and distraint any goods, chattels, or
effects, and the personal property, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts, and
interests in and rights to personal property and/or levy the real property of such persons in sufficient quantity
to satisfy the tax or charge together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency. This remedy shall
not be exclusive and shall not preclude the Court from availing of other means under the Rules of Court.

Section 14. Retention of Personnel; Security of Tenure; Upgrading of Positions and Salaries. - All existing
permanent personnel of the CTA shall not be adversely affected by this Act. They shall continue in office
and shall not be removed or separated from the service except for cause as provided for by existing laws.
Further, the present positions and salaries of personnel shall be upgraded to the level of their counterparts
in the Court of Appeals.

Section 15. Transitory Provisions. - In consonance with the above provision, the incumbent Presiding Judge
and Associate Judges shall comprise a Division pending the constitution of the entire Court.

Section 16. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included
in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.

Section 17. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, executive issuances or letter of instructions, or
any part thereof, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed,
amended or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any section or provision of this Act shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Section 19. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at
least (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249 February 5, 1997

AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A
special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court
ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and
fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President."

Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office
in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with
it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is,
from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the
greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the
contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another
geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any
divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest
of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require
the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any
of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders
of the Sandiganbayan."

Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted.

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors
engineers and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.

"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned."

Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the
merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain
complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it
and necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided
within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in
the Rules of Court.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by
law.

"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as
those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable
by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.

"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether
or not accused files an appeal."

Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall
be charged against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as
may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof

Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional
or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved:

11. Duncano vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March
24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case
against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public
officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon
City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year
2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus
Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor
vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to
the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree
was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D.
No. 1861.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article
XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this
year, R.A. No. 10660.

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.

“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying
to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those
officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that
will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction
is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed
for.

Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL

TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.

"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross
value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate,
or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila
where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees:
Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That
when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts."

Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec.
19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted
to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall
be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case
of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered
amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts
by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive
judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the
cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 25, 1994

12. 389 Phil. 810

PURISIMA, J.:

This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third
Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners,
Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of
November 18, 1993:

xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;

2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed;

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the
attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and

9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.

The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a
court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of
title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject
area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.

The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein private
respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.

In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not infallible. Should any
error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected
thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this
jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount importance.

Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc
these consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was presented but when the same was
first brought to its attention on March 7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had not yet
acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was then premature for the Court to resolve the
consulta. However, the Court succinctly cautioned that the action of the Third Division on the matter would
just be tentative.

On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the
Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept
the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient
importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and
valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc
of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention." (underscoring supplied)

Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate
Justices who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or
compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated
November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these
consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of
the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private
petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is
meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to
warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution
and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and
fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention
and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting
strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual
membership - that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of
the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are
always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law,
jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court - to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and
rule of law be observed.

Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case
is not on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en consulta, the
motion for reconsideration of the decision therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division
with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a denial of
the motion for reconsideration.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of the
petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of
the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that
their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases; and petitioners'
motions for reconsideration are hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let
corresponding notices issue.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr. JJ.,
concur.

Melo, J., joined the dissents and in lieu of the close vote, urge that this action be not repeated and that it
be reviewed again.

Puno, J., see separate opinion.

Vitug, J., joined the dissenting justices.

Panganiban, J., see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, and Pardo, JJ., joined the dissent of J. Reyes.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see dissenting opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

In the session last March 21, 2000, information was given that a majority of the members of the Third
Division intends to hear the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic and then report its result to
the Court en banc. I sincerely believe that the result of the said oral arguments will be a vital factor to
consider before the court en banc should finally decide to assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. The
issue for resolution in the said Motion for Reconsideration concerns res judicata. This is an issue that does
not strictly involve a question of law for beyond doubt its resolution will rest on some amorphous questions
of fact. Until and unless these questions of fact are sharpened and given shape in the intended oral
arguments, I am of the opinion and so vote that the Court en banc should defer its action to assume
jurisdiction over the case at bar.
DISSENTING OPINION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

With due respect, I am constrained to dissent from the acceptance by the Court en banc of the referral of
the motions for reconsideration in the cases at bar. The justification for the referral is stated thus:

"These cases involve a vast tract of land around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals under a decision
allegedly rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and of the original
certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto is contingent on the character
or classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated to private persons, the determination of
the same is essential. The decision sought to be reconsidered does not clearly reflect or indicate the correct
character of the land involved at the time the private respondents obtained a degree of registration
thereover. Thus, should it be established that indeed the land in question was still within the forest zone
and inalienable at the time of its disposition to private parties, reversal of this Court's decision is in order.

In Lemketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[1] this Court has acknowledged that it is not infallible
and that, if upon examination an error in judgment is perceived, the Court is not obliged to blindly adhere
to such decision and the parties are not precluded from seeking relief by way of a motion for reconsideration.
In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is paramount."

The fact alone that the property involved covers an area of 99 hectares does not provide a cogent reason
to elevate the cases to the Court en banc. Nowhere in the extent guidelines for referral to the Court en banc
is the value of the property subject of the case relevant to determine whether the division should refer a
matter to the Court en banc. Moreover, the validity of OCT No. 4216, which petitioner Republic raised as a
principal issue in the instant petition, had already been long settled by final judgments of this Court in three
(3) cases.[2]

It was also submitted that the cases are of sufficient importance to be "reexamined and reviewed" by the
Court en banc pursuant to S. C. Circular No. 2-89 dated February 7, 1989 as amended by the Resolution
of November 18, 1993, which considers the following, among others, as en banc cases:

xxx xxx xxx

"9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention."

It is believed that the acceptance by the court en banc of the referral on the proposal of one member of the
division is not called for on the following grounds:

(1) The motion for reconsideration from the decision unanimously adopted by the 3rd Division on September
2, 1999 is still pending. If there is any error to be rectified in the said decision, the matter should be left to
the sound judgment of the members of the division which promulgated the decision unless there is a
demonstrated incapacity or disqualification on the part of its members to render a fair and just resolution of
the motion for reconsideration.

(2) The court en banc is not an appellate court to which a decision or resolution may be appealed:

Article VIII, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and
in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc."

It is implicit in the paragraph immediately preceding that decisions or resolutions of a division of the court,
when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting
en banc is not an appellate court vis a vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the
latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably
as the Court en banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en
banc.
(3) Circular No. 2-89 of the Court en banc laid down the following Guidelines and Rules on the referral to
the Court en banc of cases assigned to a Division:

"1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five or seven Members (Sec. 4[1].
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court has three Divisions of five Members each.

2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section
4[3]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed.

4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolution therein
rendered becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc
which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the case to the Division
or accept the case for decision or resolution.

4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 205 (formerly
item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977), enumerating the cases considered as en banc
cases, states:

"f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable by a majority vote of the
actual members of the Court en banc."

5. A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en banc of any Division
case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc.

6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc, the latter may, in the
absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of the same, in which case, the
decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division.

7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a
referral by a Division, shall be entertained.

8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989."

In the Resolution of the Court en banc dated November 18, 1993, the following were enumerated as the
cases to be considered as "en banc cases":

"1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;

2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.000 or both;

7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed.

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the
attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and

9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention."

Notably, the rule that "cases assigned to a division which is the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the
Court en banc" has been reiterated.

However, a new paragraph was added in the 1993 Resolution, as follows:

"9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention."

The immediately foregoing paragraph may lend itself to an interpretation that any case which the Court en
banc by majority vote of its members "may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" is an en
banc case.

This interpretation is of doubtful validity and soundness.

To begin with, Resolution dated November 18, 1993 is essentially an amendment to Sections 15 and 16,
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which deals with the form ("unglazed paper," margins, number of copies,
etc.) of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with this Court. This Resolution was clearly not intended to
lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a Division. Thus, the
principle that the court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may
be appealed could not have been intended to be abrogated. Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, earlier
quoted, expressly provides that "when the required number (the concurrence of at least three members of
the division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc." The obvious contemplation is that when
the required vote of at least three members is obtained, the banc's participation is not called for.
(4) It is true that the Constitution itself recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to require other cases
to be heard en banc (Article VIII, Sec. 4 (2) ). As pointed out, the November 18, 1993 Resolution quoted
earlier, could not, by reading the issuance in proper context, have been intended to expand the enumeration
of en banc cases. A reasonable interpretation is that paragraph 9 refers to cases accepted by the banc
pursuant to existing rules, foremost of which is that the referral requires the concurrence of at least three
of the members of the division. If the provision "all other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" was intended to give the court
en banc a general residual power and prerogative to cause the elevation of any case assigned to a division,
without a consulta from the division itself, this intent should be ineluctably expressed, having in mind the
essential and traditional role of a division of the court sitting veritably as the court en banc itself.

The court en banc should be shielded from the importunings of litigants who perceive themselves aggrieved
by a decision of a division of the court and resort to the convenience of an appeal to the court en banc on
the plea that its case is "of sufficient importance to merit its attention." In the Sumilao case, the majority of
the banc's members refused to take the case where there was a two-two tie vote in the division for the
elevation of the motion for reconsideration to the court en banc. In an earlier precedent involving the
conviction of Imelda Marcos' by the Sandiganbayan, the case was considered as deserving of a full court
treatment, despite the fact that the motion for reconsideration did not garner a majority vote in the division.
The Court should establish a consistent policy on these referrals for the stability of its policies and
procedures.

The prerogative to take out a case from the division without the concurrence of a majority of its members,
should, if at all, be used only for clearly compelling reasons; otherwise the decision of the Court en banc to
take cognizance of the matter itself would be suspect of irregularity and the precedent would be difficult to
justify before litigants who may be similarly situated.

I vote to deny the motions to refer the motions for reconsideration to the Court en banc.

13. TERESITA G. FABIAN v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, GR No. 129742, 1998-09-16

Facts:

Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents

Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the
offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship.

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989)[1] pertinently provides that -

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or... decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure
of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative
proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and... unappealable.

"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it
creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial... of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.

Issues:

She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit
the power of review of this Court.

Ruling:

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It... consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court.

Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper
correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770... t also reveals that Senator

Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision
will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted
this Court on the matter,... As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from... decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43.

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be... vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereover, relates to procedure only... it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court
to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a... substantive power.

rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely
and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect
Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in
said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other
provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and... insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby
declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

Principles:

First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure
of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of...
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court

14. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE v. RAYMOND MANALO, GR No. 180906, 2008-10-07

Facts: appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19[1] of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals

Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their... officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007.

filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

Hence, this appeal.

Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several
armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother,... Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre.

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded,
he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names.
The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie
Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his
house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30... years old

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as
his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally... arrived at a house.

The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he
was hit with the butt of their guns. He was... questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he
had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape.

Fort Magsaysay.

. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him.
Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he
was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he... was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo
was detained

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars.
He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including
urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He... counted that eighteen people[22] had
been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.[23]

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay.

In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him.
As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they
continued to... join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were
then brought back to Sapang.

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose
name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander"... by his men in the 24th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were... threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.

They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February
14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was... blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the
soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the
NPA because Raymond escaped.

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture... was involved. He was
requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first
asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the
scars borne by respondents were consistent with... their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them.
The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results
thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed
the Istanbul

Protocol in conducting the examination.[47]

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture.

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of
National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of
the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. H

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier
filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which
averred among others,... Lt. Col. Jimenez was directe... investigate the alleged abduction... of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely

He was directed to determine: (1)... the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the
alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements were turned
over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May
30, 2006 and... finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.[68]

Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula

Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.

That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only
implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed
a criminal charge against their brother Rolando

Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated
him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said
Manalo brothers.
He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to
that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned
only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is
merely fabricated... because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and
he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his... service to the
government as a CAA member.

alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this
investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability.
It... is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule).

Issues:

whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

Ruling:

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained
until they escaped on

August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either
members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who
turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the
petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that... he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a
safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen.
Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the
dire situation of the... petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his
command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely
tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the
petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and
Caigas, among others, was similarly established.

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymond's affidavit and testimony were
corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo

Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of
the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents' accounts
of the torture they endured while in... detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities
in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be
the "Division Training Unit,"[104] firms up respondents' story that they were... detained for some time in
said military facility.

based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when
she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.

There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents... admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the
word"[109] as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the... case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."[110] (emphasis supplied)
Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed,
which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.[111]

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue... except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person -
houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over
a person's home and possessions, but more importantly,... protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article
III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched
or invaded without a search warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion.

When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as... the dignity of the human
person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado or other... similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine
whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With
their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and
implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own... abduction and torture, but also in those of
other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino,
among others.

since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because
of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of
their abduction,... These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,... actionable through a petition
for a writ of amparo.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely
relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in
the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation... when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their
statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the... family or neighbors of the respondents.

is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as
a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent
threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective... investigation and protection on the part of the military.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to... the grant of the production order, namely: (1)
the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense;
and (4) the... probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas,
whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant
in ensuring the safety of respondents... by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation
to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical... personnel is
also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate
medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret... walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

Principles:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal... killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial... proceedings."[75] On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or... indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."[76]

"Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of
the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse

Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses; it is curative in that it... facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive
and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced... disappearances.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of...
a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied.

(emphases supplied)

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or... judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation
when attempted. (

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want... has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people."... individual international human right.

26] (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention.

Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article
III, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution and the right to security of person (as free... it was intended to narrow the concept of the right
to security only to situations of... formal deprivation of liberty

It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under
their jurisdiction, just because that... he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are
under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them.

15. Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on
the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has
jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality
of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance
of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It
is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent
and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though
its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same
vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.
16. 354 Phil. 830

MARTINEZ, J.:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun,
India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private respondent,
PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED.

