RULE 130 Section 39 – Act or Declaration about Pedigree
declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde.
Tison vs CA
GR 121027, July 31, 1997
Facts: Petitioner commenced an action for reconveyance against
respondents for a parcel of land with a house and apartment
thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon
Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively,
of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes,
died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute
Petitioner offered as evidence her lone testimony as to her filiation with
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the
lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to
prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a
family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes
Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora
Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of
Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero;
certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar
attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela
Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and
Teodora Guerrero.4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and
submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment5
was filed by herein private respondent. The trial court dismissed
the case declaring that petitioner failed to prove her filiation.
Issue: Is petitioner’s testimony admissible?
Held: The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon. There is a distinction must be
made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved
by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this
fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof
than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does
not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant
himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes
sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason
being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure
by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the
decedent.
RULE 130 Section 40 – Family Reputation and Tradition regarding Pedigree
Jison vs CA
GR 124853, February 24, 1998
Facts: Respondent filed a case for recognition as an illegitimate child by
petitioner. Respondent presented some documents such as
various letters from the relatives of petitioner attesting as to her
filiation.
Issue: Are these admissible as evidence of pedigree?
Held: No. It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2)
parts:
(1) the portion containing the first underscored clause which
pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in
question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take
the witness stand;
(2) and the section containing the second underscored phrase.
What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as
private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the
like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engravings on rights and family
portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the
second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as
"family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a
family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a
person. These have been described as objects "openly exhibited
and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a
family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a
family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions
on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
RULE 130 Section 44 – Entries in the Course of Business
Lao vs Standard Insurance
GR 140023, August 14, 2003
Facts: Petitioner filed a case for breach of contract against respondent
for the refusal of the latter to pay insurance claims of the former.
Respondent claimed that petitioner violated the ‘authorized
driver’ clause of the policy as the driver of the truck when the
accident figured was not qualified as indicated in the latter’s
driver’s license. Petitioner contends that it was another driver,
who was qualified, who drove the said truck. Respondent, on the
other hand, presented the police blotter which indicated the
unqualified driver as the one who drove the truck.
Issue: Is the police blotter admissible?
Held: The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the
Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the
requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information. We agree with the trial
and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was
properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in
police records made by a police officer in the performance of the
duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although
police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless
admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence
to refute the facts stated therein. In this case, the entries in the
police blotter reflected the information subject of the
controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was
driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is
unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that “entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative
value,” since the Court there found that “the entries in question
are sadly wanting in material particulars”. Furthermore, in this
case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as
evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise
presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the
entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to
the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about
any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the
alleged interchange of names.
RULE 130 Section 43 – Entries in the Course of Business
 PAL v Ramos (March 23, 1992)
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO,
DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents
Facts:
Respondents purchased plane tickets with PAL to take them from Naga City
to Manila but were not allowed to board as they failed to check-in in time.
Respondent thus filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against
petitioners.
Respondents claim that they complied with the conditions prescribed in
their tickets which is to check-in 1-hour before flight and alleged that no
one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure.
In their defense, petitioner presented the check-in counter clerk at
theirNaga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk
testified that: (1) the respondents were lateand that he noted the time of
check-in on their tickets; and (2) there were other passengers who came
latebefore the respondents. Two documentary evidence were offered,
namely: (1) theticket bearing the notation “late 4:02” of the clerk; and (2)
the passenger manifest showing the other names ofother passengers who
were also late.
Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued
that those are self-serving.The trial court ruled in favor of respondents
Issue:
Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of PAL maynot
be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving.
Ruling:
No. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late
4:02" stampedon the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon
the check-in of private respondents and thepassenger Manifest which
showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the respondents are
entries made in the regular course of business which the, respondents
failed toovercome with substantial and convincing evidence other than
their testimonies.
It is a general rule that a writing or document made contemporaneously
with atransaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarilyregarded as more reliable
proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as
to suchfacts based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a writtendocument that speaks a uniform
language
Respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self-
serving cannot be sustained. Thehearsay rule will not apply in this case as
statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected withthe
main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate,
qualify or characterize the act, areadmissible as part of the res gestae.
The SC ruled that Court of Appeals decision is be annulled and set aside
RULE 130 Section 44 – Entries of Official Records
 People v Belmaldez (294 SCRA 317 [1998])
G.R. No. 109780 August 17, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
RODOLFO BERNALDEZ @ "Dolfo," accused-appellant
Facts:
Rodolfo Bernaldez from Polangui,Albay was accused of raping his 10-year-
old niece,Maria Teresa Bernaldez, at his home in the morning of August 29,
1990. The next day, the incident was revealed to the complainant’s father
after he had tasked the complainant to borrow money from the accused crime since they were drinking tuba with the relatives of the Mecrito at the
which she was reluctant to do so. time the incident had happened.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses the complainant and her father
Pedro Bernaldez, the accused full-blooded brother. However, Dr. Nancy de
la Paz, who examined the victim and issued the medical certificate, failed to
testify.
The victim had narrated clearly and readily identified the accused as the
malefactor while Pedro, the father, testified that the accused lives in a
house “two hills away” and confirmed that his daughter revealed the
incident after he had hit her with his belt several times for refusing to go as
instructed.
The accused denies the allegation and had alibi for his defense. Both the
overseer and the complainant’s teacher testified that the accused was at his
workplace and the complainant was at school on August 29, respectively.
The trial court gave weight to the medical certificate issued on 3 September
1990 by Dr. De la Paz, who was a government doctor at the time. In
considering the medical certificate despite the failure of Dr. De la Paz to
testify thereon, the trial court reasoned that such document, being an act
done by a public officer, was presumed to be done regularly unless proved
otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued.
They also alleged that the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jaime Baillo, is
far from credible for being conflicting, uncorroborated, unreliable and
inconclusive.
In support of this contention, accused point out that Jaime Baillo upon
admission in the hospital on the night of the incident allegedly told
attending doctor that hewas shot by an unknown assailant. The defense
also argues that as stated in the police blotter, the shooting incident
happened at around 7:40 o'clock in the evening of June 17, 1988 and not
6:30 o'clock as claimed by the prosecution witnesses. It was therefore, not
possible for the victim Jaime Baillo to have seen the accused without the aid
of a lighted torch.
Issues:
Wheher or not the police blotter is conclusive evidence?
Ruling:
No. A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to
the police. Entries in official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not
conclusive. It is undisputed that the alleged time of the commission of the
crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the
parish priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident
happened nor presented as a witness during the trial. The information
supplied is therefore hearsay and does not have any probative value.

