I.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LGU
A. Spanish Era
1. Harty vs Mun. of Victoria, March 13, 1909
In answering the question that has arisen between the contending parties and consists only
in determining who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the
parish church of the said town, and which is called the public ​plaza ​of the same, the Court
held that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was
the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public ​plaza
of said town, now that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required
by law. Meanwhile, it has been fully proven that the said ​plaza has been used without let or
hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its creation.
Because of these, the Court said that the whole of the land not occupied by the Church of the
town of Victoria and its parish house is a public ​plaza of the said town, of public use, and
that, as a consequence, the Municipality of Victoria is absolved of the complaint.
2. Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments. An exception to the general rule
against the delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to make such delegation to local authorities.
"Necessary in the interest of law and order" is a standard held sufficient.
Is the provision in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which conferred authority upon
the Province of Mindoro to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board,
an unlawful delegation of legislative power? The Court held, no. Discretion may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in
the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In the case at bar, the Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Governor, with the
approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of law. Who, but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order." As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better
fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
3. Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan vs Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, G. R.
No. 149145, March 31, 2006.
Does the petitioner’s open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
Lot 138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law
upon it a government grant, a vested title, to the subject property? The Court held no. There
was no question that petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built
thereon but there was no evidence to show that such possession and occupation extended
to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by the
petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal building as well as the
subsequent improvements thereon was by its tolerance does not constitute proof of
possession and occupation on the petitioner’s part. Absent the important requisite of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no
government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or
by operation of law.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation
of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. Use of land is adverse
when it is open and notorious.
4. Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385,
December 6, 2000
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? No, the provisions of IPRA do not
contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership
over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form
of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
B. The Japanese Occupation
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Topacio Nueno vs Angeles, No. L-89, February 1, 1946 ​Do petitioners, who were appointed
by the President of the Commonwealth to fill the vacancy he created because of his because
of his resignation, have a right to hold-over of office? SC said no. The term of office must be
distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right and fixes the interval after the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. The term of office is not affected by hold-over, and the
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be
extended by reason of war.
Sec. 27 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code provided for the right to
hold-over of a municipal and provincial officer: “the incumbent shall hold-over until a
successor shall be duly qualified.” Such phrase was suppressed by a subsequent amendment
(Act No. 2774), but was provided by a different section in the act, so it was still in effect.
However, the foregoing provisions were all repealed by Sec. 184 of the Commonwealth Act
No. 357. It provided: “The officers elected shall assume office on the first day of January next
following.”
Are the appointments made by the President when the special election could not
be held after the restoration of the Commonwealth due to physical impossibility valid?
Supreme Court said yes. Sec. 16 of the Commonwealth Act provides for the appointments to
be done by the President in case of vacancy in an elective or municipal office. The vacancies
enumerated thereof may be immediately filled in the manner provide, therefore there will
be no interregnum during which the office may be temporarily without an incumbent.
The act provides for appointment during temporary vacancy of office under
subsection (a). Subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) provides for appointment to fill in a vacancy.
Subsection (a) cannot be applied in this case since no vacancy, temporary or otherwise, exists
in this case. Temporary absence is not the same as vacancy since in vacancy, there is no
incumbent in public office.
The petitioners were also not appointed under subsection (f), which provides for
the appointed officer to serve for the “unexpired term of office.”
Their terms, therefore, expired already on Dec. 1943, and the subsequent
appointments of the respondents are valid under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act 357.
C. The Martial Law Epoch: Before and After Declaration
Lansang vs Garcia, No. L-33964, August 10, 201 ​Is the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus causing
death of 8 people, constitutional? Yes. The SC declared that it had the power to inquire into
the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in
August 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly,
hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door
sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself
that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to
uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Aquino, Jr. vs Enrile ​Was Aquino’s detention without any charge against him legal in
accordance to the declaration of Martial Law? The Supreme Court held yes. The Constitution
provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the
state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at
bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a
clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to
the President’s order.
II. PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Principle of Decentralization
Sarcos vs Castillo, G.R. No. L-29755, January 31, 1969. ​Is the provincial governor vester with
power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos, who was charged with misconduct
and dishonesty in office, for having cut, fell and sell timber for own use and benefit? The
Supreme Court held no.
Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the
petitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph
dealing with preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Board and City or
Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the
charges within 10 days after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev.
Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it
was already repealed by the Decentralization Act of 1967.
The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by
Governor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus
of a different political persuasion.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension
order by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.
*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended /
repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provincial governor, if
the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his
preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it
is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension.
Ferrer vs Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015.​​1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City is valid.​Cities have the power to tax - It must be noted that local government
units such as cities has the power to tax. The collection for the socialized housing tax is valid.
It must be noted that the collections were made to accrue to the socialized housing programs
and projects of the city.
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 The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power of taxation + police
power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax (primary) and police power
(incidental). Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged
and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully
enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the
quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of
business products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality - Note: There is a substantial distinction
between: real property owner and an informal settler. In fact, the Supreme Court said that
the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the
subjects of taxation. Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.
The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory - The ordinance is also not
oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992). While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on
properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only
covers properties with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance
provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the
property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid ​Note: There was no
violation of double taxation but there was a violation of the rule on equity. There is no
violation of double taxation: the garbage fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."
Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double
taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid
out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate,
other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. All these are valid taxes. The
garbage fees are license fees
Note: In order to constitute double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited
sense the same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both taxes
must be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the same purpose, by the
same State, Government, or taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district,
during the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no substantial distinction - There is no
substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit
in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not
vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.
The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable - A resident of a 200 sq. m.
unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a
resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of
200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage
fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized
housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose of the ordinance - The declared
purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common
mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot
or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City Council
should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated
and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and
size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity
to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.
SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.
Mangune vs Ermita, G.R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016 ​Is EO 567 issued by President
Arroyo devolving the administration and supervision of Taguig-Pateros District Hospital from
the DOH to City of Taguig constitutional? Supreme Court held yes. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations, shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. Thus, to be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an EO, must
comply with the following requisites:
a. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
b. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
c. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
d. It must be reasonable.
EO 567 satisfies all the above requisites.