The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private
respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The
present conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a contract entered into
by and between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the
petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration
therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an
irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on
board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and
Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo
was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private
respondent had already received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private
respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and
they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with
Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class "G"
cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the private
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which
stipulates:

"Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating to the
meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality
of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any
way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole
arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It will be no
objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he
had to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as
Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference.

"The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being
unable to act for any reason the Member of the Commission shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator
in acordance with the terms of the contract/supply order. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with
reference from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940, or any Statutary modification or re-enactment there of and the rules made there under
and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.
"The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from time to time, to make and publish the
award.

"The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun."[1]

On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor
setting forth the arbitral award as follows:

"NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the evidence, oral and documentarys adduced
by the claimant and carefully examining the various written statements, submissions, letters, telexes, etc.
sent by the respondent, and the oral arguments addressed by the counsel for the claimants, I, N.N.
Malhotra, Sole Arbitrator, appointed under clause 16 of the supply order dated 26.2.1983, according to
which the parties, i.e. M/S Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Pacific Cement Co., Inc. can refer the
dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the Arbitration Act. 1940, do hereby award and direct
as follows:-

"The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant :-

1. Amount received by the Respondent

against the letter of credit No. 11/19

dated 28.2.1983 - - - US $ 477,300.00

2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred

by the claimant on the inspection team's

visit to Philippines in August 1985 - - - US$ 3,881.00

3. L. C. Establishment charges incurred

by the claimant - - - US $ 1,252.82

4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant

from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 - - - US $ 417,169.95

 Total amount of award - - - US $ 899,603.77

"In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay to the claimant the interest at the rate
of 6% on the above amount, with effect from 24.7.1988 upto the actual date of payment by the Respondent
in full settlement of the claim as awarded or the date of the decree, whichever is earlier.

"I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards the expenses on Arbitration, legal
expenses, stamps duly incurred by the claimant. The cost will be shared by the parties in equal proportion.

"Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988."[2]

To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the
Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India (hereinafter referred to as the foreign court for brevity), praying that the
decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court issued notices to the private
respondent for filing objections to the petition. The private respondent complied and sent its objections
dated January 16, 1989. Subsequently, the said court directed the private respondent to pay the filing fees
in order that the latter's objections could be given consideration. Instead of paying the required filing fees,
the private respondent sent the following communication addressed to the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun:

"The Civil Judge

Dehra Dun (U.P.) India

Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989

M/S Pacific Cement Co.,

Inc. vs. ONGC Case

Sir:

1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May 1989.

2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your letter did not mention the amount to
be paid.

3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us how much to pay to comply with the
same.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Pacific Cement Co., Inc.

By:
Jose Cortes, Jr.

President"[3]

Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on February 7, 1990, to
wit:

"ORDER

Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit No. 5 on 7.2.90, therefore, award
should be made "Rule of the Court.

"ORDER

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of award
decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled
to get from defendant (US$ 899, 603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point
seventy seven only) alongwith 9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation."[4]

Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner
for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court
as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The
private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff's lack of legal
capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiff's claim or demand has been waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished. The petitioner filed its opposition to the said motion to dismiss, and the private
respondent, its rejoinder thereto. On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order upholding the petitioner's
legal capacity to sue, albeit dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The RTC held that
the rule prohibiting foreign corporations transacting business in the Philippines without a license from
maintaining a suit in Philippine courts admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign corporation is suing
on an isolated transaction as in this case.[5] Anent the issue of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of
action, however, the RTC found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator under Clause
16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,

"[a] perusal of the above-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows that the matter covered by its terms is
limited to "ALL QUESTIONS AND DISPUTES, RELATING TO THE MEANING OF THE SPECIFICATION,
DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY
OF WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS ORDERED or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing
whatsoever, but qualified to 'IN ANY WAY ARISING OR RELATING TO THE SUPPLY
ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN, DRAWING, SPECIFICATION, etc.,' repeating the enumeration in the
opening sentence of the clause.
"The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the defendant that the breach, consisting of the
non-delivery of the purchased materials, should have been properly litigated before a court of law, pursuant
to Clause No. 15 of the Contract/Supply Order, herein quoted, to wit:

'JURISDICTION

All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be
subject to the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction
and the place from which this supply order is situated.'"[6]

The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a "mistake of law or
fact amounting to want of jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null
and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an
enforceable right.[7]

The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the
arbitrator's award. In addition, the appellate court observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign
court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact and law as basis for the award.
Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional
provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.[8] The appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the
private respondent's objections for non-payment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first
replying to the private respondent's query as to the amount of legal fees to be paid, constituted want of
notice or violation of due process. Lastly, it pointed out that the arbitration proceeding was defective
because the arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner, and the fact that the arbitrator was a former
employee of the latter gives rise to a presumed bias on his part in favor of the petitioner.[9]

A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the appellate court's decision was denied,
thus, this petition for review on certiorari citing the following as grounds in support thereof:

"RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

ORDER OF DISMISSAL SINCE:

A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY THE

PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE 16 OF THE CONTRACT;
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA WAS AN AFFIRMATION OF THE
FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITRATOR AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS
JURISDICTION;

C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT UNDER A

FOREIGN JUDGMENT."[10]

The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner
and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. To reiterate, Clause 16 provides as follows:

"Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating to the
meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality
of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any
way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole
arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It will be no
objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he
had to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as
Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference."[11]

The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
to the petitioner. The primary question that may be posed, therefore, is whether or not the non-delivery of
the said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16. The petitioner contends
that the same was a matter within the purview of Clause 16, particularly the phrase, "x x x or as to any other
questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract,
design, drawing, specification, instruction x x x".[12] It is argued that the foregoing phrase allows
considerable latitude so as to include non-delivery of the cargo which was a "claim, right or thing relating to
the supply order/contract". The contention is bereft of merit. First of all, the petitioner has misquoted the
said phrase, shrewdly inserting a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" where
none actually exists. An accurate reproduction of the phrase reads, "x x x or as to any other question, claim,
right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions x x x". The absence of a comma between the words "supply
order/contract" and "design" indicates that the former cannot be taken separately but should be viewed in
conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions". It is thus clear
that to fall within the purview of this phrase, the "claim, right or thing whatsoever" must arise out of or relate
to the design, drawing, specification, or instruction of the supply order/contract. The petitioner also insists
that the non-delivery of the cargo is not only covered by the foregoing phrase but also by the phrase, "x x
x or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during the
stipulated/extended period or after completion/abandonment thereof x x x".

The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is equally applicable in the
ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual stipulations, such as the aforementioned
phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it is associated, or stated differently,
its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associated words.[13] A close examination of Clause
16 reveals that it covers three matters which may be submitted to arbitration namely,

(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and
instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered; or

(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply
order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions; or

(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof.

The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes relating to the design,
drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply/order contract. In the third
category, the clause, "execution or failure to execute the same", may be read as "execution or failure to
execute the supply order/contract". But in accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference
to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding words with which it is associated,
meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract. The non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature
of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the
technical aspects of the contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a
referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with the
required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.

This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter
properly cognizable by the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract:

"All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place
from which this supply order is situated."[14]

The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts and other instruments served as our
guide in arriving at the foregoing conclusion:

"ART. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual."[15]
"ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly".[16]

"Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument,
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all."[17]

Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be read in isolation from
the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions.[18]
The whole and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the canon of construction that in interpreting a
statute (or a contract as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.[19]

The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to contemplate even the non-delivery of
the oil well cement would in effect render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16 shows that
the parties did not intend arbitration to be the sole means of settling disputes. This is manifest from Clause
16 itself which is prefixed with the proviso, "Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract
x x x", thus indicating that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is not all encompassing, and admits of exceptions
as may be provided elsewhere in the supply order/contract. We believe that the correct interpretation to
give effect to both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising
from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply
order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.

The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of argument, that the non-delivery of the oil well
cement is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the
specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16. In this contention, we
find merit. When the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement were not delivered to the petitioner, an agreement
was forged between the latter and the private respondent that Class "G" cement would be delivered to the
petitioner as replacement. Upon inspection, however, the replacement cement was rejected as it did not
conform to the specifications of the contract. Only after this latter circumstance was the matter brought
before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly, what was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of
the cargo at the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the specifications
of the contract, a matter clearly within the coverage of Clause 16.

The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to make replacement and that it
undertook the latter only "in the spirit of liberality and to foster good business relationship".[20] Hence, the
undertaking to deliver the replacement cement and its subsequent failure to conform to specifications are
not anymore subject of the supply order/contract or any of the provisions thereof. We disagree.
As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent undertook to deliver the 4,300 metric
tons of oil well cement at "BOMBAY (INDIA) 2181 MT and CALCUTTA 2119 MT".[21] The failure of the
private respondent to deliver the cargo to the designated places remains undisputed. Likewise, the fact that
the petitioner had already paid for the cost of the cement is not contested by the private respondent. The
private respondent claims, however, that it never benefited from the transaction as it was not able to recover
the cargo that was unloaded at the port of Bangkok.[22] First of all, whether or not the private respondent
was able to recover the cargo is immaterial to its subsisting duty to make good its promise to deliver the
cargo at the stipulated place of delivery. Secondly, we find it difficult to believe this representation. In its
Memorandum filed before this Court, the private respondent asserted that the Civil Court of Bangkok had
already ruled that the non-delivery of the cargo was due solely to the fault of the carrier.[23] It is, therefore,
but logical to assume that the necessary consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by the private
respondent of the cargo or the value thereof. What inspires credulity is not that the replacement was done
in the spirit of liberality but that it was undertaken precisely because of the private respondent's recognition
of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract, Clause 16 of which remains in force and effect until the
full execution thereof.

We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction
in view of the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which
the award in favor of the petitioner was based. The pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreign court
reads:

"ORDER

Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions of award
decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled
to get from defendant ( US$ 899, 603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three
point seventy seven only) alongwith 9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation."[24]

As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the
decree". This is a categorical declaration that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the
arbitrator as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive
discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same.
Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the
appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision containing literally, only
the dispositive portion".[25]

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul,[26] this Court held that the following
memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto."[27] (Underscoring supplied.)

This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court of
Appeals,[28] where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of
the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:

"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We are
persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the soundness
of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference,
the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our
decision."[29] (Underscoring supplied)

Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.[30]
This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion
of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen
(18) single spaced pages.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that
the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.[31] This Court has held that matters of remedy and
procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.[32] Thus, if under the procedural
rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's
findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court
mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket
fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our
rules provide otherwise.

The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated, first by reason of
the fact that the foreign court never answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees to be paid then
refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and second, because of the presumed bias on
the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee of the petitioner.

Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense[33] or stated
otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard.[34] Thus, there is no
violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain
his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.[35]

In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by the foreign court to
file its objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its objections to be given
consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the private respondent sent a communication to
the foreign court inquiring about the correct amount of fees to be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting
the foreign court's reply, almost a year passed without the private respondent paying the legal fees. Thus,
on February 2, 1990, the foreign court rejected the objections of the private respondent and proceeded to
adjudicate upon the petitioner's claims. We cannot subscribe to the private respondent's claim that the
foreign court violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected
its objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity
to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply to the private respondent's written
communication. On the contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should have prompted the private
respondent to ascertain with all due diligence the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The private
respondent did not act with prudence and diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this Court.[36]

The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee
of the petitioner. This point deserves scant consideration in view of the following stipulation in the contract:

"x x x. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission
employer (sic) that he had to deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the
course of his duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in
dispute or difference."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)

Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[38] that:

"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary
is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

"Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed
by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty."[39]

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private respondent herein, had the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its enforcement, despite
the fact that the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As
this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further
proceedings in the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint in Civil
Case No. 4006 before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED, and another in its stead is
hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC. to pay to petitioner
the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case.

SO ORDERED.

17. 103 Phil. 1051

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens
Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the general elections
held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintín Paredes, Francisco
Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected.
Subsequently, the election of these Senators-elect who eventually assumed their respective seats in the
Senate was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario
Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf
of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the
Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon
nomination of Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the
objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J.
Cuenco, and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
his recommendation of said respondents; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant
and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal,
and upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case
at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipólito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners alegge that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate
consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator namely, petitioner,
Lorenzo M. Tañada belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation * * * of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution,
usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical
assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado who caused said appointments to be
made as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and
Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as
a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more
than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than three (3) Senators upon nomination of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein, together with three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the petitioner Diosdado Macapagal
and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been
nominated and chosen in the manner alleged * * * herein-above."

Petitioners pray that:

"1. Upon petitioners' filing- of a bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ
of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A.
Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from
continuing to usurp, intrude into and/or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied
by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipólito restraining him from paying
the salaries of respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending
this action.

"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public
offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the
preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents."
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators.
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the
Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause óf action, because "petitioner Tañada has
exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators",
because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy.

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six
(6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution
upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the
respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission
provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners
herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion."

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike
the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192) relied upon by the
respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly
or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the
Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 139: Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators
who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in
which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation
has aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on
the other hand, to determine whether the powers thus possessed have been validly exercised. In performing
the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the government, since
the determination of the validity of an act is not the same thing as the performance of the act. In the one
case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case
we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or
attempted by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221,
224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; italics supplied.)

The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondents refutes their own pretense. This
Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact
that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the personnel thereof.