Ruling: The well-settled rule is that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be
Yes. The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued resorted to by an accused, not only because it is inherently weak and
by Dr. De la Pat despite the failure of the latter to testify. The certificate unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication. We have repeatedly held
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, since it that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert the accused by witnesses for the prosecution and that to establish it, the
witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period of
it be presented in court to show his qualifications. Nevertheless, a medical time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the
examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone crime was committed at the time of its commission.
testimony of the victim is sufficient if credible.
SC sustained the judgement on BelarminoDivina but acquitted MecritoBaga
The SC ruled that RODOLFO BERNALDEZ, alias "Dolfo," was guilty beyond for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
 People v Leones (117 SCRA 382 [1982])
 People v Divina (221 SCRA 209 [1993])
G.R. No. L-48727 September 30, 1982
G.R. Nos. 93808-09. April 7, 1993. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
vs. JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias JESSIE, defendant-appellant
BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG,
accused-appellants Facts:
This is an appeal filed by the accused,JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias Jessie
who was found guilty of rape. He was the son of the store owner and the
Facts: complainant, Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed therein.
Accused BelarminoDivina alias "Bejar" and MecritoBagayHiyog appealed
from the judgment the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City convicting On April 22, 1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room
both for the murderof Concepcion Baillo, which record show was a witness while the Leones family was out to a nearby beach resort. At about past
against the Divinas in another pending case;and for the gunshot wounds noon the accused and his sister Elizabeth returned to their house and
sustained by her 13 year old son, Jaime Baillo, the sole witness-survivor of forcibly made the complainant take tablets which made her dizzy and semi-
the encounter. unconscious which then the accused is said to allegedly raped her. Later
that day, accused’s stepmother Natividad Leones found the complainant
Accused-appellants contend that the court erred in finding that their guilt unconscious in her room and had her taken to a Provincial Hospital.
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accusedinterpose the defense
of denial and alibi by stating that it is impossible for them to commit the
Dr. Fe Cayao who examined her issued a medical certificate showing the
date of the victim's admission in the hospital, her complaint of vaginal
bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10
o'clock hymen".
The accused denies the charged imputed to him claiming he was with his
family but RTC was fully convinced and ruled in favor of the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not entries in the medical record made by the physician in a
government hospital is admissible as the exception to the hearsay rule?
Ruling:
YES. The said entries having been made in official records by a public officer
of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law,
which is that of a physician in a government hospital is prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.
The entry written in the medical record statesthat the lacerations of the
hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock to be Healing when it should be described
as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new lacerations."
There is no instant formula, technique or process known to medical science
or by human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen within
three (3) hours or so after defloration.
The medical record also shows that the vaginal bleeding was menstruation Pedro Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia Cañeta by right
blood and the complainant admitted in her testimony that she was having
her menstruation period on the day she was raped.
The SC was persuaded and convinced that the guilt of the accused has not Felipa C. Buesa. That the baptismal certificate is not sufficient
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
People v Crisostomo ( 160 SCRA 47( ( 1998)
Facts: The case is about the accused who is found guilty of the
crime of homicide for killing a certain Romeo Geronimo by shooting the
victim with a revolver when he refused Crisostomo’s invitation to have a
drink. The accused first entered a plea of not guilty but change it to a plea thereon, depriving petitioners of possession thereof.
of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed to
prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and admission of
guilt asserting that although he hid himself from the authorities for ten
days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter upon the
advice of his parents. The lower courts denied the petition and punished
the accused without mitigating circumstance and sentence him with
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
WON the petitioner should be granted with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and confession of guilt?
Held: NO
The requisites of voluntary surrender are:
(a) that the offender had not actually been arrested;
(b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and
(c) that the surrender was voluntary.
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution
that while in hiding, upon the advice of his parents, he voluntarily
surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was detained in the municipal jail of
Hagonoy. The Court agrees that the appellant is entitled to this mitigating
circumstance.
However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance
of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide as invoked
under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously
confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court,
that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the
prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the
prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA
GR# 106314-15/OCT. 08, 1999
316 SCRA 338
Facts: Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died on
April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel of land situated 3 in Basud,
Tabaco, Albay, with an area of 1,638 square meters in the
name of Pedro Cabais. The said property was inherited by
of representation. His mother, Felipa Cañeta Buesa, who was
the only daughter of Eustaquia Cañeta, predeceased the
latter, leaving him as the only legal heir of Eustaquia. The
respondents contend that Pedro did not proved his filiation with
to prove his filiation. On October 15, 1979, shortly after Pedro
Cabais had adjudicated to himself the property in question, a
complaint for partition and accounting was brought by Simon
Bonaobra, Heirs of Victoria Cañeta and Heirs of Anastacio
Cañeta against Pedro Cabais. During the pendency of case,
Pedro Cabais died. Whereupon, the respondents herein
entered the property in dispute and constructed houses
Issue: WON the lower court erred in relying on the Baptismal
Certificate of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and
filiation of Pedro Cabais.
Ruling: A birth certificate, being a public document, offers
prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is
needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in
such public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries
in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must,
therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. On the contrary, a
baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being
hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have
the same probative value as a record of birth, an official or
public document. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates
therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations
therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk.
People v San Gabriel ( 253 SCRA 184( ( 1996)
Facts: The accused was found guilty of murder arising from a
stabbing incident. The prosecution witness positively identified the
suspects, thus the conviction.
On appeal, the accused contends that entries in the Advance
Information Sheet prepared by police officer, Pat. Steve Casimiro, did not
mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as the principal suspect.
Such sheet however contains information acquired by said police officer
only after his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness.
Issue:
WON the Advance Information Sheet constitutes an official
information, hence, is admissible?
Held:
NO.
It could not be categorized as official information because
in order to be classified as such, the persons who made the statements not
only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the
duty to give such statements for the record. In this case, the public officer
who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of
the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from
Camba, an alleged eyewitness, who was not legally so obliged to give such
statements.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur:
(a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and,
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
Feria v CA ( 325 SCRA 525) ( 2000)
Facts: Petitioner Norberto Feria has been under detention since
May 21, 1981, by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide In Criminal Case No. 60677.
On June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the
Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge that the
transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.
It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing.
In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of RTC
attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not
be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire
records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at
the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.
Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy
in this case.
Held:
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other
words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets
forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the
prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that
tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of
the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the
petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the
detention, petitioner’s release from confinement is not warranted under
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing
that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already
become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree
is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in
order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus,
it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public
respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under
either Act No. 3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial
records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time
the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule
135 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own
admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged.
Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information
for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal
Possession of Firearm, the records of which could be of assistance in the
reconstitution of the present case.
Petition is DENIED.
RULE 130 Section 45 – Commercial List
Meralco v Quisumbing ( 336 SCRA 172) eligibility
Facts: The court directed the parties to execute a CBA
incorporating the terms among which are the following modifications
among others: Wages: PhP 1,900 for 1995-1996; Retroactivity: December
28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed a
motion for intervention/reconsideration. Petitioner warns that is the wage
increase of Php2,000.00 per month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the
cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase rate of
electricity. On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon
the period as when retroaction shall commence.
Issue:
 WON retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such
time as granted by Secretary.