Decentralization is the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. One form of decentralization is devolution, which involves the transfer of
powers, responsibility, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the
central government to the LGUs. It has been said that devolution is indispensable to
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decentralization. Because of this, there is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact,
Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code explicitly states that in case of doubt, any
question on any provision on a power of a local government shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the LGU.
B. R.A 7924 (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135162, March 27, 2000. ​The MMDA is,
as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative
in nature.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It
is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence,
its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation
system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions
cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without
any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
MMDA vs Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005. ​Is Sec 5(f) of RA 7942, which authorizes
MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic
rules and regulations constitutional? The Court said, no.
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not
a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact
ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People’s Organizations,
NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions
are administrative in nature.
Beley vs Torres, G.R. No. L-17689, January 30, 1962.​​Does the Motor Vehicles Office have the
right to impound the plate and driver’s license of an erring vehicle and driver? The Court said,
yes. The license plate in question was the object which was stolen from the truck of Agripina
Vidal and at the same time constitutes evidence that Marbella was using a stolen plate on his
truck that was operating on the highways. The retention of the driver's license was also
justified in view of the fact that the truck was found being used with a stolen plate, and the
driver's license, is to be utilized as evidence against the driver of the truck.
The above circumstances certainly justify the employee of the Motor Vehicles
Office at Cabanatuan City to impound the plate and the driver's license, and the judge below
should have refused to order the return of the articles, which were lawfully confiscated and
lawfully retained by the predecessor of the petitioner herein.
MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc ​Does the
MMDA have the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of respondents’
advertisement materials? The Court held, no. The MMDA had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards and other advertising materials installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. The MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installing a system and administration. Nothing in Republic Act 7924 granted MMDA police
power let alone legislative power. Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards,
signages and other advertising media in the MRT 3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT
agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising
income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25
years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the
Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time
material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising
services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. MMDA also may not invoke that
it is implementing the Building Code rules and regulations because the power to enforce this
lies with the DPWH and not in the MMDA. The DPWH hass not delegated the MMDA to
implement such Code. Petition is denied.
MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008.
May the MMDA be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay? The Court held, yes.It is
true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process of
implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this
does not mean that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking
closer, MMDA’s function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems
is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not
alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay area.
While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
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 Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code
involves a general clean up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the
Environmental Code is to perform cleaning in general and not just to attend to specific
incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the other government agencies, must
act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.
MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011. ​Is
the recommendation by The Manila Bay Advisory Committee that time frames be set for the
agencies to perform their assigned tasks an encroachment over the powers and functions of
the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines? The Court held, no. The
issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under
Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of
the adjudicative function of the Court.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage
of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
MMDA vs Viron Transportation Co. Inc. ​Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
The Court held, yes. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding
government and private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal
transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules
and regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or
cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the
one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies
concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not
have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes and the means.
Francisco, Jr. vs Fernando ​Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis
because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2)
violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3)
disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment;
and (4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.
Is the petitioner correct? Court said, no.
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a
favorable action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer
must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under
either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing
requirement because of the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As
an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues
raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party invoking it must show, among
others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.
Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and
municipalities within the MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted
anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian
regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents’ implementation of schemes,
or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After
all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and
regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in
Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents
implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.
C. R.A. 6734 (Organic Act for ARMM, as amended by R.A. 9054)
Abbas vs COMELEC Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous
region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be
included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734
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will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No.
6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in
each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they
could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have
been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Chiongban vs Orbos ​The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions
have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the
President the power to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453)
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in
the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the
same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department:“to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the
government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for
accelerated social and economic development.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Issues:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule
under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
Ruling:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for
all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the
EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our
Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
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Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim
[in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms
of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until
those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way
that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever
way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention
of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either
the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall
not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse
of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than
the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term
of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the
pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure
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that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed;
these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it
falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint
OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent
political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in
the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA
No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization,
it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012 ​Issues:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with
the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory
powers over autonomous regions?
Held: (a)YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly
instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be
inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
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which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall
include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional
intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
(b)NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first
ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections.
In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in
RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent
history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving
the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or
provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA
No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the
laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153
without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and
Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12 (emphases supplied)
(c)YES. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective
ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending
the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in
various laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past cases is
that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case
refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term
limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can
only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it
clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it
deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this
decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the
legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the
ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
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(d) NO. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To
recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the
power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow
confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. – When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or
upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby
all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,
or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases
the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[emphases and underscoring ours]
(e) YES. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power,
thus:
(f) YES. We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a
vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No.
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10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional
elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the
scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide
the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of
those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away –
of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress
to address the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to
remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special
elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM
regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the
exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the
ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional
government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the
unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the
adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153
by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In other words,
“given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM
officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as
an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
D. LGU Defined
Alvarez vs Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996
Issues:
(a) WON RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
(b) WON the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.
Held:
(a) NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows.
Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was
on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st
hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in
anticipation of the said HB as well)
(b) YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual
income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they
form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further
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 action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to
classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and
meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it
distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support
from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations.
E. Local Autonomy, explained
Pimentel vs Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000 ​Section 1 of the AO does not violate
local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal
and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake
cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal
matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of
the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment
shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the
withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Province of Batangas vs Romulo ​Issue: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
Held: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the
Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision,
which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes
supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has
the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself;
supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the
rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the
national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be
automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required
to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of
further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
& regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the
collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of
1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of
the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate
law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited
to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate
provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of
general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through
the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which
these provisions are based.
Sampiano vs Indar
Issues:
(a) WON RTC has jurisdiction
(b) WON the October 11 order freezing the release of the IRA is valid.
(c) WON the said order partakes of a TRO.
(d) WON the Order contravenes the automatic release of funds to LGUs
Held:
(a) Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. The petition prayed, among others, that Go should cease
and desist from ordering PNB-Marawi through its branch manager to release the
IRA for the month of October 2004 and the succeeding months to Sampiano and
Macabato or their agents. The issue here involves the determination of whether
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 Ogka is entitled to the issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application or
enforcement of election law. Undeniably, RTC has jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.