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the
Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress[1] And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity
of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in
the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution.[2] (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled
certain acts of the Executive[3] as incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.[4]

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654),
likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review
the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House
should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of , a resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a
political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions
in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to
constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed
for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate after acknowledging that the
Citizens Party is the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the
Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate Electoral Tribunal could validly
choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party
in the Senate, Senator Primicias, claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its
representation in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority
of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to
force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-
half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political
alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or
advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the
case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the
Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is
whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the
Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the
effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion,
could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not
one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial
forum, but, to use petitioner Tañada's own words, 'to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81,
Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give
the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the
acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people which is not a fact. During the
discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February
21, 1956, Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionalista
Senators and the latter declined the nomination. Senator Tañada replied.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us
that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion.
Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here,
has said one day; 'If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the
Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of
anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court.'
But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the
Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the
Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr.
President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional
Record, Vol. Ill, p. 339; italics supplied.)

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took
place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter
announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected."

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us
is political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within
the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those
powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with
the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will
not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not
granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts."
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; italics supplied.)

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase 'political question', nor to determine what matters fall within
its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that the outside the scope of the judicial questions,
which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125
Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs. Elizalde, 112 P. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C, 108; italics supplied.)

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are
invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled
by the Courts.[5]

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully.
The Court said:

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not
judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would
then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental
one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it
would seem, to be finally settled.

*******
"* * * What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.
See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19
L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. E. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 111. 41,
37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine
whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have
no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they
are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may
exercise the powers delegated-to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts
within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because
they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under
his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him
to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the
executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon
all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is
necessary, to 'the end that the government may be one of laws and not men' words which Webster said
were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; italics supplied.)

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the_present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias a member and spokesman of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination * * * of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith.

"* * * whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights * * *." (16 C. J. S., 439; italics supplied.)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine
the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal,
valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Italics
supplied.)

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty-
three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator
Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956,
Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate * * * three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. Ill, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated
by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally
to this motion upon the ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members but to
the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being
devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot
give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that
Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal,
although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or
three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right
to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his
motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias,Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took
part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do., pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336,
338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the
opposition of Senator Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one"
member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said
House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised whether or not one who does not belong
to said party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Tañada on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez,
Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do-, pp.
345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning
and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to
be remote. So, at 7:40 p. m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to
seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p. m., Senator
Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista
Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member
in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.''

Without any objection, this nomination was approved "by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and
said:

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of
the Senate and I am mow making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the
Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco."

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the
Senate.

" Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named
gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be
appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations
are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party
having the largest number of votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few-moments ago when I took the floor, /
also wish to record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the
Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Está dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que estén
conformes con la nominación hecha por el Presidente del Comité de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores
Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, sí. (Varios Senadores: Sí.) Los que no
lo estén digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 377;
italics supplied.)

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado who belong to the
Nacionalista Party as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made
without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate,
of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be
members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes
in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which
he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House
of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when after the nomination of three (3) Senators
by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal Senator
Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to nominate
two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these
respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, said Senator
Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law,
relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators
Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings for the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the
President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal.
Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that
the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the
framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the
end of 1955, he subsequently '"parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished
president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the
Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. Ill, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened,
stating:

"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second
largest number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as
a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. * * * I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this
authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 332;
italics supplied.)

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and
not a mere privilege to nominate," adding that:

"* * * the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is
clear in my mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from
Quezon belongs. * * * We have to bear in mind, * * * that when" Senator Tañada was included in the
Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party
and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens
Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because
that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did
not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the Nacionalista Party. And we should also
remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the
effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party * * *." (Id., id., p. 360; italics supplied.)

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:

"* * * there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he
belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation that he is not
a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable
ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation * * * approximates or approaches what is
within the spirit of that Constitution. * * * and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would
be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral
Tribunal * * *." (Id., id., p. 376; italics supplied.)

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator
Tañada the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens
Party, the minority party in this Body" not only without any objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval
of the Senate leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by
Senator Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory
character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote.[6]
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little,
if any, weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the "practical construction of a Constitution
is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform * * *."[6a] Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of
substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any
application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a
contemporaneous or practical * * * executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be
allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the
Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount
considerations of public policy, it may be rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; italics supplied.)[6b]

The aforementioned opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a "uniform" application of the
view therein adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous
constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and
spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by
paramount considerations of public policy.

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondents herein is that, while, it relies upon the
compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it
ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that
both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the
same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive why "shall" must
be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be
considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and
back up the theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the
task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking
body, the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether
satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a
great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in 'the
dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in
some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the 'determination of a great number of the
cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function
assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice
in the decisions that there was gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to
the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and
Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 257-258; italics supplied.)

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956,
Senator Sumulong declared:

"* * * when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually
placing the majority party in a position to. dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House
will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election
protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate
the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so many injustices'
committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have
been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag,
when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the
intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those
cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided
under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the decision in the election
protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 361; italics supplied.)

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:

"* * * what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court
composed of nine members: three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and
three from the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members may represent the
party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it
comes, to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 351; italics supplied.)

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as
follows:
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of
the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was
given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body
to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed
as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that
provision was the fact that that was, among other things, the system obtaining in

the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that
power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that that would
make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the
past.'' (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 376; italics supplied.)

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus
expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego
states:

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition
of party lines because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the
National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members: of the same, would insure greater political justice in the
determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had
been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation
of the Electoral Commission in the following words;

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority
party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which Would make protests decided
in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the
House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment
that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we
have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.

' But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of
three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice
applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would
be nothing but questions purely, of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the
minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have
in this case, as a cheek upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what
is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the
House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the
Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the
application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially
in these electoral questions.

'I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible
to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the
parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied improperly or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the
doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat,
is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the
protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice
that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and
that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power.
And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many
have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases * * *. I repeat that the best guarantee
lies in the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by
three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of
the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; italics
supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All" that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the
creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom 'ultimate justice of the people'.
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation
of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contesta devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in
its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court." (Pp. 174-175.)[7]

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir información del Subcomité de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comité?

"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como está el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoría, y otros tres a la minoría y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree su Señoría que este equivale prácticamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

"El Sr. ROXAS. Sí y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comisión está constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoría como los de la minoría así como los miembros de la Corte Suprema considerarán
la cuestión sobre la base de sus méritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

'El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Señoría que en un caso como ese, podríamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoría como los de la minoría prescindieran del partidismo?

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que sí, porque el partidismo no les daría el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra, pp. 168-169; italics supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the
establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission,[8] and then [9] of one Electoral Tribunal for each House
of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting
members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the
party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the
National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the
Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control
the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme
Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so
that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial
temper. This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact,
Senator Sabido who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the "privilege" to make the nominations on
behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate agrees with it. As Senator
Sumulong inquired:

"* * * I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of
creating- this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in
the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 330; italics supplied.)

Senator Sabido replied:

"That is so, * * *." (Id., p. 330.)

Upon further interpelation, Senator Sabido said:

"* * * the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance
between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak
of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record
for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 349; italics supplied.)

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were:

"* * * The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members
of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants
or the protestees. It is hoped that they will act as judges; because to decide election cases is a judicial
function. But the framers of the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew
that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to
the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party,
so that in case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as
judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along
party lines, still there Is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result w|ill be that the deciding
vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees
or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating
the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded not by the Congressmen
or Senators who are members of the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their
judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants or protestees. That is my
understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral
Tribunal.
*******

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure
impartiality and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority
party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in
the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, pp. 362-363, 365-366; italics supplied.)

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that
several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes
in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative of the Citizens Party to nominate for the
Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes
maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did
not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations.[10]

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest,
and the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those
members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most
vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting
equilibrium, to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the
words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the
Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record
for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation
of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof,
and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof,
while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where
the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing
its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.)

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all
circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this
question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative
intent. The legislative intent must be obtained from all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination
does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its
object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute
must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given
a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such
that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation,
without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; * * * On the other hand,
the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative
purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a
mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted
and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. * * * Whether a
statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the
thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only
by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial
matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where
the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a
statute is regarded as directory where no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring
it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with
substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done,
that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts
or proceedings to be done in a certain way; shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such
provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and prerequisite
conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can
be exercised, the statute must be regarded as, mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See, also, Wiords and
Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; italics supplied.)

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority
party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium
between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are
members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to
play. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory,
and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.[11]

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present
composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. Ill, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its
letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations
can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members
nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that
the Citizens Party[12] has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate,
for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically
handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate
other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein,
of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme
Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy
underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be
destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped
out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations
in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers
of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.[13]

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being
questioned. As a matter of fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of
record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the principle involved. When the
election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the
political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of
selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the
wealth of experience of the delegates to the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians
and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution
must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition
of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to
shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political
exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the
party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present
Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.)

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no
minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the
following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:

"Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party
would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us
suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party
A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed
elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections
held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no
senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates
of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral
Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of
fraud and terrorism,. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would
make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could intrench
itself in power in the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.

*******

"* * * When there are no electoral protests filed by the minority party, or when the only electoral protests
filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no
objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the, minority party, it is at this
point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the
above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices
of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6
members of the majority party in the Tribunal.

*******

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it did not appear that there
were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and
who could liave brought a test case to court." (Italics supplied.)

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an
individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the
protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power
to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization of
the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held
that "where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive
its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which
Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the
exercise thereof by a person or party other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule on estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 68, sec. 68 [a],
Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator
Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly
asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not
of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other
members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents,
is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later
on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution;
that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3)
members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the
Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person
or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative
therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and
that the nomination of Senators,Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not
prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Elecr toral Tribunal, they were appointed
by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body[14] or,
pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the selection of
its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every
reason to believe that it will, hereafter, take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they
are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the
powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection
with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as
regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., and Félix, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING

PARAS, C. J.,

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As all
the members of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it
was impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral
Commission should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes, the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved.
Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:
"Sir:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of His
Excellency, the President, in which you request my opinion as 'to the proper interpretation of the following
provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':

'There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number
of votes therein.'

"You state that 'as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is
impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Assembly.'

"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six members to be chosen by "the National
Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes.

"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that
the Electoral Commission shall be composed of 'three members elected by the members of the party having
the largest number of votes, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court * * * (Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-
261). But as finally adopted by the Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there sh,all be 'six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The
Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).

"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention of the framers
of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It was also
intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the
Commission. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan
considerations.
"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the
Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation
in the Assembly the power to .nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows
that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the
Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been
intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and
six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The
membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

" 'A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform
interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time,
even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am.
Jur. 659).

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority
party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their
interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protested. The basic
philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the
majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor.
Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a
check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices
of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it
has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convention, as well as the
considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to
the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the
Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there
being no other party entitled to such nomination."

Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally organized,
with six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the
Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in 1940, and the Electoral
Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that
"Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution.)
If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of
which may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National
Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of Justice. When instead of wording
the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only
did not substantially depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and, expressly
ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear
and mandatory that at all times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or
not two parties make up each house of Congress.

It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate
three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should
belong to the same party. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by
the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary.

Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the
second largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief Justice may
similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, this would frustrate the purpose of having an
ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks.
It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the
Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of
the Justices; otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court
and six others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other
hand, the framers of the Constitution not insensitive to some such argument still had reposed their faith and
confidence in the independence, integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in
the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices
of the Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.

In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party, the party having
the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal,
the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional mandate, to choose as it did said two Members.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endencia, J., concurs.

DISSENTING

LABRADOR, J.,

I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.

The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the
Senate members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications, of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II,
Article VI of the Constitution.)

I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character and that
this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that
which defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-
settled rules of statutory construction.

"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory
effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the generally
acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character is such as to require absolute compliance in all
cases without exception. And the very principles of our institutions, involving as they do concepts of
constitutional supremacy, are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a
constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it * * *." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Vol. 3, p. 84.)

The majority holds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the
Nacionalista Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two
other members, the Senate may not elect said two other members. And the reason given for this ruling is
the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. This holding
is subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first place, it renders nugatory ythe provision which
fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory
provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly
grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; so in effect this right or prerogative is
lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member
of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the supposedly
procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and
paramount over the power of election, which is lodged in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the
majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important
mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place,
the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional
Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or
refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral Tribunal
shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law
or reason.

I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members
must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the constitutional
provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy"
by which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes membership at nine and that which
outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is
the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to
make them both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles.
The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.

While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is
ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion
for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate
exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.

Senators Cuenco and Delgado not having been duly elected as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
are not entitled to act as such. Petition dismissed <="" em="">

[1] Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Orno vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340;
Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compañía Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board
of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepción vs.
Paredes, 42 Phil., 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs.
Pomar, 46 Phil., 440; Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. vs.
Agoncillo, 50 Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil., 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57
Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45
Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., 4822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm.
Investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex. Parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil Rights Cases [U.S. vs. M. Stanley;
U.S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. Menphis and Charleston Railroad
Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U.S.,
181 U. S. 286.

[2] Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of the
Electoral Tribunals under the Constitution as amended.

[3] Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, andRodriguez vs. Teasurer of the
Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off.
Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289,
48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93;,Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil.,
506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51 Off. Gaz., 5607.

[4] "From the very nature of the American system of government with Constitutions prescribing the
jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government, it has devolved on the judiciary to
determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the fundamental law. All the
departments of the government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to judge of the Constitution for
themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the obligations imposed in, the instrument, and in the order of
time pointed out by it. When the judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of the other two departments are
held to be unauthorized or despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they
cease to be operative or binding.

"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands: It is their duty in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution
and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.

"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a
law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment
of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that
a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts
to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office.
This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law,
the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter,
the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by
political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur,, pp. 712-713, 713-715;
italics supplied.)

[5] Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson,
24 Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N. W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment Cases,
24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 N.
W. 1064; University vs. Mclver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27
South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.

