Major grid blackouts :

analysis, classification and

prevention
Prof. Dr. Yvon BÉSANGER
Grenoble Institute of Technology – Grenoble INP, France
Grenoble Electrical Engineering Lab – G2ELab
School of Engineers for Energy, Water and Environmental Sciences – ENSE3

Seminar
Bandung Institute of Technology
Indonesia, 11 April 2018

1
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 I. Introduction

What is a blackout ?

 Major incident in power systems

 Characteristics :
Geographical scale, quantity of non energized customers
(depth), duration
 Conjunction of an initiating event and worsening factors
 Serious consequences :
Economical, social, security of sensible customers

4
 I. Introduction

What is a blackout ?

 Blackouts, as disastrous phenomena in power

systems, occur throughout the world

 Blackouts often happen in power systems but large

scale blackouts rarely occur

 This study investigated :

 37 blackouts throughout the world from 1965 to 2005
 then, 9 blackouts from 2005 to 2016

5
 I. Introduction

What is a blackout ?
Large electric breakdowns in the world
 growing conscience and concern

Power systems => critical infrastructure

 interdependancy with communication and computer networks

 A reccuring phenomenon!
 France (19-12-1978): Cascade of overloads

 France (12-01-1987): Loss of generation, voltage collapse

 France (05-12- 1999): Storm, destruction of lines

 Europe (04-11-2006): Generalized disaster barely avoided !

 Brazil (10-11-2009): Tropical storm – 70 million people

 India (30/31-07-2012) : Largest blackout ever recorded : more than 600 million
people !!!
 World : Many blackouts since the major incident of NY 1965
 I. Introduction

Evolution of resupplied load function of time

Source : RTE 2004

 I. Introduction

Source: S.LINDHAL
LTH, Université LUND EURELECTRIC Task Force Final Report 06-2004
 I. Introduction

Reasons which can lead to a blackout

Worsening factors and initiating events :

• Natural reasons
Storm, geomagnetic storm, earthquake, lightning, tree contact…

• Technical reasons
Short-circuits, componants failures, heavy load, componants
maintenance…

• Human reasons
Wrong operations, inadequate communications between
operators…

Combination of some reasons => snowball effect

9
I. Introduction
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Blackouts mechanisms

Slow dynamics (mn to 10s mn):

• Overload cascade
• Voltage collapse

Fast dynamics (a few 100s ms to s):

• Frequency collapse
• Loss of synchronism

12
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Blackout phases

! No steady-state progression

(b) Cumulated triggerings of lines, transformers and

(a) Cumulated triggerings of lines, transformers and generators during generators during the cascade of 12 janvier 2003, Croatia
the cascade of 14 august 2003 USA-Canada (NERC Steering Group) (N.Dizdarevic, M.Majstrovic)
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Pre-conditions

 Stressed system => consumption peaks in summer or winter

 Inadapted reactive reserves

 Some important equipments out-of-order

 Aging equipments

 Natural causes: wind, storm, fog, geomagnetic perturbations, fires,

etc.
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Blackouts:
Summer and winter peaks

Other conditions Summer peak

35% 35%

Winter peak
30%

Summer peak Winter peak Other conditions

=> 35% of blackouts appear in « normal » conditions

 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Initiating events
 BIG 67 BIG 66 DALL 68