(b) YES. But Judge violated the Rules when the TRO extended to 11 days, when only a
72-hour TRO is allowed ex-parte. Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the
very same day it was filed, and without any hearing and prior notice to herein
complainants. Respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex parte a TRO of
limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety
of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent
conducted the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004 or on the third day of
the issuance of a TRO ex parte. The October 11, 2004 Order was lifted in an Order
dated October 27, 2004 issued by the latter. Hence, the TRO issued ex parte was
effective for 11 days from October 11, 2004 until October 22, 2004 in violation of
the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a summary hearing can last for a period of 20
days. It is worthy to note that the said October 11, 2004 Order was subsequently
lifted by the succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction were not present.
(c) YES. It is obviously one of the prayers prayed for which is subsequently granted by
the judge. A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or
preliminary injunction order. The Order directed PNB's Go and Disomangcop to
hold or defer the release of the IRA to Sampiano and Macabato while the petition
is pending resolution of the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the court.
This Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in respondent's petition
for prohibition and injunction
(d) NO. This automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent
the proper court from deferring or suspending the release. The automatic release
of the IRA under Section 286 is a mandate to the national government through the
Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said
funds from the treasury directly to the local government unit, free from any
holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government. However, this automatic
release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court
from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when
there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the
parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a
preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined. This should be
considered an exercise of judicial functions and judicial prerogatives in the most
cautious manner taking into account the factual and serious circumstances
obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano whose family
were already at war with each other.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Ochoa ​Issue: Whether or not the CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD in
the GAA 2011 violates the Constitution in relation to Section 17 of the LGC by providing for
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the recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of basic services already
devolved to the LGUs.
Held: No.
● A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
● Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.
● Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of
the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion
budget for an intervention program formulated by the national
government itself but implemented in partnership with the local
government units to achieve the common national goal development and
social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy
of local governments.
Law: The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full article on the
subject of local governance which includes the following pertinent
provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful
autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective
partners in the attainment of national goals, Section 17 of the Local Government
Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of
basic services and facilities.
Exception: While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the
national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
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 exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are NOT covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services.
● The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is
that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
● Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has NOT
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress.
AUTONOMY AS DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION
● There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.
● The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
AUTONOMY AS DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER
● Involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities
Villafuerte vs Robredo ​Assailed MC’s:
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● MC No. 2010-83, entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids
and Public Offerings”
○ Aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs
○ Requires the posting within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at
least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local
government unit a summary of all revenues collected and funds received
including the appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the
preceding fiscal year
● Another MC issued by Robredo
○ Reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable
social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It also
enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized.
Issue: Did these memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy?
Held: No.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing
provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the
directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for
development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they
have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in
response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of
some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses
more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however, the enumeration was not
meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at
liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own
judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be
expended for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the
enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development
projects.
Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of
sanctions therein is a clear indication of the President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of
LGUs. Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did not particularly
establish a new set of acts or omissions which are deemed violations and provide the
corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing
rules to consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund and that non-compliance
therewith may render them liable to sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other
applicable laws.
Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in the
mentioned issuances went beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No.
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9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that
budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans of LGUs be publicly
posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local treasurers, accountants,
budget officers, and other accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of
the fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local
government unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting of the invitation to
bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved contract in the procuring entity’s
premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the procuring entity. In
particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information
on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest. Pertinently,
Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
F. Two-fold character of a Municipal Corporation and its
significance
Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs Reyes ​Petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel
v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public. In the instant case, the
functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social
justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The
fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of
the law by public officers in the DBM which will not bar subsequent correct application.
Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of Department of National Defense is
proper.
Fontanilla vs Maliaman ​Issue: Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the
possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its
special agent. Held: Yes
The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent
and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and
considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions
and thus considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make
the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the
purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly,
the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency
renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is
the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and
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distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 3601 provides: Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the
City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its
business. (Emphasis for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation
systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration
charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and
insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of
time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions
thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation
systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under
section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon
the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have
preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred
liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the
property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the
satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its
own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board
of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain
subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.
The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government
agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is
not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent
act of its driver who was not its special agent.
DISSENTING:
PADILLA: To say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable
for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held
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 liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special
agent.
G. Is the Boy Scout of the Philippines a Public Corporation?
Boy Scout of the Philippines vs Commission on Audit ​BSP is a public corporation and its
funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction. The BSP is a public corporation whose
functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The functions of the BSP
include, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and
kindred virtues, are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under the Constitution. Any
attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be incomprehensible since no less
than the law which created it had designated it as a public corporation and its statutory
mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions. The manner of creation and the
purpose for which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency.
Moreover, there are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil
Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the
second classification.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created
in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in
pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations" defined
by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it.Law:
● Commonwealth Act No. 111 (or Boy Scout Charter) or An Act to Create a Public
Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its
Powers and Purposes:
Section 3.The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote, through
organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to
do things for themselves and others, to train them in scout craft, and to
teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using
the methods which are now in common use by boy scouts.
● Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that COA shall have
the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters
● ART II, Section 13 of the Constitution. The State recognizes the vital role
of the youth in nation- building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well- being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
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● Article 44 of the Civil Code: The ff are juridical persons
○ The State and its political subdivisions;
○ Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest
or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted according to law;
○ Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest
or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member
H. What is a quasi public corporation? (And Example)
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals vs Commission on
Audit ​Issue: WON the PSPCA is subject to CoA’s Audit Authority.Held: No.
The charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal regime
established by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the
charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test
cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19, 1905. Laws,
generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a
few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative
statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others.None of the exceptions apply in the
instant case.The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law
doesn’t necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. At the time PSPCA was
formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription
similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the
legislature to create private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by
CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a government
agency.
PSPCA’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by
any agency of the State. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members
are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers
generally accorded to private corporations.
PSPCA’s employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s
initiative and not through the GSIS.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does
not make the entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public
corporations which are private corporations that render public service, supply
public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to
determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by the latter’s own
agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.
 
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Marilao Water Consumers Associations, Inc. vs IAC ​ISSUE: Which triburial has
jurisdiction over the dissolution of a water district organized and operating as a
quasi-public corporation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as
amended: the Regional Trial Court, or the Securities & Exchange Commission.
RULING: The present case does not fall within the limited jurisdiction of
the SEC, but within the general jurisdiction of RTCs.