[6a] "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the
Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation
in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that
the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution
that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been
intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and
six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The
membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

'A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform
interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time,
even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am.
Jur. 659).'

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority
party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their
interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protected. The basic
philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the
majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor.
Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a
check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices
of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it
has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the
considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to
the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the
Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there
being no other party entitled to such nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.

"Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up or
discussed, until the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).
[6b]"Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral
Commission formed part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of
contemporaneous and practical construction this Court deemed it unnecessary to refute the same in order
to adopt the opposite view.

[7] Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22, 1956, in the following
language:

"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner prescribed in
the Constitution, the party that received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party which is
the Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party receiving the next highest number of votes
therein, meaning the minority party, the party receiving the next highest number of votes. But there was a
great deal of opinion that it would be better if this political organization, so far as the legislative department
is concerned, could be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as
to each Electoral Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great
majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why we have nine
members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I remember then
and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three members representing a
party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it would be better that even on that
hypothesis or on that supposition it would be better, in case they annul each other because three votes in
favor or three votes against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme
Court decide the case because then it would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on
the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are supposed to be beyond pressure, beyond influence,
although that may not be true. But having reached the highest judicial position of the land, these persons
would likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 376.)

[8] When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.

[9] Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.

[10] Senator Lim said:

"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second
largest number of votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because partisan
considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a senator belonging to a particular party. Although
grammatically, I agree with Your Honor, Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the
Constitution is clear that the three must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the
other three nominated must belong to the party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor
can see the point. If we allow Your Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be maintained,
because partisan considerations enter when one is with the majority party, and that no party should prevail,
Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that to the
extent than only three can be nominated from the party having the largest number of votes and three from
the party having the second largest number of votes." (Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 337;
italics supplied.)

The statement of Senator Sabido was:

"* * * the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance,
between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak
of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation."

*******

"* * * I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those
participating in the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral
tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure impartiality in the proceeding and justice in
the decision that may be finally rendered." (Congres<-sional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, pp. 349, 352;
italics supplied.)

Senator Cea declared:

"* * * the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the
Senate in the Electoral Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 350; italics supplied.)

The words of Senator Paredes were:

"* * * what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court
composed of nine members three of them belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three
from the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members may represent the party,
and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to
a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be. made along party lines."
"(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. Ill, p. 351; italics supplied.)

[11] The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but, also, by
the fact that constitutional provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be mandatory, "unless
the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:

"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are
mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory
merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory.
Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any
discretion to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality
is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory.
The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection
and are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.

"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even
been said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of
the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each and every one of its provisions should be
treated as imperative and mandatory, withóut reference to the rules and distinguishing between the
directory,land the mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur. 686-687; italics supplied.)

[12] Which admittedly," has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.

[13] In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court,
recalled that:

"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment
by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission."(Italics supplied.)

Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or
grant of authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by resolution
of one House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter.

[14] Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or
a total of six (6) members of the Tribunal.

18. [ GR No. 203754, Jun 16, 2015 ]

FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF PHILIPPINES v. COLON HERITAGE REALTY CORPORATION +

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.[1]

The Case

Once again, We are called upon to resolve a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature
and the constitutionally-delegated power to tax of local governments in these consolidated Petitions for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision dated
September 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-
35601, entitled Colon Heritage Realty Corp., represented by Isidoro Canizares v. Film Development Council
of the Philippines, and Decision dated October 24, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 14 in Cebu City, in Civil Case
No. CEB-35529, entitled City of Cebu v. Film Development Council of the Philippines, collectively declaring
Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.

The Facts

The facts are simple and undisputed.

Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under
Section 140 of the Local Government Code[2] (LGC)anchored on the constitutional policy on local
autonomy,[3] passed City Ordinance No. LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance
of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance).” Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof
which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia,
and other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City. Said provisions read:

CHAPTER XI – Amusement Tax

Section 42. Rate of Tax. – There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees,
or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement,
an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.[4]

Section 43. Manner of Payment. – In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and
withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross receipts
are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and the distributors of the cinematographic films.

Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167,[5] creating the Film Development
Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc.
and the Film Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded
films as follows:

Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained an “A” or “B” grading from the Council
pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:

Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the
amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and
other highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to
151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at the following rates:

For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and

For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. The remaining thirty-five (35%)
shall accrue to the funds of the Council.

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the
graded film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act.
No. 7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the termination of the
exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the
graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to remit the amusement tax proceeds
within the prescribed period shall be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due
for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council. (emphasis added)

According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities and municipalities
in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole exception of Cebu
City, have complied with the mandate of said law.

Accordingly, petitioner,through the Office of the Solicitor General, sent on January 2009 demand letters for
unpaid amusement tax reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the producers of
the Grade “A” or “B” films to the following cinema proprietors and operators in Cebu City:

Cinema Proprietor/Operator

Amusement Tax Reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) Number of CEB Graded Films
Period Covered

SM Prime Holdings Inc.

76,836,807.08 89 Sept. 11, 2003 – Nov. 4, 2008

Ayala Center Cinemas

43,435,718.23 70 May 14, 2003 – Nov. 4, 2008

Colon Heritage Realty Corp.

8,071,267.00 50 Aug. 11, 2004 – Nov. 4, 2008

Eden Theater

428,938.25 4 May 5, 2005 – Sept. 2, 2008

Cinema Theater

3,100,354.80 22 Feb. 18, 2004 – Oct. 7, 2008

Visaya Cineplex Corp.

17,582,521.89 86 June 25, 2005 – Oct. 21, 2008

Ultra Vistarama Cinema

68,821.60 2 July 2 – 22, 2008

Cebu Central Realty Corp.

9,853,559.69 48 Jan. 1, 2004 – Oct. 21, 2008

In said letters, the proprietors and cinema operators, including private respondent Colon Heritage Realty
Corp. (Colon Heritage), operator of the Oriente theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to
pay the aforestated amounts to FDCP. The demand, however, fell on deaf ears.

Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the
status of its receivables for tax rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate films along with those
which it co-produced with GMA films. This was followed by a letter from Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film
Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate remittance of its amusement tax rewards for its graded films
for the years 2004-2008.

Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said amounts as
FDCP demanded, on one hand, and Cebu City’s assertion of a claim on the amounts in question, the city
finally filed on May 18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch 14 a petition for declaratory relief with application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529 (City of Cebu v. FDCP). In said
petition, Cebu City sought the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.

Similarly, Colon Heritage filed before the RTC, Branch 5 Civil Case No. CEB-35601 (Colon Heritage v.
FDCP), seeking to declare Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.

On May 25, 2010, the RTC, Branch 14 issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining and enjoining
FDCP, et al. from, inter alia:

(a)

Collecting amusement tax incentive award in the City of Cebu and from imposing surcharges thereon;

(b)

Demanding from the owners, proprietors, and lessees of theaters and cinemas located and operated within
Cebu City, payment of said amusement tax incentive award which should have been deducted, withheld,
and remitted to FDCP, etc. by the owners, etc., or being operated within Cebu City and imposing surcharges
on the unpaid amount; and

(c)

Filing any suit due to or arising from the failure of the owners, etc., of theaters or cinemas within Cebu City,
to deduct, withhold, and remit the incentive to FDCP.
Meanwhile, on August 13, 2010, SM Prime Holdings, Inc. moved for leave to file and admit attached
comment-in-intervention and was later granted.[6]

Rulings of the Trial Courts

In City of Cebu v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 14 issued the challenged Decision[7] declaring Secs. 13 and 14
of RA 9167 unconstitutional, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner City of Cebu
against respondent Film Development Council of the Philippines, as follows:

Declaring Sections 13 and 14 of the (sic) Republic Act No. 9167 otherwise known as an Act Creating the
Film Development Council of the Philippines, Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for other purposes, as violative of Section 5 Article X of the 1997 (sic) Philippine Constitution;
Consequently

Declaring that defendant Film Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) cannot collect under
Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 as of the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418;

Declaring that Intervenor SM Cinema Corporation has the obligation to remit the amusement taxes, withheld
on graded cinema films to respondent FDCP under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for taxes due prior to
the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418;

Declaring that after the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418, all amusement taxes
withheld and those which may be collected by Intervenor SM on graded films shown in SM Cinemas in
Cebu City shall be remitted to petitioner Cebu City pursuant to City Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI, Section
42.

As to the sum of PhP 76,836,807.08 remitted by the Intervenor SM to petitioner City of Cebu, said amount
shall be remitted by the City of Cebu to petitioner FDCP within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision
in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418 without interests and surcharges.

SO ORDERED.

According to the court, what RA 9167 seeks to accomplish is the segregation of the amusement taxes
raised and collected by Cebu City and its subsequent transfer to FDCP. The court concluded that this
arrangement cannot be classified as a tax exemption but is a confiscatory measure where the national
government extracts money from the local government’s coffers and transfers it to FDCP, a private agency,
which in turn, will award the money to private persons, the film producers, for having produced graded films.

The court further held that Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are contrary to the basic policy in local autonomy
that all taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs shall accrue exclusively to them, as articulated in
Article X, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This edict, according to the court, is a limitation upon the rule-
making power of Congress when it provides guidelines and limitations on the local government unit’s
(LGU’s) power of taxation. Therefore, when Congress passed this “limitation,” it went beyond its legislative
authority, rendering the questioned provisions unconstitutional.

By the same token, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 5, in its Decision of September 25, 2012,
also ruled against the constitutionality of said Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 for the following reasons: (a)
while Congress, through the enactment of RA 9167, may have amended Secs. 140 (a)[8] and 151[9] of the
LGC, in the exercise of its plenary power to amend laws, such power must be exercised within constitutional
parameters; (b) the assailed provision violates the constitutional directive that taxes should accrue
exclusively to the LGU concerned; (c) the Constitution, through its Art. X, Sec. 5,[10] directly conferred
LGUs with authority to levy taxes––the power is no longer delegated by the legislature; (d) In CIR v. SM
Prime Holdings,[11] the Court ruled that amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors remain
with the LGU, amusement tax, being, by nature, a local tax. The fallo of the questioned judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:

(1)

Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;

(2)

The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to respondent is ordered extinguished;

(3)

Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner, by way of amusement tax, plus the legal
rate of interest thereof, until the whole amount is paid in full.

Notify parties and counsels of this order.

SO ORDERED.

The Issue
Undeterred by two defeats, petitioner has come directly to this Court,presenting the singular issue: whether
or not the RTC (Branches 5 and 14) gravely erred in declaring Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid for being
unconstitutional.

Anent Sec. 13,[12] FDCP concedes that the amusement taxes assessed in RA 9167 are to be given to the
producers of graded films who are private persons. Nevertheless, according to FDCP, this particular tax
arrangement is not a violation of the rule on the use of public funds for RA 9167 was enacted for a public
purpose, that is, the promotion and support of the “development and growth of the local film industry as a
medium for the upliftment of aesthetic, cultural, and social values for the better understanding and
appreciation of the Filipino identity” as well as the “encouragement of the production of quality films that will
promote the growth and development of the local film industry.”[13] Moreover, FDCP suggests that “even
if the resultant effect would be a certain loss of revenue, [LGUs] do not feel deprived nor bitter for they
realize that the benefits for the film industry, the fortification of our values system, and the cultural boost for
the nation as a whole, far outweigh the pecuniary cost they would shoulder by backing this law.”[14] Finally,
in support of its stance, FDCP invites attention to the following words of former Associate Justice Isagani
A. Cruz: “[t]he mere fact that the tax will be directly enjoyed by a private individual does not make it invalid
so long as some link to the public welfare is established.”[15]

As regards Sec. 14[16] of RA 9167, FDCP is of the position that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution does
not change the doctrine that municipal corporations only possess delegated, not inherent, powers of
taxation and that the power to tax is still primarily vested in the Congress. Thus, wielding its power to impose
limitations on this delegated power, Congress further restricted the LGU’s power to impose amusement
taxes via Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167––an express and real intention of Congress to further contain the
LGU’s delegated taxing power. It, therefore, cannot be construed as an undue limitation since it is well
within the power of Congress to make such restriction. Furthermore, the LGC is a mere statute which
Congress can amend, which it in fact did when it enacted RA 9164[17] and, later, the questioned law, RA
9167.[18]

This, according to FDCP, evinces the overriding intent of Congress to remove from the LGU’s delegated
taxing power all revenues from amusement taxes on grade “A” or “B” films which would otherwise accrue
to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component
cities in the Philippines pursuant to Secs. 140 and 151 of the LGC.

In fine, it is petitioner’s posture that the inclusion in RA 9167 of the questioned provisions was a valid
exercise of the legislature’s power to amend laws and an assertion of its constitutional authority to set
limitations on the LGU’s authority to tax.

The Court’s Ruling

We find no reason to disturb the assailed rulings.

Local fiscal autonomy and the

constitutionally-delegated power to tax

The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of
right, to every independent government, and needs no express conferment by the people before it can be
exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated to the executive and judicial branches of
government without running afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It, however, can be delegated to
municipal corporations, consistent with the principle that legislative powers may be delegated to local
governments in respect of matters of local concern.[19] The authority of provinces, cities, and municipalities
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised
only to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute.[20]

Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the delegation of the
power to tax to municipal corporations. They only derived such under a limited statutory authority, outside
of which, it was deemed withheld.[21] Local governments, thus, had very restricted taxing powers which
they derive from numerous tax laws. This highly-centralized government structure was later seen to have
arrested the growth and efficient operations of LGUs, paving the way for the adoption of a more
decentralized system which granted LGUs local autonomy, both administrative and fiscal autonomy.[22]

Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre,[23]
fiscal autonomy was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to
allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets,
and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.”