BIG 65 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

NAUG 155

Cascade of events
CELI 70
CELI 69 NAUG 154
GRIZ 77

GRIZ 86 GRIZ 90 GRIZ 82

GRIZ 87 GRIZ 91 GRIZ 83 BENL 150

MIDP 80 BRID 34
SUMM 81
BURN 76 MIDP 79

ROUN 105
A GRIZ 88 GRIZ 92 MALI 85
BURN 173 BURN 94 BENL 149 500 kV
GRIZ 89 GRIZ 93 MALI 84
TERM 160

CAMP 148 345 kV

EMER 152

B
ROUN 106 MALI 78

MALI 161 MALI 163 MALI 165

EMER 151
287 kV
MONA 153
ROUN 107 MALI 162 MALI 164 MALI 166
SPAN 158

138 kV
COTW 96

ROUN 117 ROUN 119 OLIN 104 INTE 42 E 230 kV

ROUN 120 PINT 157
ROUN 118 INTE 43
CORT 95 GLEN 100 LOGA 101 OLIN 113 SIGU 159

TABL 108 OLIN 114

TABL 123 CRAI 4 PINT 156

TABL 121 OLIN 115
SJUA 16
TABL 124
TABL 122 OLIN 116
HAYD 9 CRAI 3

TEVA 110 SAN 15 FOUR 8

TEVA 111
12 2121
TEVA 112
30 CORO 2
CORO 1
FOUR 6

TEVA 109
TEVA 127
TEVA 125
FOUR 5

GATE 99 FCNG 7

FOUR 26
TEVA 126

30 30
DIAB 97
GATE 128 MOHA 141
30 ELDO 131

FOUR 27

DIAB 98

MOHA 140 ELDO 132

MOEN 12

MIDW 102
MOEN 22
23
9 MOEN 25 MOEN 24 MOEN 23
LUGO 135 NAVA 19
MIDW 103
MIDW 167 MIDW 171
9
MIDW 169 14 SERR 144
15
WEST 17

MIDW 168 MIDW 170 MIDW 172

2 17
NAVA 18
NAVA 20

34
VINC 146
VALL 145 20 NAVA 21

MIRA 138
17
DEVE 129
NAVA 10

19
PARD 142
VINC 147
MIRA 139 MIRA 137 NAVA 11

10 30
11 6 8 PALO 14

PARD 143 18 PALO 13

EAGL 130
5 MESA 136
7
LITE 134
LITE 133
13 23 VICT 62

17 17
SYLM 59

STA 51
28
CAST 38 SYLM 58
VICT 61 STA 50

26
24 STA 49

CAST 37
28
OWEN 45
RINA 47
25 ADEL 35
31 HAYN 41

OLIV 44 ADEL 36
27 STA 52
RINA 46

STA 54 HAYN 40
STA 56 STA 55
27
VALL 60

STA 53
RIVE 48 27
1
STA 57

GLEN 39 27
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Phase duration
Steady-state High-speed
Blackouts Restoration
progression cascade
14/08/2003
1 h 5 min 3 min ~24 h
United States and Canada
28/09/2003
24 min 9 min 20 h
Italy
12/01/2003
------ 30 s > 3 h 15 min
Croatia
14/03/2005
------ 6 min 1.5 h
South Australia
12/07/2004
13 min 2 min 3h
Greece
02/07/1996
------ 60 s >6h
United States
10/08/1996
1 h 38 min 7 min ~9h
United States
19/12/1978
47 min 6 min 10 h
France
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Blackout: types of incidents

Type of incident
Types of incidents
Blackouts
1 2 3 4 5
9/11/1965 United States √
19/12/1978 France √ √
12/01/1987 Western France √
2/7/1996 United States √ √
07/08/1996 United States √ √
12/01/2003 Croatia √
14/08/2003 Northeast United States and Canada √ √
23/09/2003 Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden √ √
28/09/2003 Italy √ √ √
12/07/2004 Athens and Southern Greece √
14/03/2005 South Australia √
04/11/2006 European power system √
Total : 12 7 1 8 1 2

1 - Voltage collapse, 2 - Frequency collapse, 3 - Cascade overload, 4 - System unsymmetrical, 5 - Loss of synchronism.
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Mechanisms of blackouts

System restoration

5
1
2 4

System System Initiating

normal contingency events Final state of
condition condition blackout

Voltage and frequency

problem,
3 Power flow surges,
overload, system
Lines, transformers, unsymmetrical Voltage and frequency
generators and loads collapse, system
tripped separation, loss of
synchronism

Initiating events Final state

Precondition Cascade events Restoration

20
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

More recent blackouts

 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

More recent blackouts

 Preconditions :
 Mainly « high dependency among transmission regions » and
« equipment out of service »
 Combination of these two => very dangerous

 Cascade :
 7/9 blackouts started directly the fast cascade
 2/9 started the slow cascade, but for a short time
 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

More recent blackouts

 II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents

Conclusions

 Steady-state progression => slow (few mn – few h)