PD 198 authorizes the formation, lays down the powers and functions,
and governs the operation of water districts throughout the country; it is "the
source of authorization and power to form and maintain a (water) district." Once
formed, it says, a district is subject to its provisions and is not under the jurisdiction
of any political subdivision.
The juridical entities thus created and organized under PD 198 are
considered quasi-public corporations, performing public services and supplying
public wants.
The juridical entities known as water districts created by PD 198,
although considered as quasi-public corporations and authorized to exercise the
powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws are
entirely distinct from corporations organized under the Corporation Code, PD
902-A, as amended.
The Corporation Code has nothing whatever to do with their formation
and organization, all the terms and conditions for their organization and operation
being particularly spelled out in PD 198.
The resolutions creating them, their charters, in other words, are filed
not with the Securities and Exchange Commission but with the LWUA. It is these
resolutions qua charters, and not articles of incorporation drawn up under the
Corporation Code, which set forth the name of the water districts, the number of
their directors, the manner of their selection and replacement, their powers, etc.
The SEC which is charged with enforcement of the Corporation Code as
regards corporations, partnerships and associations formed or operating under its
provisions, has no power of supervision or control over the activities of water
districts.
The "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973" has a specific provision
governing dissolution of water districts created thereunder This is Section 45 of PD
198. Under this provision, it is the LWUA which is the administrative body involved
in the voluntary dissolution of a water district; it is with it that the resolution of
dissolution is filed, not the Securities and Exchange Commission. And this provision
is evidently quite distinct and different from those on dissolution of corporations
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"formed or organized under the provisions of the Corporation Code under which
dissolution may be voluntary (by vote of the stockholders or members), generally
effected by the filing of the corresponding resolution with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or involuntary, commenced by the filing of a verified
complaint also with the SEC.
Although described as quasi-public corporations, and granted the same
powers as private corporations, water districts are not really corporations. They
have no incorporators, stockholders or members, who have the right to vote for
directors, or amend the articles of incorporation or by-laws, or pass resolutions, or
otherwise perform such other acts as are authorized to stockholders or members
of corporations by the Corporation Code. In a word, there can be no such thing as a
relation of corporation and stockholders or members in a water district for the
simple reason that in the latter there are no stockholders or members. Between
the water district and those who are recipients of its water services there exists not
the relationship of corporation-and-stockholder, but that of a service agency and
users or customers.
There can therefore be no such thing in a water district as
"intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates (or) between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively," within the contemplation of Section 5 of the Corporation Code so as
to bring controversies involving them within the competence and cognizance of the
SEC.
III. CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Sec 6, LGC)
A. Requisites for Creation of LGU
PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL​​, ​G.R. NO. L-23825 (DECEMBER 24, 1965) EN BANC ​The
Congress may not delegate to the President the creation of local government units, because
the power to create local government units is lodged exclusively in Congress.
Bad effects in allowing the president to create local government units:
1. The President can influence the mayors. (Power and influence)
2. The President can be a dictator insofar as these local government units are concern.
3. It will encourage the President in violating the law.
BARRAMEDA V. ATIENZA, 369 SCRA 311 Discusses how a public corporation governs
distinguished from a private corporation.
CAMID V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ET. AL G.R. NO. 161414 (JANUARY 17, 2005) EN BANC
The Municipality of Andong was one of the municipalities created by virtue of an Executive
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Order but which was declared void in the Pelaez case. If it claims that it possesses the
indicators to merit the status a de facto municipal corporation after so many years, it can still
not be recognized as a regular municipality, because the Executive Order creating
the municipality of Andong was annulled, and therefore, it cannot exist as a municipality.
The Supreme Court suggested a remedy. If the municipality of Andong wants to be
recognized, they should go to the Congress for the creation of a new law creating the
municipality of Andong.
TAN V. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 ​Today, this is the prevailing jurisprudence, not the Paredes
Case. Simply put in the conduct of plebiscite for the creation of a new unit. The plebiscite
should be conducted in the entire unit, not only in the break-away unit.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, “An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros del Norte” was enacted. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San
Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto were proposed to belong to this new province. To
implement this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite. Whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The
creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
PAREDES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 128 SCRA 6 ​If a break away unit wants to be separated
from the mother unit, a plebiscite should only be conducted ​only in the break-away unit.
They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. ​To allow other voters to participate
will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it. That certainly will
be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority.
However, today, the prevailing jurisprudence is the Tan Case, not this Case. Simply put in the
conduct of plebiscite for the creation of a new unit. The plebiscite should be conducted in the
entire unit, not only in the break-away unit.
MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL V. CA & MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V. BAZ, JR., 251
SCRA 530 ​It talks about a simple jurisprudence on creation prior to Pelaez and after Pelaez.
Talk about a public corporation de facto. Any presidential creation prior to Pelaez and there
is no objection, the creation is valid even if it is a presidential creation. But after Pelaez, there
is a presidential creation and somebody objects, then that creation is void. That’s the essence
of these two cases. Don’t mind about the preponderance of evidence, there’s nothing there.
It only tells us of the demarcation line and the power of the president to create local
governments. With or without objection, the President cannot create local government units
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because of the Pelaez Case because the power to create a local government unit is
exclusively lodged in the Congress and not to the President.
MENDENILLA V. ONANDIA, 5 SCRA 536 ​With the creation of the City of Legaspi on said date,
the legal personality of the Municipality of Legaspi was extinguished, and the city, which
superseded the municipality came into being as a new legal entity or municipal corporation.
The consequent effect of said dissolution, was the abolition of all municipal offices then
existing under the superseded municipality, including that held by petitioner, save those
excepted in the charter itself. Petitioner's appointment by the then municipal mayor of the
municipality of Legaspi, therefore, ceased to have legal force and effect.
SAMSON V. AGUIRRE, 315 SCRA 53 Appointment of Casual Employees if there is conversion
from a municipality to a city. Their office will not be carried.
CAWALING V. COMELEC, 368 SCRA 453 ​The 120-day requirement is only permissive and not
mandatory because of the publication requirement insofar as the passage of a law creating a
local government unit is concerned. And besides, there are instances, the Congress itself sets
a fixed date for the conduct of a plebiscite. In other words, there are exceptions in the
120-day conduct of a plebiscite requirement is concerned.