With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,[24] and later the 1987 Constitution, municipal corporations were
granted fiscal autonomy via a general delegation of the power to tax.[25] Section 5, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution gave LGUs the “power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.” This authority was further strengthened in the 1987 Constitution,
through the inclusion in Section 5, Article X thereof of the condition that “[s]uch taxes, fees, and charges
shall accrue exclusively to local governments.”[26]

Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the
tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory
limitations and guidelines.[27] The basic rationale for the current rule on local fiscal autonomy is the
strengthening of LGUs and the safeguarding of their viability and self-sufficiency through a direct grant of
general and broad tax powers.Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be
absolute and unconditional. The legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each LGU will have its fair share of available
resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation
will be fair, uniform, and just.[28]

In conformity to the dictate of the fundamental law for the legislature to “enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization,”[29] consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, Congress enacted the
LGC, Book II of which governs local taxation and fiscal matters and sets forth the guidelines and limitations
for the exercise of this power. In Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. The Province of Benguet,[30] the Court
alluded to the fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs as laid out in Section 130 of the
LGC, to wit:
1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.

2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;

b. be levied and collected only for public purposes;

c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade.

3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private
person.

4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be
subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided by the LGC.

5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.

It is in the application of the adverted fourth rule, that is––all revenue collected pursuant to the provisions
of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax,
fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC––upon which the present
controversy grew.

RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy

It is beyond cavil that the City of Cebu had the authority to issue its City Ordinance No. LXIX and impose
an amusement tax on cinemas pursuant to Sec. 140 in relation to Sec. 151 of the LGC. Sec. 140 states,
among other things, that a “province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.” By
operation of said Sec. 151,[31] extending to them the authority of provinces and municipalities to levy
certain taxes, fees, and charges, cities, such as respondent city government,may therefore validly levy
amusement taxes subject to the parameters set forth under the law. Based on this authority, the City of
Cebu passed, in 1993, its Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance,[32] Chapter XI, Secs. 42 and 43 of which
reads:

CHAPTER XI – Amusement Tax

Section 42. Rate of Tax. – There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees,
or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement,
an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.[33]

Section 43. Manner of Payment. – In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and
withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross receipts
are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and the distributors of the cinematographic films.

Then, after almost a decade of cities reaping benefits from this imposition, Congress, through RA 9167,
amending Section 140 of the LGC,[34] among others,transferred this income from the cities and
municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities, such as
respondent City of Cebu, to petitioner FDCP, which proceeds will ultimately be rewarded to the producers
of graded films. We reproduce anew Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, thus:

Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. – Films which have obtained an “A” or “B” grading from the Council
pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:

Amusement tax reward. – A grade “A” or “B” film shall entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the
amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and
other highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to
151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at the following rates:

For grade “A” films – 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and

For grade “B” films – 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. The remaining thirty-five (35%)
shall accrue to the funds of the Council.

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the
graded film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act.
No. 7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the termination of the
exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the
graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to remit the amusement tax proceeds
within the prescribed period shall be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due
for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.

Considering the amendment, the present rule is that ALL amusement taxes levied by covered cities and
municipalities shall be given by proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres and cinemas to FDCP, which
shall then reward said amount to the producers of graded films in this wise:

For grade “A” films, ALL amusement taxes collected by ALL covered LGUs on said films shall be given to
the producer thereof. The LGU, therefore, is entitled to NOTHING from its own imposition.
For grade “B” films, SIXTY FIVE PERCENT (65%) of ALL amusement taxes derived by ALL covered LGUs
on said film shall be given to the producer thereof. In this case, however, the LGU is still NOT entitled to
any portion of the imposition, in view of Sec. 16 of RA 9167 which provides that the remaining 35% may be
expended for the Council’s operational expenses. Thus:

Section 16. Funding. - The Executive Secretary shall immediately include in the Office of the President’s
program the implementation of this Act, the funding of which shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.

To augment the operational expenses of the Council, the Council may:

a. Utilize the remaining thirty-five (35%) percent of the amusement tax collected during the period of grade
“B” film is exhibited, as provided under Sections 13 and 14 hereof x x x.

For petitioner, the amendment is a valid legislative manifestation of the intention to remove from the grasp
of the taxing power of the covered LGUs all revenues from amusement taxes on grade “A” or “B” films
which would otherwise accrue to them. An evaluation of the provisions in question, however, compels Us
to disagree.

RA 9167, Sec. 14 states:

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the
graded film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act.
No. 7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the termination of the
exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the
graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

A reading of the challenged provision reveals that the power to impose amusement taxeswas NOT removed
from the covered LGUs, unlike what Congress did for the taxes enumerated in Sec. 133, Article X of the
LGC,[35] which lays down the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. Thus:

Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:

(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise
provided herein;

(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds
of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local
government unit concerned;

(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through,
the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or
otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;

(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;

(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a
period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration;

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the national Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products;

(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods
or services except as otherwise provided herein;

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way or reinsurance or retrocession;

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses
or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;

(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided
herein;

(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938)
otherwise known as the “Cooperative Code of the Philippines” respectively; and

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and
local government units. (emphasis ours)

From the above, the difference between Sec. 133 and the questioned amendment of Sec. 140 of the LGC
by RA 9167 is readily revealed. In Sec. 133, what Congress did was to prohibit the levy by LGUs of the
enumerated taxes. For RA 9167, however, the covered LGUs were deprived of the income which they will
otherwise be collecting should they impose amusement taxes, or, in petitioner’s own words, “Section 14 of
[RA 9167] can be viewed as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to remove from the
LGU’s delegated taxing power, all revenues from the amusement taxes on graded films which would
otherwise accrue to [them] pursuant to Section 140 of the [LGC].”[36]

In other words, per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to levy amusement taxes, albeit at the end
of the day,they will derive no revenue therefrom. The same, however, cannot be said for FDCP and the
producers of graded films since the amounts thus levied by the LGUs––which should rightfully accrue to
them, they being the taxing authority––will be going to their coffers. As a matter of fact, it is only through
the exercise by the LGU of said power that the funds to be used for the amusement tax reward can be
raised. Without said imposition, the producers of graded films will receive nothing from the owners,
proprietors and lessees of cinemas operating within the territory of the covered LGU.

Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Congress did in this instance was
not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to
earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of
and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in clear contravention of
the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant
to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.

It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress, broad as they may be, are limited and
confined within the four walls of the Constitution.[37] Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going beyond the parameters wrought by
the organic law.

In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the income from the
amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not
even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its
plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local
autonomy, as echoed in Sec. 130(d) of the LGC, thus:

Section 130. Fundamental Principles. - The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of
the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:

x xx x

(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be
subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition
unless otherwise specifically provided herein xxx.

Moreover, in Pimentel,[38] the Court elucidated that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of LGUs to
allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. By earmarking the income on amusement
taxes imposed by the LGUs in favor of FDCP and the producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated
and distributed the LGUs’ funds––as though it were legally within its control––under the guise of setting a
limitation on the LGUs’ exercise of their delegated taxing power. This, undoubtedly, is a usurpation of the
latter’s exclusive prerogative to apportion their funds, an impermissible intrusion into the LGUs’
constitutionally-protected domain which puts to naught the guarantee of fiscal autonomy to municipal
corporations enshrined in our basic law.

Grant of amusement tax reward incentive:

not a tax exemption

It was argued that subject Sec. 13 is a grant by Congress of an exemption from amusement taxes in favor
of producers of graded films. Without question, this Court has previously upheld the power of Congress to
grant exemptions over the power of LGUs to impose taxes.[39] This amusement tax reward, however, is
not, as the lower court posited, a tax exemption.

Exempting a person or entity from tax is to relieve or to excuse that person or entity from the burden of the
imposition. Here, however, it cannot be said that an exemption from amusement taxes was granted by
Congress to the producers of graded films. Take note that the burden of paying the amusement tax in
question is on the proprietors, lessors, and operators of the theaters and cinemas that showed the graded
films. Thus, per City Ordinance No. LXIX:

CHAPTER XI – Amusement Tax

Section 42. Rate of Tax. – There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees,
or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement,
an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.

Section 43. Manner of Payment. – In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and
withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross receipts
are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and the distributors of the cinematographic films.

Similarly, the LGC provides as follows:

Section 140. Amusement Tax. -

(a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of not
more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees.

(b) In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors,
lessees, or operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between
said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of the cinematographic films.
Simply put, both the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are borne by the proprietors, lessors, and
operators, not by the producers of the graded films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is
actually a monetary reward given to them for having produced a graded film, the funding for which was
taken by the national government from the coffers of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an
exemption from payment of tax.

Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the

entire RA 9167 as unconstitutional

Noticeably, the RTC, Branch 5, in its September 25, 2012 Decision in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ruled against
the constitutionality of the entire law, not just the assailed Sec. 14. The fallo of the judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:

(1)

Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;

(2)

The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to respondent is ordered extinguished;

(3)

Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner, by way of amusement tax, plus the legal
rate of interest thereof, until the whole amount is paid in full.

In this regard, it is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of the law is free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, then it should remain in force and effect if said law contains a separability clause. A
separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate
the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts, in spite of it,may
invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and workable.[40]

In this case, not only does RA 9167 have a separability clause, contained in Section 23 thereof which reads:

Section 23. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any provision of this Act, or any part thereof, is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, all other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and
effect.

it is also true that the constitutionality of the entire law was not put in question in any of the said cases.

Moreover, a perusal of RA 9167 easily reveals that even with the removal of Secs. 13 and 14 of the law,
the remaining provisions can survive as they mandate other matters like a cinema evaluation system, an
incentive and reward system, and local and international film festivals and activities that “will promote the
growth and development of the local film industry and promote its participation in both domestic and foreign
markets,” and to “enhance the skills and expertise of Filipino talents.”[41]

Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.The exception to this is when the parts of
a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, in which
case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.[42]

Here, the constitutionality of the rest of the provisions of RA 9167 was never put in question. Too, nowhere
in the assailed judgment of the RTC was it explicated why the entire law was being declared as
unconstitutional.

It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case,[43] which the RTC, Branch 5 did when
it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional. This being the case, and in view of the elementary rule that every
statute is presumed valid,[44] the declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entirety of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional, is improper.

Amounts paid by Colon Heritage need not be returned

Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, the RTC, Branch 5, in Colon Heritage v.
FDCP, ordered the return of all amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of amusement
tax. Thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:

(1)

Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;

(2)

The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to respondent is ordered extinguished;

(3)

Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner, by way of amusement tax, plus the legal
rate of interest thereof, until the whole amount is paid in full.

As regards the refund, the Court cannot subscribe to this position.

It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. Applying this
principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the return of all the amounts remitted to FDCP and given
to the producers of graded films, by all of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions,
if not billions. In fact, just for Cebu City, the aggregate deficiency claimed by FDCP is ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY NINE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
EIGHT PESOS AND FIFTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P159,377,988.54). Again, this amount represents the
unpaid amounts to FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in only one covered city.

An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.[45]

In Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, the Court elucidated the meaning and scope of the operative fact doctrine,
viz:

The “operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a
legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must
be complied with, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, wherein
we ruled that:

Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government’s order of suspension, as we have no reason to
do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and
valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap
of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof.
Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative
fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private
respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.

The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further explicated by this Court in Rieta
v. People, thus:

Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was
invalid, as the law upon which it was predicated — General Order No. 60, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos — was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera, 33 to have no force
and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of
various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect acts done on a
presumption of their validity, the Court said:

“. . . In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

‘The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects
— with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is ‘an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’”

The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance
of “a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.” Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive
act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that
was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 — long before our Decision in Tañada and the arrest of
petitioner — is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored. (citations omitted;
emphasis in the original.)

Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2––an executive act––was declared invalid in the instant
case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.[46]

Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already received the amusement
tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts received to
the respective taxing authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial burden
upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case.
For these reasons, We are of the considered view that the application of the doctrine of operative facts in
the case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having complied with the legislative command in
RA 9167, and the producers of graded films who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision
for having produced top-quality films.

With respect to the amounts retained by the cinema proprietors due to petitioner FDCP, said proprietors
are required under the law to remit the same to petitioner. Obeisance to the rule of law must always be
protected and preserved at all times and the unjustified refusal of said proprietors cannot be tolerated. The
operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non-remittance by said proprietors since the law produced
legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Secs. 13 and 14 in these instant petitions. It can be
surmised, however, that the proprietors were at a loss whether or not to remit said amounts to FDCP
considering the position of the City of Cebu for them to remit the amusement taxes directly to the local
government. For this reason, the proprietors shall not be liable for surcharges.

In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, all amusement
taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of the finality of this decision shall remain legal and valid
under the operative fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this
decision shall be remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of finality. Thereafter, amusement
taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be remitted to the local governments.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
questioned Decision of the RTC, Branch 5 of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-35601 dated September 25,
2012 and that of the RTC, Branch 14, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 dated October 24, 2012,
collectively declaring Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 invalid and unconstitutional, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

As modified, the decisions of the lower courts shall read:

1. Civil Case No. CEB-35601 entitled Colon Heritage Realty Corp. v. Film Development Council of the
Philippines:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Colon Heritage Realty
Corp. and against the Film Development council of the Philippines, as follows:

Declaring Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 otherwise known as an Act Creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines, Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating Funds therefor
and for other purposes, as invalid and unconstitutional;

Declaring that the Film Development Council of the Philippines cannot collect under Sections 13 and 14 of
R.A. 9167 as of the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418;
Declaring that Colon Heritage Realty Corp. has the obligation to remit the amusement taxes withheld on
graded cinema films to FDCP under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for taxes due prior to the finality of
this Decision, without surcharges;

Declaring that upon the finality of this decision, all amusement taxes withheld and those which may be
collected by Colon Heritage Realty Corp. on graded films shown in its cinemas in Cebu City shall be remitted
to Cebu City pursuant to City Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI, Section 42.