High-speed cascade => very fast (few s – few mn)

 Stop the blackout => efficient actions => before the triggering
events of high-speed cascade

 Voltage collapse and cascade of overloads => slow dynamic

=> most frequent

 But recent blackouts => often enter directly the fast cascade
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 III. Major incidents

Some major incidents

 Examples in 2003-2004
 USA (14-08-2003)
 London (28-08-2003)
 Italy (28-09-2003)
 Sweden & Denmark (23-09-2003)
 Iran (31-03-2003)
 Finland (23-08-2003)
 Algeria (03-02-2003)
 Australia (2004)
 Greece (2004)
 Jordan (2004),
 Bahrain (2004)

USA 2003
 Events
 Loss of 3 production plants
 Loss of a transmission line (short-
circuit)
 Then, loss of the system following a
cascade: lines, generators
(unstability), low voltages (without
voltage collapse)
 Dysfunction of « State Estimator »
 Lack of alarms
 Local islanding (balance production-
consumption)
 HVDC interconnection line with
Quebec: islands
III. Major incidents
 Impacts
 More than 50 million people affected
 60000 – 65000 MW
 30 hour for resupplying
 Damaged equipments in industries
 More than 400 generators tripped
 Statistics
 First line tripping: 15:05
 Start of cascade: 16:06
 Duration of cascade: a few seconds
 Thousands of « discrete 1/0 » events
 III. Major incidents

USA 2003

Source: Cigré Paris Session 2004

28
 III. Major incidents

USA 2003
 Satellite picture 14-08-2003
 USA 2003
A wide area without energy

Before the incident

Local islands survived !

Source: EPRI 2003

30
 Sweden-Denmark 2003
23.9.03
2

3 Oskarshamm

1 12.30 Loss of a nuclear plant

1200 MW
2 12.35 Short-circuit on a
busbar
3 Loss of a nuclear plant
1800 MW

31 31
 III. Major incidents

Sweden-Denmark 2003

 Loss of generation (1.2 GW)

 Short-circuits: tripping of lines and of a

nuclear plant (1.8 GW)
 Loss of lines
 Separation of Sweden in 2 parts: production in
the north, consumption in the south
 Voltage collapse in the south of Sweden (100 s
between initial events and the loss of the
system)
 III. Major incidents

Sweden-Denmark 2003

Frequency [Hz] 50.5

50

49.5

49
290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400
Time in seconds after 2003-09-23 12:30

1
Voltage [pu]

0.8

0.6

0.4
290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400
Time in seconds after 2003-09-23 12:30

Source ABB
Projet CRISP
 III. Major incidents

Italy 2003

Italy in the dark

20 min. after the trip of the first
line: loss of a second line...
then, «house of cards» effect
 III. Major incidents

Italy 2003
 III. Major incidents

Italy 2003

 Satellite picture
 III. Major incidents

Lessons to be learned
 a few conclusions from these blackouts:

 Italy
• Energy dependence of the interconnected system
• Negative effect of tripping protection (dispersed generation)
• Lack of coordination between TSOs
• Lack of observability of border tie lines

 USA
• Lack of coordination between TSOs to avoid the incident spreading;
• Loss of « software » and of system alarms;
• Bad maintance of vegetation
• Not enough training of system operators in emergency condition

 Sweden & Denmark

• Lack of reactive power ressources
• Problems with dispersed generation during the resupply
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

How to prevent or to reduce

consequences of blackouts ?
- Correct sizing and design of the power system (n-1, n-2 …)
PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

- Good maintenance of equipments (breakers, protections …)

- Good operation of the electric system (knowledge of margins …)

- Exceptionnally operation actions (reconfiguration …)

CURATIVE

- Safety actions (actions on LTCs …)

ACTIONS

- Defense plan

- Retoration plan (if nothing else has worked before !)