CENTRAL BARRIO V. CITY TREASURER OF DAVAO, 23 SCRA 6 ​The Supreme Court used a
ruling in Stat Con in mandating the abolition of the local government unit - ​Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
When a budget was not given to a local government unit and was not included in the budget,
this is equivalent to abolition because how can a local government unit operate without any
budget.
After the annual budget was made, there is no inclusion with respect to Central Barrio, it
means it has already been abolished because it returned and reverted to its mother unit. It is
as simple as that.
The abolition of the local government unit includes total deprivation of its total operational
budget. Is it not a violation of the power of the Congress to abolish a municipal corporation
because it is exercised in the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL INC., 512 SCRA 467
Issue: Is there a need for the Department of Agrarian Reform to approve the classification of
lands whenever there is a conversion of the local government unit?
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You have to consider the different kinds of lands: residential, commercial and agricultural
lands.
Q: If the land is classified as an agricultural land, do you have to seek for the approval of the
DAR before that land will be considered as a part of the new local government unit?
A: There is no need to seek for the approval of the DAR and besides, local government units
have inherent legislative rights to classify lands for zoning purposes. Therefore, there is no
need for DAR to give its approval to the said conversion of lands.
LEAGUE OF THE CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC, 571 SCRA 263 ​Controversial Cases
– These cases are the first in the legal history, it became the basis for the impeachment of
the late Chief Justice Renato Corona. It was the first tie the SC made flip-flopping decisions,
which is contrary to established principles especially the rule on stare decisis.
● League of the Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
During the 11​th Congress, there was an order that converts 13 municipalities into cities.
However, this was not approved by the Senate and during the Congress there was already a
law that increases the income requirement of a municipality to be converted into a city from
P20M to P100M so the municipality which applied previously want to be exempted from this
income requirement. So, during the 13​th congress, 16 municipalities filed to be exempted
from the P100M income requirement. According to the League of Cities, this income
requirement is unconstitutional and violates the equal protect clause because it will decrease
their share in the internal revenue allotment when these muni want to be exempted from
the requirement and to be converted into a city. The Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional because it should be the Congress that will prescribe for the criteria for a
municipality to be a city and not the Supreme Court alone. The Supreme Court agreed that
the requirement violates the equal protection clause. In sum, the law declared
unconstitutional.
● Motion for Reconsideration
Supreme Court reversed the decision.
Supreme Court said that it is constitutional. When the law is passed and it is not signed by
the President, it becomes a law. Also, Justice Bersamin said that it is constitutional because
of the principle of local autonomy even if they do not comply with the P100M income
requirement.
NAVARRO V. ERMITA, 612 SCRA 131 ​This case was also used as a basis for the impeachment
of the late Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del
Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population
or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous
decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional. The
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creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional. The Court looked at the
central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions
on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area
requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC. For as long as you can connect the conspicuous island from that unit, that should
compose compliance in the land area requirement.
CAGAS V. COMELEC, 708 SCRA 672 ​The Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En
Banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
B. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces
GRINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ​The law did not provide that the President shall also
appoint provincial
officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of
Guimaras shall continue to
be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by
registered voters of Iloilo province
including the sub-province of Guimaras.
C. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city;
and reclassification
CENIZA V. COMELEC ​The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component
cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or
not it is capable of existence
and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would
also show whether the city
has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the
province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial
government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
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TOBIAS, ET AL. V. ABALOS ​A legislative enactment that calls for the increase in number of
congressmen on the ground of “necessity” is NOT unconstitutional. There is an increase in
the number of congressmen because of the addition of representatives from the party-lists.
JOSE MIRANDA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, et al. ​A close analysis
of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator —
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as
the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval
of the people "in
the political units directly affected." The criteria fixed by the Local Government
Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
The people's
plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Jr., 706 SCRA 724 ​Only reiterates Ceniza vs
COMELEC. Prohibition to participate in provincial elections once a highly urbanized city, like
Baguio will be classified as one.
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 573 SCRA 290 ​There is no need to conduct a plebiscite in a legislative
re-apportionment because there is actually no change in the nomenclature of the LGU, it is
just a reapportionment. Since there is no “CREATION” then there Is no need for the conduct
of a plebiscite.THIS IS THE RATIONALE for denial of the motion for reconsideration on the
attempt of those petitioners who wanted to change the decision.
Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, 611 SCRA 137, Motion for
Reconsideration denied with finality in 615 SCRA 564
Aquino III and Robredo v. Commission on Elections, 617 SCRA 623 ​There is a creation of a
new legislative district in the province of Camarines Sur. COMELEC was implementing the
orders of GMA when she signed the law, dividing Camarines Sur into two districts. Aquino
and Robredo lost in this case because it was said that there is no specific provision in the
constitution that fixes a minimum of 250k inhabitants, they also said that the 250k
requirement is only for a city and not for a province when it comes to legislative
reapportionment.
Umali v. Commission on Elections, 723 SCRA 170 ​There was a conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city to a highly urbanized city. The issue is whether the plebiscite should
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cover the entire Nueva Ecija or just Cabanatuan City. The plebiscite should cover the whole
Nueva Ecija and not just Cabanatuan City because it would affect the whole Nueva Ecija.
D. Effect of conversion of a municipality to a city on the term of
the mayor
Laceda Sr. Vs Limena ​The conversion of the municipality into a city will not affect the
interrupt the counting of the terms of the official.
E. Abolition
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI V COMELEC ​COMELEC cannot abolish a local government unit
because in this case the “ghost pecint” does not necessarily mean that it should be abolished,
because it does not cease to function or become a precint, its just that there are no
inhabitants or voters at present.
SALVA VS MAKALINTAL ​The decisions of the COMELEc when it is adjudicatory, it should be
appealed with the Supreme Court. If it is just an ordinance, then the ordinary courts can
decide for them.
F. Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (E.O. 249)
HERRERA V. COMELEC ​In the conversion of a sub-province to a regular province, is there a
need to conduct a plebiscite? No more, because it is up to the president to appoint
“temporarily” the provincial officials for continuity in governance
G. Selection and Transfer of Local Government sites
CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC ​Administrative issue = boundary dispute and plebiscite
MARIANO, JR. V. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 ​Any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will
sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare which is the evil sought to be avoided by the LGC. The Court cannot
perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section
2 did
not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that the city's land area “shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality.”