2. Civil Case No. CEB-35529 entitled City of Cebu v. Film Development Council of the Philippines:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in favor of the City of Cebu against the
Film Development Council of the Philippines, as follows:

Declaring Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 otherwise known as an Act Creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines, Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating Funds therefor
and for other purposes, void and unconstitutional;

Declaring that the Film Development Council of the Philippines cannot collect under Sections 13 and 14 of
R.A. 9167 as of the finality of this Decision;

Declaring that Intervenor SM Cinema Corporation has the obligation to remit the amusement taxes, withheld
on graded cinema films to respondent FDCP under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for taxes due prior to
the finality of this Decision, without surcharges;

Declaring that after the finality of this Decision, all amusement taxes withheld and those which may be
collected by Intervenor SM on graded films shown in SM Cinemas in Cebu City shall be remitted to petitioner
Cebu City pursuant to City Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI, Section 42.

As to the sum of PhP 76,836,807.08 remitted by the Intervenor SM to petitioner City of Cebu, said amount
shall be remitted by the City of Cebu to petitioner FDCP within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision
in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418 without interests and surcharges.

Since Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 were declared void and unconstitutional, all remittances
of amusement taxes pursuant to said Sections 13 and 14 of said law prior to the date of finality of this
Decision shall remain valid and legal. Cinema proprietors who failed to remit said amusement taxes to
petitioner FDCP prior to the date of finality of this Decision are obliged to remit the same, without
surcharges, to petitioner FDCP under the doctrine of operative fact.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on official leave.

Leonen, J., see concurring opinion and on official leave. (on leave, left vote)

Jardeleza, J., no part.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 16, 2015 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which was received by this Office on July 16, 2015 at 1:50
p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)

FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA

Clerk of Court

19.

PERALTA, J.:

In law, as much as in life, there is need to find closure. Issues that have lingered and festered for so long
and which unnecessarily divide the people and slow the path to the future have to be interred. To move on
is not to forget the past. It is to focus on the present and the future, leaving behind what is better left for
history to ultimately decide. The Court finds guidance from the Constitution and the applicable laws, and in
the absence of clear prohibition against the exercise of discretion entrusted to the political branches of the
Government, the Court must not overextend its readings of what may only be seen as providing tenuous
connection to the issue before it.
Facts

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte)
publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon
of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacañan Palace.

On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General
Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:

Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB

Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016.

In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise to have
the remains of the late former President Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
kindly undertake all the necessary planning and preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and security requirements. Coordinate closely with the
Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the transport of the late former President's remains from
Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.

The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO since the LNMB is under its supervision and
administration. PVAO shall designate the focal person for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of
the event.

Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as possible.[1]

On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the following directives to
the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General:

SUBJECT: Funeral Honors and Service

TO: Commanding General, Philippine Army

Headquarters, Philippine Army

 Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City

Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff for RRA, G9

Pursuant to paragraph 2b, SOP Number 8, GHQ, AFP dated 14 July 1992, provide services, honors and
other courtesies for the late Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as indicated:

[x] Vigil - Provide vigil-

[x] Bugler/Drummer

[x] Firing Party

[x] Military Host/Pallbearers

[x] Escort and Transportation

[x] Arrival/Departure Honors

His remains lie in state at Ilocos Norte

Interment will take place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ft. Bonifacio, Taguig City. Date: TBAL.

Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a President

POC: Administrator, PVAO BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VISAYA[2]

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[3] filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,[4] in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention[5] filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son,[6] as members of
the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.[7]
3. Petition for Prohibition[8] filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member
of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced
disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others,[9]
in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition[10] filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission
on Human Rights, and several others,[11] suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations
during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[12] filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others,[13] as concerned
Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[14] filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others,[15] as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[16] filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional
Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the
Moro[17] who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[18] filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

Issues

Procedural

1. Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a
justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts.

Substantive

1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign
promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB.

2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws, particularly:

(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Section 17 of Article VII, Section
1 of Article XI, Section 3(2) of Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution;

(b) R.A. No. 289;

(c) R.A. No. 10368;

(d) AFP Regulation G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000;

(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(f) The "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" of
the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly; and

(g) The "Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity" of the U.N. Economic and Social Council;
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies,
and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and
former President to interment at the LNMB.

4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President
Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred
in the Philippines.

Opinion

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural Grounds

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.[19] In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.[20]

An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.[21] There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.[22] Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite
of "ripeness," which means that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.[23] Moreover, the limitation on the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.[24] Those areas pertain to questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.[25] As
they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure,[26] political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. However, the
scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers
under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted
for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave
abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question,[27] locus standi requires that a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[28] Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.[29] Petitioners, who filed their
respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights
violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[30] In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the
wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws
or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al.,[31] as members of the Bar, are required to allege any direct or potential injury
which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence
of the act complained of.[32] Suffice it to state that the averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to
disclose such injury, and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that
their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal
standing.[33]
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[34] In
cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence.[35] In Marcos v. Manglapus,[36] the majority opinion observed that
the subject controversy was of grave national importance, and that the Court's decision would have a
profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of national life. The ponencia explained that
the case was in a class by itself, unique and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator forced
out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country
and who, within the short space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the Philippines to die.

At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military
cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and
thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear
and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of petitioners decry re-
traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners'
argument is founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by law to
perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be
discussed further, reveals its nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine, under
the administration of the AFP.

Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator De Lima, and Congressman
Lagman, et al.[37] come before the Court as legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect
appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury
to their person or the institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot
be upheld.[38] They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum
of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.[39]

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes available.[40] If resort
to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.[41] For reasons of comity and
convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.[42] While there are exceptions[43] to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners
should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct
himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions
on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion,
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate
the matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the Department of
National Defense (DND).[44]

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases,[45] which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be
filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve
questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven
necessary.

In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone. Even if We decide the case
based on the merits, the petitions should still be denied.

Substantive Grounds

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.[46] None is present in this case.

The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of
not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." For them, the
ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism." To support
their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2,[47] 11,[48] 13,[49] 23,[50] 26,[51] 27[52] and 28[53] of Article II,
Sec. 17 of Art. VII,[54] Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV,[55] Sec. 1 of Art. XI,[56] and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII[57] of the
Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of
our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara[58] already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing.
Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart
of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente
Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self- executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not "self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them x x x.

xxx

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making."[59]

In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self--executing provision considering that a
law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As
a matter of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees"), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of 1989"), R.A. No.
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and Republic Act No. 9485 ("Anti--Red Tape
Act of 2007"). To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda,
and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing
and reporting; and client feedback program.

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced.
Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of
patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision
on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect
to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987,[60]
is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her
department.[61] Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law.[62] The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions.[63] It is best
construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.[64] The provision simply underscores
the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged
to obey and execute them.[65]

Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos
at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws
cited by petitioners.

A. On R.A. No. 289[66]

For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of
generations still unborn, R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial
place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots.[67] It also
provided for the creation of a Board on National Pantheon to implement the law.[68]

On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site of the National Pantheon at East Avenue,
Quezon City.[69] On December 23, 1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally "withdraw from sale
or settlement and reserve as a site for the construction of the National Pantheon a certain parcel of land
located in Quezon City." However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42
revoking Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953, and reserving the parcels of land embraced
therein for national park purposes to be known as Quezon Memorial Park.
It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a person's mortal remains
may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the law and should
not violate its spirit and intent. Petitioners claim that it is known, both here and abroad, that Marcos' acts
and deed - the gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of government coffers,
and his military record that is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies - are neither worthy of
perpetuation in our memory nor serve as a source of inspiration and emulation of the present and future
generations. They maintain that public respondents are not members of the Board on National Pantheon,
which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.

Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to
provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one
and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place
envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431,
which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered
by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress
has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National
Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and
patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery, the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally distinguished
private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but without cost to the limited funds of the government.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail. To apply
the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of
public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting
therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is
based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares
the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal
remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually
a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to
confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without
showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is
speculative until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

B. On R.A. No. 10368[70]

For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos'
burial at the LNMB because the legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily
declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human
Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs)[71] under his regime. They insist that the intended act of public
respondents damages and makes mockery of the mandatory teaching of Martial Law atrocities and of the
lives and sacrifices of its victims. They contend that "reparation" under R.A. No. 10368 is non-judicial in
nature but a political action of the State through the Legislative and Executive branches by providing
administrative relief for the compensation, recognition, and memorialization of human rights victims.
We beg to disagree.

Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of
summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights
violations committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. To restore their honor and dignity,
the State acknowledges its moral and legal obligation[72] to provide reparation to said victims and/or their
families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they experienced.

In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs, which is part of the right to an effective remedy,
R.A. No. 10368 entitles them to monetary and non-monetary reparation. Any HRVV qualified under the
law[73] shall receive a monetary reparation, which is tax-free and without prejudice to the receipt of any
other sum from any other person or entity in any case involving human rights violations.[74] Anent the non-
monetary reparation, the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies are
required to render the necessary services for the HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by
the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board (Board) pursuant to the provisions of the law.[75]

Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the violations committed against the HRVVs,
regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not. This is manifested by enshrining their names in
the Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims (Roll) prepared by the Board.[76] The Roll may be displayed
in government agencies designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission (Commission).[77] Also, a
Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established and a compendium of their sacrifices shall be prepared and
may be readily viewed and accessed in the internet.[78] The Commission is created primarily for the
establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the Memorial/Museum/
Library/Compendium.[79]

To memorialize[80] the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10368 further
mandates that: (1) the database prepared by the Board derived from the processing of claims shall be
turned over to the Commission for archival purposes, and made accessible for the promotion of human
rights to all government agencies and instrumentalities in order to prevent recurrence of similar abuses,
encourage continuing reforms and contribute to ending impunity;[81] (2) the lessons learned from Martial
Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs shall be included in the basic and higher education
curricula, as well as in continuing adult learning, prioritizing those most prone to commit human rights
violations;[82] and (3) the Commission shall publish only those stories of HRVVs who have given prior
informed consent.[83]

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not
exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law
beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily
inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the HRVVs,
but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law
what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by
supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be
impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do
not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More
importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic
laws are not curtailed. It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether
express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375:

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect
a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be
made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There
must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute
must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. x x x[84]

C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to "full" and
"effective" reparation, which is provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),[85] the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law[86] adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles
for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity[87] dated February
8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

We do not think so. The ICCPR,[88] as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity,
call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for
administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that are
necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws. The
U.N. principles on reparation expressly states:

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or
domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms[.][Emphasis supplied]

The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When the Filipinos regained their
democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986,
the three branches of the government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's
human rights obligations, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect human rights and social justice.

As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo,[89] and habeas data,[90] the
Supreme Court promulgated on March 1, 2007 Administrative Order No. 25-2007,[91] which provides rules
on cases involving extra-judicial killings of political ideologists and members of the media. The provision of
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the prevention of the victim's re-traumatization applies in the course
of legal and administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.[92]

On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of administrative and executive orders. Notable of
which are the following:

A.O. No. 370 dated December 10, 1997 (Creating the Inter--Agency Coordinating Committee on Human
Rights)

E.O. No. 118 dated July 5, 1999 (Providing for the Creation of a National Committee on the Culture of
Peace)

E.O. No. 134 dated July 31, 1999 (Declaring August 12, 1999 and Every 12th Day of August Thereafter as
International Humanitarian Law Day)

E.O. No. 404 dated January 24, 2005 (Creating the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Monitoring Committee [GRP-MC] on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law)

A.O. No. 157 dated August 21, 2006 (Creating an Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist
Killings)

A.O. No. 163 dated December 8, 2006 (Strengthening and Increasing the Membership of the Presidential
Human Rights Committee, and Expanding Further the Functions of Said Committee)[93]

A.O. No. 181 dated July 3, 2007 (Directing the Cooperation and Coordination Between the National
Prosecution Service and Other Concerned Agencies of Government for the Successful Investigation and
Prosecution of Political and Media Killings)
A.O. No. 197 dated September 25, 2007 (DND and AFP Coordination with PHRC Sub-committee on Killings
and Disappearances)

A.O. No. 211 dated November 26, 2007 (Creating a Task Force Against Political Violence)

A.O. No. 249 dated December 10, 2008 (Further Strengthening Government Policies, Plans, and Programs
for the Effective Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

E.O. No. 847 dated November 23, 2009 (Creating the Church-Police-Military-Liaison Committee to
Formulate and Implement a Comprehensive Program to Establish Strong Partnership Between the State
and the Church on Matters Concerning Peace and Order and Human Rights)

A.O. No. 35 dated November 22, 2012 (Creating the Inter--Agency Committee on Extra-Legal Killings,
Enforced Disappearances, Torture and Other Grave Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of
Persons)

A.O. No. 1 dated October 11, 2016 (Creating the Presidential Task Force on Violations of the Right to Life,
Liberty and Security of the Members of the Media)

Finally, the Congress passed the following laws affecting human rights:

Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodia/Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof)

Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997)

Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of 2002)

Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)

Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004)
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)

Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007)

Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women)

Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)

Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity)

Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010)

Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012)

Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012)

Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking In Persons Act of 2012)

Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation And Recognition Act of 2013)

Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of 2013)

Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of
President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners
admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and
minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board
and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVVs, the National Historical Commission
of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHI),[94] is mandated to act
as the primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters
relating to official Philippine history.[95] Among others, it is tasked to: (a) conduct and support all kinds of
research relating to Philippine national and local history; (b) develop educational materials in various media,
implement historical educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history, and disseminate,
information regarding Philippine historical events, dates, places and personages; and (c) actively engage
in the settlement or resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and
events.[96] Under R.A. Nos. 10066 (National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009)[97] and 10086 (Strengthening
Peoples' Nationalism Through Philippine History Act),[98] the declared State policy is to conserve, develop,
promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources.[99] Towards this end,
means shall be provided to strengthen people's nationalism, love of country, respect for its heroes and pride
for the people's accomplishments by reinforcing the importance of Philippine national and local history in
daily life with the end in view of raising social consciousness.[100] Utmost priority shall be given not only
with the research on history but also its popularization.[101]

II.