Held:
In St. Luke’s Medical vs Torres, a deadlock developed during
CBA negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed
jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration
of the previous CBS. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific
provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public
respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the
expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following
such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the
agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent as to the
retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the
mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. In
the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of
retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall
control.
Wherefore, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1,
1995 to November 30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from
Php1,900 to Php2,000.

RULE 130 Section 47 – Testimony or Deposition at Formal Proceeding

People v. Deleon 210SCRA151

Appellant also faults De la Peña for having made an assertion in his Sworn
Statement that was inconsistent with his court testimony. In his Affidavit,
the question "Bakit, talo-talo na ba tayo?" supposedly came from him; in
his testimony, he said that these words were uttered by his brother, the
victim.

This inconsistency is minor and does not shatter the credibility of the
witness and his testimony. We have repeatedly held that minor disparities
in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their essential
credibility, as long as their testimonies are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole, particularly29 when, as in this case, there is
consistency in the narration of the principal occurrence and in the positive
identification of the accused.30

Neither does the alleged conflict between the Sworn Statement and the
testimony of De la Peña in open court vitiate his credibility. It has been
held that affiants are not necessarily discredited by discrepancies between
their testimonies on the witness stand and their generally incomplete ex
parte statements.31 Basic is the rule that affidavits taken ex parte are
considered to be incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries,
without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for their accurate recollection.32 Affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations, because
the former are often executed when affiants' mental faculties are not in
such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to narrate in full the
incidents that have transpired.33 Moreover, testimonial evidence carries
more weight than an affidavit.34

What is clear is that the responsibility of appellant for the victim's death
was indubitably established by both his Sworn Statement and his
testimony.

People v Ortiz v Ortiz 279SCRA145

People vs Ortiz-Miyako

GR 115338-39, September 16, 1997

Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of illegal

recruitment in large scale. Only 1 of her 3 victims appeared to testify.
However, the trial court adopted the decision of another court convicting
the appellant of estafa, which also involved the same parties. The trial court
alleged that both cases were one and the same.

Issue: Was the adoption of the trial court of the facts from another case
proper?

Held:

No.

The accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such

right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment
and appearance of the witness while testifying. This right, however, is not
absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or
produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in
which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of
evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony
is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly
and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court
of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall
under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent
witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous decisions or judgments. A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty
of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence
proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay.
To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case
would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him