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA V. MADRONA, 402 SCRA 330 ​Because the outcome of the
boundary dispute would necessarily determine the outcome of the plebiscite. This is why the
plebiscite should be suspended to give way for the resolution of the boundary dispute.
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MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE V. MUN. OF ANITAO, 533 SCRA 586 ​Only talks about the history
of the boundary dispute. Reiterates the ruling that any decision that is not decided by an of
those that is not involved in the barangay dispute should be tackled by the RTC where the
incident or the place of the boundary dispute is located.
ART 313 OF THE RPC
Penalty for alternate boundary disputes = arresto menor
MUN OF NUEVA VERA, ILOCOS NORTE VS MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS ILOCOS NORTE.
Reiterates the ruling in Municipality of Santa Fe v. Mun. Of Aritao.
STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT INC. VS CITY OF PASIG ​Importance of knowing the
territorial jurisdiction of LGUs. The boundary is important for purposes of tax collection. An
LGU cannot collect taxes beyond his territorial boundary.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU
H. Principle and Definition of Devolution
Plaza v. Casion, 435 SCRA 294 ​Devolution refers to the act by which the government confers
power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions & responsibilities.
Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution
decreed by the LGC. As the
local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved
personnel & may designate an employee to
take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.
Civil Service Commission v. Yu, 678 SCRA 39 ​Abandonment of an office is the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession
and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under
such circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a
complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a
relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential
elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or 'external'
act by which the intention is carried into effect. By no stretch of the imagination can Dr.
Castillo's seeming lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights be construed as an
abandonment of her position resulting in her having intentionally and voluntarily vacated the
same.
We rule, therefore, under the attendant circumstances of the case, that with Dr. Castillo's
re-absorption by the DOH which appears to bear the former's approval, her devolved
position with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant. Thus, we hold that Dr. Yu was validly
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appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its
re-classified designation Chief of Hospital II.
Moncayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association, Inc. (MISSMA) v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., 744 SCRA 328 ​In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter
League of Provinces v. DENR Since the DENR Secretary has power of control as opposed to
power of supervision, he had the power to affirm with modification the PMRB’s decision.
SPOUSES LEONOR AND ROSA BADUA V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION ​Such
tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower
courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
IV. POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A. Intent behind the powers granted to LGU
Kulayan v. Tan, 675 SCRA 482 ​Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. It has already been established that there is
one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means
that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
B. Consultation needed with LGU’s before any project of the
Nat’l Gov’t is implemented
Republic v. Lazo, 737 SCRA l ​The petitioners did not violate R.A. No. 7160 of the Local
Government Code, Section 2(c) of the Local Government Code declares the policy of the
State “to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people’s organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions.” This provision applies to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code requires prior consultations with
the concerned sectors and the prior approval of the Sanggunian. It was said that the
Congress introduced these provisions to emphasize the legislative concern “for the
maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment.
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 C. Police Power
Intent behind the powers granted to LGUs
KULAYAN VS. TAN Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under
the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the
local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465
of the Local Government Code.
Consultation needed with LGU’s before any project of the Nat’l Gov’t is implemented
REPUBLIC VS. LAZO ​the petitioners did not violate R.A. No. 7160 of the Local Government
Code, Section 2(c) of the Local Government Code declares the policy of the State “to require
all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people’s organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.” This provision applies to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code requires prior consultations with
the concerned sectors and the prior approval of the Sanggunian. It was said that the
Congress introduced these provisions to emphasize the legislative concern “for the
maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment.
Police power delegated through the general welfare clause
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may
be delegated. Section 16 of the Local Government Code, known as the general welfare
clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, G.R. No. 118127 (April 12, 2005) EN BANC; BATANGAS CATV
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 138810 (September 29, 2004) EN BANC Police power of
local governments is a statutory delegated power. The general welfare clause is the
delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to local government units. Local
governments by virtue of Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 have been
vested with police power.
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DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, G.R. Nos. L-42571-72 (July 25, 1983) EN BANC The general welfare
clause authorizes such ordinances “as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.” It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power
found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
Definition and scope of police power
BINAY VS. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 92389 (September 11, 1991) EN BANC; SANGALANG VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 71169 (August 25, 1989) EN BANC Police power
is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all- comprehensive embrace. The scope of police power is ever-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times. It is expected to anticipate the future where enough room
is provided for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHIL., INC VS. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY
AFFAIRS Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain
is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. In more familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Requisites for the proper exercise of, and limitations on, police power
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the area of the “Pandacan
Terminals” from industrial to commercial is a valid police power measure since there is
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The power to establish zones for
industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
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exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.
PARAYNO VS. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408 (July 14, 2006) SECOND DIVISION A local
government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause, and the
second to the due process clause of the Constitution. A municipality failed to comply with the
due process clause when it passed a Resolution ordering the closure/transfer of a gasoline
station where it did not even attempt to determine if there was an actual violation of a
zoning ordinance.
MOSQUEDA VS. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSN. INC. ​In the State's
exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Tests to invoke police power as a rationale for the valid passage of an ordinance
FERNANDO VS. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE “Police power is the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” Two tests have been
used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: Under the
rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:(1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Ordinance is unreasonable if other means to prevent the evil are available.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846 (January 20, 2009) EN
BANC An ordinance preventing motels from offering wash rates and renting out a room more
than once a day is an unreasonable exercise of police power where the behavior which the
ordinance seeks to curtail (i.e., prostitution, use of illicit drugs) is already prohibited and can
be curtailed by applying existing laws.
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Police power distinguished from eminent domain
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation or restriction on property interests
to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary
only when the state's power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise
of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden
purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives,
public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement
of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the
use of the property, nobody else acquires the use thereof or interest therein, hence there is
no compensable taking.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, G.R. No. 118127 (April 12, 2005) EN BANC If the intended
exercise of police power amounts to taking or confiscation, there must be payment of just
compensation. The ordinance which forbids the running of the enumerated businesses and
instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area
or convert said businesses into allowed businesses is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
UNITED STATES VS. TORIBIO, G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) FIRST DIVISION ​Act No. 1147,
a statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the purpose of conserving an adequate
supply of draft animals, constitutes a valid exercise of police power, notwithstanding the
property rights impairment that the ordinance imposed on cattle owners.