The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out
of malice, ill will or personal bias

Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will desecrate it as a sacred and hallowed
place and a revered national shrine where the mortal remains of our country's great men and women are
interred for the inspiration and emulation of the present generation and generations to come. They erred.

A. National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or historical shrines) refer to
sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP.[102] The
national shrines created by law and presidential issuance include, among others: Fort Santiago (Dambana
ng Kalayaan) in Manila;[103] all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan;[104] the site of First Mass in
the Philippines in Magallanes, Limasawa, Leyte;[105] Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom Shrine in Kawit,
Cavite;[106] Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine in Malate, Manila;[107] Tirad Pass National Shrine in
Ilocos Sur;[108] Ricarte Shrine[109] and Aglipay Shrine[110] in Batac, Ilocos Norte; Liberty Shrine in Lapu-
Lapu, Cebu;[111] "Red Beach" or the landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces
in Baras, Palo, Leyte;[112] Dapitan City as a National Shrine City in Zamboanga Del Norte;[113] General
Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine in Hamtic, Antique;[114] and Mabini Shrine in Polytechnic University
of the Philippines - Mabini Campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila.[115] As sites of the birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold and
keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.[116] P.O. No. 105[117] strictly prohibits and
punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the desecration of national shrines by disturbing their peace and
serenity through digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and committing unbecoming
acts within their premises. R.A. No. 10066 also makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or destroy
the original features of, or undertake construction or real estate development in any national shrine,
monument, landmark and other historic edifices and structures, declared, classified, and marked by the
NHCP as such, without the prior written permission from the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCAA).[118]

As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA,[119] the NHCP manages, maintains and administers
national shrines, monuments, historical sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural
value.[120] In particular, the NHCP Board has the power to approve the declaration of historic structures
and sites, such as national shrines, monuments, landmarks and heritage houses and to determine the
manner of their identification, maintenance, restoration, conservation, preservation and protection.[121]

Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and battle monuments
declared as national shrines, which have been under the administration, maintenance and development of
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND. Among the military shrines are: Mt. Samat
National Shrine in Pilar, Bataan;[122] Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan, Ifugao;[123] Capas
National Shrine in Capas, Tarlac;[124] Ricarte National Shrine in Malasin, Batac, Ilocos Norte;[125]
Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine in Jaro, Iloilo;[126] Balete Pass National Shrine in Sta. Fe,
Nueva Vizcaya;[127] USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park in Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur;[128]
and the LNMB in Taguig City, Metro Manila.[129]

B. The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani

At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning for the death of thousands of Filipinos.
Several places served as grounds for the war dead, such as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the Bataan
Memorial Cemetery, and other places throughout the country. The Republic Memorial Cemetery, in
particular, was established in May 1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of Filipino military
personnel who died in World War II.

On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which ordered "the remains
of the war dead interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province, and at other places in the
Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley,
Rizal Province" so as to minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and to make the remains
accessible to the widows, parents, children, relatives, and friends.

On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 86, which changed the name of
Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan Ng Mga Bayani to symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers
have died" and to "truly express the nations esteem and reverence for her war dead."[130]
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, which reserved for military
purposes, under the administration of the AFP Chief of Staff, the land where LNMB is located. The LNMB
was part of a military reservation site then known as Fort Wm McKinley (now known as Fort Andres
Bonifacio).

On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio
military reservation and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the administration of the
National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.

On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as the AFP Commander-in-Chief, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September
22, 1972, as amended, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 which reorganized the Executive Branch
of the National Government through the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP). Section 7,
Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII thereof abolished the NSC and its functions together with applicable
appropriations, records, equipment, property and such personnel as may be necessary were transferred to
the NHI under the Department of Education (DEC). The NHI was responsible for promoting and preserving
the Philippine cultural heritage by undertaking, inter alia, studies on Philippine history and national heroes
and maintaining national shrines and monuments.[131]

Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the administration, maintenance and
development of national shrines tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.

On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of
the IRP was repealed on the grounds that "the administration, maintenance and development of national
shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they
are removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter s greater capabilities and
resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely related and relevant to the charter or
significance of said national shrines." Henceforth, the PVAO through the Military Shrines Service (MSS),
which was created to perform the functions of the abolished NSC - would administer, maintain and develop
military memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.

On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the Administrative Code. The Code retains PVAO
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense.[132] Among others, PVAO shall
administer, develop and maintain military shrines.[133] With the approval of PVAO Rationalization Plan on
June 29, 2010, pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was renamed to Veterans Memorial
and Historical Division, under the supervision and control of PVAO, which is presently tasked with the
management and development of military shrines and the perpetuation of the heroic deeds of our nation's
veterans.

As a national military shrine, the main features, structures, and facilities of the LNMB are as follows:
Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers - The main structure constructed at the center of the cemetery where wreath
laying ceremonies are held when Philippine government officials and foreign dignitaries visit the LNMB.
The following inscription is found on the tomb: "Here lies a Filipino soldier whose name is known only to
God." Behind the tomb are three marble pillars representing the three main island groups of the Philippines
- Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Buried here were the remains of 39,000 Filipino soldiers who were
originally buried in Camp O'Donnell Concentration Camp and Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila.

Heroes Memorial Gate - A structure shaped in the form of a large concrete tripod with a stairway leading to
an upper view deck and a metal sculpture at the center. This is the first imposing structure one sees upon
entering the grounds of the cemetery complex.

Black Stone Walls - Erected on opposite sides of the main entrance road leading to the Tomb of the
Unknown Soldiers and just near the Heroes Memorial are two 12-foot high black stone walls which bear
the words, "I do not know the dignity of his birth, but I do know the glory of his death." that General Douglas
MacArthur made during his sentimental journey to the Philippines in 1961.

Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Pylon - Inaugurated on April 5, 1977 by Secretary Renato
S. De Villa in memory of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor during World War II. This monument is
dedicated as an eternal acknowledgment of their valor and sacrifice in defense of the Philippines.

Korean Memorial Pylon - A towering monument honoring the 112 Filipino officers and men who, as
members of the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), perished during the Korean War.

Vietnam Veterans Memorial Pylon - Dedicated to the members of the Philippine contingents and Philippine
civic action groups to Vietnam (PHILCON--V and PHILCAG-V) who served as medical, dental, engineering
construction, community and psychological workers, and security complement. They offered tremendous
sacrifices as they alleviated human suffering in war-ravaged Vietnam from 1964-1971. Inscribed on the
memorial pylon are the words: "To build and not to destroy, to bring the Vietnamese people happiness and
not sorrow, to develop goodwill and not hatred."

Philippine World War II Guerillas Pylon - Erected by the Veterans Federation of the Philippines as a
testimony to the indomitable spirit and bravery of the Filipino guerillas of World War II who refused to be
cowed into submission and carried on the fight for freedom against an enemy with vastly superior arms and
under almost insurmountable odds. Their hardship and sufferings, as well as their defeats and victories,
are enshrined in this memorial.[134]

Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105[135] does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208
predated P.D. No. 105,[136] the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in
the latter.[137] The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which
may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:
(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.

(2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,[138] the LNMB is not a site
"of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation." What P.D.
No. 105 contemplates are the following national shrines: Fort Santiago ("Dambana ng Kalayaan"), all
battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan, the site of First Mass in the Philippines, Aguinaldo Shrine or
Freedom Shrine, Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine, Tirad Pass National Shrine, Ricarte Shrine,
Aglipay Shrine, Liberty Shrine, "Red Beach" or the landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and the
liberating forces, Dapitan City, General Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine, and Mabini Shrine. Excluded
are the military memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines under the PVAO, such as:
Mt. Samat National Shrine, Kiangan War Memorial Shrine, Capas National Shrine, Ricarte National Shrine,
Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine, Balete Pass National Shrine; USAFIP, NL Military Shrine
and Park, and the LNMB.

(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. While
P.D. No. 1 dated September 24, 1972 transferred the administration, maintenance and development of
national shrines to the NHI under the DEC, it never actually materialized. Pending the organization of the
DEC, its functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.
Eventually, on January 26, 1977, Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. The PVAO, through the MSS, was tasked
to administer, maintain, and develop military memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national
shrines. The reasons being that "the administration, maintenance and development of national shrines
consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they are
removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter's greater capabilities and
resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely related and relevant to the charter or
significance of said national shrines."

The foregoing interpretation is neither narrow and myopic nor downright error. Instead, it is consistent with
the letter and intent of P.D. No. 105.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB
as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the
LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the
presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The
"nations esteem and reverence for her war dead," as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in
issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore,
does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
military shrine.

At this juncture, reference should be made to Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), which is identical to
the LNMB in terms of its prominence in the U.S. It is not amiss to point that our armed forces have been
patterned after the U.S. and that its military code produced a salutary effect in the Philippines' military justice
system.[139] Hence, relevant military rules, regulations, and practices of the U.S. have persuasive, if not
the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries,[140] the Arlington is under the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Army.[141] The Secretary of the U.S. Army has the responsibility to develop, operate,
manage, administer, oversee, and fund the Army national military cemeteries in a manner and to standards
that fully honor the service and sacrifices of the deceased members of the armed forces buried or inurned
therein, and shall prescribe such regulations and policies as may be necessary to administer the
cemeteries.[142] In addition, the Secretary of the U.S. Army is empowered to appoint an advisory
committee, which shall make periodic reports and recommendations as well as advise the Secretary with
respect to the administration of the cemetery, the erection of memorials at the cemetery, and master
planning for the cemetery.[143]

Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are established as national shrines in tribute to the
gallant dead who have served in the U.S. Armed Forces.[144] The areas are protected, managed and
administered as suitable and dignified burial grounds and as significant cultural resources.[145] As such,
the authorization of activities that take place therein is limited to those that are consistent with applicable
legislation and that are compatible with maintaining their solemn commemorative and historic
character.[146]

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to
administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The
DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of
the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.[147] This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement[148] between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos
interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political
agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on
informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for
specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.[149] At
present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located
from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB
for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief,[150] a legislator,[151] a Secretary of National
Defense,[152] a military personnel,[153] a veteran,[154] and a Medal of Valor awardee,[155] whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The
disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him
for valuable public services rendered.[156] Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos'
remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation
that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang
na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident,
petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this
Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

C. AFP Regulations on the LNMB

A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as to who may and may not be interred at the
LNMB underscores the nature and purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/grave site.

On May 13, 1947, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, by the direction of the President and by order
of the Secretary of National Defense, issued General Orders No. 111, which constituted and activated, as
of said date, the Graves Registration Platoon as a unit of the Philippine Army.

On February 2, 1960, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP
Regulations G 161-371 (Administrative and Special Staff Services, Grave Registration Service), which
provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) World War II dead of the AFP and recognized
guerillas; (b) Current dead of the AFP; (c) Retired military personnel of the AFP; (d) Remains of former
members of the AFP who died while in the active service and in the Retired List of the AFP now interred at
different cemeteries and other places throughout the Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense; and
(e) Others upon approval of the Congress of the Philippines, the President of the Philippines or the
Secretary of National Defense. The regulation also stated that the AFP Quartermaster General will be
responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation of the Graves Registration Service; the
interment, disinterment and reinterment of the dead mentioned above; and preservation of military
cemeteries, national cemeteries, and memorials.

On July 31, 1973, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP
Regulations G 161-372 (Administration and Operation of AFP Graves Registration Installations), which
superseded AFP Regulations G 161-371. It provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a)
Deceased Veterans of the Philippine Revolution of 1896/World War I; (b) Deceased World War II members
of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (c) Deceased military personnel of the AFP who died while in the
active duty; (d) Deceased retired military personnel of the AFP; (e) Deceased military personnel of the AFP
interred at different cemeteries and other places outside the LNMB; and (f) Such remains of persons as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP may direct. The remains of the following were not allowed to be interred
in the LNMB: (a) The spouse of an active, or retired, deceased military personnel, recognized guerillas who
himself/herself is not a military personnel; and (b) AFP personnel who were retireable but
separated/reverted/discharged for cause, or joined and aided the enemy of the Republic of the Philippines,
or were convicted of capital or other criminal offenses, involving moral turpitude. The regulation also stated
that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation of the
AFP graves registration installations; the interment, disinterment and reinterment of deceased military
personnel mentioned above; and the preservation of military cemeteries, proper marking and official
recording of graves therein.
On April 9, 1986, AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, by order of National Defense Minister, issued AFP
Regulations G 161-373 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded
AFP Regulations G 161-372. It enumerated a list of deceased person who may be interred at the LNMB,
namely: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Ministers of
National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired
military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1896, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; and (h) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artist and other deceased persons whose
interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Batasang Pambansa or the
Minister of National Defense. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster General shall be
responsible for the allocation of specific section/areas for the said deceased persons, while the
Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Company shall be charged with the
preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials at LNMB and the registration of graves.

On March 27, 1998, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP
Regulations G 161-374 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded
AFP Regulations G 161-373. It provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP; (g)
Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (h) Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has
been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense; and (i) Former
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, CSAFP, Generals/Flag Officers, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National
Artists, widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. The remains of
the following were not allowed to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude. Like AFP Regulations G 161-373, it stated that the
Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the allocation of specific section/areas for the deceased
persons, whereas the Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit shall be charged
with the preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials, and the registration of graves.