39
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

Defense plan

Some actions can be made manually or automatically :

 Detecting that the system is in degraded state

 Action on generators references (active and/or reactive)
 Starting of generation units
 Action on load tap changers
 Load shedding
 System split to avoid propagation
 Islanding of nuclear and/or thermal units

40
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

Actual restoration plan

Used strategies for transmission system :

• Build-up :
re-energize the bulk power network before
synchronizing most generators

• Build-down :
restore islands that will then be mutually
interconnected

• Build-together :
mixed solution
41
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

Actual restoration plan

 First period:
36
GEN 4 24 G
33 19 16
GEN 7
G 247.5 + j84.6
308.6 - j 92.2

34 329 + j 32.2
G 21
20 35
GEN 5 G GEN 6
680 + j 153 274 + j115

15 22

320 + j153

 Black-start units operation

 Thermal units re-energizing
 Loading the thermal units with their minimum of production (critical loads
=> stabilization)

42
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

Actual restoration plan

4
 Second period:
3
36
GEN 4 24
33 19 16
GEN 7
247.5 + j84.6
308.6 - j 92.2

34 329 + j 32.2
21
5
20 35
GEN 5 GEN 6
680 + j 153 274 + j115

15 22
2
320 + j153 1

 Re-energizing gradually the lines

 Re-energizing loads
 Synchronising sub-systems

43
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

A new restoration plan

Critical
The idea event

Deep Build Together Transport

system National dispatching center
Downward Upward
stream stream
Existing New operation mode
operation mode using DG
Distribution
systems control
Existing New processes to
processes develop/invest
Existing Telecontrol system to
telecontrol develop
system
Distribution networks

44
 IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes

A new restoration plan

• Some customers are re-energized earlier

• The total restoration time is shorter
45
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 V. Possible solutions

A few possible solutions

 HVDC to avoid perturbation propagation

 Implementation of PMUs (Phasor Measurement Units)
=> WAMS / WACS (Wide Area Measurement / Control System)
 FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission System: power electronics
actuators for better control of power flows)
 Reconfiguration of the system: islands with energy autonomy –
concept of cells and distributed intelligence
 Dispersed generation
 Self-healing
 Summary

I. Introduction
II. Mechanism of formation of major incidents
III. Major incidents
IV. Defense and reconstruction schemes
V. Possible solutions
VI. Conclusions
 VI. Conclusions

Conclusions
 One of the more complex system build by human
 Complexity difficult to control

 Need of strong skills

 Electricity is essential for modern and developping societies

 Often an aging infrastructure: average age 30-40 years
 Costly investments, long-term profitability

 A system with « additive » strata

 Information and coordination between systems is a real issue
 Impossible to predict all: rare events
 Technical solutions exist but no « zero » risk

 Investment is one of the most important issue

– Ratio: Investment/Risk
– Adequate Incitations from authorities
 Some references
 Y. Besanger, M. Eremia, N. Voropai « Major Grid Blackouts: Analysis, Classification and
prevention », chapter 13 of the book « Hanbook of Electrical Power System Dynamics,
edited by M. Eremia and M. Shahidehpour, Wiley, 2013, ISBN 978-1-118-49717-3
 T. T. H. Pham; Y. Besanger; N. Hadjsaid « New Challenges in Power System Restoration
With Large Scale of Dispersed Generation Insertion » IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp 398 - 406, 2009
 T. T. Ha Pham; Y. Besanger; N. Hadjsaid; D. L. Ha « Optimizing the re-energizing of
distribution systems using the full potential of dispersed generation » IEEE Power
Engineering Society General Meeting,18-22 juin 2006, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
 RTE: « Memento sûreté » 2004
 Université de LUND & WISCONSIN: « Wide Area Measurements for System protection »
 SIEMENS: « Bottlenecks in Transmission Systems, Blackouts USA & Europe:
Consequences and Countermeasures »
 CIGRE SC C2: « Workshops on Large Disturbances, 1998,2000, 2002, 2004 »
 Techniques de l‘Ingénieur: D4807 « Plan de défense contre les incidents majeurs »
 Rapport EURELECTRIC, « Power outages in 2003 »
 Rapports blackout Italie, UCTE
 Rapports blackout USA, NERC
 Michel CRAPPE, « Stabilité et sauvegarde des réseaux électriques »
 Michel CRAPPE, « Rapport Commission Ampère »
 BPA et Washington State University «WACS : R&D and Online demonstration »