Regulation distinguished from prohibition
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the area of the “Pandacan Terminals” from industrial to
commercial merely regulates the businesses and industries that may be allowed within the
area. It does not prohibit the affected oil companies from doing business in the City of
Manila, nor did it render the oil companies illegal. It merely disallowed the maintenance of
oil storage facilities in the Pandacan area.
DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, G.R. Nos. L-42571-72 (July 25, 1983) EN BANC​​ It is
clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
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Observance of due process and equal protection
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
Ordinance No. 8027 disallowing the maintenance of oil storage facilities in the Pandacan area
is not partial and discriminatory as it is based on a valid classification. The requirements for a
valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. There is a substantial
distinction between the oil depots and the structures surrounding them. The former are
high-value terrorist targets while the latter are not. Any damage caused by fire or explosion
in the surrounding areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or
explosion in the depots itself. The enactment of the ordinance removes the threat they pose,
hence, germane to the purpose of the law. The classification is not limited to the conditions
existing when the ordinance is enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance
is applicable to all businesses and industries in the delineated area.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, G.R. No. 118127 (April 12, 2005) EN BANC The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Concededly, the
challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the
public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of
such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary. But in spite of its virtuous
aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand
on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of
sauna and massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels, inns or order their transfer or conversion
without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
of laws not even under the guise of police power.
Liberty not curtailed by requirement of patrol duty, the latter being a valid exercise of police
power.
UNITED STATES VS. POMPEYA, G.R. No. L-10255 (August 6, 1915) EN BANC ​An ordinance
requiring able-bodied men, ages 18-50 to render patrol duty for a period not exceeding 5
days in a month for the purpose of assisting authorities to apprehend bandits and thieves
was held as constitutional and does not violate liberty of citizens. The ancient obligation of
the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and order of his/her community is still
recognized in all well-organized governments. Under this power, the persons in the State,
country or town, who were charged with the maintenance of peace and order were bound
ex-officio to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law. For that purpose, they
may command all male inhabitants of certain age to assist them.
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Zoning is an exercise of police power.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 156052 (February 13, 2008) FIRST DIVISION
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from
the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.
Nuisances
Abatement of nuisances, legitimate exercise of police power
AC ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP., G.R. No. 166744 (November 2,
2006) FIRST DIVISION The regulatory functions/duties of the National Pollution Control
Commission were devolved to local government units (LGUs) under DENR Administrative
Order No. 30 dated June 30, 1992, in relation to the Local Government Code. Pursuant to
such devolution, the LGUs may conduct inspections at reasonable times, without doing
damage, after due notice to the owners of buildings, to ascertain compliance with noise
standards under the laws and order compliance therewith, or suspend or cancel any building
permits or clearance certificates after due hearing. However, the LGUs have no power to
declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they
effect the extrajudicial abatement of a nuisance per accidens. Those things must be resolved
by the courts in the ordinary course of law.
Types of nuisances per se and per accidens
PARAYNO VS. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408 (July 14, 2006) SECOND DIVISION ​The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per
se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons
and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
TAYABAN VS. PEOPLE The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation
of a common right. In the present case, the acts of Tayaban have been established as a
violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95279 (July 26, 1991) SECOND
DIVISION The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature,
it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
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intervention.
ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, G.R. No.
L-7012 (March 26, 1913) EN BANC Municipal councils have under the Municipal Code the
power to declare and abate nuisances. However, municipal councils do not have the power
to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se;
nor can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which in its nature, situation, or use is not such. These things must be determined by the
ordinary courts of law. An ice factory is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance
due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution
of the board. The owner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.
Nuisances should be actual and not merely anticipated.
Building permits
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN,
RIZAL VS. LOOD, G.R. No. L-31864 (September 29, 1972) EN BANC ​Constructions without
provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building
permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which
supplies potable water to Greater Manila area, duly found to be public nuisance per se may
be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code. The police power of the state
justifies the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings pf public nuisance per se.
GANCAYCO VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY ​the fact that in 1966 the City Council
gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the
wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately
and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may
declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when
Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city
engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety
of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily
demolishing the structure.
Public plaza and sidewalk
VILLANUEVA VS. CASTAÑEDA, JR., G.R. No. L-61311 (September 21, 1987) FIRST DIVISION A
public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking. This is elementary.
Limitation for the exercise of police power
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AMERICAN MAIL LINE VS. CITY OF BASILAN ​Under its Charter, the City of Basilan had the
authority, among others, (1) to levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes in
accordance with law; and (2) to fix the charges to be paid by all watercraft landing at or using
public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.It is clear from the foregoing that the City of
Basilan was not granted a blanket power of taxation. The use of “in accordance with law”
clearly discloses the legislative intent to limit the taxing power of the City. The power to
regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose fees for
revenue purposes. Fees for purely regulatory purposes may only be of sufficient amount to
include the expenses of issuing the license and the cost of the necessary inspection or police
surveillance, taking into account not only the expense of direct regulation but also incidental
expenses.
ZOOMZAT VS. PEOPLE although LGUs have not been stripped of their general power to
prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code (i.e.
Respondent, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and
approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code of 1983, and under the new law, R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.),
the local government unit can regulate the operation of cable television only when it
encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts,
such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.
YNOT VS IAC The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion
of the general welfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the
case at bar, E.O. 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626
as cited in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
D. Eminent Domain
Definition of Eminent Domain
BARANGAY ASINDALAN VS. CA ​In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic
that the taking of private property must be for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public
use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for the community."
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BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R. No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) ​While the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public
entities and public utilities, the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not
absolute. The scope of such delegated power is narrower than that of the delegating
authority and may be exercised only when authorized by Congress, subject to its control and
the restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Thus,
strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but "inferior.” The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs, and the latter cannot
go against the principal's will or modify the same.