Finally, on September 11, 2000, the AFP Chief of Staff, by the order of the Secretary of National Defense,
issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which
superseded AFP Regulations G 161-374. The regulation stated that the Chief of Staff shall be responsible
for the issuance of interment directive for all active military personnel for interment, authorized personnel
(such as those former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the Philippine Coast Guard
[PCG] and the Philippine National Police [PNP]), and retirees, veterans and reservists enumerated therein.
The Quartermaster General is tasked to exercise over-all supervision in the implementation of the regulation
and the Commander ASCOM, PA through the Commanding Officer of Grave Services Unit is charged with
the registration of the deceased/graves, the allocation of specific section/area at the LNMB for interment of
deceased, the preparation of grave sites, and the supervision of burials.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to
include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary
(CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who
laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII
and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar
to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel
who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who
were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains
to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB.
Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must,
therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the
Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

x x x In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency and its limit in this wise:

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)[157]

It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law
and, until set aside, is binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President as the
chief executor of laws.[158]

1. Qualification under the AFP Regulations

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing
that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither
could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards
for qualification for burial at the LNMB.

To compare, We again refer to the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington. In the U.S., the Secretary of the
Army, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, determines eligibility for interment or inurnment in the
Army national military cemeteries.[159] Effective October 26, 2016, the rule[160] is as follows:
Only those who qualify as a primarily eligible person or a derivatively eligible person are eligible for
interment in Arlington National Cemetery, unless otherwise prohibited as provided for in §§ 553.19[161]-
553.20,[162] provided that the last period of active duty of the service member or veteran ended with an
honorable discharge.

(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons for purposes of interment:

(1) Any service member who dies on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces (except those service members
serving on active duty for training only), if the General Courts Martial Convening Authority grants a
certificate of honorable service.

(2) Any veteran retired from a Reserve component who served a period of active duty (other than for
training), is carried on the official retired list, and is entitled to receive military retired pay.

(3) Any veteran retired from active military service and entitled to receive military retired pay.

(4) Any veteran who received an honorable discharge from the Armed Forces prior to October 1, 1949, who
was discharged for a permanent physical disability, who served on active duty (other than for training), and
who would have been eligible for retirement under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1201 had the statute been
in effect on the date of separation.

(5) Any veteran awarded one of the following decorations:

(i) Medal of Honor;[163]

(ii) Distinguished Service Cross, Air Force Cross, or Navy Cross;

(iii) Distinguished Service Medal;

(iv) Silver Star; or

(v) Purple Heart.

(6) Any veteran who served on active duty (other than active duty for training) and who held any of the
following positions:

(i) President or Vice President of the United States;

(ii) Elected member of the U.S. Congress;

(iii) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States;

(iv) A position listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5 U.S.C. 5312[164] or 5313[165] (Levels I
and II of the Executive Schedule); or

(v) Chief of Mission of a Category 4, 5, or post if the Department of State classified that post as a Category
4, 5, or 5+ post during the person's tenure as Chief of Mission.

(7) Any former prisoner of war who, while a prisoner of war, served honorably in the active military service,
and who died on or after November 30, 1993.

(b) Derivatively eligible persons. The following individuals are derivatively eligible persons for purposes of
interment who may be interred if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible person:

(1) The spouse of a primarily eligible person who is or will be interred in Arlington National Cemetery. A
former spouse of a primarily eligible person is not eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery under
this paragraph.

(2) The spouse of an active duty service member or an eligible veteran, who was:
(i) Lost or buried at sea, temporarily interred overseas due to action by the Government, or officially
determined to be missing in action;

(ii) Buried in a U.S. military cemetery maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission; or

(iii) Interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial (the derivatively eligible spouse may
not be buried in the group burial gravesite).

(3) The parents of a minor child or a permanently dependent adult child, whose remains were interred in
Arlington National Cemetery based on the eligibility of a parent at the time of the child's death, unless
eligibility of the non-service connected parent is lost through divorce from the primarily eligible parent.

(4) An honorably discharged veteran who does not qualify as a primarily eligible person, if the veteran will
be buried in the same gravesite as an already interred primarily eligible person who is a close relative,
where the interment meets the following conditions:

(i) The veteran is without minor or unmarried adult dependent children;

(ii) The veteran will not occupy space reserved for the spouse, a minor child, or a permanently dependent
adult child;

(iii) All other close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur with the interment of the veteran with the
primarily eligible person by signing a notarized statement;

(iv) The veteran's spouse waives any entitlement to interment in Arlington National Cemetery, where such
entitlement might be based on the veteran's interment in Arlington National Cemetery. The Executive
Director may set aside the spouse's waiver, provided space is available in the same gravesite, and all close
relatives of the primarily eligible person concur;

(v) Any cost of moving, recasketing, or revaulting the remains will be paid from private funds.
There is a separate list of eligible with respect to the inurnment of cremated remains in the
Columbarium,[166] interment of cremated remains in the Unmarked Area,[167] and group burial.[168] As a
national military cemetery, eligibility standards for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in Arlington are
based on honorable military service.[169] Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves, which are
rarely granted, are for those persons who have made significant contributions that directly and substantially
benefited the U.S. military.[170]

Judging from the foregoing, it is glaring that the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington and the AFP Regulations
G 161-375 on the LNMB, as a general rule, recognize and reward the military services or military related
activities of the deceased. Compared with the latter, however, the former is actually less generous in
granting the privilege of interment since only the spouse or parent, under certain conditions, may be allowed
"if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible person."

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani"
in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a
national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military
cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB,
both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the
title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege
of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible includes
not only those who rendered active military service or military-related activities but also non-military
personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense).
In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added
to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted
in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at
bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related
activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his
alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and
Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions
he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be
viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either.
Certainly, just a human who erred like us.

Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee and a veteran. R.A. No. 9049[171]
declares the policy of the State "to consistently honor its military heroes in order to strengthen the patriotic
spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military."[172] For the "supreme self--sacrifice and distinctive
acts of heroism and gallantry,"[173] a Medal of Valor awardee or his/her dependents/heirs/beneficiaries are
entitled to the following social services and financial rewards:
Tax-exempt lifetime monthly gratuity of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which is separate and
distinct from any salary or pension that the awardee currently receives or will receive from the government
of the Philippines;[174]

Precedence in employment in government agencies or government-owned or controlled corporation, if the

job qualifications or requirements are met;

Priority in the approval of the awardee's housing application under existing housing programs of the
government;

Priority in the acquisition of public lands under the Public Land Act and preferential right in the lease of
pasture lands and exploitation of natural resources;

Privilege of obtaining loans in an aggregate amount not exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) from government-owned or controlled financial institutions without having to put up any
collateral or constitute any pledge or mortgage to secure the payment of the loan;

Twenty (20%) percent discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services,
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, recreation and sport centers and purchase of
medicine anywhere in the country;

Twenty (20%) percent discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls,
circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement;

Free medical and dental services and consultation in hospital and clinics anywhere in the country;

Exemption from the payment of tuition and matriculation fees in public or private schools, universities,
colleges and other educational institutions in any pre-school, baccalaureate or post- graduate courses such
as or including course leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine (MD), Bachelor of Laws (LLB), and
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) or allied and similar courses; and

If interested and qualified, a quota is given to join the cadet corps of the Philippine Military Academy or
otherwise priority for direct commission, call to active duty (CAD) and/or enlistment in regular force of the
AFP.
On the other hand, in recognizing their patriotic services in times of war and peace for the cause of freedom
and democracy; for the attainment of national unity, independence, and socioeconomic advancement; and
for the maintenance of peace and order,[175] R.A. No. 6948, as amended,[176] grants our veterans[177]
and their dependents or survivors with pension (old age, disability, total administrative disability, and death)
and non-pension (burial, education, hospitalization, and medical care and treatment) benefits as well as
provisions from the local governments. Under the law, the benefits may be withheld if the Commission on
Human Rights certifies to the AFP General Headquarters that the veteran has been found guilty by final
judgment of a gross human rights violation while in the service, but this factor shall not be considered taken
against his next of kin.[178]

2. Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in
AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral
turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the AFP regulations disregards historical
context and the rule on statutory construction. They urge the Court to construe statutes not literally but
according to their spirit and reason.

It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights violations,
massive graft and corruption, and dubious military records, as found by foreign and local courts as well as
administrative agencies. By going into exile, he deliberately evaded liability for his actions. And by allowing
death to overtake him, he inevitably escaped the prospect of facing accountability for his crimes. They also
contend that his removal in the 1986 popular uprising is a clear sign of his discharge from the AFP. The
People Power Revolution was the direct exercise of the Filipinos' power to overthrow an illegitimate and
oppressive regime. As a sovereign act, it necessarily includes the power to adjudge him as dishonorably
discharged from the AFP.

Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 only to soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an additional
cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results (because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged
would be disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos). Also, the AFP
regulations would place Marcos in the same class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a
class of his own, sui generis. The other Presidents were never removed by People Power Revolution and
were never subject of laws declaring them to have committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended
burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently situated.

Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final
judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presum innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf."[179] Even the
U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity cited by petitioners unequivocally guarantee the rights
of the accused, providing that:

XIII. Rights of others

27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally or nationally protected
rights of others, in particular the right of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due
process.

xxx

PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED

Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals concerned shall be entitled to the
following guarantees:

(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating individuals before they are named
publicly;

(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide a statement setting forth their
version of the facts either at a hearing convened by the commission while conducting its investigation or
through submission of a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the commission's file.

To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital crime (i.e., a crime which
a sentence of imprisonment for life or death penalty may be imposed) but who has not been convicted by
reason of not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution, may be ineligible for
interment, inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military cemetery. Nevertheless, such
ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in § 553.21.[180]

The various cases cited by petitiOners, which were decided with finality by courts here and abroad, have
no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral
turpitude.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard because
even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be
interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander--in-Chief, the Congress
or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is
not legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not met.[181]
In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former President.
The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War[182] attach only to the members of the
military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried
at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President
is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national
shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held
by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a
retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was
dishonorably discharged from military service under AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative
Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of
War.[183] The NHCP study[184] is incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite
and include the official records of the AFP.

With respect to the phrase "[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service," the same should be viewed in light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G 161-375 to
the term "active service" which is "[s]ervice rendered by a military person as a Commissioned Officer,
enlisted man/woman, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
service rendered by him/her as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date
of his/her separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for which military and/or civilian
service he/she shall have received pay from the Philippine Government, and/or such others as may be
hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638, as amended)."[185] To my mind, the word
"service" should be construed as that rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from
the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her
separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP
is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.
The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only
enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who
may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act
of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.
It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called
EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal
meaning other than its obvious consequence- that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead
the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or
theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine
the exact implications or significance of the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the
number of participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in
political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its
recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and
confusing messages from the actions of the people.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check
and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's discretion is not
totally unfettered. "Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is
reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but
'canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.'"[186] At bar, President Duterte, through the public
respondents, acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights
advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place
at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available
at any stage of a person's development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she
leaves this earth.[187]

There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do
so much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the
people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the
passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must mov'e on and let this issue rest.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo
Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.

Sereno, C. J., See dissenting opinion.

Carpio, J., See dissenting opinion.

Velasco, Jr.,** J., I concur in the ponencia as also in the opinion of Justice Mendoza.

Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the ponencia and separate opinion of Justice Mendoza.

Brion, J., with separate concurring opinion.

Bersamin, J., See separate opinion.

Del Castillo, J., I join the separate opinion.

Perez, J., See separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., See separate opinion.

Reyes, J., Inhibited/no part.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the separate opinion of J. Mendoza.

Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.

Jardeleza, J., I join dissent of J. Caguioa.

Caguioa, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on November 8, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which was received by this Office on
November 10, 2016 at 5:15 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA

Clerk of Court
20.

JULY 22, 2016 BY EMIR MENDOZA

CASE DIGEST: Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]

QUICK LINKS:

Full text of the Decision (Bersamin, J.)

Dissenting opinions:

Sereno, C.J.

Leonen, J.

Concurring and dissenting: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659)

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas.

The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and penalized under Section
2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3)
former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the
Board of Directors Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two
former officials of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The information read:

…[the] accused…all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or
a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence
Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, · and converting,
misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the
aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for
their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO’s accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers
and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW

The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused, including petitioners. All
filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted except those of the petitioners. Their motions for
reconsideration were denied. GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court.
However, this remains unresolved.

After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting
that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the accused within its
jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was sufficient evidence showing that they
had conspired to commit plunder.

Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the
denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers
to evidence – YES.

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer
to evidence.

HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying GMA’s
demurrer to evidence.

General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory
order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides, “the order denying the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.”

Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial” (citing Ong v. People [G.R.
No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in denying GMA’s demurrer that
GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege
the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior
to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate
because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
“The gravamen of the conspiracy charge…is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or
for former President Estrada.”

Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such
identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly
informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause against
the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an implied conspiracy
among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. The sole overt act of GMA to become
a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the requests made by Uriarte
for the use of additional intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests in that manner, GMA violated the
following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs)
to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if
there was an existing budget to cover the request.
HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design to raid
the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent the specific
allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s
requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests,
similarly worded, furnished:

(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;

(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and

(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.

The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the integrity of its operations.
According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to how specific the requests should
be made.

b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only
15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the
remaining 85% of PCSO’s revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the
additional requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for
CIFs.

PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the
amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO.

HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions
of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA
under those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations.
This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue (compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo [G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011]).

B. As regards Aguas

HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA’s
participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the additional
CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied
conspiracy to commit plunder.

3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder
– NO.

A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of
not less than P50 million – NO.

HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that
matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired illgotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information was proved by the
Prosecution – NO.

SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the Prosecution need
not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving
that the public officer had raided the public coffers.

HELD: The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 together
(misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds) is that the public officer used the
property taken. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider
to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.