MASIKIP VS. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 136349 (January 23, 2006) SECOND DIVISION; LAGCAO
VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC ​Local government units have no
inherent power of eminent domain. Local governments can exercise such power only when
expressly authorized by the Legislature. By virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991,
Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Further, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. The
exercise thereof is subject to the statutory requirements.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION V. CITY OF PASIG
When the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction
will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be
strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is
granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear
implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. Corollarily, the condemnor has the
burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the
burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law
for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION VS. CITY OF PASIG ​A local government
has the burden of proving compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts
to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory
requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The offer must be complete,
indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the
essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a
clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract. There is no valid offer when the letter sent by the local government to the owner is
a mere invitation to a conference to discuss the project and the price.
LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain. Local governments can
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exercise such power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature. By virtue of the Local
Government Code of 1991, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. However, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. The exercise thereof is subject to the statutory requirements.
PP v ED
QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA, G.R. No. L-34915 (July 24 1983) FIRST DIVISION ​The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. Compelling a private cemetery to allocate a portion of its
land for indigent families involves the exercise of eminent domain, not police power, since
there is taking. Just compensation must be paid. The ordinance cannot also be considered as
valid exercise of police power. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare.
Limitations on the power
BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R. No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) ​Several requisites
must concur before local government unit (LGU) can exercise the power of eminent domain:
(1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) The power of eminent
domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless; (3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and (4) A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted.
LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991
itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws.
General requirements for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
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ILOILO CITY VS. LEGASPI, G.R. No. 154614 (November 25, 2004) ​The requisites for
authorizing immediate entry in the exercise of a local government’s right of eminent domain
are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance;
and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property
to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial. For a writ of
possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and
substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is
required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the
complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of
the complaint.
Public purpose and necessity
Foundation of power is genuine public necessity, public use
MASIKIP VS. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 136349 (January 23, 2006) SECOND ​The right to take
private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the
taking must be limited to such necessity. Important as the power of eminent domain may be,
the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual
requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The
genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to
exist. Thus, there is no genuine necessity when taking of private property is done for the
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding the fact that there is a recreational facility only a short distance away. Such
taking cannot be considered to be for public use.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION V. CITY OF PASIG
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose
which private property should be expropriated.
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION V. CITY OF PASIG ​A local government may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious. The condemnor must show the necessity for the
constructing the road particularly in the owner’s property and not elsewhere. The claim of
the local government that the piece of property is the “shortest and most suitable access
road” and that the “lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress” must be
proven by a showing of a preponderance of evidence. Further, the conduct of ocular
inspection, being part of the trial of the expropriation case, all parties must be notified and
must be present.
LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC
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There was no showing at all why the subject property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. The city ordinance stated no reason for the choice of petitioners' property as the
site of a socialized housing project. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a
few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by
the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his/her property for the convenience of a few
without perceptible benefit to the public.
Resolution vs. Ordinance
HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEV CORP VS. DELA CRUZ ​An ordinance is required in order to
reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public
hearings. A ​resolution ​will not suffice as it is a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that is temporary in nature. It is different from an
​ordinance​ in that the latter is a ​law by itself and possesses a ​general​ and ​permanent
​character.
ED suit filed with RTC
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE VS. HEIRS PASTOR The primary consideration in an expropriation
suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. 1
In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Property already devoted to public use may not be taken for another public use.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355 ​Since the Chinese
cemetery in the City of Manila is a public cemetery already devoted to public use, it may no
longer be taken for another public purpose.
Just compensation
Payment of just compensation is required, regardless of the passage of time.
Remedies for non-payment of just compensation
A government entity’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.
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Procedures in Expropriation
Expropriation ordinance is required
BELUSO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, G.R. No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) ​A local government
unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the
purpose, and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will
not suffice.
Review by higher sanggunian of ordinance, limitations
MODAY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 107916 (February 20, 1997) ​The authority of the
supervising-higher local government in exercising its review authority over ordinances of
supervised-lower local government is limited to questions of law/legal questions, i.e.,
whether or not the ordinances are within the powers of local government to enact; whether
or not ultra vires; and whether or not procedures were followed. The power to review does
not extend to choice of property to be expropriated.
Agricultural land, approval of DAR not required
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 103125
In the expropriation of agricultural lands, approval of the Departments of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) are not required. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least
that local government units must first secure the approval of the DAR for the conversion of
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. It is the legislative
branch of the local government unit, not the DAR that shall determine whether the use of
the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy.
Purposes of Expropriation
PHIL COLUMBIAN ASSN VS. PANIS The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch,
has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into
home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and
low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the
expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not
possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Public use now
includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular,
urban land reform and housing.
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Stages in expropriation proceedings
MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN VS. GARCIA, G.R. No. 69260 (December 22, 1989) ​There are two
stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff (municipal corporation) to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second
phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.
RTC has jurisdiction over expropriation.
MASIKIP VS. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 136349 (January 23, 2006) SECOND ​Judicial review of
the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy
of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the
purpose of the taking.
Effect on land covered by expropriation proceedings
When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, the same does not return to its
former owner upon an abandonment of the particular use for which the land was
expropriated. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner.
Requisites to allow entry or possession
Under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the requisites for authorizing
immediate entry, i.e., issuance of a writ of possession are: (1) filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) deposit of the amount equivalent to
15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.
No need for hearing for writ of possession.
ILOILO CITY VS. LEGASPI, G.R. No. 154614 (November 25, 2004)
Hearing is not required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The determination of
whether or not the complaint is sufficient in form and substance can be ascertained by the
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mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
Eminent Domain and Statutes the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
R.A. No. 7279, Urban Development and Housing Act prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."

LAGCAO VS. LABRA, G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) EN BANC
There was no showing at all why the subject property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. The city
ordinance stated no reason for the choice of property as the site of a socialized housing
project. Under Republic Act No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992,
private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same
vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition
are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory.

FORTICH VS. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457 (November 17, 1998) THIRD ​Procedural lapses in
the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes
cannot be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local
government units in the management of their local affairs. The language of Section 20 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs
including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities.

QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA, G.R. No. L-34915 (July 24 1983) FIRST DIVISION ​The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. Compelling a private cemetery to allocate a portion of its
land for indigent families involves the exercise of eminent domain, not police power,
since there is taking. Just compensation must be paid. The ordinance cannot also be
considered as valid exercise of police power. Police power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception
of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it
for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare.

Effect of non-payment of just compensation

REPUBLIC VS. LIM While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is
the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their

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